Rosenbaum 1968 - A Critique of Brazilian Foreign Service

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    A Critique of the Brazilian Foreign ServiceAuthor(s): H. Jon RosenbaumSource: The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Apr., 1968), pp. 377-392Published by: College of Business, Tennessee State UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4189484.

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    The Joumal of Developing Areae, II (April, 1968), 377-392.

    Cri t ique o t h razi l iano r e i g n S e r v i c e

    H. JON ROSENBAUM

    Nations anxious to become world powers or those simply wishing tobreak the bonds of underdevelopment must possess a variety of resources.A seldomly studied human resource which may contribute to the achieve-ment of either goal is an effective foreign service. Numerous articles andbooks have been written about diplomacy generally and about UnitedStates and European foreign services,' but there have been almost nodescriptive analyses published about the foreign services of the devel-oping countries, while investigations of the foreign service's role in thedevelopment of these states are completely absent.2

    Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Wellesley College, Wel-lesley, Massachusetts; formerly a Shell International Feilow (Brazil), 1966. The authoris grateful for the cooperation of the many Brazilian diplomats, journalists, andscholars who provided information for this article. Of course, the writer alone isresponsible for the interpretations.

    IThe interested reader may consult the following works: Sir William Hayter, TheDiplomacy of the Great Powers (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1959); K. M. Panikkar,The Principles and Practice of Diplomacy (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1956);Harold Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method (London: Constable, 1954);Henry M. Jackson (ed.), The Secretary of State and the Ambassador (New York:Praeger, 1964); Charles Thayer, Diplomat (London: Michael Joseph, 1960); Sir NevilBland (ed.), Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice (London: Longmans, 1958); WilliamBarnes and John Heath Morgan, The Foreign Service of the United States (Washington:Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, 1961); Lord Strang, Inside the ForeignOffice, annual lecture of the David Davies Memorial Institute of InternationalRelations, 1960.2The present study of a single country is intended only as a contribution to thedescriptive literature in the field. After the collection of similar descriptive material

    for other countries, the author hopes to write a comparative study of the role offoreign services in the development process of nations.

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    378 H. Jon Rosenbaum

    Brazil, potentially one of the first five or six world powers, alreadyhas what many foreign diplomats and scholars consider to be one of themost professional, if not best, foreign services of developing nations.Among other Latin American nations, perhaps only Argentina's foreignservice approximates Brazilian standards.Unlike the practice common in many Latin American countries wherea politician can arrange a foreign service appointment for his relativesor friends, Brazil's foreign service demands that new diplomats have thehighest possible qualifications as demonstrated by competitive examina-tions. Ambassadors are the only exception to the rule that career officersmust fill all diplomatic positions. When noncareer diplomatic appoint-ments are made to ambassadorial positions (an infrequent occurrence),the quality of the individual is considered of great importance, andalthough political considerations are a motivating factor, the selectionof the nonprofessional is not merely a political prize. For example,although not a career diplomat, former member of the federal Chamberof Deputies, Bilac Pinto, now ambassador to France, has proven anable representative of Brazil. (It should be noted, however, that not allpolitical appointments have been equally successful.)The Brazilian foreign service deserves its fine reputation, but this doesnot mean that the diplomatic corps is without problems or that itsquality has been consistent since its founding. From its establishmentby law 614 of 22 August 1851, until after World War II, entrance intothe foreign service was mainly determined by one criterion, the personaljudgment of the foreign minister or hi-sclose aides. Although an entranceexamination was specified in 1852 as the method of selecting new officers,even the hero foreign minister, the Baron of Rio Branco, relied on ahighly aristocratic method of selection which placed good manners aboveintelligence as an entrance requirement. Standards for admission werefinally regulated by the Joaio Neves de Fontoura Reform, decree law9032 of 6 March 1946, which initiated the current rigorous examinationsystem.3 This system has been largely responsible for the high qualityof the Brazilian foreign service in recent years.Since the formation of the diplomatic corps in 1851, other reformsadopted by Paulino Jose Soares de Souza, Viscount of Uruguay, havealso contributed to the modernity of the present organization. For exam-ple, the Mello Franco Reform of 1951 specified that Brazilian diplomatscould no longer remain overseas indefinitely, a previously commonpractice. Decree law 18.392 required diplomats to change posts everytwo or three years and to return to Brazil for two or three years afterevery four to six years overseas. Before this reform was enacted manyBrazilian diplomats spent almost their entire adult lives outside ofBrazil and knew little of the current state of their own country.4Although the quality of the Brazilian foreign service is admirable, inrecent years the foreign services of several other Latin American nations

    3Antonio Camilo de Oliveira, Educaqdo para a diplomacia, Digesto Econbmico,No. 150 (1959), pp. 89-103; and Geraldo Eulalio Nascimento e Silva, Organizaqaodiplomatica brasileira, Revista do Serviqo Pitblico, LXXIII, No. 1-3 (1956), 53-69.4A more complete description of the organization of the Foreign Ministry is avail-able in Brasil, Ministerio das Relaq6es Exteriores (cited as MRE subsequently), Em-baixador A. F. Azeredo da Silvera, Organizaqao do Ministerio das Relacbes Exteriores(Rio de Janeiro: Seqao de Publicaq6es, 1966).

