Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
This article was downloaded by: [UOV University of Oviedo]On: 29 October 2014, At: 04:57Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Asian SecurityPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fasi20
Revisiting the Bangsamoro Struggle:Contested Identities and Elusive PeaceMely Caballero-AnthonyPublished online: 06 Jun 2007.
To cite this article: Mely Caballero-Anthony (2007) Revisiting the Bangsamoro Struggle: ContestedIdentities and Elusive Peace, Asian Security, 3:2, 141-161, DOI: 10.1080/14799850701351425
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14799850701351425
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Asian Security, vol. 3, no. 2, 2007, pp. 141–161Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN 1479-9855 print/1555-2764 onlineDOI:10.1080/14799850701351425
FASI1479-98551555-2764Asian Security, Vol. 3, No. 2, March 2007: pp. 1–14Asian SecurityRevisiting the Bangsamoro Struggle: Contested Identities and Elusive PeaceRevisiting the Bangsamoro StruggleAsian SecurityMELY CABALLERO-ANTHONY
Abstract: This article revisits the issue of the quest for the “Bangsamoro” since its first articu-lations in the 1960s. It examines the dynamics of identity in the history of this struggle and howthese dynamics have shaped the Muslim separatist movements in the Philippines. Given thediverging trajectories of “Moro” groups that took up the “Bangsamoro” struggle and the con-temporary developments that have since unfolded over the years, the paper argues that theissue of identity is a tenuous factor undergirding the fight for a “Bangsamoro” homeland. It istenuous for many reasons: one of these is the construction of a “Moro” identity, which has cometo mean different things to the many multi-ethnic and multi-lingual groups. The other is divi-sive history of the various ethnic groups who have wanted to be part of the envisioned separatestate called the “Bangsamoro.”
IntroductionSince 1968 when a group of young Muslim Filipinos launched the struggle to establisha separate “Bangsamoro” state and secede from the Philippines, the prospects of creat-ing an independent state for Muslims in the Philippines have remained dim. Instead,the story of the Moro struggle has been characterized as one of endless wars and vio-lence, naked aggression and competition for power, and of poverty and untold humanmisery.
If one goes back in history – to as far back in the early 1500s when the Spanish con-quistadors came to the islands now known as the Philippines, through the 1890s whenthe Americans replaced the Spanish as the country’s colonial masters and until themid-1940s when the Philippines finally became an independent state – the struggle ofthese people to keep their own, separate identity as “Moros” persisted throughoutthese periods. This struggle has become an enduring feature in the life and times ofmany of these communities which once claimed the southern Philippine island ofMindanao as their own. In contemporary times, this struggle eventually became astruggle for self-determination – a fight for a separate and independent “Bangsamoro”state.
A number of writers have problematized the struggle for the “Bangsamoro” withinthe framework of identity and politics.1 On the other hand, depending on whose voiceis heard and at which period this issue is examined, the notion of a “Bangsamoro” hastaken on different framings and has generated multiple discourses. If one looks at itfrom the perspective of the Philippine government, the struggle for the “Bangsamoro”state is a political and security problem. It has been defined as an insurgency and/or asecessionist movement led by certain Muslims groups in Southern Philippines that are
Address correspondence to: Mely Caballero-Anthony, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NanyangTechnological University, Block S4, B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798. E-mail: [email protected]
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
142 Asian Security
intent on usurping power from the state. These groups are the Moro National Libera-tion Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). But for manyFilipinos, the problem in Southern Philippines or Mindanao is a religious conflictbetween the Muslims who want to establish a separate Islamic state and the Christianswho want the Muslims to assimilate and be part of the Philippine state. Meanwhile,there are other actors in the country like civil society organizations and NGOs whowould argue that the problem is essentially one of governance. So, whether the conflictis religious or political in nature, this can be eventually resolved once the government’sproject of granting a meaningful autonomy to the provinces and regions representingMuslim Philippines can be implemented credibly. Nonetheless, in whatever form thediscourses have evolved, the theme of identity politics continues to resonate.
Yet an interesting but often ignored feature in the narrative of the “Bangsamoro” isthe panoply of terms that have emerged, generated from the multiple discourses thatfollowed the history of this struggle. These include the development of several ethniclabels and hyphenated words denoting representations of distinct ethno-religiousgroups and the ethnic affiliation/identities of the many actors caught in this struggle –e.g. the Tausugs, Maguinadanaos, Maranaos, and the Lumads; Muslim-Filipinos,Christian-Filipinos, and indigenous or native Filipinos. There had also emergedrelated terms that indicate political predilections and ideologies – e.g. Marxist-Muslims, liberal-Muslims, conservative-Muslims and/or Islamist; extremists and Jihadists,etc. Terms also surfaced to differentiate the contemporary Muslim movements, whichare organized as the secular-modernist MNLF; Islamic-fundamentalist MILF and thematerialist Abu Sayyaff Group (ASG). This array of terminologies reflects, amongother things, the extent to which the struggle for the “Bangsamoro” has taken on mul-tiple forms, in the process adding more complex layers of identities that blur the“core” feature of the “Moro” identity.
Against this background one can appreciate the need to revisit the issue of identitywithin the context of the “Bangsamoro” and raise some questions. Among the salientones are: How has the struggle of the Bangsamoro unfolded over the course of history,especially since the 1970s? What explains the tensions and competitions between thevarious groups that claim to represent the “Bangsamoro” cause, e.g. the MNLF, MILF,the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO), and even the Abu Sayyaff Group?And to what extent does the “Moro” identity still constitute the primordial foundation,the clarion call that defines the contemporary Muslim separatist movement?
The main objectives of this study are twofold. First, to revisit the issue of the questfor the “Bangsamoro” since its first articulations in the 1960s, and, second, to examinethe dynamics of identity in the history of this struggle and analyze how these havedefined the nature of the struggle over the years. Given the diverging trajectories of“Moro” groups that took up the “Bangsamoro” struggle and the contemporary devel-opments that have since unfolded in the course of the campaign, this article argues thatthe issue of identity is a tenuous factor undergirding the fight for a “Bangsamoro”homeland. It is tenuous for many reasons, and for the purpose of this paper I shall citetwo. First, is the very notion of a “Moro” identity. Over the years, the Moro identityhas been a constructed concept and has come to mean different things to the manymulti-ethnic and multi-lingual groups that were envisioned as part of the proposed
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
Revisiting the Bangsamoro Struggle 143
Bangsamoro. Second, the history of multiple identities that comprise these variousgroups who want to be part of Bangsamoro has been divisive.
Notwithstanding the caveats above, understanding the different formulations ofthe Moro identity remains salient in our analyses of the Bangsamoro struggle. Andwhile studies of identity and ethnicity may not necessarily be new, the elusiveness ofpeace in Muslim Mindanao despite decades of efforts by the Government of thePhilippines to forge a peace settlement between Muslim groups has underpinned theimportance of identity formation among the Moros. In brief, one could suggest thatthe different notions of being Moro remain a decisive factor in determining the pros-pects for any meaningful resolution of conflict. One can therefore make the case that itis useful to examine the struggle of the Bangsamoro from the perspective of multipleidentities if only to underscore the fact that after centuries of colonial struggles andmore than four decades of attempts at making peace, these contested identities amongdifferent Muslim groups have added a new stratum of “political identities” to the oldlayers of ethnic divisions. The implications of such layering have been extremely sig-nificant – not least being the lack of coherence in the Bangsamoro struggle.
