Roles and Realities: When and Why Gatekeepers Fail to Change Foreign Policy

Roles and Realities: When and Why Gate-keepers Fail to Change Foreign Policy

MARIJKE BREUNING

University of North Texas

The adoption of international norms by a state depends on the activesupport of decision makers in key gatekeeping positions. Yet, politicalchange does not inevitably follow the initiatives of norm entrepreneurs.The literature on norm dynamics has largely focused on successful normchange. This focus on cases that support the notion that norms matterconstitutes selection on the dependent variable. To more fully grasp therole and limits of gatekeepers, it is important to also investigate caseswhere political resistance prevented the domestic adoption of interna-tional norms. This study uses an illustrative case study in which circum-stances appeared ripe for a new policy direction but where change failedto materialize. The study concludes that gatekeepers matter, but alsothat norm change crucially, depends not only on gatekeepers’ ability toframe norms in terms that resonate domestically but also on their abilityto build coalitions with other relevant political actors.

The adoption of international norms by a state depends on the active support ofdecision makers in key gatekeeping positions (Busby 2007, 2010; Hook 2008;Breuning 2011). It is unlikely that these decision makers advocate the adoptionof international norms if they do not expect those norms resonate with thedomestic audience (Price 2003; Cortell and Davis 2005; Busby 2007, 2010). Onthe other hand, international norms are often modified to render them consis-tent with domestic values, involving processes often referred to as grafting andpruning (Price 1995, 1997; Checkel 1999; Acharya 2004). Taken together, thesepropositions suggest that the successful incorporation of international normsinto the foreign policy of the state depends crucially on the roles played by deci-sion makers (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Goertz 2003). Their ability to crafttheir message in a way that allows a norm to take root with the domestic audi-ence – and to convince their fellow decision makers – influences whether or notpolicy is changed in the direction of the international norm (Cortell and Davis2000, 2005).Political change does not inevitably follow the initiatives of norm entrepre-

neurs (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Carter and Scott 2009; Busby 2010). Yet, asalso noted by Legro (1997), the literature on norm dynamics has largely focusedon successful norm change (e.g., Price 1995, 1997, 2003; Finnemore 1996; Chec-kel 1999; Acharya 2004; Busby 2007; Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011). Perhaps thisis logical given the place of norms scholarship within the broader discipline: Ithas been crucially preoccupied with demonstrating that norms matter in

Author’s note: An earlier version of this study was presented at the ISA annual meeting in Montreal, Canada, in2011. I am grateful to Cameron Thies for organizing the panel, which was a follow-up to the role theory, the roletheory workshop the previous year. I thank Paul Kowert for his insightful comments and the other panelists fortheir helpful suggestions. The anonymous reviewers provided useful feedback as well. The study has benefitted fromthe input of all these colleagues. As usual, any remaining errors are mine.

Breuning, Marijke. (2012) Roles and Realities: When and Why Gatekeepers Fail to Change Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy Analysis,doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00178.x© 2012 International Studies Association

Foreign Policy Analysis (2012), 1–19

effecting change (Price 2003). On the other hand, this focus on cases that sup-port the notion that norms matter does constitute selection on the dependentvariable.Interestingly, Cortell and Davis (2000) posit that such selection bias is not a

problem for the hypothesis-generating case study research in which they areengaged. This may be so, but most of the work focusing on successful normchange reaches conclusions about the significance of norms – that is, it positionsitself (implicitly) as hypothesis-testing research. To more fully grasp the condi-tions under which norms are adopted, either as originally intended or modifiedto resonate better with domestic values, it is important to move beyond cases ofsuccessful norm change to more explicitly investigate cases where political resis-tance prevented the adoption of international norms.Busby (2007) and Breuning (2011) suggest that the role of gatekeepers is

critical, although neither negates the relevance of other actors. It may beimportant for gatekeepers to have the active support of civil society actors(Goertz 2003). Gatekeepers who are not able to rely on such domestic actorsmay find it very difficult to overcome a tendency toward maintaining the sta-tus quo among their fellow decision makers, even if the values they representare well-entrenched internationally. On the other hand, it has also beensuggested that the support of executive and legislative decision makers – orpolicy-making elites – suffices (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Milner 1997). Inshort, authors differ on the importance of societal actors for norm change –a point also made by Cortell and Davis (2005) – but agree that the supportof policy-making elites matters.This study uses an episode in Belgian development cooperation policy as a

deviant case study (Lijphart 1971, 1975) to illustrate the limitations of the preva-lent focus on successful cases of norm diffusion. As a small (and economicallyopen and vulnerable) state, Belgium should be predisposed to adopting interna-tional norms (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Cortell and Davis 2005). The factthat it did not change its development cooperation policy in the direction of theinternational norm, despite a gatekeeper who advocated for this norm, suggeststhat the adoption of international norms is by no means guaranteed. On thecontrary, several authors have argued that domestic politics influences the accep-tance – or not – of new norms (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Milner 1997;Checkel 1999; Cortell and Davis 2000). In addition, the Belgian episode demon-strates that even when circumstances appear ripe for a new direction in policy, itcan be quite difficult to achieve foreign policy change. How decision makers ingatekeeping positions navigate institutionalized practices also determineswhether international norms are incorporated into the state’s foreign policy.

Literature

The literature on norms has long been associated with constructivism (Wendt1987, 1994, 1999; Young 1991; Barnett 1993; Finnemore 1996; Kowert and Legro1996; Hall 1999; Hopf 2002). Much of this literature has focused on puzzles asso-ciated with the adoption and diffusion of norms throughout the internationalsystem. For instance, several authors have focused on grafting and pruning tomake international norms consistent with domestic values (Price 1995, 1997;Checkel 1999; Acharya 2004). Using a somewhat different approach, Cortell andDavis (2000, 2005) have sought to investigate the role of domestic salience ofinternational norms on state’s acceptance of – and adherence to – such norms.Interestingly, this literature developed largely in isolation from work on foreignpolicy change (Holsti 1982; Auerbach 1986; Boyd and Hopple 1987; Goldmann1988; Hermann 1990; Rosati, Hagan and Sampson 1994; Gustavsson 1999). Yet,the two literatures share much in common. Indeed, recent work has begun to

