Upload
others
View
4
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
November 2009, Wellington, New Zealand | R e p o R t 1 1 1
e31(111)
ReVIeW oF pARt 8 oF tHe CRIMeS ACt 1961:
CRIMeS AGAINSt tHe peRSoN
November2009,Wellington,NewZealand|R E P O R T 1 1 1
REVIEWOFPART8OFTHECRIMESACT1961:
CRIMESAGAINSTTHEPERSON
E31(111)
TheLawCommissionisanindependent,publiclyfunded,centraladvisorybodyestablishedbystatutetoundertakethesystematicreview,reformanddevelopmentofthelawofNewZealand.Itspurposeistohelpachievelawthatisjust,principled,andaccessible,andthatreflectstheheritageandaspirationsofthepeoplesofNewZealand.
The Commissioners are:
RightHonourableSirGeoffreyPalmerSC–President
DrWarrenYoung–Deputy President
EmeritusProfessorJohnBurrowsQC
GeorgeTannerQC
ValSim
TheGeneralManageroftheLawCommissionisBrigidCorcoran
TheofficeoftheLawCommissionisatLevel19,HPTower,171FeatherstonStreet,Wellington
Postaladdress:POBox2590,Wellington6140,NewZealand
DocumentExchangeNumber:sp23534
Telephone:(04)473-3453,Facsimile:(04)471-0959
Email:[email protected]
Internet:www.lawcom.govt.nz
NationalLibraryofNewZealandCataloguing-in-PublicationData
ReviewofPart8oftheCrimesAct1961:crimesagainsttheperson.
(LawCommissionreport;111)
ISBN978-1-877316-81-4(pbk)
ISBN978-1-877316-78-4(internet)
1.NewZealand—CrimesAct1961.2.Offensesagainstthe
person—NewZealand.I.NewZealand.LawCommission.
II.Series:NewZealand.LawCommission.Report;111.
345.93025—dc22
Report/LawCommission,Wellington,2009
ISSN0113-2334(print)
ISSN1177-6196(online)
ThisreportmaybecitedasNZLCR111
ThisreportisavailableontheLawCommission’swebsite:www.lawcom.govt.nz
i i Law Commiss ion Report
TheHonSimonPowerMinisterResponsiblefortheLawCommissionParliamentBuildingsWELLINGTON
30November2009
DearMinister
NZLCR111–REVIEWOFPART8OFTHECRIMESACT1961:CRIMESAGAINSTTHEPERSON
IampleasedtosubmittoyouLawCommissionReport111,Review of Part 8 of the Crimes Act 1961: Crimes Against the Person,whichwesubmitundersection16oftheLawCommissionAct1985.
Yourssincerely
Geoffrey Palmer President
Letter of transmittaL
i i iReview of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
In2007theLawCommissionreceivedareferencefromthegovernmenttoreviewPart8oftheCrimesAct.Part8contains“crimesagainsttheperson”,includinghomicide,assault,andinjuryoffences.Intwopreviousprojectsundertaken by the Law Commission – drafting sentencing guidelines,andthereviewofmaximumpenalties–wehadencounteredanomaliesinthePart8offencesthatmadeitdifficulttocarryoutthenecessarywork.
In2008,thenewNationalgovernmentannouncedthatoneofitsprioritiesinthecriminaljusticeareawasdevelopinganappropriateresponsetoviolenceagainstchildren.BecausesomeofthePart8provisionsrelatetooffendingagainstchildren,thegovernmentinvitedustoexpediteourworkonthisproject.
Inundertakingthiswork,wehavethereforepursuedthreeobjectives.First,wehaveaddressedtheproblemsinitiallyidentified,byensuringthattheschemeofPart8offencesfromhomicidethroughtocommonassault–includingthe“endangering”offences(whereriskof injury is incurred,althoughinjurymaynotresult)–iscomprehensiveandcoherent.Inparticular,wehaveensuredthattheoffencestructureproperlyreflectsboththerangeofculpabilityinvolvedinviolentbehaviourandtheconsequencesarisingfromit,andhaveusedthisasabasistoensurethatmaximumpenaltiesforalloftheoffencesareallocatedonaprincipledbasis.
Secondly,wehaveconcludedthatthecurrentoffencesaddressingchildilltreatmentandneglecthaveanumberofgapsanddeficienciesanddonotattachsufficientweighttotheimportanceofchildprotection.Weproposeanexpansionofthelegaldutiesinrelationtochildren,andsomesignificantchangestocurrentoffences(includingasubstantialincreaseinthemaximumpenaltyfortheoffencethatiscurrentlytermed“crueltytoachild”).Wealsoproposethecreationofanewoffenceoffailingtoprotectachildorvulnerableadultfromtheriskofdeath,seriousinjuryorsexualassault,iftheperpetratorresidesinthesamehouseholdorresidence,hasknowledgeoftherisk,andfailstotakereasonablestepstopreventit.
Thirdly,wehaveendeavouredtoeliminateanumberofoffencesthataremoreappropriatelycoveredbyothergenericPart8offences.This includestherepealofassaultonachild,andassaultofafemalebyamale.Bothoftheseoffencesresultininconsistentchargingpracticeandsometimesinappropriateunder-charging.Wethinkitbetterthatchargesrepresenttheculpabilityrelatingtotheoffenceanditsconsequenceratherthanthestatusofthevictim.
Overall,webelievethatourrecommendedpackageofreformswillsubstantiallyimprovetheaccessibilityandfunctioningofthelawinthisveryimportantarea.
TheCommissionersresponsibleforthisreferencewereWarrenYoungandValSim.TheywereassistedbyadvisersSteveMelrose,ClaireBrowning,andZoëPrebble.
Geoffrey Palmer
President
foreword
i v Law Commiss ion Report
TheLawCommissionhasbeenaskedtoreviewtheoffencesofassaultandinjurytothepersoninPart8oftheCrimesAct,particularlysections188to194,196,and202C.Indoingso,theCommissionshouldconsider:
TheoverallschemeoftheCrimesActprovisions,andwhetheramore·coherentschemecanbedevised;Theelementsandscopeofindividualoffencesandtheirrelationshipsto·eachother;Themaximumpenaltylevelsofthese,andotheroffences,andtheirrespective·relativities;andThe implications of any proposed reforms for assault provisions in·otherlegislation.
terms of reference
vReview of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
v i Law Commiss ion Report
Review of Part 8 of the Crimes Act 1961: Crimes against the person
ConTenTsForeword.........................................................................................................................................ivTermsofreference...........................................................................................................................vSummary.........................................................................................................................................3
ChapTer 1 Introduction...................................................................................................................................11
Background.........................................................................................................................11Scopeofthereview............................................................................................................12Structureofthispaper.......................................................................................................13
ChapTer 2Thecoreassaultandinjuryoffences:assaultandinjuringwithintent.....................................15
Introduction.......................................................................................................................15Problemswiththecurrentlaw..........................................................................................15Thenewoffences...............................................................................................................17Section9oftheSummaryOffencesAct...........................................................................20Maximumpenalties...........................................................................................................21Otheroffences....................................................................................................................24Recommendedrepeals......................................................................................................27
ChapTer 3Specificassaults..............................................................................................................................30
Introduction.......................................................................................................................30Theadvantagesanddisadvantagesofspecificassaultprovisions...................................30ReformproposalsinNewZealandandelsewhere...........................................................31Assaultonachild...............................................................................................................32Maleassaultsfemale..........................................................................................................35Assaultsonpoliceofficers.................................................................................................37Assaultsonothersinperformanceoftheirduties...........................................................38
ChapTer 4Endangering,negligentinjury,andhomicide..............................................................................42
Thecurrentlaw.................................................................................................................42Ourapproachtotheseoffences.........................................................................................43Thementalelement...........................................................................................................43Unlawfulacts.....................................................................................................................45
1Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Changing“lawful”to“statutory”duty.............................................................................45Actsandomissionslikelytoinjure...................................................................................47Section160(2)(c)and(e)..................................................................................................48Maximumpenalties–newsections157Aand157B.......................................................48
ChapTer 5Illtreatmentorneglectofchildrenandothervulnerablevictims..............................................49
Introduction.......................................................................................................................49Illtreatmentorneglectofachildorvulnerableperson...........................................50Newoffenceoffailuretoprotectchildorvulnerableadult............................................55Section152–dutyofparentorguardian.........................................................................57Section151–dutyofcaregivers.......................................................................................60Section153–dutyofemployerstoprovidenecessaries.................................................61
appendiCes
appendix aAlteredprovisions..........................................................................................................................64
appendix BThedraftBill..................................................................................................................................65
2 Law Commiss ion Report2
Summary
Part8of theCrimesAct1961dealswith“offencesagainst theperson”.1
Itcontainsoffencesincludingmurder,manslaughter,injuryandassault.
In2007theLawCommissionreceivedareferencefromgovernmenttoreview2
Part8oftheCrimesAct.Inlate2008,theMinisterofJusticeinvitedustoexpedite thiswork,withaparticularview toensuring that childrenareadequatelyprotectedbytheoffencescontainedinthisPart.
Inthetimeframesavailabletous,wehavenotbeenabletocomprehensively3
reviewthewholeofPart8.Theprincipalfocusofthisprojectwasonthecoreinjuryandassaultoffences;thedefinitionofhomicideandrelatedoffencesofcriminalnuisanceandnegligent injury;andoffencesaddressingchild illtreatmentandneglect.Wehavesubstantiallyrevisedtheoffencesinthesethreeareas.
Manyofthechangesthatwerecommendhave,astheirprincipalobjective,4
codificationorclarificationoftheexistinglaw.However,particularlyintheareaofchildilltreatmentandneglect,weareproposingsignificantsubstantivechanges.
AdraftCrimes(OffencesAgainstthePerson)AmendmentBillisattachedas5
AppendixBtothispaper.
Chapter 2 – The core assault and injury offences
WerecommendthatthecoreassaultandinjuryprovisionsinPart8shouldbe6
replacedbysixnewoffences:
Causingseriousinjurywithintenttoinjure;·Causingseriousinjurybyassaultinganyperson,oractingwithreckless·disregardforsafety;Causinginjurywithintenttoinjure;·Causinginjurybyassaultinganyperson,oractingwithrecklessdisregard·forsafety;Assaultwithintenttoinjure;·Commonassault.·
Thenewoffenceswouldaddressthreeproblemsthatweidentifiedwiththe7
currentprovisionsinPart8.First,thecurrentprovisionshavenoclearorganisingprinciple,eitherinthewaythattheyarestructured,orintheallocationoftheirmaximumpenalties.Secondly,theyhave“passedtheirusebydate”.Alotofthelanguageemployedintheirdraftingisoldfashionedandundulylegalistic.
3Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person 3
Summary
Furthermore,astheresultofjudicialinterpretationovertheyears,theirmeaningandscopearenottransparent,andtherearesubstantialoverlapsinthecoverageofanumberoftheoffences.Thirdly,thereareanumberofoffencesinPart8thatarbitrarilyelevateaspecificsetofcircumstances(eg,assaultwithaweapon)intoanelementofaseparateoffence,whenitoughttoberegardedasnomorethanoneofthewholerangeofaggravatingfactorstobedealtwithonsentencing.
Ourproposednewoffencesalladdressbothculpability(thatis,theintentor8
othermentalstateoftheoffender)andconsequence(theresultsoftheoffender’sacts).However,becauseconsequencemaybefortuitous,wehavetakentheviewthattheculpabilityoftheaccusedshouldbetheprincipalconsideration.Thus,whilethereareelementsintheoffencesaddressingbothculpabilityandconsequence,culpabilityhasbeengivengreaterweightinallocatingmaximumpenaltiestoeachoffence.
Maximum penalties
Werecommendasubstantialrevisionofthemaximumpenalties,byreference9
toamethodologythatissetoutinchapter2.Noneofthemaximaweareproposinghasdecreased,relativetocurrentmaximumpenalties.Whileanumberofthepenaltieslookquitedifferent,thedifferencesareprimarilyaconsequenceofthereorganisationoftheoffences.Thereisonlyonecoreoffenceinchapter2thathasaneffectiveincreaseinthemaximumpenalty:assaultwithintenttoinjure.
Miscellaneous offences
Chapter2 concludeswithadiscussionof fouroffences thatwepropose10
shouldberetained,andhalfadozenotherswhoserepealisrecommended.Wehaveidentifiedaneedtoretainthefollowingoffences,becausetheyaddresswhatwouldotherwisebegapsonthestatutebook:
Section197–Disabling;·Section201–Transmittingdisease;·Section202–Settingtraps;·Section204–Impedingrescue.·
Werecommendtherepealofthefollowingoffencesbecausetheyareadequately11
coveredbythecoreoffencesandarethereforeunnecessary:
Section191–Aggravatedwoundingorinjury;·Section192–Aggravatedassault;·Section194–Assaultonachild,orbyamaleonafemale;·Section198–Disablingfirearmordoingdangerousactwithintent;·Section199–Acidthrowing;·Section200–Poisoningwithintent;·Section202C–Assaultwithaweapon.·
Chapter 3 – Specific assaults
Thischapterconsiderswhenprovisionshouldbemadeforspecificassault12
offences–thatis,assaultsonparticularcategoriesofvictim,thattypicallycarryaggravatedmaximumpenalties.
4 Law Commiss ion Report
Werecommend:13
Repealingtheoffencesofassaultonachildandmaleassaultsfemaleinsection·194oftheCrimesAct;Retainingthestatusquoasregardsassaultsonpoliceofficers;·FurtherworkbyeithertheMinistryofJusticeortheLawCommissionto·rationalisethenumerousotherspecificassaultprovisionsonthestatutebook–assaultsonenforcementofficers,judges,courtstaff,andsoon.
Wedonotrecommendtheestablishmentofanynewspecificassaultoffences.14
Assault on a child
Ourrecommendationtorepealthechild-specificassaultoffenceinsection194(a)15
mightbeconsideredsurprising,inthecontextofareportthatisdirectedtoensuringthatthelegalframeworkadequatelyaddressestheilltreatmentandneglectofchildren.Butinourview,theindirectdisadvantagesofsection194(a)aresuchthatthelawwillinfactbemorerobustwithoutit.
Theprincipalargumentinfavourofestablishingaseparatevictim-specific16
offenceistosignalthatthisparticularcategoryofconductissomuchmoreseriousthanthe“normal”rangeofcriminalconductthatitrequiresaseparatelabel,andanaggravatedmaximumpenalty.However,thereareanumberofreasonswhysection194(a)doesnotadequatelyachievethispurposeandistendingtoundermineit.
Firsttheoffenceisonlyavailabletoaddresslow-leveloffendingagainstchildren.17
Moreseriousoffencesaredealtwithbyothercharges.Thiscreatesaperceptionproblem:itlooksasifthiscategoryofoffendingisnottakenseriously,contrarytotherealitythatsentencingjudgesareinfactimposingmoreseveresentencesforoffendingagainstchildrenacrossthewholerangeofcases.
Secondly,theavailabilityoftheseparateoffenceinvitesinconsistentpolice18
chargingpractice.Inparticular,itmayleadtounder-charging–thatisachargeofassaultonachildundersection194whenthefactssupportthelayingofamoreseriouscharge.Thatcontributestotheperceptionproblem.
Thirdly, thereareothervictimswhoare just asvulnerableas children,19
suchastheveryelderlyorseverelymentallyimpaired.Thereisnocaseforelevatingtheundeniablyimportantinterestsofchildrenabovethoseofequallyvulnerablevictims.
Finally,itisunnecessarytocreateavictim-specificoffencetoachieveappropriate20
sentencingoutcomes.Aspartofourreviewweundertookananalysisofsentencingoutcomesforoffendingagainstchildren.Itdemonstratedthatsentencesimposedareconsistentlymoreseverewhenchildrenarevictims,whetherornotachild-specificchargeislaid.ThefactthatthereshouldbeasentencingpremiumwhereachildvictimisinvolvedhasbeenreinforcedbyrecentamendmentstotheSentencingActthatmakeitexplicitthatthefactthatoffendingagainstachildistobetreatedasanaggravatingfactor.
5Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Summary
We note that our proposed changes to section 195 of the Crimes Act,21
whichrelatestochild“cruelty”bywayofilltreatmentorneglect,wouldstillpermitthatsectiontobeusedincasesinvolvingassault.Wehaverecommendedasubstantialincreaseinthemaximumpenaltyattachingtoit.Itwouldthereforeremainopentotheprosecution,intheabsenceofsection194,torelyuponsection195insteadifitfeltthattheculpabilityoftheconductinanygivencaserequiredanaggravatedcharge.
Male assaults female
The“maleassaults female”offence insection194(b)of theCrimesAct,22
likeassaultonachild,onlyaddressesrelativelyminorcases–theequivalentof common assault, but for the gender of the two people involved.Wheretheconductismoreserious,resultingininjurytooreventhedeathofthefemale,moreseriousgenericchargesoughttobe,andinmostcaseswouldbe,laid.Weconsiderthat,providedthemaximumpenaltyforcommonassaultisincreasedtoaddresstheculpabilityofthiscategoryofassault,theseparateoffenceisnotfulfillingausefulfunction.
Thestrongestargumentofferedforitsretentionisthatitofferstangibleevidence23
ofacriminalhistoryofthisparticularkindofhighlyundesirableconduct.However,ultimatelyeverybodywithwhomweconsultedagreedthatacriminalrecordthatreliesupontheoffenceofmaleassaultsfemaletoindicatepropensityishighlymisleading,becausetheoffenceonlycapturescasesatthelowendofthespectrumofseriousness.Ultimately,everybodyagreedthatitwouldbepreferabletodevelopamethodofrecordingsuchpropensity,coveringthewholerangeofrelevantoffences.WeunderstandthattheMinistryofJusticeandPoliceareworkingtogethertoaddressthis.
Chapter 4 – Endangering, negligent injury, and homicide
Chapter 4 recommends changes to section 160(2) of the Crimes Act,24
which defines culpable homicide, and to two other related provisions.Thesection160(2)changescodifycaselaw.Therelatedoffences–whichappearinnewsections157Aand157BoftheBilland,broadlyspeaking,relatetoendangeringandnegligentinjury–areamendedtoalignthemwithsection160.Therehavebeensomehistoricalanomaliesandinconsistenciesofapproachthatinourviewarenotjustified.Thepolicyobjectivehereissimplytoensurethatthelawisconsistent.Thethreeprovisionsnowestablishahierarchythataddressesthewholerangeofpossibleoutcomes(death,injuryorriskofinjury)thatmayrisefromunlawfulactsoromissionstoperformstatutoryduties.
Thekeychangesrecommendedinthischapterare:25
Amendingsection150AoftheCrimesAct,tocodifytheCourtofAppeal·decision inR v Powell [2002]1NZLR666(CA) thatgrossnegligenceneedstobeprovedbytheCrownincaseswhere,butforsection150A,alessermentalelementwouldsuffice.Substitutinggrossnegligencefortherecklessnessrequirementinwhatis·currentlysection145oftheCrimesAct(newsection157AinourproposeddraftBill),sothatthereisconsistencyofapproachacrossthethreeprovisions:sections160,157A,and157B.
6 Law Commiss ion Report
Defining “unlawful act” to mean “an offence in breach of any Act,·regulation,ruleorbylaw”,inordertocodifytheCourtofAppeal’sapproachinR v Myatt[1991]1NZLR674(CA),andensurethat“unlawfulact”hasthesamemeaningacrossallthreeprovisions.Requiringthatanysuchbreachalsobeonethatis,inthecircumstances,likely·tocauseinjurytoanyperson.This,too,codifiestheCourtofAppeal’sapproachinR v Myatt[1991]1NZLR674(CA);althoughtheCourtinthatcasereferred to“harm”,rather than“injury”,wedonotconsider thedifferencesignificant.Changingreferencesto“lawfulduty”to“statutoryduty”,intheinterestsof·certaintyandtransparency.Repealingsection160(2)(c)and(e).·
Chapter 5 – Ill treatment or neglect of children and other vulnerable victims
Weproposesubstantialreformstothelawsrelatingtochildneglectandill26
treatment.Thechangesweproposecanbesummarisedasfollows:
A redrafted section 195 of the Crimes Act 1961 (formerly entitled·“crueltytoachild”),addressingilltreatmentandneglectbythosewithcareorchargeofachildorvulnerableadult,withasubstantiallyincreasedmaximumpenaltyof10years.Anewoffenceforthoselivingwithachildorvulnerableadult,offailingto·takereasonablestepstoprotectsuchavictimfromanyknownriskofdeath,seriousinjuryorsexualassault.Anextensiontothescopeofthedutiesprovisionsundersections151and·152oftheCrimesAct,byintroducinganadditionalrequirementineachprovisiontotakereasonablestepstoprotectachild(section152)orvulnerableperson(section151)frominjury.
Section 195
Therearesomeaspectsofthecurrentfunctionandpurposeofsection195that27
weexplicitlydonotwishtochange:inparticular,thenotionofilltreatmentbeingsufficientlyopen-endedtoaccommodatesomeinstancesofassault;andtheabilityofajurytoassessintheround,havingregardtothetotalityofevidence,whetheracourseofconductconstitutesilltreatmentorneglect.
Werecommendfourkeychangesthatbroadenthescopeofthiscategoryof28
offending,andsignalitsverygravenature:
extension of scope to vulnerable adults.· Atpresent,section195appliesonlytochildvictims.Weconsiderthatothervulnerablevictimsareentitledtothesamelevelofprotection.Ourproposedsection195hasthereforebeenextendedtoapplytobothcategories–vulnerableadults,aswellaschildren.age of child raised, to under 18 years.· Section195currentlyappliestochildrenundertheageof16years.Inourview,thisshouldberaisedtounder18 years. We have recommended this in all of our revised offences.ItisconsistentwithNewZealand’sobligationsundertheUnitedNationsConventionontheRightsoftheChild.
7Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Summary
an objective gross negligence test.· TheCourtofAppealhasheldthatthecurrentrequirementthattheconductbewilfulrequiresilltreatmenttohavebeeninflicteddeliberately,withaconsciousappreciationthatitwaslikelytocauseunnecessarysuffering.Neglect,too,willonlyberegardedas“wilful”whereitisdeliberate.Thesearesubjectivetests:theyrequirethedefendant’sstateofmind tobeproved. Inpractice, thismeans that ignoranceorthoughtlessnessisadefence.Werecommendthatanyreferenceto“wilfully”shouldberemovedfromsection195.Insteadweareproposinga“grossnegligence”test.Thiswouldrequirethejuryonlytobesatisfiedthattheconductallegedwasamajordeparturefromthestandardofcaretobeexpectedofareasonableperson;ignoranceorthoughtlessnesswouldnolongerabsolveadefendantfromliability.Maximum penalty raised from 5 to 10 years.· Thecurrentmaximumpenaltyforilltreatmentandneglectofachildundersection195is5years’imprisonment.Weconsiderthatthispenaltyneedstobeconsiderablyhighertoreflecttheproperrelativitybetweenitandotheroffences.Weproposeanewmaximumprison termof10years, since theworst classof caseundersection195willbeoneinwhichthechildhasnearlydied.Furthermore,thesectionistypicallyinvokedinresponsetowhatisoftenextremelyunpleasant and grave offending, that may well have occurred over aconsiderableperiod.Theresultingconsequencesmaywellextendbeyondphysicalinjury,tolongtermpsychologicaltrauma,and/ordevelopmentalissues.Thepenaltyneedstobesufficientlyhightoaddresstheculpabilityofsuchcases.
New offence of failing to protect a child or vulnerable adult
Weproposeanewoffenceoffailingtoprotectachildorvulnerableadultfrom29
riskofdeath,seriousinjuryorsexualassault,iftheperpetratorresidesinthesamehouseholdorresidence,hasknowledgeoftherisk,andfailstotakereasonablestepstopreventit.
The offence proposed has been closely modelled on section 5 of the30
DomesticViolence,CrimeandVictimsAct2004(UK).ThereisalsoasimilarSouthAustralianprovision.
Nodutytointerveneinsuchcasespresentlyexists.Itisasituationthatfalls31
beyondthescopeofanyoftheexistingstatutoryduties,andintheabsenceofsuchaduty,thereisnocriminalliabilityforomittingtoact.Inpractice,this means that household members who are neither perpetrators of,nor(legallyspeaking)partiesto,illtreatmentorneglectcannotbeheldliablefortheirfailuretointervene,nomatterhowoutrageousorhowobvioustheilltreatmentorneglectofthechildmaybe.Wetaketheviewthatthosewholive in close proximity to a child, and are in frequent contact with thechild,haveasufficientlyclosenexustomaketheimpositionofadutyofcareappropriate.