To be sure, the multi-layering of identities have informed the nature of the politicalstruggles of these various Muslim groups over the years, and their relations with thestate. As this article will show, the Bangsamoro struggle continues to be a story ofpower and competition among traditional political Muslim elites fighting to maintaintheir influence and authority over their respective provincial enclaves that now formmost of the Mindanao Island. It has also been a story of the emergence of counter-elites and Muslim “revolutionaries” bent on crafting a new political and religiousorder in the region. Hence, in revisiting the Bangsamoro struggle, this article endorsesthe point made by scholars who argue that the narrative of the Bangsamore struggleshould not be confined to the struggle of one monolithic, subaltern group against thehegemonic entity – i.e. the Philippine state. Instead, the “Bangsamoro” struggle shouldmore appropriately be read as an interplay of multiple groups, representing multipleidentities navigating through the well-trodden paths of either secession or integration.2
Moreover, the Bangsamoro struggle also needs to be understood, as one scholar hasargued, through “a wide-ranging and multi-layered analysis of domination, accommo-dation and resistance.”3 Thus, against these colorful tapestries of differing – sometimesconflicting – identities, the paper suggests that unless one goes beyond the rhetoric ofthe MLNF and MILF and other separatist groups, and “penetrates beneath” theaccounts of journalists and security analysts, peace will remain an elusive goal in thesouthern islands of Mindanao. This is an important factor that needs to be consideredparticularly in the light of the government’s efforts, under the Gloria Arroyo adminis-tration, to revive the stalled peace talks between the Muslim rebels and the Philippinegovernment.
Currently, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) has beeninvolved in two separate peace processes with the MNLF and MILF. These processesare discussed in more detail later in the paper. Suffice it to say that sustaining thesetalks has been extremely problematic. The 1996 Peace Process with the MNLF, forexample, had been regarded as ineffective in ending the problem of secession, and con-tinued to be beset with problems of poor implementation and opposition from the
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
144 Asian Security
hardliners. Meanwhile, the on-going peace talks with the MILF have yet to yield anysignificant result. A major stumbling block in any effort so far to advance the peaceprocess with the MILF has been its unequivocal goal of establishing a separateBangsamoro. At the same time, the MILF’s notion of the Bangsamoro underscores theproblem of multiple identities – both within the Muslim groups (i.e. between being aMoro and a Muslim) and between the Muslim groups and their Filipino others. Thetensions therefore of maintaining a shared primordial identity of being a Moro and aMuslim, and of being either part of or separate from the Philippine state cut acrossissues of legitimacy in deciding who should represent them and how the vision ofBangsamoro should be realized.
This article adopts an historical approach in examining the “Bangsamoro” struggleand proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief historical background of the“Bangsamoro” movement and reviews the events that led to the genesis of the Moro“nationalist” movement. Section three proceeds to analyze the problems that emergedin the course of advancing the Bangsamoro struggle and teases out the complexities ofcontested Bangsamoro identity. It then examines the interplay of multiple identitiesand power in the continuing quest for a “Bangsamoro” and the extent to which thesedynamics have remade the Bangsamoro identity. This also includes a brief descriptionof the various groups that have become the dominant actors in the search for viablemechanisms to resolve the conflict, including the peace processes that are taking place.Section four extends the analyses of Bangsamoro and its multiple identities to theattempts by the Philippine government to cope with this evolving imbroglio. Finally,some tentative observations are raised on the prospects for the realization of the“Bangsamoro” homeland given the contestations regarding the nature of the Moroidentity.
Historical Overview: The Quest to Build a “Nation within a Nation”Most, if not all, of the historical accounts that describe the evolution of the “Bangsamoro”struggle refer back to the Philippines’ pre-colonial history before the arrival of theSpanish conquistadors and Americans.4 The historiographical accounts depictedimages of several indigenous and Islamized communities that had inhabited the islandsin the southern region of what are now the Philippines. The Islamization of most ofthese indigenous communities was said to have started in 1380. In fact, by the mid-1400s, Islamic forms of government (sultanates) were already in place, with the SuluSultanate formally established in 1450 AD. Political authority in the sultanate restedon a Sultan who was a Tausug (one of the ethnic communities that lived in the islandsand who were considered the aristocrats or elites in the community).5 Below the Sultanwere the panglimas who were responsible for the administration of their appointedterritories and in each of these territories were local powerful families led by a datu.Although the datus were subordinate to the panglimas, they held strong influence,power and prestige over their followers. They could also advise the Sultan if theybecome members of a council or ruma bichara.
Historical accounts also indicated that during that period, the Sulu Sultanate wasalready considered a de facto and de jure nation state, especially since it was able toenter into treaties with Spain in 1578 (in spite of the latter’s aggression toward the
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
Revisiting the Bangsamoro Struggle 145
former when it colonized the Philippines), Britain in 1761, the French in 1843 and theAmericans in 1842, 1899 and 1915.6
Following the establishment of the Sulu Sultanate was the Maguinadanao Sultanatewhich was founded in the 1600s, and reached its peak during the reign of SultanDipatuan Kudarat (1619–71). Like the Sulu Sultanate, the Maguindanao Sultanateruled over the Islamized tribes which included the Maranaos, the Maguinadanaos,Iranuns, Sangils and the Kalagan. However, aside from these Islamized groups therewere also non-Islamic tribes like the Subanens, Teduray, T’bolis, Bagobos, Mansakasand the Manobos that held tributary relations with the sultanate. The existence ofthese multiple ethno-linguistic groups, both Islamized and non-Islamized (sometimesreferred to as animist until they were Christianized or Islamized), was very significant.Firstly, it indicates that apart from the politically dominant and influential elites – theTausugs and the Maranaos in the Sulu and Maguindanao sultanates respectively – theethnic configuration of what became the southern frontier of the Philippines was notconfined to Muslim groups alone. Secondly, one would also note that there had been ahistory of peaceful co-existence among the different ethno-linguistic and religiousgroupings in both sultanates.
Another notable feature among the sultanates aside from their highly developedpolitical structures, was their economic self-sufficiency. The history of trade linkagesextends beyond the adjacent islands and territories outside the periphery to as far asChina. This was well described by historian James Warren, who wrote about the tradelinkages of the Sulu Sultanate. He noted that: [In the Sulu Sea], the surrounding islandsand territories are the resource base for forest produce, agriculture, minerals whichwere collected, cultivated and extracted for the market. There was also a distinct butsmall manufacturing base in the Sulu territories. The Tausugs were the main traders . . .and trading was their main source of income and wealth . . . the largest market for theproduce from Sulu Sea was China.7
Subjugating the “Moros”This seemingly peaceful existence was rudely interrupted when the Spanish, in searchof spices, came to colonize the Philippines. The lives of these people suddenly changed –dramatically. It did not take long for the Spanish conquistadores to realize that what-ever success they had in subjugating the northern and central parts of the archipelago,including converting its people to Catholicism, could not be replicated in its southernislands. Therefore, they attempted to eradicate Islam by attacking the islands of Suluand Mindanao. Thus, the period of Spanish aggression against these Muslim commu-nities which started in 1548 and continued until 1898 was punctuated by “wars”against the Moros (or Moors) – a term used by the Spanish conquerors to refer to theunsubjugated people living on the southern islands. But the genealogy of the “Moro”in the Philippine context offers some interesting insights. According to Majul,8 theterm Moro was a pejorative term used by the Spanish to refer to the “uncivilized” peo-ples in the south and often associated with those whom the Spanish considered as“pirates,” “traitors,” and even “juramentados” (people who ran amok). Appliedbroadly, the reference to southern peoples as “Moros” paid little attention to the lin-guistic or political distinctions among the various Muslim and non-Muslim societies.9
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
146 Asian Security
This is an important consideration given that anthropologists have categorized about30 ethno-linguistic groups that make up the people in the islands of Mindanao andSulu,10 and only about 13 of these indigenous groups are envisioned to be part of theBangsamoro people.11
Despite the failure of the Spanish to subjugate the Moros and the impressive featdisplayed by the latter to successfully defend their territory and remain uncolonized,these could not however mitigate the massive devastation that resulted from the 333years of aggression. As Rodil documented:
. . . [T]he price they [the Moros] had to pay was tremendous. There was politicaland economic decay . . . they had also become impoverished. Gone were theirformer productive links with the rest of the Philippines and Asia . . . The rest oftheir manpower focused attention to fighting off the enemy rather than to produc-tive endeavours . . . [there was] large-scale destruction of plantations, boats andsettlements.12
The relentless aggression against the Moros continued for another 30 years from 1898to 1928 when the Americans replaced the Spanish as the new colonizers. This changeof colonial rule was arranged through the Treaty of Paris in 1898 which was concludedbetween these two powers. However, what Spain failed to inform the Americans wasthat the territory it ceded to them was a contested territory. It was only partially “His-panized” but was also not fully under their control. Nevertheless, when compared tothe Spanish, the American colonizers were “not only more determined but also moreadvanced – politically, technologically, economically and militarily.”13 Given theirpreponderance in military power, the Moros – worn out from their resistance againstthe Spanish – eventually gave up their armed resistance, but only after a decade ofstruggle against the Americans.14 It was during the American occupation that theimpetus to fight for an independent homeland for all the Muslim peoples of thePhilippines began.
