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Rhodesia’s Unil ateral
Decl aration of Independence
An International History
Carl Peter Watts
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Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070
RHODESIA’S UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
Copyright © Carl Peter Watts, 2012.
All rights reserved.
First published in December 2012 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the
United States— a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue,
New York, NY 10010.
Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world,
this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire RG21 6XS.
Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and
has companies and representatives throughout the world.
Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.
ISBN: 978- 1- 4039- 7907- 0
Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data
Watts, Carl Peter, 1971–
Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence : an international history /
Carl Peter Watts.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-1-4039-7907-0 (alk. paper)
1. Zimbabwe—History—1965-1980. 2. Zimbabwe—Politics and
government—1965–1979. 3. Zimbabwe—Foreign relations—Great Britain.
4. Great Britain—Foreign relations—Zimbabwe. 5. Great Britain—Politics
and government—1964–1979. 6. Great Britain—Foreign relations—
Commonwealth countries. 7. Commonwealth countries—Foreign relations—
Great Britain. 8. Great Britain—Foreign economic relations—United
States. 9. United States—Foreign relations—Great Britain. I. Title.
DT2981.W38 2012
968.9104—dc23 2012040839
A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.
Design by Scribe Inc.
First edition: December 2012
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
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Contents
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction: The Rhodesian Crisis in International History and
International Relations 1
1 “Cudgelling Themselves Numb”: Anglo- Rhodesian
Negotiations and the Search for a Settlement 13
2 “A Classic Strategic Blunder”:
The Failure of British Deterrent and Coercive Strategies 53
3 “Moments of Tension and Drama”: Britain, Rhodesia,
and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings 83
4 “A Concert of Convenience”: Britain, Rhodesia, and
the Old Commonwealth 115
5 “An Essential Part of Our Cooperation in World Affairs”:
Anglo- American Relations and Rhodesia 155
6 Preventing a “Red Army in Blue Berets”?
The Rhodesian Problem at the United Nations 183
Conclusion: Reflections on the Rhodesian Crisis 203
Appendix: The Rhodesian Franchise 209
Notes 211
Bibliography 285
Index 303
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Introduction
The Rhodesian Crisis in
International History and
International Rel ations
On November 11, 1965, the Rhodesian prime minister, Ian Douglas Smith,
broadcast a proclamation to the people of Rhodesia that was modeled on
the American Declaration of Independence. The proclamation observed that
it was an “indisputable and historic fact” that Rhodesia had enjoyed self-
government since 1923, claimed that the people of Rhodesia supported their
government’s request for independence, and lamented that the British gov-
ernment persisted in “maintaining an unwarrantable jurisdiction . . . to the
detriment of the future peace, prosperity, and good government of Rho-
desia.” The proclamation declared the Rhodesian government’s belief that
“procrastination and delay strike at and injure the very life of the nation,”
and that it was “essential that Rhodesia should obtain without delay sov-
ereign independence, the justice of which is beyond question.” Finally, the
proclamation affirmed the “unswerving loyalty” of the Rhodesian people to
Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, and asserted their “undoubted right . . . to
promote the common good so that the dignity and freedom of all men may
be assured.” Annexed to the proclamation was a new constitution that uni-
laterally severed British responsibility for Rhodesia’s affairs. Smith went on
to reiterate the justice of the Rhodesian cause and told the Rhodesian people
that they had been cast in a heroic role of “worldwide significance.” He con-
cluded, “We have struck a blow for the preservation of justice, civilization,
and Christianity— and in the spirit of this belief we have thus assumed our
sovereign independence.”1 As Smith delivered his broadcast, the governor of
Rhodesia, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, issued a statement to the press in which he
announced that in accordance with his instructions from London he had dis-
missed Smith and his Cabinet from office: “I call on citizens of Rhodesia to
refrain from all acts which would further the objectives of the illegal authori-
ties. Subject to that it is the duty of all citizens to maintain law and order in
this country and to carry on with their normal tasks. This applies equally to
the judiciary, the armed services, the police and public services.”2 However,
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Rhodesia’s Unil ateral Decl aration of Independence2
the dismissal of the Rhodesian government was not reported to the Rhode-
sian public because of strict press censorship.
The situation in Rhodesia remained calm, but the Rhodesian government
had taken steps to ensure that this would be the case. On November 3, Smith
asked Gibbs to sign a proclamation introducing a state of emergency, which
was supported by an affidavit from the commissioner of police. Smith assured
Gibbs that this was not a prelude to a (Unilateral Declaration of Indepen-
dence) UDI and the governor was therefore persuaded to sign the procla-
mation, which was issued two days later.3 With the domestic situation under
control, the Rhodesian government hoped that the international controversy
over the UDI would last only a matter of days. Smith recognized that UDI
would infuriate “starry- eyed liberals and the frustrated communists,” but he
placed his faith “in the theory that sudden storms are short.”4 This was a sad
delusion; the storm would be anything but short. The situation in Rhodesia
was inescapably part of what W. E. B. Du Bois had famously predicted would
become “[t]he problem of the twentieth century . . . the problem of the color
line.”5 The international indignation aroused by UDI— among the African
nationalists in Rhodesia, within the Organization of African Unity, among
the members of the Commonwealth, and at the United Nations— combined
with the intrusion of the Cold War into African politics meant that the Rho-
desian situation remained a festering sore on the international body politic
for the next 15 years. A combination of economic sanctions, guerilla war-
fare, and changing political attitudes toward Rhodesia in the United States
and South Africa eventually undermined the capacity of the white minority
regime to further resist the transition to black majority rule. As the respon-
sible colonial power, Britain was embarrassingly impotent throughout the
UDI period, and was not able to grant legal independence to the state of
Zimbabwe until April 1980. This book seeks to examine why Britain, in con-
junction with its international partners, was unable to manage the issue of
Rhodesian independence more effectively and prevent a UDI from occur-
ring, or to bring a swift end to the crisis as it unfolded.
The Rhodesian Crisis:
Historiography and Sources
During the 1960s, the disintegration of the Central African Federation
and the concomitant problems of granting independence to Southern
Rhodesia attracted a significant amount of coverage in the British media
and a high degree of interest among academics. The level of scrutiny inten-
sified in the wake of Rhodesia’s UDI. Many books were published that
examined the events leading up to UDI and subsequent efforts to bring
Rhodesia back to legality through diplomatic negotiations and economic
sanctions. With the escalation of the armed confrontation between Afri-
can nationalists and the UDI regime, a number of books also appeared
about the guerilla war. After Rhodesia eventually became legally indepen-
dent as Zimbabwe in 1980, a couple of studies of the Lancaster House
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Introduction 3
negotiations emerged and a few other books on Rhodesia’s independence
were published, then interest generally subsided for almost twenty years.6
However, during the last decade or so, a combination of media attention,
fresh archival material, new oral histories, ongoing archival cataloguing
and digitization projects, periodic academic conferences, and a flurry of
publications, has revealed a resurgent interest in the Rhodesian crisis and
the recent history of southern Africa.
