Romania

Romania

LAVINIA STAN1 & RAZVAN ZAHARIA2

1Concordia University, Canada; 2Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania

Background

According to the 1991 Constitution and its 2003 amendments, Romania is asemi-presidential republic with a bicameral parliament whose 332 deputiesand 137 senators are elected for four-year terms according to a system ofproportional representation with closed party lists and a national threshold of5 per cent for individual political parties and 8 per cent for multiparty coali-tions. A total of 18 seats in the Chamber of Deputies are set aside for repre-sentatives of national minorities other than Transylvanian Hungarians. TheChamber of Deputies and the Senate have identical responsibilities – a con-stitutional oversight making for a lengthy legislative process, low efficiencyand high levels of popular distrust toward the house and its members. ThePresident is directly elected for a maximum of two five-year terms in a French-inspired runoff system. Except for the 1990 elections, all other presidentialpolls were won in the second round with a majority of the national vote. Aswell as assuming the role of commander-in-chief, the President can dismissprime ministers and ministers, veto laws adopted by the legislature, call fornational referenda, and dissolve a deadlocked Parliament and call for earlyelections (Articles 91–94).

The country has a multiparty system with a better organized left and achronically fragmented right. Nationalist, chauvinistic and antisemiticmembers of the former Communist Party and its repressive state securityservice, the notorious Securitate, have gathered around the Party forRomanian National Unity (PUNR, now defunct) and the Greater RomaniaParty (PRM), led by charismatic poet Corneliu Vadim Tudor – an ardentsupporter of Ceausescu and his nationalist policies. The political left has beenrepresented primarily by the two wings of the National Salvation Front, suc-cessor to the Communist Party. In the early 1990s, the Front split into theconservative Party of Social Democracy (later renamed the Social DemocraticParty, or PSD), part of the European Socialist group and the reformist Demo-cratic Party (PD, a member of the European People’s Party since 2004). The

1082 European Journal of Political Research 46: 1082–1095, 2007doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2007.00754.x

© 2007 The Author(s)Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden,MA 02148, USA

Tabl

e1.

Ele

ctio

nsto

the

Cha

mbe

rof

Dep

utie

s

Dat

eof

elec

tion

:28

Nov

embe

r20

04To

taln

umbe

rof

seat

s:31

4(e

lect

ed)*

+18

assi

gned

toet

hnic

min

orit

ies

othe

rth

anth

eH

unga

rian

s=

332

Ele

ctor

ate:

18,4

49,3

44vo

ters

Tota

lvot

esca

st:

10,7

87,7

47(5

8.49

%)

Tota

lval

idvo

tes:

10,1

88,1

06(9

4.44

%)

Par

tyN

umbe

ran

dpe

rcen

tage

ofvo

tes

Per

cent

age

chan

gesi

nce

2000

Num

ber

and

perc

enta

geof

seat

sC

hang

esi

nce

2000

Uni

unea

Nat

iona

laP

SD+P

UR

–N

atio

nalU

nion

PSD

+PU

R1,

23,

730,

352

(36.

6)0.

0313

2(3

9.7)

-233

Alia

nta

Dre

ptat

esi

Ade

var

–Ju

stic

ean

dTr

uth

Alli

ance

(DA

)43,

191,

546

(31.

3)+1

7.45

112

(33.

8)+5

15

Par

tidul

Rom

ania

Mar

e–

Gre

ater

Rom

ania

Par

ty(P

RM

)1,

316,

751

(12.

9)-6

.548

(14.

5)-3

6U

niun

eaD

emoc

rata

aM

aghi

arilo

rdi

nR

oman

ia–

Dem

ocra

tic

Uni

onof

Mag

yars

inR

oman

ia(U

DM

R)

628,

125

(6.2

)-0

.622

(6.6

)-5

Par

tidul

Nou

aG

ener

atie

–N

ewG

ener

atio

nP

arty

(PN

G)

227,

443

(2.2

)+2

.0–

–P

artid

ulN

atio

nalT

aran

esc

Cre

stin

Dem

ocra

t–

Nat

iona

lC

hris

tian

Dem

ocra

tP

easa

ntP

arty

(PN

TC

D)6,

7

188,

268

(1.8

)-3

.2–

–

Oth

ers2

905,

621

(8.9

)-9

.2–

–E

thni

cm

inor

itie

sot

her

than

the

Hun

gari

ans

––

18(5

.4)

–

Not

es:

