RISK-BASED NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PRIORITIES

FOR EMP AND SOLAR STORMS

by

George H. Baker

July 2017

REPORT TO THE COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES FROM ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) ATTACK

RISK-BASED NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PRIORITIES

FOR EMP AND SOLAR STORMS

by George H. Baker

July 2017

The cover photo depicts Fishbowl Starfish Prime at 0 to 15 seconds from Maui Station in July 1962, courtesy of Los Alamos National Laboratory.

This report is a product of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack. The Commission was established by Congress in the FY2001 National Defense Authorization Act, Title XIV, and was continued per the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 1089.

The Commission completed its information-gathering in June 2017. The report was cleared for open publication by the DoD Office of Prepublication and Security Review on June 5, 2018.

This report is unclassified and cleared for public release.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

EMP electromagnetic pulse

GMD geomagnetic disturbances

GPS global positioning system

HF high frequency

MHD magnetohydrodynamic

MOV metal-oxide varistor

UHF ultra high frequency

VHF very high frequency

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Table of Contents

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 3

Wide-Area Electromagnetic Environments ......................................................................................... 3

Wide-Area Electromagnetic Infrastructure Effects .............................................................................. 4

EMP and Solar Storm Risks............................................................................................................... 5

Countermeasures .............................................................................................................................. 7

Summary and Future Directions......................................................................................................... 8

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Introduction

TheCommissiontoAssesstheThreattotheUnitedStatesfromElectromagneticPulse(EMP)AttackhasprovidedacompellingcaseforprotectingcivilianinfrastructureagainsttheeffectsofEMPandgeomagneticdisturbances(GMDs)causedbyseveresolarstorms.Similartoprotectingcriticalinfrastructureagainstanyhazard,itwillbeimportanttotakearisk-basedpriorityapproachforthesetwoelectromagneticthreats,recognizingthatitwillbefiscallyimpracticabletoprotecteverything.Inthisregard,EMPandsolarstormsareparticularlychallenginginthattheyinterferewithelectricalandelectronicdata,control,transmission,andcommunicationsystemsorganictonearlyallinfrastructures,simultaneously,overwideareas.Theaffectedgeographiesmaybecontinentalinscale.Theseeventsthusrepresentaclassofhigh-consequencedisastersthatisuniqueincoverageandubiquitoussystemdebilitation.Suchdisastersdeserveparticularattentionwithregardtopreparednessandrecoverysinceassistancefromnon-affectedregionsofthenationcouldbescarceornonexistent.Atfirstblush,theproblemofwheretobeginindevelopinganationalprotectionprogramseemsoverwhelming.Despitethechallengesposedbysuchanendeavor,itisthepurposeofthepresentworktosuggestthatsuchaprogramispossibleandaffordablebasedonasystempriorityapproach.

Wide-Area Electromagnetic Environments

Thenuclearelectromagneticpulse(EMP),resultsfromadetonationhighabovethetropopause.SolarstormGMDsoccurnaturallywhenanintensewaveofchargedparticlesfromthesunperturbstheearth’smagneticfield.

Inthecaseofhighaltitudenuclearbursts,threemainphenomenacomeintoplay,eachwithdistinctassociatedsystemeffects:

§ Thefirst,a“prompt”EMPfield,alsoreferredtoasE1,iscreatedbygammarayinteractionwithstratosphericairmolecules.Itpeaksattensofkilovoltspermeterinafewnanoseconds,andlastsforafewhundrednanoseconds.E1’sbroad-bandpowerspectrum(frequencycontentinthe10s–100sofmegahertz)enablesittocoupletoelectricalandelectronicsystemsingeneral,regardlessofthelengthoftheirpenetratingcablesandantennalines.Inducedcurrentsrangeintothe1000sofamperes.Exposedsystemsmaybeupsetorpermanentlydamaged.

