Risky Business - Crisis Management Needs in the Public Sector

Institute of Public Administration AustraliaQueensland Division

Annual State Conference24 August 2001

CORPORATE GOVERNANCEBuilding Trust and Credibility

RISKY BUSINESS -CRISIS MANAGEMENT NEEDS

IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

by

PAUL BARNES

The content of this paper should not be construed as indicating policy or strategic intention ofthe Dept of Primary Industries or the Queensland Government.

IPAA Qld State Conference 2001 Page 2 P. Barnes � Risky Business: Crisis Management Needs in the Public Sector

1. Introduction

The world has changed from what we knew and will continue to do so. With thesechanges have come prosperity and innovation aligned with cycles of industrial andtechnological development.

It is clear that along with the obvious benefits of such changes has come a range ofunexpected and often calamitous emergency events that remind us that certainty isoften a scarce commodity.

Strongly linked to certainty are the dual notions of safety and danger. It has beenpopularly argued for a number of years that as society pursues innovation andenjoys the many benefits of technological development it must also deal withincreased risk of unanticipated failure in both human and technological systems thatare by design and use becoming more detailed and complex. Many large-scaleemergencies resulting from the failure of complex systems have been documentedin recent years.

What role has government in such situations? If consideration is given to the ideathat the �modern state� as a functional and mostly effective form of publicadministration and governance that derives much of its validity from the promise thatit is an effective (and preferred) form for the provision of safety for society thengovernment has a pivotal role.

This paper argues that while government regulation and legislative forms are criticalin the provision of safety nets and for the reduction of the likelihood of emergencyevents, the need for a capacity to anticipate the signs and onset of crises and thusmitigate impacts is becoming important. Crisis Management needs within andacross government agencies are examined in relation to this capacity.

2. Crisis? What crisis?

Crises appear often when they are least expected. On the evening on the 1st ofMay, 1986 officials of the U.K. Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food (MAFF)probably had no idea that their working life was about to hit a speed bump.

The speed bump in question was the delivery of 20 mm of rain over a 24-hour periodin the sheep farming areas of the �Lake District� of western England - the CumbrianFells. It was not so much the rain itself that embodied this bump but the mainradioactive cloud from Chernobyl nuclear plant that had travelled over 4,000 kms tomeet with a warm front moving north-northeast towards Scotland.

The resultant rainfall deposited large amounts of radioactive iodine-131 (and otherisotopes of iodine) across a wide area of heavily farmed country. The radioactivityvaried significantly over small distances due to heavy water run-off.

The following is a vignette of government responses and actions as the crisisexpanded. 1

1 Derived from Park, C. (1989) Chernobyl (The Long Shadow), Routledge, London.; Wynne, B. (1989)�Sheep Farming after Chernobyl, in Environment, Vol. 31, No. 22, pp. 11-39.


Table 1: U.K. Government Responses to Chernobyl Radiation Fallout

° On the 4th of May milk samples from a range of areas returned increased radiationlevels (measurable rise in iodine-131 and trace levels of isotopes).

° Media release (May 5, 1986) MAFF confirm detection of Iodine-131 radiation in milkbut state that hey were under Derived Emergency Reference Levels (DERL�s) set theInternational Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP).

Later it was found that the U.K. differed slightly from other EC countries when itcame to defining safe. ICRP levels for radiation in was 10,000 becquerels per litrein milk for adults and 1,000 becquerels for children. The UK National RadiologicalProtection Board (NRPB) use the same levels for adults but set the level forchildren at 2,000 becquerels per litre.

No official reason was given to explain this discrepancy. It caused considerableconcern among the public.

° Media release (May 6, 1986) Secretary of State for the Environment, Kenneth Bakerstates there is no risk to health � �the effects of the cloud have already been assessedand none represents a risk to health in the UK. Levels were no where near those atwhich there is any hazard to health � current levels are falling rapidly and this trendwould continue.�

° Media release (May 11, 1986) NRPB Head John Dunster claims that the effects ofChernobyl will be over in a week or two. � �Chernobyl might lead to an increase of afew tens of excess cancers over 50 years in the UK. Assuming the cloud does notreturn it will be over in a week or two.�

° Media release (May 13, 1986) The Secretary of State for the Environment said ��the incident may be regarded as over for this country by the end of the week althoughsome traces of contamination will remain.�

But

MAFF announced that � �they had found radioactive contamination in samples fromlambs in the Cumbrian Fells at greater than 1,500 becquerels per Kg of tissue.�

This level was 50% higher than EC levels requiring official intervention. TheMAFF stopped daily radio bulletins on monitored levels reasoning that levelswere now insignificant.