*T

hesi

zeof

the

low

erch

ambe

ris

esta

blis

hed

acco

rdin

gto

a‘r

epre

sent

atio

nqu

ota’

of1

depu

tyfo

rev

ery

70,0

00in

habi

tant

s.Fo

llow

ing

apo

pula

tion

decr

ease

,th

enu

mbe

rof

elec

ted

seat

sfo

rth

eC

ham

ber

ofD

eput

ies

was

adju

sted

from

327

to31

4.1

The

Nat

iona

lUni

onis

anel

ecto

ralc

oalit

ion

ofth

eP

artid

ulSo

cial

Dem

ocra

t–

Soci

alD

emoc

rati

cP

arty

(PSD

)an

dth

eP

artid

ulU

man

istd

inR

oman

ia–

Hum

anis

tP

arty

ofR

oman

ia(P

UR

).O

fth

eco

alit

ion’

s13

2se

ats,

113

wer

eal

loca

ted

toth

eP

SDan

d19

toth

eP

UR

.2O

n7

May

2005

,the

Hum

anis

tPar

tyof

Rom

ania

(PU

R)

chan

ged

its

nam

eto

the

Con

serv

ativ

eP

arty

(PC

).3

Inth

e20

00el

ecti

ons,

the

PSD

(bac

kth

enna

med

Par

tidul

Dem

ocra

tieiS

ocia

ledi

nR

oman

ia–

Par

tyof

Soci

alD

emoc

racy

ofR

oman

ia(P

DSR

))co

ntes

ted

the

elec

tion

sto

geth

erw

ith

Par

tidul

Soci

alD

emoc

ratR

oman

–R

oman

ian

Soci

alD

emoc

rat

Par

ty(P

SDR

and

the

PU

R)

asth

eP

olul

Dem

ocra

tSoc

iald

inR

oman

ia–

Soci

alD

emoc

rat

Pole

(or

Blo

c)of

Rom

ania

(PD

SR).

Aft

erth

e20

00el

ecti

ons,

the

PSD

Rw

asin

corp

orat

edin

toth

eP

DSR

,whi

chch

ange

dit

sna

me

toP

SDin

the

proc

ess.

The

PU

Rco

ntes

ted

both

2000

and

2004

elec

tion

sto

geth

erw

ith

PD

SR/P

SD.T

here

sult

sof

the

PSD

/PU

Rco

alit

ion

inth

e20

04el

ecti

ons

have

been

com

pare

dw

ith

thos

eof

the

PD

SRin

2000

.4

The

Just

ice

and

Trut

hA

llian

ce(D

A)

isan

elec

tora

lcoa

litio

nof

the

Par

tidul

Nat

iona

lLib

eral

–N

atio

nalL

iber

alP

arty

(PN

L)

and

Par

tidul

Dem

ocra

t–D

emoc

rati

cP

arty

(PD

).O

fthe

coal

itio

n’s

112

seat

s,64

wer

eal

loca

ted

toth

eP

NL

and

48to

the

PD

.5C

ompa

red

toth

eco

mbi

ned

resu

ltof

the

PN

Lan

dP

Din

2000

.6In

the

2000

elec

tion

s,th

eP

NC

TD

ran

wit

hso

me

smal

ler

part

ies

asth

eC

onve

ntia

Dem

ocra

taR

oman

a–

Rom

ania

nD

emoc

rati

cC

onve

ntio

n(C

DR

2000

).7

Vot

esob

tain

edby

polit

ical

form

atio

nsun

able

tow

inpa

rlia

men

tary

repr

esen

tati

onbe

caus

eof

the

5pe

rce

ntna

tion

alth

resh

old.

Incl

udes

vote

sob

tain

edby

part

ies

and

asso

ciat

ions

repr

esen

ting

the

18et

hnic

min

orit

ies.

Sour

ces:

Bir

oulE

lect

oral

Cen

tral

(ww

w.b

ec20

04.r

o);P

olit

ical

Tran

sfor

mat

ion

and

the

Ele

ctor

alP

roce

ssin

Post

-Com

mun

ist

Eur

ope

(ww

w.e

ssex

.ac.

uk/e

lect

ions

).

romania 1083

© 2007 The Author(s)Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)

http://www.bec2004.ro



http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections





Tabl

e2.

Ele

ctio

nsto

the

Sena

te

Dat

eof

elec

tion

:28

Nov

embe

r20

04

Tota

lnum

ber

ofse

ats:

137*

Ele

ctor

ate:

18,4

49,3

44vo

ters

Tota

lvot

esca

st:

10,7

94,6

53(5

8.51

%)

Tota

lval

idvo

tes:

10,2

31,4

76(9

4.78

%)

Par

ty**

Num

ber

and

perc

enta

geof

vote

sP

erce

ntag

ech

ange

sinc

e20

00N

umbe

ran

dpe

rcen

tage

ofse

ats

Cha

nge

sinc

e20

00

Uni

unea

Nat

iona

laP

SD+P

UR

–N

atio

nalU

nion

PSD

+PU

R1

3,79

8,60

7(3

7.2)

+0.1

57(4

1.6)

-8A

liant

aD

rept

ate

siA

deva

r–

Just

ice

and

Trut

hA

llian

ce(D

A)2

3,25

0,66

3(3

1.8)

+16.

749

(35.

8)+2

3

Par

tidul

Rom

ania

Mar

e–

Gre

ater

Rom

ania

Par

ty(P

RM

)1,

394,

698

(13.

6)-7

.421

(15.

