Roth - On Peirce's Concept of Abduction

8/12/2019 Roth - On Peirce's Concept of Abduction

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Robert}.Roth

Andersonon Peirce s ConceptofAbduction:Further ReflectionsDouglas Anderson s recent article on Peirce s theory of abduction

is both informative and thought-provoking.1 As he indicates at thebeginningof the article, hedeals with two questions: the evolution ofPeircean abduction and its basis fo r scientific creativity asboth insightand inference.Th e latter problem isparticularly interesting for it con-fronts th e critics of abductionw howould claim that it excludes logi-cal analysis, that it is fundamentallyintuitionistic, and that Peirceconfuses th e logical with th e psychological. The author makes skill-ful use of the relevant texts and in the main presents a strong casefor his own position. While I myself am persuaded by Anderson'sarguments, I do feel that there are other aspectsof abduction whichdeserve consideration in order that it may be better understood. Atthe sametime, such aconsideration mayraiseadditionalnervousques-tions and open the way for further objections on the part of Peirce scritics.2

The aspects of Anderson s position which I would like to exploremay be stated in two propositions which hediscusses: (1) abductionis an animal instinct, but (2 ) this does not entail a mechanical orbiological reduction of the abductive process, fo r Peirce believesthat there must be a reason behind th e conjecture made by abductionand for him this presupposes some rational control of the processby the scientist (pp. 152-153).The purpose of thispaper isbrieflyto describe Anderson s defense of these propositions and to indicatein what sense the defense, while on target, stands in need of furtherdevelopment.

IThat Peirce held abduction to be an animal instinct is beyond

dispute and Anderson marshals the pertinent texts to substantiatethis point. The basic problem which Peirce was trying to solvewas


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how the scientist can hit upon a hypothesis which would be sufficientto explain a given happening in nature.W heredoes he begin? How doeshenarrow downhisoptions?As Peircestates:

Think of what trillions of trillions of hypotheses mightbe made of which one only is true; and yet after two orthree or at the very most a dozen guesses, the physicisthits pretty nearly on the correct hypothesis. By chancehe would not have been likely to do so in the whole timethathaselapsed sincetheearthwassolidified. (5.172)3

Peirce indulges in a bit of fancy here for he asks how we could excludeas explanations the conjunctions of the planetso r some c h a n c ewordof mystical power pronounced by the dowager empress of Chinaor even the presence of some invisible jinnee. In another place, headds other possible explanations such as the day of the week on whichthe phenomenon occurred, the blue dress worn by the scientist'sdaughter, hisdream of awhite horse thenight before,or the fact thatthe milkman was late that morning (5.591). Fanciful indeed, but itis Peirce's attempt, however maladroit, to make apoint. He refusesto have recourse to chance. He admits that one cannot give anyexact reason for his best guesses and he refers to some magical

faculty (5.173, 6.476). Bu_^it appearsto me that th e clearest state-/i mentwe can make of thalogicalsituation - the freest from allques-

tionable admixture - is to say that man has a certiri Insight, notstrong enough to be oftener right than wrong, but strong enough notto beoverwhelmingly more often wrong thanright,intotheThirdness,the general elements, ofNature*^^.,173). In other places he calls thisfaculty a natural light, (a light of nature^,instinctive insight, genius,or il lume natural? appealed to by Galileoandundoubtedly employedbyKepler, Gilbert, Harvey,andCopernicus (5.604, 6.477,1.80).

But basically and in the lastanalysis abduction is an instinct similarto that found in the animal kingdom. Peirce usesthe example of thepeckinginstinctinchickens.

