Review Article Liquefaction Incidents of Mineral Cargoes on …downloads.hindawi.com/journals/amse/2016/5219474.pdf · 2019-07-30 · Review Article Liquefaction Incidents of Mineral

Review ArticleLiquefaction Incidents of Mineral Cargoes onBoard Bulk Carriers

Michael C Munro and Abbas Mohajerani

School of Engineering Civil Engineering RMIT University Melbourne VIC 3000 Australia

Correspondence should be addressed to Abbas Mohajerani drabbasrmiteduau

Received 31 December 2015 Revised 25 February 2016 Accepted 25 February 2016

Academic Editor Luigi Nicolais

Copyright copy 2016 M C Munro and A Mohajerani This is an open access article distributed under the Creative CommonsAttribution License which permits unrestricted use distribution and reproduction in any medium provided the original work isproperly cited

Liquefaction is a frequently occurring problem taking place when transporting wet granular solid bulk cargoes on board bulkcarriers Liquefaction of a solid bulk cargo can occur when excessive dynamic loading induced by rough seas and vessel vibrationsis transmitted to the cargo From 1988 to 2015 there have been 24 suspected liquefaction incidents reported which resulted in 164casualties and the loss of 18 vessels The objective of this study is to investigate the collective causes of liquefaction of solid bulkcargoes on board bulk carriers in order to make recommendations to prevent future incidents from occurring This was achievedby analysing the seven available investigative reports relating to the incidents focusing on the key findings and exploring the effectof excess moisture within the cargo This study has placed significant emphasis on the importance of preventing ingress of waterinto the cargo during transportation loading and storage Recommendations have been given based on the key findings from thereports to reduce the potential for liquefaction incidents to occur

1 Introduction

Liquefaction is a frequently occurring problem taking placewhen transporting wet granular solid bulk cargoes on boardbulk carriers [1ndash3] Similar to liquefaction of soils duringearthquakes [4ndash7] liquefaction of a solid bulk cargo occurswhen excessive cyclic or dynamic loading induced by roughseas and vessel vibrations is transmitted to the cargo [8] Car-goes that are more likely to undergo liquefaction in the holdsof bulk carriers are those that contain sufficient amounts ofmoisture and fine particles [9ndash12]

Liquefaction in soil mechanics is a term used to describethe behaviour of amaterial that flows in amanner resemblinga liquid when subjected to monotonic cyclic or shockloadingThis behaviour is caused by pore pressures changingwithin thematerial which results in the loss of effective stressand therefore shear strength [6 13 14] Liquefaction does notcease until the loading is reduced causing the shear stressesacting on themass to be as low as the reduced shear resistance[15] Although further investigation is needed some inci-dents attributed to liquefaction may also be more accuratelydescribed as cyclic instability which is a form of unstable

behaviour (strain softening) caused by a succession ofdynamic load cycles [9 16 17]

If liquefaction of a solid bulk cargo occurs it can cause thevessel to list and occasionally capsize [18] During this studyit has been found that from 1988 to 2015 there have been 24suspected liquefaction incidents reported which resulted in164 casualties and the loss of 18 vessels

The International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes Code(IMSBC Code) published by the International MaritimeOrganization (IMO) is an internationally recognized codeof safe practice to be followed when transporting hazardoussolid bulk cargoes on board bulk carriers [19] In 2011 theIMSBC Code formally the Code of Safe Practice for SolidBulk Cargoes (BC Code) was made mandatory under theSOLAS Convention [20] Included in Appendix 2 of theIMSBC Code are test methods to be followed when a cargo isclassified as ldquoGroup Ardquo or liquefiable [19]These test methodsinclude the flow table penetration and ProctorFagerbergtests which are described in detail in related publications [1121 22]The results from these tests provide the shipper with aldquosaferdquo moisture content at which the cargo can be loadedwithout being at risk of liquefying [19]

Hindawi Publishing CorporationAdvances in Materials Science and EngineeringVolume 2016 Article ID 5219474 20 pageshttpdxdoiorg10115520165219474

2 Advances in Materials Science and Engineering

Table 1 Major incidents investigated during this study along with the main vessel and incident details [23 25ndash30]

Casestudy Vessel name IMO

numberaDate ofincident

Casualtiescrew Vessel lost Disembarked Cargo Cargo

(tonnes)

1 Padang Hawk 9109354 26 July 1999 020 No Kouaoua NewCaledonia Nickel ore NA

2 Hui Long 9037032 20 May 2005 023 Yes Sungai PakningIndonesia Fluorspar 5185

3 Jian Fu Star 8106379 27 Oct 2010 1325 Yes Obi Island Indonesia Nickel ore 43000

4 NascoDiamond 9467861 09 Nov 2010 2225 Yes Kolonodale

Indonesia Nickel ore 55150

5 Hong Wei 9230139 3 Dec 2010 1024 Yes KolonodaleIndonesia Nickel ore 40000

6 TransSummer 9615468 14 Aug 2013 021 Yes Subaim Indonesia Nickel ore 54067

7 Bulk Jupiter 9339947 02 Jan 2015 1819 Yes Kuantan Malaysia Bauxite 46400aThe IMO number is a distinctive reference number of a vessel [31]

This ldquosaferdquo moisture content is known as the trans-portable moisture limit (TML) and its inferred definitionis ldquothe maximum gross water content that a liquefiablecargo may contain without being at risk of liquefying whilebeing transported in a bulk carrierrdquo [19] The flow moisturepoint (FMP) is also determined using two of the threemethods stated in the IMSBC Code The TML is 90 ofthe FMP [19] Along with these test methods other policiesand procedures are included to reduce the occurrence ofliquefaction incidents and ensure liquefiable cargoes do notget loaded on a bulk carrier if it exceeds its TML

One final method in the IMSBC Code used to determineif a cargo is potentially liquefiable is the ldquoCanTestrdquo If aMasterhas doubts in regard to the appearance or condition of thematerial a simplified in situ testing method for providing arough idea on the possibility of flowmay be carried out by halffilling a cylindrical vessel of about 1 litre capacity with a sam-ple of the cargo and striking it against a hard surface at least 25times If free moisture appears on the surface of the sampleadditional laboratory tests should be conducted [19 23]