Media reports about Ian Smith’s activities a few years before his death, and
accounts of the troubled rule of Robert Mugabe in present day Zimbabwe,
have contributed to a renewed focus on the country’s history and contem-
porary politics.7 In a debate at the Oxford Union in October 2000, Smith
refused to apologize for atrocities committed while he held office. He said
he had no regrets about the estimated 30,000 Zimbabweans killed during
the period of Rhodesian Front rule. On the contrary, Smith suggested, “The
more we killed, the happier we were. We were fighting terrorists.”8 Professor
Welshman Ncube, then shadow Home Affairs Minister for the Movement for
Democratic Change in Zimbabwe, was astounded that Smith “could actu-
ally today stand up and feel no remorse, no contrition, find nothing wrong
in the system he defended.”9 When Smith died in November 2007, some
commentators noted that many people who remembered the Rhodesian cri-
sis would remain sympathetic to Smith because he had been correct in his
prediction that the Mugabe regime would become just as dystopian as so
many other African states. However, such assessments neglected the fact that
Smith’s ruthless defense of UDI left a legacy of bitterness that ultimately
made Mugabe’s rule possible.10 One writer even asserted that “those black
Zimbabweans who lived through the Smith years would still prefer Mugabe,
despite the current brutalities inflicted upon them.”11 This is a bold and con-
troversial claim, but it does serve to underscore the continuing significance
of the UDI period for Zimbabweans.12
Research on the Rhodesian crisis has been assisted by the vast numbers of
public and private records that have been released during the last 15 years
in Britain, Zimbabwe, South Africa, the United States, Australia, Canada,
and New Zealand.13 These records have been supplemented by several oral
history projects that have captured the story of Rhodesia’s painful journey
toward independence in the words of the people who lived through it. In
1999, David Dimbleby presented a BBC documentary series titled Rebel-lion!, which featured interviews with many of the surviving protagonists.14
In September 2000, the Institute for Contemporary British History (ICBH)
organized a Witness Seminar on UDI, held at The National Archives, Kew,
United Kingdom.15 This was followed by a further Witness Seminar on the
Lancaster House settlement organized by the ICBH and the Cold War Stud-
ies Centre at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE),
which was again held at The National Archives, in July 2005.16
Archival cataloguing and digitization projects have also facilitated the
study of UDI. For example, the Rhodesian Army Archive is a major research
collection deposited at the British Empire and Commonwealth Museum in
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Rhodesia’s Unil ateral Decl aration of Independence4
London.17 Cataloging of that collection has facilitated an oral history project
about the Rhodesian security forces who served during the guerilla war of
the 1960s and 1970s.18 Other highly significant developments include the
Aluka Project’s Struggles for Freedom in Southern Africa Collection, and the
Nordic Africa Institute’s Documentation Project on the Liberation Struggles
in Southern Africa, which have greatly assisted scholars examining the UDI
period from the perspective of African nationalists.19
The availability of this abundant and rich material has generated a great
upsurge in scholarship, which was evident in two academic conferences that
marked the fortieth anniversary of UDI in November 2005. In Septem-
ber 2005, the Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humani-
ties, Cambridge, organized a conference titled “UDI Forty Years On:
Liberation, Confrontation and Cooperation,” which was opened by Ken-
neth Kaunda, former president of Zambia (1964– 91).20 In January 2006,
a similar conference was held in the Cold War Studies Centre at the LSE,
which was opened by Lord Owen, who was involved in the Rhodesian crisis
as Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for the Navy (1968– 70), and later
as Foreign Secretary (1977– 79).21 Those conference proceedings generated
an edited collection of essays on southern Africa in the Cold War that was
wide- ranging in its chronological and geographical scope but did not deal
comprehensively with UDI.22
The last decade has seen significant research output on the Rhodesian cri-
sis, with the completion of several doctoral theses and an increasing number
of specialist journal articles on various aspects of UDI.23 Many useful books
have also been published, although none purport to be an international his-
tory of UDI. Scholars of British policymaking have been well served by the
British Documents on the End of Empire Project, which has made available
a wide selection of documents on the Rhodesian crisis.24 There have been
several recent studies of Harold Wilson’s government that deal in whole or
in part with international policy, including Rhodesia, and these books have
made an important contribution to the debate on Labour’s performance in
office during the period 1964– 70.25 In terms of autobiography and biog-
raphy, historians of Rhodesia during the UDI period have had the benefit
of Ian Smith’s vituperative memoirs,26 and Alan Megahey’s study of the
“beleaguered” governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Humphrey Gibbs.27 No
books have been written recently on the Commonwealth and the United
Nations aspects of the Rhodesian crisis, but there have been some excel-
lent studies of the United States’ involvement.28 Richard Wood has fur-
nished the scholarly community with what is undoubtedly the lengthiest
account of Rhodesia’s attempts to obtain independence, which is based on
the papers of Ian Smith as well as British public records.29 However, Wood’s
chronological narrative is heavy on detail and does not effectively separate
the various international strands of the Rhodesian crisis. A key task of this
book is therefore to provide a clearly structured international history of the
period leading up to UDI.
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Introduction 5
Arguments and Scope of the Book
Historians have tended to view UDI as the inevitable outcome of an intrac-
table political problem. Robert Holland, for example, has commented that
“Anglo- Rhodesian talks were really concerned with the cultivation of images
for media presentation, since the two sides were too far apart for a real agree-
ment to be practicable.”30 This view is supported to some extent by the fact
that a feeling of inevitability pervades the documentary record for many
months before Rhodesia actually declared its independence.31 More recent
oral history records have also tended to confirm the contemporary impres-
sion that a UDI could not be avoided, and that it was really a question of
when, rather than if, it would occur.32 It is a common observation that histo-
rians can become captives of their documentary evidence, which often leads
them “to conclude that what was done was the only thing that could have
been done.”33 It is a central contention of this book, however, that although
the problem of Rhodesian independence was highly complex, a UDI was
by no means inevitable. The documentary record does suggest that there
were courses of action that were dismissed or remained underexplored— not
only in Britain but also in the Commonwealth and the United States— which
could have been pursued further and may have prevented a UDI. This book
will also demonstrate that there were structural weaknesses in the machinery
of government of each of the major actors, particularly in Britain. This made
the management of the Rhodesian crisis more difficult, contributed to the
likelihood of a UDI, and exacerbated tension in relations between Britain
and its international partners.
Chapter 1 explains briefly the collapse of the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland— also known as the Central African Federation (CAF)— and the
emergence of the Rhodesian independence problem. However, the main
purpose of the chapter is to survey the negotiations between the British and
Rhodesian governments in the year preceding UDI. The chapter observes
the dominant role that Harold Wilson played in the shaping of British policy
and in the conduct of negotiations, but suggests that the focus of the negoti-
ations was misplaced. Although British ministers and officials did remarkably
well to keep the Rhodesians talking for so long, they expended an enormous
amount of effort trying to reach agreement on constitutional arrangements
that were acceptable to the British government, the Rhodesian government,
the African nationalists in Rhodesia, and the wider international community.
It would have been more realistic to try to maintain the status quo for a few
years, during which time the transition to African majority rule could have
been planned. Such an arrangement might have been acceptable if the British
government had been prepared to offer a massive program of aid and techni-
cal assistance, which would have engaged the Rhodesian government’s key
concern about economic uncertainty, and facilitated the education and train-
ing of Africans for future majority rule. Literature on negotiation theory is
used in this chapter to analyze and evaluate the conduct of Anglo- Rhodesian
negotiations.
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Rhodesia’s Unil ateral Decl aration of Independence6
Chapter 2 uses correspondence from former members of the Rhodesian
security services, recent oral testimony from British politicians and civil ser-
vants, and documentary evidence from archives around the world to reexam-
ine the viability of British military intervention in Rhodesia during 1964 and
1965. The chapter argues that the military and political obstacles to the use
of force cited at the time and since have been grossly exaggerated. This chap-
ter demonstrates that with sufficient resolve, the British government could
have used force to prevent or end UDI. This would have offered an effective
solution to one of the most protracted and embarrassing international prob-
lems that confronted successive British governments during disengagement
from Empire. The chapter situates the arguments on the use of force in rela-
tion to theoretical analyses of deterrence and coercive diplomacy.
The British government’s decision to abjure the use of force exposed it
to profound criticism within the Commonwealth. Wilson and the right wing
of the Labour Party had hoped that the Commonwealth would continue to
serve as a vehicle for British economic and strategic interests, but these hopes
foundered on the sharp rocks of the Rhodesian problem, which threatened
to tear the Commonwealth apart. Chapter 3 examines why, despite wide-
spread fears that it would not survive, the Commonwealth did not disinte-
grate during the Prime Ministers’ Meetings held between 1964 and 1966.
The chapter argues that a combination of British diplomatic dexterity, sup-
port from the Old Commonwealth, and political divisions among the African
Commonwealth states in particular allowed the Commonwealth to survive
relatively unscathed. Chapter 3 also discusses the founding of the Common-
wealth Secretariat, whose immediate origins are to be found in the context of
the 1964 and 1965 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting. The chapter
shows that the Rhodesian crisis quickly exposed tension between radical and
conservative views about the proper functions of the Secretariat, but it also
acknowledges the long- term implications of the Secretariat for the organiza-
tional character of the Commonwealth.
Chapter 4 extends the discussion of the Commonwealth dimension. It
demonstrates that Canada developed a particularly proactive approach toward
the Rhodesian problem but Britain, Australia, and New Zealand gave only
limited encouragement to Canadian initiatives. This chapter also explains
how the conventions of Commonwealth diplomatic representation made the
problem more difficult to manage. By the mid- 1960s the arrangements for
intra- Commonwealth representation between its sovereign member states
were well established. The exclusion of Rhodesia from the Commonwealth
Prime Ministers’ Conference ruled out the possibility of multilateral diplo-
matic engagement. Opportunities to influence the Rhodesian government
were therefore restricted to bilateral exchanges, but the mechanisms for such
diplomatic representation, though technically correct, were limited and inad-
equate. This chapter uses representation theory to confirm the necessity for
sufficient bilateral exchanges between sovereign states and other international
actors but demonstrates that the parties to such a diplomatic relationship can
conceive the functions of representation in different terms.
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Introduction 7
Chapter 5 explores Anglo- American consultation and cooperation during
the period leading up to UDI. The chapter considers the formulation of US
contingency plans to deal with the eventuality of a UDI, and US efforts to
provide diplomatic support for Britain in its attempts to prevent a UDI. It is
argued that on both issues there was considerable misperception and miscom-
munication between Washington and London, which caused disappointment
and even suspicion at senior levels of government on both sides. This chapter
explains the misunderstandings and frustrations in Anglo- American relations
by using some theoretical perspectives on alliance politics and thereby makes
a useful contribution to the literature on the “special relationship” during the
Wilson- Johnson era.
