Revival of Political Islam in the Aftermath of Arab Uprisings: Implications for the Region and Beyond

8/12/2019 Revival of Political Islam in the Aftermath of Arab Uprisings: Implications for the Region and Beyond

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Strategic Studies Instituteand

U.S. Army War College Press

REVIVAL OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN THEAFTERMATH OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS:

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONAND BEYOND

Mohammed El-Katiri

July 2014

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FOREWORD

Regime change during the Arab Spring allowed Is-lamist political forces that long had been marginalizedto achieve political inuence in Tunisia, Egypt, andLibya. Meanwhile, Moroccos rst government ledby an Islamist party has been in power since January2012. This trend caused widespread concern over thefuture direction of these states; but despite the tragicexample of Egypt, few negative predictions have yetbeen borne out.

In this monograph, Dr. El-Katiri, a British analystwith many years of experience in reporting on theMiddle East and North Africa, cautions against anoverly simplistic assessment of this rise in the inu-ence and power of political Islam. He uses an exten-sive range of source material to show that the political

crises besetting each of these Islamist governmentsare not necessarily of their own making, but insteadare determined by objective circumstances. He alsodescribes how in several key respects the aims of Is-lamist parties are in line with U.S. aspirations forthe region.

The Strategic Studies Institute recommends thismonograph to all readers studying and working withNorth African states, as well as those interested in thetopic of political Islam more broadly.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MOHAMMED EL-KATIRI is a Director of MENAInsights, a political risk consultancy that focuses onthe Middle East and North Africa, and a Senior Re-search Analyst at the United Kingdoms (UK) ConictStudies Research Centre (CSRC). Before joining CSRC,Dr. El-Katiri was a Research Fellow at the UK DefenceAcademy, and later served as a Political Risk Analystat Eurasia Group and as a senior researcher at theHague Institute for Global Justice. He has more than10 years of regional experience. His research interestsinclude political and economic security in North Af-rica and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states,North African relations with the European Union,and security policies around the Mediterranean. Dr.El-Katiri has published numerous internal and exter-

nal UK Defence Academy reports, including referencepapers on national and regional security issues in theGCC and the Mediterranean and a monograph on theAlgerian national oil and gas company Sonatrach. Hispublications also include commentaries and researchpapers in a range of languages for research organiza-tions in the UK and Europe, as well as various news-paper articles dealing with the region. Dr. El-Katiri isa frequent commentator in media, including the BBC,the Financial Times, andAl-Jazeera.


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SUMMARY

As part of the radical political changes that haveaffected a number of Arab countries over the past 4years, the toppling of regimes and the organization ofthe rst fair and free elections in several Arab stateshave allowed Islamist parties to rise to power. Thishighly visible political trend has caused mixed reac-tions, both within these countries and internationally.Prior to the Arab Spring, most countries in the regionbanned Islamist movements from forming politicalparties. For decades, members of such movementswere jailed, tortured, and exiled from their homecountries. Even in those states where Islamist politicalparties were allowed, they had limited freedom andwere under the scrutiny of the regimes, as was, for ex-ample, the Moroccan Justice and Development Party.

The varied experiences of Islamist political partiesin power over the last 2 years in Tunisia, Morocco, andEgypt offer a mixed picture. The debacle of MuslimBrotherhood rule in Egypt captured a great deal of in-ternational attention, but it did not resemble the trajec-tory of other governing Islamist parties in the region.Electorates have been disappointed by the perfor-mance of Islamist-led governments, which turned outto be unprepared to govern. Their poor performanceis not only due to a lack of capability; it is also dueto the fact that integration into the existing politicalsystem has not been smooth and free of obstruction.Islamist parties have faced erce resistance both fromsecular parties and other forces in their respective so-cieties and from abroad, as is evident from the opposi-

tion of rich Arab Gulf Monarchies.Completed in 2013, this monograph does not in-

clude the most recent political developments in all


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of the three countries under discussion, but it estab-lishes a number of important and persistent themes.

It provides an overview of the factors behind the vic-tory of Islamist parties in Egypt, Morocco, and Tuni-sia, and continues by examining their performancein power in different policy areas, with a particularfocus on foreign policy. It argues that policymak-ers should not follow the popular trend of reducingthe delicate political transition underway in Egypt,Tunisia, and Morocco to simple ideological differ-ences between Islamist parties and their secular op-ponents. Instead, this is a reection of an ongoingstruggle between traditional elites. Furthermore, itshould be remembered that, contrary to widespreadfears, the foreign policy aims of Islamist politicalparties in North Africa coincide with the aims of theUnited States and its allies in a number of key areas.

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REVIVAL OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN THEAFTERMATH OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS:

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONAND BEYOND

INTRODUCTION

The uprisings that have swept across the Arabworld since December 2010 have resulted in drasticchanges in the political landscape of several countries,and brought new dynamics in intraregional relations.The long-term political regimes rst of Tunisia, thenEgypt, Libya, and later Yemen were ousted, and oth-er Arab leaders were pressured to announce a set ofinstitutional and constitutional reforms. Subsequentelections for new governments brought about sweep-ing victories for Islamic parties in both Tunisia and

Egypt, with Islamic protest movements crowdingthe streets in many other Arab neighbors, includingLibya, Algeria, and Syria. Moroccos rst governmentled by an Islamic party took ofce in January 2012, fol-lowing increasingly large electoral successes at twoprevious elections in the 2000s. These victories are nosmall development for the Arab region; for the rsttime in the modern history of these countries, Islamicpolitical parties are now ascending to power throughdemocratic elections.

Islamist groups do not have to win elections tochange the political landscape; the experiences of Al-geria and Libya provide instructive examples. Againstthe expectations of many observers, Islamists per-formed poorly in the 2012 elections in both countries,

but they continue to distort local politics. In Libya, avictory by liberals does not mean the inuence of Is-lamists in the political sphere has vanished. The Mus-


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lim Brotherhood-inspired Islamist group is shapingthe political and security situation in parliament and

the streets through its militias. In Algeria, the Islamistparties were not victorious in the legislative electionsof May 2012, a result that surprised many observerswho predicted Algeria would follow in the footstepsof its neighbors, Morocco and Tunisia. But Algeriaselection results have generated much discussionwithin Algerian political circles about the role of theregime in manipulating the elections.1

Where Islamic governments are already in powerin the Islamic world, their troubles are not over. At thetime of this writing, the three elected Islamist govern-ments in the region are each experiencing a politicalcrisis that has either suspended their rule or threatenstheir coalitions. In Egypt, the Egyptian military oustedPresident Mohammed Morsi in July 2013 and arrested

several of his ministers and leaders of the MuslimBrotherhood. In Tunisia and Morocco, both Islamist-led governments are entangled in political crises thatmay cause their coalition governments to fall apart.

The problems these governments face are not nec-essarily self-inicted. Both in Egypt and in Tunisia,and to some extent also in Morocco, Islamist partiescame to power at the most challenging political andeconomic moment since these countries gained in-dependence decades ago. They inherited precariousand challenging economic situations, characterized bywidening budget decits, soaring food prices, dwin-dling foreign reserves, and increased unemployment.Facing these enormous challenges, the Arab worldsIslamist parties share a common lack of governing ex-

perience, often tied to (1) their rst time in ofce; (2)their typically high focus on religious-ideological top-ics rather than core themes such as economic reform


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including a complicated political backdrop and lack ofexperience in running a government. For this analy-

sis, we highlight common features that characterizethe time in power of all these governments, leadingto conclusions about the nature of political Islam asa whole.