2 When and Why Gatekeepers Fail

trace the impact of (international) norms on foreign policy change (Busby 2007,2010; Hook 2008; Breuning 2011).More recently, Acharya (2011) has argued the opposite dynamic, which he

calls “norm subsidiarity” and which suggests that states generate norms to chal-lenge ideas advanced by powerful countries. He posits this as specific to globalsouth countries and as a reaction to their marginalization in world politics. How-ever, norm subsidiarity functions in a manner that is quite reminiscent of thepropositions advanced by role theory (Holsti 1970; Walker 1979, 1987; Wish1980, 1987; Breuning 1995, 2011; Thies 2010; Harnisch, Frank and Maull 2011),the associated work on norm entrepreneurs (Ingebritsen 2006; Bergman 2007;Browning 2007), as well as recent work on the conditions under which nationalidentities are resilient or malleable (Legro 2009). Acharya (2011) developed hisconcept of norm subsidiarity within the context of constructivism, which alsoinforms much (but not all) work on norm entrepreneurs and national identity,whereas role theory derives from social psychology and tends to focus on foreignpolicy decision making (Thies 2010; Harnisch et al. 2011).The advantage of role theory is that it may be better able to account for

change and adaptation. For instance, Grossman has argued that “role theorymay prove to be a useful tool in forecasting changes in state behavior” (Gross-man 2005; see also Legro 2009). Earlier, Holsti described stable role conceptionsas a source of predictability when he argued that “as these national role concep-tions become a more pervasive part of the political culture of a nation, they aremore likely to set limits on perceived or politically feasible policy alternatives”(1970:39). Hence, national role conceptions function as a filter through whichforeign policy decision makers perceive the world. As long as role conceptionsremain stable, they will be a source of stability – and predictability – of a state’sforeign policy. As role conceptions change, foreign policy change should followas well.When and why will role conceptions change? Gustavsson (1999; see also

Goertz 2003) drew on the public policy concept of “policy windows” to explainthe timing of foreign policy change. He suggested that fundamental change ismost likely when three factors coincide: (i) change in the fundamental structuralconditions; (ii) strategic political leadership; and (iii) a crisis of some kind (Gu-stavsson 1999). The second factor, strategic political leadership, indicates thatdecision makers can play key roles in the revision of national role conceptionswhen the other two factors are present. However, such revisions are not made ina vacuum and must resonate with domestic values – and must be accepted byother actors in the international system – to take root (Hudson 1999:770-1; seealso Legro 2009).In other words, changes in the national role conceptions that guide foreign

policy decision makers are not independent of changes in international norms(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The literature on norm entrepreneurs suggeststhat states may function as sources – or rather: initiators – of international sys-tem change (Ingebritsen 2006; Bergman 2007; Browning 2007). In contrast, con-structivist scholarship on international norms has generally focused on broadercoalitions of transnational civil society actors, including individuals and organiza-tions (Price 1995, 1997, Finnemore 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011). An exception is the recent work on norm subsidiaritythat seems to argue that states in the global south may generate their own normsand that these may spread regionally (Acharya 2011; see also Legro 2009).Investigations regarding the incorporation of international norms into the for-

eign policy of states are mostly of a more recent vintage (Busby 2007, 2010,Hook 2008; Breuning 2011). Consistent with the work of Cortell and Davis(2000, 2005), these studies confirm not only that changes in norms and values atthe international and state levels of analysis are interrelated, but they also point

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at the significance of key individual actors as gatekeepers. The earlier literatureon foreign policy change had also stressed that decision makers do not initiatepolicy change in a domestic or international vacuum (Holsti, 1982; Hermann,1990; Gustavsson 1999; Goertz 2003). Some authors have privileged internationalsources of policy change (for instance, Holsti, Siverson and George 1980; Holsti1982, 1991; Rosati et al. 1994), whereas others have emphasized the domesticimpetus for such change (for instance, Rosenau 1981; Smith 1981; Hagan 1989a,b). The extent to which either international or domestic factors influence for-eign policy change is likely to vary across time and issue area.On average, small states may face stronger incentives to adapt in response to

international pressures than larger, more powerful states, irrespective of theirstatus as countries of the global north or global south (Katzenstein 1985; Hey2003; see also Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Cortell and Davis 2005). Althoughthis distinction between small and large states is a rather crude categorization,the literature on small state foreign policy suggests some expectations regardingbehavioral differences that are the result of their low relative status in the inter-national system. For smaller states, international constraints may be more signifi-cant than for larger states (Katzenstein 1985; Hey 2003), whereas the mostpowerful actors may face a strong temptation to act unilaterally (Skidmore2005). This suggests that, generally speaking, smaller states should be expectedto adopt international norms more readily than larger and more powerfulactors.1

In the process of doing so, however, the decision makers of small states willalso need to connect the international norm to domestic values. Several authorsprovide propositions about such processes. For instance, Price (1995) claims thatthe ban against chemical weapons, which was instituted before any nation actu-ally possessed chemical weapons, had its roots in both an analogy (between poi-son and chemical weapons) and a pre-existing norm (against attacks oncivilians). Both devices (analogy and pre-existing norm) suggest a “grafting” of anew idea onto an existing value. In addition, Acharya (2004) contends that normdiffusion entails “actively borrowing and modifying” international norms torender them consistent with “preconstructed normative beliefs and practices,” aprocess which he calls “localization” (Acharya, 2004, 269). Rather than merelygrafting the new idea onto an existing value, it also involves “pruning” or modify-ing “foreign ideas to find a better fit with local beliefs and practices” (Acharya,2004:246). Cortell and Davis (2005), furthermore, hypothesize that internationalnorms will be accepted more readily when decision makers link them with thenational interest and show them to be advantageous to foreign policy, althoughthis effect is conditioned by domestic political institutions. The common threadis the contention that international norms are more readily accepted by stateswhen they can be constructed (or reconstructed) as congruent with pre-existingnational values.This requires an active process of building connections between new norms

and existing values. Fukuda-Parr and Hulme (2011) describe this process withregard to the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals. In their view,adoption of a norm depends not only on advocacy by norm entrepreneurs, butalso on grafting and pruning by what they call “message entrepreneurs” (2011:23). Earlier theorizing on the role of norm entrepreneurs did not explicitly sepa-rate these two roles, although the distinction resonates well with the observationthat norm entrepreneurs (or perhaps, more accurately, message entrepreneurs)may advocate a norm not out of value-driven commitment but rather out of