8 Law Commiss ion Report
Theoffenceweproposewouldhavethefollowingkeyelements:32
Thevictimmustbeeitherachildundertheageof18years,oraperson·whoisvulnerablebyreasonofdetention,age,sickness,mentalimpairment,oranyotherreason;Theoffendermustbeeitheramemberofthesamehouseholdasthevictim,·orastaffmemberofaresidentialfacility,whohasfrequentcontactwiththevictim.Heorshemustbeovertheageof18years;Theoffendermustknowthatthevictimisatriskofdeath,seriousinjuryor·sexualassault,astheresultofanunlawfulactoranomissiontoperformanystatutoryduty;Theoffendermust fail to take reasonable steps toprotect thevictim·fromharm.
Extended section 151 and 152 duties
Section152imposesadutyonparentsandthose intheplaceofparents,33
to provide their children under the age of 16 years with “necessaries”.Asnotedabove(paragraph28),werecommendraisingthisage tounder18years.
Wealsorecommendextendingthescopeoftheduty.In34 R v Lunt[2004]1NZLR498(CA),theCourtofAppealheldthataparentorpersoninlocoparentisisunderadutytotakereasonablestepstoprotecthisorherchildfromtheillegal violence of any other person where such violence is foreseen orreasonablyforeseeable.
Thenewsection152dutyweproposeis35 expressedinmoregeneralterms,asadutyonaparentorpersoninplaceofaparenttotakereasonablestepstoprotecthisorherchildfrominjury.Inotherwords,thescopeofwhatweareproposingisnot,initsexpressterms,confinedto“illegalviolence”.Therealityisthatmanythingslikelytocauseinjury(ie,actualbodilyharm)toachildwillindeedamounttoillegalviolence.However,fromtimetotime,anomissiontoperformastatutorydutymaygiverisetothesamerisk.Suchanomissionisequallyculpableinourview,inthesensethattherisktothechildisthesame.Ourproposednewdutyisthereforecastintermsthatdonotexcludesuchacase.
Wenotethattheadditionalparentaldutytoprotectfromharmthatweare36
proposinghassomesimilaritytoananalogousdutyprovisioninQueensland:section286oftheCriminalCodeAct1899.
Section151oftheCrimesActappliestoanypersonwhohaschargeofanother37
vulnerableperson.Avulnerablepersonisapersonwhois“unablebyreasonofdetention,age,sickness,insanityoranyothercoursetowithdrawhimselffromsuchchargeandunabletoprovidehimselfwiththenecessariesoflife”.Section151establishesadutyonthepersonincharge,tosupplythevulnerablepersonwiththenecessariesoflife.
9Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Summary
Wethinkthatvulnerablepeopleareentitledtothesameprotectionaschildren.38
Wethereforeproposeanextensionofthedutyinsection151,aswithsection152.Thiswillrequirethepersonincareorchargetotakereasonablestepstoprotectavulnerablepersonintheircarefrominjury,andtoprovidethemwith“necessaries”.
Section 153 of the Crimes Act
Wearerecommendingthatsection153oftheCrimesAct,whichimposesaduty39
onemployerstoprovidefood,clothingorlodgingtoanapprenticeorservant,shouldberepealed.Thatsectionisoutdated.Itwillnolongerbenecessary,inthelightofourotherproposedchanges.
Section 10A of the Summary Offences Act
Section10A,theoffenceofill-treatmentorwilfulneglectofachild,isextremely40
rarelycharged:inthe10yearsfrom1999to2008,only30chargeswerelaid.Wehavetakencaretoframesection195inawaythatencompassesthepresentscopeofsection10A,sothatthereisasingleoffencecapableofaddressingthewholerangeofconduct.Werecommendthatsection10Ashouldberepealed.
10 Law Commiss ion Report
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Part8of theCrimesAct1961dealswith“offencesagainst theperson”.Itcontainsoffencesincludingmurder,manslaughter,injuryandassault.
Intheinjuryandassaultcategory,whichwasaprimaryfocusforthisreview,1.2
therearebothgenerallyapplicableprovisions (eg, commonassault)andnumerousoffencesaddressingparticulartypesofcircumstances,victimsoroutcomes,suchasmaleassaultsfemale,1poisoning,2andacidthrowing.3
In2007theLawCommissionwasinvitedtoreviewPart8oftheCrimesAct.1.3
Ourtermsofreference,whicharereproducedonpage2,directedustodeterminewhetheramoresimplified,rationalandcoherentschemeofassaultandinjuryoffencescouldbedevisedforPart8.
Theimpetusforthisreviewinitiallyarosefromproblemsencounteredinthe1.4
courseoftwootherLawCommission,orLawCommission-affiliated,projects:workundertakenbytheSentencingEstablishmentUnittodraftsentencingguidelinesforPart8;andtheLawCommission’smaximumpenaltyreview.Bothprojectsidentifiedanomaliesinthescopeandcoverageoftheoffencesandtheirrespectivemaximumpenalties.TheseissuessuggestedthattherewasarealneedtoreviewandrevisetheschemeofPart8–and,indeed,thenumerousassaultandobstructionprovisionsinotherlegislation,thatsimilarlyshowsignificantvariationofapproachandwidelydifferingmaximumpenalties.
TheCrimesAct1961wascloselymodelledontheCriminalCodesof1893and1.5
1908.Anattemptwasmadein1989tosubstantiallyreformtheentire1961Act through the introduction of the Crimes Bill 1989,4 followed by theCrimesConsultativeCommittee (“CaseyCommittee”)Reporton theBillpublishedin1991.5Thisworkdidnotprogress–oratleast,notasapackage.SubstantialchangeshavebeenmadeinapiecemealfashiontootherPartsoftheAct,implementingorupdatingtheCrimesBill1989proposals.However,todate,Part8remainslargelyunchanged.
1 CrimesAct1961,s194(b).
2 CrimesAct1961,s200.
3 CrimesAct1961,s199.
4 CrimesBill1989,no152–1.
5 CrimesConsultativeCommittee Crimes Bill 1989: Report of the Crimes Consultative Committee(CrimesConsultativeCommittee,Wellington,1991).
Background
11Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 1
CHAPTER 1: Introduct ion
Inlate2008,inresponsetoanumberofhighprofilecasesinvolvingtheworst1.6
formsof childneglect andnon-accidental death, theMinisterof JusticeHonSimonPowerinvitedustoexpeditethePart8review,andtohaveparticularregardtotheoffencesaimedattheprotectionofchildrenfromilltreatmentandneglect,andtheadequacyoftheirmaximumpenalties.
ThisadvicetotheMinistercompletesourwork.1.7
1.8 Not everything in Part 8 was included within the scope of our review.Inthecircumstances,therewereverysignificanttimeandresourceconstraintsthatmadeitunrealisticforustoreviewtheentirePart.
Foreaseofreferenceascheduleoftheoffencesamended,repealed,orreplaced1.9
aspartofthereviewisincludedinAppendixA.
In Part 8 but out of scope
Althoughwehaveproposedsomeamendmentstosection160(2),wedidnot1.10
attemptafirstprinciplesreviewofthelawrelatingtohomicide.Thiswouldhavebeenamajorundertakingthatwasunachievablegiventhelevelofresourceandperiodoftimeavailabletous.Forsimilarreasons,suicideandabortionwerealsoexcludedfromscope.Provocationinsection169hasalreadybeenaddressedbytheLawCommission;aBillispresentlybeforetheHousetorepealit.6
TheprovisionssurroundingfemalegenitalmutilationwereinsertedinPart8in1.11
1996.7Wefeltthattheygaverisetoconsiderationsthatwouldbebetterdealtwithseparately(issuesofculturalimperialism,internationallegalobligations,andsoon).
Webrieflyconsideredwhetherweshouldattempttodealwiththevexedissue1.12
oftheboundariesofconsenttoassaultandinjury,orleaveittocommonlawdevelopment,alongthelinessetoutbytheCourtofAppealinR v Lee.8Thisisafraughtarea,extremelydifficultasamatterofbothpolicyanddrafting,thathasbeencontroversialoverseas (although less so inNewZealand).Again,wewerenotabletoaddressitinthetimeavailable.Weare,inanycase,unconvincedthatcodificationwouldbecapableofprovidinganygreaterclarityorcertaintythantheguidancelaiddownbytheCourtofAppeal.
Culpabilitytermssuchas“intention”and“recklessness”thatappearthroughout1.13
Part8arenotcodifiedintheCrimesAct,althoughtheyarewellunderstoodatcommonlaw.GiventhatitwasnotdefensibletodefinesuchtermssolelyforPart8purposes,tacklingthemwouldhaveswiftlyevolvedintothedraftingofaGeneralPart,whichwouldhavesubstantiallyexpandedthescopeoftheprojectinawaythatwasnotfeasibleinthecircumstances.
6 Crimes(ProvocationRepeal)AmendmentBill2009,no64–1.
7 CrimesAct1961,ss204A,204B.
8 R v Lee [2006]3NZLR42(CA).
scope of the review
12 Law Commiss ion Report
Severaloffencesthatcouldnotsensiblybereviewedinisolationfromtheir1.14
widercontextwereexcluded(inparticular,sections198A,198B,202A,202B,and202BA).Broadlyspeaking,theseaddressarmsoffending.WeunderstandthatPoliceareseparatelyreviewingtheArmsAct,whichbyextension,oughttoincorporateareviewofotherarms-relatedprovisions.9
Theabductionandkidnappingoffences,andoffencesrelatingtobigamyand1.15
feignedmarriage,werealsoexcludedfromscope.Forcompleteness,wenotethatwearenotsurewhythebigamyandfeignedmarriageoffencesappearinPart8atall;theywouldseemtobemorecloselyalignedwithPart7matters.
Outside Part 8 but within scope
WeextendedthescopeofourreviewtoincludesomeprovisionsintheSummary1.16
OffencesAct1981,thatoverlappedsubstantiallywithoffencesbeingaddressedinPart8.Theseincludedsection9–commonassault,section10–assaultonapolice,prison,ortrafficofficer,andsection10A–illtreatmentorwilfulneglectofachild.
Itwasalsonecessarytoaddresssection145inPart7oftheCrimesAct,which1.17
iscloselyconnectedwithsections160and190inPart8.
InthedraftBill,consequentialamendmentsandminorchangeshavebeenmade1.18
throughouttheCrimesActtomaintainconsistencyoflanguage.
1.19 Thestructureoftheremainderofthispaperisasfollows.
Chapter2dealswithwhatwehavedubbedthecoreassaultandinjuryprovisions:1.20
current sections188,189,193and196.The chapter alsodescribesourmethodologyforreviewingthemaximumpenaltiesattachedtotheseprovisions.Asaresultofourreformproposalsinwhatarenownewsections188,189and189AofthedraftBill,wearerecommendingtherepealofanumberofexistingPart8provisions.Thesearenotedinthechapter,alongwithabriefdiscussionofafewadditionaloffencesthatweconsidereditappropriateandnecessarytoretain:disabling,infectingwithdisease,settingtraps,andimpedingrescue.
Chapter3setsoutourpolicyon“specificassaults”–thatis,assaultprovisions1.21
directed to particular classes of victim. It proposes that section 194,whichcontainsoffencesofassaultonachild,andmaleassaultsfemale,shouldberepealedanddealtwithinsteadunderthegenerallyapplicableassaultandinjuryprovisionsdiscussedinchapter2.Ourreasonsforreachingthisviewarediscussedatsomelengthinthechapter.
Chapter4discussesourproposedchangestotheoffencesofendangeringand1.22
injuringbyunlawfulact(formerlysections145and190),andthedefinitionofculpablehomicideinsection160(2)oftheCrimesActwhichaffectsthescopeofthelawofmanslaughter.Forreasonsexplainedinthechapter,weconsiderthataconsistentapproachtothesethreeprovisionsisdesirable.Ourpolicyinthisarea,ifagreedto,wouldalsonecessitatesomechangestosection150A.
9 “Lethalairgunstobereviewed”(12September2008),http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/624488(lastaccessed4August2009).
structure of this paper
13Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 1
CHAPTER 1: Introduct ion
Chapter5setsoutourpolicyrelatingtotheoffencesandmaximumpenalties1.23
forchildneglectandilltreatment.Weareproposinganumberofchangestomakethelawsubstantiallymorerobust,thatarediscussedatsomelengthinthatchapter. Italsoexplainswhysection153of theCrimesAct1961(whichestablishesadutyonemployerswhohavecontractedtoprovidecertainitems,suchasfoodandlodging,toyoungemployees)willnolongerbenecessary,inthelightofourotherproposedchanges.
AdraftCrimes(OffencesAgainstthePerson)AmendmentBillisattachedas1.24
AppendixBtothispaper.
14 Law Commiss ion Report
Chapter 2The core assault and injury offences: assault and injuring with intent
2.1 Thischapterbeginswithourdiagnosisoftheproblemswiththecoreassaultandinjuryoffencesinsections188,189,193and196oftheAct.Wethenoutlinethesixnewoffenceswhichwerecommendshouldreplacethem.Weexplaintheapproachtomaximumpenaltieswehavetakeninthisreview,whichisbestillustratedbyreferencetothesehalfdozennewoffences.Thechapterconcludeswithabriefdiscussionofotheroffences,someofwhichwebelieveneedtoberetained,andsomerepealed.
2.2 ThecoreassaultandinjuryoffencescurrentlyintheCrimesAct1961aresections188(woundingwithintent),189(injuringwithintent),193(assaultwithintenttoinjure)and196(commonassault).Thereisafurthercommonassaultoffenceinsection9oftheSummaryOffencesAct1981.Collectively,theyaddressthewholespectrumofthiscategoryofoffending,fromthethreatenedapplicationofforce,totheintentionalinflictionofgrievousbodilyharm.
Part8alsoincludesanumberofcircumstance-specificandaggravatedoffences.2.3
Bycontrastwiththecoreassaultandinjuryoffences,thesemight,forexample,refertomethodofcausation(suchaswhetherornotapersonwasassaultedwithaweapon),10orspecifythegenderorageofavictim(suchasawomanorchild),11orlistotheraggravatingfeatures(suchasthefacttheoffencewascommittedinfurtheranceofsomeothercriminalgoal).12
Broadlyspeaking,wehaveidentifiedthreeproblemswiththecontentand2.4
structureoftheseoffences.
10 CrimesAct1961,s202C.
11 CrimesAct1961,s194.
12 CrimesAct1961,s191.
introduction
proBLems with the current Law
15Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 2
CHAPTER 2: The core assault and in jury offences: assault and in jur ing with intent
First, the core assault and injury offences address both culpability and2.5
consequences:thatis,theaccused’sintentionorothermentalstateatthetimeofcommittingthecriminalact(culpability),andthelevelofharmorotheroutcomethathasresulted fromtheact (consequences).But theydo thisincoherently.Thereisnoclearorganisingprincipletothestructureoftheoffencesthatwewereabletodiscern,andtheapproachtakentotheallocationofmaximumpenaltiesisinconsistent.
Bywayofanexample,sections191(1)and192(1)oftheCrimesActprovidefor2.6
theoffencesofaggravatedwoundingandinjury(section191(1))andaggravatedassault(section192(1)).Inbothoffences,thelevelofculpabilityoftheoffenderisthesame–intenttocommitacrimeoravoidarrest.However,themaximumpenaltiesfortheoffences,14yearsand3yearsrespectively,areclearlyverydifferent.The14-yearmaximumpenaltyappliesintheworstcasestosituationswheregrievousbodilyharmhasbeencaused,whereasthemaximumpenaltyof3yearsdealsonlywithaggravatedassault(wheretherewaslittleornoinjury).
Itwouldseemthat,asregardsthesetwooffencesatleast,thelegislaturehastaken2.7
aconsequence-focusedapproach.Thatis,ithasstructuredtwodifferentoffencessolelybyreferencetotheirdifferentoutcomes,andhasgiventhemsubstantiallydifferent maximum penalties, notwithstanding the identical culpability.Formaximumpenaltypurposes,aheavyweightinghasclearlybeengiventotheveryseriousoutcomeundersection191(1)(grievousbodilyharm).
Bycontrast,however,theschemeoftheoffencesinsections188(1)and188(2)2.8
appearstobequitedifferent.Section188(1)dealswithwoundingwithintenttocausegrievousbodilyharm;section188(2)withwoundingwithintenttoinjure.Theirculpabilitythereforediffers.However,bothoffenceslistidenticaloutcomesorconsequences.Themaximumpenaltiesforthetwooffencesare14yearsand7years’imprisonmentrespectively.Inthisinstance,therefore,thefocusisevidentlyonculpability,notconsequences.Iftherationalelaidoutabove,in relation to sections 191 and 192, had been consistently applied,twoseparateoffences–certainlytwoseparateoffenceswithsuchdisparatemaximum penalties – would not have been necessary or appropriate.Iftherewasanymaximumpenaltydifferenceatall,onewouldexpectittobequitesmall.(Infact,weregardthesection188approachasmorelegitimate,forreasonsthatwillbesubsequentlyexplained;thesolepointwearemakinghererelatestothemuddledschemeofthecurrentoffences.)
Thesecondproblemiswhatmaybesummedupastheoutdatednatureofthe2.9
offences–bothintheirterminology,andtheirdraftingstyle.13Thelanguageisfrequentlyarchaic(suchas“wounding”,“maiming”and“grievousbodilyharm”).Thereisalackoftransparencyastotheactualscopeoftheprovisions,arising from the fact that many of the terms are not defined or have,overtheyears,beensubstantiallyqualifiedbythecourts.Someoftheoffenceshavescopeforconsiderableoverlap.Forexample,thebreadthoftheconceptofwounding,whichhasbeenheldtomean“abreakinginthecontinuityofthe
13 ThissentimentwassharedbymembersoftheCaseyCommitteewho,inrelationtothecoreinjuryandassaultoffences,wrotethattheseare“unnecessarilydetailedandallowtoomuchscopeforargumentastotheprecisecategoryintowhichparticularconductshouldappropriatelyfall”:CrimesConsultativeCommittee,aboven5,60.
16 Law Commiss ion Report
skin”couldeasilyberegardedaseither“grievousbodilyharm”oran“injury”dependingontheseverityofthewound.14Therearearbitraryorirrelevantdistinctions(eg,theconceptsofwounding,maiming,anddisfiguringarbitrarilydistinguishbetweenthedifferentwaysinwhichtheinjurywasinflicted,ratherthanitsextent).
Thirdly,thecircumstance-specificoffencespreviouslynoted,suchasacid2.10
throwingandassaultwithaweapon,arbitrarilyidentifyaspecifictypeofconductorsetofcircumstancesandelevatethatfactorintoanelementofanoffence,totheexclusionofnumerousotheraggravatingfactorsthatareequallyworthyofrecognition,butcanonlybetakenintoaccountatsentencing.InapproachingthereformofthePart,wehavetriedtominimisetheextenttowhichthisoccurs.Allrelevantaggravatingandmitigatingfactorsshouldofcoursebeabletobetakenintoaccountbythecourts,buttodosobyestablishingseparateoffenceprovisionstorecogniseeachofthemissimplynotpracticable.CertainlytheapparentlyadhocapproachthatispresentlyevidentinPart8isnotdesirable.
2.11 Theproposednewoffencesdiscussedinthischapterappearinclause22oftheBill.Theyhavebeenreproducedbelowforeaseofreference:
188 Causing serious injury with intent
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years who, (1) with intent to injure any person, causes serious injury to any person.
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 4 years who causes (2) serious injury to any person by assaulting any person or otherwise acting with reckless disregard for the safety of others.
189 Injuring with intent
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years who, (1) with intent to injure any person, injures any person.
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years who injures (2) another person by assaulting any person or otherwise acting with reckless disregard for the safety of others.
189A Assault with intent to injure or common assault
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years who, (1) with intent to injure any person, assaults any person.
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years who assaults (2) any person.
Weareproposingthatthis“matrix”ofsixoffencesshouldformthecoreof2.12
Part8.Itisnotamajordeparturefromthecurrentapproach,inthesensethatthenewoffenceswillcontinuetoaddressbothculpabilityandconsequences.15Thekeydifferenceisthatthenewoffencesarecomprehensive,coherent,andplainlydrafted.
14 R v Waters [1979]1NZLR375,378(CA)McMullinJfortheCourt.
15 Thisisincontrasttootherrecommendationsthathavebeenmadefromtimetotime,forexample,intheCrimesBill1989andthe1976ReportoftheCriminalLawReformCommitteeonCulpableHomicide,inwhichapureculpabilityfocuswaspreferred.
the new offences
17Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 2
CHAPTER 2: The core assault and in jury offences: assault and in jur ing with intent
Oftheseelements,weconsidertheculpabilityoftheaccusedtobetheparamount2.13
consideration.Consequencemaybefortuitous,andisbeyondthecontrolandforesightofthepersonaccused.Inotherwords,itistosomeextentalottery.Thus,whilethereareelementsintheoffencesaddressingbothculpabilityandconsequence,inallocatingmaximumpenaltiestothem,culpabilityhasbeengivengreaterweight.16
However, that isnottosaythatconsequenceshouldbegivennoweight,2.14
andtheoffencesweareproposingrecognisethreedifferentdegreesofoutcome.Coveringalldegreesofinjurywithinasingleoffencewouldprovideinadequateguidancetothecourtsaboutappropriatesentencinglevels.Thequestionishowtostriketherightbalancebetweenwhatmustbeestablishedasanelementoftheoffence,andwhatcanproperlyandpreferablybelefttosentencing.We have attempted to find a middle ground between overly broad anddiscretionaryoffencesontheonehandand,ontheother,offencesthatareundulydetailedandprescriptive.
Levels of culpability
Thenewoffencesrecognisetwolevelsofculpability:2.15
intenttoinjure–includedinnewsections188(1),189(1)and189A(1);·assaultorotherwiseactingwithrecklessdisregardforthesafetyofothers–·includedinnewsections188(2)and189(2).
Inourview,thereisaconsiderablemoraldistinctiontobedrawnbetweenthose2.16
whointentionallyinjureanother,andthosewhocauseinjuryasaresultofbeingreckless.Includingthesetwoconceptsinthesameoffence,ascurrentlyoccursinPart8–forexample,insections188(2)and189(2)–blursthisline,andunjustifiablyexposesthesubstantiallylessculpabletothesamemaximumpenaltyastheoffenderwhointentionallyinjuresanother.
AtpresentinPart8,thereareoffencessuchasthoseinsections188(1)and189(1)2.17
thatrequireproofofanintenttocausegrievousbodilyharm.Inourproposednewoffences,thehighestculpabilityelementis“intenttoinjure”.Whileweconsideredtheoptionofafurther“tier”ofaggravation,namelyintenttoseriouslyinjure(whichis,essentially,what“grievousbodilyharm”means),wereceivedsomejudicialfeedbackthatoften,inpractice,itmaybedifficultontheevidencetodrawacleardividinglinebetween“intenttoseriouslyinjure”and“intenttoinjure”.Wethereforethinkthatitispreferableforthelevelofintendedinjurytobeasentencingfactor,ratherthanasubstantiveelementofthenewoffences.
Wherethereisnointenttoinjure,the“matrix”weareproposingestablishes2.18
lowerleveloffencesforassaultorotherwiseactingwithrecklessdisregardforsafety,thatresultsininjuryorseriousinjury.Bothconceptsofassaultandrecklessnessarewellunderstoodinthecurrentschemeofoffences,andnofurtherlegislativedefinitionofthemisnecessary.Bothhavebeentreatedassignallingroughlyequivalentdegreesofculpability.Clearly,manyinstancesofassaultwillconstituterecklessdisregardforsafety.However,whilesimilarinculpabilityterms,theyarenotidentical;inparticular,therewillbeoccasionsinwhichrecklessdisregardforsafetydoesnotrequireanassault.
16 Seefurtherpara2.39.
18 Law Commiss ion Report
Levels of consequence
CurrentlythereisadistinctioninthePart8offencesbetweensituationsinvolving2.19
anassault,17thoseinwhichavictimsuffersinjury,18andthoseinwhichavictimsuffers grievous bodily harm or is wounded, maimed or disfigured.19Ourproposednew“matrix”doesnotdiffer significantly in this respect,althoughit isbetterorganised,andwehavenotretainedtheconceptsofwounding,maiming,ordisfiguring.20
Thethreedegreesofconsequenceproposedare:2.20
assault;·injury;·seriousinjury.·
Assault
“Assault”isdefinedinsection2oftheCrimesAct.Itcoversboththeintentional2.21
applicationofforcetothepersonofanother,andthreatsofforcebyactorgesture.Ratherthanbeinga“consequence”perse,assaultclearlydescribesconduct;however,itaddressesthecategoryofcaseswherenoinjuryhasensued,oronlyrelativelyminorinjury,suchthatitisnotconsideredappropriatebyprosecutorstochargewiththemoreaggravatedoffence.