Some other physical properties that influence the lique-faction potential of ldquoGroup Ardquo cargoes are the particle sizevoid ratio degree of saturation hydraulic conductivity andpore airwater pressure characteristics [9ndash11] Additionallysome system variables is the induced cyclic loading drainageconditions and rate of loading The moisture content is con-sidered the major factor regarding the liquefaction potentialof ldquoGroup Ardquo cargoes It is noted that all the test methodsgiven in the IMSBC Code use the moisture content of thecargo as a variable that can be monitored and adjustedaccordingly to prevent cargoes from liquefying Other phys-ical properties of the cargo are not considered changeable toprevent liquefaction of the cargoes [19] This is because themajority of cargoes being transported on bulk carriers areconsidered products and therefore their physical propertiesare more or less unalterable

The objective of this study is to investigate the collectivecauses of liquefaction of solid bulk cargoes on board bulkcarriers in order to make recommendations to prevent futureincidents from occurring This will be achieved by analysing

the available investigative reports relating to the incidentsfocusing on the key findings and exploring the effect of excessmoisture within the cargo

2 Case Studies

In order to make recommendations to prevent future liq-uefaction incidents from occurring investigation reportswill be utilized to summarize seven incidents includingthe conclusions and key findings These seven investigationreports are the only publicly available reports of suspectedliquefaction incidents from 1988 to 2015 The list given inTable 1 shows themajor incidents that are investigated duringthis study along with the main vessel and incident details

It is noted that the terms ldquosea staterdquo and ldquowind forcerdquogiven herein are stated using theDouglas andBeaufort scalesrespectively [24] All the case study summaries and conclu-sions presented in Section 2 have been obtained from theirrespective investigation reports [23 25ndash30] By summarizingand analysing these incidents we hope to determine trends orsimilarities that may be causing these incidents to occur

21 Case Study 1 Padang Hawk Built in 1995 the Singaporeflag PadangHawk (IMO 9109354) is a handymax bulk carrierwith a summer deadweight of 46635 tonnes [32] The vesselwhich has a length of 190m breadth of 31m and summerdraught of 12m has five cargo holds serviced by four on-board cranes [25] At the time of producing this report thePadang Hawk now Panama flag Tong Ji Men is still in activeservice [33] The Padang Hawk along with its hold and tanklayout can be seen in Figures 1 and 2

211 Summary of Incident On 17 July 1999 at 1224 thePadangHawk arrived at the port of KouaouaNewCaledoniaseen in Figure 3 to begin loading a cargo of nickel ore fromshore barges Loading commenced at 1440 andwas completedon 23 July by 2140 Each day during loading soundings weretaken to record if any water was present in the cargo holdsAlthough no bilge water was recorded during these sound-ings the crew noticed that some of crane ldquograbsrdquo of the cargo

Advances in Materials Science and Engineering 3

Figure 1 The Padang Hawk [25]

had water running from them as they were transferred fromthe barges into the cargo holds of the bulk carrier [25]

The Padang Hawk departed Kouaoua at 2307 on 23 Julyon a north-westerly course along the coast of NewCaledoniaAt 1700 on 24 July the ships logbook shows that the bilgesof all cargo holds were pumped dry while the vessel wasrolling heavily in south-easterly swells Just before 2400 onthe same day the PadangHawk altered course north of RecifsdrsquoEntrecasteaux The vessel was rolling and pitching heavilywhen thewindwas noted as being east-south-east and at force5 and the sea was described as rough as the Padang Hawksailed west towards Townsville Australia [25]

At 0900 on 25 July and 0830 on 26 July the bilges inall holds were again pumped The rough conditions causedthe vessel to roll and pitch heavily particularly from 1600onwards on 25 July At noon on 26 July the PadangHawk wasabout 100 nautical miles of Marion Reef as seen in Figure 4During the afternoon the wind strength was logged at force5 with regular notations in the logbook concerning the shiprsquosheavy rolling Throughout the day from time to time seasbroke over the deck and hatch covers By 2000 the wind waslogged at force 6-7 and the vessel was rolling heavilyThe holdbilges were pumped at 2000 and again at 2100 [25]

A little before 2200 the PadangHawk suddenly developeda 15-degree list to port After reducing speed and altering thecourse to bring the wind and sea onto the port quarter crewwere sent to check the hatches and the state of the main deckAfter noting that nothing was out of place the crew openedaccess hatches to each of the holdsThey found that the cargoof nickel ore in all the holds except hold number 5 had settledand shifted to portThe cargo in the first three holds appearedto be semiliquid ldquolike melted ice creamrdquo as one of the crewdescribed it Two images of the nickel ore in hold number 1of the Padang Hawk can be seen in Figure 5 [25]

After using ballast to try to correct the list a message wassent to the AustralianMaritime Safety Authority (AMSA) viathe ships agent in Townsville noting the condition of the shipand actions taken and reporting that the cargo had liquefied[25]

By early morning the list had been reduced to about5 degrees by using the vesselrsquos double bottom ballast tankswhich was recommended by the owners The strong windand heavy swell continued and seas broke regularly over

the vesselrsquos quarter The cargo hold bilges were pumped atregular intervals throughout the day [25]

Due to the consistently rough weather at noon on 27 Julythe Master decided to maintain the course with the windastern This course took the Padang Hawk directly towardsGrafton Passage In the early hours of 28 July the ship wasapproaching Grafton Passage By 0400 it was safely in thecalmer waters inside the Great Barrier Reef and later thatafternoon the vessel anchored off Townsville Once a pilotboarded the Padang Hawk was safely navigated and dockedat Townsville by 1930 [25]

212 Investigation Conclusions Investigations into the inci-dent started immediately after the Padang Hawk arrived atTownsville AustraliaThe following are themain conclusionsfrom the investigation into the incident involving the PadangHawk [25]