1 Such states may also function as norm entrepreneurs in specific policy domains to have an impact in somepolicy area rather than only adapting to pressures from more powerful actors in the international system (forinstance, Hey 2003; Ingebritsen 2006).


self-interested motives (Cortell and Davis 2005). Fukuda-Parr and Hulme’s(2011) message entrepreneurs are the equivalent of the supportive policy gate-keepers in studies that focus on the adoption of international norms by stateactors (for example, Busby 2007, 2010, Hook 2008; Breuning 2011). These arethe decision makers who work within the government to gain support for aninternational norm.Fukuda-Parr and Hulme imply that the skills of norm entrepreneurs and mes-

sage entrepreneurs are quite different: The former are activists with “a deep per-sonal commitment to reducing poverty” (2011:22). The latter are “institutionallyembedded individuals who were motivated by organizational mandates” (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011, 22-23). In other words, Fukuda-Parr and Hulme (2011)distinguish between advocacy and policy-making roles. On the other hand, theCongressional foreign policy entrepreneurs who are the focus of Carter andScott (2009) serve in both roles simultaneously, although they clearly are politi-cians first and foremost. Hence, even though the roles of norm entrepreneurand message entrepreneur can be conceptually distinguished and require differ-ent skills, they need not necessarily be fulfilled by different individuals – onepolicy-maker may play both roles.On the surface, it would seem that a policy entrepreneur placed in a gatekeep-

ing role should be successful at redirecting the state’s foreign policy. Studies thathave sought to investigate successful cases of norm-driven foreign policy changewould indeed suggest this. What, then, might account for the failure of a normentrepreneur in a gatekeeping position to redirect foreign policy?

Gatekeepers and Politics

Studies consistently find that key decision makers in gatekeeping positions areimportant in explaining foreign policy change (Holsti 1982; Busby 2007, 2010;Hook 2008; Breuning 2011). But it would be a mistake to assume that it is easyfor decision makers to effect change: Especially in democratic government struc-tures, leaders are constrained by “bureaucratic webs” (Goldmann 1988; Volgyand Schwarz 1991), as well as the domestic audience more generally. Hence,individual decision makers who advocate change must overcome a tendencytoward stability and status quo, something which is more likely to succeed underunusual circumstances (Gustavsson 1999; Goertz 2003; see also Legro 2009).Both Hook (2008) and Busby (2007) suggest this, drawing on Kingdon‘s (1995,1984)) work, as Gustavsson (1999) did almost a decade earlier. Gustavsson(1999) suggests that significant change in foreign policy is most likely whenthree factors coincide: (i) change in the fundamental structural conditions; (ii)strategic political leadership; and (iii) a crisis of some kind.Busby (2007) suggests six conditions, which overlap partially with Gustavsson’s

three factors: (i) a permissive international context, which could be defined asakin to Gustavsson’s change in fundamental structural conditions; (ii) focusingevents, which could be taken to be akin to Gustavsson’s crisis, but suggest abroadening of the latter’s conception to include both scheduled events likeinternational conferences as well as crises that take leaders by surprise; (iii) cred-ible information, which points to the potential role of epistemic communities, afactor also mentioned by Hook (2008); (iv) low costs, which suggest agreementwith the constraining influence of bureaucracies (Goldmann 1988) or domesticinstitutions (Cortell and Davis 2005); (v) a cultural match, which suggests theimportance of framing the policy change in terms that resonate with the domes-tic audience and appeal to fellow decision makers (Checkel 1999; Acharya2004); (vi) supportive policy gatekeepers, which is akin to Gustavsson’s (1999)strategic political leadership, as well as to the findings of Holsti (1982). Busby(2007) suggests that the first three are necessary but not sufficient conditions for

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foreign policy change to occur and emphasizes the latter three in his study. Ulti-mately, however, he suggests that the role of gatekeepers is critical.Does this also entail that the failure of norm change must be attributed to the

failure of a decision maker in a gatekeeping position to effect change? The dis-tinction between norm and message entrepreneur may be useful here, especiallyin the context of (coalition) cabinet government: If a norm entrepreneur in a gate-keeping role is not able to craft a message that resonates sufficiently with fellow decisionmakers and/or the domestic audience, then the effort at norm change is likely to stall. Thissuggests that the significance of gatekeepers must be attenuated: gatekeepersmatter, but they are not free agents (Cortell and Davis 2005). Gatekeepers areusually embedded in a collective body of decision makers (a cabinet and/orlegislature) and connected to bureaucratic webs and domestic audiences. Theimportance of each of these can vary: Domestic civil society groups can at timesbring significant pressure to bear on their government, but this is not always agiven; bureaucracies may impose constraints or facilitate policy change; andmembers of the cabinet and legislature must be persuaded – and they may resistthe overtures of a gatekeeper. Milner (1997) theorized that three sets of domes-tic actors influence policy decisions: the executive, the legislative, and – perhapsto a lesser degree – societal interest groups. Ultimately, no matter how well amessage resonates, a decision maker in a gatekeeping position must build a coa-lition that incorporates at a minimum the first two (see Ikenberry and Kupchan1990), but preferably all three. This suggests that a norm entrepreneur in a gatekeep-ing role must not only craft an appealing message, but also build a coalition around it, orthe effort at norm change is likely to stall.The following sections elaborate on the proposition that gatekeepers are polit-

ical actors who are embedded in an inherently political system. I illustrate theproblematic politics of norm diffusion through a deviant case study of anepisode in Belgian development cooperation policy. The case is noteworthybecause circumstances appeared ripe for a normative shift in Belgian develop-ment cooperation: A norm entrepreneur became state secretary (and later minis-ter) of development cooperation, both the executive and legislative branchesappeared amenable to a normative shift – or at least a change – in Belgian devel-opment cooperation policy, and civil society groups (although limited in numberand strength) were supportive of change as well. Yet, incorporating well-acceptedinternational norms into the state’s foreign policy proved quite difficult. Thecase shows that, no matter how favorable the alignment of domestic context andpolitical actors, norm entrepreneurs must carefully build coalitions in support oftheir policy proposals. Norm change is ultimately a political endeavor.