Chapter 6 examines support for Britain in the United Nations during the
Rhodesian crisis. Britain relied heavily on its Old Commonwealth partners
and the United States to prevent the Rhodesian crisis from slipping out of
its control in the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, but this
gave rise to certain anomalies. For example, Canada and New Zealand saw
the United Nations as a cornerstone of their external relations, but they were
placed in the invidious position of supporting the British claim that Rhodesia
did not fall within the United Nations’ sphere of competence. The United
States also found itself— not for the first, or the last time— supporting Brit-
ish colonial policy despite America’s supposedly anti- imperial heritage. The
situation offered opportunities for China and the Soviet Union to exploit
anger among Afro- Asian nations who perceived racism in British policy. Brit-
ain and its supporters feared the possibility of a “Red Army in blue berets” in
southern Africa, but economic concerns were also highly significant. A Chap-
ter VII resolution imposing mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia would
have created a precedent that could have been used to bring similar measures
against South Africa. This would have had more profound effects on West-
ern economic interests than sanctions against Rhodesia. This chapter there-
fore examines both the strategic and economic foundations of cooperation
between Britain and its supporters at the United Nations during the Rhode-
sian crisis. The chapter includes a theoretical consideration of the nature of
international crisis and explains why Rhodesia’s UDI can be conceptualized
in such terms.
Methodology
This book is first and foremost an international history, which seeks to
illuminate the Rhodesian crisis from the perspectives of Britain, the Com-
monwealth (especially the Old Commonwealth), the United States, and the
United Nations. However, in the last two decades the field of International
History has come to mean something very different from the state- centered
approach of this book. The “cultural turn”— which has been driven mainly,
but certainly not exclusively, by American historians— has greatly affected the
pattern of scholarship on international history. The trend began with analy-
ses of the way in which states used culture as a policy tool in the ideological
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Rhodesia’s Unil ateral Decl aration of Independence8
context of the Cold War. A range of new approaches has proliferated, such
as those based on race, gender, “collective memory,” and identity, which has
transformed the field of inquiry.34 Historians have also seized on the con-
cepts of globalization and transnationalism in order to address themes such
as diasporas, migration, disease, the environment, human rights, and terror-
ism.35 The significance of these developments is evident in the response of the
Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), which has
sought to remain relevant by reaching out beyond its original constituency
of diplomatic historians. SHAFR has encouraged closer association with pro-
fessional bodies such as the American Studies Association and Organization
of American Historians, whose members pursue scholarship on cultural and
transnational history, and the SHAFR journal, Diplomatic History, regularly
publishes articles on these themes.36 Cultural approaches have also become
dominant in the “new imperial history,” whose adherents emphasize the
mutual interplay of cultural influences between metropolitan and colonial
societies, and the continuing effects of this even after decolonization.37 It is
undoubtedly true that the “cultural turn” has enhanced understanding in
the fields of international and imperial history and it is certainly no longer
the case that practitioners of international history are characterized by the
reactionary conservatism lamented even a decade ago.38 Younger scholars
especially have been quick to embrace cultural approaches, lest they be con-
sidered “old- fashioned” or “retrograde.”39 However, as Frederick Cooper
has suggested, the bandwagon effect has produced a “conformism of the
avant- garde,” which militates against other approaches.40 One would hope
that a more traditional international history of the type found in this book
can still find acceptance, first because “it is the diversity of approach in our
profession that helps to make the discussion of controversial historical issues
exciting and productive.”41 Second, a state- centered approach is clearly rel-
evant when discussing issues such as the collapse of a federation, the nego-
tiation of constitutional arrangements under which a colony may become
independent, the possible use of force to achieve a policy objective, inadequa-
cies in the arrangements for diplomatic representation, structural problems in
the relationship between allies, or the utility of economic sanctions to coerce
a rogue state. This is certainly not to say that a state- centric approach is the
only way to write about the Rhodesian crisis; it is merely that the themes
selected for investigation in this book are concerned with the interaction
between states.
Although the book is traditional in its focus on the diplomatic relationship
between states, it is more novel in its interdisciplinary methods, as it uses
multiple theoretical perspectives from International Relations (IR) to frame
different aspects of the empirical research. Many theoretically oriented works
tend to test and illustrate a single theory by using multiple comparative case
studies or by adopting an in- depth case study approach. For example, the
International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project, established in 1975, adopted
both qualitative and quantitative methods to investigate the nature of inter-
national crisis, consisting of “in- depth studies of perceptions and decisions
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Introduction 9
by a single state; and studies in breadth of the 412 crises that plagued the
international system from the end of World War I.”42 The ICB Project classi-
fied Rhodesia as a “protracted conflict,” consisting of 11 international crises
during the period 1965– 80. In a very detailed case study, Douglas Anglin
used the ICB Project’s model of international crisis to analyze the nature of
Zambian decision making during 1965– 66.43 By contrast, academic stud-
ies that apply more than one theoretical perspective to the same case study
are relatively uncommon. The classic example, written by the political sci-
entist Graham Allison, is Essence of Decision, which was first published four
decades ago. Allison explored US decision making during the Cuban missile
crisis from three perspectives that explain foreign policy outcomes differently:
the Rational Actor Model, the Organizational Process Model, and the Gov-
ernmental Politics Model.44 A more recent example of multiperspectivism is
Roger Pfister’s Apartheid South Africa and African States, which uses theo-
ries from political science and IR to explain the formulation of South African
foreign policy and the interaction between South Africa and other states in
sub- Saharan Africa.45 The methodological approach in this book is similar; it
is intended to illustrate how the different facets of a historical case study can
be analyzed using a variety of theories, such as those on negotiation, deter-
rence, coercive diplomacy, and alliance theory.
It has been suggested that the relationship between the fields of Interna-
tional History (IH) and IR has been “ambiguous, indeed at times downright
hostile.” But during the last 15 years, there has been “a thawing between the
two fields.”46 Thomas Smith has explained the perception of the acrimoni-
ous relationship through a familiar metaphor: “Perhaps because it is a child
of history, International Relations, as it developed, has tried to distance itself
from historical discourse, through methodological and theoretical innova-
tions seeking general knowledge about international and global politics.”47
It is commonly observed that in the 1960s a transatlantic divide became
established between the historically informed English school of IR scholars
and the ahistorical community of American IR theorists that was increas-
ingly turning to quantitative methods. Writing in 1972, Hedley Bull, one
of the leading academics of the English school, lamented what he called the
“long, dark winter of the ‘social scientific’ ascendancy.”48 Two decades later
it seemed that the separation between theorists and empiricists was no less
pronounced, as evidenced by the controversies over Francis Fukuyama’s “end
of history” thesis and Samuel Huntington’s theory of the “clash of civiliza-
tions.”49 In fact, the perception of a division between ahistorical American IR
theorists and atheoretical British international historians has been somewhat
exaggerated. John Hobson and George Lawson have recently commented
that “history never really went away as a tool of IR theory” even among
neorealist scholars who are renowned for their static world view.50 It has also
been suggested that IR theorists have become more interested in historical
narrative “not as an adjunct or empirical resource, but as a theoretical per-
spective in its own right.”51 Neither is it true that the craft of the historian
is inherently devoid of theory. Although historians pursue narrative- based
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Rhodesia’s Unil ateral Decl aration of Independence10
explanations aiming for accuracy and descriptive completeness, they nev-