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    A Critique of the Brazilian Foreign Service 379

    have become more professional while Brazil has made few significantinnovations. The relative advantage Brazil has long held in Latin Ameri-can diplomacy has therefore decreased. The most glaring deficienciesof the Brazilian foreign service are insufficient mid and advanced careertraining and a membership too small to meet its growing responsi-bilities.5Compared to the American or British foreign services, the Brazilianservice is smaller,6 more compact, and exercises a greater amount ofautodirection. Many members seem to resist change. Family traditionin the service is strong and has produced, in effect, a foreign serviceoligarchy. At least 10 percent of the diplomats have fathers, sons, orbrothers who are also diplomats.7The 1966 class of the Rio Branco Institute, the Foreign Ministryadministered school through which all career foreign service officersmust pass, included the names Araujo Castro, Ribeiro, and Grieco.Luis Augusto de Araujo Castro is the son of Ambassador Joao Augustode Araujo Castro, Brazil's present ambassador to Peru and a formerforeign minister. Edgar Teles Ribeiro is the son of Ambassador MiltonRibeiro, Brazil's ambassador to Nationalist China; Mario Grieco is theson of Ambassador Donatelo Grieco, general assistant secretary forWestern European and African affairs at the Itamarati (the ForeignOffice). The three sons were in a class of twenty-seven; all three fathersentered the foreign service in 1940.8 Among the candidates for foreignservice appointments in 1967 were a grandson of former President Wash-ington Luis and a nephew of former Foreign Minister Raul Fernandes.Some of these problems are being acknowledged, studied, and solved.A general reform of the foreign service was initiated with the proclama-tion of decree law 69 of 21 November 1966, signed by President Castelo

    5Most of the criticism and recommendations contained in this article are those ofBrazilians, including foreign service officers, although the author has contributed afew personal observations. Because the material is controversial, direct quotes andattributions are minimal to avoid embarrassing individuals or endangering theircareers. Eight Brazilian foreign service officers read this manuscript before publica-tion, and all have agreed that the facts are accurate and the comments are not unfairto their service.Research for this article included interviews with Brazilians and foreign diplomats,students at the Rio Branco Institute, and applicants to the institute, professors ofinternational relations at the institute and at other Brazilian schools of higher learn-ing, and journalists. Brazilian literature, including newspapers and periodicals, wasalso consulted although it must be admitted that there is little written about theForeign Ministry or the foreign service in Brazilian publications.

    6The Brazilian foreign service was composed of about 525 diplomats between 1964and 1966. At the same time the United States foreign service consisted of about11,000officers.7Statistics compiled by the author from Brasil, MRE, Departamento de Adminis-

    trac4, DavisAo do Pessoal, Anuaro 1964 a 1965 (Rio de Janeiro: SeqAo de Publica-q6es da DivisAo de Documentaq&o, 1967). Other diplomats are related to each othermore distantly, but the nature of the biographies in the above book does not permitexact statistical analysis of family relationships beyond the father, son, or brothercategories.8The fathers' positions listed are those they held in 1966, the time of their sons'graduation.

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    380 H. Jon Rosenbaum

    Branco. Patterned after the post-World War II reforms of the UnitedStates foreign service, the Brazilian service will no longer remain a small(but well qualified) Europe admiring, inbred elite. The number of diplo-mats is being increased by ninety-four: including five ambassadors,fourteen ministers, twenty-five first secretaries, twenty-five second secre-taries, and twenty-five third secretaries. These advanced positions arebeing filled by immediate promotions within the foreign service. Theninety-four vacancies thus created are also being filled, and the foreignservice is gradually being increased from 592 to 868 members. Thisaspect of the reform does not seem to be producing a morale crisissimilar to that following the Wristonization'll of the U.S. foreign service.The character of the elite may change due to other provisions of thenew law, but the foreign service officer's prestige will not be impairedbecause he will continue to be a member of an elite organization.In order to entice diplomats from the large staffs of the Europeanposts, the degree law requires that for merit promotion to a highergrade an officer must serve in a developing area of the world. Forpromotion from second secretary to first secretary, the candidate mustserve at least two years either in Latin America, Africa, Asia, or Oceania.Similarly, a first secretary wishing to be promoted on merit to mninistersecond class must serve at least four years in the above geographicalareas. Promotion by seniority without service in developing areas is stillpossible, and at present, there are three promotions from second to firstsecretary based on merit for every one such promotion based on seniority(from first secretary to minister second class-five on merit, one onIseniority; from minister second class to ambassador promotion is onlyby merit).Inbreeding in the service will be controlled and partly eliminated bythe new law because the Itainarati will be permitted to employ peoplefrom outside career service ranks to staff overseas positions of a non-diplomatic and specialized character. For example, a commercial attachemay be hired from the central bank to do work previously carried outby the generalists of the diplomatic corps. These reforms may causesome animnosity among diplomatic officers and, together with the currentremoval of the Foreign Ministry from Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia, mayeven cause a few diplomats to resign. The prospect of living in Brasilia,New Delhi, or Accra rather than in Rio de Janeiro, Paris, or Londoncertainly will not be welcomed by many officers. However mass resigna-tions are not to be expected; only one career officer has resigned since1958 although four individuals were ousted after the 1964 Revolution.Decree law 69 also stipulates that all personnel employed in foreignservice capacities, whether career diplomats or not, will now be controlledby the new Brazilian Foreign Service Office (SEB) patterned after theUnited States Department of State and the British Foreign Office.9Brasil, MRE, Departmento Cultural e de Informaqoes, DivisAo de Informaq6es,

