Upload
li-li-thomson
View
25
Download
0
Tags:
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Gentle Savages and Fierce Citizens against Civilization: Unraveling Rousseau's ParadoxesAuthor(s): Matthew D. MendhamReviewed work(s):Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 1 (January 2011), pp. 170-187Published by: Midwest Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25766261 .
Accessed: 23/02/2013 21:38
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
Midwest Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toAmerican Journal of Political Science.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded on Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:38:09 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Gentle Savages and Fierce Citizens against Civilization: Unraveling Rousseau's Paradoxes
Matthew D. Mendham Emory University
Rousseau seems to argue, on one hand, that moderns are luxurious, lazy, weak, and soft, in opposition to primitive
hardiness, vigor, ferocity, and rustic virtue. On the other hand, he depicts modern life as cruel, frenzied, competitive, and
harsh, in opposition to primitive gentleness, idleness, abundance, and spontaneity. Is Rousseau, then, simply an imaginative ideologue, forwarding wildly opposed and oscillating characterizations of these eras, merely to be contrarian? This article
attempts to demonstrate a degree of coherence in his analyses, by focusing on the various sociopolitical contexts he discusses, and the various moral characterizations and norms which apply to each of these contexts. Building upon a half-century of interpretations, it offers an innovative logical typology of Rousseau s social thought?in terms of social complexity, environmental resources, and normative foundation?which may explain many of his central paradoxes.
ousseau's many paradoxes and at least apparent contradictions have been noted since the first re
JL X^sponses to his first significant work. Here we will focus upon two clusters of antitheses with significant im
plications for the overall tenor of his social thought. On one hand, we find praises for "sensitivity, gentleness, sen
timentality, and compassion," apparently in keeping with his reputation as a proto-romanticist or vanguard intel lectual of the modern Left. On the other hand, we find
comparable enthusiasm for "manliness, courage, hard
ness, and patriotism," apparently in keeping with his
reputation as a stern moralist or classical republican (cf. Melzer 1990, 91 ).2 Discerning whatever possible coher ence may lie behind such dualisms and paradoxes seems essential to grasping his fundamental intentions. These
particular antitheses become especially relevant in view of
recent scholarly inquiries into the Enlightenment theory of "doux commerce" According to this theory, the increase
of commerce?meaning both economic exchange and
broader social interaction?would make societies more
doux (gentle, mild, calm, peaceable, soft, and/or sweet: see Hirschman [1977] 1997, 56-63; 1985, 43). It was ad
vocated by Jean-Franc;ois Melon, Montesquieu, Voltaire, David Hume, and indeed a strong majority of the lead
ing intellectuals of the time. Although Rousseau has been
rightly singled out as a uniquely vigorous opponent of doux commerce (Rosenblatt 1997,1-45; Wokler 2001, 56,
91), the ways in which he opposed it are more problem atic and complex than has been supposed. For instance, his many appeals to primitive ways of life seem chiefly intended to discredit the urbane lifestyles celebrated by doux commerce, yet we find a peculiar duality in these
Matthew D. Mendham is Post-Doctoral Fellow, the Program in Democracy and Citizenship and the Department of Political Science, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322 ([email protected], [email protected]).
A previous version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. For their helpful comments, I thank Vittorio Hosle, Michael Zuckert, Jennifer Herdt, Mary Keys, Shmulik Nili, and three anonymous reviewers. For their
generous support, I thank the University of Notre Dame, the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, and the Notre Dame Institute for Advanced
Study.
References to Rousseau's works list section divisions, followed by the page number in an English translation, then in the Pleiade edition. The following abbreviations have been used. For modern editions of Rousseau: EPW = Rousseau 1997a; LPW = 1997b; CW = 1990-; OC = 1959-1995. For frequently cited works of Rousseau: Conf. = Confessions (CW:5/OC:l); DOI = Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men, or Second Discourse (EPW/OC:3); DPE = Discourse on Political Economy (LPW/OC:3); DSA = Discourse on the Sciences and Arts, or First Discourse (EPW/OC:3); E = Emile, or On Education (Rousseau 1979/OQ4); EOL = Essay on the Origin of Languages (LPW/OC:5); Julie = Julie, or the New Heloise (CW:6/OC:2); LA = Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theatre (Rousseau 1960/CW:10/OC:5); LR = Last Reply (EPW/OC:3); PF = "Political Fragments" (CW:4/OC:3); Rev. = Reveries of a Solitary Walker (CW:8/OC:l); RJJ = Rousseau Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues (CW:l/OC:l); SC = Of the Social Contract (LPW/OC:3). Translations have occasionally been modified.
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 1, January 2011, Pp. 170-187
?2010, Midwest Political Science Association DOI: 10.111 l/j.l540-5907.2010.00468.x
170
This content downloaded on Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:38:09 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
UNRAVELING ROUSSEAU'S PARADOXES 171
lines of criticism. On one hand, moderns are said to be
luxurious, lazy, weak, and soft, in opposition to images of
primitive hardiness, vigor, ferocity, and rustic virtue. On
the other hand, modern life is said to be cruel, frenzied,
competitive, and harsh, in opposition to primitive gentle ness, idleness, abundance, and spontaneity. Is Rousseau,
then, simply an imaginative ideologue, forwarding wildly
opposed and oscillating characterizations of these eras,
merely in revolt against the spirit of his age? This article attempts to unravel Rousseau's central
paradoxes, with special reference to gentleness and sever
ity. It begins with some of the most influential general
interpretations of his work, and comes to focus on the
surprising amount of moral variety among "savages" he
describes. In the process, it synthesizes and expands upon
previous interpretations, offering an innovative typology of the character types he most prominently depicts, and
differentiating certain clusters of moral tendencies and
norms which he considers proper to (or characteristic
of) differing sociopolitical contexts. As scholars who have
previously offered more limited typologies have acknowl
edged (e.g., Todorov 2001, 3), some of the categories can
only be offered as helpful tools which we may bring to
the texts, rather than all-encompassing, fixed categories Rousseau self-consciously posited. Yet I do contend that
this typology, which systematically depicts several funda
mental contrasts and tensions,2 can serve as an illuminat
ing prolegomenon, or first approach, to Rousseau's so
cial thought. Accordingly, it does not attempt to displace
prior interpretations, or pronounce definitively whether
Rousseau should ultimately be understood as coherent or
contradictory. Rather, it provides a clear schematization
of aspects of his work which are plausibly perceived as
revealing some degree of tension, thereby facilitating a
greater degree of awareness, precision, and rigor in future
discussions of his coherence. By laying the groundwork for more systematic comparisons of precivilized, civilized, and ideal forms of life in Rousseau, we will also be bet
ter positioned to explain his full response to doux com
merce?and with it, his basic stance toward modernity as
he perceived it. Finally, this endeavor may be of intrinsic
value in offering sustained explorations of some of his
most acute psychological and sociopolitical observations, as well as his various conceptions of virtue and of the
good life.
2At this formal level, my reading is perhaps closest to O'Hagan, who understands Rousseau as offering a "recurring tension" at the
heart of a "unitary systematic project" (O'Hagan 1999, chap. 1; 2004, 73-76). O'Hagan's tension, however, is between a morality of the senses and one of duty, which overlaps only minimally with
my typology.
Men or Citizens?
During the last half-century, most scholars who have
ventured to interpret Rousseau's general teaching have
defended its fundamental unity. Some have done so with
out clear acknowledgement of any deep tensions within
his thought?a task which can seem plausible enough so long as one, in practice, focuses chiefly or exclusively on a single aspect of it, such as the romanticism of his
autobiographical writings or the republican virtue of his
political writings. Other scholars have, more plausibly, at
tempted to show how his many apparent contradictions
might somehow be consistent expressions of some deeper
principle,3 or how one principle or stance can be judged to be his truest or most fundamental, despite substantial
and largely unintended incompatibility among the ideals
he praises.4 For our purposes, we will focus upon those
who have shown how Rousseau presents multiple ways of life or kinds of society which are largely incompatible, some of which are nonetheless comparably defended by him. A seminal version of this approach is Judith Shklar's
Men and Citizens, which argues that Rousseau presents two radically opposed Utopias as "equally valid" (Shklar
1969, 4). She explains how one of Rousseau's main in
fluences, Archbishop Fenelon, had used a similar tactic, which need not be self-contradictory since these Utopias are offered more in the service of diagnosing "the emo
tional diseases of modern civilization" than as empirical or attainable alternatives. Rousseau's models of "a tran
quil household" and "a Spartan city" are not meant to be
reconciled, but to show how each meets "the inner psy chic needs of men for inner unity and social simplicity," unlike the modern attempts to be half natural and half
social, thus rending the self and generating neither true
3 For Straussians, Rousseau's many obvious contradictions clearly indicate, for the careful and philosophical reader, a deep underly
ing unity: see esp. Strauss (1953, 252-94), Masters (1968), Melzer
(1990), and Marks (2005).
4Esp. Cassirer ([1932] 1989). Todorov seems close to Cassirer in
considering the autobiographical ethic an intrusion of Rousseau's
personal imperfections and misfortunes, rather than a genuine ideal (Todorov 2001, 2002; discussed in note 13 below). Wok ler maintains a thesis of fundamental unity, while allowing for
chronological shifts and development ([1995] 2001, 32-33, 68, 72, 79, 125-26). Starobinski claims to "discover the images, ob
sessions, and nostalgic desires" governing Rousseau, but allows
for fundamentally inconsistent positions and great shifts across
time ([1957] 1988, xi, 13-15, 34, 45-48, 162-63, 201-12, 228-29, 273-77). Neuhouser maintains that the three "principal texts of
Rousseau's philosophical project" (i.e., the Second Discourse, So
cial Contract, and Emile) constitute "a single, coherent system of
thought," even though contradictions maybe more common in his
other works (2008,18-19).
This content downloaded on Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:38:09 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
172 MATTHEW D. MENDHAM
"men" nor true "citizens" (Shklar 1969,1-6,31n4,57-58, 213; see E I, 39-40/248-49f).