3)-1

6

Uni

unea

Dem

ocra

taa

Mag

hiar

ilor

din

Rom

ania

–D

emoc

rati

cU

nion

ofM

agya

rsin

Rom

ania

(UD

MR

)63

7,10

9(6

.2)

-0.7

10(7

.3)

-2

Par

tidul

Nou

aG

ener

atie

–N

ewG

ener

atio

nP

arty

(PN

G)

241,

486

(2.3

)+2

.0–

–

Par

tidul

Nat

iona

lTar

anes

cC

rest

inD

emoc

rat

–N

atio

nalC

hris

tian

Dem

ocra

tP

easa

ntP

arty

(PN

TC

D)

196,

027

(1.9

)n/

a–

–

Oth

ers

712,

886

(7.0

)n/

a–

–

Not

es:

*T

hesi

zeof

the

uppe

rch

ambe

ris

esta

blis

hed

acco

rdin

gto

a‘r

epre

sent

atio

nqu

ota’

of1

depu

tyfo

rev

ery

160,

000

inha

bita

nts.

Follo

win

ga

popu

lati

onde

crea

se,t

henu

mbe

rof

seat

sfo

rth

eSe

nate

was

adju

sted

from

140

to13

7.**

See

note

sto

Tabl

e1.

1O

fthe

57se

ats

for

the

Nat

iona

lU

nion

,46

wer

eal

loca

ted

toth

eP

SDan

d11

toth

eP

UR

.2O

fth

e49

seat

sfo

rth

eD

A,2

8w

ere

allo

cate

dto

the

PN

Lan

d21

toth

eP

D.

Sour

ces:

Bir

oul

Ele

ctor

alC

entr

al(w

ww

.bec

2004

.ro)

;Po

litic

alTr

ansf

orm

atio

nan

dth

eE

lect

oral

Pro

cess

inPo

st-C

omm

unis

tE

urop

e(w

ww

.ess

ex.a

c.uk

/ele

ctio

ns).

1084 lavinia stan & razvan zaharia










Tabl

e3.

Res

ults

ofth

epr

esid

enti

alel

ecti

ons

Firs

tR

ound

Seco

ndR

ound

Dat

eof

elec

tion

:28

Nov

embe

r20

0412

Dec

embe

r20

04E

lect

orat

e:18

,449

,676

18,4

49,6

76To

talv

otes

cast

:10

,794

,653

(58.

51%

)10

,112

,262

(54.

81%

)To

talv

alid

vote

s:10

,452

,205

(96.

83%

)10

,008

,314

(98.

97%

)

Can

dida

teP

arty

Firs

tR

ound

Seco

ndR

ound

Num

ber

and

perc

enta

geof

vote

sN

umbe

ran

dpe

rcen

tage

ofvo

tes

Adr

ian

Nas

tase

Par

tidul

Soci

alD

emoc

rat

–So

cial

Dem

ocra

tic

Par

ty(P

SD)

4,27

8,86

4(4

0.94

)4,

881,

520

(48.

77)

Trai

anB

ases

cuA

liant

aD

rept

ate

siA

deva

r–

Just

ice

and

Trut

hA

llian

ce(D

A)

3,54

5,23

6(3

3.92

)5,

126,

794

(51.

23)

Cor

neliu

Vad

imTu

dor

Par

tidul

Rom

ania

Mar

e–

Gre

ater

Rom

ania

Par

ty(P

RM

)1,

313,

714

(12.

57)

Mar

koB

ela

Uni

unea

Dem

ocra

taa

Mag

hiar

ilor

din

Rom

ania

–D

emoc

rati

cU

nion

ofM

agya

rsin

Rom

ania

(UD

MR

)53

3,44

6(5

.10)

Ghe

orgh

eC

orio

lan

Ciu

hand

ruP

artid

ulN

atio

nalT

aran

esc

Cre

stin

Dem

ocra

t–

Nat

iona

lPea

sant

Chr

isti

an-D

emoc

rat

Par

ty(P

NT

CD

)19

8,39

4(1

.90)

Geo

rge

Bec

ali

Par

tidul

Nou

aG

ener

atie

–N

ewG

ener

atio

nP

arty

(PN

G)

184,

560

(1.7

7)P

etre

Rom

anFo

rta

Dem

ocra

ta–

Dem

ocra

tic

Forc

e(F

D)

140,

702

(1.3

5)G

heor

ghe

Din

uIn

depe

nden

t11

3,32

1(1

.08)

Mar

ian

Pet

reM

ilut

Act

iune

aP

opul

ara

–Po

pula

rA

ctio

n(A

P)

43,3

78(0

.42)

Ovi

diu

Tudo

rici

Uni

unea

pent

ruR

econ

stru

ctia

Rom

anie

i–

Uni

onfo

rR

oman

ia’s

Rec

onst

ruct

ion

(UR

R)

37,9

10(0

.36)

Aur

elia

nR

adul

escu

Alia

nta

Pop

ular

aC

rest

inD

emoc

rata

–C

hris

tian

Dem

ocra

tP

eopl

e’s

Alli

ance

(AP

CD

)35

,455

(0.3

4)