    Boletim Informativo No. 220-Decreto-lei No. 69 (Rio de Janeiro: 30 November 1966).10After the submission of a report by the Eisenhower appointed Public Committeeon Personnel, headed by Dr. Henry M. Wriston of Brown University, Department ofState personnel were integrated into the foreign service which was expanded in themid-1950's. Although some foreign service officers complained that they were losingtheir elite status by this reform, the innovations which followed the Wriston report,usually termed Wristonization, were generally beneficial.

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    A Critique of the Brazllian Foreign Service 381

    This aspect of the decree law is a response to the fear of some ForeignOffice personnel that they were in danger of being controlled by theDASP (Departamento Administrativo do Serviqo Plublico), the Braziliancivil service. People formerly classified as civil servants are no longerso classified and are available for worldwide assignment. It is not yetapparent whether former civil servants will be required to serve overseas.If people formerly employed in Brazil are ordered to serve overseas, somemay be provoked into resigning their positions.Finally, the decree law creates a new system whereby a diplomat canbe temporarily removed from the list of active diplomats. When takenfrom the active list a diplomat's position can be held by others, and hewill receive no diplomatic remuneration. This Instituto de Agregeqaoaffected fifteen individuals when enacted, including then Planning Minis-ter Roberto Campos and Francisco de Assis Grieco, coordinator for theAlliance for Progress in Brazil.Although tensions have already been created by the law, the overalleffect appears to be positive. Other reforms are also contemplated bythe Brazilian government; for example, in June 1967 the president ap-pointed a commission, headed by Ambassador Arnaldo Vasconcellos, tomake the first study on the formation of a consular service.The other major criticism of the foreign service, made earlier, has yetto receive appropriate study and action. A progressive reform of theentire training procedure from the initiation of formal recruitment toadvanced training is badly needed. Some important Brazilian diplomats,however, believe that there have already been too many reforms of theservice. One ambassador, for example, told the author that the foreignservice must digest present reforms. No new reforms should be enacteduntil the Foreign Ministry is settled in Brasilia.Training at the Rio Branco Institute consists of a two year coursefollowed by a two year internship at the Foreign Office and then byimmediate assignment abroad. Until recently it was not necessary tohave a university education in order to enter the Rio Branco Institute.A presidential decree now requires a candidate for entrance into theinstitute to have completed at least two years of university.'2 This reformis of no great significance since about 90 percent of the students admit-ted to the school in the past few years have completed university courses.However, the two year length of the Rio Branco coaurseseems to beinadequate since many entering students have had little training insocial sciences, economics, or foreign affairs.'3 The administration of the

    1This rule applies to diplomats in the following cases: (1) when on leave forprivate reasons for more than six months; (2) when on sick leave for six monthsexcept in cases of labor accident or professional illness; (3) when on leave to serve inthe army for more than six months; (4) when on leave for reasons of illness in hisfamily; (5) when on leave to assume a position in the federal, state, or municipaladministrations except when serving in the civil household of the president of theRepublic; (6) when on leave to assume a position in an international organization;(7) when on leave to hold an elective office; and (8) when on leave to accompany adiplomat spouse who will serve abroad.

    12Jornal do Brasil, 7 December 1966, p. 15.A basically uncritical account of the Rio Branco Institute is available in GeorgesD. Landau and Elizabeth B. Kilmer, School for Diplomats, Americas, X (March1958), 3-7.

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    382 H. Jon Rosenbaum

    institute realizes this and attempts to cram too many subjects into thelimited time period. As far back as 1959 an Itamarati committee investi-gating Brazilian education for the diplomatic service pointed to the factthat military officers were given a longer professional education thanwere diplomatic officers. 4 The report suggested a minimum of five yearsof education during a diplomat's career, but instead of lengthening theinitial training period, the report called for even more required coursesduring the initial two year training period. A knowledge of Spanish aswell as a course in Latin American problems were to be added.The consequence of all foreign service officers receiving their interna-tional affairs education at the same institution may be the creation ofintellectual conformity or perhaps only the strengthening of an extantconformity due to the trainees similar class and geographical backgrounds.Most students at the institute are from the upper middle and upperclasses of urban areas, particularly Rio de Janeiro.'5 A final ingredientwhich reinforces conformity even more is the composition of the RioBranco faculty. Fifty percent of the professors at the institute in recentyears have been either foreign service members or government econo-mists.'6 The 50 percent of the staff from outside government ranks wouldprobably not be employed very long if they deviated greatly from theForeign Ministry's interpretation of world events.It has been suggested that either the institute should be transformedinto a graduate school with the government supplying funds for theuniversities to establish independent international affairs centers or thatRio Branco graduates should be sent to independent university graduateschools either in Brazil or overseas. Another suggestion receiving seriousattention by officials of the Itamarati is the addition of a third stage tothe training schedule. This plan would have the young officer sent tohis first overseas assignment in a location near a major university. Oneof the officer's main duties on this first assignment would be to takeuniversity courses. The problem facing the advocates of this scheme ishow to finance the training. This difficulty should not hinder the initia-tion of such a program because many universities in developed countrieswould be willing, even anxious, to provide free or partial tuition toBrazilian diplomats in the hope of earning good will or attracting quali-fied foreign students to their campuses.A reciprocal scheme which would allow foreign students to attend theRio Branco Institute seems less likely to be approved due to the suspi-cion and concern for security on the part of many officers at the ForeignOffice, the lack of space at the institute's present physical location, andthe opposition of the director of the institute to the attendance of foreignstudents. Director Antonio Correa do Lago seems to feel that Braziliandiplomats will be overseas for a great part of their lives, thereforeforeign service students should spend their years at school learning aboutBrazil. He believes that the presence of foreign students and professors