There can be little doubt that Shklar's distinction is illuminating, at least preliminarily.5 We might high light, for instance, Rousseau's stark contrast of (on one
hand) the true citizen's radical subordination of domes tic life and repudiation of contemplative and univer
salist religiosity with (on the other hand) village life's embrace of sweet, "unspoiled family love," which even al lows gentle Christianity to flourish (Shklar 1969, 12-32,
160-61). Along these lines, Shklar's distinction may help us understand Rousseau's recurring contradictions be tween apparently sincere praises and forceful disparage
ment of cosmopolitanism (DOI II, 174/178; "Geneva
Manuscript" 1.2, CW 4:81/OC 3:287; cf. Todorov 2001,
26-30). Unlike the citizen, whose duties do not extend be
yond the national borders, the cosmopolitan is not bound to any particular polity, but to humanity as a whole. De
spite Rousseau's occasional praise for cosmopolitanism, it is clear that he saw patriotic fervor to be deeply neces
sary in the cultivation of citizen virtue, which is largely understood as love of the polity's common good over pri vate goods (DPE 15-16,20-21/254-55,259-60f; "Geneva
Manuscript" 1.2, CW 4:79/OC 3:284). And since patri otism and cosmopolitanism are virtually impossible to
combine in the same soul?and fully impossible to com
bine among an entire people?he seems to have found it necessary to preach patriotism one-sidedly in civic
contexts.6 This civic virtue is pursued through radical dedication to the polity's general will (DPE 13/252; DSA
I, 13/14f)> and generates a deep harmony among one's
fellows, while naturally tending toward utter indiffer ence and harshness to foreigners (E I, 39/248f; SC IV.8, 146-47/464-65). However, an alternative vision of a more
private moral virtue is also prominent in his writings, and this defines virtue as the strength of will necessary to conquer one's passions, which naturally values and serves humanity as such (E V, 441/812f; cf. Reisert 2003, 8f, 107-13, 135). In another relevant contrast, within the
5Neuhouser rejects the contrast of man and citizen as "mutually exclusive ideals" (2008, 19-24, 155-61, 172-73, 252-60), but due to the significant theoretical efforts he requires to reconcile the accounts of rationality and moral motivation in Emile and Social Contract (236-60), the categories must remain valuable prima facie. A fuller answer to Neuhouser is offered in Mendham (2009, section 4.7).
6"Patriotism and humanity, for example, are two virtues incompat ible in their energy, and especially among an entire people_This compatibility has never been seen and never will be, because it is
contrary to nature, and because one cannot give the same passion two aims" (Letters Written from the Mountain I, CW 9:149n/OC 3:706n). On "an entire people," cf. DPE 16/255; E IV, 312n/632n; Letter to Beaumont, CW 9:52/OC 4:967. On the tension between
patriotism and humanity, see DPE 15/254; Kelly (2003, 95-96).
Figure 1 The Shklarian Model
Man Citizen
political sphere he insists upon severely prosecuting the wicked (in the manner of the Spartans and early Ro
mans), lest one indirectly become cruel to the innocent.
Regarding personal virtue, though, he tends toward a
(proto-Kantian) maxim of "severity toward oneself and
gentleness [douceur] toward others."7 We may thus di
agram a basic dichotomy of Rousseau's thought along Shklar's lines (Figure 1).
Nonetheless, in depicting these two "psychological poles" (Shklar 1969, 31), we might question whether Shklar has adequately depicted that of "man." For equally formidable cases have been made that Rousseau's genuine alternative to his political ideal is the radically individu
alistic, proto-romantic "solitary dreamer." This aspect of his thought is emphasized by many writers, including those influenced by Leo Strauss. In Arthur Melzer's The
Natural Goodness of Man, which is plausibly understood as the leading comprehensive Straussian interpretation, we find a largely dichotomous reading of the alternatives which Rousseau presents to civilized, divided human
ity: "the political solution" and "the individualistic solu tion" (Melzer 1990, 91-108; see also Salkever 1978, 208,
223). On such readings, Rousseau is seen as rigorously consistent in his ultimate meaning, since he subtly indi cates that his political solution?and with it, his many pronouncements in favor of virtue?ought to be read as
merely intended for popular consumption.8 The one life which is currently available to moderns, and which re ceives true justification according to his most fundamen tal theoretical or philosophical principles, is that which he most boldly revealed in the Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality (Strauss 1953, 264; Conf.
7For the political sphere, see LR 64n/72n; E IV, 253/548; SC II.5; cf. Letters Written from the Mountain III, CW 9:186/OC 3:753f; Marks (2007, 735-37). For the personal virtue, see DOI Dedica tion 121/199; "Fragments on God and Revelation," CW 12:160/OC 4:1038; RJJII, 179/891; cf. Metaphysics of Morals in Kant (1996, AK 6:385, 393). 8 For the Straussian distinction between writings or claims intended
for popular audiences and those intended for philosophers, as ap plied to Rousseau, see Strauss (1947, 466n36; 1953, e.g., 258nl5, 261n20, 265-66, 280, 288-89). For the most sophisticated recent
interpretation along these lines, see Kelly (2003, e.g., 37, 44-49, 64-65, 127-33, 140-71). We will return to other commentators influenced by Strauss who attempt to avoid this dichotomous read
ing (e.g., Cooper, Marks), but the interpretation here described as "Straussian" is the closest to Strauss himself.
This content downloaded on Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:38:09 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
UNRAVELING ROUSSEAU'S PARADOXES 173
IX, 314/407). This is also very nearly the life in which
he himself indulged in his later years?one of sponta neous, sentimental delight, shorn of human attachments, transcendent moral principles, and their corresponding
obligations and burdens.9 While not entirely neglecting Shklar's idea of "man"?that is, the domestic and virtu
ous life of Emile and Julie?such readings would generally agree with Melzer in seeing this romanticization of do
mestic virtue and attachments as mere popularizations of Rousseau's genuine individualistic solution. On this
reading, the latter solution is only attainable by someone
with extraordinary intellectual gifts.10 If Shklar's distinction between citizen and man cor
responds to Rousseau's contrast between civic virtue and
domestic moral virtue, the Straussian distinction be
tween the political solution and the individualistic solu
tion largely corresponds to Rousseau's contrast between
"virtue" and "goodness." Unlike the demanding and
harsh standard of virtue, this "goodness" is humanity's natural endowment (E II, 92/322; IV, 237/525; "Letters
to Malesherbes" II, CW 5:575/OC l:1135f; Strauss 1953,
290; 1959,49-50). It is the healthy and natural expression of love of oneself (amour de soi), which?apart from the
corruption of society and the development of pernicious self-love or vanity (amour-propre)?tends toward one's
simple self-interest with a minimum of harm to others, due to the influence of pity (DOI Preface, 127/126; I,
152-54/154-57; Note XV, 218/219). For our purposes,
perhaps the most revealing contrast of the ethics of good ness with that of virtue is found in Rousseau's conflicting
pronouncements regarding harm. For, in his teachings re
lated to virtue?and especially political virtue?relevant
others make binding claims upon us and not to overcome
one's passions and dedicate oneself to them constitutes a
severe harm (DSA II, 17/18; Observations, EPW 46/OC
3:51; LR 81/91; Preface to Narcissus, EPW 97/OC 3:965; LA 16, 117/262, 337f/15, 107). In his teachings related
to goodness, however, the avoidance of direct and pal
pable harms to others, insofar as this can be reconciled
with one's self-preservation, appears to be humanity's sole
moral requirement (DOI I, 154/156). It seems to be the
latter standard to which the autobiographical Rousseau
9For Rousseau's intentional subversion of virtue through his the
oretical teachings on goodness, see esp. Melzer (1990, 90, 101-6,
258) and Strauss (1947, 482; 1953, 282, 290-91; 1959, 51-53). Cf. Gourevitch's Epicurean interpretation (2001,213-15,218-19) and Masters's view that Rousseau's teaching on conscience is his sin
cere, personal view, but is of "radically restricted" importance, and
should not be considered part of his fully political or philosophical teaching (1968, 76-77, 84-86, 91).
10See Strauss (1959,53); Masters (1968,90,96,254); Salkever (1978, 223-26, 223n64, 225n70); Melzer (1990, 90-92, 113, 279-81); Cooper (1999, 172-79; 2008, 152-63, 176); Marks (2005, 70).
Figure 2 The Straussian Model
Individualistic solution:
The solitary Dreamer
Political solution:
The virtuous Citizen
appeals. In surrendering himself to the sweet reveries of
solitude, he asks for nothing from society and thus may offer it nothing in return.11 In this way he seems to sug
gest that duties differ objectively and to a very large extent,
depending on ones social circumstances.12 Along these
lines, then, we may depict a second Rousseauian contrast
(Figure 2). One reason for choosing either the Shklarian or the
Straussian dichotomy as the most accurate overall in
terpretation is that Rousseau himself characteristically frames his contrasts in a radically dualistic fashion. In
this he follows a distinguished line of powerful rhetori
cians such as Augustine?who are often, for this very reason, guilty of overstating their dichotomies (cf. Rist
1994,310; Letter to Beaumont, CW 9:29/OC 4:937f). Thus
if it remains the case that both dualisms illuminate ba
sic elements of his thought, we might prefer a model
which incorporates them both. And since they both in
clude a similar "Citizen" category, we need only consider
whether the solitary Dreamer and the domestically vir
tuous member of the village or the family might sensibly be distinguished, deciphered as significant for Rousseau, and placed alongside each other. Here we may find the
work of Jonathan Marks helpful, since he has recently established that Rousseau repeatedly praises a "middle
way" between the solitary individual and the collectivized
Citizen (2005, 7-11, 54-88). Marks finds that although some of Rousseau's most prominent and well-known
formulations are framed dichotomously, his considered
11 For enthusiastic depictions of how he began "systematically sur
rendering to his sweet idleness [douce oisivete']" see RJJII, 126/822; Rev. VII, 57/1060. At times, though, he displays regret regarding his lack of moral dedication (e.g., Conf. X, 426/509; Rev. VI, 56/1059).
On the advantages of the solitary state for never wanting or need
ing to harm anyone, see "Letters to Malesherbes" II, CW 5:576/OC
1:1137; Conf. IX, 382/455; EII, 105n/340-41n.
12The apparent contradiction regarding the ethics of harm is par
tially explained by the concept of a "conditional duty" or what Hosle terms an "implicative imperative," which is not a matter of
subjective preference but objectively requires that "under condi tions A you must do B" (see Hosle 1998,48). As Rousseau puts it: "Outside of society, isolated man, owing nothing to anyone, has
a right to live as he pleases. But in society, where he necessarily lives at the expense of others, he owes them the price of his keep in work. This is without exception" (E III, 195/470; see also Julie V.3, 464/566f; Letter to Beaumont, CW 9:59/OC 4:976; EOL IX, 278n/406n).
This content downloaded on Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:38:09 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
174 MATTHEW D. MENDHAM
Figure 3 A Synthesis of the Shklarian and Straussian Models
Solitary Existence
Individual solution:
Solitary Dreamer
Independent Association
Domestic solution:
Moral Human
Interdependent Multitude
Political solution: Citizen
judgments frequently prescribe a social life based around
the tribe or the family to be the ideal situation. In such
a middle state of "independent commerce," one may at
tain many of the sweet pleasures and cultivations of social
life, while avoiding the radical interdependence and con
comitant servility of advanced societies (Marks 2005, 12,
61-65, 77-82; see also Plan for a Constitution for Corsica, CW ll:134-35/OC 3:914-15). The virtuous and domes
tically sentimental life possible under such circumstances
would seem to constitute "the happiness of the moral
human" (E III, 177/444; V, 442-46, 474/814-820, 859). Whereas for Marks (as for many other recent commen
tators) this model based on Emile is clearly Rousseau's
genuine ideal,13 we will suspend such final judgments. Instead, we will adopt Marks's argument for our own
purposes and suggest that insofar as Rousseau variously recommends a middle state of limited societies in addition
to the two better-known extremes, we may schematize his
thought as tripartite (cf. O'Hagan 1999, 19-20, 26-27,
272). Rousseau himself suggests a three-tiered distinction soon after his famous "man or citizen" dichotomy, by say
ing that a father, in educating his son, "owes to his species men; he owes to society sociable men; he owes to the state
citizens" (E I, 49/262; see Figure 3).