The rst section of the monograph examines thereasons behind the Islamist parties emerging as themain political force in the rst free and fair elections inthe history of the region. The second section outlinesthe internal political and economic challenges facedby these Islamist-led governments over the previous2 years. Finally, the third section discusses the trajec-tory of the three countries foreign policies during theIslamists rule.

FOUNDATIONS OF ISLAMIST ELECTORAL

SUCCESS

To gauge the importance of the moderate Islamistsascent to power, a brief history of their political expe-rience is necessary. In contrast to many radical Islamicgroups that believed in and adopted violence as a wayto achieve political change, moderate Islamist move-ments adopted a more constructive attitude and rolein society. They rejected violence and accepted demo-cratic rules as a way to compete for political power,including as political parties. During the 1990s and2000s, many of these groups, including the Egyp-tian Muslim Brotherhood, gradually turned into defacto opposition movements, using human rights anddemocratic rhetoric and the ght against systemic cor-

ruption in existing political cadres as an integral partof their political programs.2 Throughout the years,many of these groups managed to rene and mod-


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erate their political thinking and win more supportacross society.

Moroccos Party of Justice and Development (PJD),Tunisias Ennahda movement, and Egypts MuslimBrotherhood have since pragmatically moderatedtheir stances on several societal issues such as person-al liberties, gender equality, and economic affairs. Inthe Moroccan and Tunisian case, women have been acritical element, both within those parties and as sup-porters and voters. The PJD party has promoted itselfas a very moderate Islamic party, dissipating fearsamong some that the party could turn into anotherAlgerian Islamic Salvation Front; the party embracesthrough its rhetoric human rights and the importanceof tourism, and has shied away from including viewsabout the consumption of alcohol in its program.Within government, the party has focused on social

sector reform, rather than on ministries traditionallyheld and managed by the King or one of his allied par-ties, such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministryof Islamic Affairs.

The bloody outcome of the Arab worlds rst elec-toral victory of an Islamic party, the Islamic SalvationFront (FIS) in Algeria in 1991, nevertheless served asa rst warning to those who seemed to believe thatthe future of the Middle East could be assured underIslamic-democratic governments. The victory of FISin the rst round of elections led to the military mov-ing in to cancel the second round in December 1991,which led to the outbreak of a decade-long civil warand is estimated to have cost 200,000 lives. Althoughthe Islamist movements were an inuential political

force, their political participation thereafter was re-strained. The Islamist movements were not allowed toform political parties and participate formally in elec-


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tions, and so, in most countries, members of Islamistmovements would run for elections as independents.

Nevertheless, Islamic parties discourses and ac-tivities constituted a serious challenge to the stabilityand continuity of political regimes in power in theirrespective countries. The Arab regimes observed withgreat concern the rise of Islamist movements, andused a range of measures to curb their progress andpopularity among the public. Experiences varied fromone country to another, but Islamists were prohibitedfrom participating in political institutions as politicalparties for years and saw their members jailed, killed,or exiled. Even when Islamists were allowed to forma civil, not religious, political party, as was the caseof PJD in Morocco,3they were deeply mistrusted andcontinuously scrutinized. The regimes used all com-munication tools and means to limit the moderate Is-

lamists appeal to the public. In Morocco, the rise toprominence of any Islamic movement is perceived asa challenge to exclusive prerogatives of the King. TheMoroccan monarch, as Commander of the Faithful, isthe supreme religious authority in the country. Thisspiritual position constitutes an important elementof the monarchs legitimacy as a descendent of theprophet Mohammed. The Islamic movement in Tu-nisia suffered from oppression and persecutions fordecades under Ben Alis regime. Tunisian authoritiesrejected applications by Islamist movements to con-stitute a political party and participate in political lifeas an organization. Following the 1989 elections, mostEnnahda leaders left the country to seek refuge in dif-ferent countries around the world. Zine El Abidine

Ben Alis regime saw in the Islamists a threat to secu-larism and the interests of the ruling class.4


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The experience in Egypt was not much different.The Muslim Brotherhood leadership and members

were intimidated and harassed by the ruling party andsecurity agencies.5Inuential members of the Brother-hood organization were routinely arrested and sen-tenced to jail.6After they were outlawed in 1954 dur-ing Gamal Abdel Nassers rule, Muslim Brotherhoodmembers were banned from constituting a politicalparty. They were only allowed to participate in leg-islative or local elections as independent candidatesduring Mubaraks rule, but with a tacit agreement thatthey should present a limited number of independentcandidates.

The post-revolution era saw a change of approachtoward the Islamist movements aspirations to par-ticipate in the political system. Several political par-ties have been legalized in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia.

In Egypt, the Al-Nour party, representing the Salamovement, was legalized in June 2011 by the PoliticalParties Affairs Commission,7and became the secondmost important political party in the country. In thesame period, the Muslim Brotherhood received a fa-vorable response to its demand to establish the Free-dom and Justice Party. Post-Qadha Libya saw theburgeoning of political parties after revoking a law in-troduced by Qadha in the 1970s that banned politicalparties, including the Islamist Justice and Construc-tion party and Al-Umma al-Wasat party. Anothermovement that came to prominence in revolution-af-fected countries is the Sala groups in Tunisia, Egypt,and Morocco.

It is only with this background in mind that one can

understand the momentousness of the change in theArab political landscape. But the question remains ofhow the Islamists garnered all the support they need-


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ed for landslide victories. The triumph of Islamists inelections can be attributed to two main factors. First,

the popularity of these parties is mainly accredited tothe fact that millions of Arabs see in Islamist politi-cians an answer to their socio-economic expectations.High rates of unemployment, soaring living costs, andregional and social income disparities were some ofthe fundamental factors that sparked protests and rev-olutions across the region since December 2010.8Thesewere the kind of issues that Islamist movements havestriven to address. Moderate Islamist groups capital-ized on all the failures and shortcomings of previousgovernments in order to build their political discourse.

The Islamist parties campaigned to ght corrup-tion and bring fair distribution of wealth; they haveopposed regimes oppressive and undemocratic prac-tices; they called for respect for human rights and the

need to introduce democratic reforms and good gov-ernance; in many cases, they strengthened their cred-ibility by matching their words with actions, by build-ing schools and hospitals, and by collecting money forvarious social causes. For years, Islamic movementsin all countries played an important role in providingservices that the state failed to provide to economi-cally and socially marginalized social groups. TheMuslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for instance, ran chari-table organizations, schools, hospitals, and housingcooperatives for millions of Egyptians.9 It providedloans to start businesses for entrepreneurs. This madethe movements very popular among many disenfran-chised social groups and political idealists (educatedgroups that dreamed of a well-functioning, fair, and

democratic nation) in Arab societies. Moreover, bothmembership and the constituency of Islamist partiesdiffers signicantly from that of other established par-


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ties: these are not based on family, tribal, ethnic, orother long-term established clientelist ties, but rather

on a shared belief. In Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia,where few sectarian minorities exist, the popularfeeling of we, versus the old-established system ofthem ruling us, is perhaps best captured by theIslamist movementsa factor explaining the massappeal of these movements.