ertheless seek to ascribe primacy to different categories of causes and con-
sequences, thereby using theory implicitly.52 Perhaps the crucial difference
is that “[w]hereas political scientists (standing aloof from the material they
propose to organize) theorise first and then illustrate the theory, historians
usually plunge in, then try to explain where they are, what is going on, and
how they might explain what they have seen.”53
The divide between IH and IR has also been overstated in other ways. It is
not particularly helpful, for example, to distinguish between history and political
science by comparing the complexity of historical explanations with the parsi-
monious preferences of political science. Historians certainly do recognize the
complexity of events and processes but they nevertheless emphasize causal or
consequential primacy, which places them not too distant from the political sci-
entists’ emphasis on key “independent variables.”54 Jack Levy has contended that
what best reflects the distinction between history and political science is the idio-
graphic approach of the former compared to the nomothetic aims of the latter. In
other words, historians are usually concerned with explaining particular events,
whereas political scientists try to generalize about classes of events.55 Historians
usually examine single cases in great depth, whereas political scientists mostly use
clusters or sequences of examples, known as “data sets,” which tend to be largely
devoid of detail. Edward Ingram has commented on this difference between the
two disciplines: “The historian’s single example may be more representative than
the political scientist’s cluster. It is researched more deeply and comprehensively
and set in a broader context. It implies a theory and tries to advance its develop-
ment, perhaps by refinement, perhaps by revisionism; it continues a discussion
instead of claiming to be a proof. Nor are historians persuaded that a cluster of
lightly researched, detached— at best semidetached— cases, often written up by
different scholars, is likely to advance the argument any better.”56
However, this distinction should not be pushed too far because histori-
ans do not always write single case studies; they often adopt a comparative
approach or test hypotheses against a range of cases.57 Neither is it uniformly
true that political scientists base their findings on evidence that lacks sufficient
depth. Douglas Anglin’s Zambian Crisis Behaviour, which is one of the ICB
Project’s qualitative studies mentioned previously, runs to 254 pages exclud-
ing notes and appendices, and cannot be said to be “lightly researched.”58
Two further bases on which history is sometimes distinguished from polit-
ical science are predictive capacity and policy relevance. Since historians are
first and foremost concerned with explaining the past, they usually decline
to make predictions, whereas political scientists are inclined to believe that
their theories have predictive utility.59 However, the confidence of politi-
cal scientists was severely dented by their failure to predict an end to the
Cold War, which raised questions about the utility of political science for
understanding a phenomenon that dominated global politics for almost five
decades.60 Unlike IR, the field of International History does not claim to
be explicitly policy relevant. IR theorists tend to focus on the recent his-
tory that is most relevant to the present concerns of policymakers, whereas
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Africa Bureau, 21, 23, 71
African National Congress, 15– 16, 22
Algeria, 57, 186
alliance theory, 177– 82
Alport, Cuthbert, 17
Anderson, John, 59– 60
Angola, 157, 159, 169
Armah, Kwesi, 90
Attlee government, 14, 21
Australia: aid and technical
assistance policies of, 125–
27, 154; Canadian policy
given limited encouragement
by, 6, 94, 120, 130– 31, 135,
138; Commonwealth Prime
Ministers’ Meetings and, 90ff.;
Commonwealth Secretariat and,
95, 110– 11; contingency planning
by and response to UDI, 14,
116– 17, 146, 149– 50, 153– 54,
206; deterrence and, 116, 132–
39; diplomatic representation in
Salisbury, 116– 17, 139– 46, 153–
54; economic sanctions and, 135,
146, 149– 50, 183– 84, 195ff.;
force against Rhodesia opposed
by, 58, 68, 118, 132, 149, 205;
influence on Rhodesia perceived
by other actors, 116, 132, 252n4;
interests in Rhodesian question,
118– 19; sympathy toward white
Rhodesians, 118– 19, 138,
144, 149, 153; United Nations
and, 119, 133, 136, 149, 187–
89, 194– 95; white Rhodesian
migration to suggested, 126–
27, 154. See also Hasluck, Paul;
Menzies, Robert
Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, 101– 6, 110–
11, 138. See also Nigeria
Ball, George, 162, 165, 167– 70,
172– 82, 199, 268n46, 272n105,
276n175
Banda, Hastings, 101, 165, 248n137
Beadle, Hugh, 38, 39
Belgium, 186
Bellenger, Frank, 68
Bennett, Oliver, 124, 129
Benoy, Maurice, 142
Bentley, Alfred, 59– 60, 63, 171
Berlis, N. F. H., 142
Bermuda Conference, 184, 196
Billericay Constituency Labour Party,
207, 284n22
Board of Trade, 45, 49
Bottomley, Arthur: bureaucratic conflict
with Foreign Office and, 49– 51;
Canadian relations and, 134–
35, 148; Commonwealth Prime
Ministers’ Meeting (June 1965) and,
98, 100, 101, 103; Confederation
of British Industry unimpressed
by, 206; correspondence with Ian
Smith, 25, 34; economic sanctions
doubted by, 77; negotiations with
and assessments of Ian Smith, 30,
32, 35; Rhodesia policy summarized
for Cabinet, 28; Rhodesia visit by
(Feb.– Mar. 1965), 29– 30, 40, 76,
221n123; technical and financial
assistance for Rhodesian government
suggested by, 44; US relations and,
180; Wilson’s trip to Salisbury (Oct.
1965) assessed by, 37; Zambian
copper production and, 66
Bowles, Chester, 160
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Britain. See armed forces; civil servants; institutions of government; political parties; politicians; relations with individual countries and organizations
British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), 57
British Council of Churches, 71
British Defence Liaison Staff (Salisbury),
59
British South Africa Police (BSAP), 61–
62, 64, 234n65, 234nn68– 71
Brodie, J. K., 143
Brown, George: Central African
Federation and, 21; contingency
planning in Department of
Economic Affairs and, 175; defense
spending and, 67; opinion of
Wilson’s Cabinet management, 46
Bruce, David, 179– 80
Bundy, McGeorge, 172– 73, 175
Butler, David, 32
Butler, R. A., 17– 18, 162, 192
Cabinet (British): Conservative, 18– 19;
Labour, 25, 27– 28, 30, 36, 38– 39,
46– 47, 60, 81, 98, 131, 181, 205
Cabinet (Rhodesian), 1, 17– 19, 31, 38,
131, 162
Cabinet Office, 45, 166
Caccia, Harold, 157– 58
Callaghan, James, 22, 53– 54, 67,
237n115, 283n10
Canada: aid and technical
assistance policies of, 120–
25; Commonwealth Prime
Ministers’ Meetings and, 90ff.;
Commonwealth Secretariat
and, 95, 110– 11; contingency
planning of and response to UDI,
14, 116– 17, 139, 146– 49, 154,
206; deterrence and, 116, 132–
39; diplomatic representation
in Salisbury, 116– 17, 139– 46,
153– 54; economic sanctions and,
118, 135, 147– 48, 183– 84, 195ff.;
force against Rhodesia opposed by,
68, 99, 132, 205; foreign policy
characteristics, 121– 22, 254n40;
interests in Rhodesian question,
117ff.; political initiatives of,
128– 31; Rhodesia policy given
limited encouragement by Britain,
Australia and New Zealand, 6, 94,
120, 128, 130– 31, 135; sympathy
toward African nationalists, 117,
120; United Nations and, 7, 122,
141, 188– 89, 195, 202; white
Rhodesian migration to suggested,
126– 27, 154. See also Martin, Paul;
Pearson, Lester
Caradon, Lord. See Foot, Hugh
Carter, Thomas, 124, 130
Cassells, James, 65
Castle, Barbara: Central African
Federation views on, 22;
technical and financial assistance
for Rhodesian government
suggested by, 44; Wilson’s Cabinet
management assessed by, 46,
228n255; Wilson’s obsession for
consensus with Conservatives noted
by, 69
Central African Federation (CAF):
Anglo- American consultation on,
157– 61, 185; Australia requested
not to assist white migration from,
126– 27; British military planning
and, 54– 55, 57– 58; collapse of, 15–
16; formation of, 14– 15; Labour
Party views on, 13, 20– 23; military
assets handed over to Southern
Rhodesia, 18, 62, 89, 191– 92;
Old Commonwealth trade and,
135– 36
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 78,
176
Central Intelligence Organisation
(CIO), 60
Chidzero, Bernard, 123
Chiefs of Staff (British), 54, 62– 63, 81,
204
Chiefs of Staff (Rhodesian), 55, 59– 60
China, 7, 86, 130, 150, 166, 183,
196– 99
Cleveland, Harlan, 159, 191
Cleveland, Harrison, 130– 31
Cold War, 2, 4, 8, 10, 71, 121, 161,
192, 196, 202
Colonial Office (CO), 101, 179, 184,
186, 187
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Commonwealth Prime Ministers’
Meetings, 83– 114
Commonwealth Relations Office
(CRO): Bottomley- Gardiner
mission and, 29; Canadians irritate,
148; Commonwealth consultative
committee proposal and, 97– 98;
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’
Meeting (July 1964) and, 92;
Commonwealth Secretariat and,
111; five principles and, 31;
Foreign Office bureaucratic conflict
with, 14, 45– 46, 48– 51; Old
Commonwealth consultations with,
90, 147– 48, 262n192; Rhodesia
chief responsibility of, 45; United
States consultations with, 157ff.;
weakness of, 206
Commonwealth Secretariat, 6, 85, 86,
94– 95, 109– 12
Communism: Britain and, 87, 89, 183–
85, 193, 196– 98, 202; Rhodesia
and, 61, 70, 75, 84, 88, 138, 144,
154; United States and, 158, 161,
166, 172, 174, 178, 184– 85, 196–
97, 202
compellence (coercive diplomacy), 54,