    14Brasil, MRE, Relatorio do Subgrupo de Trabalho Encarregadq de Estudar oProblem a da Form acao e Aperfeicoamento do Diplom ata, 1959.15Brasil, MRE, SeqAo de Pesquisas e Publicaq6es do Instituto Rio Branco, Anuariodo Instituto Rio-Branco, 19611196211963Rio de Janeiro: 1964). To be cited subsequentlyas Anuario do IRB.16Ibi.

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    A Critique of the Brazilien Foreign Service 383

    would not contribute to the educational experience of Brazilian diplo-mats. Perhaps, he concludes, when the school moves to larger quarters,or in five years, the attendance of foreign students might be reconsid-ered.'7 In 1965, when the institute was directed by Ambassador AntonioCamillo de Oliveira, a Swedish girl, financed by a Rotary Club Fellow-ship, was allowed to take a course or two at the Rio Branco Institute.The new director has not permitted her to complete the courses shestarted.The library of the school appears to be completely inadequate, contain-ing only 7,000 items. Although the students have access to the BibliotecaNacional, also located in Rio, that institution reflects the lack of atten-tion given to education by almost every Brazilian government.'# Therich Foreign Ministry library collection which contains 250,000 books isalso available to Rio Branco students but will probably be moved to thenew Foreign Ministry building in Brasilia in the near future. In theunlikely event that the library remains in Rio, it may become a partof the Rio Branco Institute when that institution occupies the formerItamarati Palace. That the library will remain is certainly the hope ofthe director of the institute, but one wonders how the active diplomatsin Brasilia would conduct their day-to-day research with the mintstrylibrary in Rio. The small Rio Branco library is hardly sufficient fordaily assignments.'9 While Ambassador Correa do Lago feels that areform of the institute's library is needed, no real action is anticipateduntil the decision on the ministry library is confirmed.Admission to the Rio Branco Institute is highly competitive. Applicantsmust pass what is generally considered by Brazilian students tc be themost difficult examination administered in the country. Language compe-tence is particularly stressed, with students required to take examinationsin Portuguese, English, and French. According to an informant who hasgraded these examinations, a candidate speaking grammatically perfectEnglish, for example, but with little knowledge of slang will not bepassed. Psychological and physical examinations are also required be-cause entrance into Rio Branco is tantamount to being accepted into theBrazilian foreign service. Hardly anyone fails the final examinations

    17Personal interview with Ambassador Antonio Correa do Lago, 26 December 1966,4:30 P.M., at the Rio Branco Institute. The ambassador recognizes the problem ofdeveloping commitment to the nation, a dilemma frequently encountered in developingcountries. It should also be noted that several foreign scholars, including Americans,have taught at the institute.18The Biblioteca Nacional is of little use to the student of contemporary affairssince cataloging is several years behind acquisitions. Lighting is poor, books must berequested a day in advance of reading, and only three volumes of periodicals may beconsulted on any one day. It is hardly surprising that there are rarely more than half

    a dozen readers in the reference room at one time. The situation at the library hasstimulated an investigation by the National Congress.19It may be of interest to note that the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, asmall American graduate school for students mainly interested in entering the foreignservice, has a library of 85,000 voluimes and even this is considered inadequate byits administration. Moreover, students at the Fletcher School have access to the richcollections of the Harvard University library system.