(1) The cargo was loaded with excessive moisture con-tent

(2) The vessel was subjected to heavy seas which led tothe cargo changing state from a solid to a viscousliquid in 4 of the 5 holds

(3) Insufficient knowledge of the characteristics of nickelore as a cargo and its propensity to become fluid whenthe moisture content is high and it is subjected tosufficient physical stress

(4) There is no test to specifically ascertain the trans-portable moisture limit (TML) of nickel ore

(5) The ownersagent of the vessel did not include inMasterrsquos voyage instructions the relevant informationpertaining to the cargo moisture content flow testsandMasterrsquos right to refuse to load the cargo under theterms of the agreement between the buyer Queens-land Nickel Pty Ltd (QNPL) and the cargo sellers

(6) The ore seller did not provide the Master with theagreed data pertaining to the cargorsquos moisture contentand flow tests as required by the SOLAS Convention

(7) The Master loaded the nickel ore without insistingon the provision of the data concerning the moisturecontent and flow tests

(8) The mined nickel ore was stockpiled in areas open tothe ingress of rainwater

(9) The agreement between QNPL and the seller did notstipulate a reasonable maximum acceptable mois-ture content based on the nickel orersquos ability to becarried safely by sea

Additionally the flow table test which is used to determinethe TML of coal and ore concentrates [19] was performed onthe cargo of nickel ore after the incident and themoisture con-tent of the cargo was found to exceed the TML determined bythe test [25]

22 Case Study 2 Hui Long Built in 1999 theHongKong flagHui Long (IMO 9037032) was a handysize bulk carrier witha summer deadweight of 16113 tonnes [32]The vessel which


Hold number 5 Hold number 4 Hold number 3 Hold number 2 Hold number 1 FPT

Deep FOT

Deep FOT (P)

(PS)

DOT(PS)

CWT

APT

FWT (P)DWT (S)

DO (S) DO (S) DO (S) DO (S) DO (S)

DO (S)DO (S)DO (S)DO (S)

DO (S)

Number 5 FOTNumber 4 FOT Number 1 BTM WBT (P)Number 2 BTM WBT (P)Number 3 BTM WBT (P)

Number 4 BTM WBT (P)

WBT (P)

FPT

Number 4 TST (P) Number 3 TST (P) Number 2 TST (P) Number 1 TST (P)Number 5 TST (P)

Deep FOT (S)

DOT (S)

CL DR TDWT

APT BTFWT

WOTBTM lost

DOT (P)

Number 5 BTM

Figure 2 Padang Hawk and Jian Fu Star hold and tank layout [23 25]

Figure 3 Port of Kouaoua New Caledonia (source Google Maps)

had a length of 158m and breadth of 23m had four cargoholds serviced by three on-board cranes [29] The Hui Longcan be seen in Figure 6

221 Summary of Incident On 1 May 2005 the Hui Longarrived in Hong Kong from China and was loaded with 5185tonnes of fluorspar in hold number 1 and the lower part ofhold number 3 as seen in the stowage plan in Figure 7 Load-ingwas carried out by grabs from the barges thatweremooredalongside the vessel [29]

According to the weather and crew reports there hadbeen slight showers on the day of loading which did notimpair the loading of the cargo After completion samplesfrom the two holds were taken and a certificate of moisturecontent was issuedThe certificate indicated that themoisturecontent of the fluorspar cargo was at 98The certificate didnot provided the details of the transportable moisture limit(TML) of the fluorspar [29]

The next day the vessel sailed to Singapore to unload acargo of aluminium ingots and steel angle bars where it wasreported that there had been intermittent rain showers duringthe cargo operation and that the crew would close hatchcovers numbers 2 3 and 4 when rainingThe vessel departedSingapore on 11 May for Sei Pakning Indonesia to load

a cargo of wood pulp Again during loading it was reportedthat there had been occasional rain showers and the shiprsquoscrew had to close hatch covers numbers 2 3 and 4 duringthe rain as wood pulp cargo is susceptible to rainwater Afterloading was completed on 14 May the Hui Long departedSei Pakning Indonesia for India loaded with a deadweightof 11244 tonnes including the 5185 tonnes of fluorspar Thevessel was upright and in normal working condition on itsdeparture and it was indicated that the vessel had no majorstructural problems [29]

On 18 May the Hui Long was proceeding off Sumatraon a westerly course The weather was fine with moderatesea and south-westerly wind at force 5 Occasional moderaterolling of vesselmovementwas experienced According to theMaster ship movement was normal and there was no severerolling during the voyage [29]

On 18 May at approximately 1535 the Hui Long suddenlydeveloped a 15-degree list to port The bridge navigatingofficer stated that the vessel was navigating normally with noirregularities and rolledmoderately approximately 10 degreesto both sides before the list After reporting the incident theMaster informed the engineers to upright the vessel by fillingthe starboard double bottom tanksThe crewswere not able toupright the vessel with ballasting due to the severe listing [29]An image of the Hui Long listing severely to port can be seenin Figure 8

At 1602 as the list worsened to 40 degrees to port theMaster decided to abandon the vessel At this time the portdeck edge of the vessel was immersed under the sea A nearbycontainer vessel and themanagement company inChinaweremade aware of the situation [29]

The nearby container vessel successfully rescued allcrewmembers from the water and the life rafts A salvage tugarrived at the scene the following day but the vessel sank 49hours and 43 nautical miles north-east of the initial listingposition There were no casualties reported in the incident[29]


Kouaoua

IncidentPosition

Voyage after incident

GraftonPassage

PalmPassage

IncidentPositionInset

Voyage before incident

Figure 4 Padang Hawkrsquos approximate voyage from Kouaoua New Caledonia to Townsville Australia [25]

Figure 5 Images of the nickel ore in hold number 1 of the Padang Hawk [25]

Figure 6 The Hui Long [29]

222 Investigation Conclusions The following are the mainconclusions from the investigation into the sinking of theHuiLong [29]