Injury
Asalreadydefinedinsection2oftheCrimesAct,“toinjure”meanstocause2.22
actualbodilyharm.Whilewedidnotconsiderthatthisexistingaspectofthedefinitionrequiredreform,ourdraftBillrefinesthedefinitiontomakeclearthatitexcludespsychologicalandemotionalharm.21
ThisaddressesthedictaoftheCourtofAppealinthecaseof2.23 R v Mwai,22 inwhichtheCourtindicatedthat“actualbodilyharm”mightwellincluderecognisedpsychiatricinjury,ifsupportedbyexpertevidenceof“adiscernibleintrusionuponorinterferencewiththenormalfunctioningofthephysicalormentalprocess”.TheCourtconsideredthat“mindandbodyareinseparable”andnoted“theartificialityofseparatingthemindfromthephysicalbody,andtreatingthemasdistinctentities.”23
Whilewearenotawareofanycaseinwhichpurelypsychologicaloremotional2.24
harmhasbeenrecognisedasan“injury”,itwasnotdesirabletoleavethisimportantquestionunresolved.
17 CrimesAct1961,ss193and196.
18 CrimesAct1961,ss189(1)and189(2).
19 CrimesAct1961,ss188(1)and188(2).
20 Seefurtherpara2.09.
21 Crimes(OffencesAgainstthePerson)AmendmentBill,cl4.
22 R v Mwai [1995]3NZLR149, 155(CA)HardieBoysJfortheCourt.
23 R v Mwai, aboven22,154.
19Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 2
CHAPTER 2: The core assault and in jury offences: assault and in jur ing with intent
Ifpsychologicaloremotionalharmwasregardedasan“injury”,itwouldhave2.25
twoconsequences.First,psychologicaloremotionalharmalonecouldprovideafoundationforthelayingofaninjurycharge.Secondly,whereitcoincidedwithphysicalinjury,itcouldbeabasisforlayinganaggravated(eg,aseriousinjury)charge.
Inourview,inalmostallcases,thelevelofpsychologicaloremotionalharm2.26
incurredwillcoincidewiththedegreeofinjury(whichwillinturntendtocoincidewiththenatureoftheattack).Totheextentthatthisdoesnotholdtrue,itislikelytobeattributabletothegreaterpsychologicaloremotionalvulnerabilityofaparticularvictim.Thatisclearlyafactorthatmaybetakenintoaccountonsentence,butitshouldnotbeafactorthat,intheabsenceofanyotherphysicalinjury,elevateswhatwouldotherwisebeamereassaulttoasubstantiallymoreseriousoffence.Wehavethereforeexcludeditfromtheinjurydefinition“forthepurposesofthisAct”(ie,theCrimesAct).Thereisnothingtopreventitbeingtakenintoaccount,asitalwayshasbeen,forsentencingpurposesundertheSentencingAct2002.
Serious injury
Our draft Bill substitutes “serious injury” for the current concept of2.27
“grievousbodilyharm”,bothinthematrixofcoreassaultandinjuryoffences,and in a small number of consequential amendments elsewhere in theCrimesAct.Thisisnotintendedtochangetheexistingscopeofthelaw.Grievousbodilyharmalreadymeans“reallyseriousharm”.24
Weareproposingthischangesimplysothattheoffencesarecastinmore2.28
user-friendlyandgenerallyunderstoodterms.OurdraftBillstatesthat“serious”hasthesamemeaningas“grievous”currentlyhas,tosignifythatthestatusquois intended to be preserved. We hope this will ensure that “grievous”is interpreted by reference to the existing legal position, as meaning“reallyseriousharm”.Whilethismayberegardedassomewhatcircular,ifreferencesto“seriousinjury”wereleftunclarified,theintendedscopeofthenewlanguagewouldbeopentoquestion,andtheboundarybetweeninjuryandseriousinjurywouldbeunclear.Wewereconcernedtominimiseanyprospectofso-called“creep”,wherebyoffencesthathistoricallywouldproperlyhavebeenregardedasmereinjuriesareabletobechargedunderthemoreseriousoffence–givingrisetopotentialinconsistency,andunfairlyexposingsomedefendantstotheaggravated14-yearmaximumpenalty.
2.29 Section9oftheSummaryOffencesAct1981(commonassault)providesthateverypersonisliabletoimprisonmentforatermnotexceeding6monthswhoassaultsanotherperson.ItduplicatestheCrimesActcommonassaultoffence,withalowermaximumpenalty.
Wedonotconsiderthatthereisanyproperjustificationforthis;thereshould2.30
beasingleoffenceof“commonassault”,anditisamatterforthesentencingjudgeinthecircumstancesoftheindividualcasetoassesswhatpenaltyisappropriate.Wethereforerecommendtherepealofsection9.
24 R v Waters,aboven14,379.
section 9 of the summary offences act
20 Law Commiss ion Report
However,thereisadifficultyinproceedingwithimmediaterepeal.Undersection2.31
9,byvirtueofits6-monthmaximumpenalty,adefendantwouldnormallybeentitledtoelectjurytrial.25However,thisgenerallyapplicablerightisoverriddeninrelationtosection9bysection43oftheSummaryOffencesAct,whichprovidesthatchargesundersections9and10canonlybetriedsummarilybeforeajudgesittingalone.
Ifsection9wasrepealed,allcommonassaultchargeswouldnecessarilybelaid2.32
undertheCrimesAct.BecauseoftheCrimesActcommonassaultpenalty,suchchargeswouldbeeligibleforelectionforjurytrial.Weconsiderthisundesirable.Commonassaultisahighvolumeoffencethatisgenerallyrelativelyminor innature. Itdoesnot, inourview, justify the time, expenseandinconveniencetothecommunitythatajurytrialnecessarilyentails.
Webrieflyconsideredtheoptionofwhether,ifsection9wasrepealed,section2.33
43oftheSummaryOffencesActmightbeamendedtoincludeareferencetoCrimesActcommonassault;orwhetheraprovisionanalogoustosection43shouldbeenactedintheCrimesAct.However,wedonotsupportthesection43approach.Weconsideritarbitraryandunprincipled.Theremaywellbeotheroffencesthat,alongwithcommonassault,similarlydonotjustifytheinvestmentofajurytrial.Tryingtocherry-picksuchoffencesforinclusioninasection43-typeprovisionisunlikelytoberobust.
Overall,thisleadsustotheviewthattherepealofsection9shouldbedeferred.2.34
We note that, as part of the criminal procedure simplification projectbeingundertakenjointlybytheLawCommissionandtheMinistryofJustice,thereisaproposaltoraisethethresholdfortheelectionofajurytrialfrom3months’imprisonmentto3years.Ifthatproposalisadopted,itwouldaddresstheproblemsoutlinedabove.Wethereforerecommendreconsiderationoftherepealofsection9aspartofthatotherproject.
2.35 Maximumpenaltiesindicatetherelativeseriousnessofoffences.Asamatterofsentencingtheory,theyaresupposedtobesetbyreferencetotheworstclassofcaseoftheparticularcategoryofoffending–inotherwords,toreflectthetermofimprisonmentthatsocietyconsidersjustifiedintheworstclassofcase.
Asnotedearlierinthechapter,thecurrentmaximumpenaltiesincludedin2.36
Part8varywidely,withoutreferencetoanyapparentgoverningprinciple.Weare,therefore,proposinganumberofrevisions.
The approach to penalties generally
Whiletakingtheviewthataconsiderableoverhaulofmaximumpenalties2.37
wasrequired,wedidnotconsiderthatitwasopentoustostartcompletelyafresh.Clearly,while it is importantforPart8maximumpenaltiestobeinternallycoherent,andanappropriatereflectionofmodernviewsofculpability,itisjustasimportanttopreserverelativitiesbetweenPart8maximumpenaltiesandmaximumpenaltylevelselsewhereonthestatutebook.
25 NewZealandBillofRightsAct1990,s24(e);SummaryProceedingsAct1957,s66.
maximum penaLties
21Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 2
CHAPTER 2: The core assault and in jury offences: assault and in jur ing with intent
TheapproximateapproachwehavetakentothePart8maximumpenaltyreview2.38
canbeillustratedasfollows:
Thisreflectsourviewthatmoreweightneedstobeattributedtoculpability2.39
insettingthemaximumpenalty,thantoconsequence.Theculpabilityofapersonwhocausesharmtoanotherisbestassessedbyreferencetohisorherstateofmindatthetimeoftheoffending.Whereasthepublicintuitivelywouldexpecttheoutcomeofthedefendant’sactstobetakenintoaccount,consequencemaywellbeamatterofchance,particularlyinthecontextofanassault.Whenculpabilityislow,thepenaltyshouldnotbeaggravatedasmuch,evenwhentheconsequences–primarilyattributabletobadluck–turnouttobeveryserious.Whenculpabilityishigh–whenanoffenderhasintenttoseriouslyinjure,forexample–thelikelihoodthattheywillachievethatobjective,orthattheconsequenceswillinanyeventbeveryserious,willtendtoincrease.Thepenaltytheyreceiveonaccountofthatconsequenceshouldthereforebeproportionatelygreater.
Application to the new core offences
Theproposedmaximumpenalties for thenewoffencesdiscussed in this2.40
chapterare:26
IntEnt to InjurE AssAult / rEcklEss dIsrEgArd for sAfEty
section 188(1) causing serious injury with intent to injure – 14 years
section 188(2) causing serious injury by assault or reckless disregard for safety – 4 years
section 189(1) causing injury with intent to injure – 10 years
section 189(2) causing injury by assault or reckless disregard for safety – 3 years
section 189A(1) assault with intent to injure – 5 years
section 189A(2) common assault – 2 years
26 ThesectionnumbersreferredtointhetablearethenewsectionnumbersthatappearinourdraftBillinclause22:seefurtherAppendixB.
22 Law Commiss ion Report
Noneoftheproposedmaximahavedecreased,relativetocurrentmaximum2.41
penalties.Whileanumberofthemlookquitedifferent,thedifferencesaremoreapparentthanreal.Theyareanecessaryconsequenceofthereorganisationoftheoffences.Onlyoneoftheproposedchangesrepresentsarealincreaseinmaximumpenalty,forreasonsthatareexplainedbelow.
Effect of the reorganisation of offences
New sections 188(1) and 189(1)
Therearecurrentlydifferentoffencesdependingonwhethertheoffender’s2.42
intentistocause“grievousbodilyharm”or“toinjure”.However, ifourrecommendationabove(paragraph2.17)wasadopted,thisdistinctionwouldberemoved.Offenceswiththehighestculpabilitywouldrequireonlyproofofanintenttoinjure.
Weproposethatthehighestoffenceinthenewhierarchy(causingseriousinjury2.43
withintenttoinjure–newsection188(1)),shouldcarryamaximumpenaltyof14years’imprisonment,witha10-yearmaximumpenaltyforthenextmostseriousoffence(injuringwithintenttoinjure–newsection189(1)).
Thesepenaltiesarehigherthantheirapparentequivalentunderthecurrent2.44
law: the maximum penalties for wounding with intent to injure andinjuringwithintenttoinjuriesareonly7yearsand5yearsrespectively.However,thisisnotthecorrectcomparison.Theworstclassofcaseforourproposednewoffencesinsection188(1)and189(1)willbethoseinwhichthereisanintenttocauseseriousinjury.Theanalogouscurrentoffencesarewoundingwithintenttocausegrievousbodilyharmandinjurywithintenttocausegrievousbodilyharm,whichhavemaximaof14yearsand10yearsrespectively.In other words, the penalties applying to the worst case of care wouldnotchange.
New section 188(2) – no current maximum penalty
Theoffenceinnewsection188(2)(causingseriousinjurybyassault,oracting2.45
withrecklessdisregardforsafety)carriesaproposedmaximumpenaltyof4years.Thereiscurrentlynoequivalentmaximumpenaltyforcasesofrecklessinjury.Althoughsection189(2),asitiscurrentlydrafted,includesreferencetoinjuringwithrecklessdisregardforsafety,the7-yearmaximummustbetakentorelatetotheworstclassofcase–thosewhointendtoinjure.
New section 189A(2) – common assault
Finally,thepenaltyforcommonassaulthasbeenraisedfrom1year(inthecurrent2.46
section196offence)to2years.However,thisistoaccommodateaggravatingfactorsthatwerepreviouslysubjecttotheirownspecificoffences–chieflytheproposedrepealofthespecificoffencesofassaultonachildandmaleassaultsfemalethatarecurrentlyinsection194.27Again,whilethepenaltythusappearstohavedoubled,inpracticeithasnotchanged.
27 Seefurtherchapter3.
23Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 2
CHAPTER 2: The core assault and in jury offences: assault and in jur ing with intent
The increased maximum penalty – new section 189A(1)
Fortheoffenceofassaultwith intentto injure, innewsection189A(1),2.47
wehaveproposedamaximumpenaltyof5years’imprisonment,whichis2yearshigherthanthecurrentmaximumpenaltyintheanalogoussection193offence.Therearetworeasonsforthisrecommendation.
First,inourview,thecurrentmaximumpenaltyundersection193(theanalogous2.48
provision)isalittlelow,giventhatitpotentiallyalsoappliestocasesinwhichthereisintenttoseriouslyinjure.
Secondlyandmoreimportantly,givenourviewthattheculpabilitylevelofan2.49
offendershouldberegardedasparamount,the5-yearproposedmaximumwassetwithaneyeonrelativitywiththepenaltiesproposedforthelowerculpabilityoffences–whereinjuryisnotintended,butistheunfortunatebyproductofanassaultoractingwithrecklessdisregardforsafety.Theproposedpenaltiesfortheseoffencesrangefrom2to4years.Whereculpabilityishigher–inotherwords,whereintenttoinjurecanbeproved,eventhoughinjurydidnotresult–itneedstobereflectedinthemaximumpenalty.
Penalty relativities
New sections 188(2), 189(2) and 189A(2) – the “low culpability” category of offences
Thedifferentiationbetweentheoffencesinthe“lowculpability”assault/reckless2.50
disregardforsafetycolumnissmall,rangingfrom2to4years,reflectingourviewthatculpabilitycarriesmoreweightthanconsequences.
New section 188(1) and 188(2) relativities
Webeganthisdiscussionbysummarisingourthinkingonapossiblemethodology2.51
forcoherentlyapproachingtheallocationofmaximumpenaltieswithinthe“matrix”.Consistentwiththatlineofthinking,theproposed14-yearmaximumpenaltyundernewsection188(1)differsagreatdealfromtheproposed4-yearmaximumpenaltyundernewsection188(2).Althoughbothoffencesaddresscasesinwhichseriousinjuryhasbeencaused,theoffender’sculpabilityisverydifferent.Undersection188(1),intheworstclassofcases,therewillhavebeenintenttoseriouslyinjure.Undersection188(2),theworstclassofcaseisactingwithrecklessdisregardforthesafetyofanyperson–inotherwords,unreasonablyrunningarisk.
Asimilarpatternisevidentintheotherproposedmaximumpenaltieswhen2.52
“highculpability”and“lowculpability”equivalentsarecompared,foridenticalreasons.
2.53 Aswellasthenewcoreassaultandinjuryoffences,werecommendthatthefollowingoffencesshouldberetained.Thediscussionbelowsetsout,inrelationtoeach,firstwhywerecommendtheirretention,andsecondly,abriefexplanationofthekeychangesweareproposing.Broadlyspeaking,thechangesdotwothings: modernise the drafting language (without significantly alteringscope),andalter themaximumpenalties (in three instancesbyreducingthemsubstantially).
other offences
24 Law Commiss ion Report
Disabling – new section 197
Weconsiderthatitisnecessarytoretainthe“disabling”offence,whichapplies2.54
whenanotherpersonis“stupefied”orrenderedunconscious.Therewillbecasesofdisablingthatdonotamounttoassault,donotcauseanyinjury,fallshortofanattempttocommitsomeothercrime,anddonotconstituteendangering(becausewithoutthisoffenceprovision,stupefyingwouldnotbeanunlawfulact).Theoffencethereforeaddressesarealgapinthelaw.
Werecommendsomeminordraftingchangestotheprovision,toensurethatits2.55
languageisconsistentwithotherchangesproposedelsewhere.Howevertheprincipalchange,andtheonethatweenvisagewouldgiverisetothemostconcern,isthereductionofthemaximumpenaltyfrom5years’imprisonmentto2years.
Where stupefying facilitates more serious offending – sexual violation,2.56
forexample–themoreseriousoffendingwouldbecharged,andstupefyingwould,inalllikelihood,beaveryseriousaggravatingfactor.Whereitconstitutesanattempt,anattemptcouldsimilarlybecharged;orwhereitcausesinjury,aninjurychargemightbelaidundernewsection189.Assuch,weconsiderthat theproperscopeof thisoffence iswherestupefying,withoutmore,occurs.Intermsofculpability,weconsiderthatitisakintotheendangeringoffencediscussedinchapter4,forwhichwehavelikewiseproposeda2-yearmaximumpenalty.
Infecting with disease – new section 201
Werecommendretentionoftheinfectingwithdiseaseoffenceinsection201of2.57
theCrimesAct.Suchanoffenceisnecessarybecausediseaseisnotnecessarilysynonymouswith“injury”,eventhoughtransmittingdiseasehassimilaritiestocausinginjury,intermsofitslevelofculpability.Theredraftedoffenceinsection201(1)ofourproposedBillisthesameastheoffencealreadyinsection201,withthesamemaximumpenaltyof14years.Theminordraftingchangesthathavebeenmadetoitdonotalteritsscope.Theterm“wilful”hasbeenchangedto“intentional”,whichcodifiescase law.28Wealsorecommenddeletingthereferencesto“sickness”and“withoutlawfuljustificationorexcuse”,bothofwhicharesuperfluous.
Subsections(2)to(7)ofourproposeddraftwouldbenewadditionstothe2.58
CrimesAct.However,theyverylargelyreproducetheprovisionsinclauses126and127ofthePublicHealthBill,currentlyawaitingitssecondreadinginParliament.WerecommendthatthoseoffencesberelocatedintheCrimesAct,so that like offences are consolidated in one place in the statute book.TheMinistryofHealth(theagencyresponsibleforthePublicHealthBill)agreesthatitwouldbeappropriatetorelocatetheoffences.
Draftsection201(2)isanoffenceofrecklesslytransmittinganotifiabledisease2.59
orcondition,asdefinedinSchedule1ofthePublicHealthBill.Amaximumpenaltyof3years’imprisonmentisimposed,inlinewiththepenaltiesproposedinournewsections157B(grosslynegligentinjurybyunlawfulactoromission
28 R v Mwai,aboven22,152.
25Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 2
CHAPTER 2: The core assault and in jury offences: assault and in jur ing with intent
toperformastatutoryduty)and189(2)(causinginjurywithrecklessdisregardforsafety).Draftsection201(3)isanoffenceofrecklesslyputtinganypersonatriskofcontractinganotifiablediseaseorcondition,againdefinedbyreferencetoSchedule1ofthePublicHealthBill.The2-yearpenaltyproposedisanalogoustothe2-yearpenaltysuggestedundersection157A(unlawfulactoromissiontoperformastatutorydutythatislikelytoinjureanother).
Section201AofourdraftreproducesafurtherfeatureofthePublicHealthBill2.60
provisions.Wewereadvisedthattheselectcommitteewasconcernedtoensurethattheoffencesdidnotextendtopeoplewhoconsenttotheriskoftransmissionofanotifiabledisease,suchaswhereonepartnerinalong-termrelationshipisHIV-positive.However,neitherwenortheMinistryofHealthconsiderthatadefenceofthiskindshouldapplytotheoffenceofintentionaltransmission(formerlyintheCrimesAct,notthePublicHealthBill,andthusnotconsideredbytheselectcommittee).
Setting traps – new section 202
Werecommendtheretentionofthisprovisiontoaddresswhat,initsabsence,2.61
wouldbegapsinthelaw.ThereisanoffenceofsettingtrapsonthelandofanotherundertheTrespassAct,29andwhereatrapislaidwithintenttoinjureandinjuryinfactresults,aninjurywithintentchargewouldbeavailable.However,ourproposedredraftofsection202addressestwogaps:theotherwiselawfullayingoftrapswithintenttoinjureorwithrecklessdisregardforsafetywhere,perhapsfortuitously,injuryhasnotresulted;andallowingtrapsplacedbysomebodyelsetoremainonone’sownlandwithintenttoinjureorarecklessdisregardforsafety.
We recommendomitting the current requirement for the conduct tobe2.62
“likelytoinjure”.Thisdoesaddanextraelementtotheoffencethatwouldnotfeature inourdraft, because theremaybe circumstances inwhich it isunreasonabletorunaknownrisk(asexpressedintherecklessdisregardforsafetyelement),evenwhenthechanceoftheriskislow.However,wethinkthatoverallthisextraelementunnecessarilycomplicatestheoffence,becauseitisdifficulttothinkofsituationswhereapersonwhoserisktakingwasunreasonableshouldnotbeheldcriminallyliable.
Section202currentlycontainstwooffences,withdifferentmaximumpenalties2.63
of3years(settingtrapswhileinoccupationorpossessionofanyplace)and5years(settingtrapswithintenttoinjureorwithrecklessdisregardforsafety).Ourproposeddraftlikewisehastwooffences,althoughexpressedindifferentterms.However,werecommendthesamemaximum2-yearpenaltyforboth,consistentwiththepenaltyproposedforalloftheendangering-typeoffences.Where an injury or death results from the deliberate setting of a trap,higherpenaltieswillbeavailableunderotherprovisions.
29 TrespassAct1980,s7.
26 Law Commiss ion Report
Impeding rescue – new section 204
Theoffenceofimpedingrescueisextremelyrarelycharged.However,itispossible2.64
toconceiveofasetoffactsinwhichnoothercriminaloffencewouldbeapplicabletoapersonwhohasimpededrescueandtherebyendangeredthelifeofanotherbecausetheymaybeactinglawfully(eg,obstructingaccessbutparkedlegally).
Ourproposedredraftmakestwothingsclear,thatarenotentirelyclearonthe2.65
faceofthecurrentprovision:
Theoffencecouldnotbecommittedbyomission;ourredraftrefersonly·toan“act”.Toextend liability insuchsituations toomissionswouldhave bordered upon the establishment of what is sometimes called“aSamaritanduty”,whichcurrentlydoesnotexist,inNewZealandcriminallaw.Thereisextensivephilosophicaldebateintheliteratureaboutwhethersuchadutyisworkableorappropriate.Weareinclinedtotheviewthatitisneither,andthatitisnotappropriatetoextendthelawinthisway.Wehaveexpressedthemensreaelementoftheoffenceasrecklessness.·Thecurrentoffence is silentas to theculpability level required forasuccessfulcharge.
Wearealsoproposingtoreducethemaximumpenaltyforthisoffencefrom2.66
10yearsto2years.Thisisaverysubstantialreduction.However,inourview,thecurrentmaximumpenalty,musthavebeenbaseduponamisconceptionasthescopeoftheoffence.Presumably,thethinkinginsettingsuchapenaltywasthatintheworstclassofcaseofimpedingrescue,thedefendantwouldactwithmaliciousintent,andthevictimwoulddie.However,insuchacase,ahomicidechargewouldbeappropriate.Similarly,ifinjuryresultedinsuchcircumstances,achargeof injurywith intentwouldproperly reflect theculpabilityinvolved.Theessenceoftheoffenceis,therefore,endangering,anditspenaltyneedstobealignedwiththeotheroffencesofsimilarcharacteralreadydiscussed,above.
2.67 Werecommendrepealofthefollowingoffences,whichweconsiderunnecessary:
aggravated wounding and injury (section 191).· Section191dealswithaggravatedwoundingandinjury.Itsetsoutalistofaggravatingfactors,suchasintenttocommitanycrime,oravoidarrest,orfacilitatetheflightofanyotherperson.Whileonthefaceofthesectionitmayappearthatithasadifferentfocusfromthecoreassaultandinjuryoffences,becauseitdoesnotrequireproofofintenttoinjure,theCourtofAppealinR v Tihiheldthatbeforeanaccusedcanbefoundguiltyofanoffenceunderthissection,itmustbeshowntheoffendereithermeanttocausethespecifiedharm,orforesawthattherewasalikelihoodofsuchrisk.30Morefundamentally,wetaketheviewthatthebetterapproachinprincipleistorecogniseaggravatingfactors,suchasthoselistedinsection191,asrelevanttosentencingunderthecoreassaultandinjuryoffences,ratherthanaselementsthatjustifyaseparateoffence.aggravated assault (section 192(1)).· Section192(1)isanoffenceofaggravatedassault.Theaggravatingfactorsarethesameasthesection191factors,describedabove.Werecommendrepealofthisoffenceforthesamereasonsassection191.