Second, the collapse of the dominant ruling par-ties in Egypt and Tunisiathe National DemocraticParty and Rassemblement Constitutionnele Democratique(RCD), alongside their long-term presidents, HosniMubarak and Zineddine Ben Ali, respectivelyleft avacuum in the political scene. Having dominated po-litical life in its entirety for decades, these parties leftfew other options in the political playing eld. Withboth systemic and popular pressure for a quick hando-

ver of power via new elections, little time was avail-able for the development of political culture and par-ties, leaving the eld open to those social trends withthe most established supportwhich, under thesetotalitarian regimes, were the primary socially activeIslamic networks. Other opposition parties were smalland weak. Their failure to win large public supporthas been ascribed to several factors, chief among thembeing weak leadership, lack of internal democracyand detachment from the masses demands and aspi-rations.10Often including former members of the oust-ed regimes, they were perceived as regime-endorsedparties lacking any genuine interest in bringing aboutpolitical and economic changes. On the contrary, themoderate Islamists managed to gain the reputation of

being genuine in their opposition to the regime andcalls for rotation of powermany of them had them-selves been harassed and imprisoned for many years


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and therefore held credibility in their aspiration forchange. In Morocco, a country that was not so much

affected by the popular upheavals, the traditional left-ist political parties lost their popular political appealafter their poor performance in previous governmentssince the 1990s.

Political Islam emerged as the main winner of thepopular upheavals and revolutions that swept theArab world since December 2010, despite the fact thatthe Islamist movement had no leadership role in theinstigation of popular protests. The triumph of Is-lamist parties has been a historical turning point in thepolitical history of these Arab countries. It might nothave been entirely surprising for countries like Egyptand Morocco, where Islamists had large constituenciesand a history of participation in the political life, buttheir victory in Tunisia was unexpected and surprised

Tunisian political and civil society as well as the out-side world. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood hadbeen the only challenging force to the ruling NationalDemocratic Party (NDP) in parliamentary electionssince 2000. In 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood, throughits members presenting as independent candidates,won 88 seats in the Egyptian parliament despite stillat that point being a banned organization.11

Alarmed by the rise of this movement, the Egyp-tian regime responded with the adoption of a set ofmeasures to restrain the Islamist organizations role inthe political institutions.12Measures employed by theEgyptian regime included arrests of Muslim Brother-hood members, including some of its leading gures,and closures of businesses owned by Muslim Broth-

erhood members. These measures, coupled with ma-nipulation of votes and voters, resulted in dramaticlosses of Muslim Brotherhood candidates in the 2010


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parliamentary elections, and a landslide victory for theNDP. Meanwhile in Morocco, PJD had been licensed

as political party since the mid-1990s, participatingactively in Moroccan political life since then. Over thenext 2 decades, PJD strengthened its position in theMoroccan political scene, and the number of parlia-ment seats won by its candidates grew steadily sinceits rst participation in general elections in 1997.

THE END OF THE HONEYMOON:THE MANY CHALLENGES FACINGTHE ISLAMIST GOVERNMENTS

Translating the initial momentum of electoral sup-port into real policy change in the region has not beenan easy task for the elected Islamists. The Islamist-ledgovernments had to deal with many urgent issues,

chief among them inherited socio-economic problemsthat had been much exacerbated in Tunisia and Egyptby months of political upheaval, legal and economicuncertainty, and a national security service at high po-litical alert. Moreover, as newcomers to the politicalsystem, Islamist parties have generally faced the chal-lenge of how to integrate and function on a politicallevel surrounded by the remnants of the old regimeswhich are still very much present. The revolutions inEgypt and Tunisia deposed key gures of the politi-cal systems but did not remove the bureaucracy and,most importantly, did not eradicate old mindsets. Theold regime was composed of security ofcers, bureau-crats, judiciary ofcials, and businessmen that hadvested interests in the continuity and the stability of

the system. In Morocco, many parts of the bureau-cracy, including ministerial staff, are the predominantclients of theMakhzen, the ruling establishment made


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up of the King and his supporters, including Palace-supported political parties. In this context, it becomes

less surprising that Islamist politics have not yet foundan effective path forward.

Integrating New Parties into Old PoliticalStructures.

The rise to prominence of Islamist parties in sev-eral Arab countries was not welcomed by all segmentsof Arab societies and ruling regimes. For instance, theelected Islamists encountered stiff resistance from thebureaucratic apparatus. Several bureaucratic elites,who in theory are supposed to be politically neutral,showed strong antipathy toward the Islamists andtheir reform agenda. Several instances of tensionshave emerged between Islamists and civil service in-

stitutions. Bureaucrats have blocked or delayed pro-cedures or were not responsive to the governmentalinitiatives. Senior technocrats appointed by the for-mer regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, or by the King inMorocco, have aligned their forces with leftist parties,secularism proponents, and economic elites in orderto oppose the Islamists. The power struggle betweenthe judiciary and Egypts Morsi on several reformprojects is an illustration of the difculties the Islamistrulers have faced.13

It should be noted that the opposition of bureau-cracy cadres was not only ideologically driven, but inmost cases is a struggle to maintain power, privileges,and economic interests. Many proponents of Islamfrom the regimes are socially conservative, but still

would not support an Islamist reform agenda. Moroc-co is the best example where many inuential fami-lies that make up the Makhzen are conservative, and


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adherence to Islamic values and traditions constitutesa signicant part of their social prestige. Neverthe-

less, they are still considered opponents of PJD and itssocio-economic reform agenda. In sum, bureaucraticopposition is not oriented solely against Islamists butagainst any political formation that could endangerexisting socio-economic entitlements.

This resistance was expected. Most technocratswere part of a culture that perceived Islam-inspiredpolitical movements as an existential threat to the re-gimes of which they were a part. These technocratsplayed an important role in government strategies tomanage the phenomenon of political Islam. Responsesby previous regimes ranged from repression to co-op-tion approaches, from persecuting and jailing the Is-lamist militants and activists to allowing them to runfor elections. Unlike Libya, where the post-revolution

government adopted a vetting law that affected of-cers and ofcials from across the state bureaucracy,Tunisia and Egypt have taken a different course. InTunisia, the draft law for the protection of the revo-lution is not as broad as the Libyan one. Vetting hasbeen limited to senior political gures who served inBen Alis government or the dissolved ConstitutionalDemocratic Rally (CDR).14

The Islamist-led coalition governments in Tunisiaand Morocco have gone through episodes of tensionsbetween Islamist parties on one hand, and their gov-ernment partners and opposition parties on the oth-er.15This is more pronounced in the case of Tunisia,where secular resistance to the Islamist governmenttriggered social unrest and political revolt for months

in Tunisian cities, and plunged the country into po-litical uncertainty. Residents of Sidi Bouzid, a townwhere the revolution began in December 2010, took


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to the streets on several occasions to protest againstthe failure of the Islamist-led government to tackle

their socio-economic grievances. Some of these pro-tests lead to violent confrontations with police forces,as was the case in August 2012.16Similar violent pro-tests happened in other peripheral cities such as theprotests in Siliana in November 2012.17 The protestswere not only conned to the peripheral cities, buthave also affected the capital Tunis that experiencedseveral riots and strikes. In June 2012, the Tunisiangovernment imposed an overnight curfew followingviolent protests by Salasts over an art exhibition thatwas deemed disrespectful of Islamic morality.18

The difcult political transition almost fracturedthe Ennahda party in February 2013. Islamist PrimeMinister Hamadi Jebali proposed without any consul-tation with his party a plan to form an apolitical gov-

ernment. This attempt to appease the political tensionsand polarization of Tunisian society was worsenedfurther by the assassination of leftist political leaderChokri Belaid, and ensuing violent protests. The solu-tion did not win political support within Ennahda andwas ercely rejected by several key members of theparty, including its leader, Rachid Ghannoushi, on thebasis of concerns regarding the image and credibilityof the party in front of its voters.