Ale

xand

ruR

ajTu

naru

Par

tidul

Tin

eret

ului

Dem

ocra

t–

Dem

ocra

tic

You

thP

arty

(PT

D)

27,2

25(0

.26)

Sour

ce:

Bir

oulE

lect

oral

Cen

tral

(ww

w.b

ec20

04.r

o).

romania 1085





Table 4. Cabinet composition of Calin Popescu-Tariceanu I

A. The party composition of Calin Popescu-Tariceanu I:

Date of investiture: 29 December 2004

Party

Number andpercentage of

parliamentary seats

Number andpercentage ofcabinet posts

Partidul National Liberal – NationalLiberal Party (PNL)

64 (19.2) 10 (40.0)

Partidul Democrat – Democratic Party (PD) 48 (14.5) 8 (32.0)*

Uniunea Democrata a Maghiarilor dinRomania – Democratic Union ofMagyars in Romania (UDMR)

22 (6.6) 4 (16.0)

Partidul Umanist din Romania –Humanist Party of Romania (PUR)

19 (5.7) 3 (12.0)

B. Cabinet members of Calin Popescu-Tariceanu:

Prime Minister/Primul Ministru: Calin Popescu-Tariceanu (1951 male, PNL)

State Minister for Coordinating Economic Activity/Ministrul de stat pentru coordonareaactivitatilor economice: Adriean Videanu (1962 male, PD)

State Minister for Coordinating Cultural, Educational and European IntegrationActivities/Ministrul de stat pentru coordonarea activitatilor din domeniile culturii,invatamantului si integrarii europene: Bela Marko (1951 male, UDMR)

State Minister for Coordinating Business Activities and Small and Medium-sizeEnterprises/Ministrul de stat pentru coordonarea activitatilor din domeniile mediuluide afaceri si intreprinderilor mici si mijlocii: Gheorghe Copos (1953 male, PUR)

Minister of Justice/Ministrul justitiei: Monica Luisa Macovei (1960 female, Ind)

Minister of Public Finance/Ministrul finantelor publice: Ionut Popescu (1964 male, PNL)

Minister of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family/Ministrul muncii, solidaritatii sociale sifamiliei: Gheorghe Barbu (1951 male, PD)

Minister of European Integration/Ministrul integrarii europene: Ene Dinga (1958 male,PD)

Minister of External Affairs/Ministrul afacerilor externe: Mihai Razvan Ungureanu(1968 male, PNL)

Minister of Public Administration and Interior/Ministrul administratiei si internelor:Vasile Blaga (1956 male, PD)

Minister of Economy and Trade/Ministrul economiei si comertului: Codrut Ioan Seres(1969 male, PUR)

Minister of National Defense/Ministrul apararii nationale: Teodor Atanasiu (1962 male,PNL)

Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development/Ministrul agriculturii,padurilor si dezvoltarii rurale: Gheorghe Flutur (1960 male, PNL)



right has been represented primarily by the reconstituted pre-communistChristian-Democrat Peasant Party (PNTCD) and the National Liberal Party(PNL). The Democratic Union of Magyars in Romania (UDMR) – anumbrella organization including a number of parties and civic groups – cham-pions the interests of the Transylvanian Hungarians.

The constitution recognizes Romania as a unitary state with no autono-mous regions, divided into the city of Bucharest and 41 counties situated in thehistorical regions of Transylvania, Walachia and Moldova. Local administra-tion is formed of elected mayors, deputy mayors and local councils at village,town and city levels, and elected councils and appointed prefects at countylevel. This structure has become progressively more decentralized since theearly 1990s, but remains overstaffed, wasteful and corrupt.Villages with barely

Table 4. Continued.

Minister of Transportation, Construction and Tourism/Ministrul transporturilor,constructiilor si turismului: Gheorghe Dobre (1948 male, PD)

Minister of Education and Research/Ministrul educatiei si cercetarii: Mircea Miclea(1963 male, PD)

Minister of Culture and Religious Affairs/Ministrul culturii si cultelor: Monica OctaviaMusca (1949 female, PNL)

Minister of Health/Ministrul sanatatii: Mircea Cinteza (1950 male, PNL)

Minister of Communications and Information Technology/Ministrul comunicatiilor sitehnologiei informatiei: Zsolt Nagy (1971 male, UDMR)

Minister of Environment and Water Management/Ministrul mediului si gospodaririiapelor: Sulfina Barbu (1967 female, PD)

Minister Delegate for Coordination of the General Secretariat of Government/Ministrul delegat pentru coordinarea Secretariatului General al Guvernului: MihaiAlexandru Voicu (1968 male, PNL)

Minister Delegate for Controlling Implementation of Internationally-financedPrograms and Monitoring the Application of the Acquis Communautaire/Ministrudelegat pentru controlul implementarii programelor cu finantare internationala siurmarirea aplicarii acquisului comunitar: Cristian David (1967 male, PNL)