Roles and Realities

Belgium is not particularly well-known for its foreign policy. By extension, itsdevelopment cooperation policy does not stand out either. Whereas Sweden anda few other Nordic countries have long profiled themselves as norm entrepre-neurs with regard to development cooperation (Ingebritsen 2006; see also Berg-man 2007; Browning 2007), Belgian development cooperation has longremained connected to the country’s foreign economic interests.However, in the mid-1990s, there appeared to be confluence of circumstances

that made norm change in Belgium’s development cooperation policy especiallylikely. The international environment changed dramatically in the aftermath ofthe end of the Cold War, several scandals rocked Belgian politics and spelled anuntimely end to the careers of a number of politicians, and the country’s domes-tic political structure was changed from a unitary to a federal state. In this set ofcircumstances, the Christian People’s Party invited Reginald Moreels, the formerchair of the Belgian section of Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF), to become state


secretary for development cooperation. This was an unusual entry into politicsfor a person with unusual qualifications. The time seemed ripe for significantchange in Belgian development cooperation.The following sections sketch first the international and domestic contexts,

before turning to a discussion of the role played by Reginald Moreels in Belgianpolitics.

International Environment: Trade, Aid, and a Tarnished Image

Belgian development cooperation policy in the 1990s must be understoodagainst an international backdrop. The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 alsoended the decades-long Cold War and heralded the beginning of a new anduncertain era in international politics. The emergence of newly independentstates as a result of break-up of the Soviet Union came on the heels of the fall ofthe Berlin Wall in 1989 – an event that heralded the transition to market econo-mies and democratic systems of governance in many states in Central and East-ern Europe. Many West European states rushed in to facilitate the stabilizationof these economies in transition with aid and investment. Belgium was no excep-tion. In fact, aiding the economies of Central and Eastern Europe nicely fits thelonger-term trends of Belgian foreign policy.The central motive that runs through the history of Belgian foreign policy is

the preservation of economic interests rather than an emphasis on traditional(military) security concerns (Kossmann 1978; Daems and de Weyer 1993; Fitz-maurice 1996; Coolseat 1998; Deschouwer 2009). In the eyes of one observer,who playfully paraphrased Von Clausewitz, Belgian foreign policy has generallybeen “in first instance the continuation of domestic politics by other means”(Coolseat 1998:469). In other words, its foreign policy has been dominated byconcerns about unimpeded access to foreign markets – especially those of thesurrounding states in Europe – and to resources, because without such access,the Belgian domestic economy would have suffered significant setbacks. Hence,it is reasonable to expect that Belgian decision makers might readily adjust theirstate’s foreign policy in response to external pressure, as the literature onforeign policy change suggests should be the case especially for small states.This preoccupation with economic interests has been equally in evidence in

Belgium’s development cooperation policy. A study covering the 1975-90 periodfound that Belgian development cooperation policy behavior was indeed domi-nated by economic concerns (Breuning 1995). Although there was some uneaseabout the influence of Belgian foreign trade and industry on development coop-eration policy among members of parliament, this was not yet a commonlyshared concern, and through the late 1970s and 1980s development cooperationand foreign economic interests were generally perceived as intertwined ratherthan separate issue areas (Breuning 1994). Change was evident only as an“increasing ambiguity in official statements” regarding the objectives of develop-ment cooperation (Berlage 1984), which may be an indication that Belgian deci-sion makers were increasingly aware that their policy objectives were out of stepwith international norms. Despite some efforts in the late 1980s and early 1990sby Minister of Development Cooperation Andre Geens and his successor StateSecretary Erik Derycke, no fundamental changes were made in Belgian develop-ment cooperation.Then, in 1994, came the bloody conflict between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda.

Belgium had administered Rwanda and neighboring Burundi as mandates (andlater trust territories) until their independence in 1962. Not only did Belgiumhave a historic tie with Rwanda, since 1993 Belgian soldiers had been part of theUnited Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) that was to supervisethe execution of a peace treaty between the Hutu government and Tutsi rebels.

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During the first days of the genocide that took place in the aftermath of theairplane crash that killed President Habyarimana, ten Belgian peacekeepers andsix Belgian civilians were killed. These murders, although a mere footnote to thegenocide, constituted a significant shock to both Belgian decision makers andthe public, especially since they were ostensibly the result of hatred among theHutu’s regarding their former colonizer (Deweerdt 1995). Neither decision mak-ers nor the general public had ever entertained the possibility that Belgianscould be hated to such an extent (Schampers 1995). The event amounted to arude awakening about the antagonisms that are frequently the inheritance of acolonial past.Somewhat later, in 1996, the Belgian Administration for Development Cooper-

ation (BADC) was implicated in the capsizing of the ferry boat Bukoba which ledto the deaths of 800 people when the vessel sank in Lake Victoria (Tanzania).The BADC had financed the acquisition by the Tanzanian government of thisboat, which had been manufactured by a Belgian company, and which turnedout to be technically deficient and dangerous (Agence France Presse 1996; VanLierop 1996b). Although the BADC had been appraised of the problem, it hadbeen slow to react. According to some observers, the incident “illustrated theoperational weaknesses and the structural deficiencies of the Belgian aid admin-istration” (OECD 1998:11; see also Rutten 1999). By the time this disastrous acci-dent happened, the Belgian Parliament had already created a commission toinvestigate charges of longstanding mismanagement within the BADC and a newstate secretary for development cooperation was intent on a thorough overhaulof the administration (Deweerdt 1997; Rutten 1999).In sum, Belgian foreign relations – as well as its development cooperation pol-

icy – have generally been guided by the country’s economic interdependence.The ability to trade is essential to the Belgian economy and to the preservationof the state’s political autonomy. The changed global environment of the early1990s created opportunities to establish new ties with countries in Central andEastern Europe – and brought to light aspects of the colonial heritage and devel-opment aid that had remained largely unexamined up to that point.

