roadmap for europe...figure 3.1 overview of fuel demand under COM and the e nrgy[ ] v oluti 26 figure 3.2 overview of additional fuel demand COM vs energy [r]evolution 27 figure 3.3

report The Energy [R]evolution for the EU 28

roadmap for europeTOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE AND INDEPENDENT ENERGY SUPPLY

© LANGROCK/ZENIT/GP

image OFFSHORE WINDFARM, MIDDELGRUNDEN, COPENHAGEN, DENMARK.

partners

Greenpeace International,Greenpeace EU-Unit

date June 2014

lead author Sven Teske,Greenpeace International

Greenpeace InternationalSven Teske

Greenpeace European Unit Franziska Achterberg

Greenpeace Belgium Jan Vande Putte

research & co-authors Overall modelling: DLR, Institute of Technical Thermodynamics,Department of Systems Analysis andTechnology Assessment, Stuttgart,Germany: Dr. Thomas Pregger

Chapter 1: Ludwig BölkowSystemtechnik, Dr. Werner Zittel

editor Alexandra Dawe,

design & layout onehemisphere,Sweden, www.onehemisphere.se

[email protected]

For further information about the global, regional and national scenarios please visit the Energy [R]evolution website: www.energyblueprint.info

“will we look into the eyes of our children and confessthat we had the opportunity,but lacked the courage?that we had the technology,but lacked the vision?”

introduction 4

executive summary 5

fossil fuel resource analysis 8

1.1 gas 91.1.1 qualitative analysis of trends and projections 91.1.2 identification of potential regional short

falls and bottlenecks 101.1.3 analysis of regional oversupply risks towards 2020 111.1.4 gas production in the EU between 1990 and 2010

and a projection until 20350 111.2 oil 111.2.1 qualitative analysis of trends and projections 111.2.2 identification of potential regional short falls

and bottlenecks 111.2.3 analysis of regional oversupply risks towards 2020 121.2.4 oil production in the EU between 1990 and 2010

and a projection until 20350 121.3 hard coal 121.3.1 qualitative analysis of trends and projections 121.3.2 identification of potential regional short falls

and bottlenecks 131.3.3 coal production in the EU between 1990 and 2010

and a projection until 2050 131.4 uranium 131.5 current supply and demand in europe 141.5.1 EU primary energy production 141.5.3 imports and energy deficit of the EU 141.5.3 great differences among member states 14

the energy [r]evolution: the EU energy independence pathway for europe 15

2.1 assumptions and methodology 162.1.1 assumptions for the cmmission scenario (COM)

used as a reference scenario 162.1.2 assumptions for the energy [r]evolution scenario 162.1.3 oil and gas price projections 182.2 key results of the energy [r]evolution EU

energy independence pathway 192.2.1 EU28: energy demand by sector 192.2.2 EU28: electricity generation 202.2.3 EU28: future costs of electricity generation 212.2.4 EU28: future investments 212.2.5 EU28: heat supply 222.2.6 EU28: transport 232.2.7 EU28: primary energy consumption 242.2.8 EU28: development of CO2 emissions 24

fossil fuel requirements for the EU 25

3.1 fossil fuel balance: scenario comparison 263.2 fossil fuel balances by fuel 273.2.1 oil 273.2.2 gas 273.2.3 coal 283.3 fossil fuel costs versus investment in

new renewable power technologies 28

EU policy recommendations 30

glossary & appendix 32

figure 1.1 gas-production 1990-2010 and projection until 2050 for europe 11

figure 1.2 oil-production 1990-2010 and projection until 2050 for europe 12

figure 1.3 coal-production 1990-2010 and projection until 2050 for europe 13

figure 2.1 development of total final energy demand by sector in the energy [r]evolution scenario (high efficiency) 19

figure 2.2 development of electricity demand by sector in the energy [r]evolution scenario (high efficiency) 19

figure 2.3 development of heat demand by sector in the energy [r]evolution scenario (high efficiency) 19

figure 2.4 electricity generaion structure under the COM and energy [r]evolution scenario (high efficiency) 20

figure 2.5 development of total electricity supply costs & of specific electricity generation costs 21

figure 2.6 development of total final energy demand by sector under the COM and the energy [r]evolution scenario (high efficiency) 22

figure 2.7 development of total transport energy demand by fuel under the COM and the energy [r]evolution scenario (high efficiency) 23

figure 2.8 development of total primary energy demand by sector under the COM and the energy [r]evolution scenario (high efficiency) 24

figure 2.9 development of CO2 emissions by sector under the energy [r]evolution scenario (high efficiency) 24

figure 3.1 oil: EU import requirements versus oil demand: COM and energy [r]evolution 27

figure 3.2 gas: EU import requirements versus gas demand: COM and energy [r]evolution 27

figure 3.3 coal: EU import requirements versus coal demand: COM and energy [r]evolution 28

figure 2.1 population development in the EU 28 2010-2050 17figure 2.2 GDP development projections in the

EU 28 2010-2050 17figure 2.3 development projections for fossil fuel and

biomass prices in € 2010 18figure 2.4 renewable electricity generation capacity under

the COM scenario and energy [r]evolution scenario (high efficiency) 20

figure 2.5 projection of renewable heating capacity under the COM and the energy [r]evolution scenario (high efficiency) 22

figure 2.6 projection of transport energy demand by mode in the COM and the energy [r]evolution scenario (high efficiency) 23

figure 3.1 overview of fuel demand under COM and the energy [r]evolution 26

figure 3.2 overview of additional fuel demand COM vsenergy [r]evolution 27

figure 3.3 invesments in new power plants under the energy [r]evolution and COM scenarios 28

figure 3.4 invesments and fuel cost savings under the COM and energy [r]evolution scenarios 29

figure 10.1 conversion factors - fossil fuels 33figure 10.2 conversion factors - difference energy units 33figure 10.3-10.20 EU 28: scenario results data 34

contents

1

2

3

4

5

list of figures

list of tables

ROADMAP FOR EUROPE TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE AND INDEPENDENT ENERGY SUPPLY

4

This report, which includes the 4th edition of Greenpeace’s EUEnergy [R]evolution scenario1, comes at a time of profoundchanges and challenges in the European energy market. Theconflict in Ukraine has once again sparked a discussion aboutEurope’s dependence on fossil and nuclear fuel imports and itsneed to reduce this dependence to ensure future energy security.The EU depends on Russian gas piped through Ukraine for about10% of its overall needs, with some Eastern countries beingmuch more exposed.

In March 2013, the threat of possible gas supply disruptions ledEU leaders to ask the European Commission to draw up a planto reduce Europe’s energy dependence. The Commission releasedthis plan on 28 May.

This energy security debate comes at the same time asdiscussions on the future direction of European climate andenergy policies. The focus is on which targets the EU should setfor 2030 to follow up its three targets for 2020 on carbonreductions, renewable energy and energy efficiency. In January2014, the Commission tabled a proposal including two targets for2030, a domestic 40% reduction in carbon emissions (comparedto 1990 levels) and a 27% share of renewable energy in theEU’s overall energy consumption.

The two discussions on energy security and 2030 targets areinextricably linked. While not every measure to enhance the EU’senergy security will also advance its climate and energy agenda, aset of ambitious 2030 targets will drastically reduce the need forenergy imports, thereby strengthening the EU’s security of supply.

EU leaders are expected to reach crucial decisions on both thesediscussions in October this year.

Against this background, this report compares the impact onenergy imports of two approaches to 2030 climate and energytargets. The first approach is based on the Commission’s proposalfor a 40% cut in carbon emissions and a 27% renewable energyshare by 2030, without any specific target for energy savings.2

The second scenario reflects the demands by Greenpeace andother environmental organisations for a set of three targets,including a 55% cut in EU carbon emissions (compared to1990), a renewable energy share of 45% and a reduction inprimary energy consumption of 40% (compared to 2005).

Chapter 1 provides an analysis of global conventional fossil fuelproduction. It highlights the declining trend of this production witha particular focus on the EU’s own fossil fuel production. Chapter2 presents two scenarios based on the Commission proposal for2030 targets (COM scenario) and Greenpeace’s demands for suchtargets (Energy [R]evolution scenario). A third chapter provides anoverview of fossil fuel import requirements of the two energyscenarios. Finally, Chapter 4 recommends a number of EU policymeasures that would be needed to achieve the changes set outunder the Greenpeace Energy [R]evolution scenario.

introduction

© ANTHONY UPTON 2003

image NORTH HOYLE WIND FARM, UK’S FIRST WIND FARM IN THE IRISH SEA WHICH SUPPLIES 50,000 HOMES WITH POWER.

references1 THE FIRST EDITION OF THE EU E[R] REPORT WAS PUBLISHED IN 2005. FURTHER EDITIONS FOLLOWED

IN 2010 AND 2012.

2 AT THE TIME OF WRITING (JUNE 2014) THE COMMISSION HAS YET TO PROPOSE A FIRM TARGET ON 2030

ENERGY SAVINGS.

image PIPELINES IN RUSSIA.

© LEONID IKAN /ISTOCK

executive summary

This report compares the impact on EU energy imports of twoapproaches to 2030 climate and energy targets. This firstapproach is based on the Commission’s proposal for a 40% cut indomestic EU carbon emissions (compared to 1990) and a 27%renewable energy share, without any specific target for energysavings. The second approach reflects demands by Greenpeace andother environmental organisations for a set of three targetsincluding carbon emission cuts of at least 55% (compared to1990), a renewable energy share of 45% and a reduction inprimary energy consumption of 40% (compared to 2005).

The report shows that, based on the Commission’s proposed 2030targets, even if the European Union exploits all of its ownconventional gas, oil and hard coal, it would still have to import atotal of 29,000 petajoules (PJ) per year in fossil fuels by 2030.

Specifically, it would need to import about 255 billion cubicmetres (m3) of gas, 2.8 billion barrels (bbl) of oil and 81 milliontonnes of hard coal. Overall, this would result in a limitedreduction in EU energy imports compared to today’s levels.

The consequences of the Ukraine crisis have once againhighlighted Europe’s vulnerability to energy import disruptions.There is a risk that, as in 2006 and 2009, gas imports fromRussia through Ukraine could drop or dry up completely. Theseimports represent over 10% of Europe’s gas supply.

However, Europe’s reliance on Russian gas is part of a widerproblem of import dependency. The EU spends about € 400billion buying over half of its energy (53%) from abroad.1 At thesame time, the use of imported fossil fuels leads to large amountsof CO2 emissions which cause climate change.

The debate about energy security comes at a time when Europe isdiscussing what energy policies to set for beyond 2020. InJanuary, the Commission tabled a proposal for 2030 climate andenergy targets. In May, it also released a proposal for a Europeanenergy security strategy. EU leaders are expected to take a finaldecision on both issues – 2030 targets and energy security – atan EU summit in October.

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reference3 HTTP://EC.EUROPA.EU/ENERGY/DOC/20140528_ENERGY_SECURITY_COMMUNICATION.PDF

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- The development of the electricity supply market ischaracterised by a dynamically growing renewable energymarket. This will compensate for the phasing out of nuclearenergy and reduce the number of fossil fuel-fired power plantsrequired for grid stabilization. By 2050, 95% of the electricityproduced in EU28 will come from renewable energy sources.‘New’ renewables – mainly wind, solar thermal energy and PV– will contribute 76% of electricity generation. The Energy[R]evolution scenario projects an immediate marketdevelopment with high annual growth rates achieving arenewable electricity share of 44% across Europe already by2020 and 75% by 2030. The installed capacity of renewableswill reach 907 GW in 2030 and 1,211 GW by 2050.

• Heating sector: -Efficiency gains in the heat supply sector arelarger than in the electricity sector. Under the Energy[R]evolution scenario, final demand for heat supply can even bereduced significantly. Compared to the COM scenario,consumption equivalent to 4,060 PJ/a is avoided throughefficiency measures by 2050

Renewables currently provide 15% of EU28’s energy demandfor heat supply, mainly from biomass. The lack of districtheating networks is a severe structural barrier to the largescale utilization of geothermal and solar thermal energy. In theEnergy [R]evolution scenario, renewables provide 47% ofEU28’s total heat demand in 2030 and 91% in 2050.

• Future costs of electricity generation: The Energy [R]evolutionscenario slightly increases the generation costs of electricitygeneration in EU28 compared to the COM scenario. Thisdifference will be less than 0.7 €cents/kWh up to 2020, however.Because of the lower CO2 intensity of electricity generation,electricity generation costs will become economically favorableunder the Energy [R]evolution scenario and by 2050 costs willbe 2.5 €cents/kWh below those in the COM version. Under theCOM scenario, the unchecked growth in demand, an increase infossil fuel prices and the cost of CO2 emissions result in totalelectricity supply costs rising from today’s € 324 billion per yearto € 355 billion in 2030 and more than € 461 billion by 2050.

• Future investments: Until 2030 It would require about € 1,754billion in investment for the Energy [R]evolution scenario tobecome reality (including investments for replacement after theeconomic lifetime of the plants) - approximately € 195 billion or€ 12 billion annually more than in the COM scenario (€ 1558billion). The average annual investment in the power sector underthe Energy [R]evolution scenario between today and 2050 wouldbe approximately € 84 billion.

• Fuel costs savings: The fuel cost savings in the Energy[R]evolution scenario reach a total of € 1,192 billion up to2050, or € 29.8 billion per year. The total fuel cost savingsbased on the assumed energy price path therefore would coverthe total additional investments several times over compared tothe COM scenario.

By contrast, if EU leaders backed more ambitious 2030 targets,overall fossil fuel import requirements would be 45% lower thanunder the Commission proposal. Specifically, annual imports ofabout 90 billion m3 of gas and 1.3 million bbl of oil could beavoided by 2030, while no imports of hard coal would be neededat all. Compared to the Commission proposal, this represents anextra 35% cut in gas imports and a 45% cut in oil imports by2030. By 2020, gas imports could already be 12% lower, whileoil and coal imports would be 19% and 42% lower respectively.

The Energy [R]evolution pathway would also result in muchhigher carbon emission cuts by 2030 compared to theCommission proposal. The investments required in the powersector would be very similar to those under the Commission’sproposal. The Commission’s impact assessment accompanying its2030 proposal also shows that higher targets would lead tobetter health and more jobs for EU citizens.