The American Occupation (1898–1920): Understanding the Shifting Sands of Identity Formation from “Moros” to “Muslim-Filipinos”The business started by the Spanish of defeating the Moros was effectively accom-plished by the Americans with their far superior military prowess. The strategy ofsubjugation, however, went beyond military power. The American colonial admin-istration through its “policy of attraction” encouraged the large-scale migration ofpeople from the north (Luzon) and central (Visayan) islands to Mindanao. It alsofacilitated the establishment of a civilian government whose control extendedbeyond the central capital of the country to southern Philippines.15 These policies ineffect saw the Islamic mode of governance that had been in place being supersededby governance structures of a modern state system, patterned after the Americansystem.
One of the most effective strategies adopted by the American to crush the Mororesistance was the introduction of the Public Land Acts, which systematicallycontrolled the ownership, distribution, and registration of land. Among the most
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
Revisiting the Bangsamoro Struggle 147
significant was Public Land Act 718 (April 4, 1903), which declared null and voidall lands granted by Moro sultans and datus or non-Christian chiefs without stateauthority. This law effectively deprived the Moros of their ancestral landholdings.The other acts included: the Cadastral Act of 1907, which facilitated land acquisitionby “educated natives, money bureaucrats and American speculators”; Public LandAct 2894 of 1919 which allowed non-Muslim Filipinos to apply for ownership of24 hectares but limited the ownerships of Muslims to only 10 hectares; and PublicLand Act 141 of 1936, which declared all Moro ancestral landholdings to be publiclands. The land ownership of Muslims was eventually whittled down to no more than4 hectares, while Christians were allowed to own 42 and corporations as much as1,024 hectares.16
The implications of these new land regimes were devastating, to say the least. Theyresulted in the massive dislocation of hundreds of Moro communities from theirancestral homes and caused internal disputes and disparities not only betweenMuslims and non-Muslims, but also within the Moro communities. Moreover, whenthe Americans began to prepare the Philippines for self-rule, they placed Mindanaounder the direct administration of central government in Manila and allowed Muslimareas to come under the governance of Christian bureaucrats. The appointment ofnon-Muslim governors over Muslim leaders served only to heighten the simmeringfrustration among the latter and increased the animosity already felt by Muslimstowards the Christian “migrants.” Hence, as observed by one scholar, one of the mostsignificant consequences throughout these periods of colonization had been “the makingof a tri-people: Moros, Lumads17 (a term that refers to tribal, indigenous people), andChristian Filipinos.”18
It is also important to note the other aspect of America’s “policy of attraction.” Aspart of its overall strategy to totally snuff out the Moro resistance, the Americansco-opted the traditional Muslim elites. Given that these elites were already concernedabout their dwindling political power and material interests, particularly as the policiesof land acquisition and internal migration continued, there was hardly any resistance.Hence, while the colonial administration effectively ended the formal authority of thesultans and the datus, their influence was not curtailed. Meanwhile, the Americans alsointroduced public and secular education in the islands with the objective of producingMuslims leaders who could help in either pacifying their fellow Muslims, or integrat-ing them into the larger Filipino society. In brief, the aggressive colonial policies oneducation and land distribution were meant to “civilize” the Moros and to “Filipinize”them so that they could eventually assimilate with their Filipino brothers.
America’s policy of divide and rule had considerable impact on the way Muslimgroups began to redefine their roles and their place in Philippine society. These signif-icant changes could be seen in the way the colonial policies on politics and educationhad shaped the attitudes of many Muslims among these diverse groups. In the politicalarena, the Americans publicly acknowledged the influence of the sultans and datus andallowed their status to remain intact. They implicitly recognized this hierarchy as anintrinsic component of Moro political culture.19 The special position of these tradi-tional political elites was recognized even by the contemporary leaders of the Mororesistance movements that emerged in the 1960s, many of whom were commoners.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
148 Asian Security
Hence, far from completely excluding them, the colonial authorities encouraged thesesultans and datus to run for public office.20 This encouragement led to a group of datuswho opted to participate in the politics of Filipinization and became part of the colo-nial legislature representing Muslim interests. Many of them eventually became electedas provincial governors, congressmen and senators. The others worked with theAmericans as advisers or tribal ward leaders. These developments signified the emer-gence of a new kind of Muslim leaders, fully devoted to the colonial state. These elitescontinued to use the traditional titles of “Datu” and “Sultan” while relishing their newpositions as senators, deputy governors, and so on. This dual role enabled these elitesto “bridge the relationship between the traditional community and the modern gov-ernment.”21 It was these groups of elites who had frowned upon the continued use ofthe term “Moro.” This was clearly articulated by one of them when he stated that “wedo not like to be called ‘Moro’ because when we are called ‘Moros’ we feel that we arenot considered as part of the Filipino people.”22
Co-option or Resistance?Although some scholars saw the motivation of some Muslim leaders in “collaborat-ing” with the Americans as driven by material consideration, there were others whoread this move as an attempt by “moderate” Muslims to work within the newFilipino-dominated system. The objective was to take advantage of opportunitiesoffered by the Americans for the betterment of Muslims. Abinales, for example,argued that while others (datus and sultans) tried to overcome their enfeebled status,others became pro-Filipinization “because they were impressed by the ‘progress’ thatthe colonial rule had brought to the rest of the colony and they hoped that similarimprovements could reach Mindanao.”23 As noted by Abinales,
These datus recognised the consolidation of the new order and realised the poten-tial of working within the system. They saw political opportunities in appoint-ment to official position, from the insular assembly down to municipal councils, inmembership in the expanding “national parties” and in the forging of political andsocial ties with both Americans and Filipinos . . . From these younger datus rosethe first generation of Muslim leaders who accepted that Mindanao was inextrica-bly linked to the larger political framework centred in Manila. It was this groupthat became known as the first “Muslim-Filipinos.”24
On the other hand, this willingness by some Muslims to work within the systemcan also be explained to a large extent by the relative success of the Americans in intro-ducing public secular education to the southern island. The colonial government hadencouraged Muslims to study in the public schools set up by the Americans. As aresult, many traditional Muslim elites began sending their children to governmentschools that offered Western secular education. The colonial education system pro-duced a number of Western educated Muslim elites who successfully became lawyers,civil servants, and even teachers. From this new breed came the development of whatMcKenna described as a “self-conscious transcendent identity” wherein theseMuslims began to refer to themselves as Muslim-Filipinos. As cogently argued by
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
Revisiting the Bangsamoro Struggle 149
McKenna, “that consciousness derived not from opposition to the American rule butrather from the studied adherence to its objectives.”25 The impact of the American pol-icies in both education and politics therefore led to a new breed of Moros, from wherethe development of the Muslim-Filipino identity started.