71– 81
Confederation of British Industry
(CBI), 43, 206
Congo, 56, 118, 157, 160, 165, 166,
169, 186, 196, 198, 229n275
Conservative Party, 18– 19, 26, 36, 39,
69, 86, 87, 115, 203– 5
contingency planning: British
government and, 14, 45– 52,
206– 7; Old Commonwealth and,
116– 17, 146– 54; United States
and, 162– 70
Coote, Wendell, 166, 168, 181
Cousins, Frank, 46
Crisis, 9, 199– 202, 282n105
Crossman, Richard: Cabinet dismayed
by Wilson’s trip to Salisbury
(Oct. 1965) according to, 36– 37;
Wilson’s Cabinet management
assessed by, 46, 228n259; Wilson
preoccupied with UDI according
to, 204; Wilson’s Vietnam initiative
assessed by, 98
Cunningham, George, 23– 24, 58
Curragh “mutiny”, 66, 236n103
Cyprus, 36, 67, 70, 75, 101, 186
Dean, Patrick, 168, 175, 189, 191, 192,
271n79
Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, 186
Defence and Oversea Policy Committee
(DOPC): Anglo- American
relations and, 168; Bottomley
informs about developments in
Rhodesia policy and negotiations,
25, 28, 32, 35; Commonwealth
consultative committee proposal
rejected by, 97– 98; contingency
planning and, 47, 50, 77, 148,
199, 206, 229n268; five principles
and, 97; military intelligence and,
60; Reedman affair discussed by,
263n209; Wilson bypasses, 46
Defence Planning Staff (DPS), 55– 58,
62, 65
Department for Economic Affairs, 46,
67
deterrence, 54, 71– 81, 132– 39
Devlin Royal Commission, 15
Dominican Republic, 176, 178
Dominion Party, 16, 17
Donnelly, Desmond, 68
Douglas- Home, Alec: becomes Prime
Minister, 18; bipartisan policy of,
203; Communist threat in Africa
and, 196; Commonwealth Prime
Ministers’ Meeting (July 1964)
and, 84, 90– 95, 109; disenchanted
with African Commonwealth at
the UN, 128; G. Mennen Williams
and, 157– 58; negotiations with
Winston Field, 18– 19; negotiations
with Ian Smith, 20; receives
suggestion of aid for Rhodesia, 44;
United Nations and, 186– 87, 189;
United States activism on Rhodesia
rebuffed by, 159; Wilson’s initial
handling of Ian Smith commented
on, 26– 27
Du Bois, W. E. B., 2
Dupont, Clifford, 41
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economic sanctions: Australia and, 135,
146, 149– 50, 183– 84, 195ff.;
Britain and, 45, 47– 49, 52, 58,
69, 76– 80, 84, 105, 148, 165– 70,
172– 74, 181– 82, 183– 84, 195ff.;
Canada and, 118, 135, 147– 48,
183– 84, 195ff.; New Zealand and,
136, 146, 150– 53, 183– 84, 195ff.;
Rhodesia and, 2, 76– 77, 80, 96,
135– 36, 139, 153, 181, 195ff.;
United Nations and, 183– 84;
195ff.; United States and, 58, 165–
70, 172– 74, 178, 181– 82, 183– 84,
195ff.
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 155, 184
European Economic Community
(EEC), 85– 87
Fabian Colonial Bureau, 21
Fabian Society, 71, 204
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
See Central African Federation
Field, Winston: African Commonwealth
disparaged by, 88; Alport’s
assessment of, 17; Australian
diplomatic representation
in Salisbury invited by, 142;
Commonwealth advice refused by,
116, 128– 29; Ian Smith’s opinion
of, 18; independence for Rhodesia
demanded by, 17; negotiations with
British government, 18– 19; ousted
by Ian Smith, 19, 124; United
States alarmed by electoral victory
and subsequent ouster, 159– 60,
162
five (six) principles, 31, 33– 36, 41, 97
Fletcher, Peter, 59, 66
Flower, Ken: British forces’ loyalty
assessed by, 66; plot to oust
Field reported by, 19; Rhodesian
forces’ loyalty assessed by, 60– 61;
Rhodesian Security Council decides
on a UDI, 74
Foot, Hugh, 187– 88, 190, 192, 197,
202, 206, 278n28, 278n33
force (against Rhodesia): Australia
opposed to, 58, 68, 118, 132, 149,
205; British cabinet subcommittee
dismisses as an option, 27– 28, 46,
54; Canada opposed to, 68, 99,
132, 205; Commonwealth calls
for use of, 28, 99– 101, 103, 108;
Commonwealth secretary- general
in favor of, 110; Foreign Office
largely against, 49; Hugh Gaitskell
probably would have been willing
to use, 22; Labour Party attitudes
regarding, 68, 71; New Zealand
opposed to, 132; problems involved
in the use of, 53ff.; United Nations
possibility of, 183ff.; United States
and, 56, 68, 166, 176, 232n30;
Wilson rules out publicly, 38, 74–
76; Wilson willing to contemplate
in certain circumstances, 58, 78–
79, 176, 200– 201
Foreign Office (FO): Commonwealth
consultative committee proposal
and, 97– 98; Commonwealth
Relations Office bureaucratic
conflict with, 14, 45– 46, 48–
51; international policy and, 80;
Kaunda and, 96; Labour Party
suspects intentions of, 204, 283n7;
majority rule and, 80; United States
consultations with, 157ff., 185ff.;
Vietnam peace initiative and, 98
Foulon, Robert, 164
France, 76, 192, 194
franchise (Rhodesian), 16, 209– 10
Fredericks, Wayne, 162– 63
Gaitskell, Hugh, 22
Gardiner, Gerald, 29– 30, 40, 47
Garner, Saville, 90, 94, 100– 101, 111,
162– 63, 168, 171, 206– 7
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), 151
Ghana: Australian sanctions satisfy, 150;
British government pressured by,
89– 90; Canadian aid and, 123;
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’
Meeting (July 1964) and, 90–
92, 95; Commonwealth Prime
Ministers’ Meeting (June 1965) and,
100; Commonwealth Secretariat
proposed by, 95; severs diplomatic
relations with Britain, 103; United
Nations and, 89– 90, 128, 187, 189,
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191; white Rhodesian migration
suggested by, 127; Wilson’s visit to
(Oct. 1965), 38
Gibbs, Humphrey: attempts to
persuade Winston Field to
remain in office, 19; political
isolation of, 32; receives notice of
India’s termination of diplomatic
representation, 96; refuses to order
Ian Smith’s arrest, 60; Rhodesian
government dismissed by, 1; state
of emergency declared by, 2,
225n200
Gilpatric, Roswell, 175
Glass, Lester, 141
Gore- Booth, Paul, 48
Greenhill, Denis, 205
Griffith, James, 21
Grimond, Jo, 68
Harriman, Averell, 158, 165, 180, 197
Hasluck, Paul, 118, 131
Hawkins, Harold, 60
Haynes, Ulric, 172, 175– 76
Healey, Denis: Britain’s overseas role
and, 237n115; British military
intervention in Rhodesia and,
57, 60, 62, 65, 74, 79, 236n100;
Commonwealth policy and, 87;
defense procurement and, 67;
Wilson assessed by, 74
Heath, Edward, 27, 36, 39, 69
Hilaly, Agha, 101
Hola camp atrocities, 70
Holyoake, Keith: Commonwealth
mission to Rhodesia endorsed
by, 131; economic sanctions
and, 152– 53; objects to Old
Commonwealth acting in concert,
137; relationship with Ian Smith,
132; Rhodesian attendance at
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’
Meeting (July 1964) and, 90– 91;
sympathy for white Rhodesians,
119– 20; Wilson’s deterrent efforts
supported by, 131, 133– 34,
136– 37
Home, Lord. See Douglas- Home, Alec
Home Office, 46
Hood, Samuel, 185
House of Commons (debates and
statements), 22, 27, 32, 67, 74, 90,
91, 107, 128, 183, 200
Howman, Jack, 123– 24, 129– 30
Hughes, Cledwyn, 33– 34, 42
indaba, 20, 24– 25, 40, 143, 164
India: Commonwealth mission proposal
dismissed by, 132; Commonwealth
Prime Ministers’ Meeting (July
1964) and, 90– 91; Commonwealth
Prime Ministers’ Meeting (June
1965) and, 101; Commonwealth
role of, 89; Commonwealth
Secretariat’s powers feared by,
110; democracy in, 89; diplomatic
representation in Salisbury
terminated by, 96; United Nations
and, 189
International Crisis Behavior (ICB)
Project, 8– 10, 200– 202
International History: changing
nature of, 7– 8; relationship with
International Relations (IR), 8– 11
Japan, 76
Johns, G. B., 60
Johnson, Lyndon B.: inherits a
developing crisis in Rhodesia,
157; message to Ian Smith, 173;
preoccupied by other US foreign
policy problems, 178, 275n149;
Roswell Gilpatric’s appointment
as Rhodesia coordinator opposed
by, 175, 273n121; US response
to the UDI authorized by, 174;
Wilson and, 77, 172– 73, 175, 177,
274n142, 274n144; Zambian airlift
authorized by, 176. See also United
States
Johnson, U. Alexis, 175
Johnston, J. B.: Bottomley- Gardiner
mission assessed by, 29– 30; five
principles and, 31; Ian Smith
assessed by, 19– 20; Ian Smith
negotiations with, 30– 32, 35
Joint Intelligence Committee (British),
77, 233n50, 281n91
Joint Chiefs of Staff (United States),
56, 65
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Kaiser, Philip, 168
Kapwepwe, Simon, 106– 8
Kariba Dam, 44, 56, 58, 166, 201
Kaunda, Kenneth: British military
presence in Zambia and, 57– 58, 63;
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’
Meeting (June 1965) and, 100;
denies Zambia providing a base
for African nationalists, 96; no
independence before majority rule
(NIBMAR) and, 107; participates in
conference on fortieth anniversary
of UDI, 4; Wilson and, 59, 78, 96,
104, 106– 7. See also Zambia
Kennedy, John F., 155, 157, 187, 196
Kenya: British atrocities in, 75;
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’
Meeting (July 1964) and, 91;
independence of turns spotlight on
Rhodesia at United Nations, 141;
mutiny in armed forces, 67; no
independence before majority rule
(NIBMAR) and, 107; United States’
opinion of before independence,
185. See also Kenyatta, Jomo
Kenyatta, Jomo, 96– 97
Kerr, David, 68, 207
Kevin, J. C. G., 119, 144
King, Cecil, 48
Kissinger, Henry, 178
Knox, William, 42
Labour Party: aid for Rhodesia and, 45;
Central African Federation policy
of, 13, 20– 22; Commonwealth
policy of, 86– 87; pressure group
influence on, 71; Foreign Office
intentions suspected by, 204,
283n7; Rhodesia policy while
in Opposition, 22– 24; Rhodesia
policy requires more research at
constituency level, 207; Vietnam
preoccupies, 68
Land Apportionment Act, 30, 34– 35
Lapsley, J. H., 62
Le Quesne, Martin, 41, 49– 51
Lloyd, Selwyn, 36, 86
MacDonald, Malcolm: African leaders
assessed by, 98– 99; Commonwealth
Prime Ministers’ Meeting (Sept.