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    384 HI.Jon Rosenbaum

    given upon completion of the course.2')Because competition is high for the few available positions, over fivehundred people usually applying for the twenty-seven positions, manystudents take a preparatory course offered in Rio de Janeiro. It is expen-sive to travel to Rio and to live in that city, therefore, students fromoutside the city who are not wealthy are usually unable to take thepreparatory course. Although the institute does offer some scholarshipassistance, about 100,000 cruzeiros (less than U.S.$ 50.00) per recipienta month, most students who lack wealth do not even consider takingthe examination because of inadequate funds. Living on 100,000 cruzeirosa month in Rio is extremely difficult and even Peace Corps volunteersworking in Rio's favelas (similar to North American slums) receive alarger living allowance. The result of Rio's high living expenses is thatstudents who have families in the city and can live with them have anadvantage over students coming from other areas of the country. There-fore, a large proportion of the students that take the examination areresidents of Rio de Janeiro.Although not representative of all Brazilian geographical areas andclasses, those admitted to the institute after successful completion of theexamination are exceptionally intelligent students.21 The only form ofrecruitment practiced by the foreign service is the holding of the prelimi-nary entrance examinations in various cities throughout the country,an admirable practice but scarcely recruitment, as the foreign serviceterms it. At present, there are no members of the foreign service whocan be called Negroes, regardless of the possible semantic arguments tosuggest the contrary.22 There are, similarly, no Negro students at theRio Branco Institute at present (1966-67). Former Foreign Minister AfonsoArinos found it necessary in March of 1961 to remind the Rio Brancoadministration to observe law 1.390 of 3 July 1951 which forbids discrimi-nation in Brazil.23 The only immediate result was the sending of aNegro, noncareerist writer Raymunido Sousa Dantas, to Ghana as ambas-sador. The reason for the lack of Negroes and lower class individualsin the foreign service may be that these people do not have sufficienteducation to enable them to pass the entrance examinations. However,

    20This year, for the first time since 1958, because of the reform which increases thesize of the foreign service, applicants who have not attended the Rio Branco are beingpermitted to take examinations in order to qualify for the position of third secretary.Successful applicants will be required to take a one year course at the institute beforeentering active service.21The 550 diplomats who were members of the foreign service from 1964 to 1966were born in the following Brazilian states: Guanabara (city of Rio)-237, Sao Paulo-46, Minas Gerais-46, Rio Crande do Sul-34, Rio de janeiro(state)-22, Pernambuco-19, and Para-19. Less than ten diplomats were born in each of the other states.Many of the diplomats not born in Guanabara were residents of that city when theyentered the service. Brasil, NIRE, Departamento de Administragao, Divisao do Pessoal,Anuario 1964 a 1966 (Rio de Janeiro: Seqao de Publicaq6es da DivisAo de Documentaqao,1967).22The medical doctor at the Itamarati, Dr. Sebastiao Santos, is the only profes-sional member of the Foreign Office who is a Negro. Racial definition 'n Brazildiffers from that generally used in the United States, nevertheless, almost all Braziliandiplomats interviewed stated that there were no Negroes in the foreign service.23'Arinos lenibra penas ao Rio Branco: sua lei, 0 Jornal, 21 March 1961, p. 1.0 Jornal is one of the best Brazilian newspapers for diplomatic news.

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    A Critique of the Brazilian Foreign Service 385

    a few of these people have been educated to a level which would permitthem to pass, and perhaps they should be actively recruited to take theexamination. This is not to suggest that special consideration be givento anyone in grading examinations. In any case, a recruitment campaignseems necessary to fill the increasing personnel needs of the service andto explain the characteristics of the career. Many of those now takingthe examination for the Rio Branco claim that they want to join theforeign service because it promises, in their words, the boa vida ( goodlife ).24Courses at the institute are taught conservatively and stress memoriza-tion. Legal training is emphasized to a degree seemingly out of propor-tion with its importance in the practice of modern international rela-tions. Of the twenty courses taken by the students during the two yearattendance at the school, one-third could be considered of a legal nature.Only two courses in economics are required. Modern political sciencetechniques are either ignored or unknown by the staff, and the onecourse in international relations is merely a survey of the entire field.The new director, young and urbane Ambassador Antonio Correa doLago, has plans for making some adjustments in the curriculum, butapparently law courses will continue to predominate. Ambassador Correado Lago says, We believe in the legal approach to political science.' 25Political science in Brazil is hardly a recognized discipline and coursesthat do exist, with few exceptions, rely heavily on legal training orbecome mere sessions in polemics. The study of international relationsas pursued in the United States is almost nonexistent in Brazil. Thebibliography in the Portuguese language is scanty, and instruction mustrely on English and French books. Specialists in the subject are mainlyof three types: the diplomats who prefer to speak twenty years later,the journalists who are only interested in the highly dramatic aspectsof the field, and the professors of international law.The course load of the institute is heavy, with students taking ninecourses the first year and eleven the second year. As a consequencestudents have little time to reflect on what they are taught. There islittle time to study during the day, and the free time the student doeshave between courses is used to relax, talk in groups, and drinkcafezinhos-all very understandable. Many students develop an almostdefeatist attitude regarding the great volume of work demanded of themand as a consequence do almost none of the assigned work. AmbassadorCorrea do Lago recognizes that a reduction in the number of coursesis necessary. He also feels that courses should be taught using theseminar method.28

    24Twenty-five students considering careers in the diplomatic service were inter-viewed by this author. Sixty-eight percent of the respondents replied that they wereinterested in the foreign service because it promised the good life while another20 percent answered that they wished to travel.25Personal interview with Ambassador Antonio Correa do Lago, 1 July 1966, 5:00P.M. at the Rio Branco Institute.26It should be noted that the seminar method is not applicable to every type ofcourse. Since many courses at the Rio Branco are rudimentary, with students havinghad no previous experience with the subject matter, the degree to which seminars willbe successful is quiestionable.