13Whereas most of the leading works of a generation ago took
either the Second Discourse or the Social Contract as Rousseau's
most fundamental work, a rising trend is to take Emile as the
most fundamental. Rousseau's claim that Emile is his "greatest and best book" (RJJ I, 23/687) is quoted to this end by Marks (2005,4), Cooper (1999, 4,18), and Dent (1988,1, see also 79-82; 1998, 63n6); cf. Todorov (2001, 65; 2002, 181). Conversely, some have downgraded the life of the Citizen because it is no longer available to modern men (Todorov, 2001, 12-13, 25, 30, 55; cf.
2002, 180). The life of absolute solitude has been downgraded because Rousseau expresses deep regrets about his final condition
(Todorov 2001,31-32,57-58; 2002,97,103-5; Marks 2005,70-74; Neuhouser 2008, 85-86), or because the peculiarities of his life and personality ought not to be confused with his "fundamental
thought" in its "maturity and perfection" (Cassirer [1932] 1989,40; see also 95-96, 128; cf. Todorov, 2002, 99-101, 104; Reisert 2003,
22, 22n). In contrast with these trends, Melzer argues that Emile
does not apply to philosophers and is addressed to an inhabitant of modern France, where citizenship is no longer possible (1990, 92,
277-81).
In addition to combining the insights of the Shklarian
and Straussian approaches, this model links Rousseau's
various moral prescriptions explicitly to three socio
political contexts, thus enabling a better explanation of his
apparently contradictory pronouncements. For Rousseau
is, in one sense, a radically political and even determin
istic thinker, maintaining that characteristic mentalities
and habits naturally flow from certain social conditions, and that certain moral norms and obligations are proper to those conditions (cf. Starobinski [1957] 1988, 292). In
terms of our themes of gentleness and severity, we find
a clear continuum of the rigor of moral demands across
these social conditions. The Citizen, in addition to being the harshest of these three to outsiders, is also called to be
the harshest to himself. He is not to find his happiness in
contemplative delights, and may take pleasure only secon
darily (at best) in domestic ones. He must instead find his
pleasures chiefly through immersion in all things public, and in deriving his delight from identification with the
harmony and well-being of the community.14 Accord
ingly, it is with regard to this social state?and not his
moral teaching in general?that we find Rousseau mak
ing his most radically "constructivist" pronouncements. For, given the naturally asocial (or at least apolitical) char
acter of humans and the aggressively competitive nature
of amour-propre among any large group of interdepen dent people, one must offer a correspondingly radical
solution to minimize social interdependence and channel
amour-propre toward communally salutary ends. Insti
tuting such a people thus requires, "so to speak, changing human nature" (SC II.7, 69/381; cf. E I, 40/250; DOI
II, 177/182; DPE 4-5/242-43). In the formation of the
"moral human" Emile, by contrast, Rousseau's depiction
differs, speaking of "the natural man living in the state of
society" (E III, 205/483; Reisert 2003,21-22,118-19), and
of allowing natural potentials of "becoming social" to de
velop in due course (EIV, 290/600; "Moral Letters" V, CW
12:196/OC 4:1109). Emile combines a fundamentally cos
mopolitan disposition and will, with rich domestic and
neighborly associations, and extraordinary physical vigor.
Although he is typically gentle, this vigor and dedication
enable him to forcibly defend the weak or his country when situations require (cf. Julie 1.57, 128/157; E V, 446,
456-57, 472-75/820, 834-35, 857-60). In addition, the
methods applied to Emile's education seem much gentler than those applied to the Citizen, since Emile is spared
14DPE 15-16, 20-21/254-55, 259-60f; "Geneva Manuscript" 1.2, CW 4:79/OC 3:284. Marks plausibly argues that Shklar exaggerates the extent of the Citizen's subordination of private freedoms and
pleasures; but they nonetheless remain "more narrowly circum
scribed than Emile's or the savage's" (2005, 82, 170n35; see E V,
363/700).
This content downloaded on Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:38:09 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
UNRAVELING ROUSSEAU'S PARADOXES 175
from any commands of a guardian, from the terrors of a wrathful religion, and from regular immersion in the
martial glories of his fatherland. Throughout his extreme
social isolation during his boyhood and adolescence, he is spared from the unnatural and premature expansion of his passions. Thus when he comes to adulthood, the duties of virtue he learns are far less burdensome to him. At this
point, nonetheless, the high degree of severity he requires in relation to himself is especially evident?in his need for natural religiosity, deep moral inspiration, and voluntary submission to his tutor (E IV, 324-26, 442-49/650-53,
814-24)?if he is to overcome his burgeoning passions when socially necessary (E V, 444-45/817-18; cf. Cohen
1997, 137n41).15 By final contrast, the autobiographical Rousseau chafes at all constraint and eventually surren
ders himself to every natural impulse. He nonetheless
maintains a dogged confidence that?despite his many
prior interactions with society?he alone has maintained
the soul of original, natural humanity, and that his nat
ural goodness has been expressed in his deeper, abstract
preferences even when social pressures led him to betrayal or abandonment (Cooper 1999, 194).
Diagnostic or Prescriptive?
Having distinguished three alternative ideals offered by Rousseau, may we be said to have outlined every fun
damental social state or moral life he sketches? A fur
ther glance at existing interpretations may call this into
question. Although what I have called the Shklarian and
Straussian paradigms may be among the best-known
overall interpretations, other commentators have focused
upon the "human types" or "cast of characters" presented
by Rousseau, and have come across a broader array of pos sibilities (Cooper 1997, 51; cf. Todorov 2001, 3). Tzvetan
Todorov, for instance, follows a different methodology than that employed here, and finds that there are three
main ways of life praised by Rousseau: (1) the Citizen, (2) the physical and solitary individual, and (3) the moral and
universal individual (Todorov 2001,18). These ways con
verge nicely with what we have depicted, but in addition
Todorov posits a distinction between the "state of soci
ety," out of which each of these lives flow, and the "state
of nature." Whereas the difference between the state of
nature and the state of society constitutes a crossing from
one stage to another, the contrast of lives following upon the state of society constitutes an alternative (Todorov
2001, 13). However, Todorov does not consider the state
15 These and other contrasts of the Citizen and the Moral Human are developed and defended in Mendham (2009, sections 4.1-2,
4.6-7).
of nature fully among the human ways of life, since on
his reading of Rousseau, "The notion of a state of nature
is only a mental construct, a fiction intended to help us
comprehend reality, not a simple fact" (Todorov 2001,10; see also 13, 47-48; 2002, 82-84).
A still more comprehensive picture is offered by Lau rence Cooper, who deciphers five human types repre
senting "the fundamental alternatives that are or have
been available to humanity" (1999, 5If; see also 17-26,
51-59; 2008, 139-40, 148-49, 166-69, 175-76). Again
converging with our analysis above, among these types are (1) "the virtuous citizen of the ancient, austere po lis," (2) "the Jean-Jacques of the Reveries and selected
other autobiographical depictions," and (3) "Emile," a
natural man living in the state of society (1999, 51).16 In addition, Cooper posits?like Todorov, but as a once
possible alternative? (4) "the inhabitant of the pure state
of nature": a "savage" who is "asocial and pre-moral" (1999,51,54). And finally but least admirably, we find (5) "the divided, corrupt social man, exemplified most com
monly by the bourgeois but most perfectly (according to
Rousseau) by the vain, malicious philosophers who con
spired against Jean-Jacques" (1999, 51).17 Among these, it is only the divided social man who has in no sense a
good or natural life, since he "lacks both moral and psy
chological integrity, [living] in contradiction with nature
in the deepest sense" (1999, 52; cf. 1). If we combine Cooper's savage and his divided social
man with Todorov's distinction between stages and alter
natives, we may conclude that both the savage and the
divided social man represent stages, with the latter being the usual historical outcome of the former (cf. Cooper 1999, 52; Neuhouser 2008, 65, 117). This suggests, in
turn, that if we are to understand properly the world
historical alternatives presented by Rousseau, we must
carefully investigate not only the lives he endorses as con
temporary alternatives, but also his broader (and often
critical) philosophy of history. Here we approach better
trodden interpretive territory, since his basic philosophy
161 have altered Cooper's numbering for my own purposes, but this
should not distort his argument since he presents the characters in
no particular order (1999,51n26). For his pictorial schematization
of the types, indicating the relation of each to nature?Cooper's main intention?see 49-50n22. Although Cooper's five types come
closest to the six posited below, his logical schema has minimal
correspondence to mine.
17 In view of the typology offered by Cooper, it becomes evident that Melzer also discusses the savage and the bourgeois (in addition to the natural man of the "individualistic solution" and the Citizen of the "political solution," discussed above). Nonetheless, since Melzer
does not employ the methodology of delineating each of the major social types in Rousseau, he is not led to bring each of these types to the forefront together, and consider their interrelations, in the
manner of Todorov and Cooper.
This content downloaded on Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:38:09 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
176 MATTHEW D. MENDHAM
Figure 4 A Dualistic Model of the Philosophy of History
Primitive "Civilized"
Peaceful Savage Frenzied, oppressive social Man
of history is apparently presented systematically in the
Second Discourse, a relatively brief and frequently read
work. According to the best-known version of its histor
ical narrative, humans had lived for ages untold in iso
lated self-sufficiency, living entirely in the moment from
the spontaneous fruits of the earth (DOI I, 143/144), with a childlike peacefulness in relation to others, whom
they had no vested interest in harming. Their needs were
minimal, purely physical, and thus easily satisfied; their
days were spent freely enjoying humanity's natural lazi ness in a "delicious indolence" (DOI 1,134/135; 150/152; II, 1870192; Note X, 208/211; EOL IX, 272n/401n; "The State of War," LPW 169/OC 3:605). This idyllic state was
brought rapidly to a close, however, due to various acci
dental and external causes, such as the seizure of private property and the founding of states, thus forcing others to leave the natural state for the sake of survival (DOI II, 1730178; E III, 193/467; "The State of War," LPW
167/OC 3:603). The "civilization" that was then quickly established is characterized by vanity, fierce ambition, and cruel exploitation. Its feigned order and violent essence
may best be exemplified by war, in which "more mur
ders were committed in a single day's fighting, and more
horrors at the capture of a single town, than had been committed in the state of Nature for centuries together over the entire face of the earth" (DOI II, 174/179; see also "The State of War," LPW 162-63,167/OC 3:608-10,603). Rousseau's philosophy of history thus seems to suggest a
fundamental historical dualism (Figure 4).