1966) and, 108; Kaunda and, 107;
Wilson assessed by, 104, 108
Macleod, Iain, 55, 158, 160
Macmillan, Harold: African policy
legacy of, 203; Douglas- Home
replaces as Prime Minister, 18,
128; Eisenhower and, 155;
Kennedy and, 155, 184; G.
Mennen Williams and, 158; Royal
Commission appointed by, 15;
United Nations and, 186– 88;
“wind of change” speech, 158.
Malaya, 67, 75, 88
Malaysia, 56– 58, 67, 101, 193
Malta, 39, 56, 91, 108, 227n239
March, Derrick, 48– 49
Margai, Alfred, 100– 101
Martin, John, 187
Martin, Paul: Britain and, 134– 35, 147–
48; Canadian policy on aid and
overseas development and, 122;
Canadian policy on Rhodesia and,
117; Oliver Bennett and, 124, 129
McClelland, Roswell, 171
McIntosh, Alister, 152
McIntyre, Laurence, 119
McNamara, Robert, 170
Menzies, Robert: Australian response
to UDI announced by, 150;
Commonwealth consultative
committee proposal and,
97; Commonwealth mission
proposals and, 36, 129, 131– 32;
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’
Meetings and, 90ff., 248n118;
Commonwealth Secretariat and,
95, 110– 11; five principles and, 97;
Rhodesian government and, 131–
32; Ian Smith and, 28, 36, 132,
134; supports Wilson’s deterrent
efforts, 131, 133ff., 258n109,
259n133; sympathy for white
Rhodesians, 118
methodology, 7– 11. See also
International History
Ministry of Defence (officials in), 45,
54, 60, 62, 66, 79, 81
Ministry of Power, 46
Mitchell, Derek, 98
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Monckton Commission, 15
Monday Club, 69
Monson, Leslie, 107
Mountbatten, Louis, 55
Movement for Colonial Freedom, 21, 71
Mozambique, 57– 58, 79, 163
Mugabe, Robert, 3, 16
Multilateral Force, 164
Musonga, Paul, 188
Mutasa, E. C., 24,
Nabrit Jr., James M., 194
National Archives (UK), 3, 46, 156,
206
National Democratic Party, 16
National Museum of Labour History,
207
National Security Council (NSC), 159,
171– 73, 175, 178
Ncube, Welshman, 3
negotiation theory, 39– 45
Netherlands, 187
New Zealand: aid and technical
assistance policies of, 125– 27;
Canadian policy given limited
encouragement by, 6, 120– 21, 138;
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’
Meetings and, 90ff.; contingency
planning of and response to UDI,
14, 116– 17, 146, 149, 150– 53,
206; deterrence and, 116, 132–
39; diplomatic representation
in Salisbury absent, 140, 145;
economic sanctions and, 136,
146, 150– 53, 183– 84, 195ff.;
force against Rhodesia opposed
by, 68, 118, 138, 205; influence
on Rhodesia perceived by United
States, 116; interests in Rhodesian
question, 120; sympathy toward
white Rhodesians, 119– 20, 138,
144, 153; trade with Central
African Federation, 135– 36; United
Nations and, 7, 151– 52, 187– 89;
United States and, 156ff. See also
Holyoake, Keith
Nigeria: Canadian aid and, 123;
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’
Meeting (June 1965) and, 101;
constitutional conference suggested
by, 96; Ghana and, 92, 95; Lagos
conference and, 103– 6; OAU
and, 103; Rhodesia coalition
government idea supported
by, 131; UDI reaction to, 48;
Wilson suggests participation in
Commonwealth prime ministers’
mission, 131; Wilson’s visit to, 38.
See also Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa
Nkomo, Joshua: Arthur Bottomley
insists on seeing while in detention,
25; funding to train guerillas
sought by, 163; parties formed by,
16; Rhodesia’s 1961 Constitution
repudiated by, 17; UN Special
Committee petitioned by, 188;
Wilson rules out use of force to
influence, 38
Nkrumah, Kwame: British policy
criticized by, 97; Commonwealth
Prime Ministers’ Meeting (June
1965) and, 100; Commonwealth
Secretariat proposed by, 95; Lagos
meeting and, 106; Julius Nyerere
and, 101; OAU and, 103. See also
Ghana
no independence before majority rule
(NIBMAR), 107– 8
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), 57, 68, 185, 196
Northern Rhodesia: Anglo- American
talks and, 158, 160; British military
planning and, 54– 56; Canadian
diplomatic representation in 141;
Central African Federation and,
14, 15, 21; Commonwealth Prime
Ministers’ Meeting (July 1964)
and, 91; Southern Rhodesia seeks
concomitant independence with,
17– 18, 160. See also Zambia
Nyandoro, George, 123
Nyasaland, 15. See also Malawi
Nyerere, Julius: Commonwealth Prime
Ministers’ Meeting (June 1965)
and, 100, 102; Kwame Nkrumah
and, 101; Lagos meeting and, 106;
no independence before majority
rule (NIBMAR) and, 107, 130;
OAU and, 103; Winston Field and,
129. See also Tanzania
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Obisesan, Alhaji, 153
Obote, Milton: Commonwealth Prime
Ministers’ Meeting (June 1965) and,
100; Commonwealth Secretariat
proposed by, 95; no independence
before majority rule (NIBMAR) and,
107. See also Uganda
O’Connor, D. S. S., 54
Old Commonwealth. See Australia;
Canada; New Zealand
Operation Fume, 56
Operation Mattock, 54, 56– 57
Organization of African Unity
(OAU): British government gives
insufficient consideration to,
48; Canadians recognize need
to forestall criticism from, 130;
further research needed on, 208;
indignation at UDI, 2; Kaunda
feels humiliated in the eyes of, 107;
resolution calls for members to
break of diplomatic relations with
Britain, 103; Wilson anxious about
calls for use of force, 201
Ormsby- Gore, David, 192
Owen, David, 4, 203
Paget, Reginald, 68
Pakistan: Commonwealth Prime
Ministers’ Meeting (July 1964)
and, 91; Commonwealth Prime
Ministers’ Meeting (June 1965) and,
101; Commonwealth role of, 89
Palley, Ahrn, 32
Pearson, Lester: Commonwealth mission
proposal and, 129; Commonwealth
Prime Ministers’ Meetings and, 84,
90ff.; economic sanctions and, 135,
195; five principles and, 97; likely
attitude to Harrison Cleveland’s
constitutional proposals, 131; Ian
Smith and, 132, 134; supports
Wilson’s deterrent efforts, 136– 38;
sympathy for African nationalists,
117; UN peacekeeping mission
opposed by, 195
Pestell, John, 59
Portugal: African colonies complicate
logistics of British military
intervention in Rhodesia, 57– 58;
Anglo- American consultation on,
165, 191, 197; Australia keen to
distance itself from at UN, 150;
Australian ambassador in South
Africa sympathetic towards, 119;
British government concludes
sanctions would be undermined by,
77; further research needed on, 208;
G. Mennen Williams fears Rhodesia
being pushed into closer association
with, 160; Kaunda views as a threat
to peace in southern Africa, 100;
Rhodesian “accredited diplomatic
representative” sent to, 34, 261n167,
263n209; Rhodesians counting on
support from to cope with sanctions,
80; Rhodesians seen as part of a
barrier against spread of Communism
in Africa, 138, 144; US assessment of
likely support for Rhodesia, 65; UN
resolutions opposed by, 194; Wilson
proposes consultative committee
involving, 97– 98. See also Angola;
Mozambique
Powell, Enoch, 86
Poynton, Hilton, 186, 190
Putterill, Rodney, 60, 66
Queen Elizabeth II: Commonwealth
role and, 113; Ian Smith affirms
“unswerving loyalty” of the