30 R v Tihi [1989]2NZLR29(CA).
recommended repeaLs
27Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 2
CHAPTER 2: The core assault and in jury offences: assault and in jur ing with intent
discharging a firearm or doing a dangerous act with intent (section 198). ·Section198providesthateveryoneisliabletoimprisonmentforatermnot exceeding14years,whowith intent todogrievousbodilyharm,dischargesanyfirearmorsimilarweaponatanyperson,sendsanypersonanexplosivesubstanceordevice,orsetsfiretoanyproperty.Thereisaparalleloffencewherethereisintenttoinjure,withamaximumpenaltyis7years.Thereferencetosettingfiretoanypropertyissuperfluous;arsonisaseparateoffence,withamaximumpenaltyof14years,thatdoesnotrequireproofofintenttocausegrievousbodilyharmorinjury.Alloftheotheroffencessetout in section198 can, inourview,be adequately, and indeedmoreappropriately,dealtwithbyutilisingotherchargesofeitherinjuryorattempt.In the circumstances addressed by section 198(1), if serious injurywascaused,ourproposednewsections188(1)or189(1)wouldapply,withamaximumpenaltyofeither14years,or10yearsifanylesserinjuryresulted.Wherenoinjuryoccurred,suchbehaviourwouldclearlyconstituteanattemptundersection188(1),withamaximumpenaltyof7years.Becauseof the lessermaximumpenalty thatwouldapply in the lattersituation,thepolicedonotsupporttherepealofsection198.However,inourview,theproperfocusisnotthereductionintheavailablemaximumpenalty,butrathertheextenttowhichitwillaffectsentencesactuallyimposedwhena firearmorsimilarweapon isdischargedbutno injuryoccurs.Ontheapproachcurrentlytakenbythecourts,thereislittleornoprospectthatsuchasentencewouldexceedorevenapproachaprisontermof7years.Relianceonanattemptchargeisthereforeunlikelytoeffectanyreductionintheseverityofpunishment.acid throwing (section 199). · Undersection199 it isanoffence tothrowacorrosivesubstanceatanyperson,orapplysuchasubstance,withintenttoinjureordisfigurethem.Themaximumprisontermis14years.Forsimilarreasonstothoseoutlinedabove,inrelationtosection198,weconsiderthatourproposednewsections188and189offeramoreprincipledmethodofaddressingsuchconduct.The14-yearterminsection199hasclearlybeensettoaddresstheworstclassofcaseinwhichseriousinjuryhasresulted;undersection188(1),ourproposedmaximumislikewise14years.Wherethereisnoinjury,theconductcanproperlybeaddressedbyachargeofattemptundersection188orsection189.poisoning with intent (section 200).· Section 200 contains twopoisoningoffences:poisoningwithintenttocausegrievousbodilyharm,andpoisoningwithintenttocauseinconvenienceorannoyance.Thefirstofthesewouldconstituteeitherattemptedmurderor,ifactualbodilyharmresulted,eitheraninjuryorseriousinjurycharge.Thesecondaddressessituationswheretheintentionofadministeringanoxioussubstanceissolelytocauseinconvenienceorannoyance,noinjuryresults,andtherehasbeennorecklessdisregardforsafetysufficienttowarrantanattemptchargeundernewsection189(2).Wedoubtthatthisisapropersubjectforcriminalliabilityatall–certainlynotonethatcouldjustifyamaximumprisontermof3years.
28 Law Commiss ion Report
assault with a weapon (section 202C).· Undersection202C,everyoneisliabletoaprisontermnotexceeding5yearswhoinassaultinganypersonusesanythingasaweapon,orisinpossessionofanythingincircumstancesthatshowanintentiontouse itasaweapon.Thisoffencesinglesoutaweaponasanaggravatingfactorthatjustifiesincreasingthemaximumpenaltyforassaultfive-fold,incaseswherethereisnointenttoinjure,and no injury is caused. In cases in which there is intent to injure,orinjuryiscaused,thereisnoneedforsection202C;aninjuryorattemptchargecould,andshould,belaid.Wecanfindnobasisinprincipleonwhichtojustifysuchaheavilyinflatedpenalty,oraseparateoffenceforcasesinvolvinganassaultwithaweapon,basedsolelyonthisoneaggravatingfactor.Wenotethatourrecommendedmaximumpenaltyforcommonassaultwillbe2years(doublethecurrentmaximum),whichwillallowaggravatingfactorsincludingtheuseofaweapontobeproperlytakenintoaccount.
29Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 2
CHAPTER 3: Specif ic assaults
Chapter 3Specific assaults
3.1 This chapter considerswhether thevictim-specific assaultoffences thatcurrentlyexistinPart8andinnumerousotherpiecesoflegislationshouldberetained,andwhetherornotitisnecessaryorappropriatetoenactanynewvictim-specificassaultprovisions.
Thenubofourrecommendationsisthattheoffencesofassaultonachild3.2
andmaleassaultsfemaleinsection194oftheCrimesActshouldberepealed.Werecommendretainingthestatusquoasregardsassaultsonpoliceofficers,andfurtherworkinrelationtothenumerousotherspecificassaultprovisionsonthestatutebook–assaultsonenforcementofficers,judges,courtstaff,andsoon.Wehavenotrecommendedtheestablishmentofanynewspecificassaultoffences.
3.3 Themainargumentinfavourofthecreationorretentionofvictimspecificoffencesisoneof“fairlabelling”orsymbolism.Itisbasedonthebeliefthatoffendingagainstparticularcategoriesofvictimsissosubstantiallydifferentin character and culpability that is it appropriate todistinguish it fromgeneric conductof the samekindbywayof a specificoffence category.Withoutthatdistinction,itisarguedthattheaggravatednatureofvictim-specificconductwillnotbeadequatelysignalled,andthatpublicmessagesofdisapprovalwillnotbeproperlyexpressed.Bythesametoken,itisarguedthatthegenericconduct,bybeinggroupedtogetherwiththeaggravatedconduct,willbelabelled(byassociationandthroughthelevelofthemaximumpenalty)asmoreseriousthanitactuallyis.
Weacknowledge themeritsof thesearguments.However, theymustbe3.4
setagainstthedisadvantagesthattoagreateror lesserextentarealwaysassociatedwithvictim-specificprovisions,whatevertheirnatureandpurpose.Thedisadvantagesare:
implications for charging discretion.· Victim-specificassaultorinjuryoffences inevitably overlap with the generally applicable assault andinjuryoffencesthatwouldotherwisebeavailable.Theythereforeenlargepolicediscretionatthechargingstage.Policedonotautomaticallychargeundervictim-specificoffences inallcases inwhichtheyareavailable;sometimestheywillconsiderthatthecircumstancesoftheoffendingwarrantagenerallyapplicablecharge.Forexample,theymaynotregardeveryassaultofafemalebyamaleaswarrantingexposuretotheaggravatedsection194(b)
introduction
the advantages and disadvantages of specif ic assauLt provis ions
30 Law Commiss ion Report
penalty;andifanassaultonachildhasresultedininjury,theyarelikelytotaketheviewthataninjuringoffencewouldbeamoreappropriatecharge.Thismayproduceinconsistencyinchargingpractice.arbitrary disparity arising from singling out some aggravating factors ·as more important than others.Victim-specificassaultoffencessingleoutoneaggravatingfactor,amongthemanypossibleaggravatingfactorsthatmaybepresentinanygivencase,asthedefiningfactor.Inthecaseofmaleassaultsfemale,forinstance,theaggravatingfactorthattheoffenderisamaleand thevictim isa female is singledout. Insome instances,thatmayindeedturnouttobethemostseriousaggravatingfactorpresent.However,sometimestherewillbeotheraggravatingfactorsthatareequallyseriousorindeedmoreserious,suchasuseofaweapon,apriorhistoryofseriousconvictions,ortheadvancedageandvulnerabilityofthevictim.Wehavesuggestedinchapter2thatotheraggravatingfactorsofthiskindshouldnotbeelementsoftheoffence.Theyshouldinsteadbetakenintoaccountonsentence.Logically,itwouldseemtofollowthatthestatusofthevictimshouldbedealtwithinthesameway.The risk of ad hoc specific offences being randomly inserted on to the ·statute book, every time an issue arises that causes political or public concern. Havingidentifiedaclassofvictimsthatarguablydeservestobesingledoutbyitsownspecificoffence,itcanbehardtoarguethatanother,arguablyequallydeservingclassofvictims,shouldnotbegiventhesametreatment.Indeed,therearealreadyaplethoraofassaultsagainstspecificvictimsscatteredthroughoutthestatutebook,withwidelyvaryingmaximumpenalties.Proposalsforthecreationofothersuchoffences(eg,toprotectemergencydoctorsandtaxidrivers)continuetoemergefromtimetotime,asperceivedneedarises.Useofvictim-specificoffencesthusgivesrisetoa“slipperyslope”effect:ifwecreatevictim-specificoffencesinsomeareas,wewillprobablyfindithardtoresistdoingsoinothers.Theresultwillbeapatchworkofoffenceswithoutanylogicalorcoherentstructure.
Overall,then,thequestioniswhetherthecaseforestablishingaspecificassault3.5
provisionsissufficientlystrongtoovercometheirmanifestdisadvantages.
3.6 LawreformproposalsinNewZealandandotherjurisdictionsgenerallyreflectashiftawayfromvictimspecificprovisions.
New Zealand – Crimes Bill 1989
In1989,aBillwasdraftedtosubstantiallyreviseandrewritethe1961Act.3.7 31TheBillmovedawayfromtheuseofvictim-specificoffences. Itexcludeda number of the child-specific provisions included in the 1961 Act,leavingonlyasmallnumberthatdealtwithchildsexualoffencesandabduction.
31 CrimesBill1989,aboven4.
reform proposaLs in new ZeaLand and eLsewhere
31Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 3
CHAPTER 3: Specif ic assaults
Notably,thevictim-specificassaultprovisionscoveringwomenandchildrenwereomitted.NoissuewastakenwiththisapproachintheCaseyCommitteeReportontheBill.32
Other jurisdictions’ use of specific offences
Themajorityofjurisdictionswelookedathavemovedawayfromtheuseof3.8
victim-specificoffencesandlawreformbodieshavetendedtotakethesameview.33Mostjurisdictionshaveinsteaddealtwithvictim-specificfactorsasaggravatingfactors,whichcaneitherelevatetheavailablemaximumpenaltyor be taken into account at sentencing.34 Some jurisdictions are silent,preferringtoleavethemattertotheCourts.35Thisapproachhasallowedthesejurisdictionstoavoidtheproliferationofsimilaroffencesdistinguishableonlybyoneor twoelements.Those jurisdictions thathaveretainedanyvictim-specificoffenceshavetendedtoconfinethemtooffencesofassaultingpoliceorassaultwithintenttoresistlawfularrest.
3.9 Undersection194(a)oftheCrimesAct1961,itisanoffenceforanadulttoassaultachild.Theoffencereads:
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years who—
(a) Assaults any child under the age of 14 years;
…
Thispartofthischapterexplainsourrecommendationtorepealthechild-specific3.10
assaultoffence insection194(a),whichmightbeconsideredsurprising,inthecontextofareportthatisdirectedtoensuringthatthelegalframeworkadequatelyaddressestheilltreatmentandneglectofchildren.Butinourview,thedisadvantagesofsection194(a)aresuchthatthelawwillinfactbemorerobustwithoutit.Ourotherproposalsrelatingtoilltreatmentandneglectoffencesarediscussedinchapter5.
Problems with the current law
It is generally acknowledged that there is a substantial difference in3.11
culpabilitybetweenassaultson childrenandother instancesof assault.Clearly,insomeindividualcases,aminorassaultonachildsuchasasmackwillbelessseverethansomeotherinstancesofcommonassaultonanadult.However,ourworktendstoindicatethatthejudiciary,atleast,regardssuchconductasmoreculpable;36sodoescurrentgovernmentpolicy,anditisprobably
32 CrimesConsultativeCommittee,aboven5.
33 SeeforexampleUnitedKingdomLawCommissionLegislating the Criminal Code Offences – Offences Against the Person and General Principles(LawComNo218,London,1993);LawReformCommissionofIrelandReport on Non-fatal Offences Against the Person(LRC45,Dublin,1994);ModelCriminalCodeOfficersCommitteeoftheStandingCommitteeofAttorneys-GeneralModel Criminal Code – Chapter 5 – Non Fatal Offences Against the Person(StandingCommitteeofAttorneys’General,Canberra,1998).
34 SeeforexampleCriminalCodeAct2007(WA),s221;CriminalCodeAct1899(Qld),s340;ModelCriminalCodeOfficersCommitteeoftheStandingCommitteeofAttorneys-General,aboven33,111;
35 Non-FatalOffencesAgainst the PersonAct 1997 (Ire);Law ReformCommissionof Ireland,aboven33,para9.129.
36 Seefurtherpara3.18below.
assauLt on a chiLd
32 Law Commiss ion Report
afairassumptionthatthepropositionwouldbegenerallyacceptedbythecommunity.CertainlythiswasindicatedbysomerecentresearchconductedbyColmarBruntonfortheLawCommission’smaximumpenaltyreview.37
Theprincipalargumentinfavourofretainingsection194(a)istosignalthat3.12
thisparticularcategoryofconduct(assaultsonchildren)issomuchmoreseriousthana“normal”assaultthatitrequiresaseparatelabel,andanaggravatedmaximumpenalty.Howeversection194(a)doesnotadequatelyachievethispurposebecauseitisonlyavailabletoaddresslow-leveloffendingagainstchildrenwhichcreatesanerroneousperceptionthatoffendingagainstchildreninnottakenseriously.Moreover,achildspecificoffenceisnotnecessarytoensurethatoffendingagainstchildrenattractsasentencingpremiumandthatsentencelevelsforthosewhooffendagainstchildrenareappropriate.Wediscusstheissuesfurtherbelow.
Offence available only at the bottom end
Section194(a)isthechild-specificequivalentoftheCrimesActcommonassault3.13
offence.Its2-yearmaximumpenaltyisdoublethatofthepenaltyforcommonassault.Ifconductisallegedtohavecausedthedeathofachild,murderormanslaughterislikelytobecharged.Similarly,inachildabusecasethathasresultedinsignificantinjury,chargesaremuchmorelikelytobelaidunderoneofthegenerallyapplicableaggravatedassaultprovisionsintheCrimesAct,suchaswoundingorinjuringwithintent.Theseprovisionshavesubstantiallyhighermaximumpenalties(upto14years’imprisonmentinsomecases).
Logically,onewouldexpectthat,ifallowanceistobemadeinthesubstantive3.14
offencestructureforthegreaterculpabilityattachingtoviolenceagainstchildren,this should be done across the whole spectrum of offending againstchildren,from“common”assaulttomanslaughter.Infact,thecurrentoffencestructuredoesnotdothis;itcreatesanaggravatedoffenceonlyforthecommonassaultcategory,atthebottomendofthespectrumofseriousness.
A perception problem
Asaresult,asonemightexpect,section194(a)chargestendtobelaidinresponse3.15
torelativelylow-leveloffendingagainstchildren.Butwhenmembersofthepublichearaboutsentencesimposedforassaultonachild,theymayinferthattheconductthatpromptedthechargewasmuchmoreseriousthanwasinfactthecase(because,ifithadbeenmoreserious,thelikelihoodisthatanaggravatedchargewouldhavebeenlaid).Thatis,wesuspect,thereasonforthecommonlyexpressedviewthatsentencesforassaultsagainstchildrenaremorelenientthancomparableassaultsonadults.Infact,ouranalysishasfoundthatthereverseistrue.38
37 Presentedwith28differentscenarios,the“crueltytoachild”scenariowasrankedonaverage3rd,betweenbulkmethamphetamineimportation(4th)andgangrape(2nd).Whiletherearecertainlysomeverysignificantcaveatsthatneedtobeapplied–thescenariowasinsomerespectsquiteextreme(includingforcingthechildtodrinkurine),andtheresponsetoitcannotnecessarilybeextendedtothecontextofchildassault–thediscussionsthatoccurredbetweenparticipantstendedtobedrivensimplybythestatusofthechild,notparticularaspectsofthescenario.
38 Seefurtherpara3.18below.
33Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 3
CHAPTER 3: Specif ic assaults
Inconsistent police charging practice
Asnotedabove,policechargingpracticemaywellbeinconsistent,particularly3.16
intheabsenceofanyprosecutorialchargingguidelines(policehaveadvisedthattherearecurrentlynosuchguidelines).Ifaprosecutorputsmoreemphasisonthestatusofthevictimthanthenatureoftheconduct,itwillsometimesinviteunder-charging–thatis,relianceonsection194whenthefactssupportthelayingofamoreseriouscharge.Thatcontributestotheperceptionproblemoutlinedabove,butequallyimportantly,itraisesissuesofnaturaljustice,byfailingtotreatlikeoffendersalike.
No reason to distinguish children from other vulnerable groups
Eveniftherewasadesiretoestablishawholehierarchyofchild-specificoffences,3.17
thereisafurtherdifficulty.Thereareothervictimsjustasvulnerableaschildren,suchastheveryelderly,orseverelymentallyimpaired.Thereisnocase,inourview,forelevatingtheundeniablyimportantinterestsofchildrenabovethoseofotherequallyvulnerablevictims.Unlessseparatespecificoffencesarealsotobecreatedforeachvulnerablecategoryofvictim(whichisimpracticable),generallyapplicablemaximumpenaltieswillneed tobe thesameasanychild-specificmaximumpenalty.Thatisbecausemaximumpenaltieshavetobesetbyreferencetotheworstclassofcase,whichwouldbeanassaultonavulnerablevictim.Thatmakestheseparateoffenceredundantatbest.
Sentencing premium in the absence of a specific offence
Intermsofwhetheroffendingagainstchildrenwillbeaccordedadequategravity3.18
andweightintheabsenceofaspecificassaultoffence,ouranalysisofsentencingoutcomessuggeststhatthiswillindeedoccur,regardlessofthenatureofthecharge.Weundertookananalysisofsentencingoutcomesforoffendingagainstchildren.Itdemonstratedthatsentencesimposedareconsistentlymoreseverewhenchildrenarethevictims.Inotherwords,thereisasentencing“premium”forthiskindofconduct.Forexample,whensentencesforassaultsonchildrenwerecomparedwithsentencesformaleassaultsfemale(thetwooffencesthatcanbechargedundersection194,whichareidenticalexceptfortheidentityofthevictim),theaveragetermofimprisonmentformaleassaultsfemalewas8.1monthswhereasforassaultonachilditwas10.1months.Asimilarpatternisevidentacrossthespectrum,fromrelativelyminorassaultstomoreseriousones.
Thissentencingpremiumisnotdependentupontheexistenceofachild-specific3.19
offence.Thedifferenceinpenaltyappliedregardlessofthenatureoftheoffencecharged.Inotherwords,itwascircumstance-basedratherthanoffence-based.
Thesentencesconsideredwereimposedpriortotheenactmentofnewsection3.20
9AwhichwasinsertedintotheSentencingAct2002inDecember2008.39Itexplicitlyprovidesthatoffendingagainstchildren,definedas lessthan14yearsofage,isanaggravatingfactor.Earlydecisionsunder9Aindicatethatthecourtshaverecogniseditspurposeandsignificance.40
39 Sentencing(OffencesAgainstChildren)AmendmentAct2008,s4.
40 R v Anthony Mervyn Richards (1May2009)HCWNCRI-2008-078-001067,para17GendallJ.
34 Law Commiss ion Report
Our recommendation for repeal
Wethereforeconsiderthattheweightofargumentleansinfavourofrepealing3.21
section 194(a). In the light of this recommendation, we are making aparallel recommendation that themaximumpenalty forcommonassault(newsection189A(2))shouldbeincreasedto2years.Thiswillensurethatassaultsagainstchildrenarestillpunishablebyanappropriatemaximumpenalty–thatis,thesamepenaltythatcurrentlyexists.Ofcourse,assaultsagainstchildrenthatcauseinjury,orwherethereisanaggravatedintent,willbechargeableunderotheroffenceswithhighermaxima:seefurtherchapter2.
Weconsiderthatthecurrent2-yearpenaltyforchild-specificassaultthatdoes3.22
notcauseinjuryisappropriate,relativetootherpenalties.Pendingafirstprinciplesreviewofmaximumpenalties–whichwesupport–ithasbeennecessarygiventhelimitedscopeofthisprojecttopreservetheexistingrelativities.Whilecomparisonshavefromtimetotimebeenmadewiththemaximumpenalty,forexample,forthewilfulilltreatmentofanimalsundersection28oftheAnimalWelfareAct1999,theexampleisnotanalogous.Theanalogousoffenceinthecontextofoffendingagainstchildreniswilfulilltreatmentinsection195oftheCrimesAct,withacurrentmaximumpenaltyof5yearsimprisonment,whichwearerecommendingshouldbeincreasedto10years.
3.23 Undersection194(b)oftheCrimesAct1961,itisaspecificoffenceforamaletoassaultafemale.Likesection194(a)(assaultonachild),itissubjecttoamaximumtermof2years’imprisonment,asopposedtothe1-yearmaximumforcommonassault.Section194(b)provides:
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years who—
…
(b) Being a male, assaults any female.
Whileanassaultbyamaleonafemaleisgenerallyarelativelyculpableform3.24
ofassault,wehavereservationsaboutwhetheritisuniversallysufficientlymoreculpabletowarrantaseparateoffence.Whileasageneralrule,theaveragemalewillveryoftenhaveaphysical advantageover theaverage female,thecircumstanceswilldifferineachcase.
Policechargingpracticesuggeststhatsection194(b)willbeusedforcaseswhere3.25
theassaultwasmorethantrifling,but(weassume)shortofthereallyseriousassaults thatwouldtriggeramoreserious injurycharge. Inotherwords,theapplicationoftheexistingoffenceinpracticetendstoundermineanyargumentforitsretentiononthebasisofsymbolism:itisnotthesymbolismthatdrivesitsuse;ithasmoretodowithensuringthatchargesaretailoredsothatmaximumpenaltyadequatelyreflectstheculpability.
Weconsideredwhethertheoffencemighthavebeendesigned,orbeoperating,3.26
asaproxyforanoffenceofdomesticassault.However,notalldomesticassaultswillbeperpetratedbyamalepartner;awomanmightbetheperpetratorinsomecases,ortheremightbeanabusivesamesexrelationship.Ifadomesticassaultoffenceistheendthatissought,section194(b)isnotdoingagoodjob.
maLe assauLts femaLe
35Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 3
CHAPTER 3: Specif ic assaults
Whilstacknowledgingthelimitedbenefitsofsection194(b)asaproxyfor3.27
domesticassault,policeandothersnotedaconcernthat,iftheoffencewasrepealed,andthosecurrentlyconvictedunderitconvictedofcommonassaultinstead,therewouldbenothingonthecriminalrecordtoestablishahistoryofthatcategoryofoffending.Thatmightberelevantinformationtoajudgeforsentencingpurposes,orChild,YouthandFamilyinconsideringtheplacementofchildren,forexample.
Weacknowledgethatthisisanimportantpoint.However,again,wenotethat3.28
section194(b) isnota goodmeans to that end.Likeassaultona child,itonlyaddressesrelativelyminorcases–theequivalentofcommonassault,butforthegenderofthetwopeopleinvolved.Wheretheconductismoreserious,resultingininjuryorevendeathofthefemale,generallyapplicablechargesoughttobe,andinmostcaseswouldbe,laid.Inotherwords,acriminalrecordthatreliesupontheoffenceofmaleassaultsfemaletoindicatepropensitytoengageindomesticassaultwillbehighlymisleading.Ultimately,everybodyagreedthatamethodofrecordingsuchpropensity,coveringthewholerangeofrelevantoffences,wouldneedtobedeveloped.WeunderstandthattheMinistryofJusticeandPoliceareworkingtogethertoaddressthis.Weareadvisedthatpolicemethodsofcodingarecapableofbeingmodifiedtodothejob.