Domestic Environment: Scandals and Public Attitudes

In the mid-1970s, Renaat Van Elslande, who was at that time minister of foreignaffairs and development cooperation, argued in parliament that the lack of astrong policy regarding development cooperation was a reflection of attitudeswithin the society (see Parlementaire Handelingen/Annales Parlementaires, 8June 1976:3889). Indeed, Belgian public opinion has not shown a great interestin, nor much support for, development cooperation (OECD 1998). As a result,public pressure has not generally been important in this issue area.Then, in the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda, Belgian newspapers pub-

lished a series of reports about failed and questionable development projects.Invariably, Belgian companies were implicated, either because they hadfurnished defective materials or had profited from tied aid without regard forthe needs of the recipients (Eppink 1995; Schampers 1995; Rutten 1999). Andthe BADC was criticized for the misuse of funds as well as the close ties betweendevelopment cooperation and Belgian trade interests. Leading officials withinthe BADC, while protesting what they considered biased information, also joinedthe media in sounding a critical note: They called for a thorough revision ofdevelopment cooperation policy in an open letter to the prime minister andstate secretary for development cooperation (OECD 1998:22). Some of theseofficials hoped that the use of the country’s development assistance to supportBelgian foreign trade interests might be exposed and changed in the directionof international norms that called for an emphasis on poverty alleviation.


The linkages between development cooperation and foreign trade were noth-ing new (Franck 1987), but the perception of them as problematic, as well asthe public debate about these issues, was. The publicity and ensuing publicdebate created a measure of societal pressure for change that had not existedpreviously. The nature and direction of that change was not a foregone conclu-sion, as public attitudes toward development cooperation in the mid-1990s weremarkedly less supportive in Belgium than in other EU states (OECD 1998:21).Nevertheless, the increased public attention was a potential source of change,especially if seen in light of another scandal that rocked Belgium in this timeperiod.The Agusta bribery affair brought down a number of prominent Belgian politi-

cians. The affair brought to light that a number of politicians had known ofmoney which the Italian helicopter manufacturer Agusta had paid to the BelgianSocialist Party in the hope of gaining military contracts. The affair led to succes-sive resignations of prominent politicians in 1994 and 1995.2 One of those wasWilly Claes, who had just recently traded the position of Minister of ForeignAffairs for the job of Secretary General of NATO. He held the latter title for justover a year, until his position became untenable as a result of his suspectedinvolvement in the affair. He had been replaced at the Belgian foreign ministryby Frank Vandenbroucke, who quit after only a few months because he wasimplicated in the Agusta affair as well. Subsequently, Erik Derycke, who was atthe time serving as State Secretary for Development Cooperation, took on theportfolio of foreign affairs in addition to continuing as state secretary until theelections of mid-1995. After the elections, Derycke continued as Minister ofForeign Affairs, but a new State Secretary for Development Cooperation wasappointed. This was Reginald Moreels.Moreels’ entry into politics coincided with the implementation of fundamental

changes in the Belgian political system. The 1990s saw the federalization of Bel-gium. The process had been set in motion decades earlier as Flemish ethnopoli-tics became a force in Belgian national politics (Ishiyama and Breuning 1998).The 1995 elections were the first held under this new system. A smaller nationallegislature was elected, which counted 150 rather than 212 seats, and politicianswere now prohibited from holding more than one office simultaneously (Dew-eerdt, Ridder, and Dillemans 1994).At the cabinet level, institutional arrangements regarding foreign policy had

not facilitated a strong development cooperation policy. Foreign affairs and for-eign trade were housed together in one ministry, which also included develop-ment cooperation. The Minister or State Secretary for Development Cooperation(both titles have been used) was the head of the BADC, which is part of the Min-istry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Development Cooperation. The link-age of these three issue areas, while logically given the importance of externaltrade to the Belgian state, has also created tensions, especially between develop-ment cooperation and foreign trade, with the latter being widely perceived asencroaching upon the former (Franck 1987). It was not until the mid-1990s thatthis came to be perceived as a problem that demanded action.Additionally, it has been argued that the lack of a distinct policy profile and

the resultant lack of political influence of the minister or state secretary incharge of development cooperation was not so much because of the generalimportance of foreign trade to Belgium, but to the large number of individuals

2 The Agusta bribery affair forced a number of Belgian politicians to resign. Each had been accused of havingknowledge about money which the Italian helicopter manufacturer Agusta had paid to the Belgian Socialist Party.The case also had a relation to the murder of a former president of that party. During the investigation, it alsocame to light that the SP might have received bribes from French airplane manufacturer Dassault as well. In bothcases, the companies were said to have paid these bribes in the hopes of gaining military contracts from Belgium(See Deschouwer and Platel 1996).

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who successively headed the department (Vandommele 1982; Serlon 1985). Thiscan be interpreted as a symptom of the low priority attached to developmentcooperation among Belgian decision makers (Berlage 1984), but also as theresult of the politics of coalition formation: The portfolio of development coop-eration has frequently been used as to round out a coalition and has seldom, ifever, been central to the formation of it (Vandommele 1982). Not only is devel-opment cooperation often a bit of a consolation prize, it has also been used as atesting ground for junior ministers – a tradition that goes back to colonial dayswhen the Ministry of Colonies fulfilled a similar role in coalition politics (Cool-saet 1987:171).According to one author, development cooperation is “one of those depart-

ments where one starts (or ends) a career and which one tries hard to leave formore prestigious offices” (Serlon 1985:529). To make one’s tenure at the depart-ment of development cooperation the start of a political career, it is very likelythat decision makers who hold this position will be far more concerned withimpressing (or at least not antagonizing) those who can help advance theircareers, rather than with radically changing Belgian development cooperationpolicy. At the very least, one would expect such a junior minister to try to makehis (or her) mark while staying within the boundaries of accepted politicalconventions.In addition, the training and prior experience of most who have held the posi-

tion has been far afield from the department’s mandate – which is not to denythat they had appropriate experience as politicians and/or as managers ofdepartments, merely to state that they lacked intimate knowledge of the develop-ment problematique. A notable exception was the appointment of ReginaldMoreels in 1995, as will be explained in more detail in the next section. A fur-ther change was that Moreels was to report directly to the prime minister ratherthan to the minister of foreign affairs (OECD 1998). Hence, until the mid-1990s,institutional constraints conspired against strong or innovative leadership regard-ing development cooperation.Moreels inherited a department in turmoil. Although unaffected by the Agusta