§ Thesecondphenomenon,late-timeEMP,alsoreferredtoasmagnetohydrodynamic(MHD)EMPorE3,iscausedbythedistortionoftheearth’smagneticfieldlinesduetotheexpandingnuclearfireballandrisingofheatedandionizedlayersoftheionosphere.Thechangeofthemagneticfieldattheearth’ssurfaceinducescurrentsof100s-1000sofamperesinlongconductinglines(afewkilometersorgreater)thatdamagecomponentsoftheelectricpowergriditselfaswellasconnectedsystems.Long-linecommunicationsystemsarealsoaffectedincludingcopperaswellasfiber-opticlineswithrepeaters.Transoceaniccablesareaprimeexampleofthelatter.

§ Thethirdphenomenon,referredtoasthe“atmosphericeffect”iscausedbyionizationoftheupperatmosphereleadingtointerferencewithnormalradiowavepropagationand

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reflectionbehavior.TheinterferencelastfortensofhoursandismostpronouncedintheHF,VHF,UHFandGPStransmissionbands.

SolarstormGMDeffectsaretheresultoflargeexcursionsinthefluxlevelsofchargedparticlesfromtheSunandtheirinteractionswiththeEarth’smagneticfieldandupperatmosphere.Twoeffectsarepresent:

§ PerturbationoftheEarth’smagneticfield,similartoMHDEMP,thatgeneratesovervoltagesinlong-linesystemsoverlargeregionsoftheearth’ssurfaceaffectingelectricpowerandcommunicationtransmissionnetworks.

§ Ionizationoftheupperatmosphere,similartoMHDEMP,leadingtointerferencewithhighfrequency(HF),veryhighfrequency(VHF),ultrahighfrequency(UHF),andglobalpositioningsystem(GPS)signals.Fortypicalsolarstorms,theseeffectslastforaround30hours.

Wide-Area Electromagnetic Infrastructure Effects

Wide-areaelectromagneticsystemeffectsarechallengingduetotheirnear-simultaneousinitialeffectsandcascadingeffectsonawidearrayofinfrastructures.Infrastructuresystemscomprisedoflong-lineconductornetworksarethemostvulnerabletobotheffects.Susceptiblenetworksincludetheelectricpowergrid,land-linecommunications,andinterstatepipelines.Effectsonthesenetworkswillcascadetomostotherinfrastructures.Smaller,self-contained,self-poweredinfrastructuresystems(e.g.hand-heldradiosandvehicles)arealsovulnerable,butonlytoEMPandtoalesserdegreethanlong-linenetworks.

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Figure1providesasummaryoftheenvironments,initially-affectedsystemsandeffectlongevity.Notethatsignificantsynergiesexistbetweenthehighaltitudenuclearburstandsolartsunamigeomagneticandionosphericenvironmentsandsystemeffects.Properlydesignedhigh-altitudeburstprotectionmeasureswillsufficeagainstsolarstorms.Theconverseisnottrue,duetotheE1effect.

TheCongressionalEMPCommissionhasmadeacompellingcaseforprotectionofcriticalinfrastructure.1Itsconclusionsandrecommendationsapplytobothnuclearandsolareffects.However,becausetheircharterforcedabroadapproach,theCommissionwrestledwithfocus.Whilerecognizingtheimpossibilityofprotectingallexposedcriticalinfrastructures,theCommissionreportwasnotprescriptiveintermsofprotectionpriorities.OnereasonwhyaU.S.protectionprogramhasyettobeinitiatedisthatpolicymakerscontinuetowrestlewiththequestionofwheretobegin,giventhelonglistofcriticalinfrastructuresectors,viz.AgricultureandFood,Water,PublicHealth,Energy,Transportation,BankingandFinance,ChemicalIndustry,EmergencyServices,InformationandCommunication,PostalandShipping,GovernmentServices,theDefenseIndustrialBase,andCriticalManufacturing.

EMP and Solar Storm Risks

TheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)ispursuinga“risk-based”prioritizationapproachindevelopinggeneralprotectionprograms.SuchanapproachishelpfulindevelopinganEMP/SolarStormthreatprotectionprogramaswell.Acommonlyusedequationforcalculatingriskis:

1 W. Graham et al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse

(EMP) Attack, Volume 1: Executive Report, 2004.