Inlightofthiswerecommendthatsection194(b)shouldberepealed.3.29
Domestic assault
Asnotedabove,weconsideredwhethersection194(b)mighthavebeendesigned,3.30
orbeoperating,asaproxyforanoffenceofdomesticassault.Thehiddennatureofdomesticassaultisapossiblerationaleforaspecificoffence.Thereiscurrentlyagovernment-fundedcampaigntryingtopromotevisibilityandshiftsocialmores,whichsomemightthinkwouldbeunderminedbytheomissionofaspecificoffence.Byseparatelylabellingthisoffencecategory,itpotentiallyhasa“nameandshame”effect.
However,thecentralmessageofthatcampaignisthatdomesticassaultis3.31
justasbadasotherassault.Itwould,infact,beentirelyconsistentwiththatmessagetorepealparticularprovisionformaleassaultsfemale,anddeclinetointroducenewprovisionfordomesticassault,onthebasisthatallareequallyculpable.Toprovideforsuchincidentsseparatelyisinfactinconsistentwiththeprimarymessage.
However,moreimportantly,therearelikelytobeverysignificantproblems3.32
whenattemptingtodefine“domesticassault”,anditisdifficulttoconstructadefinition–whether“relationshipinthenatureofmarriage”,cohabitation,longtermrelationship,andsoon–thatwouldnotpotentiallyresultinsomeverysignificantanomalies.
Wedonotrecommendtheintroductionofanewdomesticassaultoffence.3.33
36 Law Commiss ion Report
3.34 TheCrimesAct1961andSummaryProceedingsAct1981eachcontainspecificassaultprovisionsinrespectofpoliceofficersactingintheexecutionoftheirduty.Section192(2)oftheCrimesActprovides:
192 Aggravated assault
…
(2) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years who assaults any constable or any person acting in aid of any constable, or any person in the lawful execution of any process, with intent to obstruct the person so assaulted in the execution of his duty.
Section10oftheSummaryOffencesAct1981(whichalsoappliestoprison3.35
officers)provides:
10 Assault on police, prison, or traffic officer
Every person is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding $4,000 who assaults any constable, or any prison officer, or any traffic officer, acting in the execution of his duty.
Theprincipalargumentforspecificallyprotectingpolicebywayofaunique3.36
assaultprovision(orprovisions)derivesfromthesymbolicnatureoftheirrole.Policearethefrontlineofstateenforcement–thesocalled“thinblueline”betweenlawlessnessandtherestofus.Implicitly,anattackonapoliceofficerisanattackontheauthorityofthestate.Thepolicearenecessarilyattheforefrontofalmosteveryemergencyresponse;aswassaidtous(bythepolice),whereasotherscanrunfromdanger,policemustruntowardsit.Becauseofthat,theyareentitledtoexpectrobuststateprotection.Furthermore,itisnotjustaboutprotectionofpolice;ifassaultsontheirpersonandauthorityareinanywaydeterredbytheexistenceofaspecificoffence,thatisofgeneralbenefittousall,notjustabenefittopoliceofficers.
Thereisthusanargumentthatassaultonapoliceofficerisqualitativelydifferent3.37
initsculpabilityfromotherassaults,andthatthisdifferenceshouldbeexplicitlysignalled.Indeed,internationally,assaultonapoliceofficeristheonespecificassaultoffencethatconsistentlyreappearsintheprecedents,andthatlawreformershaveconsistentlydecidedtoretain.41
Thepoliceputtheircasestrongly,andultimatelywearepersuadedthataspecific3.38
offenceofassaultonapoliceofficershouldforthetimebeingberetained.Nochangetosections10and192(2)isrecommended.
41 SeeforexampleUnitedKingdomLawCommission,aboven33,41;andLawReformCommissionofIreland,aboven33,paras9.111–9.115.
assauLts on poLice off icers
37Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 3
CHAPTER 3: Specif ic assaults
3.39 Currentlythereareamyriadofstatutoryoffencesinvolvingassaultsandotherrelatedconduct(eg.obstruction)onarangeofenforcementofficersandofficials.Theseincludethefollowing:
sEctIon offEncE – AssAults MAxIMuM pEnAlty
Animal products Act 1999, s 133(1)
offence to assault, threaten, or intentionally obstruct or hinder an animal product officer official assessor, or recognised risk management programme verifier.
$50,000
Biosecurity Act 1993, s 154(a)
offence to threaten, assault or intentionally obstruct or hinder an inspector or authorised or accredited person.
12 months or $50,000
civil defence Emergency Management Act 2002, s 98
offence to threaten, assault, or wilfully obstructs person performing duty under Act.
3 months or $5,000
copyright Act 1994, s 221 offence to assault, threaten, intimidate or intentionally insult member of tribunal.
$1,000
courts security Act 1999, s 30
resists/ assaults/ wilfully obstructs court security officer.
3 months or $300
crimes Act 1961, s 401 Assault of judge, registrar, officer of the court, witness
3 months or $1,000
customs and Excise Act 1996, s176
threatens/ assaults/ by force resists/ intentionally obstructs or intimidates customs officer.
12 months or $15,000
disputes tribunal Act 1988, s 56(1)
Assault of referee, witness, or officer of tribunal.
$1,000
district court Act 1947, s 18 Assault on officer of the court (this does not require a charge, so is not an offence).
$300
Employment relations Act 2000, s 196(1)
Assault on member of authority/ judge/ registrar, etc.
3 months or $5,000
Evidence Act 2006, s 179 Assaults witness, solicitor or court officer during video link proceedings to Aus court.
3 months or $1,000
forests Act 1949, s 59 Assault of forestry worker, other person exercising duties under the Act.
$2,000
International War crimes Act 1995, s 40(1)
Assault of judge, prosecutor, registrar, barrister or solicitor.
3 months or $1,000
judicature Act 1908, s 56 Assault of judge, registrar, officer of court, etc of federal court of Aus sitting in nZ.
3 months or $1,000
judicature Act 1908, s 56c Assault of judge, registrar, officer of court, juror or witness.
3 months or $1,000
Health Act 1956, s 72 threatens/ assaults/ intentionally obstructs/ hinders health officer or police officer acting under the Act.
6 months or $4,000
Health practitioners competence Assurance Act 2003, schedule 1, cl (13)(1)
Assault on member of tribunal, officer, barrister or solicitor or witness.
$10,000
assauLts on others in performance of their duties
38 Law Commiss ion Report
Human rights Act 1993, s 114(1)
Assault of judge, officer, registrar, prosecutor.
10 days or $1,500
lawyers and conveyancers Act 2006, s 251(1)
Assault of member or officer of disciplinary tribunal.
$5,000
reserves Act 1977, s 98 Assault of ranger or employee of the crown.
3 months or $2,500
residential tenancies Act 1986, s 112(1)
Assault of tenancy adjudicator or officer of tribunal or witness etc.
$1,000
resource Management Act 1991, s 282
Assault of member of, special adviser to ot officer of court.
10 days or $1,500
social Workers registration Act 2003, sched 2 cl (13(1)
Assault on member/ advisor/ officer of complaints and disciplinary tribunal.
$2,000
summary offences Act, s 10 Assault on police, prison, or traffic officer.
6 months or $4,000
summary proceedings Act 1957, s 192(9)
Assault of special constable or assistant in execution of duty.
3 months or $300
supreme court Act 2003, s 35(1)
Assault of supreme court judge, registrar, witness.
5 days or $5,000
Weathertight Homes resolution Act 2006, s 115
Assaults/ threatens/ intimidates Member of tribunal.
$5,000
Wildlife Act 1953, s 40(1) Assault of ranger or assistant. 3 months or $5,000
Wildlife Act 1953, s 51 Assault of inspector or other authorised person.
$5,000
Wine Act 2003, s 101(1) Assault of wine officer, assistant or authorised person.
$50,000
sEctIon offEncE – oBstructIon MAxIMuM pEnAlty
Antarctica (Environmental protection) Act 1994, s 47
offence to obstruct inspectors. $1,500
Auckland Harbour Act 1874, s 34
penalty for obstructing receiver. $200
Biosecurity Act 1993, s 134 Enforcement of area controls. 5 years or $100,000 or both (individual), $200,000 (company)
Building Act 2004, s 367 offence to obstruct execution of powers under this Act.
$5,000
civil Aviation Act 1990, s 55 personation or obstruction of aviation security officer.
3 months or $2,000
commerce Act 1986, s 103 offences. $10,000 (individual), $30,000 (body corporate)
companies Act 1993, s 365 registrar’s powers of inspection. $10,000
driftnet prohibition Act 1991, s 25
offences. $20,000
fisheries Act 1996, s 113W persons on new Zealand ships to co-operate with foreign high seas inspectors.
5 years or $250,000 or to both
fisheries Act 1996, s 229 obstructing fisheries officers. $250,000
39Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 3
CHAPTER 3: Specif ic assaults
gambling Act 2003, s 346 obstructing gambling inspector. $2,000 (individual), $5,000 (higher grade of licence)
Health and safety in Employment Act 1992, s 48
obstruction, etc. $250,000
Historic places Act 1993, s 21 rights of entry. $2,500
Immigration Advisors licensing Act 2007, s 69
offence to obstruct inspection. $10,000
Insurance companies (ratings and Inspections) Act 1994, s 26
registrar’s powers of inspection. $10,000
land transport Act 1998, s 53
obstruction of enforcement officer or dangerous goods enforcement officer.
$10,000
limited partnerships Act 2008, s 78
registrar’s powers of inspection. $10,000
Maritime security Act 2004, s 74
personation or obstruction of authorised person.
3 months or $2,000
Mental Health (compulsory Assessment and treatment) Act 1992, s 117
obstruction of inspection. $2,000
Misuse of drugs Act, s 16 obstruction of officers. 3 months or $500 or both
Misuse of drugs Amendment Act 2005, s 60
offence to obstruct enforcement officer or member of police under this part.
$1,000
Motor Vehicle sales Act 2003, s 109
offence to obstruct inspection. $2,000
Motor Vehicle sales Act 2003, s 110
offence to obstruct search. $2,000
real Estate Agents Act 2008, s 153
offence to resist, obstruct, etc. $40,000 (individual), $100,000 (company)
retirement Villages Act 2003, s 97
registrar’s powers of inspection. $30,000 (individual), $100,000 (body corporate)
serious fraud office Act 1990, s 45
offence to obstruct investigation, etc. 12 months or $15,000 (individual), $40,000 (company)
transport Act 1962, s 80 Inspection of vehicles required to have certificates of fitness or permits.
$1,000
Ajumbleofapproachesisevidentintheseoffences.Theirmaximumpenalties3.40
varywidely.Someof theoffencesrefer toassault;others toother formsof obstruction, using language such as “resist”, “impede”, “obstruct”,“useabusiveorthreateninglanguage”,or“behaveinathreateningmanner”inadditionto,orinsteadof,assault.
Itisquestionablewhattheseoffencesaddtothegeneralprovisionsinthe3.41
CrimesAct1961andSummaryOffencesAct1981.Theyappeartohavebeencreatedforsymbolicreasonstorecognisethespecialroleofenforcementofficersandtheriskstheyfaceincarryingouttheirduties.However,itisdoubtfulthat
40 Law Commiss ion Report
theyachievethisbecausethelowlevelnatureoftheoffencesrisksthesameproblemofperceptionthatwediscussedinrelationtothechildspecificoffenceearlierinthechapter.
Moreover,ifweareconcernedwithpeopleonthe“frontline”,therearepersons3.42
otherthanlawenforcementofficersonwhomwerelyinacrisis.
AconsultationdocumentcirculatedbytheScottishExecutiveillustratesthe3.43
problemthatquicklyariseswhenonegroupissingledouttotheexclusionof another. In 2003, the Executive circulated a consultation paper titledProtection of Emergency Workers.42Itconcludedthatcommonlawandstatutoryprotectionswereinadequateandthatprotectionforemergencyworkersneededtobebroughtintolinewiththatavailableforpolice.Thepaperstartedbymakingitscaseforpolice,fireserviceandambulanceofficers.Itthendrewalinkbetweentheseworkersandgeneralpractitioners,communitynursesandcommunitymidwiveswhoattendemergencies.Addedtothislistweredoctors,consultants,alliedhealthprofessionalsandnurseswhoworkinemergencydepartments.Thosethatassistedthesestaffwerealsotobeprotected.Andifthatwasnotsufficient,theproposedprotectionwasalsostatedtocover“workerswhorespondtoenvironmentalemergencies”includingthosewhofixgasleaksorworktodecontaminatewater.Thelegislationproposedwouldhavemadeitanoffencetoobstruct,assault,orhinderoneofthesecategoriesofworkersintheexecutionoftheirduty.
This“floodgates”problemleadsustotheviewthat3.44 nospecificassaultoffencesotherthanassaultonapoliceofficerarejustified.
Inaddition,singlingoutsomeoccupationalgroupsforspecialtreatmentnot3.45
onlycreatesariskofanomalies.Italsoaddsunnecessarytechnicalityandcomplexitytoprosecutionsbecauseoftheneedtoprovethestatusofthevictim.Inourview,thestatusofthevictimandthefunctionthatheorsheperformsatthetimeoftheassaultaremattersthatcanbeproperlytakenintoaccountaspartofthesentencingprocess.
Inprinciple,weconsiderthatthevariousspecificassaultprovisionsthatapply3.46
toenforcementofficersandotherofficialsshouldberepealed.
Recommendation for further work
Thescopeoftheworkinvolvedinaddressingspecificassaultand/orobstruction3.47
offencesrelatingtoallenforcementofficersisconsiderable.Itcouldnotbeachievedwithinthetimeavailabletous–particularlygiventhelikelihoodthatwewouldproposerepealofanumberoftheoffencesandperhapsindeedallofthem,whichwouldhaverequiredextensiveconsultation.Wewouldhaveneededtoconsidertheimplicationsoftheblurrylinebetweenoffencesthatrefertoassault(perhapsincludingreferencetootherformsofobstruction)andthosesolelydirectedtoobstruction:isthereanybasisonwhichtoarguethatthetwocategoriesofoffencearedifferentincharacter?
Werecommendthatfurtherworkshouldbeundertakenonthisissue,byeither3.48
theLawCommissionortheMinistryofJustice.
42 ScottishExecutiveProtection of Emergency Workers – A consultation paper(Astron,Edinburgh,2003).
41Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 3
CHAPTER 4: Endanger ing, negl igent in jury, and homicide
Chapter 4Endangering, negligent injury, and homicide
4.1 Sections145,160,and190oftheCrimesAct1961provide(inrelevantpart):
145 Criminal nuisance
Every one commits criminal nuisance who does any unlawful act or omits to (1) discharge any legal duty, such act or omission being one which he knew would endanger the lives, safety, or health of the public, or the life, safety, or health of any individual.
…
190 Injuring by unlawful act
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years who injures any other person in such circumstances that if death had been caused he would have been guilty of manslaughter.
160 Culpable homicide
…
Homicide is culpable when it consists in the killing of any person—(2)
By an unlawful act; or(a)
By an omission without lawful excuse to perform or observe any legal duty; or(b)
By both combined; or(c)
By causing that person by threats or fear of violence, or by deception, to do an (d) act which causes his death; or
By wilfully frightening a child under the age of 16 years or a sick person.(e)
Undersection190,apersonisliableforinjuringanotherincircumstanceswhere4.2
heorshecouldhavebeenguiltyofmanslaughterhadthevictimdied.Accordingly,thecaselawrelatingtosection160appliestosection190cases,albeitmodifiedasnecessarytofitsituationsofinjuryratherthandeath.
the current Law
42 Law Commiss ion Report
4.3 Ourproposedredraftoftheseprovisionsmakessomechangestosection160(2)oftheCrimesAct,whichdefinesculpablehomicide.Thesection160(2)changeswouldcodifycaselaw.Werecommendthatsections145and190shouldbere-enactedinnewsections157Aand157Bofthedraft,andamendedtoalignthemwith section160.Therehavebeen somehistorical anomalies andinconsistenciesofapproachbetweenthethreeprovisionsthatinourviewarenotjustified.Thepolicyobjectivehereissimplytoensurethatthelawisconsistent.Ifourrecommendationsareagreedto,thethreeprovisionswouldestablishahierarchythataddressesthewholerangeofpossibleoutcomesarisingfromagrosslynegligentunlawfulactoromissiontoperformastatutoryduty,dependingonwhetherdeath,injury,orriskofinjuryresults.
Thenewdraftclausesread:4.4
157A Unlawful acts and omissions likely to cause injury
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years who does any unlawful act or omits to perform any statutory duty if, in the circumstances, that act or omission is likely to injure another.
157B Injuring by unlawful act or omission
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years who—
does any unlawful act or omits to perform any statutory duty if, in the circumstances, (a) that act or omission is likely to injure another and results in injury to another; or
causes a person to do an act that results in injury to that person by threats of (b) violence, or fear of violence, or by deception.
Section 150A
Whenachargeis laidundereithersection160or190oftheCrimesAct,4.5
alleginganomissiontoperformaduty,section150AoftheActapplies.43
Section150AwasinsertedintotheCrimesActin1997,togiveeffecttothe4.6
recommendationsoftheMcMullinreport.44SirDuncanMcMullinrecommendedthattheminimumlevelofculpabilityforcasesofmanslaughterbyomissionshouldbegrossnegligence–or,aseventuallyexpressedinsection150A,agrossdeparturefromthestandardofcareexpectedofareasonableperson.Section150Acurrentlyreads:
43 InR v Andersen [2005]1NZLR774(CA),theCourtofAppealpreferredtoleavethequestionofwhethersection150Ashouldalsoapplyinsection145casesforanotherday.Weareproposingthatsection145,currentlyinPart7oftheCrimesAct,willbebroughtintoPart8asnewsection157A.TheprovisionsitsmorelogicallyinPart8,becauseofitscloseconnectionwithnewsection157Bandsection160(2).Thismeansthatsection150AoftheCrimesAct(whichappliestooffences“inthisPart”–ie,Part8)willapplytoit,thusclarifyingtheunresolvedAndersenpoint.
44 SirDuncanMcMullin,Report of Sir Duncan McMullin to Hon Douglas Graham, Minister of Justice, on Sections 155 and 156 of the Crimes Act 1961(Wellington,1995).
our approach to these offences
the mentaL eLement
43Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 4
CHAPTER 4: Endanger ing, negl igent in jury, and homicide
150A Standard of care required of persons under legal duties
this section applies in respect of the legal duties specified in any of sections 151, (1) 152, 153, 155, 156, and 157.
for the purposes of this part, a person is criminally responsible for—(2)
omitting to discharge or perform a legal duty to which this section applies; or(a)
neglecting a legal duty to which this section applies—(b)
only if, in the circumstances of the particular case, the omission or neglect is a major departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person to whom that legal duty applies in those circumstances.
Aspresentlydrafted,section150Aaddressesthemensreaelementonlyincases4.7
wheretherehasbeenanomissiontoperformalegalduty.Butinourview,grossnegligenceshouldalsobetheminimumstandardofcriminalliabilityforunlawfulactschargedunder theproposedsections157A,157Band160.ThisisconsistentwiththeviewtakenbytheCourtofAppealinR v Powell,45whentheCourtheldthatthelegislaturecannothaveintendedthatdifferentstandardswouldapplytounlawfulactsandomissionsrespectively,becauseinsomecases,itmaybeopentotheCrowntoframeitschargeintermsofeithersection160(2)(a)or(b).Itwouldbenonsensicalfortherequiredstandardofculpabilitytodependuponthedecision(perhapsmadearbitrarily)astotheframingofthecharge.
Wethereforerecommendthatsection150Ashouldbeamended,tocodifywhat4.8
weunderstandtohavebeenthedecisioninPowell.Wheretheoffenceconstitutingtheunlawfulactincludesaculpabilityelementofintentionorrecklessness,itwill remainnecessary for theCrown toestablish thiselementbeyondreasonabledoubt.Butwheretheoffencerequiresmerenegligenceorisastrictorabsoluteliabilityoffence,weproposethatundersection150A,theCrownwillhavetoprovethattheperson’sactwasagrossdeparturefromthestandardofcareexpectedofareasonableperson.
New section 157A – gross negligence, not recklessness
Atpresenttheculpabilityelementfortheendangeringoffenceinsection145is4.9
recklessness.46Thisisnotthecaseundersections160and190,wheredeathorinjuryhasresulted;byvirtueofsection150AoftheAct,grossnegligencesufficestoestablishliability.47
Recklessnessmeansthatanaccusedhasknowinglyrunarisktoanother4.10
that, inthecircumstances, itwasunreasonabletorun.Grossnegligence,ontheotherhand,isanobjectivetestthat,assetoutinsection150AoftheAct,simplymeasures theconductof theaccusedagainst thestandardofcareexpectedofareasonableperson,andasks:wasthisamajordeparturefromthatstandard?
45 R v Powell [2002]1NZLR666(CA).
46 R v Andersen,aboven43.
47 SeegenerallyAdamsonCriminalLawCA160.03.
44 Law Commiss ion Report
Inourview,thereisnojustificationforperpetuatingthisdistinction.Ifamajor4.11
departurefromthestandardofcareexpectedofareasonablepersonissufficienttoestablishliabilityincasesinvolvingdeathandinjury,itisdifficulttoseewhyahigherstandardofculpabilityshouldberequiredtoestablishliabilitywhentheconsequenceoftheconductislessseriousandtheavailablepenaltyislower.
4.12 Theterm“unlawfulact”appearsinsections145and160.Undersection145,theunlawfulactneednotbecriminaloroneprohibitedbystatute;anyactthatisinbreachofeithercriminalorcivillawwillsuffice.48Thisistobecontrastedwiththemeaningof“unlawfulact”undersections160(and190)which,asconfirmedbytheCourtofAppealinR v Myatt,islimitedtoanoffenceinbreachofanyAct,regulationorbylaw.49
ThenarrowerinterpretationpreferredbytheCourtin4.13 Myattisourpreferredoption,fortworeasons.50First,wedonotthinkthatcriminalliabilityshouldarisesolelyfromcivilwrongs.Civilliabilityallocateslossbetweentwoparties,where one party has allegedly suffered harm at the hands of the other,whereasthecriminallawinvolvesthestatebringinganindividualtojusticewhohasdoneawrongagainstthecommunity.Ifcivil lawsarebreached,civilremediesareavailableandshouldnotgiverisetocriminalliabilityunlessthereissomeindependentjustificationfordoingso.Secondly,wethinkthatforseriouschargesthatmayresultinasignificantprisonterm,thescopeofliabilityshouldbecertain,sothatapersonisabletoascertaininadvancetheextentofhisorhercriminalliability.
Wethereforerecommendtheadoptionofamodified4.14 Myattapproach,thatwouldcoveroffencesinbreachofrules,aswellasthosethatbreachActs,regulationsorbylaws.
4.15 Sections 145 and 160 each refer to omissions to perform a legal duty(andasnotedabove,althoughsection190doesnotcontainthislanguage,itimportsallofthelawrelatingtosection160).Inmostcases,thedutyonwhichachargeunderanyoneofthesesectionsisbasedwillbeoneofthosesetoutinsections151to157oftheCrimesAct.ButtherearealsouncodifiedcommonlawdutiesthathavebeenreliedonatleasttwicetoestablishalegaldutybytheNewZealandCourtofAppeal.51InR v Mwai thedefendanthadallegedlyfailedtouseprotectionduringsexualintercoursewhenheknewhewasacarrieroftheHIVvirus.TheCourtheldthatageneraldutyatcommonlawexists
48 AdamsonCriminalLawCA145.01.
49 R v Myatt [1991]1NZLR674,678(CA),BissonJfortheCourt. WhiletheCourtinR v Myatt wasnotrequiredtoconclusivelydeterminewhetherthesolescopeof“unlawfulact”formanslaughterpurposesisbreachofanAct,regulationorbylaw,thisseemstohavebeentheviewreachedbytheEnglishappellateauthoritiesandthebasisonwhichtheMyattCourtproceeded:seeforexampleR v Lamb[1967]2QB281(CA)andR v Kennedy (No 2)[2008]1AC269;[2007]3WLR612(HL).
50 WehavenotedtheapproachtakentoendangeringintheCrimesBill1989,followedbytheCaseyCommittee,whichbasedtheendangeringoffenceson“anyact”thatislikelytoinjureorendangerthesafetyofanother.Wedidnotsupportthisapproachbecauseofitsbreadth:ifthenewoffenceswereframedintermsof“anyact”,itcouldgiverisetoliabilityforanyonewhosmokedinapublicplace,skateboardeddownthestreet,orsoldunhealthyfoodtoasickperson.OurmorecautiousapproachissupportedbyCagney v Director of Public Prosecutions [2007]IESC46,inwhichtheSupremeCourtcriticisedsection13oftheNon-FatalOffencesAgainstthePersonAct1997(Ire).