bribery affair, it was implicated in scandals of its own, as discussed earlier. Inaddition, events in Belgium’s former colonies in central Africa, and the genocidein Rwanda in particular, led decision makers to rethink their foreign policy pri-orities in Africa. The aid relationships with Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi had(temporarily) ended as a result of the domestic turmoil in those countries. Ineach case, there were ongoing talks to restart the aid relationship in the form ofhealth- or education-related projects, but the relationships were tense, and Bel-gium had difficulty moving beyond a commitment to sustain humanitarian reliefefforts in its former colonies.The confluence of these events created a favorable set of circumstances for

policy change: There was a fundamental shift in the international system aswell as in Belgium’s relationship with its former colonies; there was a crisis inBelgium’s development cooperation policy as well as in domestic politics morebroadly, and these crises played out against the backdrop of the country’smove toward a federal political system; a political outsider with expertize inthe area of development issues and first-hand work experience during human-itarian crises assumed the leadership of the department of development coop-eration.

The Role of the Individual: Reginald Moreels

As indicated earlier, the appointment of Reginald Moreels to the post of statesecretary of development cooperation in 1995 heralded some changes in the pri-orities and administration of Belgian development cooperation. Up to the point


of Moreels’ appointment, the BADC had seen a succession of ministers and statesecretaries pass through, none of whom stayed very long. Moreels was the firstState Secretary who had experience and expertize related to the subject matterof his department: He was a medical doctor who had been the chairperson ofthe Belgian section of Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF). In addition, he had beenactive as a physician in disaster areas between 1986 and 1994. He had beeninvited by the leadership of the Flemish Christian People’s Party to join the cabi-net (Van Lierop 1996a), which was an unusual entry into political life in Bel-gium. He had not previously held public office and was less tied to thetraditional networks of Belgian politics, in which patronage remained a featurelong after it had declined in other European states (Deschouwer 1994).Although new to national politics, Moreels had well-developed ideas about therelationship between North and South – ideas that had been shaped by his expe-rience of working in the developing world and which mirrored commonlyaccepted norms among donor states. In other words, Moreels’ appointmentplaced a norm entrepreneur in the position of state secretary of developmentcooperation.After a little over a year in office, in October 1996, Moreels presented a policy

plan. By doing so, he scooped the parliamentary commission which had beencharged with investigating the BADC, diagnose the problems, and proposechanges. The commission was in the midst of its deliberations at the time thatMoreels presented his plan. It finally published its report in July 1998 (Deweerdt1998; Rutten 1999). By that time, Moreels had already moved ahead and pro-posed a series of policy changes on the basis of his original plan. The fact thatMoreels moved ahead with a public presentation of his policy plan andproceeded with efforts to implement it, created negative feelings among themembers of the parliamentary commission, who perceived Moreels as a “primadonna” and eager to steal the lime-light. Additionally, the perception took holdthat he was not a “team player” in the consensus-oriented tradition of Belgianpolitics. Although it is probably more accurate to attribute Moreels’ actions tohis activist roots and his impatience with slow and ponderous consensus build-ing, the perception mattered.Interestingly, his proposals and those of the parliamentary commission were

quite compatible, which should have ensured success for his policy initiatives.3

Moreels advanced the following normative cornerstones for Belgian developmentcooperation: (i) a desire to foster respect for human rights, democratization,and good governance; (ii) an emphasis on partnerships; and (iii) an emphasison alleviating poverty (Cabinet of the State Secretary for Development Coopera-tion/Federal Information Service 1998; OECD 1998). Moreels furthermorerededicated Belgium to the performance goal of 0.7% of GNP, the OfficialDevelopment Assistance target set by the United Nations.4 For the first time, aclear set of values had been formulated as a foundation for development cooper-ation policy. In other words, Moreels clearly positioned himself as a norm entre-preneur who sought to significantly alter Belgian development cooperationpolicy.The policy plan he created shared many of the objectives sketched by the

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) in itsreport Shaping the Twenty-First Century (1996). Belgian development cooperation,hence, did not seek its new direction in a vacuum, but took a clear cue frominternational norms and from the organization that monitors compliancewith those norms. In other words, the proposals sought to bring Belgium into

3 According to Rutten (1999), both used the same consultants.4 In fact, very few countries reach this target. Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden are the only

states to have consistently met or exceeded this target (see OECD 2000).

MARIJKE BREUNING 11

congruence with norms that were advocated by the OECD and shared by a num-ber of the members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC).Although the values in themselves were not innovative, they would have broughtBelgian development cooperation policy in line with objectives which hadbecome commonly accepted ideas among many other donor states. In otherwords, adoption of these proposals would have constituted the diffusion of aninternational norm into Belgian development cooperation policy.In addition to this set of substantive policy objectives, Moreels proposed to

revamp the BADC and give it a new name, to revise the relationship betweenthe administration and the Belgian NGOs, abolish tied aid, and reduce thenumber of recipient countries (Deweerdt 1997; Cabinet of the State Secretaryfor Development Cooperation/Federal Information Service 1998; OECD1998). Some of the administrative reforms Moreels had designed were imple-mented in March 1997, and just a few months later, further changes weredecided upon as a result of the report of the parliamentary commission(Deweerdt 1998; OECD 1998; Rutten 1999). In July, there was an agreementin principle to divide the policy planning and policy execution functions ofthe BADC (Deweerdt 1998). The former would be a directorate-general forinternational cooperation, housed in the ministry of foreign affairs. The latterwould be a public corporation called the Belgian Technical Cooperation orBTC. The advantage of this construction would be that the BTC would havegreater flexibility in hiring technical personnel for short-term contracts relatedto development projects than would be possible within a department boundby the rules governing the civil service. All of these changes related to theadministrative and institutional structure rather than the policy objectives ofBelgian development cooperation policy – and mirrored those made underprevious governments. Administrative reorganizations had occurred severaltimes before, substantive policy change, however, had been far more difficultto achieve. In the meantime, the parliamentary commission that had beencharged with investigating the problems within the BADC and making recom-mendations to improve the situation finally presented its report (Deweerdt1998). Predictably, the commission argued that the lack of vision and pur-pose, as well as the lack of continuity in its leadership had contributed to theadministration’s lack of a clear policy direction. To trim down the scatteredprograms, the commission recommended that Belgian development coopera-tion focus on just a few sectors and countries. It recommended a separationbetween policy planning and execution, and to delegate the latter to anautonomous institution, which would determine the basic principles thatwould guide Belgian development cooperation (Deweerdt 1998).The wrangling over the details of the reorganization continued for several