You cannot seriously think that every little chicken, thatis hatched, has to rummage through allpossible theories


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until it lights upon the good ideaof picking up somethingand eating it. On the contrary, you think the chickenhasan innate idea of doing this; that is to say,that it canthink of this, but has no faculty of thinking anythingelse. (5.591)

But if we attribute instinct to animals, why should we deny it tohumans? And here,I believe,it isnecessary to gobeyondAnderson'streatment of abduction as instinct and to introduce an aspect ofPeirce s position which the author does not mention. It is the evolu-tionary process which is at the basis of Peirce's whole philosophy.Evolution in relation to abduction is mentioned briefly by Peircewhen he argues that chance cannot explain how the scientist narrowsdown the trillions of possible explanations to aworkable few. Howdo weexplain thisability?

You may produce this or that excellent psychological ;account of the matter. But let me tell you that all the ,'psychology in the world will leave the logical problemjust where it was.I might occupy hours developing thatpoint. I must pass it by. You may say that evolutionaccounts for the thing. / don t doubt it isevolution.Butas for explaining evolution by chance, there has not beentime enough.(5.172 Italicsadded)

The connection between abduction as instinct and evolution isbriefly mentioned here. But I believe it is crucial. In other places,Peirce wrote at length about evolution and his development iscom-plex. He discussed the theories of Darwin and Lamarck and usedthe terminology of tychistic, anancastic, and gapastic evolution(1.13-1.17, 1.103-1.109, 6.287-6.317).4 For the present discussion,it is sufficient to note that fo r Peirce th e human mind is a part ofnature and has emerged by the same evolutionary process. Conse-quently there is a connaturality between mind and cosmos whichmeans that themindhas an affinity with nature, isattuned to it, andhas a natural adaptation to imagining correct theories of some kinds,


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andinparticularto correct theories about forces.In short, the instincts conducive to assimilation of food,and the instincts conducive to reproduction, must haveinvolved from the beginning certain tendencies to thinktruly about physics, on the onehand, andabout psychics,on the other. It is somehow more than a figure of speechto saythat naturefecundates themind of manwith ideaswhich, when those ideas grow up, will resemble theirfather, Nature. (5.591)

For Peirce, evolution develops neither by chance (tychism) nor bynecessity (anancism) but by creative love (agapism). A sV i n c e n tPotterstates:

Consequently,the universe is not as themechanisticphilos-ophers would have it. It is not governed solely nor princi-pallyby the laws ofdynamics.It isgoverned by reasonable-ness working itself out in the concrete. It has an intrinsicand immanent finality which cannot be reduced to theinteraction ofblindforces.

In this context, then, mind and nature develop together. Nature,as it were, implants in the mind seeds of ideas that will mature inaccordance with nature, Man's mind must have been attuned to thetruth of things in order to discover what he has discovered.It is thevery bedrock of logical truth (6.476). From all this it follows thatabduction is not only linked with instinct but in turn it is also theresult of an evolutionary development which explains both the bio-logical origin ofhumansandtheir abilityto formhypothesesinlogic.

IIThe second proposition which I have selected from Anderson's

article statesthat abduction asinstinctis not amechanical orbiologicalreduction of theabductive process. This meansthatitdoesnotimmedi-ately and always select the correct hypothesis nor does it make its


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Anderson onPeirce sConcept of Abduction 135

selection automatically. Even instincts in animals make mistakes.Abduction narrows the field of hypotheses to be considered. AsAnderson points out, citing Peirce,abduction is a fairguess (2.623),an extremely fallible insight (5.181), not strong enough to beoftener right than wrong, but strong enough not to be overwhelminglymore often wrong than right (5.173). The tightness or wrongnessofthehypothesisis to bedeterminedby induction.

But more importantly the selection ofhypotheses is notautomatic.Thus Anderson states that Peirce believes there must be a reasonbehind the conjecture made byabductionand for himthispresupposessome rational control of the process by the scientist (pp. 152-153.See 5.108). But what could that rational control be? I am afraid thatAndersondoes not adequately answer the question, or perhaps better,Peirce himself isdeficient on this point.Anderson refers to one textto show that abduction does not begin de novo but is influencedby previous thoughts and funded experience. Peirce's statement isas follows: But the stimulus to guessing,thehint of the conjecture,was derived from experience (2.755). This is a very brief and incon-clusive textand I am not sure that itcontainsallthatAnderson wouldlike to attribute to it. Yet hemakesagoodpointinstressing fundedexperience as aprerequisite forcreativity. Even WilliamJames,who isoften accused of being an extremerelativistin his theory of knowledge,emphasized the importance of old opinions in reaching solutionsto new problems. The new idea is grafted upon the old stock withthe least amount of change. The new idea mediates between the oldand newexperience.