° Media release (May 30, 1986) MAFF noted that � �higher readings had been found[in some sheep] but gave assurances that no action was needed.�

° Media release (June 20, 1986) The Secretary of State for the Agriculture enacted��an immediate ban on slaughtering and movement of sheep in Cumbria and NorthWales. But this would have little effect because radiation levels would decrease beforelambs were ready for market. The ban is set for 3 weeks.�

These bans affected more than 4,000,000 sheep and close to 7,000 farms. Theywere extended to Scotland 4 days later.

There was some confusion and disbelief about the credibility of Governmentadvice at this point because although no sheep could be sold there were norestrictions on the sale of sheep milk.

On July 24 1986 the 3 week ban was extended indefinitely On July 24 1986 the 3


Over twelve months later the U.K. Government announced that restrictions mightextend through a second lambing season.

To add further complexity to public concerns about information limitations duringthe acute periods of the crisis, previously unrecognised radiation hotspots werefound in Yorkshire in June, 1987. The House of Commons announced an inquiryinto the government response to the Chernobyl contamination soon after. A keyfinding of this inquiry criticised government communications.

3. Governance, Community and Safety

A key problem central to governance is the regulation of safety in the modern world.It is a phenomenon in most representative democracies that a majority of decisionswith potential to significantly affect our lives are made by others (either electedofficials or from within bureaucracies).

People can evacuate their homes as cyclonic flooding approaches, or choose totake part in certain hazardous activities, but cannot generally avoid the results of asafety regulator�s decision-making. Such differentials in power and influence oftenresult in long-term concerns among members of the public who find themselvesdistant from the decision-making processes especially if those decisions are relatedcontentious issues.2

But regulatory authority also gives advice and information to the public that it serves.As shown in the example of 'Chernobyl' contaminated sheep, government suppliedinformation was a critical factor. Contact with the public was important in two ways:(1) from a moral and legislative perspective the government was obliged to assist inreducing harm to consumers, farmers and the livestock [hazard and riskcommunication]; and (2), the changing information passed on to those affected wasa source of concern and doubt among the population because it was perceived to bemisleading.

Public concern about the safety of the wider environment and their surroundings arekey issues. At the same time, regulators may be seen to be concerned about helpingto provide safe environments. An impasse arises in this interdependence whenregulatory expertise loses credibility in the eyes of the public it is meant to protect.Reduced trust in and disbelief of authority has been well noted in such circumstances.

Public fear of large scale industrial disasters or concern about harm from less visible�slowburn� toxic exposures are often seen as misplaced by authorities that point tomore obvious threats to health and well-being existing in everyday life.3

How might such concern and disbelief be explained? Three factors have beenidentified as important. Disbelief may be based on (1), a lack of public trust and

2 Luhmann, N. (1990) �Technology, environment and social risk: a systems perspective,� in IndustrialCrisis Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1990, pp. 223-231.3 Otway, H. & Simms, D.L. (1987) �Criteria for Technological Choice,� in Public Administration, Vol.65, Summer, pp. 131-143.


confidence in the institutions involved in the control of hazards and regulation of risk 4 5

and (2), the failure to disclose key pieces of information; or (3), inaccuracies in thecommunication process.6

Other factors such as inequity in exposure to harm, fear of the catastrophic potential ofsome hazard or the safety and acceptability of a range of modern technologies, arealso important.7 8 These particular factors however, are more matters of politics,authority and power than specific issues of scientific knowledge or its interpretation.9

The key issue about living within modern 'risky' systems may not, therefore, be aboutrisk itself, but power. That is, the power to impose risk (potential harm) on the many forthe benefit of the few.10

This chasm of distrust and disbelief between the public on one side and Industry orRegulatory Authority on the other has historically been the central problematique ofattempts to regulate and thereby promote safety on behalf of communities.11 12 It has,arguably, retained that importance.