(1) The exact cause of the sinking of ldquoHui Longrdquo couldnot be established

(2) After investigating the probable causes of the acci-dent it is believed to be the liquefaction of thefluorspar cargo inside holds numbers 1 and 3 Theflow state of the fluorspar cargomight have caused thevessel to list capsize and sink

(3) The Master appeared to have not followed the com-panyrsquos cargo safety manual for loading a bulk cargothat may liquefy by accepting on board for shipmentof fluorspar cargo with the moisture content higherthan the stipulated 8

(4) The shipper has failed to provide the TML of thefluorspar cargo before the shipment as required bytheMerchant Shipping (Safety) (Carriage of Cargoes)Regulation and the BC Code while a norm of 10TML for bulk fluorspar was used by the shipper with-out documentation support of any laboratory test Assuch it is possible that the fluorspar cargo at moisturecontent of 98 had exceeded the actual TML

(5) The amount of sample taken by the survey firmwould not be sufficient for a proper determination ofmoisture content as far as the BC Code is concerned

23 Case Study 3 Jian Fu Star Built in 1982 the Panama flagJian Fu Star (IMO 8106379) was a handymax bulk carrierwith a deadweight of 45107 tonnes [32] The vessel whichhad a length of 190m breadth of 31m and summer draughtof 11m had five cargo holds serviced by four cranes [23]


Hatch number 4 Hatch number 3 Hatch number 2 Hatch number 1

4685358 MTin bulk

KandlaFluorspar450 MTin bulk

BTN MB102-03Sungai Pakning-Mumbai

948 units1896 tons


Balallpur

Balallpur

607 units1214 tons


Balallpur460 units920 tons

Mumbai EX Singapore

Machinery and pipes

36 PrsquoKGS45312 MT



[ = illegible]

Melanie

BTN MB102-01[]

Sungai Pakning[]

150300

BTN MB102-01

Sungai Pakning-

Mumbai Melanie

100200 MT

Mumbai KandlaFluorspar

Figure 7 Hui Longrsquos cargo stowage plan on departure from Sei Pakning [29]

Figure 8 Hui Long listing severely to port after suspected liquefac-tion of the cargo of Fluorspar [29]

Figure 9 The Jian Fu Star [35]

The Jian Fu Star as seen in 2008 as Elene [34] along with thehold and tank layout can be seen in Figures 9 and 2

231 Summary of Incident On 16 October 2010 at approx-imately 1900 the Jian Fu Star arrived at an Obi Island portin Indonesia one of which can be seen in Figure 10 Loadingcommenced on 17 October at 0200 and was completed on 20October by approximately 1400TheMaster andChief Officernoted that the cargo was dry in appearance and to the touchsimilar to previous loadings condition Due to the visuallydry appearance of the cargo theMaster and Chief Officer didnot carry out any tests to determine its moisture content [23]

Figure 10 Port of Kawassi Obi Island Indonesia (source GoogleMaps)

The stowage plan for the Jian Fu Star for this voyage can beseen in Figure 11

The vessel loaded 23800 tonnes of nickel ore continu-ously depending on the inflow of barges and halting duringperiods of occasional showers After theMaster noted that themoisture content of the nickel ore was less than the shipperrsquosearlier declaration the Jian Fu Star departed Obi IslandIndonesia on the 20 October at approximately 1800 boundfor Lazhou China [23]

During loading there were no reports of damage to thebulk carrier by either the barges or grab cranes The journeyfrom Obi Island to just off Lazhou was uneventful and theweather was reported to be fine with calm sea states On26 October at approximately 1000 as the vessel continuedtowards Lazhou the wind shifted to a strong northerly witha force of 5 to 6 By 1400 the wind had increased to force of 7to 8 and sea conditions worsened causing the vessel to pitchheavily and roll moderately [23]

On 27October at approximately 0700 as the sea remainedrough and swell heavy the vessel listed suddenly 5 degreesto port and did not upright itself Procedures began to tryto upright the vessel by reducing the port and increasing thestarboard tank ballast along with transferring fuel from portto starboard Even after these measures were implementedthe vesselrsquos list increased to 10-degree port [23]


Voy Number 1008 Port Obi portDate Oct 07 2010

Hold 5 Hold 4 Hold 3 Hold 2 Hold 1

Nickel ore9500 MTS

Nickel ore9400 MTS

Nickel ore9500 MTS

Nickel ore9300 MTS

Nickel ore6100 MTS

Cargo type Nickel oreStowage factor 07 M3MTTTL cargo loaded 43800 MTSPort of loading Obi Island portPort of discharge North of China

Sailing draft F1167mA 1203m

Stowage plan

Figure 11 Stowage plan for the Jian Fu Star [23]

At this time the general alarm was raised and the Masternotified the company in charge During this time the vesselrsquoslist had increased dramatically to where the port deck waslevel with the sea Due to the inevitable capsizing of the vessela distress signalwas activated and the abandon ship alarmwassoundedThe vessel sank within a 20-minute period from theinitial list Of the 25 crewmembers on board the Jian Fu Star12 were rescued [23]

232 Investigation Conclusions The following are the mainconclusions from the investigation into the sinking of the JianFu Star [23]

(1) The exact cause of the sinking of Jian Fu Star could notbe establishedwith absolute certainty as the vessel hadcompletely sunk


(3) The cargo was loaded with suspected excessive mois-ture content

(4) The vessel was subjected to heavy seas which led tothe cargo changing state from a solid to a viscousliquid in all of its 5 holds


(6) It is highly believed the accident was a result of liq-uefaction of the nickel ore inside the cargo holds thatcaused the sudden list capsize and sinking of the JianFu Star


(8) The ownersmanager of the vessel did not have clearinstruction on the care and handling of such cargoes

as specified in its Safety Management System espe-cially relating to the procedures in accepting shipperrsquoslaboratory certificate self-basic testing of the cargomoisture content and the procedures inMasterrsquos rightto refuse to load the cargo under the terms of theagreement between the Chinese buyer and the cargosellers

(9) The ore seller did provide the Master with data per-taining to the cargorsquos moisture content and flow testsas required by SOLAS but with respect to accuracyand authenticity of the laboratory data this was verymuch in doubt