51 See for example R v Mwai, above n 22; R v Andersen, above n 43, para 71; R v Lunt [2004]1NZLR498(CA).
unLawfuL acts
changing “LawfuL” to “statutory” duty
45Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 4
CHAPTER 4: Endanger ing, negl igent in jury, and homicide
“nottoengageinconductwhichonecanforeseemayexposeotherstoharm”,52andthatthisdutywassufficienttosupportthechargeundersection145.InR v Lunt,theCourtofAppealheldthatwhilethedutyonaparentorpersoninplaceofaparentcontainedinsection151didnotincludeadutytoprotectachildfromharm,acommonlawdutyexistedonaparentto“protecthisorherchildfromtheillegalviolenceoftheotherparentorofanyotherpersonwherethatviolenceisforeseenorreasonablyforeseeable”.53
Ifthe“legalduty”languagewasretained,itwouldremainopentothecourtsto4.16
continuetoapplycommonlawduties.Thiswouldallowthecourtstoaddresssituationsbeyondthescopeofthecodifiedduties,asMwaiandLuntillustrate.Viewsamongstthoseweconsultedwerefairlyevenlydividedontheargumentsforandagainstthis;someconsideredtheresultingflexibilitytobeanadvantage,and thatprecisely thepurposeofacatch-allphrase suchas“legalduty”istorespondtounforeseencircumstances.
However,onbalanceweconsider that, in the interestsof certaintyand4.17
transparency,itwouldbepreferabletoreferinsteadto“statutory”ratherthan“legal”duties.Wefeeluneasywiththenotionthatuncodifieddutiescanformthebasisforcriminaloffences;asoneacademichasnoted,“itisnotamatterofwhatdutiesexist,itisonlypossibletoindicatewhichoneshavesofarbeenrecognised.”54Itisacornerstoneoftheruleoflawthatpeopleshouldonlybeheldcriminallyliableforconductthatwascriminalatthetimethatitoccurred,sothat,iftheywereinclinedtodoso,theywouldbeabletoascertainwhetheritisprohibited.Thisisnotpossibleinrelationtothecommonlawdutiesdiscernedbythecourtsfromtimetotime;bluntlyput,itinvitesthecourtsto“makeitupastheygoalong”accordingtothecircumstancesoftheindividualcase.WethereforeconsiderthatthebasisofomissionsliabilityinthecriminallawofNewZealandneedstobecomprehensivelyestablishedbystatutoryduties,andconfined to thescopeof thoseduties.Whilewecannot ruleout thepossibilitythat,infuture,theoccasionalcasemayfallonthewrongsideoftheline,thatwillbeamatterforthelegislaturetoaddressfromtimetotime,astheoccasionarises.
Otherproposedchangesarediscussedinotherpartsofthereport,4.18 55whichwillensurethatthescenariosaddressedbyMwaiandLuntwillremainwithinthescopeofthecriminallaw,notwithstandingthechangeinlanguagefrom“legal”to“statutory”duty.Neitherwe,norotherswhomweconsulted,wereabletoidentifyanyotherscenariosbeyondthescopeofoneoftheexistingorproposedstatutorydutiesthatwouldamounttoalacuna.
52 R v Mwai,aboven22,156.
53 R v Lunt, aboven51,687.
54 FranWright“Criminalnuisance:gettingbacktobasics”(2004)21NZULR665,679.
55 SeefurtherthediscussionregardingthedutyinR v Lunt,aboven51inchapter5;andthediscussionregardingR v Mwai,aboven22inchapter2.
46 Law Commiss ion Report
4.19 InR v Myatt,havingnotedthatbreachofanyAct,regulationorbylawconstitutesanunlawfulactformanslaughterpurposes,theCourtofAppealheldthattwofurthermattersneededtobeprovedtoestablishmanslaughterliability.
ThefirstwasthattheAct,regulationorbylawbreachedshouldhavepublic4.20
safetyasitsobjective,oratleastoneofitsobjectives.TherearemyriadoffencesinActs,regulationsandbylaws,andwhilemanyofthesewillhaveapublicsafetycomponent,therearealsomanythatdonot.WhileweagreewiththepropositionthatitwouldbeproblematicifthemerebreachofanyAct,regulationorbylawonitsownwassufficienttogiverisetoliabilitywithoutsomefurtherqualification,wedonotbelieveitisappropriatetorequirethattheAct,regulationorbylawshouldbedirectedtopublicsafety.Itwouldnotachieveclarityinthelaw,itwouldbedifficulttoapplyconsistently,anditwouldhavethepotentialtoundulynarrowthescopeofliabilitybyfocusingonthegeneralnatureoftheoffencethatisbreached,ratherthenatureoftheparticularbreachandwhetherornotitinvolvedadangerousact.
Secondly,accordingtotheCourt in4.21 Myatt, theactthatbreachestheAct,regulationorbylawalsoneedstobe“anactlikelytodoharmtothedeceasedortosomeclassofpersonofwhomhewasone”.56InR v LeetheCourtofAppealappliedthistest,notingthatthiswasadifferentmethodofexpressingtheconceptthattheact inquestionmustbeobjectivelydangerous,aprinciplethatis“wellestablishedinNewZealand”.57Thedegreeoflikelyharmwasunqualified,andhasbeenheldsimplytomean“someharm”.
Inourview,thepertinentquestionshouldbesimplywhetherornottheactis4.22
onethat,inthecircumstances,islikelytoinjureanother.Whilstnotingthatthisdiffersfromthelanguageof“harm”employedbythecourts,wethinkitalmostinevitablethatinreferringto“harm”,“injury”wasinfactwhatwasmeant.58 Ifharminsomebroadersense–forexample,encompassingpsychologicaloremotionalharm,asopposedtoactualbodilyharm–isinfactthecurrenttest,thequestioniswhetherwewouldbeinappropriatelynarrowingthescopeofcriminalliabilitybyreferringinsteadonlytolikelihoodofinjury.Wefindithardtoimagineanycircumstancesfromwhichdeathorinjuryhasresulted,thatcouldarisefromconductconfinedsolelytoalikelihoodofsomedifferentkindofharm;iftherewasanylikelihoodatallofsomeinjury,ourproposedtestwillcontinuetocaptureit.Furthermore,ifthereareanysuchcircumstances,wedoubtwhetherthedeathorinjuryoutcomeissufficientlyforeseeabletorendertheconductculpable.
Our draft places the same precondition on liability for omissions to4.23
performastatutoryduty–thatis,theomissionmust,inthecircumstances,havebeenlikelytoinjure.Giventhenatureofthestatutoryduties,itwouldseemalmostinevitableinmostcasesthatabreachofthemwillbelikelytoinjure.However,intheeventthatitisnot,wecanfindnojustificationforcriminalisingtheomission,whenanunlawfulactwouldnotbecriminalised.
56 R v Myatt, aboven49, followingtheapproachoftheCourtofAppealintheunreportedcaseofR v Faigan.
57 R v Lee,aboven8,para138.
58 This conforms with the statement of Humphries J in R v Larkin [1943] 1 All ER 217, 219,restatedinR v Myatt,aboven49,thattheunlawfulact“isanactlikelytoinjureanotherperson”.
acts and omiss ions L ikeLy to injure
47Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 4
CHAPTER 4: Endanger ing, negl igent in jury, and homicide
4.24 Section160(2)oftheCrimesActdefinesculpablehomicide.Undersection160(2)(c)apersoncanbeliableforculpablehomicideiftheycausedeathbybothanunlawfulactandanomissioncombined.Section160(2)(e)includesthefurthergroundofwilfullyfrighteningachildundertheageof16years,orasickperson.
We recommend the repeal of section 160(2)(c) because we regard it as4.25
unnecessary.Inordertoestablishcriminalliabilityonahomicidecharge,theCrownneedstoestablishthattheallegedunlawfulactoromissiontoperformastatutorydutywasasubstantialandoperatingcauseofdeath.Inalmostallcases,itwillbepossibleandindeedquitestraightforwardtoidentifywhichofthesetwoitis–eitheranactoranomission–inwhichcase,eithersection160(2)(a)or(b)respectivelywillapply.Incasesinwhichanactandanomissionhaveoccurredthatarebothweresubstantialandoperatingcausesofthedeath,itisopentotheprosecutiontolaytwocharges.
Section160(2)(e)waswidelyregardedbythoseweconsultedassomewhat4.26
arbitrary.Whileitistruethat,intheabsenceofsection160(2)(e),suchconductwouldnotbecriminal,wedonottreatitascriminalwhenanoutcomeshortofdeathresults,ifitdoesnototherwiseamounttoanunlawfulactoranomissiontoperformastatutoryduty.Ifdeathdidoccurfromsuchconduct,itwouldbeextremelyunfortunateandregrettable,butnot,wethink,sufficientlyforeseeabletogiverisetomanslaughterliability.Noristhereanyrealriskthat,forexample,thecaregiversofsickpeoplewillelecttotrytofrightenthemtodeathassomesort of informal substitute for euthanasia (this being the only exampleanyonemanagedtosupplyasapotential justification for theprovision).Furthermore,whiletheprovisionclearlyattemptstoprotecttherelativelyvulnerable,itoffersnoprotectionforsomeotherswhoareequallyvulnerable–forexample,veryoldpeoplewhoarenot“sick”,althoughtheymaywellhaveheartsthatareweakerthanthemajorityofpeoplewithanillness.
Whilewedidencounterafewdifferingviews,ourrecommendationthatboth4.27
paragraphs(c)and(e)shouldberepealedwassupportedbyvirtuallyeveryoneweconsulted.
4.28 Newsection157A(unlawfulactsandomissionslikelytocauseinjury)andsection157B(injuringbyunlawfulactoromission)ofourproposeddraftBilladdress,respectively,situationsofendangeringandgrosslynegligentinjury.
Theproposedoffenceinsection157Ainvolvesconductthatislikelytocause4.29
injurybutdoesnotdoso.Althoughtheminimumculpabilitythresholdisgrossnegligence,theworstclassofcasemayinvolveatleastrecklessnessastoinjury.Wethereforeregarditasequivalenttocommonassault,andrecommendthesamemaximumpenaltyof2yearsimprisonment.
Theproposedoffencein157Bisinourviewroughlyanalogouswiththeproposed4.30
offenceofrecklesslycausinginjuryundernewsection189(2).Althoughtheworstclassofcaseundersection157Bwouldinvolveonlygrossnegligence(sincetheothermoreseriouschargeswouldbeavailableforhigherlevelsofculpability),wedonotregardthedistinctionbetweenrecklessnessandgrossnegligenceinthiscontextassufficientlygreattowarrantdifferentmaximumpenalties.Wethereforerecommendthata3-yearmaximumpenaltyinsection189(2)shouldalsoapplytosection157B.
section 160(2)(c) and (e )
maximum penaLties – new sections 157a and 157B
48 Law Commiss ion Report
Chapter 5Ill treatment or neglect of children and other vulnerable victims
5.1 Inlate2008,inresponsetoanumberofhighprofilecasesinvolvingtheworstformsof childneglect andnon-accidental death, theMinisterof JusticeHonSimonPowerinvitedustoexpeditethePart8review,andtohaveparticularregardtotheoffencesaimedattheprotectionofchildrenfromilltreatmentandneglect,andtheadequacyoftheirmaximumpenalties.
Thereare,currently,twoprovisionsonthestatutebookthatestablishoffences5.2
ofchildneglectandilltreatment:section10AoftheSummaryOffencesActandsection195oftheCrimesAct.Therearealsotwoapplicable“duties”provisions(sections151and152oftheCrimesAct).Thedutiesprovisionscontainoffencestoo,59andinaddition,maybeinvokedwhenlayinganyotherchargesthatrefertobreachofalegalorstatutoryduty(eg,ahomicidecharge).60
Weareproposingsignificantreformstothelawsrelatingtochildneglectandill5.3
treatment–andalso,totheneglectandilltreatmentofequallyvulnerableadults(eg,theelderlyorimpaired).Thereisnodefensiblerationale,inourview,fordistinguishingbetweenthetwocategoriesofvictim.
Thechangesweareproposingcanbesummarisedasfollows:5.4
Aredraftedsection195oftheCrimesAct1961(formerlytitled“crueltytoa·child”),addressingilltreatmentandneglectbythosewithcareorchargeofachildorvulnerableadult,withasubstantiallyincreasedmaximumpenaltyof10years.Anewoffenceforthoselivingwithachildorvulnerableadult,offailingto·takereasonablestepstoprotectsuchavictimfromanyknownriskofdeath,seriousinjuryorsexualassault.
59 CrimesAct1961,ss151(2),152(2).
60 CrimesAct1961,s160(2)(b).
introduction
49Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 5
CHAPTER 5: I l l t reatment or neglect of chi ldren and other vulnerable v ict ims
Extendingthescopeofthedutiesprovisionsundersections151and152of·theCrimesAct,byintroducinganadditionalrequirementineachprovisiontotakereasonablestepstoprotectachild(section152)orvulnerableperson(section151)frominjury.
Our views on the child assault provisions are discussed in chapter 3.5.5
Wearerecommendingtherepealofsection194(a),forthereasonsoutlinedinthatchapter.
Inourview,therepealofsection194willhavetheeffectofmakingthelaw5.6
more,notless,robust.Inchildassaultcases,thewholehierarchyofgenerallyapplicableassault,injury,homicideandendangeringprovisionsdiscussedintheotherchaptersofthisadvicewillbeavailabletoprosecutors.
Inaddition,thesection195illtreatmentorneglectoffenceisframedinterms5.7
of“engaginginconduct”and,assuch,doesnotexcludethepossibilityofanilltreatmentchargebeingfoundedonthebasisofanallegedassault.Thisisthecurrentpositionasregardsthelegalscopeofilltreatment,andwedonotproposetochangeit.Section195willhaveasubstantiallyincreasedmaximumpenaltyof10years.
Wearerecommendingthatsection153oftheCrimesActshouldberepealed.5.8
Thatsectionhasneverbeenfullyfitforpurpose.Itwillnolongerbenecessary,inthelightofourotherproposedchanges.
The current law
Section195oftheCrimesActandsection10AoftheSummaryOffences5.9
Actprovide:
195 Cruelty to a child
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years who, having the custody, control, or charge of any child under the age of 16 years, wilfully ill-treats or neglects the child, or wilfully causes or permits the child to be ill-treated, in a manner likely to cause him unnecessary suffering, actual bodily harm, injury to health, or any mental disorder or disability.
10A Ill treatment or wilful neglect of child
Every person is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or to a fine not exceeding $4,000 who,—
Being a paid or unpaid staff member of a residence under the children, (a) young persons, and their families Act 1989, ill-treats or wilfully neglects any child under the age of 17 years who resides in that residence; or
Being a person to whom the care or custody of a child under the age of 17 years (b) has been lawfully entrusted, ill-treats or wilfully neglects that child.
Section10Aisextremelyrarelycharged:inthe10yearsfrom1999to2008,5.10
only30chargeswerelaid.Itsscopeis,essentially,thesameassection195.
iLL treatment or negLect of a chiLd or vuLneraBLe person
50 Law Commiss ion Report
Section195coversawiderangeofconduct.Theterms“ill-treats”and“neglects”5.11
areundefinedintheAct,whichmakesitdifficulttoarticulatethepreciseboundsoftheprovision.Manycaseswheresection195isinissueinvolveviolence,andsometimesquiteseriousinjuringcharges.
Section195issimilartotheequivalentEnglishprovision.5.12 61Inparticular,theexpression“wilfullyill-treatsorneglectsthechild...inamannerlikelyto cause him unnecessary suffering” is common to both provisions.UndertheEnglishstatute,theconceptofilltreatmentexpresslyincludesassault,providedtheassaultislikelytocauseunnecessarysuffering.Illtreatmentmayextendtobullying,orfrightening,oranyothercourseofconductthatislikelytocausethechildunnecessarysuffering.
Section195isgenerallychargedinsituationswherethereisapatternofsuch5.13
behaviouroveraperiodoftime,sothatthereismorethanoneinstanceofilltreatmentorwilfulneglect.However,thisisnotalwaysthecase,anditispossibletochargeasingleinstanceofassaultundersection195.62TheCourtofAppealhasheldthattheparticularformthatilltreatmentorneglecttakesisnotaningredientoftheoffence.ParticularsoftheallegedbehaviourmustbeprovidedbytheCrown.Thejurythenassesses,intheround,whethertheallegedspecificincidentorcourseofconductissufficienttoamountto“illtreatment”or“neglect”.Itisanevaluativeprocess,undertakenbyreferencetothetotalityofevidence.63
TheNewZealandcasesindicatethatawiderangeofbehaviourfallsunder5.14
section195.Examplesofilltreatmentorwilfulneglecthaveincluded:
Scaldingachildinthebathduetoinsufficientsupervision,andwaitingan·unreasonabletimebeforeseekingurgentmedicalattention;64Physicalandmentalabuseincludingexcessiveandmenialdomesticchores,·deprivationoffood,coldbaths,verbalabuse,force-feedingofcoldrottenfoodandhitting;65Hosingchildrendownwithcoldwaterduringwinter;· 66Shakinganinfant,causingbraindamage;· 67Leavingchildrenaloneunsupervisedforseveraldayswithresultinghygiene·andhealthissues(dirtyandsmellyhouse,childrendevelopinginfectedsoresandeczema,childrenwearingthesameunlaunderedclothesformanydays)andsafetyissues(suchasovenleftonbychildren);68
Assaults on children with hands, and implements such as spoons,·belts,vacuumcleanerpipesandsticks,orincitinganotheradulttodosoandwatching;69
61 ChildrenandYoungPersonsAct1933(UK),s1.
62 R v Accused[1994]DCR883.
63 R v Mead[2002]1NZLR594(CA).
64 Morgan v R[2008]BCL712(HC).
65 R v Mead,aboven63.
66 R v T(11May2004)HC,AKCRI-2003-055-1514,para9RandersonJ.
67 Newton v Police(1990)6CRNZ630.
68 Gear v Police 27(2004)TCL12/3HC,paras5–7HeathJ.
69 R v McFarlane (17May2001)CA29/01Doogue J for theCourt;R v Rowland (2001)24TCL11/6;[2001]BCL393(CA)TippingJfortheCourt;R v Moke and Lawrence[1996]1NZLR263(CA)ThomasJfortheCourt.
51Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 5
CHAPTER 5: I l l t reatment or neglect of chi ldren and other vulnerable v ict ims
Neglectingachild’sdaytodaycareandhealthneedsoveraperiodofabout·ayear;thechildwhenfoundwas“inaverycompromisedphysicalstatewithinfestationsofhead lice,unhealthyhairandskin,and living in filthyhouseholdconditions…[she]woredirtyclothing,didnotshowerorbatheregularly,wasleftathomealone,andsleptinsqualidconditions”.70
Our reform proposals – new section 195
Ournewdraftsection195reads:5.15
195 Ill-treatment or neglect of child or vulnerable adult
Every person is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years who, (1) being a person described in subsection (2), intentionally engages in conduct that, or omits to perform any statutory duty the omission of which, is likely to cause unnecessary suffering, injury, adverse effects to health, or any mental disorder or disability to a child or vulnerable adult (the victim), if the conduct engaged in or the omission to perform the statutory duty is a major departure from the standard of care to be expected of a reasonable person.
the persons are—(2)
a person who has actual care or charge of the victim; or(a)
a person who is a staff member of any hospital, institution, or residence where (b) the victim resides.
for the purposes of this section and (3) section 195A,—
a vulnerable adult is a person unable, by reason of detention, age, sickness, (a) mental impairment, or any other cause, to withdraw himself or herself from the care or charge of another person:
a child is a person under the age of 18 years.(b)
Therearesomeaspectsofthecurrentfunctionandpurposeofsection195that5.16
weexplicitlydonotwishtochange:inparticular,thenotionofilltreatmentbeingsufficientlyopen-endedtoaccommodatesomeinstancesofassault;andtheabilityofajurytoassessintheround,havingregardtothetotalityofevidence,whetheracourseofconductconstitutesilltreatmentorneglect.71
Wearerecommendingfourkeychangesthatbroadenthescopeofthiscategory5.17
ofoffending,andsignalitsverygravenature:
extension of scope to vulnerable adults. · Atpresent,section195appliesonlytochildvictims.Weconsiderthatothervulnerablevictimsareentitledtothesamelevelofprotection.Ourproposedsection195hasthereforebeenextended,toapplytobothcategories–vulnerableadults,aswellaschildren.age of child raised, to under 18 years.· Section195currentlyappliestochildrenundertheageof16years.Thisage,inourview,shouldberaisedtounder18years.Wehaverecommendedthisinallofourrevisedoffences.ItisconsistentwithNewZealand’sobligationsundertheUnitedNationsConventionontheRightsoftheChild.an objective gross negligence test. · TheCourtofAppealhasheldthat“wilfully” requires ill treatment to have been inflicted deliberately,
70 R v R[2009]NZCA356.
71 SeefurtherthediscussionofR v Mead, aboven63.
52 Law Commiss ion Report
withaconsciousappreciation that itwas likely tocauseunnecessarysuffering.72Neglect, too,willonlybe regardedas“wilful”where it isdeliberate.73Thesearesubjectivetests:theyrequirethedefendant’sstateofmindtobeproved.Inpractice,thismeansthatignoranceorthoughtlessnessisadefence.Werecommendthatanyreferenceto“wilfully”shouldberemovedfromsection195.Insteadweareproposinga“grossnegligence”test.Thiswouldrequirethejuryonlytobesatisfiedthattheconductallegedwasamajordeparturefromthestandardofcaretobeexpectedofareasonableperson;ignoranceorthoughtlessnesswouldnolongerabsolveadefendantfromliability.Maximum penalty raised from 5 to 10 years. · Thecurrentmaximumpenalty for ill treatment and neglect under section 195 is 5 years’imprisonment.Weconsiderthatthispenaltyneedstobeconsiderablyhighertoreflecttheproperrelativitybetweenitandotheroffences.Weproposeanewmaximumprisontermof10years,sincetheworstclassofcaseundersection195willbeonejustshortofdeath.Furthermore,astheexamplesofilltreatmentandneglectcasesaboveillustrate,thesectionisinvokedinresponsetowhatisoftenextremelyunpleasantandgraveoffending,thatmaywellhaveoccurredoveraconsiderableperiod.Theresultingconsequencesmaywellextendbeyondphysicalinjury,tolongtermpsychologicaltrauma,and/ordevelopmentalissues.Thepenaltyneedstobesufficientlyhightoaddresstheculpabilityofsuchcases.
Wearerecommendinganumberofothermoreminorchanges.5.18
First,any“personwhoisastaffmemberofanyhospital,institution,orresidence5.19
wherethevictimresides”willalsofallwithintheproposedscopeofsection195.Thisislargelyaconsequenceofourproposaltorepealsection10AoftheSummaryOffencesAct,74whichhasasimilarprovisionthatreferstostaffmembersofanyChildYouthandFamilyresidence.Weconsiderthataspecificprovisionofthiskindisnecessary,becausearguablynotallsuchstaffmemberscanbesaidtohave“actualcareorcharge”ofthechildreninresidentialcare.Thepreciselegalstatusofsomestaffmembers(perhapskitchen,cleaningorgroundsstaff,forexample)isunclear.Weconsideritdesirabletoputthematterbeyonddoubt;giventhatthestatehasaspecialrelationshiptothechildrenunderitscare,whoareamongourmostvulnerablechildren,itisimportanttoensurethattheyarecomprehensivelyprotected.Inourview,thepolicyreasonsforensuringthatallChildYouthandFamilystaffmembersaresubjecttosection195logicallyapplyequallytostaffofanyhospital,institutionorresidentialcarefacilityinwhichavulnerablevictimresides–forinstance,elderlypeoplein residential care,peoplewith intellectualdisabilitieswhoare in care,prisoners,orpatientsinhospitals.Ournewsection195(2)(b)isthereforenotexclusivetoChildYouthandFamilyresidencesbutcastinmoregeneralterms.
72 R v Hende[1996]1NZLR153(CA).
73 R v Sheppard[1981]AC394;[1980]3AllER899(HL),appliedinNewZealandbytheCourtofAppealinR v R,aboven70.
74 Seepara5.22below.
53Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 5
CHAPTER 5: I l l t reatment or neglect of chi ldren and other vulnerable v ict ims
Secondly,thelanguagecurrentlyusedinsection195is“illtreatsorneglects”,5.20
whichourproposeddraftsuggestsshouldbeamendedto“engagesinconductoromitstoperformanystatutoryduty”.Asalreadynotedabove,thechangeinlanguagefrom“illtreatment”to“engagesinconduct”isnotintendedtosignalanychangeinapproach;theexplicitintentionisrathertopreservethestatusquo.Thisiswhywehavereferredto“engaginginconduct”incontrasttothe“unlawful act” language employed in other proposed Part 8 provisions;“unlawfulact”inthiscontextmightbeinterpretedasbeingconfinedtoasingleincident.Theproposedreferenceto“omissiontoperformastatutoryduty”will bring within the scope of this offence the extended statutoryduties,75andalsoassistsinmakingitclearonthefaceofthestatutewhatconstitutesneglect.