Following his failure to form a government oftechnocrats, Jebali resigned from his position.19A newcabinet was formed where important ministerial port-folios, such as defense, interior, and justice, went totechnocrats. These political concessions did not winEnnahda peace. Unsatised about limited political

power to shape the new political order in the post-BenAli era, the secular opposition parties have constantlycriticized the performance of the Ennahda-led govern-


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ment. Secular critics have accused Ennahda of adopt-ing a lax attitude toward increasing Sala violence,

and of having a hidden counterdemocratic agenda.These accusations and counteraccusations betweenthe two political blocs have polarized Tunisian soci-ety still further. In the view of Tunisian intellectuals,this emerging schism poses the main security threat toTunisian society, and could push the country to cha-os.20After months of political standstill, the Ennahdaparty has at the time of this writing still not reached anagreement with the secular opposition parties to endtheir political differences and agree on a political roadmap.21The opposition parties are calling for the dis-solution of the current government and the holding ofnew elections.

Morocco remained relatively stable compared toEgypt and Tunisia. The country did not experience

mass violence, and most demonstrations were peace-ful. However, the government still went through con-tinuous political crises. At the time of this writing,the PJD-led government is on the brink of collapse.Since its election victory in 2011, PJDs ministers anddecisions had received continuous criticism fromopposition parties, in particular from its ideologi-cal rival, the Authenticity and Modernity Party. Thisgroup is regarded by many observers as the Palacesparty, and one of its fundamental missions since itsestablishment in 2008 has been to limit the politicaldominance of Islamist movements. The antagonismtoward the PJD ministers was not limited to its op-position rivals but came also from within its coalitionpartners. The PJD-led government became a minority

government following the withdrawal of one of its im-portant coalition partners, the Istiqlal Party, in June2013. The PJD had no other options than to approach


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one of its opposition rivals, the National Rally of Inde-pendents, to negotiate the terms of their participation

in the government.22

The Moroccan electoral systemdoes not allow any party to win a clear majority andgovern alone.

Islamists also have external opponents. Severalcountries have seen in the rise of Islamist parties a di-rect threat to their strategic interests. At the regionallevel, the Gulf monarchies saw in the election of theMuslim Brotherhood in Egypt a threat to their own na-tional stability and interests in the region. Historically,Egyptian Muslim Brothers have had an inuence ontheir offshoots across the Arab world, including in theGulf countries. The Gulf rulers were concerned thatthese ties could be exploited to challenge their author-ity. United Arab Emirates (UAE) Foreign Minister,Abdullah bin Zayed, openly expressed these concerns,

saying that:

The Muslim Brotherhood does not believe in the na-tion state. It does not believe in the sovereignty ofthe state. There were individuals within the MuslimBrotherhood who would be able to use their prestigeand capabilities to violate the sovereignty, laws andrules of other countries.23

Based on these assumptions, Gulf regimes, led bySaudi Arabia and the UAE, worked actively to restrainthe political success of the Muslim Brotherhood dur-ing the period of Morsis rule. Gulf countries, otherthan Qatar, froze their nancial aid to Egypt in orderto accentuate the failure of the Islamists. It is reveal-ing that both Saudi Arabia and the UAE announced

$8 billion in aid to tackle Egypts immediate nan-cial and economic problems directly after the oustingof Morsi.24 The timing of the Gulf rulers generosity


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was aimed to send a strong signal to Egyptian votersthat voting against the Muslim Brotherhood brings

prosperity.25

Beyond the Arab world, a statement by French

Minister of the Interior Manuel Valls illustrates suchfears. He remarked that:

There is an Islamic fascism rising everywhere, but thisobscurantism must, of course, be condemned becauseit denies the democracy for which the Libyan, Tuni-

sian and Egyptian people have fought it is a consid-erable issue not only for Tunisians but for the wholeMediterranean space and thus for France.26

Ideological Opposition of Secularists andReligious Minorities.

This change in the political balance has alarmed re-

ligious and political forces and minorities, particularlysecularist parties, which saw in these developmentsa potential threat to liberal and modern values and,most importantly, to their privileges. These concernsare not new.

Liberals and secularists have a history of resent-ment against Islamists in the Arab world. The victory

of Islamists in several Arab countries revived old dis-agreements and rivalry between Islamists and secu-larists. The general concern of the liberal and secular-ist groups is the future of civil liberties and freedoms.For instance, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood afterthe 2005 parliamentary elections worried Copts andleftists in Egypt because of the potential inuence thatthe Brotherhood could exercise on legislation. The

vagueness of the Muslim Brotherhoods societal proj-ect remains the primary contributor to the worries ofEgyptian minorities and liberals. The long-standing


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slogan, Islam is the solution, used by the MuslimBrothers in many parliamentary elections is confusing

and adds to the anxiety of the proponents of a civilstate. In effect, the Muslim Brotherhood has failed toexplain how exactly Islam will provide solutions toEgypts problems. A comment by a Coptic intellec-tual published in the Egyptian newspaper,Al-Ahram,captures the worries of his community once the Mus-lim Brotherhood is in power, rich Copts will leavethe country while the poor Copts will stay . . . maybesome of them will be converted . . . I hope I die beforethis happens.27

The return of sectarian strife across different Egyp-tian regions since the ousting of Mubarak has rein-forced worries among Copts. Although the MuslimBrotherhood apparently did not incite its membersto attack Copts, the involvement of Islamists in at-

tacks against Copts or justication of such clashes ona religious basis have only entrenched the idea thatIslamists are a threat to the Copts.

The ongoing political discussion in post-revolutionEgypt on the role of Islam as a source of legislation isanother important illustration of the divide betweenthe two groups. Attempts by Egyptian and TunisianIslamists in constituent assemblies to give Islam andIslamic law an important position in the constitutionsdraw strong opposition from secularist groups andparties that advocate a separation between religionand politics.

During the electoral campaigns, most Islamistpublic gures in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt werepushed, by inammatory media articles and protests,

to reassure the public about their adherence to dem-ocratic rules, and respect for human rights and per-sonal liberties as well as a free market. They had to


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clarify their positions to local public and internationalobservers on different issues including tourism, con-

sumption of alcohol, the role of women in society, andthat it is not their intention to impose a way of life ormake people more religious. In an article published inthe British newspaper, The Guardian, Tunisias RachidGhannouchi wrote that:

We have long advocated democracy within the main-stream trend of political Islam, which we feel is the

best system that protects against injustice and authori-tarianism. In addition, it provides institutions andmechanisms to guarantee personal and public liber-ties . . . protection of the rights of women, separationof powers, independence of the judiciary, press andmedia freedom and protection of minority rights. Allthese are in no way contradictory with Islam, but re-ect the Islamic principles of consultation, justice andaccountability as we understand them.28

The worries of secularists and non-Muslim mi-norities might appear exaggerated. But there are prec-edents in Gaza and Iran, where Islamist governmentsadopted a range of policy initiatives to moralizetheir respective societies.29The mistrust runs so deepbetween the two groups that attempts by Islamist lead-

ers in Morocco and Tunisia to display moderation andpragmatism in their political and societal plans haveonly brought limited success. Originally, this schismwas an ideological disagreement limited to intellectu-als, but secularism has come to serve as a symbol ofprotection of the interests of the political and econom-ic elites, including gures from the old regimes in the

case of Tunisia and Egypt.


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Insufcient Institutional Capability.