From Muslim-Filipinos to Moros: The Genesis of the Moro StruggleAt least until the late 1960s, the construction of the Muslim-Filipinos identity wasunproblematic. Muslim-Filipinos were understood to refer to the non-HispanicizedFilipinos who professed Islam. However, the Islamic orientation of these Muslim-Filipinos is different from the way Islam is characterized in the country today – i.e.one that is largely fundamentalist. As noted by McKenna, the Islamic content of thatidentity was “rationalized – even sanitized – to conform with Western assessments ofIslam’s ‘favorable’ aspects.” This identity must therefore be understood not as anexpansion of Islamic observance but “an amplification among (Muslim) elites of a[separate] ethnic identity as Muslim Filipinos.” Hence, contrary to the notions thatbeing Muslim-Filipinos is an assertion of one’s identity, McKenna argued that thisassertion of ethnicity (as identity) was instead a representation, “not a reversal of thetendencies of the colonial period but their logical extension.”26
As the colonial government prepared to grant independence to the Philippines, theterritory of the “new” Philippine Republic was finally delineated to incorporate thesultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao. The establishment of the Republic on July 4,1946 had therefore conveniently overlooked the pre-colonial statehood status of thetwo sultanates. Although the Americans may have succeeded in co-opting some of theMuslim sultans and datus to embrace the identity of Muslim-Filipinos (thereby creat-ing a sense of common identity with the rest of the Filipinos), there remained pocketsof resistance from other Muslims who openly opposed the incorporation of theirhomeland into the Philippine territory.
These pockets of resistance found expression in many forms. One of these was the pro-duction of a historical document known as the “Dansalan Declaration” drawn up by 120datus of the Lanao province on March 18, 1935 that declared their desire to be excludedfrom the “new” Philippine state. The Declaration proclaimed that the Muslim leaders:
. . . do not want to be included in the Philippines for once an independent Philip-pines is launched, there will be trouble between us and the Filipinos because fromtime immemorial these two peoples have not lived harmoniously together . . . It isnot proper [for] two antagonizing people live together under flag, under the Philip-pine independence.27
The document became one of the most visible signs of the nascent movement amongthe other Muslims to build their own “Bangsamoro.”
Indeed, to many Muslims, the opposition against being included in the Philippineterritory had been a result of years of grievances about exclusion, deprivation andunderdevelopment. In fact, these sentiments were borne out several decades laterwhen the subsequent Philippine administrations failed to improve the socio-economicconditions of many ordinary Muslims. One could therefore argue that the Muslims’
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
150 Asian Security
experience of being part of the Philippine state was a history of marginalization, socialinjustice, and political alienation. Except perhaps for the traditional Muslim elites whohad benefited from being part of the system, a vast majority of Muslim groups andeven non-Muslim ethnic groups, i.e. the Lumads, are mired today in poverty and mis-ery. The once prosperous sultanate of Sulu has now been reduced to one of the poorestprovinces in the country and the social indicators (health, education, etc.) are amongthe lowest in the country.28
Over time, the incipient oppositions were gradually transformed into organizedmovements for separatism. This began with the introduction in the Philippine Con-gress of House Bill 5682 in 1961. Sponsored by a congressman from Sulu, the billsought to grant recognition of an independent Sulu state. Although the Bill was prettymuch regarded as a non-starter, it nevertheless signaled the growing momentum forwhat was to be known as “Moro nationalism” with the formation of various organizedseparatist movements. The Muslim Independent Movement (MIM) established in 1968was the pioneering group. The MIM called for outright secession of the provinces/islands of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan from the Philippines. It also called for Jihad(holy war) to defend the “Bangsamoro” homeland. As this group began to attractmore Muslims to the fold, the word “Muslim” in MIM was eventually changed to“Mindanao” to reflect a separate territory that envisaged the inclusion of the otherpeoples in southern Philippines who were non-Muslims.29
The Jabidah MassacreAs support for the separatist sentiments continued to build across different segments/groups in the larger Muslim community, the revelation of the Jabidah Massacre fur-ther aggravated the growing sentiment against the central government. Months beforethe formation of the MIM, news about the summary killing of several Muslimsinvolved in the “Jabidah” or “Merdekah” movement began to circulate among theMuslim community. Although details of what actually happened remain unclear today –despite several official enquiries and wide media coverage – the Jabidah massacrerevealed an overt plot by former Philippine president, Ferdinand Marcos, to trainMuslim recruits holed up in the Philippine island of Corregidor to infiltrate theMalaysian territory of Sabah. The plan was to destabilize Sabah to bolster thePhilippines’ claim to the territory. The Muslim recruits who resisted the deploymentwere reported to have been summarily killed by Filipino army officers.30
News of the event triggered a series of week-long demonstrations and vigils in frontof the president’s Malacanang Palace denouncing the massacre. The Jabidah incidenteffectively became the linchpin that provided the rallying point to unify disparate Muslimgroups to call for justice and fight for a separate Muslim territory. The incident alsoprecipitated the formation of several Moro student organizations. These included: theUnion of Islamic Forces and Organization, Muslim Progress Movement, PhilippineMuslims Nationalist League, Bismillah Brotherhood, and others.31 Some of the studentleaders of these protests became familiar names in the Muslim community and evolvedinto the prominent leaders of the current Muslim rebel movements in the country.Among them are: Nur Misuari, leader of the MNLF; Hashim Salamat, leader of theMNLF-breakout group – the MILF; and Rashid Lucman who established the BMLO.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
Revisiting the Bangsamoro Struggle 151
Re-imagining the Bangsamoro ProjectA salient feature in the mushrooming of several Muslim organizations is the attempt oftheir leaders to construct a Muslim “nationalist” movement, reflecting an identitybased on a common heritage shared by Muslim peoples. This common heritage iscogently encapsulated in the re-appropriation of the term “Moro.” Leaders likeMisuari purposely transformed the once pejorative term into a powerful symbol ofnational identity.32 “Moro not Filipino” became the slogan for their rebellion andMoro cultural heroes like Sultan Kudarat of Maguidanao who led the fight against theSpanish became one of their symbols of resistance.
The revival and recasting of the term “Moro” revealed much about the attempts byemerging Muslim leaders to stamp their own identity in place of the traditional Muslimelites who were once the powerful leaders of Muslim communities. Given that thearistocratic Muslim elites had earlier shunned the term (Moro), which they consideredderogatory, and preferred instead to refer to themselves as Muslims, the young leaderssaw it as instrumental to the value of the term. As described succinctly by Gutierrez,the term “Moro” was perceived to “evoke shared historical memories of successfuland fearless resistance to colonial rule.” To these young minds, the new “Moro”referred to a people “who were once masters of their own destiny.” Being “Moro” was“equated with valor and resistance . . . [hence] to be called one fuelled yearnings for aunique, historically different nation.”33 Leaders like Misuari and others knew the pow-erful symbolism that this recast term could evoke. They then deployed this to urgeyoung Muslims to rediscover their shared experiences as colonized people, and to rallythem around their common cause of recapturing their lost Moro nation and to fightfor the realization of a sovereign Moro republic. As further described by Gutierrez,
The youths launched into a frenzied construction of images of their own “nation”radically different from the “homeland” offered by their untrustworthy, aristo-cratic and egocentric elders . . . The fresh, new faces of non-traditional, youth-based leadership stirred the Moro re-awakening – Misuari, the intellectual;Salamat, the Islamic scholar and cleric; and Alonto, the aristocrat’s son who foundcommon cause with his generation. They set aside their differences, imagined andsuccessfully engineered their own project, and broke away from traditional eliteleadership. In so doing, they firmly established themselves as the alternative.34
From then on, being a Moro became the shared identity among these people. To beMoro is to be anti-colonial, anti-elite, distinctly Islamic and rooted in the struggle forsocial justice.35 The struggle for the “Bangsamoro” therefore became the clarion call ofthese leaders and found expression in the political organizations of today, starting withthe founding of the Moro National Liberation Front in the 1970s.