Regardless of the ultimate historical status of the state of nature, Rousseau is quite clear that there can be no re turn en masse to the forests and the savage state (DOI
Note IX, 203-4/207-8f). This provides further justifica tion for not modeling it alongside the three alternatives he
prescribes, in various ways, for his contemporary readers. An additional complication arises in considering whether Rousseau's primitive history can be adequately character ized as a single stage. Arthur Lovejoy and Jonathan Marks are among the more careful scholars who have insisted
upon the significance of a middle historical stage, be tween what we may call the "primitive" stage of the "pure state of nature" and the stage of advanced civilization.18
18See Lovejoy (1923, esp. 165-67, 179-82); Marks (2005, 54-88); see also Masters (1968,166-75); Gourevitch (1988,36-37); Melzer
Rousseau refers to this middle stage as "nascent society," in which comparative judgments, amour-propre, and the
development of reason and foresight have been set in mo
tion, with deeply ambivalent consequences for humanity, which we will explore below (DOI II, 162-67/165-71). Even with the beginnings of amour-propre, however, an
intensive social interdependence could not exist before
the invention of agriculture and metallurgy (168/17 If; cf.
EOLIX, 272/400). And it is interdependence which seems
to be the decisively negative turning point, since as long as humans applied themselves only to tasks and arts "that
did not require the collaboration of several hands, they lived free, healthy, good, and happy as far as they could
by their Nature be, and continued to enjoy the gentle sweetness of independent association [des douceurs d'un commerce independant]..." (DOI II, 167/171; see Melzer
1990, 70n2, 74-81,108,290).19 Although Rousseau's dis
cussion of this middling stage is terse and?like the "mid
dle way" represented by Emile?often overlooked, he ex
plicitly states that it occupied "a just mean between the indolence of the primitive state and the petulant activity of our amour-propre, [and thus] must have been the hap piest and the most durable epoch" (DOI II, 167/171; cf.
Marks 2005, 64-65; Melzer 1990, 70; Masters 1968, 168,
171-75). It seems significant enough to include in our
basic model, then, and upon consideration, these three
stages seem to be differentiated by precisely the same so
cial structures which differentiate the three prescriptive types. Although some scholars have previously identified
parallels between a descriptive type and a prescriptive type (e.g., Marks 2005, 70-71, 77-79), to my knowledge none have anticipated the following systematic analysis (Figure 5).
We must pause to explain the terminology, since Rousseau's usage of "savage" seems looser than his un
derlying concepts (cf. E II, 108n/345n; DOI II, 166/170). On one hand, he is remarkably clear in distinguishing the two states in question. The earliest state of humanity,
which occurs in "the pure state of nature" or "the prim itive state" (DOI I, 141-42, 159/142-43, 162), is one in
which a human might meet another "perhaps no more
than twice in their life" (144/146; cf. II, 161/164f). In some passages these terms are explicitly contrasted with a nascent state of society, which is characterized by "inde
pendent association," and exemplified by "most" of the
"Savage Peoples who are known to us" (DOI Exordium,
(1990, 63, 70). Cooper is aware of this "tribal society' (1999, 17, 31-32, 44, 50, 188n5), but does not integrate it into his five-type model discussed above, perhaps because he does not find it to reveal anything pivotal about the relation of nature to the good life.
19For alternative translations of this phrase, see EPW167; CW 3:49; Marks (2005, 61,168nll); Rosenblatt (1997, 78).
This content downloaded on Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:38:09 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
UNRAVELING ROUSSEAU'S PARADOXES 177
Figure 5 The Basic Sociopolitical Typology
Solitary existence Independent association
Interdependent multitude
Descriptive, Diagnostic
Primitive
(solitary-Savage) Savage
(social-Savage)
Frenzied,
oppressive "Civilized"
Prescriptive, Constructive
Individual solution:
Solitary dreamer
Domestic solution:
Moral Human
Political solution: Citizen
132/132; I, 157/160; II, 166f/170; Note XV, 218/219). On the other hand, perhaps due to the polemical require
ments of the Second Discourse in contrasting noncivilized
life favorably with civilized life, his terminology regarding these peoples is far less clear, referring to them indiscrim
inately as "Savage," in dualistic opposition to "civilized"
(DOI 1,157/159f; Marks 2005,101). By contrast, we shall see below how the Essay on the Origin of Languages uses
"Savage" in a narrower, technical sense, referring to a
minimally socialized people who subsist chiefly by hunt
ing. Partially on this basis, then, I introduce "Primitive"
as a noun to refer to people of the solitary, primitive state.
When applying Rousseau's broader use of "Savage" in an
instance which clearly refers to one or another social state, I will add a prefix: "solitary-Savage" or "social-Savage." For his overarching category of "Savage," I will often sub
stitute "noncivilized."
The plausibility of this model hinges largely upon a distinction between diagnostic (or descriptive, or critical) and prescriptive (or constructive) teachings in Rousseau.
This distinction is central to Kant and later Kantian
interpreters of Rousseau, while also appealed to by non-Kantian interpreters, such as the Straussians.20 Put
simply, the two early Discourses are understood as diag
nosing the ills of modern society, in terms so bleak they often seem hopeless; whereas later works (including Julie,
Emile, and the Social Contract) propose various remedies
for those ills, none of which involve a return to the state
of nature. Some disputes properly remain regarding how
unqualifiedly this distinction may be applied, such as the
extent to which the patterns exemplified in the diagnos tic thought are retained and reapplied in the prescrip tive thought (Marks 2005, 70-79, 113-15; cf. Todorov
2001, 18). Nevertheless, the model seems accurate inso
far as it suggests a clear distinction between a philosophy of history?depicting the usual course of human social
20For Kant, see "Conjectural Beginning of Human History" and
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (in 2007, AK 8:116-17 and 7:326-27, respectively).
development and moral decline?and a series of pro
posals for radically breaking from this process and thus
avoiding its "civilized" end. We have seen how, in his
most prominent narrative, Rousseau attributes the rise of
civilization to accidental factors which are external to hu man nature (DOI Preface, 124/122f; 1,137f, 159/138,162;
EIV, 212/491). Nonetheless, he simultaneously maintains
that this process has unfolded with overwhelming uni
formity, and in accordance with human capacities which
he acknowledges to be latent. This has drawn intelligent criticism from the beginning.21
However his persuasiveness on this point may be
challenged, we have seen that he does not believe re
turning to an earlier, spontaneous social state is an op tion. Thus for any prescriptive solution, breaking from
the course of civilization requires a mind and will power ful enough to transcend the usual course of thought and
life in instituting a new way. If this were not daunting
enough, certain highly favorable social conditions also
seem to be required. In the case of the political solution, "the Legislator" along the lines of Lycurgus is required? someone who is able to "persuade without convincing." This, in turn, requires a people who are minimally social
ized, and thus remain malleable.22 Any robust form of the
21As Charles Bonnet, a well-known Genevan naturalist, objected: "All that results immediately from the faculties of man, should it not be said to result from his nature7.... It would be as unreasonable
to complain that these faculties, in developing, have given birth to
that state, as it would be to complain that God has given man such
faculties" ("Letter from M. Philopolis," CW 3:123). See Rousseau's
replies at "Letter to Philopolis," EPW 224/OC 3:232; cf. DOI II, 167/171. Marks appeals to this exchange as evidence that Rousseau did not sincerely believe his exoteric position, that the natural must be equated with the original (2005, 28-33, 98).
22SC II.7-10, III.8; Considerations on the Government of Poland II,
LPW180/OC 3:956; Conf. XII, 543-44/648-49; cf. DOI II, 175/180.
Interestingly, for polities to flourish over time and experience rela
tions of sweetness, a moderate degree of harshness in the natural
environment also seems required (SC III.8,101/416; Plan for aCon
stitutionfor Corsica, CW ll:136/OC 3:914; LA 60-61, 93/295-96, 319/54-55, 85).
This content downloaded on Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:38:09 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Ij8 MATTHEW D. MENDHAM
domestic solution seems to require a brilliant and benev
olent manipulator of circumstances, such as Wolmar or
Emile's tutor (Shklar 1969, 127-64); alongside a divinely
inspiring paragon of female virtue, such as Julie or Sophie; as well as a moderate degree of decency in one's govern ment and a robust degree of isolation from advanced and
urban societies. Finally, the individual solution?in addi
tion to presupposing a person of formidable brilliance?
seems to require a still higher degree of rustic isolation
(cf. DOI Note IX, 203-4/207-8f).
Hard or Soft Primitivism?
The six-type model above seems useful as a first approach to Rousseau's teachings on the social forms and moral
possibilities of human life. For those concerned with the
issues of gentleness and severity, however, certain com
plications soon emerge regarding Rousseau's diagnos tic thought?complications with deep implications for
his critique of civilization and its most intensified form,
modernity. We have seen how, in the images of the Second
Discourse which would prove so influential in later cults
of sentimentality and romanticism, Rousseau appeals to
a peaceful and idle primitive existence as a device for
exposing the frenzied, unnatural oppressions of self and
others which are typical of civilization. It has accordingly been observed that Rousseau nowhere uses the term "no
ble savage" with which he is often associated, and that his
image of humans in the pure state of nature is not re
motely "noble" in the usual sense (Melzer 1990, 55nl3). Nevertheless, it is equally striking that in the Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts and in several other writ
ings, he offers far different images of early humanity?as
thoroughly vigorous, stern in their morals, and at times
pitiless in their fury and vengeance. Such images are in
voked to expose, not the excess harshness or cruelty of
civilized and modern life, but rather its softness, weak
ness, and decadence. In short, at first and second glance, Rousseau seems to engage in a blatant form of philo
sophical self-indulgence, seeking to have it both ways in
describing the softness and severity of both civilization
and savagery, and in evaluating the moral status of both
softness and severity. Otherwise put, he seems to insist,
somehow, that savage life is to be seen as simultaneously soft, hard, and thus praiseworthy, while civilized life is also
soft, hard, and yet despicable. We can put a finer point on the problem by invoking Arthur Lovejoy and George Boas's distinction between two traditions which they term
"hard primitivism" and "soft primitivism." The soft va
riety was exemplified in many paeans to "the Golden Age
under the Saturnian dispensation," during which humans
enjoyed abundant security, leisure, and simple pleasures, bestowed by Nature as a gentle and indulgent mother
(Lovejoy and Boas 1935, 10-11, 27-28, 46-47, 64-65,
304-14). By contrast, hard primitivism paid tribute to
the constant overcoming of physical hardship, poverty, and threats from harsh climates and predatory animals;
among the "rude, hardy fellows" of this tradition were the
Scythians, the Getae, and later the Germans (Lovejoy and
Boas 1935, 9-11, 70-73, 315-67). The most immediately apparent solution would be
to find in Rousseau's solitary-Savage the bases for soft
primitivism, and to find in his social-Savage those of
hard primitivism. In the later state, amour-propre has
been awakened, and thus pride, the drive for honor, and the need to be loved and praised superlatively by all (DOI I, 152/154; Note XV, 218/219; E IV, 213f/493; RJJ I, 9-10/669-70; II, 112-13/805-6). One then came to
judge any intentional wrong not only as physical harm, but also as "contempt for his person," and "vengeances became terrible, and men bloodthirsty and cruel" (DOI II,
166/170). Jealousy springing from new ideas of compara tive merit, beauty, and romantic attraction also provided
powerful new kindling for explosions of social violence
(DOI II, 165-66/169-70; cf. E V, 429-3 l/796-98f). In
deed, Rousseau was led to reason philosophically toward a gentler, prehistorical, primitive state precisely because
of the historical and ethnographical evidence which de
picted the cruel vengeances of humans in this middling
stage:
This is precisely the state reached by most of the
Savage Peoples known to us; and it is for want
of drawing adequate distinctions between ideas, and noticing how far these Peoples already were
from the first state of Nature, that many hastened to conclude that man is naturally cruel and that
he needs political order to be made gentle [a be
soin de police pour Vadoucir], whereas nothing is as gentle [si doux] as he in his primitive state
when, placed by Nature at equal distance from
the stupidity of the brutes and the fatal enlight enment of civil man, and restricted by instinct
and reason alike to protecting himself against the harm that threatens him, he is restrained by
Natural pity from doing anyone harm, without
being moved to it by anything, even after it has
been done to him. (DOI II, 166/170)
We may note here in passing Rousseau's frequent ap
peals to historical and ethnographical evidence regarding the social-Savage state, which deeply undermine the view
This content downloaded on Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:38:09 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
UNRAVELING ROUSSEAU'S PARADOXES 179
that he is indifferent to empirical evidence.23 Among this
vast range of sources, he takes a special interest in the
Caribs, who seem to provide decisive evidence for certain
softer elements of the noncivilized?and perhaps even the
primitive?state: "it is all the more ridiculous to portray
Savages as constantly murdering one another in order to
satisfy their brutality, as this opinion goes directly counter
to experience, and as the Caribs, which of all existing Peo
ples has so far deviated least from the state of Nature, are
in fact also the most peaceful in their loves and the least
given to jealousy..." (DOI 1,156/158). Rousseau's claim
that the Savage soul yields itself "to the sole sentiment of
its present existence, with no idea of the future," is also
based partially on observations of the Carib, who "sells
his Cotton bed in the morning and comes back weep
ing to buy it back in the evening, not having foreseen
that he would need it for the coming night" (143/144).24 This may reflect the profound indifference of all noncivi
lized people to all but repose and freedom, in contrast to
the citizen's frenzied pursuits of power and reputation?