Elected governments in Tunisia and Egypt inher-ited a murky economic situation following the revolu-tions in January 2011. The price of the revolutions waseconomic recession, increased unemployment, and se-vere imbalances in public nances. Political instabilityand uncertainty have severely affected the function-ing of key economic sectors in both countries. For ex-ample, continuous strikes and social unrest have ham-pered phosphate production in Ghafsa, Tunisia, andphosphate accounts for 7 percent of Tunisian grossdomestic product (GDP). In 2012, the Compagnie desPhosphates de Ghafsa lost 60 percent of its produc-tion compared to previous years.30Tourist arrivals inboth countries have, unsurprisingly, dropped signi-cantly over the last 3 years, and have failed to return

to pre-revolution levels. Both countries have lost theirattractiveness to foreign investors. Foreign Direct In-vestments (FDI) have dropped considerably.31

Thus, it is not surprising that addressing economicchallenges featured in political discourses and govern-ment decisions as the rst priority of the Islamist-ledgovernments in the region. Their focus started withrestoring macroeconomic stability, but since then hasnot moved on from this approach. Their reforms werenot aimed at solving structural economic issues suchas unemployment, ination, and stimulating econom-ic growth, but rather focused on tackling scal stabil-ity and foreign reserves. They lacked a comprehensiveplan to deal with the difcult economic challenges oftheir respective societies. With no exception, all the

Islamist-led governments have failed to come up withcomprehensive and sustainable policy initiatives tostimulate economic growth, create jobs, and attract in-


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vestments. The Islamist-led governments were mainlyin a reactive rather than a proactive mode.

It is not only foreign investors that were deterred bysocial and political tensions and uncertainty, but alsolocal investors. Consumer and business condencehave been considerably weakened since the eruptionof protests and upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt. Po-litical and legal uncertainties remain the key factorsthat are discouraging domestic investors to investtheir capital in the local economy. For households, itis uncertainty about their jobs and continuity of theirincome that limits their consumption behavior.

Some government decisions have further contrib-uted to business community worries. For instance,judicial investigations on corruption cases involvingbusinesses linked to the ousted Ben Ali clan have notnished, and they are maintaining a high state of anx-

iety among the Tunisian business community. Hun-dreds of Tunisian businessmen are banned from trav-elling abroad.32The decision of the Egyptian Islamistgovernment to launch a tax-evasion investigationagainst one of the most inuential business families,the Sawiris, was a strategic error and a shortsighteddecision. The case ended with a nancial settlement33but did not erase the concerns of the Egyptian busi-ness community about the future steps of the govern-ment. The community saw in this case a precedent thatcould be further pursued by the government againstmany crony-capitalists from the Mubarak era.

Another initiative that has alarmed both the sec-ular and traditional business community was thelaunch of the Egyptian Business Development Asso-

ciation by the Muslim Brotherhoods business elites.The most important rationale for the new business as-sociation was to counter the inuence of the existing


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powerful Mubarak-linked businessmen, and providethe government with ideas for its economic policy

decisions. The establishment of this new business as-sociation that mainly groups business owners who aresympathetic with Islamist political goals and ideals,was perceived by Egyptian economic elites as a signalof the Muslim Brotherhoods ambitions to replicatethe strategy of the governing Turkish Islamist party,the Justice and Development Party (AKP), in challeng-ing their economic interests and political power.34TheIslamic Bourgeoisie, referring to the Anatolian en-trepreneurs, is considered the backbone of the AKPseconomic and political success.35

In Egypt, the Islamist government encountered dif-culties in its negotiations with international nancialinstitutions to get loans for its development projects.Lack of agreement after onerous and lengthy negotia-

tions between the International Monetary Fund (IMF)and the Egyptian government has negatively impact-ed the Egyptian economy, particularly its credit ratingin international markets. Disagreement on IMF condi-tionality for a $4.8 billion loan sends alarming messagesabout the future growth and macroeconomic stabilityof Egypt. IMF economic adjustment requirements toadd new taxes and reduce spending on subsidies havebeen regarded by the Egyptian government as not themost sensible approach given post-revolution politi-cal and economic conditions. The Egyptian authoritiesdo not disagree on the need for reform to bring moreefciency in the way fuel and food subsidies are spent,but they object to the timing with which these reformsshould be implemented. The Egyptian government

judges immediate implementation to be inappropri-ate given the countrys political climate and peoplesexpectations.


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Over and above the technical details, political di-visions and instability have complicated the negotia-

tion of a nancial loan deal. The IMF has required aconsensus among key political forces on the reformprogram in the country in order to ensure its applica-tion over the coming years, which has been impossi-ble to achieve given the severe political disagreementamong different political forces in the governmentand opposition.

The Islamist movements were caught off guard bythe unexpected change of the political scene in theirrespective countries, as was any other political forcein the region and international community as a whole.The Islamist movements were simply not ready to rule.This is understandable in the case of the Ennahda inTunisia, relatively new to political participation. Butthe cases of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and,

more importantly, the Moroccan PJD evidence a fail-ure to prepare to govern. Both organizations had beenvery active in local politics for decades. For instance,PJD had been established as a political party for al-most 20 years, had participated in a number of legisla-tive and local elections, and played a leading role inthe parliamentary opposition. But it had invested littlein preparing to govern the country.

The economic challenges that Egypt, Morocco,and Tunisia are currently experiencing, with vary-ing degrees of severity, are another symptom of theunpreparedness of the Islamists to govern. Socio-economic indicators have deteriorated.36 The mainreason is the lack of business experience and exper-tise of the Islamist leaders and among their cadres.

The second reason is more political in nature. TheIslamists lacked the political instinct to counter themaneuvering of their opponents from the traditional


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economic and political elites and their establishedpatronage network that extended into the public

administration.The problems of Islamist movements have not been

lack of knowledgeable individuals on economic af-fairs, but rather lack of institutions and teams that areable to develop strategies for key sectors and imple-ment them. Some of these individuals had theoreticalknowledge that was not accompanied with practicalexpertise to bring real change on the ground. For in-stance, Ridha Saidi, Ennahdas leading economist, hadshowed an understanding of the needs of some of thecountrys strategic economic sectors during the elec-toral campaign in 2011, such as the tourism sector, andpromised several steps to revitalize the industry.37Thesuggested solutions were a series of generic commonsense measures, which did not reect any innovative

thinking to present a tailor-made solution that tackledthe structural problems of the sector or recognize theongoing political instability and lack of security.

What all the Islamist parties that achieved powerhave lacked is the support of an advisory group ofexperts that are able to provide policy-oriented ad-vice and prepare initiatives to the government. TheIslamists relied entirely on the technocrats in thebureaucracy to develop new initiatives to present tothe government for endorsement and implementa-tion. This has been a nave assumption and a tacti-cal mistake. The governing Islamist leadership didnot take into consideration the lack of capacityand willingnessof the executive cadres to providesuch solutions.

Although socio-economic reforms were at thecenter of their demands and concerns, Islamist par-ties never developed alternative policies or thinking


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to achieve economic growth and improve economicconditions for the majority. This structural dearth of

governing experience and policy implementation ca-pability was evident in the electoral campaigns. TheIslamist parties manifestos lacked any detailed eco-nomic sections on how to deal with the economic chal-lenges. Apart from generic aims such as ghting cor-ruption and building an economy based on solidarityand Islamic values, the programs did not include anyspecic measures and instruments on how to attainsuch goals.