This new idea is then adopted as the true one. It preservesthe older stock oftruths with aminimumof modifications,stretching them just enough to make them admit thenovelty,but conceiving that in ways as familiar as the caseleaves possible. An outre explanation, violating all ourpreconceptions, would never pass for a true account of anovelty. W e should scratch round industriously till wefound something less eccentric. The most violent revolu-tion in anindividual's beliefs leaves most of his old order


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standing. Time and space, cause an d effect, nature andhistory, and one's own biography remain untouc hed.N ew truth is always a go-between, a smoother-over oftransitions. It marries old opinion to new fact so as everto show a minimum ofjolt,a maximum ofcontinuity.

John Dewey, too, could be me ntioned in this contex t. As a m atte rof fact, Anderson suggests that the move from funded experience tohypothesis is similar to Dewey's viewpoint. It is at least questionablewhether a similarity between Peirce and Dewey can be drawn fromth e above text of Peirce. I m yself suspect tha t P eirce wo uld agreewith Dewey but the agreement is not clearly stated. In any case,Dewey, w hile not calling the hyp othesis -formin g process an instinc t,has stated more clearly than Peirce how the hypothesis is formed.For Dewey, a problem arises out of an organized situation or experi-ence which is beginning to disintegrate, to become unraveled, as itwere. Things we re going along smoothly until some new ele m en tarises which puzzlesu sbecause it does not seem to fit into ourexperi-ence. Then even prior to conscious reflection, th e parts of the experi-ence strivetowardintegrationand it isthiswhichinitiatesthe logicalprocess. As a result, a suggestion enters th e mind spontaneously, itpops into the mind. It flashes upon us. There is no direct controlof its occurrence; th e ideajust comes or it does not come; that is allthat can be said. In Dewey's view, th e occurrence of the suggestionis not intellectual; it is what we do after its occurrence that wecall /intellectual. And of course what we do is to put the hypothesis tothe test.

Again, in describing a disturbed situation, Dewey speaksof intui-tion. He puts the word in quo tation marks because by it he doesnot intend an act of the mind which isa priori w i thout anyrelat iontoexperience.

Intuition isthat meeting of the old and new in whichth e readjustment involved in every form of consciousnessis effected suddenly by means of a quick and unexpectedharmony which in its bright abruptness islike a flash of


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Anderson on Pence s Concept of Abduction 137

revelation; although in fact it is prepared by long andslow incubation. Oftentimes the union of old and new,of fo reground and background, is accomplished by effort,prolonged perhaps to the point of pain. In any case, thebackground of organized meaningscan alone convert thenewsituation from th e obscure into theclearandluminous.When old and new jump together, like sparks when th epoles are adjusted, there is intuition. This latter is thusneither an act of pure intellect in apprehending rationaltruth nor a Crocean grasp by spirit of its own imagesandstates.8

In Dewey's view, both observed facts an d ideas are operational an ddynamic resulting in a series of interactions. Some facts point to anidea as a possible solution; the idea in turn prompts more observation.This interaction continues until the elements of the disorganizedexperience are brought into harmony and a satisfactory solutionto the original problemisreached.9

If my analyses of Peirce and Dewey are correct, it can be seen thatDewey says both less and more than Peirce. He says less because ulti-mately he leaves unanswered the question regarding the origin of thetendencyof the mind to form appropriate ideas.Humansare productsof evolution but they are not ends which evolution has been strivingto reach. They are merely termini resulting from the chance combi-nations of biological forces. This is what Peirce would call tychism.But Dewey claims that once the human mind emerges, it is capableof projecting aims and goals with the result that purpose entersintonature.