The Importance of and Differences in Being MoroNur Misuari founded the MNLF in 1972. Since its establishment, the group hasbecome one of the most important organizations involved in the current processesgeared toward the resolution of the southern Mindanao conflict. Once the MNLF wasestablished and the secessionist agenda affirmed, the organization was able to mobilize
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
152 Asian Security
enough support to pose a serious challenge to the Philippines. In fact, when thenPresident Marcos declared Martial Law in 1972, the Moro secessionist problem wascited as one of the reasons. Soon after Martial Law was declared, the Philippine armylaunched a military offensive against the MNLF stronghold in southern Philippines.But the MNLF’s response caught the government by surprise. Unknown to the gov-ernment, Misuari had already trained some of his men in Libya, with the tacit supportof Libya’s Muamar Gaddafi. After training, these men returned to the Philippines andformed the MNLF army. With this organized “army,” the MNLF launched a strongcounter-offensive against the government’s military forces. So, from 1972 to 1976,Mindanao became a hotbed of military confrontation between the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines (AFP) and the MNLF rebels. At its height, the MNLF boasted of aforce of 15–20,000 armed men. Fighting did not abate until the government was even-tually forced to propose a political settlement of the Mindanao conflict and sought theassistance of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).
The OIC managed to persuade Misuari to respond to the government’s peace initi-atives and attend a series of preliminary talks in Libya organized by Gaddafi under theauspices of the OIC. These talks became the start of a negotiated political settlementbetween the GRP and MNLF and culminated in the signing of the Tripoli Agreementof 1976. The Agreement called for an immediate ceasefire among conflicting parties. Italso provided, among other things, for the creation of a southern autonomous regionin the southern Philippines consisting of 13 provinces (Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi,Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, South Cotabato,Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur andPalawan).36 The provisions for the framework of autonomy was based on Philippinelaw, including the provisions on setting up of courts, administrative units andeducation systems to ensure that the sovereign status of the Philippine state was notcompromised.
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the problems and prospects of theAgreement. Suffice it to say, however, that the Agreement and its implementation wasextremely problematic and mired in controversy. The unrest led to the collapse of theTripoli Agreement only a year after its signing in 1976, until the OIC interceded onceagain. But despite the initial dissatisfaction of Misuari and other Moros about theAgreement, the GRP was eventually able to get Misuari and the MNLF to accede tosome of its proposals – a long-drawn-out process that lasted for over 20 years. Overthis protracted period and after three Philippine presidents, the following agreementshad been concluded: the 1996 Peace Agreement between the GRP and the MNLF; thesetting up of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in 1996; as wellas the creation of the Southern Philippines’ Council for Peace and Development(SPDC) and the Southern Philippines Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD).Misuari became the governor of the ARMM soon after its establishment and also theHead of the SPDC and Chairman of the SZOPAD.37 Until mid-2001, Misuari hadheld the governorship position for two terms and was effectively the chief executive ofthe entire Muslim autonomous region.
But to many Muslims/Moros, the ARMM and its permutations – SPDC andSZOPAD – still fell short of the envisioned Bangsamoro. Hence, despite the progress
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
Revisiting the Bangsamoro Struggle 153
made in working toward a political solution to the separatist problems – e.g. the estab-lishment of the ARMM, SPDC and SZOPAD; as well as the on-going peace negotiationsthat had been taking place, peace has remained elusive. More importantly, these pro-cesses had been plagued by the intractable problem of legitimacy.
Legitimacy and the Continuing Saga of Elite DisunityA recurring issue in many of these peace talks and related agreements had been theissue of legitimacy. Essentially, the problem has been one of deciding who legitimatelyrepresents the Moro interest? To find an answer to this imbroglio, the next section willprovide a brief sketch of the contending rebel movements in Mindanao and in the pro-cess address the issue of contending identities that had not been fully examined in theanalysis of the Muslim rebel movements.
Misuari and the MNLF: shifting identities? A cursory review of Misuari’s backgroundportrays a man who had been a product of the colonial policy of secular education.Misuari comes from the island of Sulu and is the son of a poor family of ten children.Although ethnically a Tausug, he was obviously not from the traditional Tausug elitethat ruled Sulu during its heyday. Misuari’s college years, spent at the University ofthe Philippines, reading political science, had a profound impact on him and shapedhis political and ideological outlook. Misuari eventually became a co-founder of theKabataan Makabayan (KM), a leftist national youth movement and was the chairmanof its Mindanao chapter. During his university days, he had also befriended two stu-dent activists who later on became leaders of the rebel movements as well – AbdulKayer Alonto (scion of the traditional elites from Lanao del Sur) and Salamat Hashim(from the aristocratic Maguindanao family, but later left for Cairo to become a reli-gious cleric).38
Misuari has been described by many writers as a Marxist and was more inclinedtoward the goal of Muslim nationalism. While also professing to be a devout Muslim,Misuari clearly advocated a secular brand of leadership rather than adopting a strictlyIslamic discourse.39 For Misuari, the role of the MNLF was to uphold social justiceand lead the Moros out of the vicious cycle of economic and social hardship. AsArguelles observed, Misuari and the MNLF compatriots had become “the epitome ofthe new Moro breed . . . which provided the alternative leadership to the traditional[self-serving] Muslim elites.”40
Despite this ideological outlook, Misuari was still also able to attract and includefamily members of the traditional elites who saw the opportunity within theMNLF to regain their lost positions. These elites that had earlier opted to workwithin the system experienced the vicissitudes of entering politics – describedcogently by one scholar as anyone “who lived by the ballots also went by the bal-lots.”41 As it turned out, the fortunes of these datus turned mayors, provincial gov-ernors, congressmen, etc. were no different from other “Filipino” politicians whowere vulnerable to the endless competition for power. Thus, joining the MNLFprovided them with the opportunity to join the “mainstream” Moro movement andavoid being completely left out of politics and being politically and economicallydisenfranchised.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
154 Asian Security
With this kind of power machination taking place, it did not take long for theseideological and political differences between Misuari and the traditional elites to gen-erate tensions within the MNLF, eventually causing a rift. It also did not help mattersthat Misuari was perceived as becoming increasingly dogmatic in the running of theMNLF. Reports of Misuari becoming too rigid in his ideology, of his monopoly ondecision-making and non-transparency in financial matters only served to alienate theother members of the committee. Hence, between 1977 and 1984, divisions within theMNLF started to emerge and the MNLF Central Committee began to split alongethno-linguistic, religious and ideological lines. The more Islamic, i.e. “conservative”members led by Hashim Salamat, who were disillusioned with the movement, brokeaway from the MNLF, moved to Cairo and formed the “new MNLF.” The othermembers who belonged to the traditional elite families – Rachid Lucman and SalipadoPendatun – also left the movement to revive the BangsaMoro Liberation Organization.42
In spite of these splits and reported divisions, Misuari managed to hold on to theMNLF chairmanship and was assured international support through the OIC – atleast until he was unceremoniously dismissed as the leader of the MNLF in mid-2001.Despite the leadership change, the MNLF has remained until today the sole legitimaterepresentative of the Bangsamoro people in the eyes of the international Islamiccommunity.
Hashim Salamat and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF): pushing the Islamicidentity. Hashim Salamat left the MNLF in 1977 to set up the rival movement, but itwas not until 1984 that he changed the name of his own group from MNLF to MoroIslamic Liberation front. The new name underscored the Islamic identity of the group.