EU leaders should therefore place much greater emphasis onenergy savings and renewable energy in order to reduce Europe’sdependence on fossil fuel imports and to enhance its energysecurity. A stringent set of policy targets for 2030 would deliveron both objectives – reducing the risk of energy supply shortagesand reducing the risk posed by global climate change.

key results high efficiency energy [r]evolution pathway

• Energy demand by sector: Under the COM scenario, totalprimary energy demand in EU28 decreases by -20% from thecurrent 72,300 PJ/a to 57,841 PJ/a in 2050. The energydemand in 2030 in the Energy [R]evolution scenario decreasesby 40% compared to current consumption and it is expectedby 2050 to reach 37,900 PJ/a.

• Primary energy consumption: Compared to the COM scenario,overall energy related primary energy demand under the Energy[R]evolution scenario will be reduced by around 40% in 2030.Around 48% of the remaining demand will be covered byrenewable energy sources (including non-energy use).TheEnergy [R]evolution version reduces coal and oil significantlyfaster than the EC. This is made possible mainly by thereplacement of coal power plants with renewables and a fasterintroduction of very efficient electric vehicles in the transportsector to replace oil combustion engines. This leads to anoverall renewable primary energy share of 48% in 2030 and92% in 2050. Nuclear energy is phased out just after 2030.

• Power sector: -Under the Energy [R]evolution scenario,electricity demand in the industry as well as in the residentialand service sectors is expected to decrease after 2015.Because of the growing shares of electric vehicles, heat pumpsand hydrogen generation however, electricity demand increasesto 2,519 TWh in 2030 and 2,673 TWh/a in 2050, 27% belowthe COM case.

7

• Transport: In the transport sector, it is assumed under theEnergy [R]evolution scenario that an energy demand reductionof about 6,000 PJ/a can be achieved by 2050, saving 49%compared to the COM scenario. Energy demand will thereforedecrease between 2009 and 2050 by 54% to 6,200 PJ/a. In2030, electricity will provide 12% of the transport sector’stotal energy demand in the Energy [R]evolution, while in 2050the share will be 50%.

• Development of CO2 emissions: While energy related CO2

emissions in EU28 will decrease by 40% in the COM scenario,under the Energy [R]evolution scenario they will decrease byover 60% by 2030. It is important to note, that the originalCommission scenario has a reduction target of 40%greenhouse gas (GHG), while the COM case calculates onlyenergy related CO2 emissions. Annual per capita emissions willdrop from 7.2 tonne to 2.7 tonne in 2030 and 0.3 tonne in2050. In spite of the phasing out of nuclear energy andincreasing demand, CO2 emissions will decrease in theelectricity sector. In the long run efficiency gains and theincreased use of renewable electricity in vehicles will reduceemissions in the transport sector. With a share of 18% of CO2

emissions in 2030, the power sector will drop below transportand other sectors as the largest sources of emissions. By 2050,EU28’s CO2 emissions are 4% of 1990 levels.

© PAUL LANGROCK/ZENIT/GPimage TEST WINDMILL N90 2500, BUILT BY THE

GERMAN COMPANY NORDEX, IN THE HARBOUR OFROSTOCK. THIS WINDMILL PRODUCES 2.5 MEGA WATTAND IS TESTED UNDER OFFSHORE CONDITIONS. TWOTECHNICIANS WORKING INSIDE THE TURBINE.

8

1fossil fuel resource analysis

image THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES, NORWAY AND SWEDEN, AND FINLAND TO THE NORTH OF THE SEA ARE STILL BLANKETED IN SNOW. FROM THE LEFT, THE COUNTRIESLINING THE BALTIC ON THE SOUTH ARE DENMARK, GERMANY, POLAND, RUSSIA (KALININGRAD), LITHUANIA, LATVIA, ESTONIA, AND RUSSIA. BELARUS FORMS THE LOWERRIGHT CORNER OF THE IMAGE.

GAS

OIL: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OFTRENDS AND PROJECTIONS

ANALYSIS OF COAL SUPPLY URANIUM RESOURCES’ - EU’S 97% DEPENDENCY ON URANIUM IMPORTS

CURRENT SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN EUROPE

energyefficiencyreducesenergyimports”

“

© JEFF SCHMALTZ, M

ODIS RAPID RESPONSE TEAM, NASA/GSFC

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Burning fossil fuels emits large amounts of CO2 which is provento cause climate change the science was indisputably laid out inthe Fifth Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change (IPCC)4,, which concluded that there is 95percent certainty that human activity -- such as the burning offossil fuels -- is the primary cause of climate change.

However, added to the worry with regards to the environment isalso security of supply. Renewable energies – with the exceptionof bioenergy – have the fundamental advantage that they do notneed any fuels which releases the EU from relying on importsfrom outside of its borders. Thus, one of the main drivers for theexpansion of renewable energy markets should be security ofsupply. Currently the EU still relies for the majority of its energyneeds on fossil fuel despite the dwindling local reserves andunreliable international markets that fluctuate dependent oneconomic and geopolitical externalities.

To better understand the current fossil fuel supplies the EU cantap into, this chapter takes an in depth view of the current fossilfuel landscape. It is based on a global fossil fuel resource analysisof Ludwig Bölkow System Analysis (LBST) for GreenpeaceInternational which estimated the global conventional oil, gas andcoal resources based on production capacities of existing oil- andgas wells and coal mines, current infrastructure as well as theinvestment plans known by the end of 2011. It assessed theremaining fossil fuel resources between 2012 and 2050 excludingany new deep sea and Arctic oil exploration, oil shale and tarsand mining.

The assessment is based on past and projected productionvolumes. The research distinguishes between resources, reservesand production dynamics:

• Resources very often have a large speculative element whichhas no correlation to possible production volumes. Resourceestimates are by no means usable in the sense that theseresources exist, or even when they exist that they have thepossibility of becoming economically interesting for productionone day. Nobody in a company or institute can be maderesponsible for a resource message which decades later turnsout to be extremely unrealistic.

• Reserves have a closer correlation to potential futureproduction volumes. However, the quality of reserve estimatesstill differs. It is by no means ensures that these reserves willbe produced.

• The most important measure is production volumes. Thedynamics between production from declining producing fieldsand still untouched but discovered new fields determineswhether the net balance at a regional and global level willdecline or rise. Despite the recent enthusiasm about rising gasresources it is a matter of fact that about half of present worldgas production comes from regions where peak productionhappened: Europe, North America and Russia.

1.1 gas

1.1.1 qualitative analysis of trends and projections

All large gas producers in Europe except Norway are already indecline. Even Norway seems to be very close to peak production.It is agreed by almost all observers including IEA and Eurogas –the European gas producers association – that gas production inEurope will considerably decline by 2030 and 2035.

Conventional natural gas production peaked in the US in parallelto oil production around 1970. The development of tight gasformations – which very often are not distinguished fromconventional production as the transition is smooth – helped tosoften the decline. In 2010, gas production from tight gas had ashare of about 30% on overall gas production. A further 10% iscontributed by gas production from coal beds (CBM). However aregional analysis of coal bed methane (CBM) reservoirs and coalbeds shows that peak has already been reached in the largest andmost promising regions, for instance in Wyoming.

Some believe that shale gas will be a game changer. Indeed, USproduction from gas shale increased from below 1% in around2000 to about 10% in 2010 This steep rise in production istaken as base for extrapolation to other shales in the USA andalso in other countries around the world.

The natural gas production in Russia peaked in 1989 whenproduction from the three largest fields Urengoy, Medvezhe andYamburg peaked with a combined output of more than 90% ofRussian gas production. In the meantime the decline has beenstopped and reversed by the expensive development of alreadyknown fields, after the disintegration of the Soviet empireattracted new investments. However, the remaining new fields arefurther away from markets in geographically more challengingregions, requiring higher specific investments and longer leadtimes due to the short Arctic summers.

Presently, Russia faces serious challenges due to the steady decline ofbase production, the development of expensive new fields, a risingdomestic demand and increased demand from Asia as well as Europe.

In face of these developments the industry enthusiasm forunconventional gas resources points towards serious problems withexisting production infrastructure. The necessary huge investments inthe development of unconventional gas resources must be interpretedas confirmation that gas production will become much moreexpensive than in the past – despite what is being claimed publicly.

Our scepticism with regards to shale gas resources is based onvarious issues:

First of all the production methods are harmful to theenvironment, requiring huge amounts of water, chemicals anddisposal opportunities for wastewater. The fast development in theUSA was only possible as the production was exempted fromenvironmental rules (The US-EIA was excluded from monitoringand punishing violations by the Clean Energy Act in Amendment1007, where these activities were explicitly excluded from theSWDA from 1974 and amendments).


image A COW IN FRONT OF A BIOREACTOR IN THEBIOENERGY VILLAGE OF JUEHNDE. IT IS THE FIRSTCOMMUNITY IN GERMANY THAT PRODUCES ALL OFITS ENERGY NEEDED FOR HEATING ANDELECTRICITY, WITH CO2 NEUTRAL BIOMASS.

reference4 HTTPS://WWW.IPCC.CH/REPORT/AR5/WG1/

Still unclear:

• How will the current production volumes develop over timefrom existing wells as projections show that production cansignificantly decrease after only a very short timeframe?

• Can the USA production experiences of large quantities ofshale gas actually be replicated in other regions – is thistransferable to other countries?

Shale gas wells show a typical production profile with a shortproduction period followed by a steep decline of 5 – 10% permonth. The regional aggregation of individual well profiles showsthat production can initially increase rapidly, with the addition ofnew wells. But very soon the decline of the individual wells takesthe lead – new wells must be added faster and faster just tocompensate for the decline. However economics has it that firstdevelopments start in the most rich areas which promise highestprofits. As soon as these are developed the new well additions aresmaller in production volume and lower in total output. Initallytechnological learning can compensate for this deficit. But as soonas the development speed of new pits decelerates so does the totaloutput. This decline in output has already begun in the AntrimShale (Michigan), the Barnett Shale (Texas), the Fayetteville Shale(Texas/Arkansas) and even the Haynesville shale.

The worldwide resource estimates assume huge recovery rates ofaround 25% of the estimated gas in place. However, the presentdevelopments in the US indicate that only 5%-10% of the gas inplace may eventually be produced. But another restriction comesfrom the huge water requirements and the different geographicstructure of these shale regions. For instance, it is very unlikely thatin China, South Africa or Australia huge amounts of water (in theorder of ten million litres per well and a total of several hundredthousand wells) will be allowed to be contaminated with toxicchemicals while these areas experience water scarcity alreadytoday. In addition these shales are very often far away fromconsumers and distribution networks while the pure economicsprohibits their development; or too close to densely populatedareas which immediately has the risk of strong opposition, as seenin New York, South Africa, the UK, the Netherlands, France,Germany, Austria and Bulgaria.

Finally it is often stated that by far the largest undevelopedconventional gas reserves are in Iran and in Qatar. Theirdevelopment and liquefaction will result in ample supply fordecades. But a closer analysis shows even here huge questionmarks arise. Most importantly is the often ignored fact that thehuge reserves of both countries almost completely depend on oneoffshore field in the Arab gulf crossing the border between the twocountries. The southern part in Qatar is called the North Field; thenorthern part in Iran is called South Pars. The size of this 6,000 km2 field as the world’s largest gas field was determined inthe 1970s after its discovery by only a few exploration wells. Someyears ago gas companies drilled a dry hole in an area which castehuge doubts on the reserve estimate which are still used today.

1.1.2 identification of potential regional shortfalls and bottlenecks

The gas sector is very different to the oil sector as regionalmarkets developed where consumer and producer regions wereconnected by pipelines. Only a few percent of world gas productionis transported in liquefied form to intercontinental destinations.

Mature areas with long lasting relations are the USA withconnections to Canada and Mexico, Europe with connections toNorth Africa and Russia, and predominantly China. Korea andJapan are completely isolated. Their import needs are completelysatisfied by LNG. Based on these structures, regional bottlenecksand inequalities between different markets are more likely tooccur than with oil.

The USA is by far the largest consumer in North America andalready receives imports from Canada to satisfy its needs. Basedon experienced shortfalls in the early 2000s and expected risingrequirements many new LNG import facilities have been planned,some of them already realized. Total US-regasification-capacitiyrose from 20 billion Nm³/year in the year 2000 to 160 billionNm³/year in 2010. However three developments inverted thesituation making USA for some time an exporter of LNG at verylow level (~1 billion Nm³/yr).

With regards to Europe, we believe that the decline of domesticproduction will set the frame for rising import needs. Accordingto LBST, 200-300 billion cubic-meters per year [m³/yr] must beimported additionally until 2030 in order to match an even flatdemand. Shale gas developments inside Europe will only have amarginal influence on these developments. Probably also Russiawill not be able to supply these quantities. Moreover, LBSTbelieves that Russian exports to Europe will stay static and startto decline around 2020-2025. This judgement is based on theexpected development:

• That Russia will struggle in increasing its gas production dueto severe development problems of remaining on- and offshorefields in Yamal, Kara Sea and Barent Sea. According to ourunderstanding it is by no means guaranteed that productionwill stay level until 2020-2030,

• That Russian domestic demand will rise in the future inparallel to its economic development which is based on risingprofits from oil exports,

• That new consumers in Asia will be able to compete for higherprices. For instance gas pipelines from Turkmenistan – viaRussia already an important gas exporter to Europe – will bemuch fast and cheaper build to China.

Indonesia, one of the most important LNG suppliers will also seestrengthening supply problems in parallel to its declining oilproduction. Around 2003 Indonesia switched from an oil netexporter to a net importer. In parallel to its development the needfor domestic gas supply will rise.

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1.1.3 analysis of regional oversupply risks towards 2020

Probably the most gas rich regions over the next two decades willbe Australia and Qatar. Their potential to increase production andexports will depend on their ability to ramp up liquefaction plantsand export terminals.

1.1.4 gas production in the EU between 1990 and 2010and a projection until 2050

Based on the analysis the European production developmentshown in Figure 1.1 (see below) has been calculated. We can seethat the EU’s own production can satisfy less than half of itscurrent needs. It is worth noting that the EU’s real productionvolumes are even lower because imported gas is in many casescheaper than domestic production.