Beyond questions of public confidence a further issue for government is theregulation of science and innovation. It is common for modern government(s) toseek to support innovation of services and the betterment of the public that it serves.An ongoing issue for governments as they endeavour to support this development ishow to bring the management of scientific innovation and the promotion oftechnology into the public arena and thus, into a main stream democraticdiscourse.13

The use and impact of technology however, has historically not always been withoutproblems from this perspective. The Director-General of the World HealthOrganisation, Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland related to this historical empowerment ofregulatory authority in a speech in July this year.14

4 Wynne, B. (1987) Risk Management and Hazardous Waste (Implementation and the Dialectics ofCredibility), Berlin: Springer-Verlag.5 Slovic, P. (1993) �Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy,� in Risk Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 6, pp. 675-682.6 Wynne, B. (1989) �Building Public Concern into Risk Management,� Chpt.8 in Brown, J. (ed.),Environmental Threats: Perceptions, Analysis and Management, pp.118-1337 Kasperson, R.E. (1987) �Trust and Credibility: The Central Issue?� (A Panel Discussion) in RiskCommunication, Proceedings of the National Conference on Risk Communication, Washington, DC.,Jan 29-31, 1986, Davies, J.C., Covello, V.T. & Allen, F.W. (eds.) The Conservation Foundation,Washington, DC.8 Otway & von Winterfeldt, 1982: �Beyond Acceptable Risk: On the Social Acceptability ofTechnologies,� in Policy Sciences, Vol. 14, pp. 247-256.9 Labonte, R. (1994) �See me, hear me. touch me, feel me: Lessons on Environmental HealthInformation for Bureaucratic Activists,� Chapter 23 in Chu, C. & Simpson, R. (eds.), Ecological PublicHealth from Vision to Practice, Institute of Applied Environmental Research, Griffith University,Brisbane, pp. 269-276).10 Perrow (1984) Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, by Basic Books, NY.306.11 Otway & von Winterfeldt, Supra Note 812 Slovic, Supra Note 5.13 Giddens, A. (2001) -Edge Interview).14 Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland (Director-General) World Health Organization, Opening address to the24th Session, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Geneva, July 2, 2001.


Modern technologies must be thoroughly evaluated if they are to become atrue improvement in our way of producing food.

While public health can benefit enormously from the potential ofbiotechnology to increase the nutrient content of foods and improve theefficiency of food production the potential for negative effects on humanhealth from the consumption of food produced through genetic modificationmust be carefully examined.

A number of statements from regulators, producers and scientists involvedin the area of biotechnology seem to suggest that they feel the problemsoriginate in the consumers incapacity to understand and scientificallycompare the risk of biotechnology foods to the risk of traditional food.

To base future deliberations upon this view could be a very serious secondmistake. The first mistake has been not to involve consumers � and otherinterested parties � in the risk analysis process. The process of a scientificassessment and the following management decisions was considered bymany regulators to be too complicated for the common consumer

It is reasonable to expect that innovation (as the application of new technology toproblems or using technology in new ways) should hold few surprises for its users.Such reliability comes from testing and understanding the limits and operationalparameters of the technology or product.

An extension of the notion that the government �makes safe� is the expectation thatgovernment also licenses and regulates the use of technology and by doing soprovides a degree of certainty about safety of that technology. It is in this area thatthe benefits of risk analysis and technology assessment become critical. Thisespecially holds in relation to reducing the likelihood that incidents or practices occurthat lead to crises.

Figure 1 examines the benign impact of technology over both limited and dispersedcontexts and emergent (unexpected) impacts that may not be benign. It contrastswhat may be seen as best-case regulatory options and a two-step transition towardsa worst-case.

A goal of effective regulation should be to minimise the outcomes shown in segment3 and 4, while maximising the likelihood of achieving those in segments 1 and 2.

Such goals might be achieved by assuring the quality of the regulatory decisions andby evaluating the processes of decision-making in relation to specific set criteria.The likelihood of achieving these goals is also increased by ensuring that theinformation used in the decision making process is the best and most completeavailable.

