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Risk Assessment Methods - Collective Anticipation and The Dual Nature of Resilience. Kurt Petersen Henrik Tehler LUCRAM. Swedish Legislation. 2002 – and updated 2010 Requiring Risk and Vulnerability Analysis New Authority, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency - MSB. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Risk Assessment Methods -Collective Anticipation and The Dual Nature of Resilience
Kurt Petersen
Henrik Tehler
LUCRAM
Swedish Legislation
2002 – and updated 2010
Requiring Risk and Vulnerability Analysis
New Authority, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency - MSB
Risk and vulnerability analysis in the Swedish crisis management system
Requirement for (almost) all public agencies, Act 2002
Purpose• Provide basis for decisions concerning risk and
vulnerability reduction
Scope• Identification of hazards, estimation of likelihood and
consequences• Capability to respond to
hazardous events/crises
Should constitute a ”system”• Vertical and horizontal integration
(1) Do not consider uncertainty explicitly (2) Verbal description of uncertainty
Ex. ”It is unlikely that event A will occur”
(3) Qualitative ranking (5 classes) Ex.
”Extremely unlikely” ”Very unlikely”
”Unlikely” ”Probable” ”Very likely”
21 Counties (2006 - 2010)Uncertainty (How frequent?)
(1) Do not consider uncertainty explicitly (2) Verbal description
(3) Qualitative ranking (5 classes) (4) Semi-quantitative ranking (5 classes)
Ex ”Extremely unlikely – less then 1 time per 1000 years”
”Very unlikely – 1 time per 100 to 1000 years” ”Unlikely – 1 time per 10 to 100 years” ”Probably – 1 time per 1 to 10 years”
”Very likely – more then 1 time per year”
(5) Quantification Ex: ”The event will occor 1 time in 50 years”
2006 2008 2010
Jämtland Ingen (1) Ingen (1) Beskrivning (2)Kronoberg Beskrivning (2) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3)
Västmanland Ingen (1) Ingen (1) Ingen (1)Västerbotten Ingen (1) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Västra Götaland Ingen (1) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Värmland Ingen (1) Beskrivning (2) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Dalarna Ingen (1) Semi-kvantitativ ranking (4) Semi-kvantitativ ranking (4)Jönköping Ingen (1) Ingen (1) Ingen (1)Östergötland Beskrivning (2) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Örebro Ingen (1) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Gotland Ingen (1) Ingen (1) Ingen (1)Uppsala Beskrivning (2) Ingen (1) Ingen (1)Blekinge Kvalitativ ranking (3) Semi-kvantitativ ranking (4) Semi-kvantitativ ranking (4)Gävleborg Beskrivning (2) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Stockholm Ingen (1) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Norrbotten Ingen (1) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Halland Ingen (1) Semi-kvantitativ ranking (4) Semi-kvantitativ ranking (4)Västernorrland Kvalitativ ranking (3) Semi-kvantitativ ranking (4) Semi-kvantitativ ranking (4)Skåne Ingen (1) Beskrivning (2) Beskrivning (2)Kalmar Ingen (1) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Södermanland Ingen (1) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3)
Number of analyses
Uncertainty treatment 2006 2008 2010None (1) 14 6 4Description (2) 0 2 2Qualitative ranking (3) 4 9 11Semi-quantitative ranking(4) 2 4 4Quantification (5) 0 0 0
Counties (2006 - 2010)Uncertainty (How frequent?)
(1) No explicit description of consequences (2) Verbal description of consequences
Ex. ”The consequences will be very serious if event A occurs”
(3) Qualitative ranking (5 classes) Ex. ”Catastrophy” ”Very serious”
”Large” ”Not serious”
”Small”
