Roads Directorate Hammersmith Flyover Emergency

Transport for London

Surface Transport

Emergency Preparedness Plan for Hammersmith Flyover (Version –Draft) Copyright © Transport for London Page 1 of 22

Roads Directorate

Hammersmith Flyover

Emergency Preparedness Plan

Status: Draft Version: V00e Date: 29th Oct 2011


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BLANK PAGE


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Distribution List Role Name Organisation Reference Structures Manager (Document Owner)

Stephen Pottle Transport for London Master

Director Roads Directorate Dana Skelley Transport for London Interim Head of Tunnels & Structures

Matthew Sercombe Transport for London

Structures Technical Advisor Ken Duguid Transport for London Programme Manager – Hammersmith Flyover Strengthening Measures

Chad Frankish Transport for London

Project Manager – Hammersmith Flyover Strengthening Measures

Darren Bearwish Amey

Head of Highway Operations Andy Best Transport for London Senior Structures Route Manager

Steve Eggleton Transport for London

Head of Profession, Bridges and Structures

Graham Bessant London Underground

Traffic Management Unit, Hammersmith & Fulham

Justin Bennett Metropolitan Police

Alex Gilbert Amey HMWC Highways Operations Manager

Andy Potts Amey ‐ HMWC

Director of Environment Mahmood Siddiqi Borough of ‐ Hammersmith and Fulham, and Kensington and Chelsea

LSTCC Manager Es George Transport for London LSTCC, Planned Events Jason Diffenthal Transport for London London Bus Operations – Hammersmith and Fulham

Dave Leslie Transport for London

Development and Planning Manager, Consultation and Engagement

Esther Johnson Transport for London

Press and Media Relations Thomas Canning Transport for London Works Co‐ordination ‐ North West Area

Karl Kulasingam Transport for London

Principal Network Impact Assessment Engineer

Dele Olaleye Transport for London

Regional Director Amrit Ghose Aecom Associate Director Peter Sparkes Aecom Date of Issue Status DRAFT


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Contents 1 Introduction 6 2 Background 6 3 Aim 7 4 Objectives 7 5 Roles and Responsibilities 8 6 Persons/Organisations to be informed when the plan is triggered 10 7 EPP Activation Procedure 10 8 Out of Office Hours 11 9 Operational Status & Trigger Levels 12 10 Operational Status ‐ Response 14 11 Traffic Management and Diversion Routes 16 12 Management of the Response and Response Organisation (Gold/Silver/Bronze) 17 13 Communications 18 14 Debriefing & Reporting 18 15 Supporting Documentation 19

Reference Documents Ref. London Underground Emergency Preparedness Plan TfL Communications Strategy

Glossary AbbreviationEmergency Preparedness Plan EPP Highways Agency HA Highways and Maintenance Works Contract HMWC London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham LB H&F London Borough of Kensington and Chelsea LB K&C London Emergency Service Liaison Panel LESLP London Streets Traffic Control Centre LSTCC London Streets and Tunnels Operations Centre LSTOC London Underground LU Major Incident and Response Recovery Process MIRRP Roads Directorate, TfL Surface Transport RD Transport for London TfL

Addenda Ref. Emergency Contact List

A


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1 Introduction The Transport for London (TfL) Surface Transport, London Streets, Roads Directorate (RD) has responsibility for the safe operation and maintenance of Hammersmith Flyover. This document sets out the emergency preparedness plan (EPP) and actions required in the event of the Flyover no longer being able to carry the required loading. The plan describes what actions shall be taken when various trigger points are reached and who is responsible for undertaking that action.

2 Background

Hammersmith Flyover was constructed c.1963 and is a 16 span segmental post tensioned structure carrying the A4 over the Hammersmith Gyratory.

A 3 stage post tensioned special inspection and structural assessment was partially completed by the Highways Agency prior to transfer to TfL in 2000. A simplistic monitoring system was also installed by the HA. The outputs from this monitoring were reviewed in 2007 when management of the structure was brought in house. It was found that the system was too localised and lacked sensitivity. As a result no meaningful information or conclusions could be obtained; the monitoring was stopped and TfL commenced new investigations. The investigations and assessment was completed in 2009 and found that the structure was adequate to carry normal highway loading up to and including 40t vehicles, but does not have sufficient capacity to carry abnormal heavy loads. However, the spare capacity was found to be very low in some sections.