The emergence of segment 3 or 4 impacts can however be difficult to predictbecause of unnoticed trends,15 an unanticipated synergism16 between components 15 While natural areas are often monitored well in the western world there are still discoveries ofaggressive non-native plant species that might have been in country for a number of years beforebeing discovered [Bright, C., (2000) �Environmental Surprises: Planning for the Unexpected,� in TheFuturist, July-August.].


of complex systems or by a discontinuity (an abrupt shift in a previously stablesystem or context).17 A further factor is that segment 4 impacts in addition to havingwide geographical footprints also exhibit extended time spans over which impactsmay occur and inter-generational effects.

Sheep farming �Chernobyl style� may be classified as a quadrant three issue:technological surprise. While the synergism of weather and radioactive fallout wasnot foreseeable, the subsequent crisis resulted in impacts spread over time with asignificant ongoing effect on livestock breeding cycles, the social and economicwellbeing of farming communities and the viability of a whole agricultural ecosystem.

4. Organisational Factors

16 An example of a segment 4 impact is the discovery of BSE in cattle caused by use of meat andbone meal products in feed. The subsequent discovery that zoonotic transmission can occur tohumans resulting in new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) adds to the reality of synergisticeffects in the food chain and across species.

17 Over use of a natural resource either by grazing or fishing, for example, could affect thereproductive success of some flora or fauna to the point where the sustainability of that resource isforced into a rapid and unrecoverable decline.

CONTEXTLimited Dispersed

IMPACT of aTECHNOLOGY

Planned

Emergent

2

ContextualInnovation

Innovative Application ofa technology:- Parasitic vaccines,- DNA finger-printing

Techno-ContextualSurprise

Emergent Impacts ofTechnology in a regionalor global context:- Global warming- Ozone depletion- BSE- vCJD

TechnologicalSurprise

Generally constrainedimpacts:- Pesticide residues in

food- Algal blooms- Unexpected behaviour of

genetically engineeredorganisms

PotentiallySurprise Free

1

3 4

Figure 1: Technology Assessment - Impacts and Context


While the nature of issues affecting how government agencies engage withcommunities and expectations about the regulatory safety role are important otherconstraints on the functioning of organisations are also of great importance.

Over the past few decades a number of large and not so large-scale disasters haveoccurred. Incidents such as the methyl-isocyanate release at Bhopal, the explosionof the Space Shuttle - Challenger and the dioxin contamination at Seveso havebecome icons of socio-technical disasters across society.

Analyses on these incidents and their aftermath have shown that in addition tocertain causal triggers of crises being often unexpected and even overlooked, thecapacity to respond quickly and appropriately once emergent signs appeared alsoseemed restricted. Further indication from these analyses defined a range ofcultural patterns that limit an organisations repertoire to mitigate impacts arising fromthe crisis.

Of the many that have been detailed three are examined here.18 These are:

Rigidity in thinkingo Restricted expectation about contingencies and their consequenceso Inflexibility in considering alternative options & choices for mitigation

Lack of Decision Readinesso Key decision makers not practiced in emergency decision making

Information Distortiono Attenuation and filtering of information to key decision makers

Specific cultural patterns or �operating rules� such as these have beenretrospectively linked to the genesis and amplification of well-known crises in recenttimes.

It has been strongly argued that the presence of such patterns in an organisation�soperational repertoire increase vulnerability to accidents and crises.19 Such �normal�crises (or accidents) can typically involve events that are not only unexpected butremain incomprehensible for some critical period of time. The people involvedcannot figure out quickly enough what is really going wrong. An example of thismight be the incident of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant where operators werenonplussed about the detail and cause of the reactor failure and its status for sometime.

An examination of a number of well-known disasters and resultant crises provides agreater insight into the type of organisational factor identified above.

Complacency and boredom(The Exxon Valdez oil disaster)

18 Smart C. & Vertinsky, I. (1977) �Designs for Crisis Decision Units,� in Administrative ScienceQuarterly, Vol. 22, pp640-657.19 C. Perrow Supra Note 10.