Finally,werecommendthefollowingminorchangestothedraftinglanguage:5.21
Because“actualbodilyharm”means“injury”asdefinedinsection2ofthe·CrimesAct,werecommendchangingthecurrentreferencefrom“actualbodilyharm”to“injury”.Because of the same definition of “injury”, the current reference to·“injury tohealth”wasconfusingandpotentiallyundesirablynarrow.Werecommendthisshouldinsteadbechangedto“adverseeffectstohealth”.Section195currentlyappliestopersonsin“custody,controlorcharge”;·section10Aappliestothosein“careorcustody”.Inallofourproposednewsections,includingnewsection195,werecommend“actualcareorcharge”,removingtheoutdatedreferencetocustody,whichisnolongerusedbydraftersorthecourts(eg,theFamilyCourt)andmaygiverisetoconfusionaboutintendedscope(eg,whetherlegaloractualcustodyistheconceptthatismeant).76
Again,nochangeinscopeisintendedtofollowfromtheseproposedchanges.5.22
Theintentionistoprovideclarification,andensureconsistencyinterminologywithchangesmade inotherpartsof thedraftBill,whilstpreserving thestatusquo.
Repeal of section 10A of the Summary Offences Act 1981
As noted above, this offence is rarely charged.5.23 77 We have taken care toframesection195inawaythatencompassesthepresentscopeofsection10A,sothatthereisasingleoffencecapableofaddressingthewholerangeofconduct.Werecommendthatsection10Ashouldberepealed.
75 Seeparas5.32–5.48below.
76 We considered that extending the scope of this section to “any person” would be undulybroad–potentiallyencompassingschoolbullying,forexample.
77 Seepara5.10above.
54 Law Commiss ion Report
5.24 Weproposeanewoffenceoffailingtoprotectachildorvulnerableadultfromriskofdeath,seriousinjuryorsexualassault,iftheperpetratorresidesinthesamehouseholdorresidence,hasknowledgeoftherisk,andfailstotakereasonablestepstopreventit.
The offence proposed has been closely modelled on section 5 of the5.25
DomesticViolence,CrimeandVictimsAct2004(UK).ThereisalsoasimilarSouthAustralianprovision.78
Nodutyto intervene insuchcasespresentlyexists. It isasituationthat5.26
fallsbeyond thescopeofanyof theexistingstatutoryduties,and in theabsenceof suchaduty, there isnocriminal liability foromitting toact.Inpractice,thismeansthathouseholdmemberswhoareneitherperpetratorsof,nor(legallyspeaking)partiesto,illtreatmentorneglectcannotbeheldliablefortheirfailuretointervene,nomatterhowoutrageousorhowobvioustheilltreatmentorneglectofthechildmaybe.Wetaketheviewthatthosewholiveincloseproximitytoachild,andareinfrequentcontactwiththechild,haveasufficientlyclosenexustomaketheimpositionofadutyofcareappropriate.
However,wehavedeliberatelychosennottorecommendanewstatutoryduty5.27
forthispurpose.Implicitly,theexistenceoftheoffencedoesofcourseestablishaduty.However,wedonotthinkthatitshouldbeimplementedbywayofanew“duties”provision.79Thatapproachwouldexposethehouseholdmembertopotentialliabilityacrossthewholespectrumofcriminaloffencesthatrefertoastatutoryduty,fromourproposednewendangeringprovisionundernewsection157A,tomanslaughterundersection160(dependingonthecircumstancesoftheindividualcase).Inourview,whilethenatureofaco-habitationrelationshipissuchthatitisproperfortheretobeadegreeofliability,theextentofsuchliabilityneedstobeclearandcircumscribed.
OurproposalisbroaderthantheEnglishoffenceinatleastonekeyrespect:5.28
thatoffenceappliesonlywhenthechildinquestionhasdied.Ourproposedprovisionistriggeredwheneverthereisafailuretorespondtoaknownriskofdeath,seriousinjury,orsexualassault.We,andotherswhomweconsulted,considerthatthiswouldbeconsistentwiththegovernment’spreferredpreventiveapproachtochildabuseandneglect.
Thedraftprovision,asitappearsinclause24oftheBill,isasfollows:5.29
195A Failure to protect child or vulnerable adult from risk of serious harm
Every one is liable to a term of imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years (1) who, being a person described in subsection (2), has frequent contact with a child or vulnerable adult (the victim), and—
knows that the victim is at risk of death, serious injury, or sexual assault as the (a) result of an unlawful act by another person or an omission by another person to perform a statutory duty; and
fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim from that risk.(b)
78 CriminalConsolidationAct1935(SA),s14.
79 Seefurthersections151to157oftheCrimesAct1961.
new offence of faiLure to protect chiLd or vuLneraBLe aduLt
55Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 5
CHAPTER 5: I l l t reatment or neglect of chi ldren and other vulnerable v ict ims
the persons are—(2)
a member of the same household as the victim; or(a)
a person who is a staff member of any hospital, institution, or residence where (b) the victim resides.
A person may not be charged with an offence under this section if he or she was (3) under the age of 18 at the time of the act or omission.
for the purposes of this section,—(4)
a person is to be regarded as a member of a particular household, (a) even if he or she does not live in that household, if that person is so closely connected with the household that it is reasonable, in the circumstances, to regard him or her as a member of the household:
where the victim lives in different households at different times, the same (b) household refers to the household in which the victim was living at the time of the act or omission giving rise to the risk of death or serious injury.
In determining whether a person is so closely connected with a particular household (5) so as to be regarded as a member of that household, regard must be had to the frequency and duration of visits to the household and whether the person had a familial relationship with the victim and any other matters that may be relevant in the circumstances.
Theoffencehasthefollowingkeyelements:5.30
Thevictimmustbeeitherachildundertheageof18years,oraperson·whoisvulnerablebyreasonofdetention,age,sickness,mentalimpairment,oranyotherreason;80
Theoffendermustbeeitheramemberofthesamehouseholdasthevictim,·orastaffmemberofaresidentialfacility,whohasfrequentcontactwiththevictim,andisatleast18yearsold;Theoffendermustknowthatthevictimisatriskofdeath,seriousinjuryor·sexualassault,astheresultofanunlawfulactoranomissiontoperformanystatutoryduty;Theoffendermustfailtotakereasonablestepstoprotectthevictimfromharm;·Theoffendermayberegardedasa“member”ofaparticularhouseholdevenif·heorshedoesnotliveinthehousehold,ifthedefendantis“socloselyconnected”withthehouseholdthatitisreasonabletoregardhimorherasamember;Relevantconsiderationsindeterminingwhethertheoffenderis“soclosely·connected”willincludethefrequencyanddurationofvisitstothehousehold,andfamilialrelationship(ifany)withthechild;“Seriousinjury”willsharethedefinitionalreadyproposedinrelationtothecore·assaultandinjuryprovisions(“grievous”orreallyseriousactualbodilyharm);Themaximumpenaltyproposedforthisoffenceis10years.Thisreflectsthe·factthattheworstclassofcasewillbeoneinwhichthechildhasdied,andthenegligencehasbeentrulygross(eg,theoffenderdeliberatelyclosedhisorhereyestotheconductoveraprolongedperiod).
80 Seepara5.46below.
56 Law Commiss ion Report
Thereareanumberofaspectsoftheproposedprovisionthat,potentially,5.31
maysparkconcernsaboutitsscope.Somepeopleexpressedconcerntousthatitscoveragewouldbetoobroad.Othersthoughtthatinsomewaysitwasarbitrarilynarrow–capturingaflatmate,forexample,butnotaschoolteacherwhosedegreeofknowledgeofandnexuswiththechildmaybesimilarorevengreater.Ourresponsetothisistwofold.First,itisarguablynecessarytodrawalinesomewhere.Weacknowledgethemeritsoftheargumentthatanypersoninrelationtowhomtherequisitedegreeofknowledgeandproximitycanbeprovedshouldbeliable.However,wehavetakentheviewthatthosewholivewithachildhaveadifferentkindofrelationshipandresponsibilitythanotherswithwhomthechildmaycomeintocontact;thehomeshouldbeaplaceofsafety.Secondly,regardingconcernsaboutunduebreadth,wenotethatthereareanumberofways inwhich theelementsof theprovisionoperate toplacesafeguardsaroundthescopeofliability.Itonlyappliestothemostseriouscases,andonlywhentherehasbeenfrequentcontactwiththevictiminadditiontostatusasamemberofthehousehold(orsomeonesufficientlycloselyconnectedwiththehousehold).Butmostimportantly,thejurywillneedtobesatisfiedthattherewasagrosslynegligentfailuretotakereasonablestepstoprotectthevictimfromharm.Whatconstitutes“reasonablesteps”willbeamatterforthejurytodetermine,inthecircumstancesofeachcase.
5.32 Section152imposesadutyonparents,orthoseinplaceofparents,toprovidetheirchildrenundertheageof16yearswith“necessaries”:
152 Duty of parent or guardian to provide necessaries
Every one who as a parent or person in place of a parent is under a legal duty to (1) provide necessaries for any child under the age of 16 years, being a child in his actual custody, is criminally responsible for omitting without lawful excuse to do so, whether the child is helpless or not, if the death of the child is caused, or if his life is endangered or his health permanently injured, by such omission.
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years who, without (2) lawful excuse, neglects the duty specified in this section so that the life of the child is endangered or his health permanently injured by such neglect.
Whilethereisnoauthorityonwhatismeantbytheconceptof“necessaries”,5.33
thereissomebasisforconsideringthatitmaybeasomewhatbroaderconceptthanthe“necessariesoflife”referredtoinsection151.Noteverythingthatisarguably“necessary”tothereasonableraisingofachildmayfallwithinthequitenarrowconceptofthe“necessariesoflife”–thelatterbeingconfinedtothefood,water,medicalcare,andsoonnecessarytosustainlife.
section 152 – duty of parent or guardian
57Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 5
CHAPTER 5: I l l t reatment or neglect of chi ldren and other vulnerable v ict ims
Reform proposals
Broadening the scope of the duty
In5.34 R v Lunt,81inconsideringtheliabilityofextendedfamilymembersonamanslaughtercharge,theCourtofAppealrelieduponacommonlawdutyuponaparentorpersoninlocoparentistotakereasonablestepstoprotecthisorherchildfromtheillegalviolenceofanyotherpersonwheresuchviolenceisforeseenorreasonablyforeseeable.82Inthelightofourrecommendationelsewherethat references to “legal duty” shouldbe changed to “statutoryduty”,83wehaveidentifiedaneedforthiscommonlawdutytobecodified.
Thenewdutywerecommendbuildsupon5.35 Lunt, butisexpressedinmoregeneralterms,asadutyonaparentorpersoninplaceofaparenttotakereasonablestepstoprotecthisorherchildfrominjury.Inotherwords,thescopeofwhatweareproposingisnot,initsexpressterms,confinedto“illegalviolence”.Therealityisthatmanythingslikelytocauseinjurytoachild(ie,actualbodilyharm)willindeedamounttoillegalviolence.However,fromtimetotime,anomission toperforma statutorydutymaygive rise to the samerisk.Suchanomissionwouldbeequallyculpableinourview,inthesensethattherisktothechildisthesame.Ourproposednewdutyisthereforecastintermsthatdonotexcludethepossibilityofcapturingsuchcases.
Wenotethattheadditionalparentaldutytoprotectfromharmthatweare5.36
proposinghassomesimilaritytoananalogousdutyprovisioninQueensland.84
Criminal responsibility and the offence provisions
Ourprincipalconcernhasbeentoensurethat,nomatterhowseriousorminor5.37
theoutcomeofthebreachofastatutoryduty,criminaloffenceprovisionswithappropriatemaximumpenaltiesareavailabletocapturethewholerangeofcases.
Undersection152,criminalresponsibilityisincurredinthecircumstancesset5.38
outin152(1).Section152(2)establishesanoffencetocapturecaseswheretherehasbeenaveryseriousbreachoftheduty,but(perhapsfortuitously)deathhasnotresulted.Incaseswheredeathresults,thedutymayformthebasisforahomicidecharge.85
81 R v Lunt, aboven51.
82 Inthatcase,threeadultswerechargedforthedeathofachild,thedaughterofoneofthethree.TheCrownallegedthatallthreeadultshadaparentalduty,andhadbreachedit,byfailingtoprotectthegirlfromillegalviolence.TheCourtofAppealheldthatwhilethistypeofdutywasnotaddressedbytheCrimesActsections,itexisted,uncodified,atcommonlaw.
83 Seeparas4.15–4.18above.
84 CriminalCodeAct1899(Qld),s286.
85 Seesection160(2)oftheCrimesAct1961.
58 Law Commiss ion Report
Weconsiderthatthecurrentstatutoryschemeisconfusing,andundulylimited5.39
initsscope.Criminalresponsibilityonlyexistsforbreachofthisdutyintheveryworsttypesofcases,becauseoftheitalicisedwordsin152(1),below.
Every one who as a parent or person in place of a parent is under a legal duty to (1) provide necessaries for any child under the age of 16 years, being a child in his actual custody, is criminally responsible for omitting without lawful excuse to do so, whether the child is helpless or not, if the death of the child is caused, or if his life is endangered or his health permanently injured, by such omission.
Theresultinggapinthelawiscapableofbeingaddressed,tosomeextent,5.40
bytheproposedneglectoffencesinthenewsection195oftheCrimesActdiscussedabove.However,thiscreatesundesirableconfusionaboutthescopeandstructureofthestatutoryscheme,andalackoftransparency.Itlooksonthefaceofthesection152dutyasthoughparentswillonlybeliableintheworstcases,wheninfact,thatisnottrue.
Inanyevent,weconsiderthatthecriminalresponsibilityaspectofthese5.41
provisionsisredundant.Thesourceofcriminalliabilityistheoffenceprovisions.Ifthereferencetocriminalresponsibilitylegallyaddsnothing,itshouldnotappearinthedraftingatall.Inourproposedredraftofsection152,thereferencesto“criminalresponsibility”havethereforebeenomitted.
In the light of our other proposed changes to the offence provisions,5.42
wehavethereforeconcludedthattheoffenceprovisionthatcurrentlyappearsinsection152(2)isnolongernecessary.Ourotherproposals, ifadopted,willensurethatoffencesareavailabletocapturethewholerangeofcasesinwhichthedutymightbebreached,fromrelativelyminorendangeringcasesundernewsection157A,tomoreseriousconsequencesforwhichsections157Borsection195mightbeinvoked,throughtocasesofdeathinwhichahomicidechargewouldbeavailable.
Section 152: definition of “child”
Section152currentlyappliestochildrenunder16.Werecommendraising5.43
thisagetounder18years.Defining“child”inthiswayisconsistentwithNewZealand’sobligationsundertheUnitedNationsConventionontheRightsoftheChild.ItistheagewehaverecommendedinalloftheproposednewandrevisedoffencesinthisPartthatrefertochildren.
Section 152: parents already “under a legal duty”
Unlikemostoftheotherdutiesprovisions,section152oftheCrimesAct,5.44
asitiscurrentlydrafted,doesnotitselfimposeaduty.Itappliestoaparentorpersoninplaceofaparentwhoisalready“underalegalduty”.Thesourceofsuchparentaldutyisunclear.Noneoftheauthoritieswereviewedwasabletoidentifyit.Thisisundesirable.Ourproposedredraftaltersthelanguageslightlysothat,consistentwiththeotherdutiesprovisions, itnotonlyrefersto,butalsoestablishes,thedutiesinquestion.
59Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 5
CHAPTER 5: I l l t reatment or neglect of chi ldren and other vulnerable v ict ims
5.45 Section151imposesadutyoncaregivers inchargeofvulnerablepeople,asfollows:
151 Duty to provide the necessaries of life
Every one who has charge of any other person unable, by reason of detention, (1) age, sickness, insanity, or any other cause, to withdraw himself from such charge, and unable to provide himself with the necessaries of life, is (whether such charge is undertaken by him under any contract or is imposed upon him by law or by reason of his unlawful act or otherwise howsoever) under a legal duty to supply that person with the necessaries of life, and is criminally responsible for omitting without lawful excuse to perform such duty if the death of that person is caused, or if his life is endangered or his health permanently injured, by such omission.
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years who, (2) without lawful excuse, neglects the duty specified in this section so that the life of the person under his charge is endangered or his health permanently injured by such neglect.
Wethinkthatthevulnerablepersondefinitionisappropriateanddonot5.46
recommendanychangeinthatrespect.However,thedutyimposedonthoseinchargeofsuchpeopleistoonarrowinourview;itaddressesonlythemostseriouscaseswherelifeisendangered,thereispermanentinjurytohealth,ordeathoccurs,anditrequiresonlyprovisionofthe“necessariesoflife”.Wehavealreadysignalledinourdiscussiononsection195andtheproposednewsection195Athatvulnerableadultsinthechargeofanothershouldgenerallyreceivethesameprotectionaschildren.86Wethereforerecommendthatthedutyinsection152shouldbeextended,toincludeanobligationtotakereasonablestepstoprotectthevulnerablepersonfrominjury,thusaligningitwiththeproposedparentalduty insection151,andanobligation toprovideany“necessaries”,notjustthe“necessariesoflife”.
Someofthosewithwhomweconsulteddoubtedwhetherthisexpansionofthe5.47
dutywasappropriate.Theyarguedthattheobligationsofparentstotheirchildrenshouldbemoreextensivethantheobligationsofotherssuchaspolice,prisonofficersandhospitalorresthomestaff)whoareinchargeofpersonsbyreasonofdetention,age,sickness,mentalimpairment,orothercause.
Inresponse,wenotethatthedutywouldrequireonlyreasonablestepstobe5.48
taken.Moreover,thenatureofthedutywouldvaryaccordinglytothenatureanddegreeofthevulnerability,andliabilityforabreachofthatdutywouldariseonlywhentherehadbeengrossnegligenceasrequiredbysection150A–thatis,amajordeparturefromthestandardofcareexpectedofareasonablepersoninthosecircumstances.Wethinkitappropriatetousethecriminallawtopenaliseconductthatfailstomeetthisfairlylowthreshold.
86 Seepara5.17above.
section 151 – duty of caregivers
60 Law Commiss ion Report
5.49 Section153provides:
153 Duty of employers to provide necessaries
Every one who as employer has contracted to provide necessary food, clothing, (1) or lodging for any servant or apprentice under the age of 16 years is under a legal duty to provide the same, and is criminally responsible for omitting without lawful excuse to perform such duty if the death of that servant or apprentice is caused, or if his life is endangered or his health permanently injured, by such omission.
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years who, (2) without lawful excuse, neglects the duty specified in this section so that the life of the servant or apprentice is endangered or his health permanently injured by such neglect.
The“servantor apprentice” terminology is archaic.While themeaning5.50
of “apprentice” is probably clear, it is debatable whether a “servant”meansanyoneinaconventionalmoderndayemploymentrelationshipbyvirtueofa“contractofservices”,andwhetherthatwouldextendto“contractsforservices”(wherethecontractorisself-employed).
Liability under the section is also circumscribed in two other ways.5.51
First, the employerneeds tohave contracted toprovidenecessary food,clothingandlodgingtotheyoungperson.Thedutydoesnotitselfimposethisobligation;itarisesfromacontractualundertaking,whichpresumablyneedstobeexplicit.Secondly,liabilityonlyattachesintheworstcategoryofcases–thatis,whentherehasbeenafailuretofeed,clotheorhouseachildandthisresultsindeath,dangertolifeorpermanentinjurytohealth.Moreminorformsofharmsuchasmalnutrition,housinginsqualidconditionsorinadequateclothingwillnotestablishabreachoftheduty.
Thereareotherlegislativeprovisionsthatprovidesomeprotectionforchildren5.52
intheworkplace:
TheEducationActprohibitsemployersfromemployingchildrenunderthe·ageof16,duringschoolhoursorwhenitwouldinterferewiththeirschoolattendance;87
TheHealthandSafetyinEmploymentActimposesageneraldutyonall·employerstodowhatisnecessarytoprotectemployeesfromdangeroussituationsintheworkplace;88
TheHealthandSafetyinEmploymentRegulations1995restrictyoungpeople·undertheageof15fromhazardousworkandworkplaces.
However,noneof theseprovisionsdirectly require theprovisionof the5.53
necessariesoflifeinthecircumstancesdescribedinsection153.
Ifsection153wasretained,wewouldwantitexpandedtocoveragreater5.54
rangeofharms.However,wehaveconcludedthatitisnotnecessaryatall,forthreereasons.
87 EducationAct1989,s30.
88 HealthandSafetyinEmploymentAct1992,s6.
section 153 – duty of empLoyers to provide necessaries
61Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
Ch
apt
er 1
Ch
apt
er 2
Ch
apt
er 3
Ch
apt
er 4
Ch
apt
er 5
Ch
apt
er 5
CHAPTER 5: I l l t reatment or neglect of chi ldren and other vulnerable v ict ims
First,asfarasPolice,CrownLaw,theMinistryofJustice,andtheDepartment5.55
of labour are aware, there has never been a section 153 prosecution.Arguably,thiscouldsuggestthattheprovisioniseffectiveasadeterrent.Alternatively,andmoreprobably,itmaytendtoconfirmourviewthatforawholerangeofreasons,thesection153dutyistoolimitedtoserveitspurpose,ifnotobsolete.
Secondly,ourproposedsection151,asredrafted,requiresapersonwhohas5.56
actualcareorchargeofanothervulnerableperson(asdefined)toprovidethe“necessaries”andtotakereasonablestepstoprotectthatpersonfrominjury.Whilethisdoesnotcoverallemploymentrelationships,weareconfidentthat where a contract exists for the provision of certain basic items(as currently requiredunder section153) therewouldbe found tobearelationshipof“careorcharge”;furthermore,arelationshipof“careorcharge”maywellexistevenintheabsenceofacontract,dependingonthecircumstances.Section151 is thusnonarrower than thepresent scopeof section153,and in some respects will be rather broader if our recommendationsareimplemented.89
Finally,ourproposedredraftofsection195iswideenoughtocoverallcasesin5.57
whichanemployerhasenteredintoacontractualarrangementtocareforachildandhasilltreatedorneglectedthechild.
Wethereforerecommendthatsection153berepealed.5.58
89 Thescopeofthedutyisnotlimitedtofood,clothing,orlodging,butmaybemoreextensiveandincludeaccess tomedical care and treatment, appropriate sleepingarrangements, and soon.Ascurrentlyframedsection151(likesection153)onlyattractscriminalliabilityintheworstclassesofcase;however,ourproposeddraftrepealssubsection(2),sothatthedutywouldgiverisetoliabilityinthewholerangeofneglectcases,frommanslaughtertosimplyendangering(anewendangeringoffenceisalsoproposed:seenewsection157A).Thedutytotakereasonablestepstoprotectfromharmisnew.