Rhodesian people to, 1; Rhodesian
armed forces owed allegiance to,
60– 62
Rahman, Abdul, 101
Ramphal, Shridath, 111
Ramsay, Michael, 71
Reedman, Harry, 34, 261n167, 263n209
representation (diplomatic), 6, 139– 46,
153– 54
Rhodesia Lobby, 69, 71
Rhodesian Front: British military
intervention feared by, 74;
Communism and, 75, 84, 87– 88;
Dominion Party merges with,
16; electoral victory (1965), 32,
96, 102; five principles and, 41;
Ian Smith and, 32, 42, 225n200;
Labour government and, 26, 31, 40,
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Index 311
203; majority rule and, 80; Robert
Menzies sees Rhodesian politics in
similar terms to 118; Rhodesian
armed forces and, 59– 61; transfer of
Central African Federation military
assets and, 18; United Federal Party
defeated by, 17; United Nations
and, 189; United States and, 159–
60, 164, 170– 71, 191; Winston
Field and, 18– 19, 162
Rhodesian Institute of Directors, 77
Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), 60– 64,
233n57, 234nn59– 60
Rhodesian Reserve Bank, 77
Rhodesian Security Council, 74
Rogers, Philip, 101, 112
Rogers, William, 175
Royal Air Force (RAF): capabilities for
potential operations against Rhodesia,
57, 62– 63; relationship with Royal
Rhodesian Air Force, 59– 60;
Wilson rules out action by, 74– 75
Royal Commission, 38– 39, 137, 194
Royal Rhodesian Air Force (RRAF):
attitudes of its senior officers, 59–
60; capabilities of, 62
Ruanda- Urundi, 189
Rusk, Dean: consultation with British
politicians and officials, 159, 162,
165, 167, 169– 70, 172– 73, 192;
estimates force needed to invade
Rhodesia, 56; little interest in
African issues, 178; US response to
UDI established by, 174
Salisbury, Lord, 69
Sandys, Duncan: becomes
Commonwealth secretary, 18, 128;
Commonwealth involvement in
Rhodesian problem advocated by,
128– 29; Ghanaian protest received
by, 90; Hugh Foot alarmed by
policy of, 190; negotiations with
Ian Smith, 20, 24– 25; negotiations
with Winston Field, 18– 19, 128–
29; Sangster, Donald, 101
Sharpeville massacre, 70, 186
Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 101
Sierra Leone, 95, 100, 131
Silundika, George, 163
Singapore, 106, 113
Singapore Declaration, 112
Sithole, Ndabaningi: Bottomley insists
on seeing while in detention, 25;
Nkomo criticized by, 16; Welensky
discusses transition to African
majority rule with, 164; Wilson
rules out use of force to influence
attitude of, 38
Skybolt, 156, 177, 179, 181
Slade, H. G., 59– 60
Smith, Arnold: Australian and British
fears about his position as
Commonwealth secretary- general,
110– 11; Canadian assistant
undersecretary for external
affairs, 117, 147; favors Chapter
VII resolution, 282n100; no
independence before majority rule
(NIBMAR) and, 107; writings on
images of the Commonwealth, 85.
See also Commonwealth Secretariat
Smith, Ian: belief that international
reaction to UDI would be brief,
2; Bottomley- Gardiner mission
and, 29– 30, 221n127; British aid
insufficient to modify belief in
utility of a UDI, 43– 44; British
assessments of, 19, 30, 32, 41– 42;
British public and, 69– 70; Canada
alarmed by posturing of, 147;
Commonwealth and, 36, 88– 91,
95– 96, 102, 116, 131– 32, 134,
136– 37, 139; Communism and,
89, 281n92; economic sanctions
and, 76– 77, 135; Field and, 18– 19,
162; five principles and, 31, 33– 36;
Holyoake and, 119– 20, 132, 134,
136; Menzies and, 94, 99, 132,
134, 136; Mutasa letter and, 24;
negotiations with Bottomley and
Wilson, 25ff.; negotiations with
Douglas- Home and Sandys, 20,
24, 217n45; Pearson and, 134,
136– 37; proclamation of the UDI,
1; reaction to Labour government’s
warning statement (Oct. 1964),
26– 27, 40, 133; refuses to
apologize for deaths of thirty
thousand Zimbabweans, 3;
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312 Index
Smith, Ian (continued): responsible
for Mugabe’s rule, 3; Rhodesian
armed forces and, 59– 61, 232n43;
Rhodesian Front and, 32, 42,
221n131, 225n200, 226n223;
Royal Commission and, 38– 39;
South Africa and, 65; status quo and,
42– 43, 226n229; United States and,
162, 171– 73, 272n97, 272n101;
visits London for funeral of Winston
Churchill, 28– 29, 41, 76, 133,
256n74; visits London for talks
with Wilson 35– 36, 74, 226n227;
Wilson’s visit to Salisbury and, 37–
38, 224n192; Zambia and, 96, 176
Smyth, Ian Douglas, 141– 42
South Africa: Anglo- American
consultation on, 165, 191, 197–
99; Australia and, 119, 150; British
arms sales to, 113, 199; British
military intervention in Rhodesia
complicated by, 57– 58, 64– 65;
Central African Federation formed
in response to influence of, 15, 21;
changing attitudes contribute to end
of white minority rule in Rhodesia,
2; Commonwealth withdrawal, 50,
85, 92, 151; further research needed
on, 208; G. Mennen Williams fears
Rhodesia being pushed into closer
association with, 160; Kaunda views
as a threat to peace in southern Africa,
100; Rhodesians counting on support
from to cope with sanctions, 80;
Rhodesian diplomatic representation
in, 34; Rhodesian financial assistance
from, 43; Rhodesians seen as part of a
barrier against spread of Communism
in Africa, 138, 144; sanctions and,
7, 77, 118, 147, 150– 52, 165,
183, 195– 96, 198– 99, 202, 206;
UN resolutions opposed by, 194;
US assessment of likely support for
Rhodesia, 65, 268n46; US considers
Rhodesia of secondary importance
compared to, 157; Wilson proposes
consultative committee involving, 97–
98; Wilson tries to keep off cabinet
agenda, 46. See also Verwoerd,
Hendrick
Southern Rhodesia. See armed forces; institutions of government; political parties; politicians; relations with individual countries and organizations
Soviet Union, 7, 71, 193, 196– 98
Special Air Service (Rhodesian), 63
Special Commonwealth African
Assistance Plan (SCAAP), 123, 126
Stevenson, Adlai, 55, 160
Stewart, Michael: bureaucratic conflict
with Arthur Bottomley, 49– 50;
consultations with Dean Rusk and
George Ball, 169– 70, 271n85;
military intervention considered too
risky by, 53, 62, 230n1; sent to UN
after UDI, 195; Wilson advises Soviet
intervention unlikely, 198, 281n91
Suez, 11, 70, 75, 121, 156, 177, 179,
181, 184– 85
Tanganyika, 89, 128– 29. See also
Nyerere, Julius; Tanzania
Tanzania: Canadian aid and, 123;
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’
Meeting (June 1965) and, 100, 102;
Hastings Banda accuses of harboring
Malawian rebels, 101; Lagos
meeting and, 106; Mozambique’s
guerilla forces and, 163; mutiny in
armed forces, 67; OAU and, 103;
Ian Smith disparages, 89, 132; UN
inflammatory statement by, 194;
Zambian contingency planning and,
166– 67. See also Nyerere, Julius;
Tanganyika
Territorial Force (Rhodesian), 55,
61– 63
Thomson, George, 197
Thorpe, Jeremy, 68– 69
Todd, Garfield, 44– 45, 125, 188
Trading With the Enemy Act (United
States), 170
Treasury, 45
Tree, Marietta P., 170, 193
Trend, Burke: British contingency
planning recognized as deficient
by, 35; British position “morally
impregnable” according to, 29;