(10) The Master and Chief Officer appeared to have notfollowed strictly the IMSBCCodersquos guideline and rec-ommendation of carrying a basic ldquoCan Testrdquo to deter-mine and compared the stated cargo specificationdeclaration supplied by the shipper

(11) The shipper might have failed to provide accuratelythe TML of the nickel ore before the shipment asrequired by the IMSBC Code

24 Case Study 4 Nasco Diamond Built in 2009 the Panamaflag Nasco Diamond (IMO 9467861) was a handymax bulkcarrier with a summer deadweight of 56893 tonnes [32] Thevessel which had a length of 186m breadth of 32m andsummer draught of 13m had five cargo holds serviced byfour on-board cranes [26]TheNascoDiamond can be seen inFigure 12

241 Summary of Incident On 18 October 2010 at 2130 theNasco Diamond arrived at Kolonodale Central SulawesiIndonesia seen in Figure 13 to begin loading a cargo of nickelore from shore barges similar to what is seen in Figure 14Loading operations commenced at 2245 on 19 October Thesame day the flow table test was carried out on a sampleof the cargo that was to be loaded on the Nasco Diamond


Figure 12 The Nasco Diamond [26]

Figure 13 Port of Kolonodale Central Sulawesi Indonesia (sourceGoogle Maps)

The representative sample that was tested was taken two daysprior to 16 October [26]

The results of the test showed that the moisture contentat time of sampling was 3008 with a flowmoisture point of3700 and resulting transportable moisture limit of 3325It was noted that the barges carrying the nickel ore had noprotection from the ldquotime to time pouringrdquo rain during thepassage and loading and that there was no sample taken forthe determination of moisture content after 16 October [26]

During loading the Master was unsatisfied with thecondition of the nickel ore cargo that was being brought tothe vessel by the barges On 2 November a ldquonote of protestrdquowas prepared andwithin stated ldquoWefind the cargo in [the 12thbarge] is very wet and contains plenty of water In view of theabove fact I the Master of the MV lsquoNasco Diamondrsquo regret tosubmit this notice in advance to reject to receive this cargo theship owner is not responsible for any lossrdquo [26] Photographswere taken at this time and can be seen in Figure 15The ldquonoteof protestrdquo was more or less ignored as the cargo was allowedto be loaded being wet [26]

On 4 November at 1230 after the loading of 55150 tonnesof nickel ore was complete the Nasco Diamond departedKolonodale Indonesia The stowage plan can be seen inFigure 16 The vessel was reported to be in normal workingcondition at the time of its departure [26]

The journey was uneventful until 9 November at 1111when the Master reported to his respective supervisor thatthe vessel was listing 3 degrees to port After inspections of allfive holds slurry was observed It was noted that slurry wasobserved in the aft section of hold number 1 in the aft sectionof hold number 4 (approximately 50 to 60 cm depth) and inthe aft section of hold number 5 (approximately 20 to 40 cm

Figure 14 Loading operation at Kolonodale Indonesia similar tothat of the Nasco Diamond and Hong Wei [26]

depth) Holds numbers 2 and 3 were dry with no formationof slurry [26]

At this time the wind was north-easterly with force of 6to 7 the sea was 3 meters in height and the vessel was rollingbetween 0 degrees and 7 degrees on the port sideTheMasterreported that his intent was to use ballast to try to correct thevesselrsquos list but was instructed to wait for further instructions[26]

At 1137 the Master was contacted by his respective super-visor whomhad gathered the companyrsquos emergency responseteam and it was suggested that he adjusted his sailing courseto head windward so as to minimize the rolling of the vesselIt was also suggested he scooped the slurry into oil drums andwith a submersible pump placed in the drum attempted topump the slurry out of the vesselrsquos holds Following that theMaster was also instructed to take the sounding of all the bal-last and oil tanks and to get the assistance of all crew on boardto assist in scooping the slurry except for those on duty [26]

At 1217 the captain reported that the removal of the slurrywas progressing and going well At 1314 the Master reportedthat the submersible pump had been placed in a bamboobasket and was directly pumping the slurry from top of thecargo At this time the Master also reported that the surfaceof the cargo in the respective holds was uneven and all waterfrom the bilges had been drained out [26]

Sometime between 1650 and 1720 after reporting that thevessel was now rolling between 5 degrees port to 2 degreesstarboard the captain reported that the situation is ratherstable From 1817 to 1825 the Master reported that the vesselwas swaying uniformly about 25 degrees and the vessel wasin stable conditionwith the sea state reduced to 2meters [26]

At 2030 the emergency response team called the Masterbut there was no answer From 2030 to 2041 the emergencyresponse team kept calling while also checking the status ofthe vessel using the available satellite tracking At 2230 aftercontinuing calls went unanswered and tracking was lost theemergency response team began search and rescue proce-dures [26]

On 10 November at 0951 the emergency response teamwas notified that a rescue plane located an oil slick on the seasurface and located two life rafts At 2330 they were also noti-fied that three life rafts were located by other rescue planes


Figure 15 Photographs submitted to the head office by theMaster of the condition of the nickel ore cargo at the time of loading at KolonodaleIndonesia [26]


Nickel ore11000 MT

Nickel ore10350 MT

Nickel ore11000 MT

Nickel ore11400 MT

Nickel ore11400 MT

Figure 16 Nasco Diamond stowage plan [26]

The name on the life rafts could not be read at the distancesthey were seen but it was confirmed that they contained nosurvivors On 11 November rescue ships from Taiwan andJapan found and rescued three crewmembers and retrievedtwo dead bodiesThe rescue operations ceased on 13 Novem-ber at 2200 leaving 22 crewmembers deceased or missing[26]

242 Investigation Conclusions The following are the mainconclusions from the investigation into the sinking of theNasco Diamond [26]

(1) The exact cause of the sinking of Nasco Diamondcould not be established

(2) The cargo as presented for loading was not in accor-dance with the Code of Safe Practice for Solid BulkCargoes (IMSBC Code) The cargo was loaded withexcessive moisture content as evident from the dampcargo loaded from the barge and Masterrsquos ldquonote ofprotestrdquo