The main feature of concern is the ongoing deterioration of the post tensioning tendons. As they corrode and break the likelihood of a sudden and catastrophic collapse of the flyover increases. This will mean that one or more spans will collapse with little or no warning. In the worst case this may lead to a progressive collapse of half the bridge. The results from the investigations and assessment were used to determine what should be monitored and how, to help ascertain the rate of deterioration of the structure and inform decisions about when and what further action may be required. As a result in 2010 a comprehensive acoustic monitoring system was installed in the worse half the bridge. The monitoring system picks up events as they happen and analyses the sound print to filter out noise from those which are probable wire breaks. These sound prints are then compared with known patterns to ascertain which are confirmed as wire breaks and where they are located. A plan is in place to install monitoring into the Western part of the bridge over the next few months.


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Recent analysis of the monitoring systems installed in the flyover has shown that the structure is deteriorating at a much faster rate than previously anticipated. Based on this new knowledge it is estimated that there could be as little as 18 months before Hammersmith Flyover could become unsafe and potentially collapse. Immediate action is therefore being taken to ensure the continued operation of the A4 over the flyover and the areas beneath. The immediate plans are to install some form of temporary structure beneath the flyover or other works, to strengthen it and prevent the likelihood of a sudden collapse, however remote the possibility. At this stage the details of the temporary structure have yet to be determined. It is likely to be 3‐4 months before construction can commence, with completion in June 2012. Until this structure is in place there is a very remote possibility that Hammersmith Flyover will collapse. This EPP will remain active until then.

3 Aim The aim of this document is to establish the framework of arrangements for effecting suitable and sufficient responses when pre‐determined trigger levels are reached which notify an increase in the level of risk and signify that collapse of the structure is likely.

4 Objectives

The principal objective is to maintain public safety and prevent serious injury or loss of life due to the full or partial collapse The objective of this plan is to set out the management actions for Hammersmith Flyover by: • Defining trigger points at which action should be taken. • Detailing the sequence of actions to be taken and who will undertake them. • Outlining the traffic management contingency measures in the event of a full or

partial closure of the Flyover and the road network beneath the Flyover. • Providing details of the key contacts to facilitate a fast and coordinated approach to

traffic management, in order to minimise disruption to the transport network as much as possible and prevent serious injury or fatalities.

• Defining the key stakeholder and communications strategy which will need to be implemented in an emergency situation.


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5 Roles and Responsibilities

Transport for London The role of TfL shall include but is not limited to: • Providing support to the emergency services where and when required (i.e. within the

incident containment, response and de‐escalation phases); • The implementation of recovery and return to normal service of affected assets; • Communication with media and stakeholders. Director Roads Directorate The Director shall: • Make the final decision to implement the emergency response; • Advise senior management of the actions being taken; • Chair the emergency response panel; • Provide media and stakeholder briefings. Structures Manager, London Streets The Structures Manager shall: • Ensure that the EPP is developed and maintained in conjunction with internal TfL

stakeholders, the emergency services and affected Boroughs; • Ensure that the EPP contains details of local communication processes, contact

numbers, reflect local conditions and include relevant information that will assist responding agencies in delivering specific response arrangements;

• Notify LU Head of Profession to initiate their own EPP; • Review the outputs from the monitoring data to determine when trigger points may

be/have been reached; • Advise the Director of Roads when trigger points are approaching and the appropriate

course of action to be taken; • Notify key stakeholders when the operational status of this EPP, as outlined in section 9,

changes. • Ensure that TfL Contractors (HMWCs) and key stakeholders are prepared and that

sufficient materials and resources are available and capable of being deployed to the correct locations at short notice;

• Prepare in conjunction with the press office and communications team a statement which can be issued immediately in the event of emergency action being necessary.