It is useful to contrast the MNLF’s Misuari with MILF’s Salamat to understand thedifferences between the two movements. Salamat’s elite ethnic Maguindanao back-ground stands in stark contrast to Misuari who came from the poor strata of theTausug group. And, while Misuari was a product of secular Western education intro-duced by the American colonial administration, and whose outlook was shaped by hisexperience as a student activist at the University of the Philippines, in contrast HashimSalamat studied at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University under Nasser’s pan-Islamic program.It was not surprising therefore that Hashim stressed religion over Misuari’s leftistideas. While Misuari busied himself with gathering international support and makingcontacts with foreign leaders and personalities who were sympathetic to the Morocause, Salamat on the other hand became a reclusive cleric. As a devout Muslim, Sala-mat did not see the distinction between politics and religion. He advocated thesupremacy of ulamas and holy men in running the MILF. Salamat’s vision of theBangsamoro was for it to become an Islamic state – although his model of an Islamicstate was vague.43 Given its avowed goal of total liberation of the Bangsamoro home-land from the Philippines, it was not surprising that Salamat regarded the initiatives bythe GRP to create the autonomous regions of Muslim Mindanao as nothing more thaninsincere means “to appease and pacify the Muslims.”44 Against these differences, thePhilippine government found it easier to deal with the MNLF than with the MILF inworking toward a political solution to the Mindanao problem. (This will be discussedin more detail in below.)
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
Revisiting the Bangsamoro Struggle 155
Abu Sayyaf Group and its indeterminate identity. The other actor that has added anotherlayer of complexity to the Moro problem is the Abu Sayyaf Group. Unlike the waythe MNLF and the MILF evolved, the history of the ASG was problematic. Foundedin the mid-1980s by Abdurajak Abubakar, who was also a religious scholar and formermember of the MNLF, the trajectory of the ASG’s activities revealed a proclivity formaterial aggrandizement rather than fighting for religion and identity. The name AbuSayyaff was supposed to represent the “Bearer of the Sword,” and to protect Islam. Itsdeclared objective was similar to the MILF – the creation of an independent Islamicstate in Mindanao. After Abdurajak died in an encounter with the Philippine army in1998, the ASG splintered into different factions and so far it has been difficult to ascer-tain what the group actually stands for and what is its raison d’être. However, itsinfamy in obtaining large ransoms from its kidnapping activities and banditry contra-dicts the MNLF’s and MILF’s cause of fighting for a Bangsamoro.
Moreover, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the ASG has beenlinked to the al-Qaeda terrorist network. It has been reported that the group receivedmaterial and financial aid as well as training from Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network.45
Against this notorious image, the MNLF and particularly the MILF distanced them-selves from the ASG. The MILF also denied any contacts or possible links with theASG. But the use of Islamic slogans by the ASG continues to fuel suspicion of possibleconnections between and among these groups. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Philippinesalso included the MILF and ASG in their list of terrorist organizations in the country.
Apart from the MNLF, MILF and the ASG there are also other smaller groups thatclaim to represent the “real” Moro interest. One of these, the Moro RevolutionaryOrganization (MRO), was established in 1982 and affiliated with the communistNational Democratic Front (NDF). Its goal, according to its published manifesto, wasto fight against national oppression and chauvinism as a result of US imperialism. Topursue this struggle, the MRO declared a “people’s war” and called for the support ofand unity with non-Moros.46 The emergence of the MRO indicates a variation of theMoro groups that had evolved and in a way presented a third alternative to the MNLFand MILF’s notion of the Moro identity that tries to situate this idea in terms of classstruggle. As stated by Gutierrez, the Moro struggle within the context of the MRO is a“struggle in terms of an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal cause.”47 This political thoughtwas almost similar to Misuari’s “liberal” idea – (at least before the 1990s when hestarted to work with the government) – of a new Moro that was anti-elite, a counter-force not only against the non-Moro aggressors but also against the traditional Muslimelites that had perpetuated its hegemonic power within the Muslim communities andhad chosen to be co-opted by the Filipino state. However, attempts to recast the Bang-samoro struggle as a class struggle were short-lived. The MRO could not be sustainedsince Bangsamoro was essentially a project about ethnic and Islamic identity, andabout Moro nationalism rather than about class-consciousness and class conflict.
Seeking Resolution to the Conflict: The Philippine Governments’Quest for Peace in the SouthSince the war broke out in Mindanao between government troops and the Muslimrebels over three decades ago, there has appeared to be no solution in sight. Nevertheless,
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
156 Asian Security
it is important to note that some significant efforts have been made by the Philippinegovernment to achieve a modus vivendi, at least between the proponents of theBangsamoro, now officially represented by the two mainstream groups – the MNLFand the MILF. These can be seen in the peace agreements concluded between the GRPand the MNLF over time.
As mentioned earlier, the Philippine government has been able to negotiate betterwith the MNLF since the latter’s acceptance of the autonomy arrangement under the1996 Peace Agreement signaled its intention no longer to pursue the Bangsamoroproject. Peace overtures with the MILF, however, had yet to bear some fruit given thatno acceptable agreement could be reached with regard to how the Bangsamoro home-land could be accommodated in a sovereign Philippine state.
Moreover, suspicions between Muslim groups remain. In fact, the MILF hadregarded the MNLF’s concessions to the GRP as evidence of the extent to which thelatter had been co-opted by the government. Moreover, the MNLF’s participation incivilian politics through the ARMM, SZOPAD and SPDC had also reinforced theperception among some Moro people that the MNLF was no longer fighting for therealization of the “Bangasamoro.” In effect, by working with the Philippine govern-ment to address the Mindanao problem, the MNLF no longer represents the interestsof the Moros.
Despite this impediment, the current Arroyo administration has made peace agree-ments with the MILF one of the pillars of its national policy. The Arroyo governmenthas revived the peace initiatives undertaken during the Ramos administration thatwere stalled after the country’s armed forces launched a military offensive against theMILF in 2000 in the hope of convincing it to agree to the arrangements for regionalautonomy.48 As far as the GRP was concerned, the autonomy framework is still themost viable alternative in addressing the grievances of the Moros and an importantstep toward eventually resolving the decade-long conflict. So far, the Arroyo adminis-tration has managed to secure a ceasefire agreement with the MILF in August 2001.This was negotiated with the help of the OIC and facilitated by the services of a third-party mediator – Malaysia.49 Prospects for peace, however, have been seriously ham-pered by intermittent military skirmishing between government troops and MILFforces. These military clashes, which effectively violated the ceasefire agreement underthe 2001 Framework, eventually ended in the suspension of the peace process in 2003.Until the time of writing, the government has been pursuing the realization of the finalpeace agreement.
In assessing the prospects of the GRP–MILF peace agreement, an important factor toconsider is the MILF’s demands, that cover a wider range of social, cultural, economic,and political issues. Critical to this is the MILF’s condition that the GRP recognizes theMoro’s ancestral domain. The implications of this demand are tremendous, as itimpinges on (1) how the concept of ancestral domain is understood by the two parties,(2) the allocation and distribution of resources, and (3) its repercussions on sovereigntyand territorial integrity. Land issues have always been critical since, to many Morotribes, their ancestral land (pusaka) is tied closely to their identity. Moreover, their pre-ferred mode of settling land disputes is predicated on the “adat” and Shariah laws,which are incompatible with the country’s secular constitution.50
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
Revisiting the Bangsamoro Struggle 157
So far, the government’s response to these demands had been perceived as lukewarmby the MILF. For example, in the case of the MILF’s ancestral domain claims, the gov-ernment responded by passing the Indigenous People’s Right Act as a framework toresolve their claim for ancestral land rights. The MILF, however, spurned this initiative.They argued that by lumping the Moros together with the other indigenous groups inthe country, the law diluted the Bangsamoro people’s sovereign rights to their home-land. In order to break the impasse on this issue, the government formed the TechnicalWorking Group in 2004, which brought together representatives from both parties towork out a common framework in addressing four contentious issues pertaining toancestral claims: concept, territory, government and resources.51 And despite occasionalceasefire violations, talks on security and rehabilitation are being pursued with the goalof arriving at a comprehensive peace settlement with the MILF. The government hasalso sought the help of an International Monitoring Team (IMT) to coordinate thecessation of hostilities between government forces and the MILF forces.