(3) The IMSBC Code was not adhered to as stated inAppendix 1

(a) Under ldquoCarriagerdquo ldquothe appearance of the sur-face of the cargo shall be checked regularlyduring voyage If free water above the cargoor fluid state of the cargo is observed duringvoyage theMaster shall take appropriate actions

to prevent cargo shifting and potential capsize ofthe ship and give consideration to seeking emer-gency entry into a place of refugerdquo

(b) Under ldquoWeather Precautionsrdquo the moisturecontent of the cargo is more than the TMLduring voyage

(4) There is insufficient knowledge regarding the charac-teristics of nickel ore as a cargo and its propensity tobecome fluid when the moisture content is high andit is subjected to sufficient physical stress The vesselwas subjected to heavy seas which led to the cargochanging state from a solid to a viscous liquid in 3 ofthe 5 holds

(5) On completion of loading there was no sample takento test to specifically ascertain the ldquotransportablemoisture limitrdquo of the nickel oreThe ore seller did notprovide the Master with the agreed data pertaining tothe cargorsquos moisture content and flow tests as requiredby SOLAS and BC Code (IMSBC Code)

(6) No evidence to indicate whether the ownersagentsof the vessel have included in the Masterrsquos voyageinstruction the relevant information pertaining tothe cargo moisture content flow tests and Masterrsquosright to refuse to load the cargo under the terms of theagreement between the cargo buyer and cargo seller

(7) The Master loaded the nickel ore without insistingon the provision of the data concerning the moisture


Figure 17 The Hong Wei (source Silvio Roberto Smera) [37]

content and flow tests of the cargo on board even afterphysically seeing the ore arriving in wetted condition

(8) The mined nickel ore was stockpiled and transportedin ways that allowed the ingress of rainwater

(9) The vesselrsquos stability should have been calculated forthe loaded condition leaving Kolonodale Indonesianand subsequently checked prior to the pumping ofballast into the topside and double bottom tanks tocorrect the list if any

(10) After investigation the probable causes of the acci-dent it is believed to be the liquefaction of the nickelore cargo inside holds numbers 1 4 and 5 The flowstate of the nickel ore cargo might have caused thevessel to list capsize and sink

25 Case Study 5 Hong Wei Built in 2001 the Panama flagHongWei (IMO 9230139) was a handymax bulk carrier witha deadweight of 50149 tonnes [32] The vessel which had alength of 181m breadth of 32m and draught of 12m had fivecargo holds serviced by four on-board cranes [27] The HongWei as seen in 2006 as the Darya Dhyan [36] can be seen inFigure 17

251 Summary of Incident On 6 November 2010 at 1820 theHong Wei arrived at Kolonodale Central Sulawesi Indone-sia seen in Figure 13 to begin loading a cargo of 48900tonnes of nickel ore from shore barges similar to what is seenin Figure 14 [27]

During loading the Chief Engineer recalled that it rainedduring two occasions and the cargo loading operations werestopped during this time Additionally he could not recall ifduring inspections of the cargo by the Chief Officer it wasfound to be in dry conditions or not

On 4 November prior to the arrival of the Hong Wei atKolonodale Indonesia a flow table test was carried out todetermine the transportable moisture limit of the nickel orecargoThe results of the test showed that themoisture contentat time of sampling was 3150 with a flow moisture point of3700 and resulting transportable moisture limit of 3325

Loading operations were completed on 27 Novemberat approximately 1800 and the vessel departed KolonodaleIndonesia for Lanshan China on the 28 November at

Table 2 Cargo distribution of the Hong Wei when departingKolonodale Indonesia [27]

Cargo hold number Quantity of nickelore (tonnes)

1 86002 101003 97004 101005 10400Total 48900

approximately 0600 The cargo distribution of the Hong Weican be seen in Table 2 [27]

The weather at the time of departure was fine with windsof force 3 and slight seas It was reported that from 28November to 2 December the wind force gradually increasedto force 4 The interviewed Bosun reported that every day ataround 1500 to 1600 he usually checked the cargo holds andthat everything seemed normal [27]

On 3 December at approximately 1300 the Chief Engi-neer felt a hard shock and reported that the vessel movedfrom port to starboard heavily until the vessel returned tothe seminormal position At approximately 1305 the captainmade an announcement requesting that the Bosun pumpedport top side tanks numbers 2 3 and 4 to correct the list thatwas reported to be approximately 3 degrees to the starboardside [27]

While lifejackets were being donned crewmembers lefttheir posts and moved towards the upper decks As the cap-tain tried to convince crewmembers to return to their respec-tive places of work the list of the vessel increased to 6 degreesstarboard As the Chief Engineer made his way to the maindeck he saw the vesselrsquos bow deck nearly touching the seasurface and at this time he heard the abandon ship signal [27]

Some of the crew went to port side to try to release thelifeboat but despite the efforts it could not be released due tothe now 20-degree list to the starboard side The Chief Engi-neer lost hold of the railing and went into the sea with mul-tiple crewmembers who were either in life rafts or also in thesea [27]

At approximately 1800 a search and rescue helicopterrescued the Chief Engineer and another crewmember whileanother vessel rescued 12 more 10 crewmembers are stillmissing and presumed dead [27]

252 Investigation Conclusions The following are the mainconclusions from the investigation into the sinking of theHong Wei [27]

(1) Many mines in the regions where these cargoes areavailable to carry are very basic and are situated invery remote locations making it hard for surveyorsand experts to attend themMoreover it is not easy toarrange for cargo samples to be tested independentlydue to the lack of reliable laboratories in such coun-tries


Figure 18 The Trans Summer [30]

(2) The nickel ore is mined from open quarries andstored in open areas where stockpiles are susceptibleto heavy rainfall and high humidity prior to shipmentIn some cases the ore is transported directly from themine to the vessel