London Streets Traffic Control Centre (LSTCC) LSTCC shall: • Manage the LSTCC Duties and Communication Plan as included and detailed in the

Major Incident Response and Recovery Policy (MIRRP); • Liaise with Structures Manager for updates; • Liaise with CentreComm (London Buses); • Notify and liaise with TfL Duty Press Liaison Officer; • Contact HMWC Operations Control Room;


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• Confirm with Police to initiate Emergency Service Response; • Inform any other London Streets Senior Managers of incidents and effect on TLRN; • Inform the Public (via VMS on TfL and HA roads, TfL Press and Website) of incident effect

on TLRN; • Inform Hammersmith and Fulham of effect on their borough roads. HMWC Operations Control Room • Will contact the on‐call TfL Structures Engineer and the on‐call TfL Highways Engineer London Underground London Underground shall: • Implement their emergency incident response as set out in their own EPP London Buses London Buses shall: • London Buses shall be responsible for the development, maintenance, communication

and delivery of an Emergency Response Plans relevant to their own service Responding Agencies • The Emergency Services shall be responsible for the development, maintenance,

communication and delivery of Emergency Response Plans relevant to their own service and for ensuring that these are developed, where necessary, considering the plans of TfL and other responding agencies.

Highway Maintenance Works Contractors The HMWCs shall: • Ensure that sufficient materials and resources are available and in the correct location to

provide a rapid response when required. • Set out traffic management, exclusion zones and diversion routes. • Assist the emergency services as required. Communication and Press The Press and Consultation and Engagement Team shall: • Pre‐prepare responses to probable key questions that are likely to asked (by press,

media and members of public), as a result of changes in the flyover’s operational status (as identified in Section 13).

• Once a press release has been issued ensure all other key stakeholders/organisations identified are contacted.

• Keep stakeholders/organisations and media regular informed once the actions have been initiated.

• Answer any questions that are received by customer services.


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6 Persons/Organisations to be informed when the plan is triggered

Once it has been agreed with the Director of Roads that action to safeguard the public is necessary, the following people and organisations shall be informed so that they can implement their necessary actions. Persons/organisations to be notified immediately when the operational status of the flyover (as outlined in section 9) changes: TfL Roles Contact Director of Roads Dana Skelley Head of Highways Operations Andy Best Highways Operation Team Area Manager (for approach roads)

Rob O’Rourke (Highways), Annette Kay (Structures)

LSTCC Duty Manager Esmon George Chief Operating Officer, London Streets Garrett Emmerson LU Head of Profession – Bridges and Structures Graham Bessant Head of Tunnels & Structures Matthew Sercombe London Bus Operations Area Manager Dave Leslie Duty Press Officer Thomas Canning Consultation and Engagement Manager Esther Johnson External to TfL Roles HMWC –Operations Manager Andy Potts Local Authorities – LB H&F / K&C Director of Environment Mahmood Siddiqi Project Manager ‐ Slip Road Re‐Alignment Works (LB H&F)

Anvar Alizadeh

Highways Agency TBC

In addition to the above; MP’s, Transport Organisations including BAA Heathrow, Hospitals, Entertainment Venus including Hammersmith Apollo, and Schools, as identified by the Consultation and Engagement team.

7 EPP Activation Procedure

Possible wire break events are recorded almost instantaneously on a dedicated ‘Mistras’ website (which can be accessed by key members of project team). The project team members are also instantly updated by text message and email confirming the time and location of these events. These events are then analysed, and confirmed as wire breaks or as non‐wire breaks – (interpretation report provided weekly by Aecom).


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Significant multiple events require instant analysis from Physical Acoustics Ltd, and discussion with TfL Streets Technical Approval’s Manager, Structures Manager London Streets, and Aecom’s Technical Assessment Team. The response to these wire breaks and the activation of this EPP will be instigated by the Structures Manager, London Streets based on pre‐determine trigger levels, as set out in section 9 of this document.