years. The Council of State, an advisory body consisting of legal experts, criti-cized the proposed reforms and especially the creation of the BTC, because itjudged that this construction would withdraw development cooperation fromministerial and parliamentary oversight. Its criticisms provided new fodder forthe opposition in parliament. Eventually, in July 1998, the parliament decided tocreate the BTC with a vote of 82-57 (Kamer Stemt in met Hervorming 1998).The policy planning functions of the BADC were subsequently integrated intothe ministry of foreign affairs. Mieke Molemans, chairperson of the umbrellaorganization of the Belgian development NGOs, the National Center for Devel-opment Cooperation (known by its Flemish acronym NCOS), expressed thatthere was some apprehension that “development cooperation will be snowedunder by the stronger department of foreign affairs” (NCOS Pleit voor Verho-ging Budget Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1998). The Belgian NGOs neverthelesssupported Moreels’ reforms and helped him argue for an increased budget fordevelopment cooperation.


Despite Moreels’ dedication to the goal of 0.7% of GNP, the OECD (1998)judged that assistance would likely remain around 0.35% of GNP in the fore-seeable future in its review of Belgian development cooperation – which is infact what happened. The BADC had problems with fully utilizing allocatedfunds and, hence, its successor could not realistically hope to acquire addi-tional ones (OECD 1998). Nevertheless, Moreels continued to argue for bud-get increases, stating that he had been promised an increase in spending ondevelopment cooperation when he entered office and wanted the governmentto stick by its word. These debates over the size of the budget (and the insis-tence that the government deliver on its promise) were only one indicationof increasing tensions between Moreels and others within both the parliamentand the government. Although Moreels was deeply familiar with the problemsof development, he was increasingly perceived as an ideologue and criticizedfor acting unilaterally.5

Moreels’ arguments began to change as he faced increasing opposition. Atone point, he argued that an increase in “development aid serves a well-under-stood self-interest… Every franc which Belgium contributes to European andinternational development funds returns threefold in the forms of orders fromBelgian companies” (quoted in: Belgische Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1998).This was a very odd way to argue for increased spending on development coop-eration, especially since Moreels had also been a strong advocate of untied aid.In fact, he seemed very intent on ensuring that development cooperation bene-fitted the needs of people in recipient states and “not those of Belgian industry”(Cabinet of the State Secretary for Development Cooperation/Federal Informa-tion Service 1998, 55).Furthermore, he appeared to be looking for support for the norm of untied

aid at the EU level when he requested that the benefits of untying aid for thedevelopment be investigated by a study group within that organization (EUOnderzoek Effecten van Niet-gebonden Ontwikkelingshulp 1998). Given thelong history of connections between development cooperation and trade inter-ests in Belgian politics, Moreels may have felt the need to obtain supranationalsupport to bolster his arguments, but this move further antagonized his col-leagues in government, who increasingly saw him as someone who was not a“team player” – something that has traditionally been valued in the consocia-tional political culture of Belgium.It is therefore not surprising that it proved to be increasingly challenging for

Moreels to effect substantive policy change in various aspects of Belgian develop-ment cooperation: At the time Moreels came into office in 1995, Belgian aid wasdispersed over 128 recipients (OECD 1998). Moreels had hoped to reduce thenumber of recipient countries to around twenty by the year 2000. Keeping trackof projects in so many countries had been difficult and had contributed to theproblems in the BADC, so the reduction in the number of recipients was a use-ful way to bring greater clarity and transparency to Belgian development cooper-ation. Moreels also hoped to focus Belgian aid on the African continent. Despitethe turmoil in Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi and despite the difficulties in get-ting the aid relationship with those countries back on track, he continued “tobelieve that we have a major role to play in central Africa.”6 Belgian develop-ment cooperation would furthermore specialize in private sector developmentby providing small- and medium-sized businesses in its target countries with

5 Newspaper accounts of the time indicate quarrels between Moreels and the minister of foreign affairs, as wellas tensions between Moreels and members of other political parties in the governing coalition. See, for example,“Rel tussen Derycke en Moreels over Ontwikkelingshulp voor Burundi” (1998) and “SP Stelt Positie Moreels in Re-gering ter Discussie” (1998).

6 Interview with Reginald Moreels in La Libre Belgique, in FBIS-WEU-96-201.

MARIJKE BREUNING 13

“technical and organizational expertize, and facilitate access to capital” (OECD1998:15).Moreels hoped, in part, to build on the banking know-how of Triodos Bank –

a pioneer within Belgium in providing credits for social projects – to move devel-opment cooperation away from charity and towards a capacity buildingapproach. He wanted furthermore to create a federal guarantee fund that wouldunderwrite NGO projects employing microcredit. Similar funds have been suc-cessfully employed by other countries, such as the Netherlands and Germany(Triodos en Moreels Willen Garantiefonds voor Mikrokredietprojecten Opzetten1998).Despite his expertize and a long list of proposals to significantly change the

normative underpinnings of Belgian development cooperation, Moreels ulti-mately left office defeated. Toward the end of his tenure, he stated in an inter-view that his stint as state secretary (and later minister) of developmentcooperation was “the loneliest job I have ever done” (quoted in Schampers1999). Although the international and domestic context presented a seeminglypositive climate for policy change, Moreels achieved little more than the admin-istrative reorganization which created the BTC. After he left office, furtherchanges took place in Belgian development cooperation, but these changes can-not be attributed to his efforts. Instead, these changes took place in the contextof the Millennium Development Goals.