The Islamist parties failed to benet from severalmeetings with the business community during theelectoral campaign to develop a strategic vision toachieve economic growth. Their objective, then, wasprimarily aimed at reassuring investors of their com-mitments to market economy and support for invest-

ments. For instance, the Ennahda leadership had meet-ings with different Tunisian business organizations inthe country. In November 2011, Ennahda organizeda conference on the tourism sector to discuss withprivate sector investors ways and means to developthe sector, but only limited practical steps have fol-lowed. The Islamist-led government plan, announcedby the Islamist Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkiranein January 2012 at the Moroccan parliament, did notinclude any details on how the government is aimingto achieve macro-economic balances and create jobopportunities. The document did not include a singledetailed policy on how to reduce the budget decit orreform tax policy.38


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ISLAMIST FOREIGN POLICY:A PRAGMATIC TRAJECTORY

The momentous change in the political landscapeof the three countries has not led to signicant policychange in their external relations. Foreign policy didnot feature as a priority policy area for the Islamist-ledgovernments, with their concern and discourse focus-ing instead on internal political and socio-economicissues. During the electoral campaign, the discoursesfocused mainly on themes and policies with broad ap-peal to massesjobs, ghting corruption, and crony-ism. References to foreign relation issues were briefand aimed at signaling continuity to international in-vestors and to governments of strategic importance.There has been no document released that outlines thekey objectives of foreign policy, or the priorities for

today and the coming years.Conversely, foreign observers have shown much

interest in the position of these much-feared politicalplayers in international affairs. The arrival of Islamistsin power in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia raised ques-tions about how the foreign policy of each country andof the entire region would develop. For many observ-ers, the immediate concern was relations with Israeland the Western world. For instance, would Egyptrevoke its peace agreement with Israel? Would therebe a radical change of policy stance toward the Israeli-Palestinian conict? Would security cooperation be-tween the United States and its Arab Mediterraneanpartners continue or experience difculties? Wouldchanges of government imply a transguration of the

regions strategic relations with emerging global pow-ers? For a country like France, the dramatic changesin the political landscape sowed doubts in politi-


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cians and strategists minds about the future of theirstrategic presence in the North African countries.

Two years of Islamist rule in Morocco and Tunisiabrought no shift in the focus and interests of foreignpolicy of either country. This continuity is attributed toseveral key factors. First, the Islamist movements nev-er had a grand strategy for foreign policy. Thus, theirarrival to power did not lead to any major changes intheir governments foreign policy stances and choices.The pragmatism that has characterized Moroccan andTunisian diplomacy still dominates the thinking andpractice of the foreign policy cadres. Foreign policywas mainly designed to protect national economicand political interests, and not to follow any ideologi-cal value or rhetoric such as pan-Arabism or liberaldemocracy. In the case of Morocco, core national po-litical interests merely refer to preserving the national

unity and territorial integrity of the country vis--visWestern Sahara and the Spanish enclaves in the Northof Morocco. The countrys leadership opted for a lowprole policy on regional and international politicalaffairs. The hegemonic aspirations of Morocco in theMaghreb have been muted. The Moroccan leadershiprefrains from openly playing a leading role in regionalaffairs at this critical geostrategic juncture.

The stance of Tunisia regarding the French militaryintervention in Mali is characteristic of the pragmatismadopted by the Islamists in foreign policy. In January2013 Tunisian Foreign Minister Rak Abdessalemvoiced sympathy with the French intervention againstthe terrorist groups in northern regions of Mali.39Thisshowed that strategic relations with France outweigh

the idealistic perspectives of the political party.Second,the change of the political landscape in Tu-

nisia and Morocco did not result in a change of bureau-


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cracy. The technocrats and civil servants remained intheir positions. In Tunisia, diplomats were not at the

center of public scrutiny. The Foreign Affairs Ministrywas not strongly associated with the wrongdoings ofBen Alis regime in the same way as the Ministry ofInterior. For most Tunisians, it was mainly city gov-ernors and senior members of the dominant rulingparty, CDR, that were seen as remnants of Ben Aliloyalists. In Morocco, the foreign policy of the coun-try is to a large extent a domain of the royal palace.The newly-endorsed constitution of July 2011, whichprimarily aimed to placate street protests, has broughtno change to the palaces dominant role in drivingMoroccos diplomatic relations. The appointment offormer Foreign minister Taib Fassi Fehri as the Kingsadvisor, and Yousef Amrani as minister delegate atthe Foreign Ministry next to the Islamist Minister,

Saadeddin Othmani, was intended both to signal andto assure the continuity of the palaces dominance inshaping the foreign policy of Morocco. This has beenclear to most of Moroccos partners, and led to lessdeep concern than in the cases of Tunisia or Egypt.

Third, Islamists have sensed that the imperativesof social stability and economic growth would have todrive foreign policy priorities. Relations with Westerngovernments are perceived as the route to a prosper-ous economy. Both countries are economically de-pendent on their relations with European countries.France remains the largest trading partner of Tunisiaand Morocco. Tunisias new leaders capitalized on thepolitical change that is taking place in their countryto request from their European peers a reinforcement

of their partnership. In November 2012, Tunisia wasgranted the status of advanced partner, which aimsto further reduce barriers to free movement of goods,


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services, and people.40 In Morocco, strengtheningstrategic relations with the European continent fea-

tured in the discourse and initiatives of the PJD-ledgovernment.

In Egypt, the election of Islamists inaugurated anew era for the countrys external relations. Changeshave been few, but remarkable. The most importantones are related to Egypts relations with Israel. Thetwo countries have enjoyed relatively stable securityrelations since the signing of the peace treaty in 1979.But the ousting of Mubaraks government and Egyptsongoing turbulent transition brought new challengesfor Israel. The concerns of Israeli policymakers aboutthe stability of their countrys relations with Egyptwere not misguided.41 There were moments of ten-sions between the two countries following the oust-ing of Mubarak and during the rule of the Supreme

Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), a military junta thatruled Egypt from January 2011 until July 2012, andthe Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian-Israeli gastrade diplomacy was the rst to suffer the repercus-sions of political change in Egypt. Recurring attackson the gas pipelines resulted in a prolonged disrup-tion of gas supplies to Israel in 2011.42The targetingof this strategic infrastructure was not random. Thegas trade between the two countries has been a con-troversial issue since the signing of the agreement in2005. Members of Egyptian civil society campaignedfor years to cancel the deal on a commercial basis.43Under pressure of public opinion, the Egyptian au-thorities rst announced their intention to review theprices of their gas exported to Israel.44 In April 2012,

Egypt announced a unilateral termination of its gassupply contract to Israel. Egyptian authorities assert-ed that the cancelation was due to domestic shortagesand not to political motives.


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Egypt recalled its Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Israel,twice, once under the military rule, and the second

time at the decision of Morsis government to protestIsraeli strikes on the Gaza strip.45 It is important tonote that Egypts post-revolution rulers showed prag-matism in managing their delicate relations with Isra-el, far from any ideological or nationalist dogma. Theonly factor that drove the Egyptian rulers was publicopinion, and both the military and the Muslim Broth-erhood avoided being deemed complacent towardIsrael. Meanwhile, Egypts rulers have tried hard toconvey a message of continuity in their diplomatic re-lations with Israel, and that

their commitment to hon-oring the Camp David Accords with Israel remains afundamental pillar of Egyptian foreign policy.

At the same time, precarious political and eco-nomic circumstances have forced Egypts leadership

to freeze their ambitions to play a leadership role inthe Middle East. For decades, Egypt was regarded asthe central regional power with its large army and dy-namic diplomacy. But the mediation of Morsi in the2012 Israel-Gaza conict should be seen more as mo-tivated by domestic Egyptian factors. An escalationof the conict on Egypts borders could have put theMuslim Brotherhood in a difcult position, given thelong relations between the Brotherhood and Hamasand delicate relations with Israel.46

The limited rapprochement with Iran remains themost controversial foreign policy episode of Presi-dent Morsis time in government. The exchange ofvisits between the two heads of state provoked con-cerns among Egypts traditional strategic partners, the

United States, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) coun-tries, and Israel, about the future direction of Egyptsinternational relations agenda. Morsis initiative did


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more harm to the image of Egypt by confusing itsstrategic neighbors. U.S. and GCC policymakers saw

in this rapprochement by one of their most importantsecurity allies an attempt to undermine their efforts toisolate Iran and pressure its political elites to recon-sider their nuclear development plans. Distancing it-self from Iran constituted an important element of theprevious governments cooperation framework withthe GCC. Over the previous decade, GCC countries,particularly Saudi Arabia, had established a doctrinein their relations with Arab and Muslim countries vis--vis the Iranian threat that could be summarized asyou are either with us or with the other.