8 Out of Office Hours

Communications between members of Aecom’s Technical Assessment Team, Physical Acoustics Ltd. and Structures Manager, London Streets during out of office hours will be via mobile phone. If a significant number of possible wire‐breaks are reported during out of office hours, it is the responsibility of the Structures Manager, London Streets, to co‐ordinate and communicates the satisfactory response according to the risk. If the Structures Manager is for whatever reason unavailable, the Technical Approvals Manager for Hammersmith Flyover will be responsible for the response.


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9 Operational Status & Trigger Levels

Whilst the EPP is activated, the situation with regard to the structural capacity and safety of the Hammersmith Flyover will continue to be recorded as per the monitoring regime. The situation with regard to traffic restrictions on the Hammersmith Flyover will be dependant upon trigger levels and is summarised in Table 9.1.

STATUS

TRIGGER LEVEL

ACTIONS REQUIRED

GREEN

The decay time at critical sections within the flyover is > than 6 months.

Continue to monitor.

AMBER

The decay time is < 6 month.

Prepare to install Emergency Strengthening / OR review Emergency Strengthening (if already installed).

RED

The decay time is < 1 month.

Install Emergency Strengthening / OR Prepare to reduce live loading/ OR Enhance Emergency Strengthening/ OR Further restrict live loading

BLACK

The decay time = 0

Reduce live loading/ OR close flyover / set up exclusion zone underneath and around flyover.

Table 9.1 – Traffic restrictions with respect to trigger levels

This table will be continually reviewed and updated to ensure appropriate trigger levels for each pier are in place to accurately reflect the condition of the Flyover at critical locations. The status of the flyover is fluid, and can change from green →amber etc. but equally if actions are taken to support the affected locations the operational status can change back from amber → green. This is outlined in the flow chart below:

NO

Continue to Monitor

Review Emergency

Strengthening/ Load restrictions

Enhance Emergency

Strengthening

Further Restrict Live Loading

Close Flyover

Set up Exclusion Zone

NO NO

YES

Continue to Monitor

Prepare to Reduce Live

Loading

Reduce Live Loading

YES

YES

YES

Green (Decay time > 6

months)

Continue to Monitor

Prepare to Install Emergency

Strengthening

Amber (Decay time < 6

months)

Red (Decay time < 1

month)

Black (Decay time = 0)

Reduce Live Loading

Review Trigger Status

Install Emergency

Strengthening

NO

Operational Status

(Decay time Trigger Levels


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10 Operational Status ‐ Response

GREEN : Continue to Monitor

Hammersmith Flyover remains fully operational and the roads above and below are open to traffic. Existing restrictions on the Flyover still apply. Monitoring results continue to be reviewed daily by Aecom and TfL Structures and an interpretation of the condition of the Flyover is also issued on a daily basis. From the rate of deterioration of the post‐tensioning strands, the timescale for implementation of the trigger actions is determined. In green status the decay time at which the require level of loading cannot be sustained is > 6 months. OR: mitigation is in place to sustain the existing level of loading, and has increased the decay time at which the required level of loading cannot be sustained to > 6 months.

AMBER : Prepare/ Or Review Hammersmith Flyover remains fully operational and the roads above and below are open to traffic. Existing restrictions on the Flyover still apply. In amber status the decay time at which the require level of loading cannot be sustained is < 6 months. OR: after mitigation measures the decay rate has again dropped to < 6 months. Structures Manager, London Streets will notify key stakeholders including LU Head of Profession – Bridges and Structures and London Bus Operations, and LB H&F.

RED : Install strengthening or/and Reduce Loading In red status the decay time at which the required level of loading cannot be sustained is < 1 month. The structure is nearing the point where any level of live loading


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cannot be sustained and mitigation is in place. OR: after mitigation measures the decay rate has again dropped to < 1 month. Structures Manager, London Streets will notify LSTCC and the local Highway Authority, (LB H&F). Traffic signal changes and VMS signage will be implemented by both TfL and LB H&F to reduce disruption prior to traffic management arrangements on site. Structures Manager, London Streets will instruct Highways Operations to implement lane restrictions, road closures and diversions in line with the proposed traffic management strategy for the RED status. Structures Manager, London Streets will notify key stakeholders including LU Head of Profession – Bridges and Structures and London Bus Operations, and LB H&F Stakeholder Communications will need to prepare their emergency communications protocol. Monitoring results continue to be reviewed daily by Aecom and TfL Structures, and an interpretation of the condition of the Flyover is also issued on a daily basis. From the rate of deterioration of the post‐tensioning strands, the timescale for implementation of the BLACK trigger actions is determined.