21 Counties (2006 - 2010)Consequences for society?
(1) No explicit consequences (2) Description
(3) Qualitative ranking (5 classes) (4) Semi-quantitative ranking (5 classes)
Ex: ”Catastrophy –Loss: >20 MSEK, Health: Some deaths”
”Very large –Loss: 5-20 MSEK, Health: Few deaths”
”Large – Loss: 1-5 MSEK, Health: Few seriously injured”
”Not serious – Loss: 0,1-1 MSEK, Health: Few seriously injured”
”Small – Loss: <0,1 MSEK, Health: inconvenience”
(5) Quantification Ex: ”The consequences are 10 killed”
2006 2008 2010
Jämtland Beskrivning (2) Beskrivning (2) Beskrivning (2)Kronoberg Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Västmanland Ingen (1) Ingen (1) Ingen (1)Västerbotten Beskrivning (2) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Västra Götaland Ingen (1) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Värmland Ingen (1) Beskrivning (2) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Dalarna Beskrivning (2) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Jönköping Beskrivning (2) Beskrivning (2) Beskrivning (2)Östergötland Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Ingen (1)Örebro Beskrivning (2) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Gotland Beskrivning (2) Beskrivning (2) Beskrivning (2)Uppsala Kvalitativ ranking (3) Ingen (1) Beskrivning (2)Blekinge Semi-kvantitativ ranking (4) Semi-kvantitativ ranking (4) Semi-kvantitativ ranking (4)Gävleborg Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Stockholm Beskrivning (2) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Norrbotten Beskrivning (2) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Halland Beskrivning (2) Semi-kvantitativ ranking (4) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Västernorrland Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Skåne Ingen (1) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Beskrivning (2)Kalmar Beskrivning (2) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3)Södermanland Beskrivning (2) Kvalitativ ranking (3) Kvalitativ ranking (3)
Number of analysesConsequence assessment 2006 2008 2010None (1) 4 2 2Description (2) 10 5 5Qualitative ranking (3) 5 12 13Semi-quantitative ranking(4) 1 2 1Quantification (5) 0 0 0
Counties (2006 - 2010)Consequences for society?
Risk - Resilience
Risk Assessment as a basis for improving Community Resilience
The concept of resilience
There are many definition of resilience. In the context of crisis management/disasters two common perspectives are:
The “bouncing back”-perspective (Reactive)
“the ability of the system to withstand a disruption within acceptable degradation parameters and to recover within
acceptable losses and time.” (Haimes, 2011)
The “foresight”-perspective (Proactive)
“Resilience is a system capability to create foresight, to recognize, to anticipate, and to defend against the
changing shape of risk before adverse consequences occur.” (Woods, 2006)
The concept of resilience
Focus in the present study:
How an aspect of proactive resilience can be measured.
How proactive and reactive resilience are connected.
To track the development of an aspect of proactive resilience in the Swedish crisis management system
between 2006 and 2010.
Collective anticipation
Resilience (including proactive resilience) is a general concept that needs to be made more specific in order to allow for measurement.
Anticipation = “visualization of a future event or state” Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary (11th ed.).
In the present context this is often associated with the production of scenarios.
To stress that these scenarios are not produced by a single person, or a single organization, we use the term collective anticipation.
Example:
The Swedish system for risk and vulnerability assessment (RVA).
“All” actors on national, regional and local level have to perform RVA.
We focus on the regional level (21 County Adm. Boards)
The connection between proactive and reactive resilience, and anticipation
Proactive resilience Reactive resilience
Risk and vulnerability assessment
Is an outcome of
Contains assessments of
We focus on how potential scenarios are communicated in the documents produced by all county administrative boards
in 2006, 2008 and 2010
(Collective) AnticipationIs an aspect of
So what does that mean?
It means that the county administrative boards use different ways of communicating likelihood (Uncommon Categorization), which obstructs
collective anticipation in the present context. For example, when constructing the national overview of risks and vulnerabilities.
The potential for communicating order and magnitude concerning the likelihood of various scenarios has increased between 2006 and 2010.
However, since:
proactive resilience is only one aspect of resilience
and anticipation is only one aspect of proactive resilience
and the communication of likelihood is only one aspect of anticipation
and there are more aspects of likelihood has that could be relevant…
…it is difficult to say how the resilience of the Swedish system has developed.
So what does that mean?
Nevertheless:
The ability to anticipate is an important aspect of a resilient system, and we have shown a way of describing the output
of anticipation that could be useful in an attempt to make the general term “resilience” measurable.
Conclusion
RSA has improved over the 10 year period
RSA is developing from verbal to quasi-quantitative approaches
RSA is developing on all administrative levels in Sweden