Minister Delegate for Coordination of the Financial Guard/Ministrul delegat pentrucoordonarea autoritatilor de control: Sorin Vicol (1970 male, PUR)

Minister Delegate for the Relationship with Parliament/Ministrul delegat pentru relatiacu Parlamentul: Bogdan Olteanu (1971 male, PNL)

Minister Delegate for Public Works and Land Management/Ministrul delegat pentrulucrari publice si amenajarea teritoriului: Laszlo Borbely (1954 male, UDMR)

Minister Delegate for Commerce/Ministrul delegat pentru comert: Iuliu Winkler (1964male, UDMR)

Note: * Including Minister Monica Macovei, an independent occupying a position reserved-for the Democratic Party.

romania 1087


Table 5. Cabinet composition of Calin Popescu-Tariceanu I

Changes during 2005:Minister Delegate for Coordination of the Financial Guard/Ministrul delegat pentru

coordonarea autoritatilor de control: Sorin Vicol (1970 male, PUR) resigned on 21 JanuaryState Minister for Coordinating Economic Activity/Ministrul de stat pentru coordonarea

activitatilor economice: Adriean Videanu (1962 male, PD), resigned and was replaced byGheorghe Seculici (1953 male, PD), on 20 March

Minister of Culture and Religious Affairs/Ministrul culturii si cultelor: Monica OctaviaMusca (1949 female, PNL) resigned and was replaced by Adrian Iorgulescu (1951 male,PNL) on 28 July

Minister of Health/Ministrul sanatatii: Mircea Cinteza (1950 male, PNL) resigned and wasreplaced by Eugen Gheorghe Nicolaescu (1955 male, PNL) on 3 August

Minister of Public Finance/Ministrul finantelor publice: Ionut Popescu (1964 male, PNL)resigned and was replaced by Sebastian Vladescu (1958 male, PNL) on 3 August

Minister of European Integration/Ministrul integrarii europene: Ene Dinga (1958 male, PD)resigned and was replaced by Anca Daniela Boagiu (1968 female, PD) on 3 August

State Minister for Coordinating Economic Activity/Ministrul de stat pentru coordonareaactivitatilor economice: Gheorghe Seculici (1953 male, PD), resigned and was replaced byGheorghe Pogea (1955 male, PD) on 21 August

Minister of Education and Research/Ministrul educatiei si cercetarii: Mircea Miclea (1963male, PD) resigned and was replaced by Mihail Hardau (1947 male, PD) on 11 October

Changes during 2006:Minister Delegate for the Relationship with Parliament/Ministrul delegat pentru relatia cu

Parlamentul: Bogdan Olteanu (1971 male, PNL) resigned and was replaced by MihaiAlexandru Voicu (1968 male, PNL) on 20 March

State Minister for Coordinating Business Activities and Small and Medium-sizeEnterprises/Ministrul de stat pentru coordonarea activitatilor din domeniile mediului deafaceri si intreprinderilor mici si mijlocii: Gheorghe Copos (1953 male, PUR), resigned andwas replaced by Bogdan Pascu (1967 male, PUR) on 1 June; Pascu resigned on 4December

Minister Delegate for Coordination of the General Secretariat of Government/Ministruldelegat pentru coordinarea Secretariatului General al Guvernului: Mihai Alexandru Voicu(1968 male, PNL) resigned and was replaced by Radu Stroe (1949 male, PNL) on 2 June

State Minister for Coordinating Economic Activity/Ministrul de stat pentru coordonareaactivitatilor economice: Gheorghe Pogea (1955 male, PD) resigned on 12 June

Minister of Transportation, Constructions and Tourism/Ministrul transporturilor, constructiilorsi turismului: Gheorghe Dobre (1948 male, PD) resigned and was replaced by Radu MirceaBerceanu (1953 male, PD) on 13 June

Minister of National Defense/Ministrul apararii nationale: Teodor Atanasiu (1962 male, PNL)resigned and was replaced by Sorin Frunzaverde (1960 male, PD) on 26 October

Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development/Ministrul agriculturii, padurilor sidezvoltarii rurale: Gheorghe Flutur (1960 male, PNL) resigned and was replaced by DanMotreanu (1970 male, PNL) on 6 December

Minister of Economy and Trade/Ministrul economiei si comertului: Codrut Ioan Seres (1969male, PUR) resigned and was replaced by Varujan Vosganian (1958 male, PNL) on 11December



10,000 inhabitants are represented by as many as 17 council members, whilethe smallest county is represented by as many as 31 council members. Thefunctions and responsibilities of the appointed prefect and of the electedcounty council president overlap significantly. Public opinion polls showthat ordinary citizens feel disconnected from an administration they perceiveas corrupt, inefficient, arrogant and largely working for its own group andpersonal interests.

Parliamentary and presidential elections were organized simultaneously in1990, 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004, and were (with the exception of the 1990 poll)largely perceived as free and fair. Ion Iliescu, a former communist officialsidelined by dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, acted as president from 1990 to 1996,and then again from 2000 to 2004. University of Bucharest geology professorEmil Constantinescu occupied that position from 1996 to 2000. In 2004, formership captain Traian Basescu won the presidential election.