1.2 oil


According to the Ludwig Bölkow System Analysis (LBST), it isvery likely that world oil production has been at peak since 2005as conventional oil production started to decline since then. Onlythe inclusion of heavy oil and tars production in Canada and ofnatural gas liquids (NGL) production from various countrieshelped to keep total production since 2005 constant. Oilproduction from tight oil supplies in the US played a minor role,though it helped to invert the US oil production decline into arise for a few years. However, due to the nature of these oilsources, we believe that the impact will be limited to a few years.

Further inclusion of so called refinery gains or processing gains(volume and energy gains during the refining process by hydrationof hydrocarbons with hydrogen predominantly produced fromnatural gas) and of biofuels (predominantly from Brazil, USA,Europe and Indonesia) helped to still increase total production of“all liquids” according to statistics from the US EnergyInformation Administration (EIA) or International EnergyAgency (IEA).

LBST sees a plausible scenario in an annual decline of world oilproduction of between 2-3%. This would result in roughly 50%decline of world oil availability in 2030 with correspondingconsequences.

1.2.2 identification of potential regional short falls andbottlenecks

The world can be split into oil importing and oil exportingcountries. Oil importing countries are vulnerable to supply deficitswith serious impact on the country’s infrastructure, almost allforms of transport and – partly as a result – to the economy.Regions with adequately established urban quarters will seeadvantages over those regions where the daily consumptionpattern highly depends on individual motorized transport.Therefore short distances between daily destinations and wellestablished public transport modes will help to soften the impactof oil scarcity considerably. This holds even more for the transportand distribution of produced goods. Regions where the GDPdepends by a large share on the production of goods whichstrongly depend on oil availability (e.g. inefficient large cars) andon large goods with low volume specific prices will encounterlarger problems than others.

For instance, economic powerful islands like Japan or SouthKorea, but also countries like USA which are used to low almosttax exempted gasoline prices, might be hit strongest.


image SOLON AG PHOTOVOLTAICS FACILITY INARNSTEIN OPERATING 1,500 HORIZONTAL ANDVERTICAL SOLAR “MOVERS”. LARGEST TRACKINGSOLAR FACILITY IN THE WORLD. EACH “MOVER”CAN BE BOUGHT AS A PRIVATE INVESTMENT FROMTHE S.A.G. SOLARSTROM AG, BAYERN, GERMANY.

figure 1.1: gas-production 1990-2010 and projection until2050 for europe

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

PJ/a 0

2,000

4,000

6,000

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GAS-PRODUCTION 1990-2010 ANDPROJECTION UNTIL 2050 FOR EUROPE

EU GAS DEMAND 2013

1.2.3 analysis of regional oversupply risks towards 2020

The above described situation will be mirrored by oil exportingcountries which at a first glance will not have problems withrising oil prices – even when the export volumes decline.Predominantly this includes the Middle East Opec countries andRussia. However, oversupply risks cannot be identified even inexporting countries, except when the demand shrinks faster thanthe production capacities due to a recession.

It seems likely that the downturn of world oil production will becharacterised by oil price fluctuations induced by variableeconomic prosperity whenever declining production volumes set aceiling for economic growth as long as this growth induces arising oil demand.

1.2.4 oil production in the EU between 1990 and 2010and a projection until 2050

Based on the analysis the European production developmentshown has been calculated. The figure 1.2 (see below) shows theremaining production capacities and the additional productioncapacities assuming all new projects planned for 2012 till 2020will go ahead. Even with new projects, the amount of remainingconventional oil is very limited and therefore a transition towardsa low oil demand pattern is essential.

1.3 hard coal


Compared to hydrocarbons, coal reserves and resources seem to beample. However some aspects create serious doubts on this view:

• World Coal reserves have been downgraded over the lastdecades several times and have in reality declined by some50% since 1987;

• The static Reserve-to-Production ratio, which often is seen as ameasure for sufficient reserves declined from 450 years in1987 to less than 120 years in 2010;

• Reserve reporting practice casts doubts on the relevance andreliability of these numbers;

• Only about 10% of world coal consumption is imported from abroad;

• The USA, China and India which together are home to morethan 50% of global coal reserves are among the largestconsumers. China switched from a coal exporting country tothe world’s largest coal importer with almost 200 milliontonnes in 2011.

Based on this analysis it can be expected that further rising coalproduction probably will come to an end within the next one totwo decades, based on geological restrictions and not assumingvoluntary restrictions based on climate change politics.

Lignite, which is also referred to as brown coal, should beconsidered separately. It has not been included in the LBSTanalysis. Due to its low energy and large water content it doesn’tplay a role in export markets. But in Germany, for example,lignite has been playing an important role in recent years. Theshutdown of German nuclear power plants in Germany wascounteracted by rising share of renewable electricity productionin combination with rising contribution from lignite. It could beexpected that these trends continue when European gasproduction declines and imported gas quantities are too small toallow gas power plants to play the role of a bridging technologyto compensate for strong power fluctuations, according to LBST.

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figure 1.2: oil-production 1990-2010 and projection until2050 for europe

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

PJ/a 0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

OIL-PRODUCTION 1990-2010 ANDPROJECTION UNTIL 2050 FOR EUROPE

EU OIL DEMAND 2013

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1.3.2 identification of potential regional shortfalls and bottlenecks

Probably the most stressed coal supply/demand patterns are inAsia, predominantly China and India. Both see a steeply risingdemand while the domestic supply cannot keep pace, requiringever larger imports.

Some arguments point on missing internal infrastructure in Chinato transport domestic coal to the consumer sites. It was easier toimport coal by ship from abroad to the energy intense industrialsites in Eastern China along the coast line. However it seems thatcoal production in China more relies increasingly on threeprovinces: Inner Mongolia, Shanxi and Shaanxi.

Future Chinese import needs will determine whether other Asiancoal importers will run into trouble to satisfy their needs of largecoal imports which predominantly come from Indonesia (steamcoal), Australia (largest exporter of metallurgic coal and secondlargest exporter of steam coal), South Africa (which more andmore directs its exports from Europe to Asia), Colombia (whichin 2011 for the first time exported coal to India) and EasternCIS countries.

South Africa already faces coal supply risks and bottlenecks.Most experts assign this to transport and infrastructuredevelopments. However, it also seems that declining coal supplyquality forced utilities to run their power plants with lowerefficiencies as the energetic throughput of the coal was not in linewith the plant layout.

1.3.3 coal production in the EU between 1990 and 2010and a projection until 2050

Based on the LBST analysis the European productiondevelopment shown in Figure 1.3 (see below) has beencalculated. As opposed to the global resource, the EU’s economichard coal resources are in decline and during the last decade coalhas become an import fuel. Even in traditional coal mining areassuch as Poland, the resource is in decline.

1.4 uranium

Under the Euratom Treaty, a common nuclear market wascreated. Euratom established the European Supply Agency(ESA) with the mandate to ensure the security of supply ofnuclear fuels to nuclear utilities in the EU. The Euratom Treatyrequires the ESA to be a party to supply contracts. The ESA alsomonitors all uranium transactions. This common market marks aformal distinction with the fossil fuel markets.

One of ESA’s monitoring functions is to publish an annual reportwhich gives an overview of the origins of the uranium used in theEU. Its publication from 2012 shows that the EU depends on97.3% on imports with 82% of these coming from only fivecountries.5 In those countries, uranium mining has had adisruptive impact on local communities and the environment.

In 2009, Greenpeace conducted scientific research in the area ofArlit in Niger,6 exposing the environmental pollution andradioactive contamination created by the Uranium mining. In thestreets of the local village of Akokan radiation dose rate levelswere found to be up to almost 500 times higher than normalbackground levels. A person spending less than one hour a day atthat location would be exposed to more than the maximumallowable annual dose.

Niger has the lowest human development index on the planet. Thisis in sharp contrast with the profits generated by the French state-owned company Areva in Niger over the last 40 years through itsenvironmentally destructive uranium mining. Areva’s activities havealso fueled local unrest and conflicts with the Tuareg population,thereby also threatening the supply from the area.

Uranium mining is also threatening local communities incountries such as Canada or Australia, especially endangering thehealth of indigenous peoples.


image PART-MADE WIND TURBINES FOR ANOFFSHORE WIND FARM AT MIDDELGRUNDEN,CLOSE TO COPENHAGEN, DENMARK

references5 HTTP://EC.EUROPA.EU/EURATOM/AR/LAST.PDF

6 HTTP://WWW.GREENPEACE.ORG/INTERNATIONAL/EN/NEWS/BLOGS/NUCLEAR-REACTION/LEFT-IN-THE-

DUST-AREVAS-URANIUM-MINING-IN-NIG/BLOG/11734/

figure 1.3: coal-production 1990-2010 and projectionuntil 2050 for europe

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

PJ/a 0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

18,000

COAL-PRODUCTION 1990-2010 ANDPROJECTION UNTIL 2050 FOR EUROPE

EU COAL DEMAND 2013


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AND DEMAND IN

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1.5 current supply and demand in europe

The recent ‘European Energy Security Strategy’ published by theEuropean Commission in May 2014 outlines the EU’s fossil fuelproduction and the state of energy security for all member states.7

1.5.1 EU primary energy production

According to the report, the EU’s primary energy productiondecreased by almost a fifth between 1995 and 2012. In thisperiod natural gas production dropped by 30%, production ofcrude oil and petroleum went down by 56% and of solid fuels(including coal) by 40%. On the other hand renewable energyproduction registered a remarkable growth – 9% in two yearsbetween 2010-2012 – and has reached a 22% share of primaryenergy production.

The Netherlands and the UK are the largest producers of naturalgas in the EU and in 2012 respectively accounted for 43% and26% of gas production in the EU; the third and fourth producers– Germany and Romania – have a 7% and 6.5% share ofnatural gas production in the EU. The UK is the largest producerof crude oil in the EU with a 61% share in 2012; Denmark isthe second largest producer with a 14% share.

1.5.2 imports and energy deficit of the EU

Despite the growth in renewable energy production, the EU hasbeen importing growing amounts of energy to compensate fordeclining domestic production and meet demand that until 2006was steadily growing. Overall EU import dependency hasincreased, mostly driven by growth in import dependency ofnatural gas (+6 p.p in the period 1995-2012) and crude oil (+3 p.p. in the same period).

The EU relies on 53% of imports for its energy use. Energyimport dependency is most pronounced in relation to crude oil(almost 90%) and natural gas (66%), and less pronounced inrelation to coal (42%) and nuclear fuel (40%). The EU spendsmore than € 1 billion per day (around € 400 billion in 2013) onenergy imports.

Since import dependency is a function of net imports and totaldemand any drop in production would result in an increase inimports. If this drop in production is faster than the decrease indemand, this would result in increasing import dependencyagainst falling demand. While import dependency points to therelative share of imports in demand (in %), the net imports –showing the total energy deficit - denotes the absolute volumes ofenergy that the European economy needs to import (in energyterms), that is the difference between total demand and totalproduction. Since the peak in 2006-2008, the net imports havedecreased – largely driven by fall and shift of consumption; stillnet imports in 2012 were at 25% above its 1995 levels.

1.5.3 great differences among member states

The aggregated EU-level numbers hide a great deal of differencesbetween Member States. In Member States with indigenousenergy production, the share of production to total demand hasdecreased – in the case of the UK by half from its peak, in thecase of Denmark and Poland by 30-40% and in the case of theNetherlands by more than 15%. Estonia is the only MemberState that has seen a stable and significant increase in the shareof domestic production in total energy demand against a stablegrowth in demand. As a result, the net imports of most MemberStates have increased. Nowhere is this more visible than in theUK, which had an energy surplus until 2003 and a steeplygrowing deficit ever since. France, Spain and Italy have all seenenergy deficits peak in 2005 and go down ever since, likely drivenby a combination of weak demand and increased renewablesshare. The deficit of the largest energy consumers in the EU –Germany – has unsurprisingly been the largest in energy termsand since its peak in 2001 has shown fluctuations in bothdirections, without a stable trend.

reference7 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY STRATEGY COM(2014) 330 FINAL}; BRUSSELS/BELGIUM 28TH MAY 2014

HTTP://EC.EUROPA.EU/ENERGY/DOC/20140528_ENERGY_SECURITY_COMMUNICATION.PDF

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2energy [r]evolution: the EU energyindependence pathway for europe

image PROMINENT IN THE CENTER OF THE IMAGE ARE THE CURVING, DARK GREEN CARPATHIAN MOUNTAINS, WHICH START IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND CURVE TOWARDTHE SOUTHEAST INTO ROMANIA. IN CENTRAL ROMANIA, THE CARPATHIANS RUN INTO THE EASTERN END OF THE TRANSYLVANIAN ALPS, WHICH RUN HORIZONTALLY ACROSSTHE COUNTRY TO THE SERBIAN BORDER.

ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODOLOGY KEY RESULTS OF THE ENERGY[R]EVOLUTION ENERGYINDEPENDENCE PATHWAY

almosthalf of

europe’s energysupply couldcome fromrenewables by 2030”

“

© JEFF SCHMALTZ, M


Moving from principles to action for ensuring energy supply thatachieves all environmental, economic and security objectivesrequires a long-term perspective. Energy infrastructure takestime to build up; new energy technologies take time to develop.Policy shifts often also need many years to take effect. Anyanalysis that seeks to tackle energy and environmental issuestherefore needs to look ahead at least several decades. The energyscenarios described in the following chapter outline how this canbe achieved.

Scenarios help to describe possible development paths, to givedecision-makers a broad overview and indicate how far they can shape the future energy system. Two scenarios are used here to demonstrate two possible pathways for a future energysupply system:

• A Commission scenario (COM) reflecting the recent proposal by theEuropean Commission for a 2030 climate and energy framework;

• An updated high efficiency Energy [R]evolution scenario(E[R]) reflecting Greenpeace’s demands for a 2030 climateand energy targets, including steep cuts in energy-relatedcarbon emissions to achieve a 95% reduction by 2050, as wellas a complete phase-out of nuclear power.