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    Most students at the institute are not outwardly critical of Brazilianforeign policy (a recent class at the U.S. Foreign Service Instituteincluded several students who were opposed, for example, to U.S. policyin Vietnam). No doubt some Rio Branco students do object to certainaspects of Brazilian foreign policy, but they are careful not to articulatetheir opinions outside the school.27 The students are less reticent, how-ever, in discussing issues of domestic policy, and there was some verbalopposition at the school during 1966 over the conduct of the nationalelections. Although students at the Rio Branco (like most students inBrazil) talk about the social problems of their country, most are notactivists. There is little interest, for example, in volunteering for workin the favelas of Rio. Of course, the students have almost no free timefrom their studies, and it should be remembered that social service inthe community has generally Ino tradition among Brazilian students.A final eduicational problem at the institute perhaps worthy of mentionis that little contact exists between students and professors outside theclassroom. After a class adjourns most professors immediately leave thebuilding. The main reason for this situation is that many professorsat the institute, as at most universities in Brazil, hold more than oneteaching or professional position in order to survive financially. Perhapssalaries at the Rio Branco should be increased so that the professors candevote all of their professional attention to their students.In spite of these educational problems, and probably in spite of thetraining itself, the foreign service of Brazil continues to consist of highlyqualified personnel. Outstanding diplomats such as Jose Oswaldo deMeira Penna, the bright and aggressive former assistant secretary forEastern Europe and Asia, and Arnaldo Vasconcellos, an accomplishedvioliniist and writer who was assistant secretary for American affairs,among others, continue to serve Brazil in top career positions.Women have attained high positions of responsibility in the Brazilianforeign service. One highly competent woman, Maria de Lourdes deVincenzi, was assistant secretary for international organizational affairs.Another female diplomat, Dona Dora Vasconcellos, serves as Brazil'samnbassador o Catnada.28Brazilian diplomats are generally satisfied with their careers, but manyforeign service officers complain of the extremely low pay for service inRio. A first secretary hardly receives enough money to rent an apartmentwhen assigned to the Itamarati. Most officers save while abroad sincevarious overseas allowances p)rovide Brazilian diplomats with handsomeincomes. Some diplomats return with cars from overseas and live in Rioon profits earned fromnelling the cars.A sonmewhatmore serious problem than low pay concerns professionalidentity, a stubject which has stimulated a basic conflict within theBraziliani foreign service. The internal dissension originated in the 1950's,and the areal of disagreement now includes not only the methods of27Brazilian historian Jose Hon6rio Rodrigues claims that the secrecy which charac-terizes the Brazilian foreign service was inherited from Portuguese colonialism. SeeJose Honorio Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press,1965), p. 314.28Four percent of Brazilian diplomats are women. Between 1964 and 1966, theBrazilian foreign service had twenty-nine female members. MRE, Anuario 1964 a 1966,statistics were computed by the author.

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    A Critique of the Brazilian Foreign Service 387

    operating the Foreign Nlinistry, such as recruiitmentand training of newpersonnel, but also the basic aims of Brazilian foreign policy. In thelate 1940's several young Brazilian diplomats went abroad (mainly tothe United States) to study economics. This group incltuded RobertoCampos, Octavio Dias Carneiro, and Joao Baptista Piinheiro.29 Havingspecialized ability and high competence, these men were exceptional androse rapidly in the career during the early 1950's, but at the same timethey developed an awareness that Brazil was having difficulty in formu-lating a successful foreign economic policy. It seemed obvious to thesemen that the future effectiveness of Brazilian foreign policy woulddepend largely upon Brazil's possession of a highly specialized foreignservice. A new trend was begun when the grotupbegan urging thatyoung diplomats receive specialized education. The economist-diplomatsargued that Brazilian diplomats would attain a more clearly definedsense of their role in society if this trend was followed.As the number of economists in the foreign service increased in thelatter 1950's, there emerged a conflict with the members of the servicewho thought of themselves as political specialists. At present the mod-ernizers, as the economists call themselves, have the allegiance ofapproximately 10 percent of Brazilian diplomats. The generalists, whoterm themselves political specialists but aredesignated traditionalistsby the economists, also constitute about 10 percent of the foreign servicemembership. Each group, therefore, depends upon the support of nearlysixty individuals. The rest of the diplomats have assumed various pos-tures of relative neutrality.Some generalists have viewed the trend toward specialization asunsavory, believing that a true diplomat is a generalist and that special-ization is undesirable. Others have had personal identity crises. Theyhave become aware of the lack of specificity in their own roles, andin some cases this has also created anxiety and hostility towards theeconomists. Sarcastic remarks about the economic racket and econo-mists monopolizing trips to international conferences ' are often madeby the generalists.Members of the Itamarati are generally more competent than otherBrazilian bureaucrats, and the specialization of the economists hashelped them to procure appointments of prestige and influence in othergovernment organs. The economic specialists in the foreign service havereceived positions, for example, in the highest levels of the NationalDevelopment Bank and the Superintendency of Money and Credit(SUMOC). This has contributed to the antagonism the hard core gener-alists maintain towards their economically oriented colleagues.The traditionalists and the modernizers are in disagreement over thestructure of the foreign service. The generalists believe that the serviceonly needs adjustments while the economists feel that basic reformsare required. As one admitted modernizer reported to the author, TheMinistry is a one legged animal. It only has an operational leg anddoes not have an intelligence and planning leg. This implies that areformulation of the entire definition of competence is needed sinceintelligence requires highly specialized training in economics and thesocial sciences.