62 Law Commiss ion Report
Appendices
APPENDIX B: The draft B i l l
Appendix AAltered provisions
crIMEs Act proVIsIons: ActIon:
s 145 – criminal nuisance new s 157A substituted
s 150A – standard of care required for persons under legal duties Amended
s 151 – duty to provide the necessaries of life Amended
s 152 – duty of parent or guardian to provide necessaries Amended
s 153 – duty of employers to provide necessaries repealed
s 155 – duty of persons doing dangerous acts Amended
s 156 – duty of persons in charge of dangerous things Amended
s 157 – duty to avoid omissions dangerous to life Amended
s 160 – culpable homicide Amended
s 163 – killing by influence on the mind Amended
s 188 – Wounding with intent new s 188 substituted
s 189 – Injuring with intent new s 189 substituted
s 190 – Injuring by unlawful act new s 157B substituted
s 191 – Aggravated wounding or injury repealed
s 192 – Aggravated assault subsection (1) repealed
s 193 – Assault with intent to injure new s 189A(1) substituted
s 194 – Assault on a child, or by a male on a female repealed
s 195 – cruelty to a child Amended
s 196 – common assault new s 189A(2) substituted
s 197 – disabling repealed
s 198 – discharging firearm or doing dangerous act with intent repealed
s 199 – Acid throwing repealed
s 200 – poisoning with intent repealed
s 201 – Infecting with disease Amended
s 202 – setting traps Amended
s 202c – Assault with a weapon repealed
s 204 – Impeding rescue Amended
suMMAry offEncEs Act proVIsIon: ActIon:
s 10A – Ill treatment or wilful neglect of child repealed
64 Law Commiss ion Report
Appendix BThe draft Bill
Crimes (Offences Against thePerson) Amendment Bill
1
65Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
APPENDIX B: The draft B i l l
Crimes (Offences Against the Person)Amendment Bill
Crimes (Offences Against thePerson) Amendment Bill
ContentsPage
1 Title 32 Commencement 33 Principal Act amended 3
Part 1Crimes against the person
4 Interpretation 35 Compulsion 36 Force used in executing process or in arrest 47 Preventing escape or rescue 48 Treason 49 Section 145 repealed 410 New section 150A substituted 4
150A Standard of care applicable to persons understatutory duties or performing unlawful acts
4
11 New section 151 substituted 4151 Duty to provide necessaries and protect from
injury5
12 New section 152 substituted 5152 Duty of parent or guardian to provide necessaries
and protect from injury5
13 Section 153 repealed 514 Duty of persons doing dangerous acts 515 Duty of persons in charge of dangerous things 516 Duty to avoid omissions dangerous to life 617 New heading and sections 157A and 157B inserted 6
Unlawful acts or omissions likely to injure157A Unlawful acts and omissions likely to cause injury 6
1
66 Law Commiss ion Report
Crimes (Offences Against the Person)Amendment Bill
157B Injuring by unlawful act or omission 618 Culpable homicide 619 Death must be within a year and a day 720 New section 163 substituted 7
163 Killing by influence on the mind 721 Further definition of murder 722 New sections 188, 189, and 189A substituted 7
188 Causing serious injury 7189 Causing injury 8189A Assault 8
23 Sections 190, 191, 192(1), 193, and 194 repealed 824 New section 195 substituted 8
195 Ill-treatment or neglect of child or vulnerableadult
8
195A Failure to protect child or vulnerable adult fromrisk of serious harm
9
25 Section 196 repealed 1026 New section 197 substituted 10
197 Disabling 1027 Sections 198, 199, and 200 repealed 1028 New sections 201 and 201A substituted 10
201 Infecting with notifiable disease or other notifiablecondition
10
201A Defences to infecting with notifiable disease orother notifiable condition
11
29 New section 202 substituted 11202 Setting traps, etc 11
30 Section 202C repealed 1131 New section 204 substituted 11
204 Impeding rescue 1132 Aggravated burglary 1233 Assault with intent to rob 1234 Threatening to kill or do grievous bodily harm 12
Part 2Miscellaneous
35 Consequential amendments 1236 Transitional provision 12
Schedule 13Consequential amendments
2
67Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
APPENDIX B: The draft B i l l
Crimes (Offences Against the Person)Amendment Bill Part 1 cl 5
The Parliament of New Zealand enacts as follows:
1 TitleThis Act is the Crimes (Offences Against the Person) Amend-ment Act 2009.
2 CommencementThis Act comes into force 6 months after the date on which itreceives the Royal assent.
3 Principal Act amendedThis Act amends the Crimes Act 1961.
Part 1Crimes against the person
4 InterpretationSection 2(1) is amended by inserting the following definitionsin their appropriate alphabetical order:“injury means actual bodily harm and does not include psy-chological or emotional harm“serious has the same meaning that grievous had immediatelybefore the commencement of this Act“statutory duty means a duty imposed by any Act, regulation,rule, or bylaw“unlawful act means a breach of any Act, regulation, rule, orbylaw”.
5 Compulsion(1) Section 24(1) is amended by omitting “grievous bodily harm”
and substituting “serious injury”.(2) Section 24(2) is amended by repealing paragraphs (g) and (h)
and substituting the following paragraphs:“(g) section 188(1) (causing serious injury):“(h) section 189(1) (causing injury):”.
3
68 Law Commiss ion Report
Part 1 cl 6Crimes (Offences Against the Person)
Amendment Bill
6 Force used in executing process or in arrestSection 39 is amended by omitting “grievous bodily harm” andsubstituting “serious injury”.
7 Preventing escape or rescueSection 40(1) is amended by omitting “grievous bodily harm”and substituting “serious injury”.
8 TreasonSection 73(a) is amended by omitting “wounds or doesgrievous bodily harm” and substituting “causes serious in-jury”.
9 Section 145 repealedSection 145 is repealed.
10 New section 150A substitutedSection 150A is repealed and the following section substi-tuted:
“150A Standard of care applicable to persons under statutoryduties or performing unlawful acts
“(1) This section applies in respect of—“(a) the statutory duties specified in any of sections 151, 152,
155, 156, 157, and 195A; and“(b) unlawful acts referred to in sections 157A, 157B, or
160 where the unlawful act relied on requires proof ofnegligence or is a strict or absolute liability offence.
“(2) For the purposes of this Part, a person is criminally respon-sible for omitting to perform a statutory duty, or performingan unlawful act, to which this section applies only if, in thecircumstances, the omission or unlawful act is a major depar-ture from the standard of care expected of a reasonable personto whom that statutory duty applies or who performs that un-lawful act.”
11 New section 151 substitutedSection 151 is repealed and the following section substituted:
4
69Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
APPENDIX B: The draft B i l l
Crimes (Offences Against the Person)Amendment Bill Part 1 cl 15
“151 Duty to provide necessaries and protect from injuryEvery one who has actual care or charge of another personunable, by reason of detention, age, sickness, mental impair-ment, or any other cause, to withdraw himself or herself fromthat care or charge and unable to provide himself or herselfwith necessaries is under a statutory duty—“(a) to provide that person with necessaries; and“(b) to take reasonable steps to protect that person from in-
jury.”
12 New section 152 substitutedSection 152 is repealed and the following section substituted:
“152 Duty of parent or guardian to provide necessaries andprotect from injuryEvery one who is a parent or is a person in place of a parentwho has actual care or charge of a child under the age of 18years is under a statutory duty—“(a) to provide that child with necessaries; and“(b) to take reasonable steps to protect that child from in-
jury.”
13 Section 153 repealedSection 153 is repealed.
14 Duty of persons doing dangerous actsSection 155 is amended by—(a) omitting “legal duty” and substituting “statutory duty”;
and(b) omitting “, and is criminally responsible for the conse-
quences of omitting without lawful excuse to dischargethat duty”.
15 Duty of persons in charge of dangerous thingsSection 156 is amended by—(a) omitting “legal duty” and substituting “statutory duty”;
and
5
70 Law Commiss ion Report
Part 1 cl 16Crimes (Offences Against the Person)
Amendment Bill
(b) omitting “, and is criminally responsible for the conse-quences of omitting without lawful excuse to dischargethat duty”.
16 Duty to avoid omissions dangerous to lifeSection 157 is amended by—(a) omitting “legal duty” and substituting “statutory duty”;
and(b) omitting “, and is criminally responsible for the conse-
quences of omitting without lawful excuse to dischargethat duty”.
17 New heading and sections 157A and 157B insertedThe following heading and sections are inserted after section157:
“Unlawful acts or omissions likely to injure“157A Unlawful acts and omissions likely to cause injury
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding2 years who does any unlawful act or omits to perform anystatutory duty if, in the circumstances, that act or omission islikely to injure another.
“157B Injuring by unlawful act or omissionEvery one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding3 years who—“(a) does any unlawful act or omits to perform any statutory
duty if, in the circumstances, that act or omission islikely to injure another and results in injury to another;or
“(b) causes a person to do an act that results in injury to thatperson by threats of violence, or fear of violence, or bydeception.”
18 Culpable homicideSection 160 is amended by repealing subsection (2) and sub-stituting the following subsection:
“(2) Homicide is culpable when it consists in the killing of anyperson—
6
71Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
APPENDIX B: The draft B i l l
Crimes (Offences Against the Person)Amendment Bill Part 1 cl 22
“(a) by an unlawful act if, in the circumstances, that act islikely to injure another; or
“(b) by an omission to perform any statutory duty if, in thecircumstances, that omission is likely to injure another;or
“(c) by causing that person by threats of violence or fear ofviolence, or by deception, to do an act that causes his orher death.”
19 Death must be within a year and a daySection 162(3) is amended by omitting “legal duty” and sub-stituting “statutory duty”.
20 New section 163 substitutedSection 163 is repealed and the following section substituted:
“163 Killing by influence on the mindNo one is criminally responsible for the killing of another byany influence on the mind alone or for the killing of anotherby any disorder or disease arising from such influence.”
21 Further definition of murderSection 168(1)(a) is amended by omitting “grievous bodilyinjury” and substituting “serious injury”.
22 New sections 188, 189, and 189A substitutedSections 188 and 189 are repealed and the following sectionssubstituted:
“188 Causing serious injury“(1) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
14 years who, with intent to injure any person, causes seriousinjury to any person.
“(2) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding4 years who causes serious injury to any person by assaultingany person or otherwise acting with reckless disregard for thesafety of others.
7
72 Law Commiss ion Report
Part 1 cl 23Crimes (Offences Against the Person)
Amendment Bill
“189 Causing injury“(1) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
10 years who, with intent to injure any person, injures anyperson.
“(2) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceed-ing 3 years who injures any person by assaulting any personor otherwise acting with reckless disregard for the safety ofothers.
“189A Assault“(1) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
5 years who, with intent to injure any person, assaults anyperson.
“(2) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding2 years who assaults any person.”
23 Sections 190, 191, 192(1), 193, and 194 repealedSections 190, 191, 192(1), 193, and 194 are repealed.
24 New section 195 substitutedSection 195 is repealed and the following sections are substi-tuted:
“195 Ill-treatment or neglect of child or vulnerable adult“(1) Every person is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceed-
ing 10 years who, being a person described in subsection
(2), intentionally engages in conduct that, or omits to performany statutory duty the omission of which, is likely to causeunnecessary suffering, injury, adverse effects to health, or anymental disorder or disability to a child or vulnerable adult (thevictim), if the conduct engaged in or the omission to performthe statutory duty is a major departure from the standard ofcare to be expected of a reasonable person.
“(2) The persons are—“(a) a person who has actual care or charge of the victim; or“(b) a person who is a staff member of any hospital, institu-
tion, or residence where the victim resides.“(3) For the purposes of this section and section 195A,—
“(a) a vulnerable adult is a person unable, by reason of de-tention, age, sickness, mental impairment, or any other
8
73Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
APPENDIX B: The draft B i l l
Crimes (Offences Against the Person)Amendment Bill Part 1 cl 24
cause, to withdraw himself or herself from the care orcharge of another person:
“(b) a child is a person under the age of 18 years.
“195A Failure to protect child or vulnerable adult from riskof serious harm
“(1) Every one is liable to a term of imprisonment for a term notexceeding 10 years who, being a person described in subsec-
tion (2), has frequent contact with a child or vulnerable adult(the victim), and—“(a) knows that the victim is at risk of death, serious injury,
or sexual assault as the result of an unlawful act by an-other person or an omission by another person to per-form a statutory duty; and
“(b) fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim fromthat risk.
“(2) The persons are—“(a) a member of the same household as the victim; or“(b) a person who is a staff member of any hospital, institu-
tion, or residence where the victim resides.“(3) A person may not be charged with an offence under this section
if he or she was under the age of 18 at the time of the act oromission.
“(4) For the purposes of this section,—“(a) a person is to be regarded as a member of a particu-
lar household, even if he or she does not live in thathousehold, if that person is so closely connected withthe household that it is reasonable, in the circumstances,to regard him or her as a member of the household:
“(b) where the victim lives in different households at differ-ent times, the same household refers to the householdin which the victim was living at the time of the act oromission giving rise to the risk of death, serious injury,or sexual assault.
“(5) In determining whether a person is so closely connected witha particular household so as to be regarded as a member of thathousehold, regard must be had to the frequency and durationof visits to the household and whether the person had a familial
9
74 Law Commiss ion Report
Part 1 cl 25Crimes (Offences Against the Person)
Amendment Bill
relationship with the victim and any other matters that may berelevant in the circumstances.”
25 Section 196 repealedSection 196 is repealed.
26 New section 197 substitutedSection 197 is repealed and the following section substituted:
“197 DisablingEvery one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding2 years who, with intent to stupefy or render unconscious anyperson, or with reckless disregard for the safety of others, stu-pefies or renders unconscious any person.”
27 Sections 198, 199, and 200 repealedSections 198, 199, and 200 are repealed.
28 New sections 201 and 201A substitutedSection 201 is repealed and the following sections substituted:
“201 Infecting with notifiable disease or other notifiablecondition
“(1) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding14 years who intentionally transmits any disease to any person.
“(2) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding3 years who recklessly transmits a notifiable disease or othernotifiable condition to any person.
“(3) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding2 years who recklessly puts any person at risk of contracting anotifiable disease or other notifiable condition.
“(4) A person does not commit an offence against subsection (2)
or (3) merely by refusing, or failing, to be vaccinated againstthe condition.
“(5) If a person is convicted of an offence against subsection (2)
or (3), the court may, instead of, or in addition to, any othersentence or other order that may be imposed, make a healthrisk order under section 113 of the Public Health Act
2009, and sections 91, 92, 108, 109, 114, 115, 116, 120,
10
75Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
APPENDIX B: The draft B i l l
Crimes (Offences Against the Person)Amendment Bill Part 1 cl 31
124, and 125 of the Public Health Act 2009 apply withany necessary modifications.
“(6) Before imposing a health risk order the court must obtain areport from the Medical Officer of Health on the current healthrisk of the person and the options for managing that risk.
“(7) A notifiable disease or notifiable condition means a condi-tion listed in Schedule 1 of the Public Health Act 2009.
“201A Defences to infecting with notifiable disease or othernotifiable conditionIt is a defence to a charge under section 201(2) or (3) that atthe time that the defendant transmitted or put the other personat risk of contracting the notifiable condition, the other personknew the defendant had the condition and voluntarily acceptedthe risk of contracting the condition.”
29 New section 202 substitutedSection 202 is repealed and the following section substituted:
“202 Setting traps, etcEvery one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding2 years who,—“(a) with intent to injure or with reckless disregard for the
safety of any person, sets or places or causes to be setor placed any trap or device; or
“(b) is in occupation or possession of any place where a trapor device has been set or placed and who knows that thetrap or device is set or placed there and, with intent toinjure or with reckless disregard for the safety of anyperson, permits it to remain in that place.”
30 Section 202C repealedSection 202C is repealed.
31 New section 204 substitutedSection 204 is repealed and the following section substituted:
“204 Impeding rescueEvery one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding2 years who—
11
76 Law Commiss ion Report
Part 1 cl 32Crimes (Offences Against the Person)
Amendment Bill
“(a) does any act that impedes or prevents any person whois saving, or attempting to save, his or her own life oranother personʼs life; and
“(b) does that act with reckless disregard for the safety of theperson whose life is in danger.”
32 Aggravated burglarySection 235(a) is amended by omitting “grievous bodily harm”and substituting “serious injury”.
33 Assault with intent to robSection 236(1)(a) is amended by omitting “grievous bodilyharm” and substituting “serious injury”.
34 Threatening to kill or do grievous bodily harm(1) The heading to section 306 is amended by omitting “grievous
bodily harm” and substituting “serious injury”.(2) Section 306(1) is amended by omitting “grievous bodily
harm” in each place where it appears and substituting in eachcase “serious injury”.
Part 2Miscellaneous
35 Consequential amendmentsThe enactments listed in the Schedule are amended in the man-ner set out in the Schedule.
36 Transitional provision(1) The amendments and repeals made by this Act do not apply to
any offence committed or alleged to have been committed (inwhole or in part) before the commencement of this Act, andthe principal Act, as in force before the commencement of thisAct, continues to apply to any such offence.
(2) Section 414 of the principal Act has effect (with any necessarymodifications) if the date on which the offence was committedcannot be established with sufficient certainty.
12
77Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
APPENDIX B: The draft B i l l
Crimes (Offences Against the Person)Amendment Bill Schedule
Schedule s 35
Consequential amendmentsPart 1
Amendments to principal ActSchedule 2Paragraph (f) of form 4: omit “grievous bodily harm” in each placewhere it appears and substitute in each case “serious harm”.
Part 2Amendments to other enactments
Aviation Crimes Act 1972 (1972 No 137)Paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of act of violence in section2(1): repeal and substitute:
“(a) an assault as described in either of sections 189A and192 of the Crimes Act 1961; or
“(b) any of the crimes specified in sections 157B, 188, 189,197, 198A, 198B, 202, or 209 of the Crimes Act 1961”.
Bail Act 2000 (2000 No 38)Section 7(2): omit “against section 194 of the Crimes Act 1961(which relates to assault on a child, or by a male on a female) or”.Section 7(3)(b) and (c): repeal and substitute:
“(b) section 151 (duty to provide necessaries and protectfrom injury):
“(c) section 152 (duty of parent or guardian to provide nec-essaries and protect from injury):”
Section 7(3)(d): repeal.Section 7(3)(f): repeal and substitute:
“(f) section 157B (injuring by unlawful act or omission):”.Section 10(2)(f) and (g): repeal and substitute:
“(f) section 188 (causing serious injury):“(g) section 189 (causing injury):”
Section 10(2)(h): repeal.
13
78 Law Commiss ion Report
ScheduleCrimes (Offences Against the Person)
Amendment Bill
Part 2—continued
Courts Security Act 1999 (1999 No 115)Paragraph (a)(i) of the definition of specified offence in section 2:repeal and substitute:
“(i) sections 87, 121, 157B, 167 to 177, 188, 189,
189A, 192, 197, 198A, 198B, 202A, 305, or 306of the Crimes Act 1961; or”.
Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons, United Nations andAssociated Personnel, and Hostages) Act 1980 (1980 No 44)Items relating to sections 188 and 189 of the Crimes Act 1961 inSchedule 1: omit and substitute:188 Causing serious injury189 Causing injuryItems relating to sections 191, 198, 199, and 200 of the Crimes Act1961 in Schedule 1: omit.
Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Act 1995 (1995 No 55)Items relating to sections 188(1) and (2) and 189(1) and (2) of theCrimes Act 1961 in Part 1 of the Schedule: omit and substitute:Causing serious injury 188
Causing injury 189
Items relating to sections 191(1) and (2) of the Crimes Act 1961 inPart 1 of the Schedule: omitItem relating to section 201 of the Crimes Act 1961 in Part 1 of theSchedule: omit and substitute:Intentionally transmitting anydisease
201(1)
14
79Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
APPENDIX B: The draft B i l l
Crimes (Offences Against the Person)Amendment Bill Schedule
Part 2—continued
District Courts Act 1947 (1947 No 16)Item relating to section 188 of the Crimes Act 1961 in Part A of Part1 of Schedule 1A: omit and substitute:Section 188 Causing serious injurySection 189 Causing injuryItems relating to sections 191, 198, 199, 200(1) of the Crimes Act1961 in Part A of Part 1 of Schedule 1A: omit and substitute:Section 191§ Aggravated wounding or injurySection 198§ Discharging firearm or doing
dangerous act with intentSection 199§ Acid throwingSection 200(1)§ Poisoning with intentItem relating to section 201 of the Crimes Act 1961 in Part A of Part1 of Schedule 1A: omit and substitute:Section 201(1) Intentionally transmitting any
diseaseInsert in Part A of Part 1 of Schedule 1A after ‡ as it read before20 May 2005:§as it read before the commencement of the Crimes (Offences Against the
Person) Act 2009
Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001(2001 No 49)Item relating to section 194 of the Crimes Act 1961 in Schedule 3:omit.
Land Transport Act 1998 (1998 No 110)Subparagraphs (c)(v) and (vi) of the definition of specified seriousoffence in section 29A(4): repeal and subsitute:
“(v) section 188 (causing serious injury):“(vi) section 189(1) (causing injury):”
Subparagraphs (c)(vii) to (x) of the definition of specified seriousoffence in section 29A(4): repeal.
15
80 Law Commiss ion Report
ScheduleCrimes (Offences Against the Person)
Amendment Bill
Part 2—continuedLand Transport Act 1998 (1998 No 110)—continued
Subparagraph (c)(xi) of the definition of specified serious offence insection 29A(4): repeal and substitute:
“(xi) section 201(1) (intentionally transmitting anydisease):”
Maritime Crimes Act 1999 (1999 No 56)Paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of act of violence in section2: repeal and substitute:
“(a) an assault as described in either of sections 189A and192 of the Crimes Act 1961; or
“(b) any of the crimes specified in sections 157B, 188, 189,197, 198A, 198B, 202, or 209 of the Crimes Act 1961”.
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992 (1992 No 86)Items relating to sections 188(1), (2) and 189(1) and (2) of the CrimesAct 1961 in items 1 and 2 of the Schedule: omit and substitute:188 Causing serious injury189 Causing injuryItems relating to sections 191(1), 191(2), 198, 199, and 200 of theCrimes Act 1961 in items 1 and 2 of the Schedule: omit.Item relating to section 201 of the Crimes Act 1961 in items 1 and 2of the Schedule: omit and substitute:section 201(1) Intentionally transmitting any dis-
ease
Parole Act 2002 (2002 No 10)Paragraph (c) of the definition of specified offence in section 107(9):repeal and substitute:
“(c) an offence against any of sections 171, 173 to 176, 188,189, 198A, 198B, 208 to 210, 234, 235, and 236 of theCrimes Act 1961.”
16
81Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
APPENDIX B: The draft B i l l
Crimes (Offences Against the Person)Amendment Bill Schedule
Part 2—continued
Sentencing Act 2002 (2002 No 9)Section 87(5)(b): repeal and substitute:
“(b) an offence against any of sections 171, 173 to 176, 188,189, 198A, 198B, 208 to 210, 234, 235, and 236 of theCrimes Act 1961.”
Summary Offences Act 1981 (1981 No 113)Section 10A: repeal.Items relating to sections 188(1), 188(2), 189(1), 189(2), 191(1),191(2), 192, 193, 198A, 198B, 199, and 202C of the Crimes Act1961 in Part 1 of Schedule 3: omit and substitute:188 Causing serious injury189 Causing injury189A(1) Assault with intent to injure192 Aggravated assault198A Using any firearm against law en-
forcement officer, etc198B Commission of crime with firearm
Summary Proceedings Act 1957 (1957 No 87)Section 186(c)(i), (ii), and (iii): repeal and substitute:
“(i) section 188 (which relates to causing seriousinjury):
“(ii) section 189 (which relates to causing injury):“(iii) section 189A (which relates to assault):”
17
82 Law Commiss ion Report
ScheduleCrimes (Offences Against the Person)
Amendment Bill
Part 2—continuedSummary Proceedings Act 1957 (1957 No 87)—continued
Item relating to section 145 of the Crimes Act 1961 in Part 1 ofSchedule 1: omit.Item relating to sections 151, 152, and 153 of the Crimes Act 1961in Part 1 of Schedule 1: omit and substitute:151, 152 Neglect to provide necessaries
and protect from injuryPart 1 of Schedule 1: insert after the item relating to section 154 ofthe Crimes Act 1961:157A Unlawful acts and omissions
likely to cause injury157B Injuring by unlawful act or
omissionPart 1 of Schedule 1: insert after the item relating to section 189 ofthe Crimes Act 1961:189A AssaultItems relating to sections 190, 193, and 194 of the Crimes Act 1961in Part 1 of Schedule 1: omit.Item relating to section 195 of the Crimes Act 1961 in Part 1 ofSchedule 1: omit and substitute:195 Ill-treatment or neglect of child
or vulnerable adult195A Failure to protect child or
vulnerable adult from risk ofserious harm
Items relating to sections 196, 200(2), and 202C of the Crimes Act1961 in Part 1 of Schedule 1: omit.
18
83Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
84 Law Commiss ion Report
85Review of Part 8 of the Cr imes Act 1961: Cr imes against the person
This document was printed on Novatech Paper. This is an environmentally friendly stock that originates from sustainable well managed forests. Produced at Nordland Papier paper mill, which holds both FSC and PEFC chain of custody certificates. (Reg. No. SGS-COC-2249) ISO 14001 environmental management systems certified. The mill is registered under the EU Eco-management and Audit Scheme EMAS. (Reg. No.D – 162 – 00007). The paper bleaching process is Elemental Chlorine Free, and Acid Free.
The HIT Pantone inks used in production of this report are vegetable oil based with only 2 percent mineral content, and are created from 100% renewable resources. The wash used with these inks was Bottcherin 6003, which is entirely CFC and Aromatic free.
86 Law Commiss ion Report