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ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

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Page 1: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE-BASED ACCESS CONTROLS

Ravi Sandhu

George Mason University

and

SETA Corporation

Page 2: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

2© Ravi Sandhu

OUTLINE

RBAC96 model: policy neutral LBAC models: policy full and varied LBAC can be reduced to RBAC96

LBAC < RBAC96 ? why bother to do this?

Page 3: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

3© Ravi Sandhu

RBAC96

ROLES

USER-ROLEASSIGNMENT

PERMISSION-ROLEASSIGNMENT

USERS PERMISSIONS

... SESSIONS

ROLE HIERARCHIES

Page 4: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

4© Ravi Sandhu

HIERARCHICAL ROLES

Engineer

HardwareEngineer

SoftwareEngineer

SupervisingEngineer

Page 5: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

5© Ravi Sandhu

RBAC96

ROLES

USER-ROLEASSIGNMENT

PERMISSIONS-ROLEASSIGNMENT

USERS PERMISSIONS

... SESSIONS

ROLE HIERARCHIES

CONSTRAINTS

Page 6: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

6© Ravi Sandhu

WHAT IS THE POLICY IN RBAC?

RBAC is policy neutral Role hierarchies facilitate security

management Constraints facilitate non-discretionary

policies

Page 7: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

7© Ravi Sandhu

LBAC: LIBERAL *-PROPERTY

H

L

M1 M2

Read Write- +

+ -

Page 8: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

8© Ravi Sandhu

RBAC96: LIBERAL *-PROPERTY

HR

LR

M1R M2R

LW

HW

M1W M2W

Read Write-

+

Page 9: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

9© Ravi Sandhu

RBAC96: LIBERAL *-PROPERTY

user xR, user has clearance x

user LW, independent of clearance Need constraints

session xR iff session xW read can be assigned only to xR roles write can be assigned only to xW roles (O,read) assigned to xR iff

(O,write) assigned to xW

Page 10: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

10© Ravi Sandhu

LBAC: STRICT *-PROPERTY

H

L

M1 M2

Read Write-

+

Page 11: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

11© Ravi Sandhu

RBAC96: STRICT *-PROPERTY

HR

LR

M1R M2R LW HWM1W M2W

Page 12: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

12© Ravi Sandhu

LBAC: WRITE RANGE

subjects have 2 labels read labelwrite label

H

L

M1 M2

Page 13: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

13© Ravi Sandhu

RBAC96: WRITE RANGE LIBERAL *-PROPERTY

HR

LR

M1R M2R

LW

HW

M1W M2W

read role ° write role

Page 14: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

14© Ravi Sandhu

RBAC96: WRITE RANGE STRICT *-PROPERTY

HR

LR

M1R M2R LW HWM1W M2W

read role ° write role

Page 15: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

15© Ravi Sandhu

LBAC: CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY

HS

LS

LI

HI

HS-LI

LS-HI

HS-HI LS-LI

two independentlattices

one compositelattice

Page 16: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

16© Ravi Sandhu

RBAC96: CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY READ ROLES

HSR-LIR

LSR-HIR

HSR-HIR LSR-LIR

Same for all cases

Page 17: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

17© Ravi Sandhu

RBAC96: CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY WRITE ROLES

LSW-HIW

HSW-LIW

HSW-HIW LSW-LIW

Liberal confidentialityLiberal integrity

Page 18: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

18© Ravi Sandhu

RBAC96: CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY WRITE ROLES

Strict confidentialityLiberal integrity

LSW-LIW

LSW-HIW

HSW-LIW

HSW-HIW

Page 19: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

19© Ravi Sandhu

RBAC96: CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY WRITE ROLES

Strict confidentialityStrict integrity

LSW-LIWLSW-HIW HSW-LIWHSW-HIW

Page 20: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

20© Ravi Sandhu

SUMMARY

policy-neutral RBAC96 can accommodate policy-full LBAC in all its variations

LBAC variations are modeled by adjusting role hierarchy adjusting constraints

Page 21: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation

21© Ravi Sandhu

COVERT CHANNELS

are a problem for LBAC remain a problem for RBAC but

they don’t get any worse same techniques can be adapted who cares about them anyway