Explaining Gatekeeper Failure

What accounts for Moreels’ failure to institute norm change when the circum-stances seemed so amenable to significant policy change? In this case, a gate-keeper who advocated change congruent with international norms ondevelopment cooperation, and who faced an (initially) sympathetic political andsocial domestic context, was unable to effect change. If gatekeepers are key, asseveral studies have suggested (Busby 2007, 2010; Hook 2008; Breuning 2011),this is indeed puzzling. However, if gatekeepers are understood as embedded inpolitical institutions (Milner 1997; Cortell and Davis 2005), and if norm accep-tance is seen as the result of an inherently political process, the failure of normchange is easier to understand.First, Moreels was, by the nature of his previous career as the chair of the

Belgian section of MSF, far more familiar with the international epistemic com-munity’s norms and values than with the intricacies of Belgian political decisionmaking. Local development NGOs supported Moreels’ efforts, providing himwith supportive civil society actors. However, these NGOs do not have a verybroad base within Belgian society, nor is development cooperation an issue thatresonates strongly with the wider Belgian public. This makes it difficult to obtainbroad societal support for significant policy change in this area. Despite theconnection of Moreels’ ideas to international norms regarding developmentcooperation and the support of domestic NGOs, he was not able to communi-cate his ideas in sufficiently persuasive ways to a large enough domestic audi-ence. Nor was he able to effectively rally their support to pressure his colleaguesin government into action.Second, Moreels made tactical errors that doomed his proposals. As

sketched above, he scooped the parliamentary commission with his own pro-posals. Interestingly, when the parliamentary commission published its report,it proposed solutions that were in many respects similar to those Moreels hadalready proposed. In other words, there was broad substantive agreementbetween Moreels and the parliamentary commission, making the former’s fail-ure to effect policy change all the more surprising. Although the commissiontook a long time to reach its conclusions and Moreels clearly did not wish to


wait, had he been able to more effectively build a political coalition with thecommission and/or relevant members of parliament and the government’scoalition parties, more might have been accomplished. The evidence suggeststhat Moreels was not able to build such a coalition. Indeed, newspaperaccounts of the time suggest that he often failed to consult with members ofthe government or the coalition parties before acting.7

Third, Moreels used his office as a soapbox from which to espouse his per-sonal vision for Belgian relations with the developing world. It was quite unusualfor a newcomer in Belgian national politics to express such a strong position sopublicly, let alone one that differed so substantially from politics-as-usual.Although Belgian prime ministers have at times taken their country’s foreignpolicy in a new direction (Coolseat 1998), politics among government ministers,and between the government and parliament, has generally been marked by apolitics of accommodation (Deschouwer 1994, 2009). Moreover, developmentcooperation has functioned as a testing ground for new ministers, who have gen-erally been far more interested in showing themselves to be good team playersthan to carve out a name and a niche for themselves. Moreels’ actions thereforewere unusual both in terms of how politics is conducted in Belgium and interms of the role usually accorded to the person occupying his post. AlthoughMoreels had been an effective activist, he had great difficulty building politicalsupport for his initiatives among his colleagues in the cabinet and parliament.Taken together, these observations suggest that the success of policy gatekeep-

ers is contingent upon their ability to frame a new norm in such a way that itresonates with the domestic audience (see Price 1995, 1997; Checkel 1999;Acharya 2004). Equally important is the ability of norm entrepreneurs in gate-keeping positions to understand the political institutions within which they oper-ate (Cortell and Davis 2005). Although Moreels made tactical errors that wouldhave been problematic in many political environments, he particularly failed tounderstand the consensus-oriented nature of Belgian politics – in which individ-ual politicians are expected to be team players rather than stars. He conductedhimself as an activist rather than as a politician and failed to carefully build acoalition of support for his plans among his colleagues in the cabinet and theparliament. Although coalition building and sharing the credit for policy initia-tives is valued in many political systems, it has been especially important in theconsociational political culture of Belgium.Fukuda-Parr and Hulme’s (2011) distinction between norm entrepreneurs and

message entrepreneurs is instructive here, albeit with a twist: To be successful,norm entrepreneurs must not only craft their message to resonate domestically,they must also be able to navigate the often murky waters of political decisionmaking without a road map. In the final analysis, this episode illustrates thatactivism and political decision making require very different skills for success.Moreels’ failing was that he was so thoroughly an activist that he failed to graspsufficiently the needs of his new role as a politician. Indeed, in the aftermath ofhis political career, Moreels has returned to humanitarian work.

Conclusion

This study began with the observation that the case selection of previous stud-ies has had an important influence on the conclusion that decision makers inkey gatekeeping positions have a decisive influence on the adoption of inter-national norms by states. By selecting primarily those cases where successfulnorm change took place, the norms literature may have been successful inillustrating that norms matter, but has deprived itself of the opportunity to

7 See note 5 above.

MARIJKE BREUNING 15

more fully understand the dynamics involved in effecting successful normchange. A stronger focus on the domestic political dynamics that influencenorm change has begun to emerge. Several studies concluded that supportivepolicy gatekeepers are crucial in the adoption of new norms. However, thecase study presented in this paper suggests that a sympathetic gatekeeperalone is not sufficient: Rather, decision makers in gatekeeping positionsincrease their odds of success when they are able to: (i) craft their messagein such a way as to gain broad public support and (ii) navigate the peculiari-ties of the political institutions within which they function. In doing so, thisstudy underscores that the adoption of international norms depends on inher-ently political processes. International and domestic circumstances may befavorable to achieving norm change, as they were in the Belgian case, buteven in favorable circumstances norm change is not guaranteed.Gatekeepers may be sympathetic to norm change, but they must also possess

the political skill to navigate the sometimes choppy waters of domestic politicaldecision making to turn a norm into policy. Although gatekeepers may holdimportant keys, they are rarely so powerful that they can unlock the gate to polit-ical transformations singlehandedly. Hence, in addition to being advocates, theymust also be savvy political actors with a deep understanding of their institu-tional context and the processes by which winning coalitions might be con-structed.In the final analysis, this case study of Reginald Moreels’ failure to alter Bel-

gian development cooperation policy in the direction of internationally acceptednorms demonstrates that norm diffusion is an inherently political process. Itrequires not just pruning and grafting, but also persuasion and bargaining.

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Documents

Roles and Realities: When and Why Gatekeepers Fail to Change Foreign Policy