The exchange of visits between Iranian PresidentMahmoud Ahmadinejad and Egyptian President Mo-hamed Morsi was not regarded merely as a routineprotocol exercise. It was rather a continuation of years

of contacts and mutual admiration. The ties betweenthe Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Iran predatethe Arab Spring, despite their ideological differences.In 2009, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, ex-Supreme Guideof the Muslim Brotherhood, conrmed this contactwith the Iranians in an interview published on Al-jazeeras website, and explained the position of theMuslim Brotherhood vis--vis the interaction withIran despite sectarian rivalry. As a Sunni organiza-tion, he asserted that the Muslim Brotherhood dealswith the Iranian state, and not with Shiism as sect.47But most importantly, Muslim Brotherhood leadershave seen in the Iranian Islamic government a practi-cal embodiment of their political ideals to establish anIslamic state.

Critical voices also emerged from within PresidentMorsis circle of collaborators. Fouad Jabblah, ex-legaladvisor to Morsi who resigned in 2013, warned the


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Islamist-led government in an interview publishedin the pan-Arab newspaper, Asharq al-Awsat, of the

damage that the rapprochement with Iran is causingto Egypts national interests, particularly with the Gulfrulers.48 Iran is no replacement for GCC countries:There is a limit of what Iran, with its own economicdifculties, can offer to Egyptians. The GCC coun-tries, in contrast, provide millions of employment op-portunities to Egyptian families. Wealthy GCC coun-tries provide economic assistance and are a source ofinward investment in the Egyptian economy.

This shift in Egypts foreign relations with its stra-tegic partners might have cheered ordinary people,but certainly did not enjoy the full backing of all Egyp-tian institutions. The Egyptian military, a key bene-ciary of the peace agreement with Israel through U.S.military aid, was alarmed about the degradation of

Egypts relations with Israel. They observed how anx-ious Israeli leaders were about the obscure directionof Egyptian foreign policy interests and the countrysstability. Deteriorating relations with Israel wouldcome at a high price. The U.S. aid has been tacitly partof the Camp David peace package, aimed at strength-ening the interest of Egypt in keeping the peaceagreement.

Military ofcers rarely make any public statementson Egypts relation with Israel. But through recent de-cades, senior military ofcers have had good relationswith their counterparts in Israel. The quality of theserelations could be deduced from the positions adopt-ed by Israeli diplomats and politicians, who lobbiedin Washington and across western capitals in favor

of military control of power in Egypt. After the oust-ing of Morsi in July 2012, Israel openly called on theUnited States to maintain its aid package.49


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There has been a palpable sense of urgency amongpolicymakers to strengthen Arab regional cooperation

and integration. In North Africa, leaders confrontedwith ongoing protests and acknowledging the com-mon socio-economic challenges facing their countriessaw reactivation of an economic integration projectas a pertinent policy measure to reduce the risks ofinstability. But so far, there has been limited success.Politicians in transition countries naturally prioritizepolitical and security issues over strengthening re-gional integration. Furthermore, the same geopoliticalhurdles that impeded the Maghreb Arab Union proj-ect for decades remain unresolved. Animosity andmistrust between Algeria and Morocco prevail. Landborders have remained closed between the two coun-tries since 1994, and recent attempts to negotiate a re-opening have yielded no results.

Ironically, it is the opposite that is happening. Thefragile political and security situations in Tunisia, Lib-ya, and Egypt have had a negative impact on a rangeof planned and existing economic integration projects.Egyptian gas exports to Jordan and other neighboringcountries, for example, have suffered from disruptionsas a result of repeated bombings of Sinai pipelines.

Turkey has seen a window of opportunity open-ing with the Arab Spring revolution, to strengthen itsposition in the Middle East. In line with its soft pow-er strategy to win the hearts and minds of the Arabpeople over the last decade, the Turkish leadershiphas aligned with demands to establish democraticregimes and respect human rights. Turkish PrimeMinister Recep Tayyip Erdogan sided with protestors

and asked Mubarak to relinquish power.50The AKPpolitical brand appeals to Islamist movements in theregion. The Turkish model was perceived a success-


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ful model of a modern and prosperous state run byan Islamic government. The Turkish democratic expe-

rience is seen as the most relevant example to Arabsocio-cultural realities. The AKPs skillful strategy tocontain the political and economic inuence of secularelites has been appreciated by Islamist governmentsin the Arab world. Turkey is used as a case study be-cause of spectacular economic performance since AKPcame to power.

To win strategic and long-term friendships in theregion, the Turkish leadership was proactive in pro-viding Islamic political parties with logistical supportand strategic guidance. This element of AKP foreignpolicy doctrine was spelled out by Kemal Dervis, Tur-keys ex-Minister of Economic Affairs, who noted thatfriendships in the new world are more importantthan membership of various clubs- including the Eu-

ropean Union.51

Turkeys interests are not solely ide-ological, but rather serve to achieve an economic foot-hold in these North African countries. The frequencyof visits is a strong indicator of the importance of therelationship between Turkey and these countries. Is-tanbul and Ankara became important destinations forIslamist political leaders mainly from Libya, Tunisia,and Egypt. Erdogan, accompanied by Turkish indus-trialists and businessmen, has paid visits to all NorthAfrican countries with the aim of strengthening hisgovernments and Turkeys political and economicties with the region.52

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Since the fall of the regimes in Egypt and Tunisiain January 2011, the political scene in the region hasseen major transformations; new political parties have


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been formed, several free and, by most accounts, rea-sonably fair elections have been organized, and a new

cadre of political partiesmany of them with Islamicvoiceshave acquired government positions in threeArab countries. The victory of Islamists sparked fearsand uncertainty within the countries and beyond.Domestically, secular and religious minorities havebeen concerned about the future of their individualrights and religious freedoms. At the regional level,neighboring countries have feared that the rise of Is-lamist parties, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood inEgypt, could be mirrored by similar transformation intheir own territories.

To various degrees this scenario remains of con-cern for the Arab worlds republics, most of whichalready face an explicit or covert Islamic opposition;as well as for its monarchies, particularly those of the

Gulf in which political parties so far do not yet exist,and for whom transnational organizations such as theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood present a potentiallythreatening scenario if transplanted into their ownnational contexts. In the West, much of the worry isfocused on how Islamist domestic and foreign policiesare going to impact the geopolitics of the Middle Eastand North Africa region and whether those potentialfuture Islamist-led governments will ever forge thekind of political ties the long-held Mubarak and BenAli regimes held with the West, despite their inter-nally largely undemocratic natures.

However, it seems that these worries have nottranslated into the worst case scenarios put forwardby those opposing the inclusion of Islamist parties in

Middle East politics a priori. In the case of Moroccoand Tunisia, Islamist leaders have displayed somemoderation andseeminglypragmatism in their


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domestic political and societal plans as well as in man-aging their governments external relations. Neither

in Morocco, nor in Tunisia, have Islamist parties sofar attempted, nor shown the institutional capacity, tochange fundamentally the way their national politi-cal systems are runbe this in a positive or negativesense. The Islamist-led governments of both countrieshave at best disappointed many of their voters expec-tations for real change. This may indeed be a lessonwith a value of its own, in a region where Islamistelectoral victories have often been accompanied byhuge positive or negative expectations.