Thus, notwithstanding the efforts by the current administration to resolve the con-flict between the government and the MILF, observers have remained cautious aboutthe prospects of moving the peace process ahead. At least until some kind of accom-modation from both sides is forthcoming on how the Bangsamoro homeland can bere-visioned without having to compromise the sovereignty and territorial integrity ofthe Philippines, the road to peace is laden with difficult challenges ahead.
ConclusionThe foregoing discussion has attempted to trace the history of the Bangsamoro strug-gle. In the process, the it has shown that over the last four decades the people whoespoused the Moro cause were not a monolithic group. Instead, they have becomefragmented. The disunity is best seen in the existing rivalry between the MNLF andthe MILF. Both had accused each other of selling out the Bangsamoro cause. But astheir leaders continued to squabble among themselves, the story of violence, wars,economic marginalization and exclusion continues.
This article has sought to examine how the Moro identity defined the struggle for aBangsamoro. As we analyzed the emergence of several groups that carried on thisstruggle for an independent state in post-colonial Philippines, and tracked their trajec-tories in terms of their missions and goals, it is increasingly hard to ascertain the extentto which the Moro identity is still the main factor that defines the existence of thesegroups. At least in so far as the MNLF story is concerned, the movement now standsmore for social justice than for the push for self-determination. For the MILF, whileits vision of an Islamic state has remained, there appears also to be some indication atleast from the on-going peace talks that its current leadership may be open to the ideaof meaningful autonomy rather than being rigid about the goal of an independent andIslamic Bangsamoro. This perceptible change in attitude emerged in the light of recentannouncements by the Philippine government that it is willing to offer self-determinationto the MILF. MILF leader Al Haj Murad Ibrahim was recently quoted as saying thatthe GRP’s offer for self-determination was a “breakthrough.”52
However, given the differing experiences of the twists and turns of theseon-going peace talks with the MILF, many questions remain, such as: what kind of
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
158 Asian Security
self-determination – is it limited autonomy similar to that reached with the MNLF?Does this approximate to the MILF’s vision of Bangsamoro? How would this affectthe GRP’s stance regarding the MNLF, and how would the MNLF respond to suchinitiatives? Would it welcome such an initiative or would it continue to insist thatthe MNLF is still the vanguard revolutionary force of the Moro people? And,finally, could the two groups agree to share power?
Revisiting the checkered history of the Bangsamoro struggle therefore raises anumber of significant/fundamental questions regarding the issue of identity in defin-ing this problem. To be sure, the emergence of different Moro movements that havetaken up the Bangsamoro cause, the way their movements have changed over the lastfour decades, their competing claims on the legitimacy of the Moro cause, and theirchanging positions in dealing with the GRP point to the fact that there are multiplevoices and multiple issues that are being articulated at different points in history. Tak-ing these issues together unveils a story of competing claims and contested identities.In fact, what has been happening to the Bangsamoro struggle is a continuing story ofre-making and re-imagining the Moro identity.
This is not to diminish or exclude the enduring feature of identity in the strugglefor self-determination. But surely, in the process, one needs to ask the question: whoseidentity? Is it one that is represented by the MNLF or the MILF? How about theidentity of non-Muslims like the Lumads who have been living the Moro heartlandand were included in the vision of the “Bangmoro” homeland? And, with the changingdemography in the whole island of Mindanao as a result of migration and inter-mar-riage between Muslims and non-Muslims, is there still a “pure” Moro identity? Willthere be backlash, for instance, if the MILF’s recovery of ancestral lands under thenew scheme of self-determination displaces the non-Muslim settlers?
These questions are extremely relevant not just to non-Muslims caught in thisstruggle, but more importantly to those who had earlier taken on the Muslim-Filipinoidentity in the history of building the modern Philippine nation state. We have seenhow these people have reconstructed their identity in their interface with non-Muslims who were also building a nation. Thus, in the current environment, how doesone reconcile being part of the larger Philippine state and still consider oneself as also aMoro? And for Muslims who had been elected into public office as mayors, senators,etc., how do these datu-politicians stand in their local constituencies?
An answer to these multiple or dual identities could perhaps be found in Abinales’portrayal of the “Janus-faced gentry” within the Muslim communities, who possessedtwo public masks to wear for different audiences. According to Abinales, a Muslimpolitician would:
wear a “traditional” mask [that] embodied his “Muslim-ness” and the “authority”conferred by his ethnic group, and his “modern” mask [that] symbolized his statusas representative of the modern-state . . . Datus invoked their Muslim identitywhen addressing national audiences as a means of claiming their right to represent,defend, and speak for their communities . . . At home, the modern mask wasdonned for the datu’s own ethnic group and the larger Muslim community . . . asrepresentatives of the modern-nation state.53
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
Revisiting the Bangsamoro Struggle 159
What this implies, however, is a complex interplay of identities, experienced bymany Muslim communities who find themselves having to wear and even adjust theirmultiple identities as they attempt to integrate themselves into the modern Philippinestate. The process of having to reconstruct their identities, either as Muslim-Filipinosor “new” Moros, makes it difficult to ascertain which identity matters, especiallywithin the context of the struggle for the Bangsamoro. And as Muslims find them-selves having to straddle the traditional and the modern structures, it becomes evenmore vexing to decipher how their identity is constituted – is it determined by ethnic,religious, or even linguistic affiliation?
To conclude, as we keep track of the evolving story of the “Bangsamoro” struggleit is important to revisit the prevailing assumptions of what it means to be a Moro, andhow this struggle is still very much about protecting one’s subaltern “identity.” It is inunderstanding the nuances of the Bangsamoro struggle that appropriate responses toaddress the myriad issues that are at stake, including the prospects for peace, can per-haps be more meaningfully and effectively crafted.
NOTES
1. See, for example, Cesar A Majul, The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines (Berkeley: MizanPress, 1985); T. J. S. George, Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1980); Thomas McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separat-ism in Southern Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); and Patricio Abinales, MakingMindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State (Quezon City: Ateneo deManila University Press, 2000). See also Federico Magdalena, “Islam and the Politics of Identity,” Center forPhilippine Studies, University of Hawai’i, Accessible via www.hawaii.edu./cps.identity.html, 8 April 2005.
2. See, for example, Charles O. Frake, “Abu Sayyaf: Displays of Violence and the Proliferation of ContestedIdentities among Philippine Muslims,” American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 100, No. 1 (March 1998),pp. 41–54; and Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of SouthernThailand (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Lela G. Noble, “Muslim Grievances and theMuslim Rebellion,” in Carl Lande, ed., Rebuilding a Nation: Philippine Challenges and American Policy(Washington, DC: Washington Institute Press), pp. 417–434.
3. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels, p. 5.4. See for example, Peter Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, eds., The Muslims Filipino: Their History, Society and
Contemporary Problem (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974); Majul, The Contemporary MuslimMovement in the Philippines; George, Revolt in Mindanao; and McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels.
5. The Tausugs were the aristocrats or elites among the other ethnic groups that co-existed in the Sultanate. Theother ethnic groups were the Samas, Badjaos, Jama Mapuns, Molbogs, Palawanis, Uakans and Kalibugans.B. R. Rodil, The History of the Moro People and the Lumad Communities in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan, ascited in Jamail A. Kamlian, “The Agonizing Search for a Peaceful Alternative to Ethnic, Religious and Cul-tural Conflict in ASEAN: The Mindanao Experience,” paper presented at the Workshop on Ethnic, Culturaland Religious Conflict in the ASEAN Region, April 14–17, 2002, Singapore.
6. See in particular, Abraham Sakili, “Towards Bridging a Gap and Crossing the Bridge in Muslim–ChristianRelations in the Philippines,” p. 22, cited in Kamlian’s “The Agonizing Search.”