2.1 assumptions and methodology

The scenarios in this report were commissioned by Greenpeacefrom the Systems Analysis group of the Institute of TechnicalThermodynamics, part of the German Aerospace Center (DLR).The supply scenarios were calculated using the MESAP/PlaNetsimulation model adopted in the previous Energy [R]evolutionstudies.8 The future development pathway for car technologies isbased on a special report produced in 2012 by the Institute ofVehicle Concepts, DLR for Greenpeace International.

2.1.1 assumptions for the commission scenario (COM)used as a reference scenario

This scenario was calculated on the basis of data published by theEuropean Commission in the Impact Assessment accompanyingits Communication on 2030 climate and energy targets.9

It broadly reflects the Commission’s “GHG40” scenario withinthat Impact Assessment, which presents the numbers underlyingthe Commission’s 2030 proposal.

The most important assumptions were drawn from the PRIMESscenario model and adjusted to the MESAP/PlaNet model whichis used for the calculation of the Energy [R]evolution scenarios.The results of the MESAP model in terms of energy mix, energydemand developments and CO2 reduction pathways are similar tothe GHG40 scenario but – due to the different modeling approach– not entirely identical.10 However, they are the closest-possiblerepresentation of the Commission’s GHG40 scenario. Especiallythe sector specific results can differ from GHG40. In thispublication this scenario – which is used as a reference case ofthe Energy [R]evolution – is called “COM”.

2.1.2 assumptions for the energy [r]evolution scenario

This latest edition of the Greenpeace Energy [R]evolutionscenario for the EU includes significant efforts to fully exploit thelarge potential for energy efficiency, using currently available bestpractice technology. At the same time, all cost-effectiverenewable energy sources are used for heat and electricitygeneration as well as the production of biofuels.11

In the transport sector, energy demand decreases due to a changein driving patterns and a rapid uptake of efficient combustionvehicles and increasing use of electric and plug-in hybrid vehiclesafter 2025. The use of biofuels for private vehicles follows thelatest scientific reports that indicate that biofuels might havehigher a greenhouse emission footprint than fossil fuels.

The Energy [R]evolution scenario also foresees a shift in the useof renewables from power to heat, thanks to the enormous anddiverse potential for renewable power. Assumptions for the heatingsector include a fast expansion of the use of district heat andmore electricity for process heat in the industry sector. The use ofgeothermal heat pumps leads to an increasing overall electricitydemand, in combination with a larger share of electric cars intransport. A faster expansion of solar and geothermal heatingsystems is also assumed. Hydrogen generated by electrolysis andrenewable electricity serves as third renewable fuel in thetransport sector after 2025, complementary to biofuels and directuse of renewable electricity. Hydrogen generation can have highenergy losses, however the limited potentials of biofuels andprobably also battery electric mobility makes it necessary to havea third renewable option. Alternatively, this renewable hydrogencould be converted into synthetic methane or liquid fuelsdepending on economic benefits (storage costs vs. additionallosses) and technology and market development in the transportsector (combustion engines vs. fuel cells).


16

references8 ‘ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION: A SUSTAINABLE WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK’, GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL,

2007 AND 2008.

9 HTTP://EUR-LEX.EUROPA.EU/LEGAL-CONTENT/EN/TXT/PDF/?URI=CELEX:52014SC0015&FROM=EN

10 UNDER GHG40, THE EU’S PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION (WITHOUT NON-ENERGY USES) IN 2030 IS

1413 MTOE, THE SHARE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY IN FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION IS 24.8%. UNDER

COM, PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION IS 1436 MTOE, THE SHARE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY IS 26.5%.

11 A LOWER RATE OF ENERGY SAVINGS WOULD OBVIOUSLY REQUIRE LARGER PRODUCTION OF

RENEWABLE ENERGY IN ORDER FOR THE EU TO CONTRIBUTE ITS FAIR SHARE OF GLOBAL EMISSION

REDUCTIONS. SEE THE ANNEX FOR A SCENARIO BASED ON HIGHER ENERGY DEMAND AND THEREFORE

A HIGHER EXPANSION OF RENEWABLE TECHNOLOGIES.

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In all sectors, the latest market development projections of therenewable energy industry12 have been taken into account. Thefast introduction of electric vehicles, combined with theimplementation of smart grids and fast expansion of super gridsallows a high share of fluctuating renewable power generation(photovoltaic and wind) to be employed.

The efficiency pathway of this latest Energy [R]evolution scenariois based on research from the Fraunhofer Institute for Systemsand Innovation Research (Fraunhofer ISI) published in 2013.13

According to the study, the EU has a 41% cost-effective end-useenergy savings potential for 2030. By tapping this potential, theEU would, by 2030, reap the wide-ranging economic, social andfinancial benefits of energy savings, including:

• Reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by between 49-61% compared to 1990 levels, enabling the EU to step up itsfight against climate change and to keep on track for its 2050climate change target of a GHG reduction of 80-95%compared to 1990 levels.

• Boosting its competitiveness through lower energy costs,increased industrial efficiency and a stronger demand fordomestic products and services. Households and industry wouldreceive net benefits of € 240 billion annually by 2030 and ofabout € 500 billion by 2050 in lower energy bills.

The study concludes that a ‘GHG target’ only approach to 2030would fail to stimulate additional energy savings and neglect animportant opportunity to curb energy waste and excessivespending on energy imports.

Compared to the EU27 Energy [R]evolution scenario publishedin 2012, higher assumptions for energy savings imply a lowerexpansion of renewable energy but achieve a higher level of CO2

emission reductions.

population development Future population development is animportant factor in energy scenario building because populationsize affects the size and composition of energy demand, directlyand through its impact on economic growth and development.

economic growth Economic growth is a key driver for energydemand. Since 1971, each 1% increase in global Gross DomesticProduct (GDP) has been accompanied by a 0.6% increase inprimary energy consumption. The decoupling of energy demandand GDP growth is therefore a prerequisite for an energyrevolution. Most global energy/economic/environmental modelsconstructed in the past have relied on market exchange rates toplace countries in a common currency for estimation andcalibration. This approach has been the subject of considerablediscussion in recent years, and an alternative has been proposedin the form of purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates.Purchasing power parities compare the costs in differentcurrencies of a fixed basket of traded and non-traded goods andservices and yield a widely-based measure of the standard ofliving. This is important in analyzing the main drivers of energydemand or for comparing energy intensities among countries.

Prospects for GDP growth have decreased considerably since theprevious study, due to the financial crisis at the beginning of2009, although underlying growth trends continue much thesame. GDP growth of the EU has been down scaled from 1.8%between 2010 and 2050 to 1.1%. GDP projections are based onthe PRIMES model for the EU 28 and assume a growth byaround 0.6% between 2010 and 2020 and 1.2% between 2020and 2035.

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© GP/EX-PRESS/M. FORTE

image COWS FROM A FARM WITH A BIOGAS PLANTIN ITTIGEN BERN, SWITZERLAND. THE FARMERPETER WYSS PRODUCES ON HIS FARM WITH ABIOGAS PLANT, GREEN ELECTRICITY WITH DUNGFROM COWS, LIQUID MANURE AND WASTE FROMFOOD PRODUCTION.

references12 SEE EREC, RE-THINKING 2050, GWEC, EPIA ET AL.

13 HTTP://ENERGYCOALITION.EU/SITES/DEFAULT/FILES/FRAUNHOFER%20ISI_

REFERENCETARGETSYSTEMREPORT.PDF

table 2.1: population development in the EU 28 2010 - 2050 (IN MILLIONS)

source UNEP WORLD POPULATION PROSPECT 2010.

2015

511

2010

505

2020

515

2025

518

2030

520

2040

519

2050

515EU 28

table 2.2: GDP development projections in the EU 282010 - 2050

source IEA WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011.

2010-2020

0.6%

2020-2035

1.2%

2035-2050

1.2%

2010-2050

1.1%EU 28


18

2.1.3 oil and gas price projections

The recent dramatic fluctuations in global oil prices have resultedin slightly higher forward price projections for fossil fuels. Underthe 2004 ‘high oil and gas price’ scenario from the EuropeanCommission, for example, an oil price of just € 28 per barrel wasassumed in 2030. More recent projections of oil prices by 2035in the IEA’s World Energy Outlook WEO) 2011 range from € 80/bbl in the 450 ppm scenario up to € 116/bbl in currentpolicies scenario.

Since the first Energy [R]evolution study was published in 2007,the actual price of oil has moved over € 83/bbl for the first time,and in July 2008 reached a record high of more than € 116/bbl.Although oil prices fell back to € 83/bbl in September 2008 andaround € 66/bbl in April 2010, prices increased to more than € 91/bbl in early 2012. Thus, the projections in the IEA CurrentPolicies scenario might still be considered too conservative.Taking into account the growing global demand for oil we haveassumed a price development path for fossil fuels slightly higherthan the IEA WEO 2011 “Current Policies” case extrapolatedforward to 2050 (see Table 2.3).

As the supply of natural gas is limited by the availability ofpipeline infrastructure as outlined in the previous chapter, there isno world market price for gas. In most regions of the world thegas price is directly tied to the price of oil. Gas prices aretherefore assumed to increase to € 20-25/GJ by 2050.

A detailed list of assumed investment costs for power generationas well as operation and maintenance costs can be found inprevious energy scenarios.14

The Energy [R]evolution by no means claims to predict thefuture; it simply describes a potential development pathway outof the broad range of possible ‘futures’. It is designed to indicatethe efforts and actions required to achieve ambitious objectivesand to illustrate the options Europe has at hand to change itsenergy supply system into one that is truly sustainable. Thepolitical change necessary to achieve the Energy [R]evolution isnot part of this analysis.

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table 2.3: development projections for fossil fuel and biomass prices in € 2010

UNIT

barrelbarrelbarrelbarrel

GJGJGJ

GJGJGJ

GJGJGJ

GJGJGJ

tonnetonnetonnetonne

GJGJGJ

2000

29

4.203.105.11

34.76

2005

42

1.943.773.79

41.38

2007

63

2.715.275.30

57.93

6.212.762.27

2008

98

100.96

2010

65656565

3.846.559.61

3.846.559.61

3.846.559.61

3.846.559.61

81.9381.9381.93

6.462.852.35

2015

808893

5.158.2110.39

5.338.5611.09

7.0311.7713.42

82.7686.89104.85

6.882.942.68

2020

808893

5.68 8.5610.48

6.129.6111.78

8.9713.8915.79

76.9690.20115.03

7.713.192.94

2025

808893

6.988.5610.48

6.7210.3912.40

10.3915.0817.07

68.6993.51134.31

8.043.393.14

2030

80112126

7.328.4710.57

7.3211.0012.92

12.0616.1718.31

61.2496.00141.51

8.383.613.35

2040

126

15.1818.4520.79

164.69

8.633.943.86

2035

80116126

6.818.2110.57

7.8611.3513.27

13.6117.3019.55

56.2797.65150.04

8.513.773.61

2050

126

19.8921.8224.64

170.73

8.814.364.10

FOSSIL FUEL

Crude oil importsHistoric prices (from WEO)WEO “450 ppm scenario”WEO Current policiesEnergy [R]evolution 2012

Natural gas importsHistoric prices (from WEO)United StatesEuropeJapan LNG

WEO 2011 “450 ppm scenario”United StatesEuropeJapan LNG

WEO 2011 Current policiesUnited StatesEuropeJapan LNG

Energy [R]evolution 2012United StatesEuropeJapan LNG

OECD steam coal importsHistoric prices (from WEO)WEO 2011 “450 ppm scenario”WEO 2011 Current policiesEnergy [R]evolution 2012

Biomass (solid) Energy [R]evolution 2012OECD EuropeOECD Asia Oceania & North AmericaOther regions

source IEA WEO 2009 & 2011 own assumptions and 2035-2050: DLR, Extrapolation (2012).

reference14 HTTP://WWW.ENERGYBLUEPRINT.INFO/FILEADMIN/MEDIA/DOCUMENTS/2013/0113_GPI_E_R__POLAND_

07_LR.PDF

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2.2 key results of the energy [r]evolution EUenergy independence pathway

2.2.1 EU28: energy demand by sector

The future development pathways for Europe’s energy demandare shown in Figure 2.1 for the COM and the Energy[R]evolution scenario with the advanced energy efficiencypathway. Under the COM scenario, total primary energy demandin EU28 decreases by -20% from the current 72,300 PJ/a to57,841 PJ/a in 2050. The energy demand in 2030 in the Energy[R]evolution scenario decreases by 40% compared to currentconsumption and it is expected by 2050 to reach 37,900 PJ/a.

Under the Energy [R]evolution scenario, electricity demand in theindustry as well as in the residential and service sectors isexpected to decrease after 2015 (see Figure 2.2). Because of thegrowing shares of electric vehicles, heat pumps and hydrogengeneration however, electricity demand increases to 2,519 TWh in2030 and 2,673 TWh/a in 2050, 27% below the COM case.Efficiency gains in the heat supply sector are larger than in theelectricity sector. Under the Energy [R]evolution scenario, finaldemand for heat supply can even be reduced significantly (seeFigure 2.3). Compared to the COM scenario, consumptionequivalent to 4,060 PJ/a is avoided through efficiency measuresby 2050. As a result of energy-related renovation of the existingstock of residential buildings, as well as the introduction of lowenergy standards and ‘passive houses’ for new buildings,enjoyment of the same comfort and energy services will beaccompanied by a much lower future energy demand.