All post-1991 parliamentary polls allowed for alternation between govern-ment and opposition. Although Romania experienced strict communist ruleunder Nicolae Ceausescu and its exit from communism was the bloodiest inthe region, Iliescu and his Salvation Front won the 1990 elections. Fragmented,cash-strapped and poorly organized, the newly constituted pro-democraticpolitical parties failed to win the 1992 election. They did win parliamentaryrepresentation, which they used to challenge the half-hearted reforms pro-moted by the Social Democrat cabinet of Nicolae Vacaroiu.The 1996 electionsallowed the PNTCD and the PNL (united as the Democratic Convention) toform the government, together with the PD and the UDMR, but dissensionwithin the Convention and between governmental partners led to politicalinstability, unfulfilled electoral promises and over-bureaucratization. From1996 to 2000, Romania had three different premiers: Victor Ciorbea (1996–1998), Radu Vasile (1998–2000) and Mugur Isarescu (2000). The convention’seroded popularity allowed the PSD to make a comeback in 2000, and form agovernment with the help of the UDMR and the tiny PUR.

Post-communist Romania has struggled to bridge the gap that separates itfrom Central Europe, but its record is patchy. Politically, the country remainsunstable, divided and uncivil. It consistently ranks among the most corruptcountries in Europe (according to Transparency International’s CorruptionPerception Index). Economically, it has resisted reforms needed to transformits command, planned, communist economy into a functional free marketeconomy, yet surprised many by registering unprecedented economic growthafter 2000. Instead of benefiting the larger population, privatization allowedcommunist leaders and Securitate officers to assert control over the country’smost valuable assets. A number of high-ranking politicians have been taintedby corruption scandals revolving around shady privatization deals, preferential

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tenders and the use of public funds for private gain. In terms of foreign policy,Romania stayed clear of the war that gripped neighboring Yugoslavia in the1990s, and proved itself an important player in the Black Sea region, but itsaccession to the European Union (EU) occurred later than Central Europe’sand was arguably due less to its own ability to fulfill pre-accession require-ments and more to the EU’s goodwill.

Romania’s political priorities and problems

From the late 2004 elections to December 2006, the country’s political prio-rities and problems revolved around three major themes: reconsidering thecommunist past, intra-governmental dissensions, and accession to the EU.These are discussed in turn.

The communist past

Romania is a laggard in terms of transitional justice, the process of coming toterms with its repressive past, although it has many more reasons than itsneighboring countries to reassess that past. Thousands of pre-communistpoliticians, anticommunist critics, landowners and independent intellectualswere imprisoned in the 1950s. President Nicolae Ceausescu’s sultanism-cum-totalitarianism included a shameless cult of personality, personal rule byCeausescu’s family and friends, and thorough penetration of society by full-time officers and part-time informers of the Securitate.While Poland, Hungaryand the Czech Republic could claim to have gone some way towards elimi-nating former communist officials from post-communist politics, lustrationmade less progress in Romania. While Central Europe tried to replace thecommunist elite with untainted politicians, Romania allowed communist offi-cials to become its political leaders and wealthiest businessmen. Failure totackle the past is believed to be the root cause for pervading corruption.

Since 1989, the country has been deeply divided regarding its past, withsome people extolling the virtue of communist rule and arguing thatcommunist officials and secret agents have the right to shape the country’sdemocracy, and others decrying communist repression and contending thatcommunist decision makers and spies should be banned from politics. Thecommunist past decided the outcome of the 2004 presidential election. In atelevised confrontation with Social Democrat Adrian Nastase, Basescuadmitted membership of the Communist Party, but emphasized that thecountry ‘could not share the mentality of the communist regime fifteen yearsafter its collapse’ (Stan 2005: 10), thereby convincing voters of his sincerity



with regard to his own tainted past and his willingness to tackle one of themost sensitive issues dividing the country.

After assuming the presidency, Basescu was expected to make good on hispromise to unblock transitional justice. In an unprecedented step, in early2006, he ordered the Romanian Intelligence Service to surrender the bulk ofthe secret archive to the National Council for the Study of Securitate Archives(NCSSA), the legal custodian of the Securitate files. Some were files of top-ranking politicians sealed by the Constantinescu administration. The transferallowed the Council to resume its main functions: granting citizens access tosecret files compiled on them; and verifying the ties to the Securitate ofpoliticians, journalists, public university rectors and heads of economic units,among others. The file opening led to spectacular surprises when well knownor respected luminaries were unmasked as former agents.