concepts which must have no meaning for a Carib (DOI
II, 187/192f). Nevertheless, a complete dichotomy between a soft
primitivism grounded in the earliest humans and a hard
primitivism grounded in the social-Savage is far from ade
quate. For, just as the above examples of Carib immediacy
23 One finds a common failure to distinguish between the pure,
primitive state of nature?about which Rousseau reasons (at least
chiefly) philosophically rather than empirically?from the mid
dling, savage state. This may largely account for the error of Shklar
in claiming that Rousseau was "utterly uninterested in history, past or future" (1969,1; see also 6,17n3), and that of Todorov in main
taining that "the state of nature" is "only a mental construct, a
fiction" and "purely imaginary" (2001, 10, 13; cf. 48, 57; 2002, 82-84). Contrast the excellent argumentation of Kelly, who con
cludes that it seems essential to Rousseau's project, not that his
account of the pure state of nature is historically correct or that it
is not so, but that it perhaps could have been so (2006, esp. 79-80;
other more balanced estimations of the combination of logical and
empirical elements in the Second Discourse are offered by Meek
1976, 78-79; Lovejoy 1923, 169nl; Cooper 1999, 17-18, 41-42).
24The account of the sold bed derives from a Jesuit, Jean Baptiste du Tertre, who defended the natural goodness of the Caribs in Histoire
generale des Antilles habiteespar les Francois (1667). For du Tertre's
influence on Rousseau, see Pire (1956,359); DOI Note VI, 195/200; cf.OC 3:1321-22,1346, and Hulme and Whitehead( 1992, esp. 129,
131). It may seem strange that Rousseau singles out the Caribs as
being closest to the primitive state, given their reputation for be
ing unusually cruel to outsiders, ambitiously warlike, and frequent eaters of beast and human flesh (Abulafia 2008, 125-26; cf. Buf fon in OC 3:1345, on 171nl). This reputation is based originally on the fearful testimony of the Tamos, a larger and vastly more
peaceable group. Perhaps the Tainos were, nonetheless, excluded
from consideration as closest to the state of nature due to their
intensive practices of agriculture, extensive trade, advanced crafts
manship of canoes, and hierarchical power structures (cf. Abulafia
2008, 117-23). For the conflicting biases brought by all European observers of the new world, see Meek (1976,37); Weber (2005,41).
are used to show that some softer aspects of primitive life are retained in the later Savage state, the Caribs are also
appealed to in establishing a certain hardness which seems
to apply even to the earliest states. The reason why Caribs
(like Africans) live in "the most profound security" with
regard to ferocious beasts, is that they have realized they surpass such beasts in skill more than the beasts surpass them in strength (DOI I, 136/136-37, 137n). The prob lem of such beasts may suggest that nature is not as gentle a mother as is sometimes suggested, and human use of
stones, sticks, and arrows is often required to compensate. More generally, Rousseau frequently depicts life in
or near the original state of nature as requiring and gen
erating an extraordinary hardiness in comparison with
civilized humanity. In keeping with the traditions of hard
primitivism, he appeals to the toughening effects of in
clement weather, changes of seasons, and fatigue from es
caping ferocious beasts (DOI I, 135/135; II, 161f/165). In
such a setting those without robust constitutions perish, and those with strong constitutions give birth to similarly endowed children who undergo the same travails, thus
acquiring "all the vigor of which the human species is
capable" (1,135/135; see also 157/160; Note XII, 215/217; EOL X, 279/407; E 1,59/277). Their physical capacities re
garding self-preservation?in sharp distinction from the
organs concerning softness (la molesse), sensuality, and
delicacy?become exceedingly fine-tuned. This reason
ing is confirmed by travelers' reports of "most Savage
Peoples," which express astonishment at their strength and acute senses of sight, hearing, and smell (DOI I,
140/140; Note VI, 194-95/199-200). Rousseau similarly observes that although civilized man, with advanced ma
chinery in hand, can easily overcome the savage, if they were both unarmed it would be a still more unequal contest in the savage's favor (I, I35/135f). At the same
time, since primitive man's passions are minimal, and
his reason and amour-propre are uncultivated, there are
no temptations to disobey the "gentle voice [douce voix]" of pity, and he will naturally seek his own good with
the least possible harm to others, being fierce only oc
casionally and as preservation requires (DOI Preface,
127/125f; I, 135-36, 152-54/136-37, 154-57; Note IX,
198f/203). Thus vengeance is only mechanical and im
mediate, seldom leading to bloodshed; for such reasons
Rousseau declares them "fierce [farouches] rather than
wicked" (154/157).25 By comparison, we have seen above
25Cf. EOL IX, 267-68/395-96, which explains how conditions of
uncertainty, fear, and weakness made it necessary for each man
of "the first times" to be "a ferocious [feroce] animal" (267/395). Here, too, ferocious is contrasted with wicked: "Someone who has
never reflected cannot be clement, or just, or pitying; nor can he
be wicked and vindictive" (268/395f). In view of the comment
This content downloaded on Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:38:09 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
180 MATTHEW D. MENDHAM
how in social-Savages, amour-propre makes outbursts of
vengeance more intense and less limited by mere self
preservation, and thus these outbursts may be described
as "cruel" rather than (the more beast-like) "fierce."26
Unfortunately, while one might outline the soft and
hard elements of Rousseau's primitivism with some con
fidence, it seems far less clear how these elements cohere.
His primary account in the Second Discourse seems to
be one of an overwhelmingly abundant and secure orig inal state (DOI I, 134/134f), which was interrupted by accidental and foreign causes. At the same time, among the difficulties with which "nascent man" is "soon" pre sented are ferocious beasts and the height of trees (II,
16If/165), and these would seem to harden the hu
man condition from nearly the beginning. According to
Jonathan Marks, we ought to infer that, for Rousseau, these harsher aspects of life?requiring foresight and
hardening to circumstances?are present from the very
beginning. And thus we must also infer that in his genuine
teaching, nature and human nature are essentially dishar
monious (Marks 2005,5-7,26-28; cf. Cooper 1999,189). Marks further argues that Rousseau's depiction of a lush
and idyllic state of nature must therefore be a form of
satire, intended to undermine his previously stated defi
nition of "nature" as equivalent to origins and therefore
independent of history and circumstance (Marks 2005,
15-38, 93-104).
on lack of reflection, this seems to converge with the category of
the first state of nature in the Second Discourse. However, in the
Essay, families existed in these first times (267/395), and the rise of sweeter sentiments and mutual taming occurs with a mixture
between families (277, 278/405f, 406), rather than with the rise of families due to fixed settlements, as in the Second Discourse
(DOI II, 164/167f). These contrasts seem to derive largely from the differing theological assumptions of the two works, with the Discourse hypothetical!/ excluding the divine bestowal of "lights and Precepts," and accordingly positing a lengthy primitive state
void of lasting sociality (DOI Exordium, 132/132). The later and unpublished Essay claims to "reconcile the authority of Scripture with ancient records," positing a relapse after Noah's Flood "into
the dull barbarism they would have been in if they had been born of the earth" (EOL IX, 271/399, cf. 269/397). On these differing assumptions, see Duchet and Launay (1967, 428-29); Gourevitch (1986, 125-26,137).
26Although the DOI II, 166/170 passage (quoted above) actually says that "vengeances became terrible, and men bloodthirsty and
cruel," I have restated Rousseau's ultimate position here as sug
gesting that vengeances (not men as such) became cruel. In addi
tion, "cruel" here should be taken as a momentary indifference to
another's suffering in a moment of rage, rather than a fixed and
positive delight in another's suffering. The passage should probably be taken as rhetorically overstating the cruelty of the social-Savages of whom we have records, accepting the extreme evaluations of
one's interlocutors for the sake of argument before charging them
with fallaciously inferring original humanity from these records (cf. "Idea of the Method in the Composition of a Book," EPW 301/OC 2:1243).
However, it is also possible that Rousseau posits two
different kinds of primitive states, with one being con
siderably softer than the other, and this possibility can
be supported by the Essay on the Origin of Languages. There Rousseau derides European philosophers for pro
jecting their own "barren and harsh" conditions onto
the first men, since humans (like all animals) surely had
their origins in the far more abundant and accommo
dating South (EOL VIII, 266/394). These lush and fertile climates allow men to live more easily, and thus with
out one another (IX, 272, 277/400, 405; cf. II, 253/380; PF X, 56-57/532-33). This may converge with the claim
in the Second Discourse that as humanity spread, "diffi
culties multiplied together with men," leading them to
different sorts of terrain and climates, and thus different
ways of life (DOI II, 162/165; cf. Note XVII, 221/222). It may be, then, that to whatever extent one inhabited a Southern climate with a low population, ones condi
tions were quite "prodigal," whereas population pressures
may have forced many to the more "miserly" North (cf. EOL X, 279/407). Alternatively, higher population would
at least lead to greater scarcity within the South, making "the height of trees" (DOI II, 161/165) newly problematic. For such reasons, we may suggest that, for Rousseau, al
though an unqualifiedly soft primitive existence was prob
ably quite rare, and although certain soft elements are
incorporated in perhaps any life prior to nascent society and especially civilization, there are some solitary, prim itive states which seem predominantly soft, while others seem predominantly hard.27 In order to avoid confusion
with Rousseau's normatively loaded uses of the terms
"soft" (mow, molle) and "hard" (dur), we will henceforth
dub those primitive existences which predominantly align with Lovejoy and Boas's category of "soft primitivism" as
"Idyllic Primitives," and those predominantly aligning with their "hard" category as "Vigorous Primitives."