BLACK : Reduce Live Loading/ OR Close Flyover/ OR and Set up exclusion

zone In black status the decay time at which the require level of loading cannot be sustained has reached 0. In this case live loading will be reduced on the flyover to increase improve the decay rates. OR: after mitigation measures the decay rate has again dropped to 0. In this case, the flyover will be closed to all traffic. From the rate of deterioration of the post‐tensioning strands, the timescale for collapse of the structure is determined. and setting up and exclusion zone underneath and surrounding the flyover will be prepared.


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Structures Manager, London Streets will notify LSTCC and the local Highway Authority, (LB H&F). Traffic signal changes and VMS signage will be implemented by both TfL and LB H&F to reduce disruption prior to traffic management arrangements on site. Structures Manager, London Streets will instruct Highways Operations to implement lane restrictions, road closures and diversions in line with the proposed traffic management strategy for the BLACK status. An exclusion zone will be created by erecting a hoarding perimeter at a distance of 50m from the Flyover. Structures Manager, London Streets will notify key stakeholders including LU Head of Profession – Bridges and Structures and London Bus Operations, and LB H&F. Stakeholder Communications will need to engage the emergency communications protocol. An emergency review meeting will be held to discuss controlling the collapse of the Flyover, measures for the removal of debris, reinstatement of the LB H&F roads beneath the flyover, and ultimately long term options for replacement will be agreed and approved.

11 Traffic Management and Diversion Routes

Traffic management will be provided by the HMWC as and when required, based on trigger levels and the associated operational status. This will include roads where LB H&F are the Highway Authority due to the speed in which the HMWC can be deployed and the severity of the consequences if restrictions are not implemented as soon as required. Diversion plans for each operational status will be finalised and key stakeholders consulted once a press release has been issued. The Metropolitan Police Service has already been briefed.


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12 Management of the Response and Response Organisation (Gold/Silver/Bronze)

The management of the TfL Streets response shall be undertaken in a similar format to that undertaken by the Emergency Services, so that the right people are communicating with each other at the right levels. Where responsibilities can be delegated to competent resources, this shall be done. Hammersmith Flyover’s emergency preparation plan shall contain an up‐to‐date contacts list of all TfL and HMWC staff responding on TfL’s behalf to an incident. It shall be the responsibility of the plan owner (Structures Manager, London Streets) to ensure that these details are maintained and all changes and/ or amendments are communicated to all concerned parties. TfL Streets Gold (Strategic) Response The role of this group is to combine and direct resources towards the strategic management of the incident. It therefore follows that this group sets the framework of policy within which the other two levels of the system operate. This response is likely to include the Managing Director Surface Transport, the Chief Operating Officer (COO) London Streets, the Director of Roads and the Head of Tunnels & Structures. The Gold Team will be supported by a TfL Surface Communications assigned internal Media Liaison Officer.

The roles & responsibilities of TfL Streets “Gold” response is detailed within TfL MIRRP. TfL Streets Silver (Tactical) Response This role defines the actual deployment and redeployment of resources in order to achieve the overall plan. The responsibility of those at the tactical or adroit level is to determine the priority and allocation of tasks, to plan and co‐ordinate when a task will be undertaken and to obtain resources as required.

This response is most likely to include the Head of Tunnels & Structures (who shall provide the link between “Silver” and “Gold”), and the HMWC Contract Manager, Maintenance Services Manager and Schemes Manager. TfL Streets Bronze (Operational) Response Those at the operational level shall have responsibility for functions and areas as defined in relevant local response procedures/

Although TfL & the HMWC may be called to assist the emergency services in their response to an incident; the recovery and return of asset to use following the incident will form the main part of TfL’s response and will therefore require the largest commitment of time, budget and resources.