© MARKEL REDONDO/GP

image GEMASOLAR IS A 15 MWE SOLAR-ONLYPOWER TOWER PLANT, EMPLOYING MOLTEN SALTTECHNOLOGIES FOR RECEIVING AND STORINGENERGY. IT’S 16 HOUR MOLTEN SALT STORAGESYSTEM CAN DELIVER POWER AROUND THE CLOCK.IT RUNS AN EQUIVALENT OF 6,570 FULL HOURSOUT OF 8,769 TOTAL. FUENTES DE ANDALUCÍASEVILLE, SPAIN.

figure 2.1: development of total final energy demand by sector in the energy [r]evolution scenario(high efficiency)

•‘EFFICIENCY’

• OTHER SECTORS

• INDUSTRY

•TRANSPORT

COM E[R]

2010

COM E[R]

2015

COM E[R]

2020

COM E[R]

2030

COM E[R]

2040

COM E[R]

2050

PJ/a 0

6,000

12,000

18,000

24,000

30,000

36,000

42,000

48,000

54,000

figure 2.2: development of electricity demand by sectorin the energy [r]evolution scenario (high efficiency)

•‘EFFICIENCY’

• OTHER SECTORS

• INDUSTRY

•TRANSPORT

E[R] E[R] E[R] E[R] E[R] E[R]

2010 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050

PJ/a 0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

figure 2.3: development of heat demand by sector in theenergy [r]evolution scenario (high efficiency)

•‘EFFICIENCY’

• OTHER SECTORS

• INDUSTRY

•TRANSPORT

E[R] E[R] E[R] E[R] E[R] E[R]

2010 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050

PJ/a 0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

2.2.2 EU28: electricity generation

The development of the electricity supply market is characterizedby a dynamically growing renewable energy market. This willcompensate for the phasing out of nuclear energy and reduce thenumber of fossil fuel-fired power plants required for gridstabilisation. By 2050, 95% of the electricity produced in EU28will come from renewable energy sources. ‘New’ renewables –mainly wind, solar thermal energy and PV – will contribute 76%of electricity generation. The Energy [R]evolution scenarioprojects an immediate market development with high annualgrowth rates achieving a renewable electricity share of 44%across Europe already by 2020 and 75% by 2030. The installedcapacity of renewables will reach 907 GW in 2030 and 1211GW by 2050.

Table 2.4 shows the comparative evolution of the different renewabletechnologies in EU28 over time. Up to 2020 hydro and wind willremain the main contributors of the growing market share. After2020, the continuing growth of wind will be complemented byelectricity from biomass, photovoltaic and solar thermal (CSP)energy. The Energy [R]evolution scenario will lead to a high share offluctuating power generation sources (photovoltaic, wind and ocean)of 58% by 2030, therefore the expansion of smart grids, demandside management (DSM) and storage capacity e.g. from theincreased share of electric vehicles will be used for a better gridintegration and power generation management.

The import of reliably available solar thermal power from MiddleEast and North Africa of around 400 TWh/a by 2050 willcontribute significantly to the supply and the load balancing inthe European energy system.


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table 2.4: renewable electricity generation capacity underthe COM scenario and the energy [r]evolution scenario(high efficiency) IN GW

2020

156152

2936

188270

26

130170

27

03

507607

2040

178153

4961

454546

338

216336

554

728

9121,103

2050

186154

6359

519569

442

303406

668

1232

1,0931,211

Hydro

Biomass

Wind

Geothermal

PV

CSP

Ocean energy

Total

COME[R]

COME[R]

COME[R]

COME[R]

COME[R]

COME[R]

COME[R]

COME[R]

2030

170152

4156

383477

219

171277

422

210

772907

2010

147147

2323

8383

11

2323

00

00

277277

figure 2.4: electricity generation structure under the COM and the energy [r]evolution scenario (high efficiency)(INCLUDING ELECTRICITY FOR ELECTROMOBILITY, HEAT PUMPS AND HYDROGEN GENERATION)

TWh/a 0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

COM COM COM COM COM COME[R] E[R] E[R] E[R] E[R] E[R]

2010 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050

•OCEAN ENERGY

• SOLAR THERMAL

• GEOTHERMAL

• BIOMASS

• PV

•WIND

• HYDRO

• NUCLEAR

• DIESEL

• OIL

• NATURAL GAS

• LIGNITE

• COAL

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© GP/MARTIN ZAKORA

2.2.3 EU28: future costs of electricity generation

Figure 2.5 shows that the introduction of renewable technologiesunder the Energy [R]evolution scenario slightly increases thegeneration costs of electricity generation in EU28 compared to theCOM scenario. This difference will be less than 0.7 €cents/kWh upto 2020. Because of the lower CO2 intensity of electricitygeneration, electricity generation costs will become economicallyfavorable under the Energy [R]evolution scenario and by 2050costs will be 2.5 €cents/kWh below those in the COM version.

Under the COM scenario, an increase in fossil fuel prices and thecost of CO2 emissions result in total electricity supply costs risingfrom today’s € 324 billion per year to € 355 billion in 2030 andmore than € 461 billion by 2050. Figure 2.5 shows that theEnergy [R]evolution scenario not only complies with EU28’s CO2

reduction targets but also helps to stabilize energy costs.Increasing energy efficiency and shifting energy supply torenewables leads to long term costs for electricity supply that are33% lower than in the COM scenario, although costs forefficiency measures of up to 3 €ct/kWh are taken into account.

2.2.4 EU28: future investments

Up until 2030 an investment of € 1,754 billion would be requiredto make the Energy [R]evolution scenario a reality in the powersector (including investments for replacement after the economiclifetime of power plants) - approximately € 195 billion or € 12billion annually more than in the COM scenario (€ 1,558 billion).

Under the COM version, the levels of investment in conventionalpower plants add up to almost 30% while some 70% would beinvested in renewable energy and cogeneration (CHP) until 2050.Under the Energy [R]evolution scenario, the EU28 would shiftalmost 95% of the entire investment towards renewables andcogeneration. Until 2030, the fossil fuel share of power sectorinvestment would be focused mainly on CHP plants.

The total investment would increase until 2050 to of € 3,369billion under the Energy [R]evolution scenario compared to € 3,243 billion under the COM scenario. The average annualinvestment in the power sector would be similar under bothscenarios - € 84 billion under the Energy [R]evolution scenarioand € 81 billion under the COM scenario.

Because renewable energy has no fuel costs, however, the fuelcost savings in the Energy [R]evolution scenario compared to theCOM case reach a total of € 1,192 billion up to 2050, or € 29.8billion per year, see also Chapter 3.3.

image AERIAL VIEW OF THE WORLD’S LARGESTOFFSHORE WINDPARK IN THE NORTH SEA HORNSREV IN ESBJERG, DENMARK.

figure 2.5: development of total electricity supply costs& of specific electricity generation costs

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

2010 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

ct/kWhBn€/a

SPECIFIC ELECTRICITY GENERATION COSTS (COM)

SPECIFIC ELECTRICITY GENERATION COSTS (E[R] (HIGH EFFICIENCY))

• ‘EFFICIENCY’ MEASURES

• REFERENCE SCENARIO (COM)

• ENERGY [R]EVOLUTION (E[R] (HIGH EFFICIENCY))

2.2.5 EU28: heat supply

Renewables currently provide 15% of EU28’s energy demand forheat supply, the main contribution coming from the use ofbiomass. The lack of district heating networks is a severestructural barrier to the large scale utilisation of geothermal andsolar thermal energy. In the Energy [R]evolution scenario,renewables provide 47% of EU28’s total heat demand in 2030and 91% in 2050.

• Energy efficiency measures can decrease the current total demandfor heat supply by at least 20%, in spite of growing populationand economic activities and improving living standards.

• For direct heating, solar collectors, biomass/biogas as well asgeothermal energy are increasingly substituting for fossil fuel-fired systems.

• The introduction of strict efficiency measures e.g. via strictbuilding standards and ambitious support programs forrenewable heating systems are needed to achieve economies ofscale within the next 5 to 10 years.

Table 2.5 shows the development of the different renewabletechnologies for heating in EU28 over time. Up to 2020 biomasswill remain the main contributor of the growing market share.After 2020, the continuing growth of solar collectors and agrowing share of geothermal heat pumps will reduce thedependence on fossil fuels.


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table 2.5: projection of renewable heating capacityunder the COM and the energy [r]evolution scenario(high efficiency)

2020

3,3153,369

101850

130994

00

3,5455,212

2040

4,5633,142

4684,291

2804,512

081

5,31112,025

2050

4,9242,912

8985,430

4185,695

0493

6,23914,530

Biomass

Solarcollectors

Geothermal

Hydrogen

Total

COME[R]

COME[R]

COME[R]

COME[R]

COME[R]

2030

3,9793,396

2072,665

3172,754

02

4,5038,818

2010

2,9782,978

6262

6262

00

3,1023,102

figure 2.6: development of total final energy demand by sector under the COM and the energy [r]evolution scenario(high efficiency)

COM E[R]

2010

COM E[R]

2015

COM E[R]

2020

COM E[R]

2030

COM E[R]

2040

COM E[R]

2050

PJ/a 0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

•‘EFFICIENCY’

• HYDROGEN

• GEOTHERMAL

• SOLAR

• BIOMASS

• FOSSIL

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2.2.6 EU28: transport

In the transport sector, it is assumed under the Energy[R]evolution scenario that an energy demand reduction of about6,000 PJ/a can be achieved by 2050, a saving of 49% comparedto the COM scenario. Energy demand will therefore decreasebetween 2009 and 2050 by 54% to 6,200 PJ/a. This reductioncan be achieved by the introduction of highly efficient vehicles, byshifting the transport of goods from road to rail and by changesin mobility-related behavior patterns. Implementing a mix ofincreased public transport as attractive alternatives to individualcars, the car stock is growing slower and annual personkilometers are lower than in the COM scenario.

A shift towards smaller cars triggered by economic incentivestogether with a significant shift in propulsion technology towardselectrified power trains and the reduction of vehicle kilometerstravelled lead to significant energy savings. In 2030, electricity willprovide 12% of the transport sector’s total energy demand in theEnergy [R]evolution, while in 2050 the share will be about 50%.

© GP/MARKEL REDONDO

image ANDASOL 1 SOLAR POWER STATION IS EUROPE’SFIRST COMMERCIAL PARABOLIC TROUGH SOLAR POWERPLANT. IT WILL SUPPLY UP TO 200,000 PEOPLE WITHCLIMATE-FRIENDLY ELECTRICITY AND SAVE ABOUT149,000 TONNES OF CARBON DIOXIDE PER YEARCOMPARED WITH A MODERN COAL POWER PLANT.

table 2.6: projection of transport energy demand bymode in the COM and the energy [r]evolution scenario(high efficiency)

2020

397408

13,00011,039

432408

276255

14,10512,110

2040

401549

12,0616,131

574364

274212

13,3107,255

2050

378632

10,9265,067

577326

250189

12,1316,214

Rail

Road

Domesticaviation

Domesticnavigation

Total

COME[R]

COME[R]

COME[R]

COME[R]

COME[R]

2030

422451

13,2178,246

552403

298234

14,4909,333

2010

366366

12,49412,494

279279

249249

13,38813,388

figure 2.7: development of total transport energy demand by fuel under the COM and the energy [r]evolutionscenario (high efficiency)

PJ/a 0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000


2010 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050

•‘EFFICIENCY’

• HYDROGEN

• ELECTRICITY

• BIOFUELS

• NATURAL GAS

• OIL PRODUCTS


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2.2.7 EU28: primary energy consumption

Taking into account the assumptions discussed above, the resultingprimary energy consumption under the Energy [R]evolutionscenario is shown in Figure 2.8. Compared to the COM scenario,overall primary energy demand will be reduced by around 40% in2030. Around 48% of the remaining demand will be covered byrenewable energy sources (including non-energy use).

The Energy [R]evolution version reduces coal and oil significantlyfaster than the EC. This is made possible mainly by thereplacement of coal power plants with renewables and a fasterintroduction of very efficient electric vehicles in the transportsector to replace oil combustion engines. This leads to an overallrenewable primary energy share of 48% in 2030 and 92% in2050. Nuclear energy is phased out just after 2030.

2.2.8 EU28: development of CO2 emissions

Overall CO2 emissions in EU28 will decrease by 40% until 2030 inthe COM scenario (compared to 1990). Under the Energy[R]evolution scenario emissions will decrease by over 60% overthe same period. Annual per capita emissions will drop from 7.2 tonne to 2.7 tonne in 2030 and 0.3 tonne in 2050. In spite ofthe phasing out of nuclear energy and increasing power demand,CO2 emissions will decrease in the electricity sector. In the long runefficiency gains and the increased use of renewable electricity invehicles will reduce emissions in the transport sector. With a shareof 18% of CO2 emissions in 2030, the power sector will drop belowtransport and other sectors as the largest sources of emissions. By 2050, EU28’s CO2 emissions are 4% of 1990 levels.

figure 2.8: development of total primary energy demand by sector under the COM and the energy [r]evolutionscenario (high efficiency)

PJ/a 0

20,000

10,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000


2010 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050

•‘EFFICIENCY’

• OCEAN ENERGY

• GEOTHERMAL

• SOLAR

• BIOMASS

•WIND

• HYDRO

• NATURAL GAS

• OIL

• COAL

• NUCLEAR

figure 2.9: development of CO2 emissions by sectorunder the energy [r]evolution scenario (high efficiency)(‘EFFICIENCY’ = REDUCTION COMPARED TO THE COM SCENARIO)REDUCTION COMPARED TO THE

REFERENCE SCENARIO)


2010 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

0

100

200

300

400

500

Mill t/aMillion people

POPULATION DEVELOPMENT

• SAVINGS FROM ‘EFFICIENCY’ & RENEWABLES

• OTHER SECTORS

• INDUSTRY

•TRANSPORT

• POWER GENERATION

25

3fossil fuel requirements for the EU

image HEAVY RAINS IN CENTRAL EUROPE LED TO SOME OF THE WORST FLOODING THE REGION HAS SEEN IN OVER 100 YEARS. THE FLOODS KILLED OVER 100 PEOPLE INGERMANY, RUSSIA, AUSTRIA, HUNGARY AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND LED TO AS MUCH AS $20 BILLION IN DAMAGE.

FOSSIL FUEL BALANCE: SCENARIO COMPARISON

FOSSIL FUEL BALANCES BY FUEL FOSSIL FUEL COSTS VERSUSINVESTMENT IN NEW RENEWABLEPOWER TECHNOLOGIES

renewableenergy =security of supply”

“

© JACQUES DESCLOITRES, M

ODIS LAND RAPID RESPONSE TEAM, NASA/GSFC

This section provides an overview of the fossil fuel requirement ofthe two different energy roadmaps previously outlined – theCommission roadmap and the Energy [R]evolution for EU 28which assumes an advanced energy efficiency program. Thedemand projections are based on the results of Chapter 2.