(3) The ldquosolar dryingrdquo of stockpiles has limited effect andrarely does more than dry the surface area of the oreNo other processing is involved The ore is typicallyloaded into barges and transhipped to bulk carrierswaiting at anchor Although the cargo presented forshipment may appear to be dry this is not a guide asto whether the cargo is actually safe to carry

(4) Nickel ore is nonhomogenous cargo and particle sizesvary considerablyThis creates problems for laborato-ries when trying to ascertain the flow moisture pointfromwhich the transport moisture limit is calculatedLocal test facilities in these problem areas are not ableto complete the testing required by the new IMSBCCode The required shipping documentation actualmoisture content and transport moisture limit maytherefore be very inaccurate

(5) The nonhomogenous nature of nickel ore means thatcargo loaded in different holds may be inconsistentfrom one hold to the next with respect to the flowmoisture point of cargo in such different holds

(6) In summary the evidence suggest that the direct causeof this accident was the loss of stability as a result ofcargo liquefaction and shift in bad weather

26 Case Study 6 Trans Summer Built in 2012 the HongKong flag Trans Summer (IMO 9615468) was a handymaxbulk carrier with a summer deadweight of 56824 tonnes [32]The vessel which had a length of 190m breadth of 31m andsummer draught of 13m had five cargo holds serviced byfour on-board cranes [30] The Trans Summer can be seen inFigure 18

261 Summary of Incident On 15 July 2013 the TransSummer arrived at Subaim Indonesia seen in Figure 19 tobegin loading a cargo of nickel ore from shore barges Prior toarrival on 10 July a precaution notice was sent to the Masterreminding him to pay particular attention to the possible highmoisture content of the nickel ore cargo Moreover the ldquoCan

Figure 19 Port of Subaim Indonesia (source Google Maps)

Testrdquo should be conducted on each barge so as to satisfyhimself before loading the cargo on board [30]

Loading commenced on 17 July at 1230 after the ChiefOfficer and Chief Engineer inspected the nickel ore mineAlthough theMaster had already received a cargo declarationtogether with a moisture certificate issued by shipper theChiefOfficer andChief Engineer did not verify the conditionsof cargo stockpiles nor were they aware whether the cargostockpiles would be covered by tarpaulins to prevent wettingThe cargo declaration showed that the moisture content attime of sampling was 3387 and had a flow moisture pointof 3866 with a resulting transportable moisture limit of3479 [30]

It was noted that it rained frequently during the loading ofcargo To avoid rainwater wetting the cargo the loading oper-ation was suspended during these times The crew on boardthe vessel closed the cargo hold hatches while the stevedoreson the barges covered the cargo using tarpaulins [30]

A ldquoCan Testrdquo was performed on each barge prior totransfer to the Trans Summer The ldquoCan Testrdquo samples weretaken from approximately 1m below the cargo surface If theldquoCan Testrdquo failed the moisture content was determined andif the moisture content was found to exceed the transportablemoisture limit then the cargo was rejected The results of allthe cargomoisture content tests were recorded and sent to thevessels owner [30]

Subsequently all documents on the vessel including theabove records were lost in the accident The informationregarding the cargo loading sequences was retrieved fromemails exchanged between the Trans Summer and the vesselsowner as seen in Table 3 [30]

As seen inTable 3 on 23 July amoisture content certificatewas received however nobody on board the vessel checkedthe cargo declaration and certificate As a consequence theydid not know the moisture content of cargo loaded into thecargo holds from 24 to 30 July On 30 July the moisturecontent certificate was checked by the crew and it was sent tothe company It showed that the moisture content at time ofsamplingwas 3388 and had a flowmoisture point of 3869and a resulting transportable moisture limit of 3480Table 3 revealed that the vessel accepted cargo on two occa-sions with a moisture content exceeding the transportablemoisture limit [30]

The loading was completed on 6 August with the distri-bution of cargo in the holds shown in Table 4 On 7 August


Table 3 The loading sequence of the Trans Summer [30]

Date Stoppage due torain (hours)

Loaded(tonnes)

ldquoCan Testrdquo(s) Moisture content test Cargo rejected Remarks

1707 1500ndash2400 310 MC certificatereceived

1807 0000ndash03001700ndash1900 4800

1907 1600ndash2100 0 No loading operation2007 1300ndash1630 1283 1 (fail) Rejected one

2107 0030ndash02300800ndash1040 808 1

2207 1430ndash15302255ndash2330 1830

2307 1630ndash17301855ndash1930 1588 1 (fail) Rejected one was

towed back

MC certificatereceived Did not

check2407 1730ndash2140 2204 1

25070210ndash05251820ndash19302100ndash2250

2657 1


5587

2707 2833

2807 6394 1 1 0220ndash0745 stop dueto wet cargo

2907 2213 1

3007 1200ndash2400 1281 1 MC certificatereceived


5549

0108 2115ndash2400 1382 1 1

0208 4896

1 1 (MC 3553 gt TML) No information

At 0907 hourscompany had enquiryof why the cargo wasloaded on board

2 1 (MC 37 gt TML) At 1250 drying in sunfor 4 hours

Rechecked by ldquoCanTestrdquo Cargo was

loaded ob0308 3040 3 10408 1340ndash1800 1809 2 2


1839

0608 Completed loading 2488 2 0010ndash0800 stop dueto wet cargo

Total 26 stoppages 54750 19 7

at approximately 1342 the vessel departed Subaim Indonesiabound for her discharge port in Yangjiang China Everythingwas found normal upon departure with the stability of thevessel intact [30]

During the voyage on 9 August the cargo in holdnumber 4 was inspected and found to be normal No furtherinspectionswere performedOn the same day theMaster wasinformed to monitor a tropical depression developing in the


Table 4 Cargo distribution of the Trans Summer when departingSubaim Indonesia [30]


1 107082 116023 99484 111595 11333Total 54750

Philippines On 10 August the tropical depression developedinto typhoon ldquoUtorrdquo which was predicted to make landfallclose to Trans Summerrsquos discharge port in Yangjiang ChinaTyphoon precautionary measures were then executed by thecrew [30]