7. James F. Warren, The Sulu Zone 1868–1898: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery and Ethnicity in theTransformation of Southeast Asian Maritime States (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1985), pp. 3–9.
8. Majul, The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines.9. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels, p. 81.
10. As well as the island of Palawan, which altogether is generally referred in contemporary period as Mindanao.11. These 13 Islamized ethno-linguistic groups include the following: Badjao, Iranuns, Jama-mapun, Kalagan,
Kalibugan, Maguindanao, Maranao, Molbog, Palawani, Samal, Sangil, Tausug and Yakan. See Kamlian,“The Agonizing Search.” See also Abinales, Making Mindanao.
12. Rodil, The History of the Moro People, p. 7, cited in Kamlian’s “The Agonizing Search,” p. 14.13. Kamlian, “The Agonizing Search,” p. 16.14. According to Peter Gowing, the military power of the Americans was too much for the Muslims and within a
decade they were able to subdue the Moro resistance. See Peter Gowing, Mandate in Moroland: The AmericanGovernment of Muslim Filipinos, 1899–1920 (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1983).
15. Gowing, Mandate in Moroland, pp. 36–41.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
160 Asian Security
16. Kamlian, “The Agonizing Search,” p. 18. See also Myrthena L. Fianza, “Contesting Land and Identity in thePeriphery: The Moro Indigenous People of Southern Philippines,” Working Paper prepared for the 10th BiennialConference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, August 9–13, 2004, Oaxaca,Mexico, pp. 4–5; and Syed Serajul Islam, “Ethno-communal Conflict in the Philippines: The Case ofMindanao-Sulu Region,” in R. Ganguly and I. Macduff, eds., Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in South andSoutheast Asia: Causes, Dynamics and Solutions (London: Sage Publications, 1998), p. 445.
17. The term “Lumad” is a relatively new name that emerged in the mid-1970s during the Martial period in thePhilippines. It refers to 20 ethno-linguistic groups inhabiting the Mindanao region. Prior to this, the Spanishused to refer to these groups as “paganos” or (pagans), while the Americans called them “cultural minorities.”
18. Magdalena, “Islam and the Politics of Identity.”19. Thomas McKenna, “Saints, Scholars and the Idealized Past in Philippine Muslim Separatism,” Working Paper
Series No. 23, Southeast Asia Research Centre, City University of Hong Kong, March 2002, p. 7. See alsoMcKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels.
20. McKenna, “Saints, Scholars and the Idealized Past in Philippine Muslim Separatism,” p. 7.21. Mamitua Saber, “The Muslim Minority in the Philippines,” cited in Abinales, Making Mindanao, p. 61.22. Speech by Aluya Alonto at the Philippine Constitutional Convention 1935, cited in Abinales, Making Mind-
anao, p. 61.23. Abinales, Making Mindanao, p. 57.24. Abinales, Making Mindanao, p. 60.25. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels, p. 112.26. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels, p.133. Emphasis added.27. Philippine Muslim News (Manila), Vol. 2, July 1968, cited in Kamlian, “The Agonizing Search,” p. 21. Also
cited in P. T. Makol-Abdul, “Colonialism and Change: The Case of Muslims in the Philippines,” Journal ofMuslim Minority Affairs Vol. 17, No. 2 (1997), p. 319.
28. See for example the World Bank 2003 Report, “Social Assessment of Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao.”Accessed via http://inweb.worldbank.org.
29. The MIM Manifesto was issued on May 1, 1968 in the province of Cotabato and called for the establishmentof an Islamic state comprising the islands of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. See Kamlian, “The AgonizingSearch,” p. 23.
30. For a number of accounts on the Jabidah massacre, see, for example, Abinales, Making Mindanao; and LelaGardner Noble, Philippine Policy Toward Sabah: A Claim to Independence (Tucson: University of ArizonaPress, 1977).
31. See Eric Gutierrez, “The Re-imagination of the Bangsamoro,” in Kristin Gaerlan and Mara Stankovitch, eds.,Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines (QuezonCity: Philippines, 2000), pp. 305–345.
32. McKenna, Muslims Rulers and Rebels, p. 164.33. Gutierrez, “The Re-imagination of the Bangsamoro,” p. 312.34. Gutierrez, “The Re-imagination of the Bangsamoro,” p. 311.35. Majul, The Contemporary Muslim Movement; Abinales, Making Mindanao; McKenna, Muslim Rulers and
Rebels and “Saints, Scholars”; and Gutierrez, “The Re-imagination of the Bangsamoro.”36. The Tripoli Agreement, December 23, 1976, as appended in Papers on the Tripoli Agreement, International
Studies Institute of the Philippines (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1986).37. For more details on the MNLF–GRP talks, see Samuel K. Tan, “Three Wars and the President,” in Kasarin-
lan Vol. 14, No. 2 (2000), pp. 221–233.38. Just as the non-Muslim Philippines is said to be ruled by a few families/dynasties, the same is true for the
Muslim Mindanao. The traditional Muslim elites discussed above had been actively involved in post-colonialpolitics and in national and local elections to consolidate their positions. Among the so-called traditionalMuslim elites are: (1) The Alontos, Lucmans, Dimaporos, Tamanos in Lanao; (2) the scions of the Magui-nadao political families of the Sinsuats, the Mengelens, and the Pendatuns in Cotabato; and (3) the Kirams, theAbubakars, the Tulawis, the Kirams, the Rasuls, the Tans and the Loongs in Sulu. Samuel Tan, International-isation of the Bangsamore Struggle, cited in Mary Ann Arguelles, “The Non-Traditional Moro Elites and theOrganisation of Islamic Conference,” Philippine Political Science Journal Vol. 22, No. 45 (2001), pp. 97–134.
39. See for example, George, Revolt in Mindanao, p. 200 and McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels, p. 141.40. Arguelles, “The Non-Traditional Moro Elites,” p. 103.41. Abinales, Making Mindanao.42. Abinales, Making Mindanao, p. 104.43. Arguelles, “The Non-Traditional Moro Elites,” p. 106.44. Arguelles, “The Non-Traditional Moro Elites,” p. 107.45. For more on the reported linkages of ASG and the al-Qaeda connection, see Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam
in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003); and Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (London: C. Hurst & Company, 2002).
46. See Guttierez, “The Re-imagination of the Bangsamoro,” pp. 324–325.47. Guttierez, “The Re-imagination of the Bangsamoro,” p. 325.48. In 2000 under the Estrada administration, the Philippine military launched an aggressive campaign to stamp
out Muslim resistance in the south. As a result, the government forces were able to infiltrate and demolish
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
Revisiting the Bangsamoro Struggle 161
Camp Abubakar, reported to be the MILF’s training camp for rebels. It was also widely reported that thiscamp was used to train “terrorists” linked to the wider al-Qaeda terrorist network. See, for example,Alexander Aguirre, “The Mindanao Peace Process: Initiatives Toward Peace and Development Following theCessation of Hostilities in Southern Philippines,” in Kasarinlan Vol. 15, No. 2 (2000), pp. 227–233.
49. “Updates on the Status of the GRP–MILF Peace Talks,” Office of the President Advisor on the PeaceProcess, October 22, 2004.
50. Fianza, “Contesting Land and Identity in the Periphery,” p. 17.51. See Status of the GRP–MILF Peace Processes (Embassy of the Philippines, Washington), February 8, 2005.52. See Douglas Bakshian, “Philippines Offers Muslim Rebels Self-Determination,” in Voice of America News.
Accessible via http://voanews.com/english/2007-03-13-v0a10.cfm.53. Abinales, Making Mindanao, pp. 187–188.
Mely Caballero-Anthony is Assistant Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,Nanyang Technological University and Coordinator of Consortium on Non-Traditional Security Stud-ies in Asia (NTS-Asia).
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UO
V U
nive
rsity
of
Ovi
edo]
at 0
4:57
29
Oct
ober
201
4