The analysis does not include a detailed analysis of biomassimports. Broadly, the use of biomass is much lower under theEnergy [R]evolution scenario than under the COM scenario, andso the amount of imports will be smaller too.

Similarly, no detailed assessment has been made of the EU’sprojected uranium consumption or imports. Under the COMscenario, the use of nuclear energy continues and even increasesslightly by 2050 compared to the current situation. Under theEnergy [R]evolution scenario the last reactor will be closed downbetween 2030 and 2035. Uranium imports will therefore beminimal by 2030, and non-existent by 2050.

3.1 fossil fuel balance: scenario comparison

The fossil fuel balances by scenario compare fuel demand withthe fossil fuel resources available within the EU. The resourceassessment is based on extensive research from Ludwig BölkowSystemtechnik (LBST) for Greenpeace International in 2012presented in the first section of this report.

The “Import Requirements” compare the theoretically availableEU resources with the fuel demand. It does not reflect the actualsituation of the fossil fuel markets - due to price differences ofoil, gas and coal inside and outside the EU, not the entire localresource will be used. Import requirements are presented as apercentage showing the difference between the theoreticallyavailable resources within the EU and the overall demand,indicating the share which is needed from outside the EU.

Under the COM scenario the EU would retain a very highdependency on importing all three fossil fuels. With around 90%of oil and 64% of gas import dependency by 2030, the EU willonly marginally change the current dependency on imports. Inreality, the level of imports is likely to be even higher since not allavailable EU resources will be used.

In comparison, the Energy [R]evolution pathway will reduce theamount of imported oil, gas and coal already by 2020. In 2030,the EU would need to import 1,287 million barrels of oil and 90billion m3 gas less gas – per year. Coal imports have been entirelyphased-out avoiding over the need of sourcing an extra 80 milliontonne per year.

Table 3.2 on the following page, shows that the annual additionalcost for fossil fuels of the COM scenario compared to the Energy[R]evolution pathway add up to € 57 billion in 2020 and € 180billion in 2030.

26

3

table 3.1: overview of fuel demand under COM and the energy [r]evolution

BILLION M3

223

192

141

104

77

223

192

141

104

77

YEAR

2015

2020

2030

2040

2050

E[R]

2015

2020

2030

2040

2050

MILLIONTONNE

173

157

128

105

85

173

157

128

105

85

MILLIONBARREL

922

689

387

219

125

922

689

387

219

125

MILLIONBARREL

2,550

2,921

2,844

2,047

1,206

2,508

2,372

1,557

696

351

%

66%

81%

88%

90%

91%

65%

77%

80%

76%

74%

MILLIONBARREL

3,877

3,610

3,231

2,266

1,331

3,836

3,061

1,944

915

476

BILLION M3

225

286

255

251

215

223

250

165

92

NON

%

46%

60%

64%

71%

74%

46%

57%

54%

47%

NON

BILLION M3

485

477

396

355

292

483

442

306

196

64

MILLIONTONNE

142

131

81

100

116

119

76

NON

NON

NON

%

42%

46%

39%

49%

57%

38%

33%

NON

NON

NON

MILLIONTONNE

333

288

209

205

201

311

233

79

39

33

GAS COALOILCOM Importrequirement

Importrequirement

Demand Importrequirement

Importrequirement

Demand Importrequirement

OILEUROPEAN FOSSIL FUELRESOURCES WITH CURRENTPRODUCTION CAPACITIES

GAS COAL

Importrequirement

Demand


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FOSSIL FUEL BALANCE

27

© GP/NICK COBBING

image GEOTHERMAL ACTIVITY NEARHOLSSELSNALAR CLOSE TO REYKJAVIK, ICELAND.

3.2 fossil fuel balances by fuel

In order to provide a better overview, this section shows thedevelopment pathways described above by fuel and puts them inthe context of both scenarios.

3.2.1 oil

In both scenarios it will not be possible to phase out overall oilimports within the next 35 years. However the Energy[R]evolution scenario will halve the demand for oil by 2030 thusthe overall purchased oil from outside the EU will be reducedaccordingly. To replace this oil, the money will be spent energyefficiency technologies and renewable electricity whichincreasingly supplies also the transport sector.

3.2.2 gas

The Energy [R]evolution pathway uses gas as a bridging fuel tocomplement the increasing share of renewables during the phase-out of nuclear, lignite and coal over the next two decades.However, by 2030 the overall import volume will be reduced30% to today’s level. The COM scenario has a significantly highergas import requirement than the Energy [R]evolution.

table 3.2: overview of additional fuel demand COM vs energy [r]evolution

YEAR

2015

2020

2030

2040

2050

EURO/BARREL

93

93

126

126

126

MILLIONEURO

3,854

51,000

162,190

170,182

107,787

MILLIONBARREL

41

548

1,287

1,351

855

EURO/BILLION M3

266,000

341,000

456,000

570,000

760,000

MILLIONEURO

0.35

12

41

90

173

BILLION M3

1.31

36

90

158

227

EURO/TONNE

105

115

141

165

170

MILLIONEURO

2,333

6,362

18,430

27,306

28,587

MILLIONTONNE

22

55

131

165

168

Assumedcosts

Totalcosts

Additionalannualdemand

Assumedcosts

Totalcosts


Assumedcosts

OIL GAS COAL

Totalcosts

MILLIONEURO

6,187

57,375

180,661

197,579

136,547

Totalfuel costssavings


figure 3.1: oil: EU import requirements versus oildemand: COM and energy [r]evolution

•2015

• 2020

• 2030

COM DEMAND

COM IMPORT NEEDS

E[R] DEMAND

E[R] IMPORT NEEDS

mill barrel/a 0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500 COM 2030Annual import requirement:

2,800 million barrel

E[R] 2030Annual import requirement:

1,550 million barrel

figure 3.2: gas: EU import requirements versus gasdemand: COM and energy [r]evolution

•2015

• 2020

• 2030

COM DEMAND

COM IMPORT NEEDS

E[R] DEMAND

E[R] IMPORT NEEDS

mill m3/a 0

100

200

300

400

500

600 COM 2030Annual import requirement:

255 million m3

E[R] 2030Annual import requirement:

165 million m3

3.2.3 coal

While the COM pathway will keep the EU dependent on coalimports, the Energy [R]evolution leads to a surplus of EU coal.Leaving coal in the ground will both benefit the climate and theinvestments saved in coal mining can be used for renewable energywhich in turn creates sustainable jobs for future generations.

Under the COM scenario, overall import requirement of the threefuels amount to 31,700 PJ by 2020 and 28,900 PJ by 2030, andstill over 18,200 PJ by 2050. Under the Energy [R]evolutionscenario this is only 25,700, 14,600 and 460 PJ. The comparisonshows that the EU can reduce overall fuel imports by 19% alreadyby 2020, by 45% by 2030 and 88% by 2050.

3.3 fossil fuel costs versus investment in newrenewable power technologies

As part of the Energy [R]evolution scenario development, weconducted a detailed cost analysis for the power sector. Ananalysis of the efficiency measures in the power, heating andtransport sectors has not been carried out.

Due the high average age of the European power plant fleet, theinvestment requirements in new power generation capacity –mainly to replace existing power plants – high even in the referencecase. The Energy [R]evolution and the COM scenario are both onthe same order of magnitude at around € 84 billion respectively € 81 billion per year between 2011 and 2050. However the COMcase foresees investments of € 28 billion in conventional fossil fuelpower plants – which increase Europe’s maintain on fossil fuelimports. As opposed to the Energy [R]evolution which channelsover 90% of the investments into renewable energy technologieswhile the remaining money is spend on gas power plants either fordispatching or for districting heating CHP plants.


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FOSSIL FUEL BALANCES BY FUEL

28

table 3.3: investments in new power plants under the energy [r]evolution and COM scenarios

2041-2050

239,498586,37955,18184,759320,114101,3844,55812,2698,113

0697,50953,98966,389220,219140,219102,38699,21415,093

2011-2050

1,132,7592,109,912189,094354,317

1,005,171473,81625,74741,63820,128

3,242,671

296,7943,072,039278,807269,331

1,057,549684,006371,340343,81067,196

3,368,833

2011-2050AVERAGE PER YEAR

28,31952,7484,7278,85825,12911,845

6441,041503

81,067

7,42076,8016,9706,73326,43917,1009,2838,5951,68084,221

2031-2040

352,817505,00831,78686,852230,787134,4535,1788,1947,757

62,464854,19962,02767,497260,062180,726120,388134,34929,149

2021-2030

271,506519,74863,823100,214274,83163,6766,6167,4833,105

52,430775,11394,90964,168295,566137,14598,55869,97914,788

2011-2020

268,938498,77838,30482,492179,439174,3039,39413,6921,152

181,901745,21867,88171,277281,703225,91650,00740,2688,166

MILL. €MILL. €MILL. €MILL. €MILL. €MILL. €MILL. €MILL. €MILL. €MILL. €

MILL. €MILL. €MILL. €MILL. €MILL. €MILL. €MILL. €MILL. €MILL. €MILL. €

COM

Conventional (fossil & nuclear)RenewablesBiomassHydroWindPV power plantGeothermalSolar thermal power plantsOcean energyTotal

Energy [R]evolution

Conventional (fossil & nuclear)RenewablesBiomassHydroWindPV power plantGeothermalSolar thermal power plantsOcean energyTotal

figure 3.3: coal: EU import requirements versus coaldemand: COM and energy [r]evolution

•2015

• 2020

• 2030

COM DEMAND

COM IMPORT NEEDS

E[R] DEMAND

E[R] IMPORT NEEDS

mill t/a 0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500 COM 2030Annual import requirement:

81 million tonnes

E[R] 2030No import dependenceCoal surplus in 2030

3

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FOSSIL FUEL VERSUS IN

VESTMENT IN

RENEWABLE POWER

29

© GP/EX-PRESS/HEIKE

image A LARGE SOLAR SYSTEM OF 63M2 RISES ONTHE ROOF OF A HOTEL IN CELERINA, SWITZERLAND.THE COLLECTOR IS EXPECTED TO PRODUCE HOTWATER AND HEATING SUPPORT AND CAN SAVEABOUT 6,000 LITERS OF OIL PER YEAR. THUS, THE CO2

EMISSIONS AND COMPANY COSTS CAN BE REDUCED.

Over the entire scenario period until 2050 the overall fuel costsavings accumulate to € 1,192 billion or € 29.8 billion per yearwhich can be used to compensate the additional investmentrequirements in new generation capacity of € 3.2 billion.Additional investments in energy efficiency measure are required.

table 3.4: investments and fuel cost savings under the COM and the energy [r]evolution scenarios

2041-2050

-239111-128

21.1602.2199.412.1834.9

2011-2050

-836962126

7165243139

1,192

2011-2050AVERAGE PER YEAR

-20.924.13.2

1.816.310.81.029.8

2031-2040

-29034959

24.1115.1149.212.4300.8

2021-2030

-21925536

18.7-56.769.312.243.5

2011-2020

-87246159

7.1-8.812.72.113.1

BILL. €BILL. €BILL. €

BILL. €BILL. €BILL. €BILL. €BILL. €

COM

Conventional (fossil & nuclear)RenewablesTotal

Energy [R]evolution

Fuel oilGasHard coalLigniteTotal

30

EU policy recommendations

4image NIGHT PHOTOGRAPH OF TWO OF BELGIUM’S MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS. ANTWERP IS A MAJOR EUROPEAN PORT LOCATED ON THE SCHELDT RIVER, AND BRUSSELS,THE CAPITAL AND LARGEST CITY IN BELGIUM, AND ALSO THE DE FACTO HEADQUARTERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. BRILLIANT POINTS OF LIGHT ARE THE CITY CENTER ANDTHE BRUSSELS NATIONAL AIRPORT. DEVELOPED ROADWAYS APPEAR AS STRAIGHTER, BRIGHTER LINES RADIATING FROM THE TWO CITIES.

every eurospent on

renewables is an investmentin securityof supply andjob security.”

“

© NASA

4

31

The Energy [R]evolution EU Energy Independence Pathwaydemonstrates that ambitious 2030 energy and climate targetswill – unlike the European Commission’s proposals – deliver asubstantial reduction in energy imports, making EU countries lessvulnerable to external supply disruptions. It shows thatenvironmental and climate protection and a reduction of energyimport dependence do not have to be contradictory but can bemutually reinforcing.

Therefore the EU should make the following key decisions:

Agree and implement ambitious 2030 energy and climate targets

EU heads of state and government should adopt a 2030 Energyand Climate Package that contains binding targets for renewables– 45% - and energy savings of 40% (compared to 2005) - alongwith an ambitious target for emission reductions within the EUof at least 55% (compared to 1990). As the next step, EUinstitutions should put in place effective laws to guarantee itssuccessful implementation. Such a framework will not onlybolster the EU’s energy independence, it will also deliversignificant climate, employment and health benefits.

This can be achieved by the following measures:

1. Strictly implement & strengthen existing EU energyefficiency legislation Recognising the economic and environmental benefits ofenergy savings, EU member states have already agreed tosave 20% energy by 2020, compared to business-as-usual.They have adopted an Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) andsubmitted National Energy Efficiency Action Plans, including2020 indicative national targets. Nonetheless, the 2020target is likely to be missed.

The Commission should therefore make sure that EUcountries which presented deficient action plans improvethese. It should also start infringement procedures againstthose EU countries whose plans clearly fail to comply withkey requirements under the EED as well as the EnergyPerformance of Buildings Directive (EPBD).

In addition, the Commission should strengthen the EnergyLabelling and Ecodesign laws to ensure greater energysavings. This should include more dynamic standards that alsomove beyond products towards system-wide energy savings.

2. Set-up an EU Energy Security Fund for buildings renovation The buildings sector alone is responsible for about 40% ofthe EU’s energy consumption. EU action should thereforeprioritize the refurbishment and improved insulation ofexisting building envelopes and replacement of inefficientheating systems. However, access to finance represents amajor obstacle.

Therefore, EU member states should task the EuropeanInvestment Bank (EIB), in collaboration with nationalinvestment banks, to create an Energy Security Fund tosupport development, financing and delivery of plans forimproving the energy performance of buildings. The focusshould be on those countries that are particularly vulnerableto energy supply disruptions and have the greatest potentialfor efficiency improvements.