In August 2006, Romania’s second most popular politician after Basescu,Liberal Mona Musca, admitted to having spied on students while teaching atthe University of Timisoara in the 1970s. Her downfall was disappointingbecause she had championed the lustration law and repeatedly called onpoliticians to reveal their past. She first appealed the verdict and then turnedto the courts when the NCSSA upheld its decision. A former Minister ofCulture, Musca retained her seat in the Chamber of Deputies while waiting forthe courts to hear her case. The wave of revelations spared no one. FormerPSD head of Prime Minister’s Office Serban Mihailescu, former PSD Ministerof Justice Rodica Stanoiu, PC leader Dan Voiculescu, former Minister forEconomic Reform Mircea Cosea, PNL Mayor of Brasov Ioan Ghise, formerDeputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Eugen Uricaru, Central European Univer-sity vice-president Sorin Antohi, and journalists Valentin Hossu-Longin, CarolSebastian and Dan Ciachir were publicly unmasked as former spies. EvenBasescu came under suspicion for representing Navrom (one of communistRomania’s shipping companies) in Belgium – a position allegedly involvingreporting to the Securitate.

Responding to pressure from civil society led by the Group for SocialDialogue, in May 2006 Basescu set up the Presidential Commission for theStudy of Communist Dictatorship in Romania under the leadership ofVladimir Tismaneanu – a University of Maryland political scientist. TheCommission was similar to the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions set upin post-authoritarian South Africa, Argentina, Sri Lanka, Nepal and SierraLeone. Its final report, posted on the website of the Romanian presidency andsummarized before Parliament by Basescu himself on 18 December 2006,outlined the repressive role of the Communist Party and the Securitate, andnamed some tortured and torturers. Based on the report, Basescu officiallycondemned the communist regime, thus aligning Romania with other Eastern

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European countries. The report was contested bitterly by the opposition PRMand the PSD for failing to include their pro-communist viewpoint. In an effortto rewrite history, the predominant Orthodox Church pledged to set up its owncommission to ‘impartially’ analyze its persecution at the hands of the com-munists. Since 1989, the Church has recast its collaboration with the party-stateas hidden opposition.

Other transitional justice efforts held the first page of Romanian news-papers, but with one exception, they failed to inspire legislation. In 2005, theLiberals drafted a lustration law, which the Chamber of Deputies refused tovote on after the Senate approved it. Also that year, the tiny New InitiativeParty drafted an anti-nomenclatura law directed against top Communist Partyleaders. That initiative was also set aside. The only headway made was onamending Law 187/1999, which allowed the NCSSA to verify the past ofelected and nominated politicians, but did not require individuals unmasked asformer secret agents to resign their public positions. Emergency Ordinance16/2006 provided for a mild lustration process similar to the one Hungarylaunched in 1994. It allowed the NCSSA to petition the Prosecutor General ifpoliticians with a proven tainted past failed to disclose their ties in confidentialdeclarations signed at the beginning of their mandate. In such cases, the courtscould charge public officials with providing false official data and sentencethem to up to two years in jail. As in Hungary, it will be difficult for the courtsto establish intent and prove that individuals knowingly lied in their signedstatements when all unmasked former spies have alleged they were not guiltyof any wrongdoing, their actions did not harm others or they did not believethat their past activity amounted to secret collaboration.

Intra-governmental dissension

The first two years of the Justice and Truth Alliance rule proved difficult as theexecutive was often deadlocked by dissensions between the President and thePremier, and the legislative majority was increasingly fragmented by disputesbetween main alliance partners, the PD and the PNL. Disagreement partlystemmed from Basescu’s antagonistic style of conducting politics, evidenced asearly as 1998 when he provoked the fall of the Ciorbea cabinet with the help ofhis fellow PD ministers (Basescu was then Minister of Transportation). Hiscriticism of Prime Minister Calin PopescuTariceanu reflected a tendency to feedhis political career off conflict, but also his personal dislike of the Premier. ThePresident’s unmatched popularity rests on his charisma, candid honesty, and anunassuming and personable character.To Basescu’s unpredictability,Tariceanuhas opposed predictability, patience and a business-like management style.



The uneasy cohabitation was also partly due to the slim and uncommittedparliamentary majority supporting the cabinet. After Basescu won the pollwith the help of the Justice and Truth Alliance, he denied the right to form thegovernment to the PSD and the PUR (together commanding a plurality ofseats in Parliament) and instead called on the PNL and the PD to nominatethe premier. The alliance designated Liberal Tariceanu as Prime Minister.Tariceanu formed the government only after securing the support of theUDMR and the PUR (renamed the Conservative Party in May 2005).Accord-ing to the Constitution, premiers are appointed by presidents and confirmedby Parliament (Article 85). Thus, the candidate must gain the support of amajority of parliamentarians, but the majority might include the party with aplurality of seats. The cabinet’s survival has depended on the support of theUDMR and the Conservative Party – both part of the PSD-dominatedGovernment of 2000–2004.