While shipping in and out of the Alyeska pipeline terminal in Valdez, Alaska hadnot been totally free of incidents, the general pattern of experiences until mid-night on March 23 1989, are unlikely to have raised concerns aboutcatastrophic failure for most observers. Over a period of more than a decadeapproximately 8,000 tankers had gone in and out of the port without a singlecatastrophic failure. Based on such an empirical track record moststakeholders, presumably, would have seen little reason for any particularconcern.

Five minutes later, however, the incredibly sophisticated tanker had anincredibly stupid encounter with a submerged obstacle that was literally milesaway from its original plotted course and clearly marked by a flashing redlight.20

It may have been the 'success' of many trips in and out of Prince William Soundover an extended period contributed to a situation where the captain decided toretire to his quarters leaving the ship under the control of a third mate whowould not have been expected by any formal risk assessment to be at thehelm. Further complications may have derived from a failure by Coast Guardpersonnel on duty to monitor the low-power radar screens that remained attheir disposal after cost-cutting efforts of a few years earlier.21

Issue: Past success (or lack of failure) inculcated restricted beliefs about whatcould happen and assumptions about reduced vulnerabilities for both individualactors and at organisational levels.

(Unrealistic expectations about contingencies and capacity to respond)(The Exxon Valdez oil disaster)

At least five contingency plans were in effect at the time of the spill.22 Theseincluded:

o The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan,o The Coast Guard�s Captain of the Port Prince William Sound Pollution Action

Plan,o The Alaska Regional Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plano The State of Alaska�s Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency

Plan,o The Alyeska Pipeline Service Company�s Oil Spill Contingency Plan for Prince

William Sound.

Among other expectations each plan assumed:23

o That rescue and response equipment would be at the ready.

20 Freudenburg, W.R. (1992) �Nothing Recedes Like Success? - Risk Analysis and the OrganizationalAmplification of Risks.� Vol. 3.1 of the Indexed Risk Articles of the Franklin Pierce Law Centre (URL:http://www.fplc.edu/risk/rapa.htm.21 Freudenburg, supra Note 20.22 Clarke, L. (1989) �Organizational Foresight and the Exxon Oil Spill,� unpublished paper,Department of Sociology, Rutgers University.23 Freudenburg, supra Note 20.


o That material would be deployed in a carefully coordinated manner, withan efficient and effective division of labour among organisations beinginstituted almost immediately.

o That communication channels among previously competitive or evenadversarial organisations would be established readily

o That interpretation of the communications would be without problemso That each responding organisation or agency would take precisely the

right step at precisely the right time to fit the need of other organisations.

The reality was that confusion seems to have been far more commonplacethan communication. Rather than coordinating their activities the variousorganizations with a stake in the spill and the clean-up often seemed to havemore interest in blaming one another than in working with one another.24

In contrast to the initial in-effectiveness of the official response, groups from thelocal fishing industry acted together to source oil barriers in Norway andarranged for their transport to Prince William Sound and their deployment.25

Issue: Lack of decision readiness and unrealistic assumptions about roles andactions to be carried out by relevant actors can lead to a state of operationalgridlock. The contingency planning in place has been described as reflectingorganizational perceptions regarding possible catastrophes and their nature,and claims that the likelihood of oil spills had been thoroughly considered.Such plans were intended to convey that the organisation was in control of apotentially uncontrollable situation.26

Bureaucratic attenuation of information flows(The Space Shuttle � Challenger Explosion)

A number of investigations after the incident called attention to the fact thatpeople within engineering areas of the launch group repeatedly expressedconcern, sometimes quite forcibly, about the potential dangers of launching theChallenger under low-temperature conditions. It is interesting to note thatpersons at the top of the organisation reported never having heard anythingabout such concerns during the same investigations.27

Issue: Information filtering can lead to a reduced organisational capacity tomake operationally difficult decisions. Further over time attenuation ofinformation especially if it relates to the core functions of sub-systems can leadto organisational blindness. Such cultural phenomena have been said tomanifest readily in pre-disaster incubation periods.28 How long the disasterneeds before hatching would be highly variable.