3. Eliminate subsidies for fossil and nuclear energy technologies Many EU countries still give generous subsidies and othersupport to coal, nuclear and shale gas technologies. Spain,Germany, Poland and Romania subsidise their coal sectors,while Italy and Ireland operate capacity payments for naturalgas plants. Nuclear subsidies – even after half a century ofcommercial operation – exist in many countries, ranging fromliability-related subsidies to public support for nuclear wastemanagement and decommissioning. This is despite theunanimous call by all EU heads of state and government inMay 2013 for a phase out of environmentally or economicallyharmful subsidies, including fossil fuel ones.

EU governments should, without further delay, phase out anysubsidies (including export credit financing) for fossil andnuclear energy technologies. In most cases, such subsidiesexist to support fuel imports from third countries, which runcounter to the EU’s energy security objective.

4. Improve electricity grid connections between EU countries The Energy [R]evolution EU Energy Independence Pathwayshows that the development of renewable energy is one of themain drivers for reducing dependency on energy imports. Inorder to promote renewable energy, additional grid connectionsare needed both within and between EU member states, andexisting connections must be modernized. Priority should begiven to those electricity interconnections that have a directimpact on the integration of renewable energy sources.

5. Plan infrastructure projects using the rights assumptions The Energy [R]evolution EU Energy Independence Pathwayshows that the combination of ambitious energy efficiency andrenewable energy measures will significantly reduce the needfor energy imports.

EU member states should take into account the reduced fossilfuel consumption when planning any new pipelines orelectricity lines in order to prevent a costly “over-engineering”of the energy system and the creation of stranded assets.

4

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KEY DECISIONS

32

5

GLOSSARY OF COMMONLY USEDTERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

DEFINITION OF SECTORS EU 28: SCENARIO RESULTS DATA

glossary & appendix

5image THE CLOUDS OVER NORTHERN EUROPE HAVE THE MENACING CURL OF A LOW PRESSURE SYSTEM ASSOCIATED WITH SEVERE WINTER STORMS. THIS PARTICULARSTORM LASHED THE UNITED KINGDOM, SCANDINAVIA, NORTHERN GERMANY, AND RUSSIA WITH HURRICANE-FORCE WINDS AND INTENSE RAINS. THE STORM BROUGHTSEVERE FLOODS TO NORTHERN ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND, SUBMERSING THE ENGLISH TOWN OF CARLISLE ENTIRELY. ACROSS NORTHERN EUROPE, TRAIN SERVICES WEREHALTED AND ELECTRICITY FLICKERED OUT UNDER THE ONSLAUGHT OF WINDS THAT GUSTED UP TO 180 KILOMETERS PER HOUR (112 MPH).

© NASA IMAGE CREATED BY JESSE ALLEN

33

10.1 glossary of commonly used terms and abbreviations

CHP Combined Heat and Power CO2 Carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gasGDP Gross Domestic Product

(means of assessing a country’s wealth)PPP Purchasing Power Parity (adjustment to GDP assessment

to reflect comparable standard of living)IEA International Energy Agency

J Joule, a measure of energy: kJ (Kilojoule) = 1,000 JoulesMJ (Megajoule) = 1 million JoulesGJ (Gigajoule) = 1 billion JoulesPJ (Petajoule) = 1015 JoulesEJ (Exajoule) = 1018 Joules

W Watt, measure of electrical capacity: kW (Kilowatt) = 1,000 wattsMW (Megawatt) = 1 million wattsGW (Gigawatt) = 1 billion wattsTW (Terawatt) = 112 watts

kWh Kilowatt-hour, measure of electrical output: kWh (Kilowatt-hour) = 1,000 watt-hours TWh (Terawatt-hour) = 1012 watt-hours

t Tonnes, measure of weight: t = 1 tonneGt = 1 billion tonnes

10.2 definition of sectors

The definition of different sectors follows the sectorial breakdown of the IEA World Energy Outlook series.

All definitions below are from the IEA Key World Energy Statistics.

Industry sector: Consumption in the industry sector includes thefollowing subsectors (energy used for transport by industry is notincluded -> see under “Transport”)

• Iron and steel industry

• Chemical industry

• Non-metallic mineral products e.g. glass, ceramic, cement etc.

• Transport equipment

• Machinery

• Mining

• Food and tobacco

• Paper, pulp and print

• Wood and wood products (other than pulp and paper)

• Construction

• Textile and Leather

Transport sector: The Transport sector includes all fuels fromtransport such as road, railway, aviation, domestic navigation. Fuel used for ocean, coastal and inland fishing is included in “Other Sectors”.

Other sectors: “Other Sectors” covers agriculture, forestry, fishing,residential, commercial and public services.

Non-energy use: Covers use of other petroleum products such asparaffin waxes, lubricants, bitumen etc.

table 10.1: conversion factors - fossil fuels

MJ/kg

MJ/kg

GJ/barrel

kJ/m3

1 cubic

1 barrel

1 US gallon

1 UK gallon

0.0283 m3

159 liter

3.785 liter

4.546 liter

FUEL

Coal

Lignite

Oil

Gas

23.03

8.45

6.12

38000.00

table 10.2: conversion factors - different energy units

Gcal

238.8

1

107

0.252

860

Mbtu

947.8

3.968

3968 x 107

1

3412

GWh

0.2778

1.163 x 10-3

11630

2.931 x 10-4

1

FROM

TJ

Gcal

Mtoe

Mbtu

GWh

Mtoe

2.388 x 10-5

10(-7)

1

2.52 x 10-8

8.6 x 10-5

TO: TJMULTIPLY BY

1

4.1868 x 10-3

4.1868 x 104

1.0551 x 10-3

3.6

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|APPENDIX - E

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34

5

EU 28: scenario results data

image WESTERN EUROPE, FROM SOUTHERN ENGLAND IN THE NORTH TO SPAIN IN THE SOUTH AND FROM FRANCE IN THE WEST TO AUSTRIA IN THE EAST, BEGINNING TOSHOW SIGNS OF SPRING

© JACQUES DESCLOITRES, M


Condensation power plantsCoalLigniteGasOilDiesel

Combined heat & power productionCoalLigniteGasOil

CO2 emissions power generation (incl. CHP public)CoalLigniteGasOil & diesel

CO2 emissions by sector% of 1990 emissionsIndustry1)Other sectors1)TransportPower generation2)Other conversion3)

Population (Mill.)CO2 emissions per capita (t/capita)

1) including CHP autoproducers. 2) including CHP public 3) district heating, refineries, coal transformation, gas transport

District heatingFossil fuelsBiomassSolar collectorsGeothermal

Heat from CHP Fossil fuelsBiomassGeothermalHydrogen

Direct heating1)

Fossil fuelsBiomassSolar collectorsGeothermal2)

Total heat supply1)Fossil fuelsBiomassSolar collectorsGeothermalHydrogen

RES share (including RES electricity)

1) cooling. 2) cooling heat pumps.

35

EU 28: COM scenario

2015

51,74747,41313,97012,925

124627294780

5.0%

12,2784,1201,089683118

1,0121,4423,850

01,171

00

19.4%

21,1656,3161,6701,599266623

3,2067,461

801,816

6518.4%

6,98014.7%

4,3343,72755551

2020

50,75146,68414,16512,578

2601,0003281070

7.8%

12,4034,2011,370693125981

1,3493,955

01,224

00

21.9%

20,1156,1061,9921,742293535

2,5407,118100

1,88588

21.7%

8,18617.5%

4,0673,45356252

2030

48,49844,92414,55512,079

5501,10081340213

10.4%

12,3544,3632,159777150587

1,2023,968

131,436

90

30.5%

18,0155,6872,8142,026358328

1,8555,425188

2,289216

32.6%

11,14024.8%

3,5732,95756552

2040

44,12541,00713,3738,823351

1,3252,2941,198579

21.1%

11,4204,4532,325823178262690

3,432105

1,614420

37.3%

16,2145,6972,9752,312467136752

4,197336

2,634149

40.5%

13,65133.3%

3,1182,51355451

2050

39,87837,09012,1905,056358

1,7372,8541,5532,18536.7%

10,4864,5422,4729112316394

2,812323

1,666760

45.5%

14,4145,7093,1072,56861330266

2,311497

2,848185

50.3%

16,49744.5%

2,7882,20653349

Total (incl. non-energy use)Total (energy use)TransportOil productsNatural gasBiofuelsElectricity

RES electricityHydrogenRES share Transport

IndustryElectricity

RES electricityDistrict heat

RES district heatCoalOil productsGasSolarBiomass and wasteGeothermal/ambient heatHydrogenRES share Industry

Other SectorsElectricity


RES district heatCoalOil productsGasSolarBiomass and wasteGeothermal/ambient heatRES share Other Sectors

Total RESRES share

Non energy useOilGasCoal

2010

50,28845,82313,43412,533

104558240500

4.5%

11,4883,738782654123790

1,4433,845

01,017

00

16.7%

20,9016,2881,3151,580290587

3,2867,309

621,749

4016.5%

5,98513.1%

4,4643,84057252

table 10.3: EU 28: electricity generationTWh/a

table 10.6: EU 28: installed capacity GW

table 10.7: EU 28: primary energy demand PJ/a

table 10.5: EU 28: co2 emissionsMILL t/a

table 10.4: EU 28: heat supplyPJ/a

2015

2,770330217463277

8879335427428106921

68615488340297500

490196

3,4561,656484305803567

8870

9143542742810616892

11832860

2,981

38111.0%26.4%

2020

2,736227147463206

843100364401431451082

68815683342208700

492196

3,4241,464383230805406

8430

1,11736440143145188108

21762870

2,954

54816.0%32.6%

2030

2,8061573619035

79815239684411519115147

693144753511011300

496197

3,499970300111540135

7980

1,7313968441151912651514

71762995

3,018

1,04229.8%49.5%

2040

3,4372242823631

900203414

1,096270270182023

714137723749

12210

516198

4,1511,083360100610121

9000

2,167414

1,0962702703251920

23170303220

3,457

1,38933.5%52.2%

2050

4,1942902324510

1,089299433

1,336460388212741

734132673954

13420

536198

4,9281,1574229064050

1,0890

2,682433

1,3364603884332327

41167311809

3,640

1,76535.8%54.4%

Power plantsCoalLigniteGasOilDieselNuclearBiomassHydroWind

of which wind offshorePVGeothermalSolar thermal power plantsOcean energy

Combined heat & power plantsCoalLigniteGasOilBiomassGeothermalHydrogenCHP by producerMain activity producersAutoproducers

Total generationFossilCoalLigniteGasOilDiesel

NuclearHydrogenRenewablesHydroWind

of which wind offshorePVBiomassGeothermalSolar thermalOcean energy

Distribution lossesOwn consumption electricityElectricity for hydrogen productionFinal energy consumption (electricity)

Fluctuating RES (PV, Wind, Ocean)Share of fluctuating RESRES share (domestic generation)

2010

2,644347248458381091774375149023601

68214593337396900

488195

3,3261,71449234079577109170

695375149023142601

1952870

2,852

1735.2%20.9%

2015

8269429129283

134151541379

100110

182411290261200

12161

1,00845413642219543

1340

4191541379

10026110

23723.5%41.6%

2020

8626520132243

1241515618813130220

178381197191300

12157

1,04040910331229433

1240

5071561881313029220

31930.6%48.8%

2030

1,0136157042

1162317038336171242

16734109781700

11651

1,1792919514167122

1160

7721703833617141242

55547.1%65.5%

2040

1,1676637440

1273017845473216357

1653199871900

11649

1,3322949713172110

1270

9121784547321649357

67750.8%68.4%

2050

1,3918337910

153431865191213033612

1592999732000

11346

1,5503041121217640

1530

1,093186519121303634612

83453.8%70.5%



Combined heat & power productionCoalLigniteGasOilBiomassGeothermalHydrogenCHP by producerMain activity producersAutoproducers





2010

7079934127335

1431214783023100

181401384321100

12159

88846813947212655

1430

2771478302323100

10611.9%31.2%

2015

71,58052,8887,6803,05518,42323,730

9,6809,0121,276987496

5,8713794

12.3%

2020

68,83449,0546,6292,19618,13722,091

9,20410,5761,3091,444761

6,6034535

14.9%

2030

63,67740,6724,8231,01615,05919,773

8,71114,2941,4263,0391,1377,94872124

21.6%

2040

60,24332,9464,717877

13,48413,867

9,82517,4721,4913,9461,7859,46270485

28.1%

2050

57,19624,6244,631762

11,0838,148

11,88820,6831,5614,8102,76110,550

852149

35.2%

TotalFossilHard coalLigniteNatural gasCrude oil

NuclearRenewablesHydroWindSolarBiomassGeothermal/ambient heatOcean energyRES share

2010

71,88754,1617,9713,75718,61023,823

10,0067,7201,349537145

5,4392482

10.5%

2015

730285238182215

3871538013420

1,11743831831645

3,55286.5%471721934

1,063363

5117.0

2020

555197162176174

3381276313513

89332422531134

3,23078.7%461643917844364

5156.3

2030

203110266133

25994481116

4622047417212

2,45359.8%348477897427304

5204.7

2040

16494125530

1706128783

333154401337

1,68941.1%204307651312215

5193.3

2050

32232700

31125141

63357201

82620.1%

9615538157137

5151.6

2010

792298272186297

47215112116238

1,26444939334874

3,65088.9%480715906

1,180370

5057.2

2015

79761517903

1,8991,61828100

18,61215,7502,688

8095

21,30817,9833,148

80970

15.6%

2020

96574521703

1,9121,61230000

17,89814,8732,798101126

20,77517,2303,3151011300

17.1%

2030

1,23994827866

2,0721,72434800

15,97512,1113,352201311

19,28614,7833,9792073170

23.3%

2040

1,3529333652727

2,3351,95237580

13,1888,6803,823441245

16,87511,5654,5634682800

31.5%

2050

1,5669404707878

2,4992,091392170

10,3125,1074,062819323

14,3768,1374,9248984180

43.4%

2010

69652916403

1,9431,61932400

18,06915,4592,489

6259

20,70817,6072,978

62620

15.0%

table 10.8: EU 28: final energy demandPJ/a

5

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Population (Mill.)CO2 emissions per capita (t/capita)‘Efficiency’ savings (compared to Com.)