On th e other hand, Dewey describes more fully th e procedureby which a solution is reached. He had the advantage of being ac-quainted with the new psychology of the day and he was in a betterposition to give a fuller account of the creative imagination. Heattempted to incorporate this information into his logic, philosophy,and educational theory.At the sametime, he did not allow logicanda theory of knowledge to collapse into a psychological descriptionof mental processes. Neither did Peirce, and Anderson rightly defends


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him against hiscritics on this point (pp.161-162). Finally in myviewboth the Peircean an d Deweyan positions are illuminating. But eachtaken by itself is inadequate an d leaves important questions unan -swered. A more fruitful explanation could be found in asynthesisof bothpositions.

As indicated at the outset, my purpose was to bring out otheraspects ofPeirce'sphilosophy in ord er to view his theory of abd uc tionfrom a broader perspective. One may very well deny that al l this isnecessary for a proper understandingof abduction. I myself believeit is. At the same time, my ownreflections mayprovide m ore ammuni-tion for Peirce's critics who would seriously challenge his theory ofevolution and especially finality . These objections wo uld have tobe confronted because evolution an d finality .are essential elementsofPeirce's science, philosophy,and even of hislogic.Fordham University

NOTES1. Douglas R. Anderson, The Evolution of Peirce 's Concept of

Abduction, Transactions of the Charles S. PeirceSociety 22 (1986), pp. 145-164.

2. Thereader's attention is called to thearticleof Timothy Shanahan, The First Momen t of Scientific Inquiry: C. S. Peirce on the Logic of Abduc-tion, Transactions of the Charles S. PeirceSociety 22 (1986), pp . 448-466.While not specifically addressing An der son 's article, Shanahan brings out oth erfeatures of Peirce's theory of abduction, i .e., its instinctual basis, instinct anditsadaptive value, synechism, lawsof nature and God's thought.My own treat-ment concentrates on instinct and finali ty as imp ortan t elements in abduc tion.

3. All references to Peirce are taken from The Collected Papers ofCharles Sanders Peirce, ed. C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, and A. W. Burks, 8 vols.(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress,1931-35,1958).

4. See the fine treatmen t of this aspect of Peirce's tho ug ht by V inc entG.Potter,S.J., CharlesS. Peirce:On Norms andIdeals (Amherst: UniversityofMassachusetts Press,1967),Part III, Ch ap.1, Evolutionary Love.

5. Potter,CharlesS.Peirce,p. 190. See1.204.6. William James, Pragmatism an d Other Essays (N.Y.: Washington

Square Press,1963),pp. 29-30. Seealsopp. 37, 95, 97, 103.


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7. John Dewey, How WeThink tf ffl (N.Y.: tytyHeathandCom pany,1933),p. 109.

8. John Dewey,Art asExperience (N.Y.:G. P.Putnam'sSons,1934),p.266.9. For a more extended treatment of Dewey's theory of logic, see

my John Dewey an d Self-Realization (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,Inc. 1962), Chap. VII, especiallypp. 135-138. Specifically I arguethat Dewey,without realizing it himself, intimated that nature exhibitsa directed strivingan d that the cosmos is in tune with human drivesand ideas. Both mind andnature cooperatein the attemptto achieve these ideals. However,in hisexplicitstatements Dewey doesnotadmitthis.

CharlesS.PeirceLogic and theClassificationofSciencesBeverley E KentCloselyexaminingboth publishedandunpublishedwritings ofPeirceandcarefully attendingto thechrono-logical development of hissystemsof classification Kentshowshow seemingcontradictionsinPeirce'sevolvingclassificationoflogicarereally partof anincreasinglyclearposition. 32.50

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Roth - On Peirce's Concept of Abduction