    29Carneiro received a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Baptistaan M.A. from Berkeley, while Campos studied at George Washington University.

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    One economist suggests that the Rio Branco Institute provide a fouryear course leading to the bachelor's degree for new diplomats. The fouryear course would include extensive training in the social sciences andwould be followed by a two year course in which each student wouldspecialize in one of the following: international relations, political theory,international economic relations, or international administration.30Some modernizers wish to eliminate the present strict language exami-nations required of students entering the Rio Branco. They feel thatadvanced language proficiency discriminates against candidates who arenot members of the upper middle and the upper classes. It is suggestedthat entering students only be required to demonstrate ability to readEnglish and French since many of the books used in the school arewritten in these languages. Intensive language training, with the assis-tance of modern electronic language laboratories, would be provided forstudents who were unable to speak foreign languages fluently. Russian,German, and Spanish instruction would be provided as well as Englishand French.3'Many of the modernizers believe that the 1966 reforms did little morethan formalize past practices and increase personnel, while the structureof the foreign service was not greatly affected. The specialists say thatthe prestige of the Foreign Ministry for too long has been associatedwith the glory brought to Brazil by a handful of men such as theBaron of Rio Branco but that the foreign service can not continue tolive on past achievements.mAnother issue producing altercations within the foreign service concernsthe proper orientation of Brazilian foreign policy. Although four foreignservice officers were expelled from the diplomatic corps after PresidentGoulart was removed from office by the 1964 coup, the highest rankingamong them being Jayme Rodrigues, some members of the service quietlycontinue to advocate an 'independent foreign policy for Brazil. Manydiplomats formerly favoring an independent foreign policy (i.e., a policydifferent from that pursued by the United States) were disillusioned by30The four year course would include, in part, the following: introduction to soci-ology, introduction to economics, introduction to political science, introduction tolaw, mathematic analysis in the social sciences, theory and methodology in politicalscience, econometrics, logic and scientific method, statistics, sociology of organization,introduction to psychology, theory of international relations, Brazilian governmentand administration, Brazilian constitutional law, commercial law, Brazilian diplomatichistory, civil law, economic analysis, public international law, ideology and politicsof Asia and Africa, ideology and politics of Latin America, ideology and politics ofthe United States, ideology and politics of the U.S.S.R., personality theory, theoryand problems of economic development, social psychology, private international law,structure and functions of the United Nations, organization and norms of consularaction, contemporary history, Brazilian economic history, ideology and politics ofWestern Europe, international economic relations, problems of economic developmentin Latin America, organization and norms of diplomatic action, and structure andfunction of the OAS.31The modernizers have advanced other specific proposals for the Rio Branco Insti-tute, including its removal to Brasilia. This suggestion has been opposed by sometraditionalists. One economist has even gone to the expense of having an architectdesign a new campus for the institute.32The results of Foreign Minister Rio Branco's foreign policy were so spectacularthat the Foreign Ministry now has an image of effectiveness which is unparalleled byany other Brazilian government agency, and unproductive foreign policy adventuresare usually not attributed to the Foreign Ministry by the public.

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    A Critique of the Brazilian Foreign Service 389

    the way Presidents Quadros and Goulart executed the policy and particu-larly by the position Brazil defended with regard to Cuba. Diplomats,considering professional security and advancement, are cautious and, atpresent, not eager to be identified with the foreign policy initiatives ofthe early 1960's. During Pio Correa's period as secretary general of theForeign Ministry, a post second in importance only to the foreign minis-ter's position, diplomats supporting an independent foreign policy wereso inhibited that they were even afraid to make their opinions knownwithin the Foreign Ministry.33 Compared to the number of officerschampioning a more or less traditional foreign policy for Brazil, theindependent group is small. Although there is no way of accuratelydetermining their composition, it seems, from casual observation, thatmore specialists than generalists support the independent position. Manyyoung diplomats and Rio Branco students also appear to be attractedby the concept of an independent foreign policy.Foreign diplomats in Brazil respect the Brazilian foreign service butare privately critical of some Brazilian practices. For example, manyBrazilian diplomats assigned to the Foreign Ministry work short hours,arriving at their offices at 10:30 or 11:00 A.M. Unfortunately, as wasdiscovered when President Quadros lengthened working hours generallyfor federal bureaucrats, a longer work day alone will not increase effi-ciency. During the short-lived Quadros reform, diplomats came to theiroffices at 8:00 A.M. but did little more than drink coffee and conversewith their friends during the additional working hours.Another criticism offered by foreign observers is that the Brazilianforeign service lacks a well developed public information organ.3 Thisdeficiency may be traced to the identity crisis discussed earlier sincesome diplomats are insecure in their role and fear drawing attention tothemselves. However, financial considerations are also a constraint onthe formation of dramatically enlarged information activities such as thedevelopment of a Brazilian information agency.An attitude which annoys many foreign diplomats, particularly thosefrom Africa, is the continuous flaunting by Brazilian diplomats of Brazil'sracial record of nondiscrimination. When a Negro was sent as Brazilianambassador to Ghana, he was not particularly well received because itwas thought that a Negro was purposely sent there in order to stressBrazilian racial harmony.Perhaps the most relevant foreign criticism of the' Brazilian foreignservice concerns the service's internal politics. Although politics are ofno help to a candidate in passing the Rio Branco entrance examinations,politics do play an important role in determining promotions and assign-ments once a person has entered the career-and highly placed relativescan be very helpful.Many attitudes of Brazilian foreign service officers are misunderstoodby the Brazilian public. Although it is true that many Brazilian officers33When Costa e Silva assumed the presidency in early 1967, Pio was appointedambassador to Argentina, a position many of his critics thought was well suited tohis supposedly authoritarian manner.341t is interesting to note that Brazilian information bulletins distributed by theBrazilian embassy in Washington are written in Portuguese, thereby drastically reduc-ing the number of Americans who can read about Brazil.