Sweet or Cruel Savagery?
In addition to these harsher aspects of solitary life, any strict dichotomy between a soft primitive state and a hard
social-Savage state is further undermined by the obser
vation that the romantic love made possible by nascent
27Marks thus seems to underestimate the role of climate in arguing that the peaceful, easily satisfied state depicted in the First Part of the Second Discourse "probably never existed, since nature is harsh and
does not leave human beings in peace" (2005, 37, emphasis added; see 34-37). Consider also Rousseau's later attempt to establish a
colony of rabbits, amid conditions which might be described as
predominantly soft (Rev. V, 44/1044).
This content downloaded on Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:38:09 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
UNRAVELING ROUSSEAU'S PARADOXES l8l
society is not solely a tale of jealousy and violence. Af
ter a chain of events led from increased interaction to
increased rationality, the use of tools, and finally the
development of huts, families could be established and
differentiated (DOIII, 164/167). The habit of living to
gether then gave rise to "the first developments of the
heart... the sweetest [les plus doux] sentiments known
to man, conjugal love and Paternal love" (164/168).28 The rise of such ideas and sentiments is said to tame
humans (166/169). In the Essay, Rousseau similarly de
picts youths' initial interactions with new, sweeter sights outside their family, which render the heart "less savage": "Beneath old oaks... spirited young people gradually for
got their ferociousness [ferocite], little by little they tamed
one another; in striving to make themselves understood
they learned to make themselves intelligible" (EOL IX,
277/406). The cultivation of romantic love thus seems to
increase sweetness as well as severity, and this paradox is
not lost on Rousseau. Indeed, "at the least obstacle" this
"tender and sweet [tendre et doux] sentiment" becomes
an "impetuous frenzy," "and the gentlest [la plus douce] of all passions receives sacrifices of human blood" (DOI
II, 165/169). In addition to these outbursts regarding the
beloved, we also find at this stage the first historical ana
logue to the insider-outsider distinction exemplified on a
broader scale by Rousseau's model of the patriotic Citi
zen: "Hence the apparent contradictions one sees in the
fathers of nations. Such naturalness and such inhumanity, such ferocious ways [moeurs si feroces] and such tender
hearts, so much love for their family and aversion toward
their species. All their sentiments concentrated among their near ones were therefore the more energetic" (EOL
IX, 268/396).29 Thus the state of independent association
is marked by the cultivation of human capacities for the
sweeter and gentler sentiments, and at the same time a
vast increase in the stakes of threats to the enjoyment of one's beloveds?whether by romantic competition or
tribal outsiders' encroachments?which leads to intense
28This is part of the reason the leading studies of amour-propre
clearly establish that it is not simply evil (as many accounts would have it), but simultaneously the source of the greatest human evils
and the highest human possibilities and goods. See Dent (1988, esp. 4, 20-25, 52-58, 76, 85; 1998, 63-64); Cooper (1999, esp. 114-72); Neuhouser (2008, esp. 9-11, 53, 59-70, 119, 156, 187-88, 218-19,
250, 267).
29Explaining merely apparent contradictions in the moeurs of an
cient times is a common theme among social thinkers associated
with historicism. Ferocity or cruelty is commonly the more negative pole, but several thinkers would place greatness or magnificence of
soul?rather than Rousseau's affection?as the more positive pole. See esp. Vico ([1744] 2001, ?38, 272, 991); Mill ([1836] 1977, 130-31); and Nietzsche ([1887] 1994, 1.11, 26). For many early
modern observations on the violence or cruelty of the ancients, see
Rahe(1994, 235-51).
expressions of cruelty unknown in more primitive life.
Rousseau nonetheless considers this stage "the golden
age," since meetings with outsiders so rarely occurred:
"Everywhere the state of war prevailed, yet the whole
earth was at peace" (269/396). And although this aspect of his thought is by no means clearly developed, it may be that it is these harder attributes of both primitive and
later savage life to which Rousseau appeals in the firsr
Discourse and the polemics which followed it. In criticiz
ing the luxurious softness of modern humanity, he there
appeals to the rude, rustic virtues of such (often despised)
peoples as the Scythians, the early Persians, the Spartans, and the Goths (DSA I, 11/11-12; Letter to Grimm, EPW
58/OC 3:65). Such virtues include a vigorous endurance
of pain, martial strength, true courage, "good faith, hospi
tality,30 justice, and... a great horror of debauchery..."
(LR66/74f).31 In contrast to these conflicting psychological devel
opments, certain material attributes of nascent society lead straightforwardly to softening. Due to a more settled
life, the sexes begin to establish different ways of living, with the women becoming more sedentary, while "both
Sexes... began to lose something of their ferociousness
and vigor" as a result of "their slightly softer [ un peu plus
molle] life" (DOIII, 164/168). Through such factors as the
mastering of useful animals (162/166) and the rise of me
chanical conveniences, the body is continually weakened
in comparison with primitive life (164f/168; cf. DSA II,
20-21/22-23). And just as our domesticated animals are
smaller and less vigorous than wild ones, so also humans
are enervated from our "soft [molle] and effeminate way of life" (DOI I, 138f/139).
Whereas the Second Discourse here anticipates the
ominous rise of modern luxury, the Essay focuses upon an economic practice which enables much of the leisure we have found in the primitive state, in combination with
the broader social sentiments of nascent society. There
Rousseau precisely defines "three stages of man consid
ered in relation to society," where "everything is seen to
be related in its principle to the means by which men
provide for their subsistence, and as... a function of the
climate and of the nature of the soil." Namely, "The sav
age is a hunter, the barbarian a herdsman, civil man
a tiller of the soil" (EOL IX, 272/400).32 Although the
30See "The Levite of Ephraim," CW 7:356/OC 2:12126 Rev. IX, 87171097; cf. Montesquieu [1748] 1989, XX.2.
31 Cf. DSA 1,7/8; II, 20-22/22-24. For the sense in which these traits are natural, see Cooper (1999,108-12).
32This three-stage model is also related to languages (see EOL V,
257/385). There is a less formal but still evident distinction among the savage, barbarian, and civilized states in the Second Discourse
This content downloaded on Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:38:09 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
182 MATTHEW D. MENDHAM
Essay claims to investigate "the first men" (269/396) and
"the first times" (cf. 267n/395n), it either bypasses or re
vises the Discourses primitive state, since the Essay's "first
men" are united in families, and apparently must engage in hunting, herding, or farming, in contrast to the Dis
course's mere gathering of the spontaneous fruits of the
earth.33 Apparently having already commenced the cycle of human industry responding to new needs, the greater number of people, who were "less active and more peace
able," stopped this frenzied cycle "as soon as they could"
by gathering and taming cattle (271/399). Thus pastoral life was born, which Rousseau praises as "the most self
sufficient art," since it "almost effortlessly" provides hu mans with food, clothing, and tents. "[F]ather of repose and of the indolent passions" (271f/400), pastoral life en
abled countless hours of the romantic taming we have
depicted, since "time had no other measure than enjoy ment and boredom" (277/406). For such reasons, it seems
plausible that at least the majority of people in nascent
society enjoyed "the gentle sweetness of independent as
sociation" as herdsmen, and the tenor of their lives was
predominantly soft in both labor and social (i.e., familial) relations. We might finally note that it is of such pastoral
images that Rousseau drew many of his most grandil oquent images, of which he himself was the fondest.34
Accordingly, a more accurate moniker for him and his
theoretical progeny may be "the gentle barbarian," rather
than "the noble savage." However, in the same pages we are introduced to
Rousseau's most severe human type?at least among the
as well. In claiming that metallurgy and agriculture gave rise to
civilization, Rousseau writes that certain peoples "seem to have
remained Barbarians as long as they engaged in one of the Arts
without the other" (DOI II, 168/171f; cf. Note VI, 194/199; SC III.8, 101f/415f; PF XVI, 75/560). See also Montesquieu ([1748] 1989, XVIII. 11). On the mode of subsistence in Enlightenment stadial theories, see Meek (1976, esp. 76, 90-93f); Weber (2005, 40).
33Discussed in note 25 above. It is noteworthy that Rousseau's
primitive, spontaneous "fruits" of the earth do not include animals, since humans are not originally carnivorous (DOI Note V, 194/199; contra Meek 1976,84,86f). The incompatibility of hunting with the primitive state may be further reinforced by the claim that hunting is not at all favorable to population growth, quickly depleting its land of prey. Thus all of "the fathers of large nations" were farmers or shepherds rather than hunters, and hunting should be regarded "less as a primary means of subsistence than as a supplement to the
pastoral state" (EOLIX, 271, 271n/399, 399n).
34See Conf. XI, 491/586; "The Levite of Ephraim," CW 7:356/OC 2:1212f. Pastoral images are associated with romance and the con
flict within Rousseau's soul, as when he describes his intoxica tions during the writing of Julie: "and behold the grave Citizen of Geneva, behold the austere Jean-Jacques, nearly forty-five years old, suddenly becoming the extravagant shepherd again" (Conf. IX, 358f/427).
noncivilized. In contrast with the "less active and more
peaceable majority":
The most active, the most robust, those who were
always on the move could only live off fruit and
the hunt; so they became hunters, violent, blood
thirsty and, in time, warriors, conquerors, and
usurpers. History has stained its records with the
crimes of these first Kings; war and conquests are nothing but manhunts. Once they had con
quered, it only remained for them to devour
men. This is what their successors learned to
do_Of the three ways of life available to man?
hunting, herding, and agriculture?the first de
velops strength, skill, speed of body, courage and cunning of soul, it hardens [endurcit] man
and makes him ferocious [feroce]. (EOL IX,
271/399)35
Such a life of hardened and habitual bloodthirstiness does
not seem to be paralleled among the noncivilized humans
depicted in the Second Discourse.36 It is not immediately clear how this textual difference should be explained. It
may simply be that the purpose of the Discourse is to indi cate the origins of inequality, and accordingly it can only
rapidly outline the intermediate forms of society which are depicted at length in the Essay (cf. Duchet and Launay 1967,434,423).371 would also suggest, more speculatively, that since the Essay began as a fragment of the Discourse, but was probably not completed until around 1761, the
Essays more impartial and descriptive tone may indicate a shift away from the harsh and somber Discourse.38 The
35 See the remarks on meat eating and cruelty in E II,
153-55/411-14; Julie IV.10, 372f/453; RJJ II, 114/808. Cf. Julie on the desensitizing impact of dueling (Julie 1.57, 130/160). On the other hand, Emile is introduced to hunting to distract him from the more dangerous passions of his burgeoning sexuality (see EIV,
320-21/644-45).