24 Freudenburg, supra Note 2025 Clarke, L. (1993) �The Disqualification Heuristic: When do organisations misperceive risk?� inResearch in Social Problems and Public Policy, Vol. 5, pp. 289-31226 Clarke, supra Note 2227 Freudenburg, supra Note 20.28 Turner, B. A. (1978) Man-Made Disasters, Wykeham Press, London.


What role might there be for government in oversighting the organisational blindspots of industry? Further, how important might self-assessment of similar factorsbe for government?

5. Lessons from the farm - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy(The Evolution of a Government Department)

Organisations, in their modern forms, may be seen as seeking to enhance theeffectiveness and efficiency of decision-making processes. A central tenet oforganisational governance is a standardisation (via routines) for handling decisions.These routines as cultural patterns then become the templates through which theinformation is filtered, and by which action is organised. By extension thereforeorganisations are, arguably, organised to be inflexible. This could mean thatorganisations will be more suited to do some things well and other things poorly.29

Exxon would be expected to be good at arctic exploration, oil management andlobbying of government but poor in crisis management and disaster preparation.Similarly the U.K. Ministry of Agriculture Food and Fisheries (MAFF) is likely to havebeen effective regulatory agency but enhanced capacities to reliably connect thescience - policy interface (critical for an effective regulation of science-basedinnovation and food safety) were, in hindsight, lacking.

Why is this interface critical? Its importance relates to the reality that science andespecially regulatory science in the public sector is often called on to generateadvice on issues that are affected by considerable technical uncertainty.Notwithstanding the existence of confidence limits attached to advice, it will be usedin policy and management decisions that are in turn affected by a need for certaintyand surety. This is a key issue: the meeting of unavoidably soft science with thereality of irretrievably hard policy considerations.

Recently, if you had been surfing the �net� and perchance decided to see how yourradioactive sheep were faring in the capable hands of the MAFF. You may havebeen surprised to find that the MAFF as public sector agency had been subsumedinto a new entity � the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs.

Why did this occur? While not a failure at crisis management it is likely that theMAFF might not be classified as a crisis prepared organisation. It is arguable alsothat as a ministry of government with lead agency status for animal health and byimplication security of the food chain, there were critical failures in assessing its ownneeds for defining the nature and the parameters of the expanding crisis and optionsfor managing it.

Key issues within the BSE crisis were:

o The Science - Policy interfaceo Uncertaintyo Risk Communication

29 Freudenburg, supra Note 20


The Rt. Hon Nick Brown, Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food at thepublication of the BSE inquiry report, 26 October 2000 (extracted from Hansard)referred to the following points from the executive summary the BSE Inquiry (ThePhillips Report) that investigated activities of the Government up to 1996:30

- At times officials showed a lack of rigour in considering how policy should beturned into practice, to the detriment of the efficacy of the measures taken.

- At times bureaucratic processes result in unacceptable delay in giving effectto policy.

- The Government introduced measures to guard against the risk that BSEmight be a matter of life and death not merely for cattle but also for humans,but the possibility of a risk to humans was not communicated to the public orto those whose job it was to implement and enforce the precautionarymeasures.

- The Government did not lie to the public about BSE. It believed that the risksposed by BSE to humans were remote. The Government was preoccupiedwith preventing an alarmist over-reaction to BSE because it believed that therisk was remote. It is now clear that this campaign of reassurance was amistake. When on 20 March 1996 the Government announced that BSEhad probably been transmitted to humans, the public felt that they hadbeen betrayed. Confidence in government pronouncement about riskwas a further casualty of BSE.

In the same speech the Hon the Minister detailed a number of governmentactions derived from 'lessons in public administration' that resulted from theBSE inquiry. These were improvements in:

o Implementation of policy decisions;o Processes of contingency planning;o Co-ordination across Departments and other agencies;o Assessment, management and communication of risk;o The role of scientific advisory committees;o The Government's assessment and use of scientific advice.

Key findings from the enquiry into the handling of the BSE crisis focused on failingsof hazard and risk communication. But absent also was a demonstrated capacity todeal with the organisational issues within the MAFF and relational issues betweenthe agency and external stakeholders.