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    are strong proponents of French culture and give the misleading impres-sion of being dilettantes because of their continuous and often pompousdiscussion of French or European culture,3 many Brazilian diplomatsare true intellectuals, spending much of their free time writing prose orverse, painting, or playing and listening to music. It is no longer true,however, that all Brazilian diplomats feel poetry, music, and theaterto be more important to Brazilian diplomacy than a knowledge ofeconomics. The time has passed when Brazilian diplomats could ac-curately be accused of being playboys.Perhaps the Brazilian diplomat is not looked upon by his fellowcountrymen as well as he deserves; the rumor, similar to the one thatcirculated in the United States during the McCarthy era about theAmerican foreign service, that the Brazilian diplomat is a homosexualis current but without foundation. These ugly rumors stem mainly fromthe affectations of some diplomats and the exclusiveness of their socialcircle.Brazilian intellectuals have made somewhat more profound observa-tions on the foreign service than the general public. Several Brazilianscholars have criticized the foreign service, and perhaps the most presti-gious Brazilian historian, Jose Honorio Rodrigues, has been one of themost vehement in his complaints. In his recent book Interesse Nacionale Politica Externa ( National Interest and Foreign Policy ), Rodriguesstated that The Itamarati is a very closed and self-sufficient organiza-tion where all the heads, of all the specialties, can be held only bycareer diplomats.' '6 He added that this situation prevents the Itamaratifrom receiving advice from independent scholars. Rodrigues also lamentedthe class influence in the Foreign Ministry which permits restrictionsand discriminations to be imposed upon entrance into the career.Recognizing and replying to many of the reproofs of the foreign service,Ambassador J. 0. de Meira Penna has written in his latest book, PoliticaExterna: Seguranqa & Desenvolvimento ( Foreign Policy: Security andDevelopment ), thatThe Brazilian diplomatic service is frequently accused of constituting a proudcaste of its own prerogatives, unassociated with and deaf to the deepest yearningsof their own people, or similarly-according to the shibboleth so agreeable to theintellectuality of the left-an estranged profession. As a member of this caste, Iam not able to judge the validity of these accusations. I will say at least that thefailings and vices of the career are appropriate to it, or the same ones Brazilhas in general. Personalism, the clique habit, an extreme tolerance of abuses,and the frequent impunity of the powerful and corrupt, the difficulties of working ina team, performance, in which the soft life and almost brilliant improvisation is asubstitute for efficiency are no more the shortcomings of the personnel of theItamaraty than they are of any other branch of the Brazilian public service. TheItamaraty, however, is one of the few truly Brazilian institutions. And it is onlyinstitutions-firm, stable and dynamic-which create the greatness of a people. Asidefrom this, recruiting for this career, done by the strict method of tests and examina-350f the 550 diplomats listed in the Foreign Ministry's Anuario 1964 a 1966, fifty-

    two were born overseas. Nineteen foreign service officers were born in France, five inItaly, four in Portugal, and four in Argentina. Seventy-five diplomats have takenuniversity level courses outside of Brazil. Thirty-nine, including nineteen in Franceand fourteen in Britain, studied in Europe. Twenty-seven officers attended Americanuniversities.36Rodrigues, lnteresse Nacional e Politica Externa (Rio de Janeiro: CivilizaqAoBrasileira, 1966), p. 41.

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    A Critique of the Brazilian Foreign Service 391

    tions, open to any candidate, is the most democratic method possible. We no longeruse the system in which the Presidents of the Republic appoint for this career, theirgod children, friends or the nephews of their political coreligionists, and it is onlythis kind of recruiting system that is likely to create a caste.37In the final analysis and in spite of criticisms, it must be emphasizedthat the Brazilian foreign service has had a long and fine tradition. Itcan be credited with a wide variety of achievements ranging from thesophisticated and ideally diplomatic settling of important boundarydisputes to its more recent contribution towards the advancement ofinternational arms control (1961-64). Hopefully, the Brazilian foreignservice will continue to assist Brazil in her thrust forward towardsnational development and international leadership.

    37J. 0. de Meira Penna, Politica Externa: Seguranqa & Desenvolvimento (Rio deJaneiro: Agir, 1967), pp. 14-15.

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