Commonwealth Secretariat and,
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Index 313
95; Crossman suggests “decisive
influence” in Wilson’s to visit
Salisbury, 37; Wilson advised to
side with CRO in disagreement
with Foreign Office, 49
Uganda: Canadian aid and, 123;
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’
Meeting (June 1965) and, 100;
Commonwealth Secretariat
proposed by, 95; mutiny in armed
forces, 67. See also Obote, Milton
United Federal Party (Rhodesia Party),
16, 17
United Nations (UN): Australia and,
119, 133, 136, 149, 187– 89,
194– 95; Britain and, 7, 14, 27,
28, 36, 48– 49, 53, 62, 65, 70,
77– 79, 86, 103, 129, 137, 159–
60, 163, 167, 170, 180, 183ff.,
205– 7; Canada and, 7, 122, 141,
188– 89, 195, 202; Central African
Federation and, 191– 92; economic
sanctions and, 77– 79, 183– 84;
195ff.; force and, 183ff.; Ghana
and, 89– 90, 128, 187, 189, 191;
Harold Macmillan and, India and,
189; 186– 88; New Zealand and,
7, 151– 52, 187– 89; OAU and,
103; Portugal and, 194; South
Africa and, 194; Tanzania and,
194; UN Charter, 108, 147, 170,
186– 88, 195, 206, 229n273,
277n17; UN Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD),
122, 126, 255n43; UN Fourth
Committee, 187– 88, 191, 194–
95; UN General Assembly, 7, 23,
62,103, 122, 184, 186– 90, 193–
95, 281n91; UN Security Council,
7, 62, 79, 89, 96, 109, 122, 147,
150, 151, 170, 184, 187, 191,
193, 195, 197, 199, 281n91; UN
Special Committee, 27, 119, 186,
188, 192– 93; United States and, 7,
70, 157, 159– 60, 163, 167, 170,
174, 180, 183ff., 202
United States (US): aid and technical
assistance policies of, 124, 163,
269n51; Bermuda Conference
and, 184, 196; Britain and, 27,
45, 48, 68, 138, 155ff., 183ff.,
206; bureaucratic politics, 174–
75, 268n42, 269n60, 270n67;
Central African Federation and,
157– 61, 185; changing attitudes
conditioned white minority rule
in Rhodesia, 2, 178; Communism
and, 158, 161, 166, 172, 174, 178,
184– 85, 196– 97, 202; economic
sanctions and, 58, 165– 70, 172–
74, 178, 181– 82, 183– 84, 195ff.;
force and, 56, 68, 166, 176,
232n30; interests in Rhodesian
question, 157, 160– 61, 166,
174; New Zealand and, 156ff.;
Portuguese and South African
support for Rhodesia assessed by,
65, 268n46; response to UDI,
174; Rhodesia perceived to be
most susceptible to influence of
Australia and New Zealand, 116;
Rhodesian Front and, 159– 60,
164, 170– 71, 191; Ian Smith and,
162, 171– 73, 272n97, 272n101;
United Nations and, 7, 70, 157,
159– 60, 163, 167, 170, 174, 180,
183ff., 202; Vietnam and, 174,
176, 178; Zambia and, 48, 58, 78,
156, 161, 165– 70, 175– 76, 181,
273n132. See also US politicians and officials (e.g., Ball, George;
Bundy, McGeorge; Harriman,
Averell; Haynes, Ulric; Johnson,
Lyndon B.; Komer, Robert; Rusk,
Dean; Williams, G. Mennen);
US government and military institutions (e.g., CIA; Joint Chiefs
of Staff; NSC)
Verwoerd, Hendrick, 64, 190
Victoria Falls Conference, 15, 18, 191
Vienna Convention, 145
Vietnam: Labour Party and, 68, 207;
Rhodesia linked with in Anglo-
American relations, 156, 182; US
preoccupied by at time of UDI,
174, 176, 178; Wilson and, 46,
98, 102, 137, 204; Zambian airlift
affected by US involvement in, 169
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Walker, Patrick Gordon, 21, 86– 87,
164– 65, 180, 199, 205, 237n115,
238n140
Walker, Victor Lee, 61
Wall, Patrick, 69
Walston, Henry, 24
Wankie colliery, 56, 166
Welensky, Roy: Bottomley- Gardiner
visit assessed by, 221n123; British
government and 158, 162, 190,
230n6; Communist threat in
Africa according to, 196; Edgar
Whitehead and, 164; Winston Field
and, 129
“White Redoubt,” 138, 159
Whitehead, Edgar: British government
and, 159, 191; Ian Smith and,
20; moderate politics of, 17, 191;
Rhodesian Legislative Assembly
warned by, 27; UN Fourth
Committee and, 191; Welensky
and, 164
Whitelaw, William, 69
Wigg, George, 57, 62– 64
Williams, Eric, 95
Williams, G. Mennen (“Soapy”):
Alfred Bentley and, 171; Britain
and, 157– 58, 171, 174, 266n15;
bureaucratic politics and, 175;
Central African Federation and,
158– 59; fears Rhodesia being
pushed into closer association with
South Africa and Portugal, 159–
60; policy recommendations in
UN, 189, 194
Williams, Marcia, 70, 205
Willoughby, John, 66
Wilson, Harold: Abubakar Tafawa
Balewa and, 103– 4, 138;
bureaucratic politics and, 49– 50;
Cabinet management, 5, 27–
28, 46– 47, 98, 181, 228n255;
Commonwealth policy of, 6,
85, 87, 206; Commonwealth
consultative committee proposal,
97– 98; Commonwealth Prime
Ministers’ Meetings and, 33, 84,
95ff.; Communism and, 87, 89,
183, 193, 197– 98; Conservatives
and, 26– 27, 36, 39, 69, 75,
203– 4; economic sanctions and,
45, 47, 51, 76– 78, 105– 6, 176,
182; force and, 27– 28, 38, 58–
59, 63, 74– 76, 78– 79, 80– 81,
105, 176, 193, 200– 201, 205,
240n177, 240n182, 241n212;
Holyoake and, 131, 133ff.; House
of Commons statements, 32, 67,
96, 107, 183, 200– 201; Ian Smith
and, 24ff., 74, 88– 89, 113, 131ff.,
198, 226n227; Johnson and, 77,
172– 73, 175, 177, 274nn141– 42,
274n144; Kaunda and, 59, 78,
96, 104, 106– 7; MacDonald’s
assessment of, 104, 108; majority
rule and, 13, 21, 22, 24, 35,
41, 51, 109, 113, 203; Menzies
and, 102, 131, 133ff., 258n109,
259n133; Nyerere and, 100,
102– 3; Pearson and, 99– 100,
104, 108, 133ff., 195; Opposition
years, 21– 24; Rhodesia policy and
negotiations dominated by, 5,
21 35, 45– 47, 204– 5, 228n259;
Royal Commission proposed by,
38– 39; United Nations and, 103,
183, 193, 195, 197– 98; United
States and, 164, 170ff.; Vietnam
and, 46, 98, 102, 137, 204; visits
Salisbury, 36– 38, 70, 138, 173,
194, 220n94, 224n190, 224n192
Wright, Oliver: Commonwealth Prime
Ministers’ Meeting (Sept. 1966)
recalled by, 108; continuity
in Britain’s Rhodesia policy
acknowledged by, 203– 4; decision
to rule out use of force explained
by, 75; moratorium on Rhodesian
independence issue suggested by,
43; Rhodesia a “second order”
problem according to, 178;
supremacy of domestic issues over
foreign affairs acknowledged by,
81; Vietnam peace initiative details
worked out by, 98; Wilson’s visit to
Rhodesia assessed by, 37
Wyatt, Woodrow, 68
Yates, Sidney R., 192
Yew, Lee Kuan, 106
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Zambia: Anglo- American consultation
and cooperation on problems of,
48, 58, 78, 156, 161, 165– 70,
175– 76, 181, 273n132; Bottomley
attends independence celebrations
in, 25; British military forces in,
57– 58, 62– 63, 78; Commonwealth
mission opposed by, 132; concept
of crisis and, 9, 200– 202, 282n112;
economic effects of the UDI on,
28, 49, 58, 76, 96, 98, 105– 6, 118,
139, 147, 165ff., 201, 247n91,
272n97; further research needed
on, 208; harboring of guerilla forces
in, 96, 234n60; Soviet Union and,
198. See also Kaunda, Kenneth
Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU), 16, 126, 165
Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union
(ZAPU), 16, 159, 165
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