Figure 1 Wide-Area Electromagnetic Effects

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Risk=E·V·C

whereErepresentsprobabilityofsystemexposuretothethreat,Vrepresentssystemvulnerability,andCrepresentssystemcriticality.TheEMP/solarstorm‘exposurefactor’issimilarforallcivilianinfrastructuresduetotheeffects’seamlesscontinental-scalecoverage.Thus,forthewide-areaelectromagneticthreats,theequationissimplifiedbecause‘vulnerability’and‘criticality’arethesoledeterminantfactorsforrisk.

Asimplerisk-basedprioritizationexerciseconductedbytheauthorisinstructiveusingthefollowingvulnerabilityandcriticalitycriteria:

§ EMP/SolarStormVulnerabilityCriteria(V)- Doestheinfrastructurefunctionrequireconnectiontolongconductinglinesand/or

networks?- Doestheinfrastructuredependondigitalelectroniccontrolsystems?- Aremanualwork-aroundproceduresavailabletoperformtheinfrastructure’sfunction?- Whatisthetimeneededtoreconstitutethesystem?- Howdifficultisittoprotectthesystem?

§ EMP/SolarStormCriticalityCriteria(C)- Howmanyotherinfrastructureswouldfailshouldthisinfrastructurebedebilitated?- Whatistheimmediacyofeffectsonservicesprovided?- Howmanyhumancasualtieswouldoccur?- Howbigistheeconomicimpact?- Isthisinfrastructurenecessarytoenabletherepairandrecoveryofother

infrastructurespost-attack?

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Theexerciseusedascaleof1to3toscoretheoverallvulnerabilityandcriticalityofeachinfrastructuresector,with3beingthemostvulnerableorcriticaland1beingtheleast.Theriskproductvaluesthusrangedfrom1to9.Figure2plotstheresults.

Theelectricpowerportionoftheenergyinfrastructureandtheinformation/communicationinfrastructureposethehighestriskstosocietyinEMP/SolarStormscenarios.Theseinfrastructuresarethemostvulnerabletothewide-areaelectromagneticthreatsduetotheirorganiclong-linenetworksandlargeassociatedcouplingcrosssections.Theyarethemostcriticalbecausetheyenabletheoperationofallotherinfrastructuresandtheyareessentialwithrespecttothereconstitutiontimeline.AprofoundresultofthissimpleexerciseisthatourmostcriticalinfrastructuresarealsothemostvulnerabletoEMP/SolarStormthreats.Thisconclusionaddsimpetusforactiontoprotectourelectricpowerandinformation/communicationnetworks.

Countermeasures

Bywayofencouragement,weknowhowtoprotectsystemsagainstwide-areaelectromagneticeffects.EMPprotectionhasbeenimplementedandstandardizedbytheU.S.DepartmentofDefense

Figure 2 EMP/Solar Storm Risk-Priority Values for Critical Infrastructures

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onahostofsystems.Becauseoftheirnortherlylatitudes,theelectricindustryinGreatBritain,Canada,andtheScandinaviancountrieshaveexperiencedseveresolarstormeffectsandhavedevelopedcountermeasuresthatappeartobeeffective.

RecognizingthatsignificantportionsoftheU.S.gridarelikelytofailinanEMPormajorsolarstormevent,itwillbeimportanttoexpandprovisionofback-uppowersystemsforbasiclifefunctions.ThisisalessonlearnedfromourHurricaneKatrinaexperiencenowemphasizedbyLTGRusselHonoré.2Manymedical,communication,andfinancialfacilitiesnowhaveemergencygenerators.Additionalprovisionofemergencygeneratorsisneededforwatersupplysystems,gasstations,foodstores,andpharmacies.Emergencygenerators’protectionisrelativelyeasytoimplementandcertifyviatest.