Direct heating1)

Fossil fuelsBiomassSolar collectorsGeothermal2)Hydrogen


RES share (including RES electricity)‘Efficiency’ savings (compared to Com.)


2015

51,48347,14913,70712,705

123590288770

4.9%

12,2784,1201,107683117

1,0121,4423,850

01,171

00

19.5%

21,1656,3161,6971,599263623

3,2057,461

801,816

6518.5%

6,98214.8%

4,3343,72755551

2020

48,68344,45512,16511,035

12356840417834

6.3%

12,1314,1171,8151,167409629903

3,873177

1,1311340

30.2%

20,1596,2222,7422,037723345

2,1066,894519

1,621416

29.9%

10,44823.5%

4,2293,453582194

2030

43,51139,5919,3787,157132554

1,141855395

18.2%

11,3103,8722,9001,585938115416

3,3875619734010

51.0%

18,9036,1194,5832,7111,630

731,1235,0511,6071,333885

53.1%

17,51544.2%

3,9192,957590372

2040

38,24034,5317,2852,519159535

2,5392,1771,53355.3%

10,0663,6753,1511,9841,576

40131

1,83695777959965

70.7%

17,1805,7574,9363,2082,593

0375

3,1722,2561,0541,35871.0%

23,34167.6%

3,7102,513603594

2050

33,93330,4826,229624132475

3,0942,9761,90584.8%

8,9303,4863,3542,2452,098

1422220

1,137575800431

93.8%

15,3235,5085,2993,3353,138

039

1,0522,753882

1,75390.2%

27,48890.2%

3,4512,206623621



IndustryElectricity






Total RESRES share


2010

50,28845,82313,43412,533

104558240500

4.5%

11,4883,738782654123790

1,4433,845

01,017

00

16.7%

20,9016,2881,3151,580290587

3,2867,309

621,749

4016.5%

5,98513.1%

4,4643,84057252






2015

2,716275217463277

8879335427428106921

68615488340297500

490196

3,4011,601429305803567

8870

91435427428106168921

1832860

2,979

38111.2%26.9%

0

2020

2,639239163429115

46184354579133238224510

7601462141115151160

530230

3,3991,440385184840265

4610

1,498354579133238235384510

20525014

2,984

82724.3%44.1%

-9

2030

2,728330

299437866363

1,1894304147414163

815530

4190

264790

560255

3,543811860

71843780

2,653363

1,18943041433015314163

208217155

3,094

1,66647.0%74.9%

16

2040

3,23000

25801062376

1,433583567110297125

80000

3100

3231626

525275

4,03056900

5680106

3,455376

1,433583567385272297125

203173617

3,333

2,12552.7%85.7%200

2050

3,404002500059387

1,510614729136406153

73000

1060

39420426

480250

4,13413100

13100026

3,978387

1,510614729453340406153

201139903

3,385

2,39257.8%96.2%349








Fluctuating RES (PV, Wind, Ocean)Share of fluctuating RESRES share (domestic generation)‘Efficiency’ savings (compared to Com.)

2010

2,644347248458381091774375149023601

68214593337396900

488195

3,3261,71449234079577109170

695375149023142601

1952870

2,852

1735.2%20.9%

0

2015

8157929128343

134151541379

100110

180401290261200

12061

99644211942217613

1340

4191541379

10026110

23723.8%42.1%

2020

94468221161326813152259422134113

193363

114152330

12965

1,13838910425230282680

68115225942213366113

47541.8%59.8%

2030

1,222110

100511110156496134370123118

182130

115041130

12260

1,403246240

21651110

1,14615649613437051253118

88363.0%81.7%

2040

1,37100810009

161550157454176236

1630085050271

10459

1,53316600

1650001

1,36616155015745459456236

1,03967.8%89.1%

2050

1,497003600011166569162570218144

1330033060345

8647

1,6306900690005

1,55616656916257071568144

1,18272.5%95.5%








2010

7079934127335

1431214783023100

181401384321100

12159

88846813947212655

1430

2771478302323100

10611.9%31.2%

2015

70,61552,0857,1683,06718,37323,476

9,6808,8511,276987496

5,7103784

12.1%434

2020

64,29145,1705,7441,84318,42319,160

5,03314,0891,2732,0852,4846,1582,052

3622.1%4,680

2030

56,56629,6771,890

1115,25812,518

85126,0381,3084,2816,5906,7086,923227

46.3%7,237

2040

52,23616,946

9080

10,2635,775

035,2901,3545,16111,4586,35510,511

45068.0%7,515

2050

47,4596,7337600

3,0382,936

040,7261,3955,43515,0636,04412,239

55186.1%8,538


NuclearRenewablesHydroWindSolarBiomassGeothermal/ambient heatOcean energyRES share‘Efficiency’ savings (compared to Com.)

2010

71,88754,1617,9713,75718,61023,823

10,0067,7201,349537145

5,4392482

10.5%0

2015

683238238182215

3891538213420

1,07239132031645

3,48385%473721918

1,015356

5116.869

2020

56120717816393

3071191616210

86932619532622

2,92471%389582798818337

5155.7305

2030

146270

11252

205410

1640

351680

2767

1,70742%268379520309231

5203.3746

2040

97009600

11500

1150

21200

2120

84020%147210189176118

5191.6848

2050

900900

3700370

4600460

2095%2765513135

5150.4617

2010

792298272186297

47215112116238

1,26444939334874

3,65088.9%480715906

1,180370

5057.20

2015

72556016302

1,8991,61828100

18,61215,7502,688

80950

21,23617,9283,132

80970

15.6%

71

2020

1,28872133515577

2,3221,6225571430

17,29113,3452,4776967740

20,90015,6883,3698509940

24.9%

-125

2030

1,878610479498291

2,8961,3448427082

15,2429,2442,0752,1681,755

0

20,01611,1983,3962,6652,754

2

44.1%

-730

2040

2,292289481

1,077445

3,362880

1,0111,454

18

12,5555,0161,6503,2132,613

63

18,2106,1853,1424,2914,512

81

66.0%

-1,334

2050

2,655106451

1,540558

3,353296

1,1491,829

79

9,9941,0691,3123,8903,309414

16,0021,4722,9125,4305,695493

90.7%

-1,626

2010

69652916403

1,9431,61932400

18,06915,4592,489

6259

20,70817,6072,978

62620

15.0%

0


EU 28: energy [r]evolution (high renewables) scenario

5

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|APPENDIX - E

U 28





Population (Mill.)CO2 emissions per capita (t/capita)‘Efficiency’ savings (compared to Com.)




Direct heating1)

Fossil fuelsBiomassSolar collectorsGeothermal2)Hydrogen


RES share (including RES electricity)‘Efficiency’ savings (compared to Com.)


37

EU 28: energy [r]evolution (high efficiency) scenario

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|APPENDIX - E

U 28

2015

51,48347,14913,70712,705

123590288770

4.9%

12,2784,1201,107683117

1,0121,4423,850

01,171

00

19.5%

21,1656,3161,6971,599263623

3,2057,461

801,816

6518.5%

6,98214.8%

4,3343,72755551

2020

45,58141,35212,16511,039

12356540417334

6.2%

12,1144,1001,7591,167396629903

3,873177

1,1311340

29.7%

17,0735,6602,4281,674571282

1,7245,642425

1,327341

29.8%

9,43922.8%

4,2293,453582194

2030

37,03933,1209,3786,971132684

1,163862429

19.9%

11,5774,0613,0081,6261,013194418

3,2616349794030

52.2%

12,1643,8402,8441,7921,135

67735

2,9511,214872695

55.6%

14,66044.3%

3,9192,957590372

2040

30,87727,1677,2852,519159535

2,5392,2081,53356.0%

9,6333,4953,0401,9161,544

38125

1,75991774657463

71.4%

10,2493,5763,1101,8931,566

0218

1,8461,313613790

72.1%

18,34367.5%

3,7102,513603594

2050

25,98022,5306,229624132475

3,0942,9401,90583.9%

7,8663,0292,8791,9981,810

1220195

1,009510710383

92.6%

8,4343,4123,2431,7261,580

020536

1,400449891

89.7%

20,07389.1%

3,4512,206623621



IndustryElectricity






Total RESRES share


2010

50,28845,82313,43412,533

104558240500

4.5%

11,4883,738782654123790

1,4433,845

01,017

00

16.7%

20,9016,2881,3151,580290587

3,2867,309

621,749

4016.5%

5,98513.1%

4,4643,84057252






2015

2,716275217463277

8879335427428106921

68615488340297500

490196

3,4011,601429305803567

8870

91435427428106168921

1832860

2,979

38111.2%26.9%

0

2020

2,443207133419115

46184354520122190222810

7601462141115151160

530230

3,2031,368353154830265

4610

1,374354520122190235382810

18923114

2,823

72022.5%42.9%152

2030

2,137300

2344378663558963403102610034

795380

3730

298860

540255

2,932682680

60743780

2,17135589634031036411210034

184191169

2,519

1,24042.3%74.1%597

2040

2,52600

16501040357

1,1164284207026098

78200

2600

3581585

515267

3,30842600

4250105

2,877357

1,11642842039822826098

167143616

2,677

1,63449.4%87.0%855

2050

2,628002200032360

1,18045652062340112

68300

1190

34819323

460223

3,31114100

14100023

3,147360

1,180456520380255340112

148103881

2,673

1,81254.7%95.0%1,059








Fluctuating RES (PV, Wind, Ocean)Share of fluctuating RESRES share (domestic generation)‘Efficiency’ savings (compared to Com.)

2010

2,644347248458381091774375149023601

68214593337396900

488195

3,3261,71449234079577109170

695375149023142601

1952870

2,852

1735.2%20.9%

0

2015

8157929128343

134151541379

100110

180401290261200

12061

99644211942217613

1340

4191541379

1002611

0.3

23723.8%42.1%

2020

8545918113132681315223238170473

193363

114152330

12965

1,0483739521227282680

6071522323817036673

40538.7%57.9%

2030

9531007851111015237110627742210

17290

103046140

11359

1,124206190

18151110

90715237110627756192210

65858.5%80.6%

2040

1,07300510006

153433116336115428

1540071055271

9658

1,22712300

1220001

1,10315343311633661385428

79765.0%89.9%

2050

1,15600310006

154449120406106832

1280038053325

8543

1,2846900690005

1,21115444912040659426832

88769.1%94.3%








2010

7079934127335

1431214783023100

181401384321100

12159

88846813947212655

1430

2771478302323100

10611.9%31.2%

2015

70,61552,0857,1683,06718,37323,476

9,6808,8511,276987496

5,7103784

12.1%434

2020

60,12542,4025,3551,52716,78518,735

5,03312,6911,2731,8721,8735,7091,927

3621.3%8,846

2030

46,81525,3591,813

511,64511,895

85120,6051,2783,2264,9295,9525,096122

44.4%16,988

2040

42,06813,970

9060

7,4635,601

028,0981,2854,0188,6315,5318,281353

67.3%17,683

2050

36,0956,1177580

2,4462,913

029,9781,2964,24910,6324,5468,852403

83.6%19,903


NuclearRenewablesHydroWindSolarBiomassGeothermal/ambient heatOcean energyRES share‘Efficiency’ savings (compared to Com.)

2010

71,88754,1617,9713,75718,61023,823

10,0067,7201,349537145

5,4392482

10.5%0

2015

683238238182215

3891538213420

1,07239132031645

3,48385%473721918

1,015356

5116.869

2020

49718014515993

3071191616210

80429816232222

2,71866%389477799754300

5155.3511

2030

1192508852

172290

1430

292540

2307

1,40034%268232507251174

5202.7

1,053

2040

62006100

9300930

15500

1540

65716%14212418912083

5191.3

1,032

2050

800800

4200420

5000500

1714%2733513425

5150.3655

2010

792298272186297

47215112116238

1,26444939334874

3,65088.9%480715906

1,180370

5057.20

2015

72556016302

1,8991,61828100

18,61215,7502,688

80950

21,23617,9283,132

80970

15.6%

71

2020

87148822610452

2,3221,6225571430

15,29811,8192,2126026650

18,49013,9292,9957068600

24.7%

2,285

2030

902293230239140

2,8741,1379607762

11,9436,9361,6661,8481,492

0

15,7198,3672,8562,0872,408

2

46.8%

3,567

2040

854108179401166

3,269700

1,1271,424

17

8,8763,6171,2232,2291,807

60

13,0594,4252,5302,6313,397

77

66.0%

3,816

2050

83033141481174

3,159341

1,0131,734

71

5,956620863

2,4102,063367

10,312995

2,0182,8913,971439

90.1%

4,064

2010

69652916403

1,9431,61932400

18,06915,4592,489

62590

20,70817,6072,978

62620

15.0%

0


energy[r]evolution

© PAUL LANGROCK / GREENPEACE

image HAZE AND POLLUTION OVER WESTERN EUROPE © NASA front cover images HAZE AND POLLUTION OVER WESTERN EUROPE © NASA, © MARKEL REDONDO/GREENPEACE, ©FRANCISCO RIVOTTI/GREENPEACE.

Greenpeace is a global organisation that usesnon-violent direct action to tackle the mostcrucial threats to our planet’s biodiversity andenvironment. Greenpeace is a non-profitorganisation, present in 40 countries acrossEurope, the Americas, Africa, Asia and thePacific. It speaks for 2.8 million supportersworldwide, and inspires many millions more totake action every day. To maintain itsindependence, Greenpeace does not acceptdonations from governments or corporations butrelies on contributions from individual supportersand foundation grants. Greenpeace has beencampaigning against environmental degradationsince 1971 when a small boat of volunteers andjournalists sailed into Amchitka, an area west ofAlaska, where the US Government wasconducting underground nuclear tests. Thistradition of ‘bearing witness’ in a non-violentmanner continues today, and ships are animportant part of all its campaign work.

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Documents

roadmap for europe...figure 3.1 overview of fuel demand under COM and the e nrgy[ ] v oluti 26 figure 3.2 overview of additional fuel demand COM vs energy [r]evolution 27 figure 3.3