36The origin of hunting is briefly mentioned in the Discourse, but the hunters' lifestyle is not described. Also, unlike the Es say's psychological interpretation, the Discourse points to climate
and terrain: "In forests [humans] made bows and arrows, and be came Hunters and Warriors..." (DOIII, 162/165; similarly, PF X,
56/532). It may be that the most active, potentially warlike people were drawn to the harsh environment of the forest, or that the harsh
environment of the forest quickly led to the dominance of the most active, potentially warlike people. 37 Consider also the differing theological assumptions of the two
works (note 25 above), which allow the Essay to essentially omit the solitary stage.
38Gourevitch also observes how the Essay is more descriptive and less critical than the Second Discourse (1986, 140). Without men
tioning the Essay, Rousseau does seem to distance himself from the Discourse when he blames Diderot for giving it a "harsh [ dur]
This content downloaded on Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:38:09 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
UNRAVELING ROUSSEAU'S PARADOXES 183
polemical thesis of the Discourse required it to depict non
civilized life as characteristically soft and gentle, especially
during its most properly natural phase, which is more
primitive (and thus gentle) than the lives of most con
temporary savages. It may be for this reason that it some
times blurs the distinction between the solitary Primitive
and the social-Savage (cf. Masters 1968,171-74). By con
trast, the Essay may be seen as partially undermining the polemics of the Discourse, since in dwelling at length upon the delights of the Barbarians' sociability, it empha sizes an exception to the layer of the Discourse which was
directed against society as such. And in clearly depict
ing a habitually bloodthirsty yet preagricultural human
type, the Essay may naturally dampen the longing which
the Discourse evoked for noncivilized life as a whole.39
Whatever the reasons for this textual difference, the Dis
course's closest approximation to the bloodthirsty hunters
is found after the invention of landed property and agri culture, when those who were stronger, more skillful, and
more ingenious employed various stratagems which rad
ically heightened inequality (DOI II, 169f/174; PF VII, 49/522). This eventually led to a class war in which the
rich "had scarcely become acquainted with the pleasure of
dominating than they disdained all other pleasures..." (DOI II, 171/175f). Although the Second Discourse thus seems to consign thoroughgoing viciousness to civilized
peoples, the polemics following the First Discourse had ul
timately conceded the presence of certain vices among the
noncivilized. In contrast to the "reasonable" and "mod
est" ignorance which Rousseau finds essential to ancient
virtue, "There is a ferocious and brutal ignorance, born
of a wicked heart and a deceitful mind; a criminal igno rance even of the duties of humanity, which multiplies the
vices, degrades reason, depraves the soul, and renders men
similar to beasts..." {Observations, EPW 49/OC 3:54).
Peoples exemplifying such vices despicably feed their self
indulgence, ambition, and idleness "with the sweat, the
blood and the toil of a million wretches" (LR 72/82; cf. Let
ter to Grimm, EPW 54/OC 3:62). Such images of vile, non
civilized hardness are rare in Rousseau, but as we can see
from the immediately above, even these could be readily
tone" and "dark air" (Conf. VIII, 326n/389n). For the Essay's begin
ning as a fragment of the Discourse, see Duchet and Launay (1967, 436-37). For the probable date of the Essay's relevant sections, see
Meek (1976, 90-91); Starobinski (OC 5:cci-ccii). 39 All of this being said, the hunter-Savages do not seem to be af
flicted by the interdependence and inequality which divide civilized
peoples among themselves. In this way, even they would parallel the
Citizen in exemplifying the "essential" moral trait?being "good to
the people with whom one lives" (cf. E I, 39/249).
Figure 6 The Detailed Sociopolitical Typology of Noncivilized Humans
Solitary existence Independent association
Images of softness: under abundant,
harmonious conditions
Idyllic Primitive:
spontaneous contentment,
peacefulness, docility
Social-Savage, or Barbarian:
sweet and gentle; occasional bursts of
cruelty
Images of severity: under scarce, violent
conditions
Vigorous Primitive: exertions for
sustenance; occasional bursts of ferocity
Hunter-Savage: bloodthirsty, habitual violence to beasts and
_humanity_
applied to expose the genealogy and character of civilized
privilege.40 Figure 6 may schematize Rousseau's images of the
softness and severity of noncivilized life. The dotted line
indicates a distinction which is not as explicit or readily
implicit in Rousseau as the distinctions indicated by solid
lines. His apparent vagueness here could be partially ex
plained insofar as the groups on either side of the dotted
line are similar in social complexity and historical locus,
differing only in the favorability of their natural and social
environments.
Soft or Harsh Civilization?
If we turn briefly to Rousseau's depictions of advanced
civilization and modernity,41 we might find that the
bulk of modern humanity is similarly dichotomized into
those under conditions of abundance and softness, and
those under conditions of scarcity and severity. Impor
tantly, however, these favorable conditions are attained not through the spontaneous abundance of the earth or
the pastoral harnessing of animals, but through advanced
40 By contrast, Adam Smith's depiction of savages in general seems
far closer to Rousseau's hunter-Savages. For Smith, savages typi
cally encounter very harsh conditions which give rise to hard and
austere virtues, cultivating an extreme endurance of pain, along with strong drives for vengeance and cruelty against their enemies.
The latter capacities are often concealed, but are "all mounted to
the highest pitch of fury" (Smith [1759-90] 1982, V.2.8-13,204-9; cf. 1.5, 23-26; III.3.34-38, 152-52; VII.ii.4.2, 306; [1776] 1981,
V.i.g.10, 794). Cf. Rasmussen's claim that the ultimate ground of
Smith's defense of commercial societies?despite his concessions
to Rousseau regarding their moral and political drawbacks?lies in
Smith's harsher depiction of "the poverty, dependence, and inse
curity that characterized most previous ages" (2006, 620-21, 626).
41 These points have been developed at length in Mendham (2009, chaps. 2-3). An abbreviated version of chapter 3 is available as
Mendham (forthcoming).
This content downloaded on Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:38:09 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
I#4 MATTHEWD. MENDHAM
Figure 7 The Comprehensive Sociopolitical Typology
I. Solitary existence II. Independent
association Interdependent multitude
A. Descriptive: Under abundant,
harmonious, or
privileged conditions
IA. Idyllic Primitive:
spontaneous contentment,
peacefulness, docility
HA. Social-Savage, or
Barbarian: sweet and
gentle socially; occasional bursts of
cruelty
IMA. "Civilized" Elites:
physically soft;
habitually "polite" to
peers or superiors;
habitually harsh to
inferiors
B. Descriptive: Under scarce,
violent, or
oppressive conditions
IB. Vigorous Primitive: exertions
for sustenance; occasional bursts of
_ferocity_
MB. Hunter-Savage:
bloodthirsty, habitual
violence to beasts and
humanity
1MB. "Civilized"
Commoners: physically
deprived, socially
degraded, habitually knavish
C Prescriptive: Decisive breaks
from the usual course of
civilization
IC. Solitary Dreamer:
heeds only naturally
gentle, properly
voluptuous, immediate impulses; association may be sweet if void of all
obligation
IIC Moral Human:
virtuous self-command
enables domestic
sweetness, communal
and cosmopolitan
dedication, and
occasional, moderate
_severity_
IIIC Citizen:
virtue as conformity to
the general will;
patriotic delight in
public goods; harsh
indifference to
foreigners
economic luxuries necessarily acquired at the expense of
the multitude (DOI I, 137/138; Note IX, 199/203f). To the extent that a people has become civilized and inter
dependent, their interests are fundamentally at odds with
each other, and the great majority of individuals will be
deprived of necessities and degraded into habitual de
ceit, betrayal, and theft (cf. PN 101-2n/970n). However,
given the intensity of Rousseau's polemics against moder
nity, and his concession of certain elements of ferocity and cruelty in noncivilized life, it is striking that he does not portray his elite contemporaries as ferocious or ac
tively cruel. Rather, he grants much of the descriptive con
tent of doux commerce theory, conceding that commer
cial wealth, cross-cultural interaction, and higher learning have made their partakers more polite and less violent in
key respects (e.g., DSA I, 7/7; Observations, EPW 47/OC
3:52; LR 65/74). Yet he interprets such gentleness as result
ing not from higher moral conviction or more elevated
sentiments, but rather from physical softness, psycholog ical weakness, and moral indifference (LR 70/79; "Moral
Letters" II, CW 12:181-82/OC 4:1089-90; EIV, 335/665). In addition, given the workings of the established state ap
paratus and economic system, they simply have no need for the vigorous ferocity of much noncivilized life (cf. E
IV, 236n/524n; Conf. VII, 274/327). Instead, they need
only remain largely indifferent to the sufferings of the
masses, which is naturally combined with contempt or
disdain for them (EIV, 224-25/507-9; "On Wealth," CW
ll:8-16/OC 5:471-81). In these ways, Rousseau's funda mental charge against his elite contemporaries is not their
cruelty but their "harshness" or "hardness" (durete: "Let
ters to Malesherbes" IV, CW 5:582/OC 1:1145). Although
refraining from charging the elite moderns with ferocity or active cruelty is a significant concession on its face, Rousseau ultimately faults them for, on one hand, an ex
cessive softness which makes them incapable of vigorous acts, and on the other hand, a lack of authentic senti
ment which makes them incapable of the sweet, intimate,
spontaneous relations of social-Savages and Barbarians.
Conclusion
A final diagram (Figure 7) summarizes the major dis
tinctions and social types described above. This analysis suggests the great extent to which Rousseau finds our
morals to be shaped by our surroundings, in terms of
social complexity (the horizontal dimension), the favora
bility of our environmental resources (the descriptive ele ment of the vertical dimension), and whether a far-seeing intellect had decisively broken with the usual course of civ
ilization (the prescriptive element of the vertical dimen
sion). This schema builds upon and confirms the status
of the main characters previously identified by Rousseau
scholars (who find between two and five types). Without
claiming to definitively identify each social type depicted
by Rousseau, it draws attention to additional characters which are theoretically pivotal, and which are neglected or undertheorized in previous analyses. Moreover, each of
This content downloaded on Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:38:09 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
UNRAVELING ROUSSEAU'S PARADOXES 185
these characters has been placed within a typology which
attempts to show the interrelation of many of Rousseau's
fundamental social principles in a more systematic man
ner than has previously been attempted. To be sure, some
of these social types and principles are more evident and
fundamental than others in Rousseau's thought. Accord
ingly, this typology is offered to spur conversation rather
than to conclude it. Yet it is hoped that even in provoking
disagreement, it might enhance the clarity and rigor of our reflections by bringing several basic types and prin
ciples systematically to the forefront.
For instance, by framing the various types as arising from our sociopolitical surroundings, this analysis may
suggest a particular understanding of Rousseau's teach
ings on perfectibility and the possibilities of human life.