The slim parliamentary majority became even slimmer as several legisla-tors crossed the floor.The Romanian Parliament allows legislators to leave theparty on whose list they secured a mandate in order to join another partyrepresented in Parliament or to continue as independent deputies or senators.From 28 November 2004 to 31 December 2006, the legislators’ party affiliationchanged as follows. On 15 February 2005, three young PD deputies formed theNational Initiative Party (Partidul Initiativa Nationala, or PIN). On 19 Decem-ber 2006, 15 Liberal deputies and nine Liberal senators joined former LiberalParty leader Theodor Stolojan to form the party close to President Basescu.Stolojan was interim premier from late 1991 to late 1992.The opposition PRMwas also affected by the trend, as in 2005 alone the party lost a total of 14deputies. Six of these remained independent, five joined the PD, two the PSDand one the PC. Thus, on 31 December 2006 there were 13 independentsenators and 33 independent deputies. Most affected was the PNL, which sawits number of deputies drop from 64 to 52, and the number of its senators from28 to 21; and the PRM, whose numbers dropped from 21 to 18 for senators andfrom 48 to 30 for deputies.

Tariceanu awarded his partners ministerial, deputy ministerial and prefectpositions, but subsequent events revealed a fragile ruling coalition. Monthsafter the 2004 elections and weeks after accepting the Tariceanu cabinet,Basescu suggested that early elections would allow the alliance to secure theparliamentary majority needed to form the government by itself. Opinion pollsshowed that a majority of voters supported Basescu and the alliance, but it wasunclear whether the alliance could win an election disconnected from thepresidential ballot. In the 2004 simultaneous presidential and parliamentaryelections, many Romanians voted for Basescu and his alliance, but, if earlyelections were called, some pro-Basescu voters might not support the alliance.

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The President ignored such arguments and repeatedly called for early elec-tions in 2005 and 2006. In doing so, he distanced himself from the Premier, andeffectively gave Tariceanu a public vote of no-confidence.Apart from Basescu,Tariceanu’s most vocal critics were not the opposition, but his Democrat andConservative partners. As 2005 drew to a close, the Conservatives withdrewtheir support after Codrut Seres resigned his ministerial portfolio. In the battleof words pitting the President against the Premier, Democratic ministersopenly defied Tariceanu and sided with the President, without resigning theirposts. As the PD and the PNL grew colder and the cabinet became a minoritycabinet, the opposition, supported by the Conservatives, began to set thelegislative agenda. The trend is likely to continue in 2007.

European Union accession

Arguably the country’s most notable accomplishment since its unification in1918, the accession into the EU was supported keenly by the political elite, civilsociety and the general public, who embraced the process as a long-overduerecognition of Romania’s rightful place among European states from ageographic, historic, political and cultural point of view. The small group ofeurosceptics, led by the PRM and the dominant Orthodox Church, remainedmarginalized until December 2006, but could enlarge if the benefits of acces-sion fail to materialize.

Romanians believe that their country’s accession was the result of itsefforts to comply with (sometimes unreasonable and always difficult) EUpolitical and economic requirements. By contrast, Western analysts point tothe EU’s pledge to accept all candidates, even those unable to adequatelyaddress their systemic problems by the accession date. Unwavering commit-ment to accession was not sufficient to allow Romania to join the EU in 2004with other post-communist candidate states. Instead, Romania and Bulgariawere accepted in January 2007. It was believed that the three more years wouldgive these candidates a chance to align their institutional structures and prac-tices to EU standards.

The Tariceanu cabinet was responsible for managing the accession processduring its last, and arguably most crucial, stage. Because the country haddifficulty closing the Justice and Home Affairs chapter, politically independentlawyer and human rights activist Monica Macovei was appointed Minister ofJustice with the support of the PD. Macovei launched extensive reforms of thejudiciary, but came under fire for burning bridges with Parliament, for propos-ing legislation extending permits for phone-tapping and for pressuring theSupreme Council of Magistrates, which decides on the appointment and pro-motion of judges. Because many of its members were appointed by the PSD,



the Council was criticized for opposing reforms that would remove corruptjudges subservient to political interests and promote younger judges withuntainted records. The council should be ‘the guarantor of judicial inde-pendence’ (Article 133 of the Constitution), but Macovei’s reforms weredenounced as undue pressure from a ‘politically appointed’ minister on an‘independent’ judicial body. She also tried to revive the fight against politicalcorruption by giving protection to prosecutors researching cases involvinghigh-ranking politicians, but throughout the country, politicians of all ideologi-cal persuasions continue to ignore the Anti-Corruption Law 503/2002 withimpunity by refusing to declare the income of their immediate family.

Romania will have to accord its legislation, political institutions and politi-cal culture with the EU even after its acceptance as a full member. In the nearfuture, much depends on the ability of the ruling coalition of coalitions toremain united around the government.

Sources and further information

Publication:

Stan, L. (2005). The opposition takes charge: The Romanian General Elections of 2004.Problems of Post-Communism 52(3): 3–15.

On the Internet:

Biroul Electoral Central (election statistics): www.bec2004.roPermanent Electoral Authority: www.roaep.roPresident of Romania website: www.presidency.roRomanian Government website: www.guv.roRomanian Parliament website: www.cdep.ro

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http://www.roaep.ro

http://www.presidency.ro

http://www.guv.ro

http://www.cdep.ro

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Romania