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood experience wasdifferent. Decisively more deconstructive, the MuslimBrotherhoods rule was, in many ways, too short toallow for any realistic long-term positive outcome, butthe damage it did to the image of Islamist rule both

in Egypt and the wider region is undeniably negative.The multifaceted relationship between the MuslimBrotherhood on the one hand, and its more Salast co-alition partners on the other, with various foreign gov-ernments and political orientations, including Iran,Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Hamas, and various Palestinianfactions, as well as the partys troubled relationshipwith its own domestic security forces and the mili-tary, imply that the problem in Egypt is signicantlymore complex, and cannot be reduced only to thefailure of one particular political stream. Instead, itis a telling episode about the difculty of reconstruct-ing and rebuilding political systems according to pa-rameters which remain unclearsuch as the role ofreligion under constitutional law, and the intended

content of policymaking beyond vague ideas of so-cial justice and the ght against corruption and theformer regime.


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Nevertheless, all three experiences have to variousdegrees demonstrated that despite their apparent vast

popularity amongst the Arab street masses, the Arabworlds Islamist parties have not been prepared togovern. They lacked the structures and qualied hu-man resources to handle affairs of state. It has beeneasy for the Islamist leaders, while in opposition orin exile, to criticize previous governments and the re-gimes behind them, highlighting their incompetenceor lack of integrity. Once in ofce, Islamist politicianshave themselves been confronted with the challeng-ing reality of taking responsibility to manage thenations affairs. All the Islamist governments in theregion have failed to handle political and economicchallenges. They have been unsuccessful in stabiliz-ing the economy in countries affected by revolution ortackling the unemployment issue. Almost 2 years after

the coming to power of the rst Islamist governmentin the region, no alternative economic policy initiativehas yet been put forward.

But despite these structural limitations and mea-ger progress in reform, Islamists still retain substan-tial public support. Regardless that the reputation ofIslamists has suffered signicant damage, particularlyin Egypt, as result of public disillusionment with lim-ited reforms the chance of Islamists of winning newelections remains high. This is especially the case if thecurrent coalition governments fail to work with theirpartners or the opposition, a scenario that is likely tohappen given the ongoing political standoffs in Tu-nisia and Morocco. Currently, there is still a lack ofstrong and credible political parties in the countries

that could provide an alternative cohesive plan thatwins the support of large number of voters.


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The problem remains not Islamic ideology and val-uesper se, but the general lack of experience, and skill,

of these parties to translate these values into realistic,sensible policies. Only the development of this capa-bility could turn Islamist parties into the sort of forceat work politically in many European countries, for in-stance Christian Democrats and other parties, whoseaim is to translate economic and legal reform into so-cial benet based on traditional social and religiousvalues. In the absence of any such realization withinthe Arab worlds Islamist parties, their role will likelycontinue to be one of an opposition movement, withno ideas of their own other than ideological ones, andno realistic long-term role in rebuilding, rather thandeconstructing economies and political systems.

The difcult political situation that has charac-terized these three countries over recent years will

remain in place for a prolonged period. Signicantpolitical reforms are not going to be easily implement-ed. The Islamist parties in Tunisia and Morocco stillhave to face a lengthy confrontation with the croniesand bureaucracy of Ben Ali and the Moroccan Palace.Every reform initiative will have to navigate its waythrough different stages of resistance from parliament,bureaucracy, and the business community. In Egypt,after the military ousting of elected president Morsi,the country has entered a new phase in its politicaltransition that is going to be characterized by furtherinsecurity and political instability. The disagreementbetween supporters of the deposed Muslim Brother-hood president and his opponents will not fade awaypeacefully or soon. What is happening in Egypt is a

manifestation of an emerging political phenomenonthat is likely to characterize the wider Arab region,whereby Arab societies are becoming more and more


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polarized between secularists and Islamists. This is al-ready having a negative impact on the political stabil-

ity and security of Arab countries as a whole.One key lesson to draw from these years of po-

litical tumult is that building a stable democracy is anevolutionary process and takes time. It is not an affairof quick wins or a zero-sum game. It is a diligent ex-ercise that requires inclusion, dialogue, compromise,and a forward-looking mindset. Governing a transi-tion without a compromise is counterintuitive andmakes it difcult for these countries to move forward.Rebuilding a country, even holding elections in the ab-sence of common social agreement over its format andtools, will be difcult within an electoral process, withor without Islamist forces. The enormously emotivedebate surrounding proposed constitutional changesby Egypts Muslim Brotherhood-led government after

the elections is an important illustrating pointsuchconstitutional issues should have been resolved longbefore any elected government had taken up its role.

Lastly, any successful transition will require thecontribution of civil society and its role in keeping thepublic expectations at reasonable levels. Dealing withthe wide socio-economic problems the Arab worldis facing is a task that has been beyond consecutiveestablished governments and the international com-munity for many decades. The outbreak of politicalunrest is merely the tip of the iceberg of long-heldfrustration and aggression against any form of politi-cal regime. No new government, whether Islamist-ledor not, could be expected to rectify decades of prob-lems within a year or two; meaning that one of the

most valuable assets these governments will need istime and stability. It is difcult for the Islamists tonegotiate with their political adversaries while their


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positions are driven by idealistic political expecta-tions; and it will be difcult for them to reform any

part of the political system, without knowledge, skill,and realistic goals and tools in their hands.

Policy Implications.

U.S. policymakers should not follow the popu-lar trend of reducing the delicate political tran-sition underway in Egypt, Tunisia, and Mo-rocco to simple ideological differences betweenIslamist parties and their secular opponents.Instead, it is a reection of an ongoing strugglebetween traditional elites that have benetedeconomically and politically from the politicalsystem of previous decades, and the new po-litical forces that seek gradual change toward

more transparency and accountability. In thisrespect, the aims of Islamist aspirations are inline with U.S. aspirations for the region.

Furthermore, the coming to power of moderateIslamist governments in countries of the regiondoes not automatically imply a deterioration ofrelations with the United States and its allies. Inthe three examples under consideration, prag-matism in foreign policy has prevailed.

Meanwhile, for as long as Arab countries lackstable governments and an inclusive politicalenvironment that is based on compromise anddialogue, the region remains susceptible to fur-ther instability. The inability of these govern-ments to meet the expectations and demands

of their people is likely to lead to more popu-lar protest and unrest. These countries fragilesocio-economic situations render them vulner-


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able to uctuations in global economic growthand changes in the prices of international com-

modities. Further upheaval should be expectedand prepared for.

It is therefore important for the U.S. Govern-ment to continue playing its important role instabilizing the region through the provision ofa range of nancial, educational, military, anddiplomatic support. It is critical for the successof the ongoing political transitions that thereshould be more emphasis on enhancing thecapabilities of the current Arab governments,ofcials, and institutions in various policy ar-eas. At the same time, government ofcials andinstitutions are not the only important actorsrequiring support; there should be more en-gagement with political parties, civil society.

and the private sector. Building a new politi-cal system is essential, and this cannot be otherthan a joint effort of all societal structures andof individuals.

There remains a vital role for the U.S. military,both in direct assistance and in training andeducation for these countries armed forces.Education in post-conict state building, le-veraging U.S. lessons from the last 2 decadesof conicts and troubled transitions, shouldbe emphasized, as well as continuing essentialefforts toward security sector reform and pro-viding best-practice guidance in civil-militaryrelations, regardless of who is leading thegovernment. Security and defense institutions

have proved to be less susceptible to Islamistideological inuences. This will foster the cre-ation of more stable societies in the target coun-


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tries during

Documents

Revival of Political Islam in the Aftermath of Arab Uprisings: Implications for the Region and Beyond