While these �lessons in public administration' from the BSE inquiry listed above donot map perfectly to the pre-disposing factors of crisis-prone organisationsdiscussed earlier, there are critical similarities. The need for enhanced contingencyplanning and a focus on the type and nature of information needed for riskcommunication between scientific staff and policy advisers are core issues. In mostcircumstances this internal organisational communication is as critical ascommunication with the public.

30 Statement by the Rt. Hon Nick Brown, Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food at the publicationof the BSE inquiry report, 26 October 2000 (Extract from Hansard)


6. Why a flexible Crisis Management capacity is important for the PublicSector

While many varieties of crisis can occur in either of the private or public sectorsthere remains central to them all a loss of credibility and support in either a brandedcommodity or the responsible public sector agencies.

The value of an effective crisis management response capacity covers a number ofareas. A functional system can:

o Support the establishment of effective and timely responses to crisissituations.

o Enhance business (service) continuity.o Assist government to meet the needs of the public when confronted by

technical uncertainty and concern.o Define short to medium term responses to incidents that entail multiple events

(simultaneous concurrency) and emergent phenomena that vary over locationand time.

o Promote a capability to anticipate areas of strategic concern, and theirimplications, before impacts occur or become significant.

o Provide the means for reducing organisational and societal vulnerability tounplanned or unexpected change.

A crisis management capacity of this nature in the public sector might entail:

o A robust threat assessment capability and capacity that includes sub-functions for - Environmental Scanning (Weak signals) - EmergencyManagement Escalation Triggers (Incident/Issue recognition) - ConsequenceAnalysis (supporting the development of impact frames in the context of highuncertainty) - Crisis Management Decision-making Capacity (separate toroutine business decision making structures).31

o Clearly stated, understood and tested communication mechanisms forreporting emergent incident/issues to the CEO and senior management.

How might such a Crisis Management capacity be developed? An obvious first stepis to ensure the support of senior management and especially the CEO for theprocesses involved and the benefits that can accrue. From this critical first step thefollowing needs should be considered:

o Build capacity and capability in applying foresight, via interdisciplinary teams,to issues that have can limit achievement of organisational goals (such issuesmay not yet be obvious).

o Ensure that robust analytical & conceptual frameworks of risk assessment aredeveloped appropriate to the functions of the organisation.

o An integrated Corporate Governance and Risk Management System.o Clarity of organisational purpose and related goals.

Within organizations disaster provoking events tend to accumulate over timebecause they are invariably over looked, misunderstood or misinterpreted. Crises 31 Smart & Vertinsky Supra Note 18.


are not normally caused by a single factor but emerge from an aggregation ofcomplex chains of events and other triggers.32

While all of these points on developing a suitable crisis management capacity areimportant a critical need for public sector organisations is the implementation ofeffective systems of corporate governance. If designed to ensure an appropriatemix if rigidity and flexibility such systems can increase the likelihood of identifyingdysfunction within an organization.

Public Sector organizations stand to gain much from effective crisis managementsystems in place. These benefits may be defined as:

o Increased capacity to limit the likelihood of the occurrence of major systemsfailures with propagating impacts (prevention).

o Enhanced capacity to limit the severity of incidents and consequent impacts.o Increased capacity to adapt to changing circumstances (internal and

external).o Increased capacity to achieve the strategic goals of the agency.o An effective means to demonstrate the worth of the agency to communities.o An enhanced reputation as a credible and effective public sector partner (over

time).

7. Conclusion

The modern world is, as mentioned earlier, in a constant state of change. A strongexpectation remains among the many public(s) that government agencies willcontinue to provide appropriate and relevant services to them.

A lexical appreciation of governance would suggest emphasis on smooth guidanceand steady control. Crisis management as both an outcome and as part of anorganisational repertoire should be integral to providing such service and formaintaining relevance in the face of changing social needs.

A suitable aphorism for crisis management may be � �do not expect the un-expected, anticipate what is plausible and act.�

32 Turner, B. (1976) The Organisational and Inter-Organisational Development of Disasters, in theAdministrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 21, Sept. pp.378-397.

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Risky Business - Crisis Management Needs in the Public Sector