WehaveempiricalevidencethatEMPandsolarstormcurrentsdamagetransformerswithintheelectricgrid.Thesecomponentsareexpensive,difficulttomove,andthelargestoftransformersarenolongermanufacturedintheU.S.,requiringmonthstoyearstoreplace.InstallationofblockingdevicesintheneutraltogroundconnectionsoftransformerswillsignificantlyreducetheprobabilityofdamagefromsolarstormsandMHDEMP.E1overvoltageprotectionisachievablebyinstallingcommonmetal-oxidevaristors(MOVs)ontransformerterminals.Estimatesforprotectingthemostdifficulttoreplacetransformers(transmissiongridtransformers)intheU.S.range$1to$10billion.

EMPprotectionmethodsforcommunicationfacilitieshavebeendevelopedandimplementedbyDoDsincethe1960sandarewelldocumented.3Techniquesareapplicableforbothtelecommunicationsfacilitiesandpowergridsupervisorycontrolanddataacquisition(SCADA)systems.Engineeringapproachesincludeuseofshieldedenclosures,provisionofbackuppower,standardgroundingtechniques,installationofovervoltageprotectiondevicesandfiltersonpenetratingconductors,andintentionalcablemanagement.ThecostofEMPprotectionforcommunicationfacilitiesranges2to5percentofthebuildingcostsifincorporatedintheinitialfacilitydesign.Emergencycommunicationfacilitiesareagoodplacetostarttodemonstratethefeasibilityandcost-effectivenessofelectromagneticprotection.IncludingEMP/solarstormprotectioninfirecodesandinteroperablecommunicationsystemprocurementsandrelatedDHSgrantswouldbehelpful.4

Summary and Future Directions

ThehugegeographiccoverageandubiquitoussystemeffectsofEMPandmajorsolarstormsbegthequestionof“wheretobegin?”anationalprotectionprogram.Wemustbecleverindecidingwheretoinvestlimitedresources.Basedonsimpleriskanalysis,theelectricpowerand

2 G. Baker and C. Elliott, editors. Cascading Infrastructure Failures: Avoidance and response, Homeland Security

Symposium Proceedings, James Madison University and Federal Facilities Council, May 16, 2007, pp. 19-31. 3 High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Protection for Ground-Based C4I Facilities Performing Critical, Time-Urgent

Missions, MIL-STD-188-125-1, Fixed Facilities, April 7, 2005 and MIL-STD-188-125-2, Transportable Facilities, March 3, 1999; also MIL-HDBK-423.

4 See National Fire Protection Association. NFPA 1221, “Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Emergency Services Communications Systems,” and NFPA 1600, “Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity/Continuity of Operations Programs.”

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communicationinfrastructuresemergeasboththemostvulnerabletoEMPandthemostcriticalinfrastructures,andthusthehighestpriorityforEMP/solarstormprotection.Protectionofalimitedsetofhighriskinfrastructureswillgoalongwayinlesseningthesocietalimpact.Inthecaseofelectricpower,protectingthelargedistributiontransformersandexpandingtheprovisionofemergencygeneratorsforcriticalsystemswillimprovethesurvivabilityofmultipleotherinterdependentinfrastructures.Forcommunicationsystems,protectionofemergencycommunicationcentersandinteroperablemobileandhandheldcommunicationsystemsareusefulfirststeps.Pilotprogramstodemonstratewide-areaEMprotectionengineeringforthehighestriskinfrastructureswouldpavethewayforacomprehensiveefforttoaddresscriticalnationalinfrastructures.RecentCongressional,FERC,andNERCinitiativeswillhopefullyspurprogressinthisdirection.5,6,7

5 H.R. 668, the Secure High Secure High-voltage Infrastructure for Electricity from Lethal Damage (SHIELD) Act,

introduced February 16, 2011. 6 U.S. Department of Energy and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation. High-Impact, Low-Frequency Event

Risk to the North American Bulk Power System: A jointly-commissioned summary report of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation and the U.S. Department of Energy’s November 2009 Workshop, June 2010.

7 National Academies Press. Severe Space Weather Events: Understanding societal and economic impacts: A workshop report, 2008.