Rousseau probably coined the term "perfectibilite" (cf. Wokler 1978, 127-28, 134n93), and it became a funda
mental social premise for legions of later progressive and
radical reformers, suggesting the prospects for indefinite
social improvement. For Rousseau, perfectibility is the
only faculty which is undeniably unique to humans; with
"the aid of circumstances," it successively develops all
our other faculties (DOI I, 142/142). Thus, our survey of
the extraordinary range of human types, and the environ
mental circumstances which give rise to them, can be read
as a study of the implications of perfectibility. Rousseau's
broader anthropology of the possible is regularly used to
expose the moderns' complacency in believing their own
petty baseness is the pinnacle of human possibility (DOI Note X, 210/212f; SC III. 12; Considerations on the Gov
ernment of Poland II, 179f/956; PF XIII, 64/544). In such
ways Rousseau is a true father of progressive perfectibility, but in several other ways he differs from this legacy of his.
Notably, he reflected so extensively upon the nature and
advantages of noncivilized life chiefly because he main
tained that, through the strong passions resulting from
interaction and interdependence, advanced civilizations
must with overwhelming regularity fall into devastating forms of corruption, degradation, and mutual exploita tion. Ironically to civilized ears, much of this degrada tion is blamed upon the unfolding of perfectibility itself,
which "perfects... human reason, while deteriorating the
species," and develops virtues in a few, while overcom
ing the many with vices (DOI I, 159/162; II, 184/189; see also DSAII, 16/18; DOI 1,15117154; E III, 204/483; Conf. VIII, 326/388). It is for such reasons that even Rousseau's
most thoroughly developed and optimistically prescribed human types?the Solitary Dreamer, the Moral Human,
and the Citizen?must be highly selective in their devel
opment of human faculties, and highly secluded from the
false delights and sophistications of civilized modernity. Overall, in Rousseau's analysis, once human perfectibility has moved beyond its rudimentary stages, it allows for
human possibilities which are indeed very high in their
greatness and purity, but exceedingly narrow in the social
and cultural conditions which enable them. More generally, by interpreting Rousseau's appar
ently conflicting remarks carefully according to sociopo litical context, we can discern many consistencies un
derlying his inconsistencies. In analyzing the social types which emerge, we might also find that Rousseau shows a
surprising degree of impartiality in openly depicting vari ous nonmodern weaknesses, while at least observationally and implicitly acknowledging certain modern strengths. Furthermore, our analysis may reveal a degree of mod
eration in his moral stances, in both their critical and
prescriptive expressions. For, despite all his bravado in
praising the hard sternness of the Citizen or the Vigorous Primitive, he consistently repudiates anybloodthirstiness, lust for domination, and universal hard-heartedness.
Similarly, despite all his romanticism in praising the idle
ness and abundance of the Idyllic Primitive or the pas toral Barbarian, he consistently repudiates any softness
attained through human exploitation, or of frivolous lux
ury, or of failure to execute any duties appropriate to one's
sociopolitical condition.
Yet though his various social types display moral
moderation and phenomenological integrity, there may remain a degree of arbitrariness in his appeals to them.
It is, for instance, rhetorically compelling to expose Civ
ilized Elite softness through the image of the Vigorous Primitive, the stern Barbarian, or the ancient Citizen.
But it would require a more careful and sustained anal
ysis to show that those moderns who enjoy a substan
tial degree of economic security, leisure, and refinement
due to economic and technological progress are charac
teristically softer in less appealing ways than the Idyllic Primitive, or harsher in more deplorable ways than the
hunter-Savage. Typically, Rousseau's approach is to criti
cize a modern weakness by appeal to an inverse primitive
strength, whereas a more impartially philosophical ap
proach would surely compare strengths against strengths and weaknesses against weaknesses. For such reasons, our
analysis?insofar as it is convincing?can only be consid
ered a prolegomenon to future discussions of Rousseau's
coherence, rather than a demonstration of it. Some mys
tery shall always remain in explanations of how he ap
pealed to both gentle savages and fierce citizens in his
campaigns against modern civilization.
References
Abulafia, David. 2008. The Discovery of Mankind: Atlantic En counters in the Age of Columbus. New Haven, CT: Yale Uni
versity Press.
This content downloaded on Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:38:09 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
!86 MATTHEWD. MENDHAM
Cassirer, Ernst. [1932] 1989. The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 2nd ed. Trans, and ed. Peter Gay. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press.
Cohen, Joshua. 1997. "The Natural Goodness of Humanity." In Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls, ed. Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman, and Christine M.
Korsgaard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 102 39.
Cooper, Laurence D. 1999. Rousseau, Nature, and the Problem of the Good Life. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Cooper, Laurence D. 2008. Eros in Plato, Rousseau, and Niet
zsche: The Politics of Infinity. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Dent, Nicholas J. H. 1988. Rousseau: An Introduction to His Psy chological, Social, and Moral Theory. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Dent, Nicholas J. H. 1998. "Rousseau on Amour-Propre." Pro
ceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72: 57-73.
Duchet, Michele, and Michel Launay. 1967. "Synchronie et di achronie: FEssai sur Torigine des langues et le second Dis cours." Revue Internationale de Philosophic 82: 421-42.
Gourevitch, Victor. 1986. "'The First Times' in Rousseau's Essay on the Origin of Languages." Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 11(2): 123-46.
Gourevitch, Victor. 1988. "Rousseau's Pure State of Nature."
Interpretation 16(1): 23-59.
Gourevitch, Victor. 2001. "The Religious Thought." In The
Cambridge Companion to Rousseau, ed. Patrick Riley. Cam
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 193-246.
Hirschman, Albert O. 1985. Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays. New York: Viking.
Hirschman, Albert O. [1977] 1997. The Passions and the Inter ests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hosle, Vittorio G. 1998. Objective Idealism, Ethics, and Politics. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Hulme, Peter, and Neil L. Whitehead, eds. 1992. Wild Majesty: Encounters with Caribsfrom Columbus to the Present Day: An
Anthology. Oxford: Clarendon.
Kant, Immanuel. 1996. Practical Philosophy. Trans, and ed.
Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, Immanuel. 2007. Anthropology, History, and Education.
Ed. Giinter Zoller and Robert B. Louden. Cambridge: Cam
bridge University Press.
Kelly, Christopher. 2003. Rousseau as Author: Consecrating One's
Life to the Truth. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kelly, Christopher. 2006. "Rousseau's 'Peut-Etre': Reflections on the Status of the State of Nature." Modern Intellectual
History 3(1): 75-83.
Lovejoy, Arthur O. 1923. "The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality.'" Modern Philology 21 (2): 165-86.
Lovejoy, Arthur O., and George Boas, eds. 1935. Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Marks, Jonathan. 2005. Perfection and Disharmony in the
Thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Marks, Jonathan. 2007. "Rousseau's Discriminating Defense
of Compassion." American Political Science Review 101(4): 727-39.
Masters, Roger. 1968. The Political Philosophy of Rousseau. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Meek, Ronald L. 1976. Social Science and the Ignoble Savage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Melzer, Arthur M. 1990. The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau s Thought. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Mendham, Matthew D. 2009. "Gentleness, Severity, and the
System of Rousseau: Responses to Modern Commerce
and Enlightenment." PhD dissertation, University of Notre Dame.
Mendham, Matthew D. Forthcoming. "Enlightened Gentleness as Soft Indifference: Rousseau's Critique of Cultural Mod ernization." History of Political Thought.
Mill, John Stuart. [1836] 1977. "Civilization." In Essays on Pol itics and Society, ed. J. M. Robson. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 117-48.
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, baron de. [1748] 1989. The
Spirit of the Laws. Trans, and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller, and Harold S. Stone. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni
versity Press.
Neuhouser, Frederick. 2008. Rousseaus Theodicy of Self-Love: Evil, Rationality, and the Drive for Recognition. New York: Oxford University Press.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. [1887] 1994. On the Genealogy of Morality. Trans. Carol Diethe, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
O'Hagan, Timothy. 1999. Rousseau. London: Routledge.
O'Hagan, Timothy. 2004. "Taking Rousseau Seriously." History of Political Thought 35(1): 73-85.
Pire, George. 1956. "Jean-Jacques Rousseau et les relations
de voyages." Revue d'Histoire Litteraire de la France 56(3): 355-78.
Rahe, Paul A. 1994. "Antiquity Surpassed: The Repudiation of Classical Republicanism." In Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649-1776, ed. David Wootton. Stan
ford, CA: Stanford University Press, 233-69.
Rasmussen, Dennis C. 2006. "Rousseau's 'Philosophical Chem
istry' and the Foundations of Adam Smith's Thought." His
tory of Political Thought 27(4): 620-41.
Reisert, Joseph. 2003. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Friend of Virtue.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Rist, John M. 1994. Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized. Cam
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosenblatt, Helena. 1997. Rousseau and Geneva: From the First
Discourse to the Social Contract, 1749-1762. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1959-1995. Oeuvres Completes. 5 vol.
Ed. Bernard Gagnebin, Marcel Raymond, Jean Starobinski, et al. Paris: Gallimard, Bibliotheque de la Pleiade.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1960. Politics and the Arts: Letter to M.
DAlembert on the Theatre. Trans. Allan Bloom. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1979. Emile, or On Education. Trans.
Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Books.
This content downloaded on Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:38:09 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
UNRAVELING ROUSSEAU'S PARADOXES 187
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1990. The Collected Writings of Rousseau. 12 vol. Ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher
Kelly. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1997a. The Discourses and Other Early
Political Writings. Ed. and trans. Victor Gourevitch. Cam
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1997b. The Social Contract and Other
Later Political Writings. Ed. and trans. Victor Gourevitch.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Salkever, Stephen G. 1977-1978. "Interpreting Rousseaus Para
doxes." Eighteenth-Century Studies 11(2): 204-26.
Shklar, Judith N. 1969. Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseaus Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, Adam. [1776] 1981. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 2 vol. Ed. R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.
Smith, Adam. [1759-90] 1982. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.
Starobinski, Jean. [1957] 1988. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Trans
parency and Obstruction. Trans. Arthur Goldhammer.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Strauss, Leo. 1947. "On the Intention of Rousseau." Social Re
search 14(1): 455-87.
Strauss, Leo. 1953. Natural Right and History. Chicago: Univer
sity of Chicago Press.
Strauss, Leo. 1959. What Is Political Philosophy? And Other Stud ies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Todorov, Tzvetan. [1985] 2001. Frail Happiness: An Essay on Rousseau. Trans. John T. Scott and Robert D. Zaretsky. Uni
versity Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Todorov, Tzvetan. [1998] 2002. Imperfect Garden: The Legacy of Humanism. Trans. Carol Cosman. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Vico, Giambattista. [1744] 2001. New Science. 3rd ed. Trans. David Marsh. New York: Penguin.
Weber, David J. 2005. Bdrbaros: Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Wokler, Robert. 1978. "Perfectible Apes in Decadent Cultures: Rousseau's Anthropology Revisited." Daedalus 107(3): 107-34.
Wokler, Robert. [1995] 2001. Rousseau: A Very Short Introduc tion. New York: Oxford University Press.
This content downloaded on Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:38:09 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions