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67 Hermeneutics Literature and Being Rod Coltman “Within all linguistic phenomena, the literary work of art occupies a privileged relationship to interpretation and thus moves into the neighborhood of philosophy.” (Gadamer 1985) I find it interesting that, when it comes to interpreting literary texts, the term “criticism” has traditionally had far more currency, at least in the English-speaking world, than the word “hermeneutics.” The notion of literary criticism, of course, tends to imply a degree of value judgment, and while it does often entail pronouncements about the superiority of a Shakespeare or a Goethe over so-called “lesser poets” and a wide-ranging rank ordering of literary achievement of all kinds, the term itself, stemming from the Greek krinein (“to judge,” “to decide”) need not, of course, apply solely to the establishment of hierarchies. Much “criticism,” in fact, consists essentially of various kinds of analyses and modes of interpretation, whose efforts are oriented more primarily toward understanding, which is to say determining or deciding the meaning of a text, rather than evaluating it and comparing it to others. And even when it does involve such evaluations and comparisons, literary criticism (like any other mode of textual interpretation, for that matter) necessarily entails this more fundamental aspect of krinein, that of judging or deciding upon meaning, that is, to understand or to interpret. Ironically, however, the term “hermeneutics,” which predominately connotes interpretation theory rather than criticism per se and which tends to a more descriptive rather than evaluative employment, has been invoked primarily, at least since Schleiermacher, in nonliterary realms such as philosophy, wherein it has even been deployed, as often as not, in reference to nontextual phenomena. Construed broadly as interpretation theory, however, hermeneutics could be understood to encompass all modes of interpretation (textual or otherwise), including any kind of literary criticism, from Aristotle’s poetics to the New Criticism of the 1950s, as well as the French tradition of structuralism and even perhaps Derridean poststructural thought. However, only a handful of late modern and postmodern thinkers, beginning with Schleiermacher and running through the likes of Dilthey, Heidegger (perhaps most significantly), Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur, have either thematized hermeneutics or characterized their own thinking as, at least in some respect, hermeneutical, and even fewer have devoted extensive ruminations on the theme of hermeneutics and its relation to literature as such. Even Heidegger, having famously pulled the idea of hermeneutics into the realm of ontology in coining the term “the hermeneutics of facticity,” nevertheless rarely characterizes his own profound philosophical relation to poetry as a function of hermeneutics understood as a process of textual interpretation, which is why I would like to focus these remarks on two of the most prominent thinkers to have done so— Keane, Niall, and Chris Lawn. The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/csun/detail.action?docID=4042997. Created from csun on 2018-01-08 15:04:40. Copyright © 2015. John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Rod Coltman Literature and Being - Michael Bryson · Construed broadly as interpretation theory, however, hermeneutics could be understood to encompass all modes of interpretation

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  • 67HermeneuticsLiteratureandBeing

    RodColtman

    “Withinalllinguisticphenomena,theliteraryworkofartoccupiesaprivilegedrelationshiptointerpretationandthusmovesintotheneighborhoodofphilosophy.”

    (Gadamer1985)

    Ifinditinterestingthat,whenitcomestointerpretingliterarytexts,theterm“criticism”hastraditionallyhadfarmorecurrency,atleastintheEnglish-speakingworld,thantheword“hermeneutics.”Thenotionofliterarycriticism,ofcourse,tendstoimplyadegreeofvaluejudgment,andwhileitdoesoftenentailpronouncementsaboutthesuperiorityofaShakespeareoraGoetheoverso-called“lesserpoets”andawide-rangingrankorderingofliteraryachievementofallkinds,thetermitself,stemmingfromtheGreekkrinein(“tojudge,”“todecide”)neednot,ofcourse,applysolelytotheestablishmentofhierarchies.Much“criticism,”infact,consistsessentiallyofvariouskindsofanalysesandmodesofinterpretation,whoseeffortsareorientedmoreprimarilytowardunderstanding,whichistosaydeterminingordecidingthemeaningofatext,ratherthanevaluatingitandcomparingittoothers.Andevenwhenitdoesinvolvesuchevaluationsandcomparisons,literarycriticism(likeanyothermodeoftextualinterpretation,forthatmatter)necessarilyentailsthismorefundamentalaspectofkrinein,thatofjudgingordecidinguponmeaning,thatis,tounderstandortointerpret.Ironically,however,theterm“hermeneutics,”whichpredominatelyconnotesinterpretationtheoryratherthancriticismperseandwhichtendstoamoredescriptiveratherthanevaluativeemployment,hasbeeninvokedprimarily,atleastsinceSchleiermacher,innonliteraryrealmssuchasphilosophy,whereinithasevenbeendeployed,asoftenasnot,inreferencetonontextualphenomena.

    Construedbroadlyasinterpretationtheory,however,hermeneuticscouldbeunderstoodtoencompassallmodesofinterpretation(textualorotherwise),includinganykindofliterarycriticism,fromAristotle’spoeticstotheNewCriticismofthe1950s,aswellastheFrenchtraditionofstructuralismandevenperhapsDerrideanpoststructuralthought.However,onlyahandfuloflatemodernandpostmodernthinkers,beginningwithSchleiermacherandrunningthroughthelikesofDilthey,Heidegger(perhapsmostsignificantly),Gadamer,Habermas,andRicoeur,haveeitherthematizedhermeneuticsorcharacterizedtheirownthinkingas,atleastinsomerespect,hermeneutical,andevenfewerhavedevotedextensiveruminationsonthethemeofhermeneuticsanditsrelationtoliteratureassuch.EvenHeidegger,havingfamouslypulledtheideaofhermeneuticsintotherealmofontologyincoiningtheterm“thehermeneuticsoffacticity,”neverthelessrarelycharacterizeshisownprofoundphilosophicalrelationtopoetryasafunctionofhermeneuticsunderstoodasaprocessoftextualinterpretation,whichiswhyIwouldliketofocustheseremarksontwoofthemostprominentthinkerstohavedoneso—

    Keane, Niall, and Chris Lawn. The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/csun/detail.action?docID=4042997.Created from csun on 2018-01-08 15:04:40.

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  • Hans-GeorgGadamerand,toalesserextentandmostlybywayofcontrast,PaulRicoeur.Morespecifically,however,IwouldliketozeroinonwhatbothGadamerandRicoeurrefertoasa“limitcase”inliteraryhermeneutics,theso-called“eminent”or“absolute”text,thatistosay,thepoeticworkofart,theexplicationofwhichmayrevealanaspectoftextualinterpretationthatgoesbeneathcriticismoranalysisandnotonlycarriesitbeyondthesphereofliterarystudiesandintotherealmofphilosophy,butmayperhapsevenestablishit,alongsidetheexperienceofart,thehistoricityofunderstanding,andthespeculativestructureoflanguage,asafourthprimaryexemplarofthephenomenonofunderstandinginGadamer’sontology,otherwiseknownasphilosophicalhermeneutics.AlthoughGadamerandRicoeurbothrecognizethepoeticworkor,atleast,lyricpoetry,asbelongingtoaspecialclassofliterature,theydodisplaysomewhatdifferentattitudestowardit.InwhatmaybeaslightlydisparagingallusiontoGadamer,inhisessay,“SpeakingandWriting,”PaulRicoeurmakesthefollowingpronouncement:“Mycontentionisthatdiscoursecannotfailtobeaboutsomething.Insayingthis,Iamdenyingtheideologyofabsolutetexts.Onlyafewsophisticatedtexts,alongthelinesofMallarmé’spoetry,satisfythisidealofatextwithoutreference”(1976,36–37).GiventhatGadameroftencitesMallarmé’s“poésiepure”ashisprimeexample,itwouldseemthatRicoeur’sideaofan“absolutetext”thatis“withoutreference”doescorrespondtowhatGadamermeansbytheeminenttext.Forourpurposes,however,themostsalientfeatureofthiscommentisthatRicoeurgoesontociteMallarmé’spurepoetryas“alimitingcaseandanexception”that“cannotgivethekeytoalltheothertexts,evenpoetictexts,…whichincludeallfictionalliteraturewhetherlyricalornarrative”(1976,37).Gadamer,too,referstotheeminenttextasa“limitcase”forhermeneutics,but,inclaimingthe“absolutetext”asanexception—evenfromotherformsofpoetry—RicoeurisclearlyunwillingtograntGadamer’sthesisthattheeminenttextdoes,infact,offerusthe“key”(or,atleast,akey)notonlytounderstanding“allothertexts,”buttounderstandingtheverynatureoflanguageitself,andthusRicoeurwouldalsoseemunwillingtofollowGadamerintothephenomenologicalandontologicaldeependofhermeneutictheory.

    ForGadamer,oneofthehallmarksoftheeminenttextisitsun-translatability.Thatis,allliteraryworksresisttranslationtoonedegreeoranother,butlyricpoetrydefiesitaltogether.Ricoeuraddressesthequestionoftranslatabilityaswell,onlyhetacklesitviahistheoryofmetaphor.QuotingMonroeBeardsley,Ricoeurseesametaphoras“‘apoeminminiature.’Hencetherelationbetweentheliteralmeaningandthefigurativemeaninginametaphorislikeanabridgedversionwithinasinglesentenceofthecomplexinterplayofsignificationsthatcharacterizetheliteraryworkasawhole”(1976,46).Ricoeur,however,distinguishesbetweentwokindsofmetaphor:metaphorsofsubstitution,asin“thefootofthemountain,”whereonesimplysubstitutesoneterm(thefigurative)foranother(theliteral—inthiscase,“foot”for“base”),and“tensionmetaphors,”whichoperateatthelevelofthesentenceratherthanthewordandcreateatensioninthatsentencebetweentheliteralandfigurativemeaningsinwhichtheliteralmeaningissublimatedandthefigurativemeaningcomestothefore;thetensionbetweenthetwo,however,remains,theideabeingnottocomeupwithanalternativewayofexpressingtheliteral,buttoexpresssomethingentirelynew.Themetaphorofsubstitution,forRicoeur,issimplyakindofstylistictrickthattypicallyfunctionsasmere

    Keane, Niall, and Chris Lawn. The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/csun/detail.action?docID=4042997.Created from csun on 2018-01-08 15:04:40.

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  • ornamentorarhetoricalflourish,whereasthetensionmetaphor(which,forRicoeur,istheonlytruemetaphor)iswhatactuallyallowsforthepossibilityofpoeticutterances.Hence,hetellsus,“realmetaphorsareuntranslatable.Onlymetaphorsofsubstitutionaresusceptibleoftranslationwhichcouldrestoretheliteralsignification.Tensionmetaphorsarenottranslatablebecausetheycreatetheirmeaning.Thisisnottosaythattheycannotbeparaphrased,justthatsuchaparaphraseisinfiniteandincapableofexhaustingtheinnovativemeaning.…ametaphorisnotanornamentofdiscourse.Ithasmorethananemotivevaluebecauseitoffersnewinformation.Ametaphor,inshort,tellsussomethingnewaboutreality”(1976,52–53).ForRicoeur,then,“realmetaphors”and,byextension,poetrywouldnotbesusceptibletotranslationbecausetranslationassumesa“literalsignification”orreferentlyingbeneaththetropewhereinthetranslatormaypresumablyfinditsrealmeaning,asignificationthatwouldbemissingfrompoeticdiscourse,whichcreatesitsownseparatemeaning.

    Gadamer,aswewillsee,wouldagreewiththelatterpartofthisformulation—theuntranslatabilityofthepoem—but,asforthewaythatRicoeurcharacterizesthefunctionofmetaphorinpoetry,Gadamerseemstoholdacontraryandratherdefinitiveattitude,whichheexpressesinseveralplaces.Forexample,inhisessay,“OntheTruthoftheWord,”hemaintainsthat“theessenceofpoetrydoesnotlieinmetaphorandtheuseofmetaphor.Poeticdiscourseisnotattainedbytakingunpoeticalspeechandaddingmetaphor”(2007,151).And,rathermorevehemently,in“TextandInterpretation,”hedeclaresthat,“Rhetoricistherealmwheremetaphorholdssway.Inrhetoriconeenjoysmetaphorasmetaphor.Inpoetry,atheoryofmetaphoraslittledeservesaplaceofhonorasatheoryofwordplay”(1989a,186).Inalllikelihood,whathehasinmindherearemetaphorsofsubstitution,whichRicoeurwouldagreehavenorealplaceinpoetry,butGadamerseemstorejectthenotionofanykindofmetaphor,tensionorotherwise,asthecreativeengineofpoeticexpression.But,regardlessoftheirdifferencesonthefunctionofmetaphorinpoetry,themorepertinentpointhereforourdiscussionistheirapparentagreementconcerningthetranslatabilityofpoetry.

    GadamerconcurswithRicoeur’sideathatonecannotreallytranslateapoem.Atbest,anotherpoetcanattempttocreateanewpoeminthesecondlanguagethatapproximatesthefeelandstructureandperhapssuggestssomethingoftheworldevokedbytheoriginalwork.ForGadamer,however,whenitcomestotextsingeneral,translatabilityisinverselyproportionaltothedegreetowhichthetextitselfdisappears.Take,forinstance,asimplemessagerequestingone’sattendanceatabusinessmeetingor,say,askingonetolunch.Unlessthelunchinvitationhassomeemotionalresonance,orthemeetingisofsomegrandsignificance,inwhichcasethenoteitselfmightbekeptasasouvenirofsomekind,inmostinstances,theprecisewordingofthenoteisoflittlesignificanceandthetextitselfisofnoimportanceandistypicallysetasideandforgottenimmediately.Eveninexceptionalcases,thetextitselfisusuallyonlyofvalueasareminderoftheevent.Theimportantthing,ofcourse,istheevent,thestateofaffairs,ortheoccasionreferredtointhemessage,notthemessageitself.And,ofcourse,anysuchmessagecouldbeeasilytranslatedintoanotherlanguagewithlittleornolossofmeaning,becausetheexactwordingofthetextisirrelevant.Thisisshownbythefactthat,inmostcases,onecouldevenexpressessentiallythesamethoughtwithentirelydifferentwordsinthesamelanguagewithlittleornolossofmeaning.Themessageisallaboutits

    Keane, Niall, and Chris Lawn. The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/csun/detail.action?docID=4042997.Created from csun on 2018-01-08 15:04:40.

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  • referentandnotatallaboutitself.

    Inpoetry,ontheotherhand,thewordsandthesyntaxofaspecificpoemareinandofthemselvesessentialtothepoem,infact,theyarethepoem.If,therefore,onechangesthewordingorsubstitutesforeignwordsfortheoriginal,thepoem(atleasttheoriginalone)islost.Andthisuntranslatabilityoperatesonakindof“slidingscale”fromthelyricpoemtoother,lesshermetic,modesofpoetrytonovelsandplays,which,becauseoftheirgreateremploymentofordinarydiction,areconsiderablymoretranslatable,tomorepropositionaltextssuchasscientificworks,orletters,orsimplenotes,which,becausetheyarelargelyinformational,maybe,asGadamersays,“translatedwithoutsacrifice,evenbyacomputer”(2007,151).1Theselatterarethekindsoftextsthat(unlessoneisahistorian)oneusuallyneednotreturntoafteronehasunderstoodtheirimport.Inmostsuchtexts,whatiscommunicatedisbeyondthetext.Thetextbecomessimplythe“rootdocument”andisonlydealtwithasatextwhenproblemsintheinterpretationoccur(Gadamer1989a,180).2Sothetext,ineffect,tendstodisappearassoonasitsmeaningisgrasped.

    Thetextofapoem,however,neverdisappearsinthisway.Becauseitdoesnotrefertoanythingoutsideofitself,thereisnothingbeyondthepoemthatismoreimportantthanthepoemitself.Thetextofthepoemremains,inotherwords,becausethepoemisnotaboutanything,orrather,itisonlyaboutitself.Whatoneistryingtounderstandwhenonereadsaworkofliteratureistheworkitself.And,contrarytoRicoeur’spronouncementquotedearlierthat“onlyafewsophisticatedtexts,alongthelinesofMallarmé’spoetry,satisfythisidealofatextwithoutreference”(1976,36–37),forGadamer,thislackofreferencewouldholdtrueforanyandallformsofliterature,although,moreproperlyspeaking,notext,noteven“poésiepure,”lacksreferencealtogether;otherwise,theywouldmeannothing.“Languageandwriting,”writesGadamer,“alwaysexistintheirreferentialfunction.Theyarenot,butrathertheymean,andthatalsoappliesevenwhenthethingmeantisnowhereelsethanintheappearingword.Poeticspeakingcomestofulfillmentonlyinspeakingorreadingitself,andofcoursethisentailsthatitisnottherewithoutbeingunderstood”(1989a,186).Thatistosay,thereferentialfunctionofdiscoursestilloperatesinpoetry,butthereferenceisturnedbackonitself,andthisself-referentialitynotonlyconstitutesthemeaningofthepoemandtherebyallowsittobeunderstood,butthepoeticwordonlyexistsinsofarasitunderstood.

    Ricoeur,however,doessaysomethingslightlyclosertoGadamer’stakeonthereferentialityofallliterarytexts(andnotjustlyricpoetry)when,inTheRuleofMetaphor,hetellsusthat“theproductionofdiscourseas‘literature’signifiesverypreciselythattherelationshipofsensetoreferenceissuspended.‘Literature’wouldbethatsortofdiscoursethathasnotdenotationbutonlyconnotation”(1977,220).Ifweunderstandconnotationasakindofimpliedorsomehowdiffuseproductionofmeaning,asopposedtothedirectreferentialityofdenotation,thenperhapsreferenceinliteraturewouldnotbeeliminatedaltogether;presumablyitwouldremain“suspended”withinthetensioninherentinpoeticmetaphor.But,whileconnotationandmetaphorictensionmaywellpreservesomedegreeofreferentiality,albeitindirect,thisdoesnotnecessarilyamounttoself-reference,acrucialaspectofGadamer’sunderstandingofhowmeaningoperatesinliterature.However,self-referenceisnotjustabouttheproductionofmeaning,forGadamer.Forinhisclaimthatthepoeticworddoesnotevenexistwithoutbeing

    Keane, Niall, and Chris Lawn. The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/csun/detail.action?docID=4042997.Created from csun on 2018-01-08 15:04:40.

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  • understood,wehaveourfirstinklingofaGadamerianontologyoflanguageinsofarasthisrecursivenessovercomeswhatGadamerreferstoinPartThreeofTruthandMethod,as“Sprachvergessenheit,”theforgettingoflanguagethatcharacterizesmostofthehistoryofphilosophicaldiscourseandwhichoccurswheneverlanguageisconstruedinpurelyreferentialterms,asamereinstrumentusedtodenotereality,ratherthanasaphenomenonofontologicalsignificanceinitsownright.Thephilosophicaltradition,inotherwords,allowslanguageitselfto“disappear”inmuchthesamewaythatthenonliterarytextdisappearsinfavorofthesubjectmattertowhichitrefers.

    Buttheself-referentialityoftheeminenttexthasaspecialstatuswithrespecttospokenlanguageaswell.Ontheonehand,insofarasthepoetictextstandsbyitselfinitslackofoutwardreferentiality,italsostandsapartfromanypriorspeaking,whichistosaythatitdoesnotreferback(orforward,forthatmatter)toanyspecificexternallinguisticutteranceas,say,thetextofaspeechdoes,ortherecordofalegalproceeding,ortheminutesofameeting,orthetextofaplay.Thepoemdoescalloutforrecitation,but,forGadamer,noactualverbalizingofthetextcaneverquitedojusticetothepoemasaliteraryworkofart.And,whilesomeformsofliteraturedodemandtobereadoutloud,lyricpoetryinparticular“cannotbereadaloud,”saysGadamer,becausethespeechmustbeameditativespeech”(1985,249).Inotherwords,onehearsapoembestnotwithone’searsbutwithwhathecallsthe“innerear.”And,thoughheisneverentirelyexplicitaboutwhathemeansbythis,theinnerearispresumablynothingmorethanthewayapoemsounds(orresounds?)inourmindswhenwereaditsilently.Asheputsit,“Mythesisisnowthattheliteraryworkofarthasitsexistencemoreorlessfortheinnerear.Theinnerearapprehendstheidealmeaninginlanguage,somethingnobodyevercanhear.Theidealformoflanguage,then,demandssomethingunattainablefromthehumanvoice,andthatisexactlythemodeofbeingofaliterarytext”(Gadamer1985,248).Hence,whileGadamerfindshimselfinagreementwiththePlatoofthe“SeventhLetter”andtheSocratesofthePhaedrusthatthepeculiarweaknessofthewrittenworkasaseriesofpropositionsisthatitcannotdefenditselfbecauseitisdetachedfromtheoriginalspeakerandthecircumstancesinwhichitwasoriginallyuttered,andthatspeechasdialogueistherefore,ashesays,“ahead”ofwriting,theaudiblevoice,nonetheless,isneveradequatetotheliterarytext,whichisthereforeaheadoflanguage(asspeech)becausetheintentionsoftheauthorareessentiallyirrelevanttoitsfullmeaning,whichcannotbesaidofmostpropositionaltexts.ForGadamer,“Whatistrulyuniquetoitisthefactthataliterarytextraisesitsvoicefromitself,sotospeak,andspeaksinnobody’sname,notinthenameofagodoralawbutfromitself!NowImaintainthefollowing:the‘idealspeaker’ofsuchawordistheidealreader!”(2007,145).Presumably,then,the“idealreader”ofthepoemwouldnotbetheauthororevenaveryskilledactor,butthe“innervoice,”thevoicethatspeakswhenwereadsilently.Inliterature,then,itistheauthorofthetextandhisorherintentionsthatdisappearratherthanthetextitselforlanguage,which,farfromdisappearing,actuallycomesintoitsowninthepoeticwork.

    However,itisnotthattheenunciatedsoundsofthewordsinapoemareirrelevant—quitethecontrary.ForGadamer,theverbalsoundandshapeofthewords,theirtoneandrhythm,arecompletelyessentialtoandinseparablefromtheirmeaning.Thisinseparability,infact,iswhatconstitutesthetextastext:“Justastheword‘text’reallymeansaninter-wovennessofthreads

    Keane, Niall, and Chris Lawn. The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/csun/detail.action?docID=4042997.Created from csun on 2018-01-08 15:04:40.

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  • thatdoesnoteveragainallowtheindividualthreadstoemerge,so,too,thepoetictextisatextinthesensethatitselementshavemergedintoaunifiedseriesofwordsandsounds”(Gadamer1980,6).Inhis1985essay,“PhilosophyandLiterature,”headds,“Wehaveaninsolublenetworkinagoodpoem,onesothicklyintermeshedofsoundandmeaningthatevensmallchangesinthetextareabletodestroytheentirepoem”(1985,254).Thus,theeminenttextis,forGadamer,theonlytruetextinthesenseofsomethingwoven,intertwined,a“textile”inwhichthesoundandthemeaningconstitutethewarpandweftofafabricthatwouldfallapartcompletelywereanyofitsthreadspulled.Apoem,therefore,isnothingwithoutenunciation,butthatenunciationisinevitablydiminishedwheneveraparticularspeakerrecitesitoutloudbecauseheorshecanneverdojusticeto,andtheouterearcanneveradequatelycapture,everypossiblenuanceorshadeofmeaningthatagreatpoemiscapableof.Moreimportantly,however,theverbalrecitationofthepoemisinevitablyoccasionalandthusatemporaloccurrenceinwhichthespoken“text”fadesawayimmediatelyuponcompletion.Thephenomenonofreadingandlisteningwiththeinnerear,however,whileittoowillneverexhaustthepossibilitiesofapoeticworkofart,hasawayofdispensingwiththistemporalaspectinsofarasthetext,ashesays,“standswritten”(Gadamer1986,114),whichistosaythatitdoesnotfadeawaybutremainspresent.Andnotonlydoesthispersistence,this“standingwritten,”insomesenseaccountforthetimelessnessofatext(thesenseinwhichapoeticwork,justasinotherartisticgenres,mightcometobeconsideredagreatworkofart,aso-called“classic”ora“masterpiece”),italsoallowsusaninsightintotheontologyoflanguageinawaythatpropositionaltextsdonot.

    Ifitsself-referentialityexemptsitfromtheephemeralnatureofpropositionaltexts(andeventhespokenword)andthusbringsthepoeticwordto“stand”(orperhaps“standout”),thiswouldseemtohaveramificationsforthetemporalityoftheliterarytext,which,forGadamer,isofgreatontologicalsignificance.Whenitcomestoasimplemessage(ormostnonliterarytexts,forthatmatter,whichGadamerreferstoasbelongingto“ordinarydiscourse”),itsreferentialfunctionestablishesaseparation,adistance,betweenthetextanditsmeaning,and,becausethetextitselfistransient,acertaintemporalityattendstoit.Itfunctionsasamerestageonthewaytowhatisreallyofinterest,thatis,thesubjectmatterofthetext.Ontheotherhand,thefactthatalyricpoemisnotaboutanythingbutitselfmeansthatthisdistanciationiseliminated,andthisparticularkindoftemporalitynolongerobtainsbecausethereisnoseparatereferent.Thereareonlythewordsthemselves;thetextiseverythingand,assuch,doesnotdisappearbutpersistsandpresentsitself,showsitself,asitselfandnotinrelationtosomethingelse.In“TheRelevanceoftheBeautiful,”heobservesthat“thepoemdoesnotfade,forthepoeticwordbringsthetransienceoftimetoastandstill.Ittoo‘standswritten,’notasapromiseorasapledge,butasasayingwhereitsownpresenceisinplay”(1986,114).Thiswouldseemtoimplythatpoetry’s“eminence”isnotsimplyanepithetthatGadameremploystocharacterizeitassomehowdifferentfromothermodesofdiscourseand,therefore,somethingspecialorevenunique;rather,insofarasit“standswritten,”the“e-minence”oftheeminenttext,its“standingout,”alsoservesasanimplicitdescriptionofitsontologicalstatuswithrespecttolanguageitself.Unlikeordinarydiscourse,thefactthattheliterarytext“demandstobecomepresentinitslinguisticappearanceandnotjusttocarryoutitsfunctionofconveyingamessage”(1989a,182)hasprofoundimplicationsforourunderstandingof

    Keane, Niall, and Chris Lawn. The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/csun/detail.action?docID=4042997.Created from csun on 2018-01-08 15:04:40.

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  • languageitself,insofarasitexplainswhy,ashesays,“Inliteraturewefindthatlanguageitselfcomestoappearanceinaveryspecialway”(TI181).Inotherwords,itisonlyintheliterarytext,andespeciallyinpoetry,thatweencounterlanguageaslanguage,andnotsimplyasamediumforcommunicatingaseparatesubjectmatter.

    However,ifthewords“standing”and“presence”wouldseemtosuggestacompletelackoftemporality,anyonefamiliarwithGadamer’sworkwillimmediatelyrecognizethat,whenheusesthephrase“inplay”intheaforementionedpassage,hedoessoadvisedly.Iftheword“play”soundsasthoughitimpliessomekindoftemporalityor,atleast,motion,itshould,becausethepoeticwordisbynomeansatemporal.Itisjustthatitstemporality,likeitsreference,isturnedinwardandexpressesitself,notasatransientstageinalinearmovementtowardanunderstandingofsomethingbeyondit,butastheconstantandchangingrelationbetweensoundandmeaning,theplaythatconstitutestheverytextuality,thefabric,ofthepoetictext.Inthisunderstandingoftheliteraryworkofart,infact,onecanseeGadamerbringinghisanalysisoftheroleofplayintheontologyoftheworkofartingeneral,whichhedevelopsinPartIofTruthandMethod,togetherwithhisdiscussionoftheontologyoflanguageinPartIIIofthatseminalwork.3And,giventhatHeidegger’sfamousessay,“OriginoftheWorkofArt,”servesGadamerasaprimaryimpetusforhisunderstandingoftheartingeneral,itisonlyappropriatethathewouldleanonaHeideggeriannotionoftemporality,whenheexplainsthat,“ThetemporalstructureofthismovementissomethingIcall‘whiling’[Verweilen],alingeringthatoccupiesthispresentnessandintowhichamediatorydiscourseofinterpretationmustenter.Withoutthereadinessofthepersonwhoisreceivingandassimilatingthetexttobe‘allears,’nopoeticaltextwillspeak”(1989a,189).Thus,thepoeticwordtakesonanonlineartemporalitythatisnotatallstatic,butisconstitutedbyakindofinternalmovementor“whiling,”amovementthatGadameralsocharacterizesas“play,”andplay,forGadamer,isakindofdialogicalmovementthatoperatesinalllinguisticunderstanding.Inthepoetictext,playmanifestsitselfasaninteractionbetweensoundandmeaningthatentailsnosubjectivecontrolbecausethereaderisnotinchargeofthismovementbutis,instead,takenupbyit.Anditisinthisdialecticalinterplayofsoundandmeaning,asthereader’sworldandtheworldofthetextcometogetherinwhatGadamerfamouslycalls“dieHorizontverschmelzung,”(1989b)afusion(or,better,a‘blending’)oftheirrespectivehorizons,thatunderstandingoccurs,anditiswithinthisdialecticalphenomenonofunderstandingthatGadamerfindstherealontologicalpoweror“valence”ofthepoeticword.

    InPartIofTruthandMethod,Gadamerlaysoutforusthehistoryofaestheticsandtakesissuewiththekindof“aestheticconsciousness”thattakestheworkofartasanobjectofstudyandevaluation.Instead,hearguesthat“play”constitutesthemodeofexistenceoftheworkofartandthattheworkofartisnotfullypresentuntilitisexperienced.Inhisdiscussionofhowanartisticimageorpicture(Bild),suchasapaintingoranartisticphotograph,differsfromamerecopyofsomething(Abbild),like,forexample,apassportphoto,hepointsoutthat,unlikethecopy,theimageisnotmerelytryingtoshowustheoriginalasaccuratelyaspossible,thatis,tomerelypresenttheoriginaltousinadifferentform;instead,theimage“represents”theoriginalsomewhatinthewaythatalawyeroranagentrepresentshisorherclient.Whetherornottheclientisphysicallypresentinthecourtroom,heorsheislegallypresentinsofarasthe

    Keane, Niall, and Chris Lawn. The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/csun/detail.action?docID=4042997.Created from csun on 2018-01-08 15:04:40.

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  • lawyeristhereinhisorherstead.Butthelawyerisnotsimplyacipherorastand-infortheclientbut,inaway,combineswiththeclienttocreatesomethinggreater(atleastinlegalterms)thantheclientwouldbealone.Gadamer’scontentionisthattheartisticpictureisnotjustsomethingphysicallynewinitsownright,norisitsimplyastand-inforthethingitisdepicting;rather,initsrelationtotheoriginal(Urbild),itactuallyconstitutesan“increaseinbeing”forthatoriginalinatleasttwoways.First,thepicturere-presentstheoriginal,notasitordinarilyappears,butinanewway;thatistosay,itshowsussomethingnewabouttheoriginalthatwouldnotbeapparentinamoremundaneencounterwithit.Second,andrathermoresubtly,theimageincreasesthebeingoftheoriginaltotheextentthatthethingdepictedisonlytheoriginalinsofarasithasbeendepicted.Theoriginal,inotherwords,wouldnotbeanoriginalwithouttheexistenceoftheimage.ThisisperhapseasiertoseeintheGerman:the“Urbild”isonlyan“Urbild”inrelationtoa“Bild.”Otherwise,onewouldnevercallitthis.

    GadamerdoesincludetheliteraryworkofartinhisdiscussionofaestheticontologyinTruthandMethod,butitisalmostasafterthought,andhefocusesonthenovelashisexemplarratherthanthepoem.Itisapparentlynotuntilhislaterwritings,someofwhichIhaveinvokedhere,includinghisextensiveruminationsonpoetssuchasFriedrichHölderlin,Rainer-MariaRilke,StephanGeorg,and(perhapsmostsignificantly)PaulCelan4thathebeginstounderstandthepoem,preciselybecauseofitslinguisticnature,ashavingevengreaterontologicalsignificancethantheplasticarts.Inhisessay,“OntheTruthoftheWord,”infact,Gadamerasksthefollowingquestionwithregardtopoeticexpression(orAussage):“Whatisitthatisthereineverythingthatissaidandcomestostandbeforeus,whentheAussagetakesplaceorhappens?”(2007,148).Ifsimplyposingthequestioninthiswayshowsusthatheisthinkingofpoetryinverydifferenttermsfromthoseoftraditionalaestheticsorliterarycriticism,hisanswertakesussquarelyintoHeideggerianterritory:“Ithinkitisself-presence,thebeingofthe‘there’[Seindes‘Da’],andnotwhatisexpressedasitsobjectivecontent.Therearenopoeticobjects,onlypoeticpresentationsofobjects”(2007,148).Heidegger,ofcourse,tellsusthatthehumanbeing“dwellspoetically”(1971),andhismostfamouswayofexpressingthisistorefertolanguageas“thehouseofbeing”(1993).Gadamerwillfollowhismentorintotheontologicalrealmoflanguage,butifHeideggerseeslanguageasthehouseofbeing(otherwiseunderstoodasthe‘Da’orthe‘there’ofbeing),thenGadamer’swillexpressitsomewhatdifferentlywhenhesaysthat“beingthatcanbeunderstoodislanguage”(1989b).Thatis,humanbeingsdonotsimplypossesslanguageasatoolforcommunicationoramoreorlesstransparentlensthroughwhichtoviewtheworld,theyactuallyexistlinguistically.Language,inotherwords,isthemodeofhumanexistenceintheworld,and,becauseofthefundamentallinguisticality(Sprachlichkeit)ofhumanbeing,ourmodeofunderstandingislinguistic,and,consequently,whatwecanunderstandoftheworldisinevitablylinguisticaswell.Thisisnottosaythatnothingintheworldexistsapartfromhumanbeingsorlanguage;itisjustthatlanguagerepresentstheworldinthewaythatthepicturerepresentstheoriginal.Theoriginal,insomeway,gainsbeingthroughbeingrepresented,andGadamer’slaterworknotonlyextendsthisformulationtothepoeticword,itdoessowitharatherprofounddifference:“Itisnotsomuchthethingsaidinthesenseofexpressinganobjectivecontentthatnowgainsinbeingasratheritisbeingasawhole.…Thewordisnotanelementoftheworldlikecolors

    Keane, Niall, and Chris Lawn. The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/csun/detail.action?docID=4042997.Created from csun on 2018-01-08 15:04:40.

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  • orformsthatcanbefittedintoaneworderofthings.Rather,everywordisitselfalreadyanelementofaneworderofthingsandthereforeisitselfpotentiallythisorderinitsentirety.Whenawordresonates,awholelanguageandeverythingitisabletosayiscalledforth—anditknowshowtosayeverything”(OTW152).Thus,itisnotthattheontologicalvalenceofthepoemissimply,aswiththepicture,thatitincreasesthebeingofwhatitrepresents,but,becausethemediumofpoetryislanguage,andthepoemdoesnotrefertoanythingbeyonditself,itonlyrefersbacktoitself—aslanguage.Consequently,ifapoemcanbesaidtorepresentanything,thenwhatis“re-presented”initislanguageitself,because,forGadamer,itisonlythroughthehermeneuticinterplaybetweenthewholeoflanguageandindividualwordsthatanythingcanmeananythingatall.

    So,whetherornotwearespeakinginstrictlypoetic,literary,oreventextualterms,ifwedounderstandhermeneuticsstraightforwardlyas“interpretationtheory,”andifweunderstandinterpretationbroadlyasaprocessofunderstandingorarrivingatmeaning,thenwearestillleftwiththequestionofhowwearetounderstand(orinterpret)thewords“understanding”and“meaning,”which,inturn,raisestheobviousquestionofhowto“understand”whateverexplanationwemightofferforthesewords,andsoon—aprocessthatmightbecharacterizedasapotentiallyinfinite(andthereforefutileandempty)logicalregression,or,insofaraseachchainofsuccessiveinterpretationsmightleadinevitablybacktotheoriginalterm,aseeminglyvicious(andthereforefutileandempty)logicalcircle—andyet,wedounderstand,andwedofindmeaningintheworld.Gadamerisnotaloneincharacterizingthisphenomenonastheso-called“hermeneuticcircle,”theplayorinterplaybetweenpartandwhole,textandcontext,theindividualwordsandtheentiretyoflanguage,thatallowsunderstandingtooccurandmeaningtoemergewithoutbecomingviciousorfutileorempty.ButGadamer’sgreatinnovationistoseethisemergenceofmeaningasakindofdialecticalanddialogical“Aufhebung,”asortofHegeliansublationoftheantithesisofwholeandpartintheemergenceofsomethingnew,anemergencethatoccursineveryinstanceofunderstanding,includingtextualunderstanding,and(atleastinhislaterwritings)theliterarytext,andthelyricpoeminparticular,thatistosay,theeminenttext,seemstohaveemergedforhimasthequintessentialexemplarymomentofthisphenomenon.

    ReferencesGadamer,Hans-Georg(1980)“TheEminentTextandItsTruth,”trans.GeoffreyWaite,TheBulletinoftheMidwestModernLanguageAssociation13(1):3–10.

    Gadamer,Hans-Georg(1985)“PhilosophyandLiterature,”trans.AnthonyJ.Steinbock,ManandWorld18:241–259.

    Gadamer,Hans-Georg(1986)“TheRelevanceoftheBeautiful:ArtasPlay,Symbol,andFestival,”trans.DanTate,inTheRelevanceoftheBeautifulandOtherEssays,ed.RobertBernasconi,trans.DanTate,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,pp.3–53.

    Gadamer,Hans-Georg(1989a)“TextandInterpretation,”trans.DennisSchmidtandRichard

    Keane, Niall, and Chris Lawn. The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/csun/detail.action?docID=4042997.Created from csun on 2018-01-08 15:04:40.

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  • Palmer,inDialogueandDeconstruction:TheGadamerDerridaEncounter,ed.DianeP.MichelfelderandRichardE.Palmer,Albany,NY:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,pp.21–51.

    Gadamer,Hans-Georg(1989b)TruthandMethod,2ndrev.ed.,trans.rev.byJoelWiensheimerandDonaldG.Marshall,NewYork:TheCrossroadsPublishingCompany.

    Gadamer,Hans-Georg(1997)GadameronCelan:“WhoAmIandWhoareYou?”andOtherEssays,trans.anded.RichardHeinemannandBruceKrajewski,Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.

    Gadamer,Hans-Georg(2007)“OntheTruthoftheWord,”trans.RichardPalmer,inTheGadamerReader:ABouquetoftheLaterWritings,ed.RichardPalmer,Evanston,IL:NorthwesternUniversityPress,pp.132–155.

    Heidegger,Martin(1971)Poetry,Language,Thought,trans.AlbertHofstadter,NewYork:Harper&Row.

    Heidegger,Martin(1993)“TheWaytoLanguage,”inBasicWritings,revisedandexpandededition,ed.DavidFarrellKrell,NewYork:HarperandCollins,pp.392–426.

    Ricoeur,Paul(1976)InterpretationTheory:DiscourseandtheSurplusofMeaning,FortWorth,TX:TexasChristianUniversityPress.

    Ricoeur,Paul(1977)TheRuleofMetaphor:MultidisciplinaryStudiesoftheCreationofMeaninginLanguage,trans.RobertCzernywithKathleenMcLaughlinandJohnCostello,SJ.Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress.

    Notes1AlthoughIthinkGadamertendstooverestimatetheefficacyofcomputertranslationsof

    complicatedtexts,eveniftheyareprimarilyinformational,asanyonewhohastriedtousethetranslatefunctioninGoogleorawebbrowsertofigureoutwhataforeignWebpageisallaboutcanattest.

    2This,ofcourse,wouldseemtoraisethesecond-orderquestionofthestatusofthetextoftheinterpretationitself,thecritic’sowntext,but,asGadamerputsit,thediscourseoftheinterpreterisnotitselfatext,rather“itservesthetext”(1989a,180).

    3Seeespecially1989b,PartI,SectionII:“TheOntologyoftheWorkofArtandItsHermeneuticSignificance,”andPartIII,Section3,“LanguageasHorizonofaHermeneuticOntology.”

    4Foroneofthemostilluminatingtextsintheregard,IwouldrecommendGadamer’sessaysonCelan,especially,“WerbinIchundWerbistDu?”(“WhoAmIandWhoAreYou?”),whichhavebeencollectedandtranslatedintoEnglish(Gadamer1997),andIwould

    Keane, Niall, and Chris Lawn. The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/csun/detail.action?docID=4042997.Created from csun on 2018-01-08 15:04:40.

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  • particularlyrecommendGeraldBruns’introductiontothevolume,towhichthepresentessayowesagreatdebt.

    Keane, Niall, and Chris Lawn. The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/csun/detail.action?docID=4042997.Created from csun on 2018-01-08 15:04:40.

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