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13 Communications

All direct communication with members of the press or media shall be undertaken in consultation with/through the TfL Surface Communications Team and TfL Duty Press Officer. Official statements shall be agreed by the Gold Response Team before release. Where practical, the TfL Surface Communications Team shall dispatch a Liaison Officer to attend the scene to assist the TfL Gold response. It is to be expected that when trigger points are reached and action is taken, there will be immediate interest from the press, media and members of the public. The key questions that will provide the focus of their attention will be: • Who is to blame? • When did TfL discover the problem? • What did TfL do before it became a Critical Incident? • What TfL are doing now that it is a Critical Incident? Those affected by the incident need to be reassured at an early stage that: • Everything reasonably practicable was in place in an effort to prevent the incident

in the first place; • TfL and its HMWC, in conjunction with the Emergency Services, have plans in place

to assess and respond to the incident; • TfL cares about what has occurred and is doing everything reasonably practicable

to remedy the situation. Regular and timely communication between each response team shall take place in order for the Silver and Gold Response Teams to be able to prioritise and provide the appropriate response to the right location and the right time. Pre‐prepared responses shall be produced and held by the communications team and will be issued to the press/media in the event of action being necessary. All the communications are detailed specifically in the TfL Communications Strategy set out by the Consultation and Engagement Team.

14 Debriefing & Reporting

During the Recovery Stage of the Incident response, the Gold Response Team will initiate the debriefing and reporting for the Incident. The purpose of this must be clearly communicated to all parties involved that it is not to assign responsibility for and actions or inactions, but to capture all relevant details regarding the development and response to the incident so that lessons can be learned, best practises shared, deficiencies identified and our organisational responses can, in future, be more robust in future. Depending upon the role undertaken in responding to the incident and the numbers of personnel involved, debriefing may be undertaken as a group or as individuals, but must be


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mediated by an impartial and un‐associated party, so that events are objectively captured and conflicts of interest and personal loyalties do not distort the findings. The party conducting the debriefing must have the authority, whether implicit or delegated, to ask the necessary questions of the personnel being debriefed. It must be understood that the debrief is to capture information for the organisation to learn from and that all parties (from Director to Trainee Operative) should fully participate for this to be effective. In the event that evidence of misconduct comes to light through the debriefing process, the appropriate authorities should be notified and the individual/s concerned notified that they should seek legal counsel, if necessary. Following the publication of the EPP, the London Streets Structures Manager will ensure that the Hammersmith Flyover Risk Register is reviewed and updated.

15 Supporting Documentation

This document refers to and details our response to the implementation of conditions outlined in the LESLP Major Incident Procedure (7th Edition) Manual. It is not the intention of TfL to duplicate the LESLP Manual through the production of this document, but to outline the TfL strategic response to the declaration of a Critical Incident on Hammersmith Flyover.


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Addendums:


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ADDENDUM A: Emergency Contact List

Name Title Telephone Mobile TfL Auto

TfL Roles

London Streets & Tunnel Ops Centre (LSTOC)

HMWC OperationalControl Room

Andy Best Head of Highways Operations

London Streets Traffic Control Centre LSTCC

Esmon George LSTCC Duty Manager

Dana Skelley Director of Roads

Garrett Emmerson Chief Operating Officer, London Streets

Graham Bessant LU Head of Profession – Bridges and Structures

Matthew Sercombe

Head of Tunnels and Structures

Dave Leslie Area Manager, Bus Operations

Thomas Canning Duty Press Officer

Esther Johnson Consultation and Engagement Manager

External to TfL Roles

Justin Bennett Hammersmith and Fulham/ Kensington and Chelsea Traffic Management Unit

Andy Potts Highways Operations Manager (Amey - HMWC)

Mahmood Siddiqi Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham and Kensington and Chelsea – Director of Environment

TBC Highways Agency


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Project Team

Stephen Pottle

Structures Manager, London Streets

Ken Duguid Technical Approvals Manager

Darren Bearwish Amey - Strengthening Measures Project Manager

Chad Frankish TfL PMC – Programme Manager

Peter Sparkes Aecom – Associate Director –Technical Assessment Advisor for Acoustic Monitoring Results