On 12 August at 1540 the Master altered course towardsWanshanQuanDao China (about 100miles fromYangjiang)to shelter from the typhoon On 13 August at 2000 afteranchoring 2 nautical miles off the coast easterly windsincreased to force of 8 to 9 and wave height increased toapproximately 5 to 6 meters The rolling and yawing of thevessel at this time were 10 degrees with increasing periods[30]

Early morning on 14 August the wind was continuing atforce 9 blowing in an easterly direction and the vessel wasyawing about 10 degrees and rolling about 7 to 8 degreesAt 0757 the wind was now blowing from the southeast atforce 9 with wave heights about 4 to 6 meters The distanceto typhoon centre was about 120 nautical miles At 1000 thewind force intensified to force 10 with wave heights up to 7meters At 1010 a high wave rushed from the starboard sidecausing the vessel to heel port side more than 20 degreesimmersing the deck edge in waterThe vessel then rolled backand stayed listing about 10 degrees to port The listing to portthen increased to 15 degrees soon afterwards and persisted[30]

Ballast was then used to try to correct the list but it wasmistakenly pumped into the starboard top tanks instead ofthe double bottom tanks causing the vessels centre of gravityto increase At 1030 when the vessel listed to port about 17degrees the second officer transmitted a distress signal underMasterrsquos order and life rafts and the lifeboat were prepared forlaunching The Master announced abandon ship at 1105 thesame day [30] The track of ldquoUtorrdquo on 14 August at 1200 canbe seen in Figure 20

As the vessel listed to port more than 22 degrees theMaster ordered all crewmembers to jump into the sea fromthe stern deck and board the inflated life rafts As rescueoperations commenced the vessel listed to port more than90 degrees and subsequently sank on 14 August at 1156 Viewsfrom a rescue helicopter can be seen in Figures 21 and 22Thevessel had dredged the anchor more than half a nautical milenorth-west from its original position

Fortunately helicopters and vessels sent to the location ofthe Trans Summer rescued all crewmembers but the deck logalong with other statutory documents was lost at sea [30]

262 Investigation Conclusions The following are the mainconclusions from the investigation into the sinking of theTrans Summer [30]

(1) The requirements of IMSBC Code for the cargo ofnickel ore under groups A and B were not strictlyfollowed The cargo was loaded despite the moisturecontent which exceeded the transportable moisturelimit of 348

(2) The safety shipboard procedures for loading andcarriage of nickel ore were not followed The relevantprocedures were as follows

(a) The procedure for handling of cargo(b) The instruction of handling of bulk cargo which

may liquefy(c) The requirement of cargo care at sea(d) The instruction for preventing strong wind(e) The voyage instruction

(3) Liquefaction of cargo inside cargo holds while theanchored vessel experienced rolling at the anchoragecompounded by worsening weather and sea condi-tion due to approaching of typhoon and mistakenlypumping water into ballast tank

(4) Masterrsquos assessment to select the shelter for the vesselto anchor was not appropriate The place selected bytheMaster could shelter thewind from the north onlyThe vessel could not shelter from the south-easterlystrong wind and waves when the typhoon ldquoUtorrdquo waspassing the south of the vessel

(5) The moisture content certificate was issued by theshipper instead of local administration or indepen-dent organization (or authorized organization)

(6) The crewwas not trained and therefore not competentto carry out Oven Drying Testing on board to verifythe moisture content of the cargo before loading

27 Case Study 7 Bulk Jupiter Built in 2006 the Bahama flagBulk Jupiter (IMO 9339947) was a handymax bulk carrierwith a summer deadweight of 56009 tonnes [32] The vesselwhich had a length of 190m breadth of 32m and draught of13m had five cargo holds serviced by four on-board cranes[28] The Bulk Jupiter can be seen in Figure 23

271 Summary of Incident On 12 December 2014 the BulkJupiter arrived at the Port of Kuantan Malaysia seen inFigure 24 to begin loading a cargo of bauxite from a berthThe cargo loading operations were delayed due to heavy andprolonged rainfall until 17 December at 2100 at which pointloading of holds numbers 1 3 4 and 5 commenced Loadingof hold number 2 commenced on 18 December [28]

The east coast of Malaysia had endured record-breakingrainfall over the month of December recording the highestmonthly rainfall in the history of Kuantan at 18064mm overa 22-day period as seen in Figure 25 The loading operationscontinued for an extended period of time due to heavy rain


1500Z

1412Z

Yangjiang

1400Z

1300Z

1312Z

1112Z1200Z

1212Z

Trans Summer

Hainan Dao

Hanoi

Figure 20 Track of ldquoUtorrdquo on 14 August at 1200 (predicted track in red) [30]

Figure 21 View from rescue helicopter as the Trans Summer listed45 degrees to port [30]


Figure 23 The Bulk Jupiter [28]

Figure 24 Port of Kuantan Malaysia (source Google Maps)

and technical delays During periods of rain vessels generallyclose their hatch covers to prevent anymoisture fromenteringcargo holds and maintain the cargo in a dry conditionHowever any cargo left on the quayside is left uncovered andtherefore exposed to the elements It is very likely that themoisture content of the bauxite increased during this time[28]

Loading of Bauxite onto bulk carriers at the Port ofKuantan is achieved using the on-board cranes as seen in


0306090

120150180210240270300

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31

Rain

fall

amou

nt (m

m)

Days

Figure 25 December rainfall at the Port of Kuantan Malaysia [28]

Figure 26 The bauxite is transported to the port on loadtrucks where they either store the cargo in stockpiles or stor-age facilities or transport the bauxite directly to the quaysideNoted in the investigation was that during transport andstorage the bauxite is generally not covered to protect it fromrain [28]

There are a number of mines dotted around the Port ofKuantan with varying sizes of operations It was also notedthat there was also no covered storage facility at these mineswhich affords any protection from the rain or surface waterrunoff [28] At the time of loading there was no transportablemoisture limit test performed on the bauxite as in the IMSBCCode under the individual schedule for bauxite it did notstate the cargo was potentially liquefiable [19]

On 30 December at 2124 the Bulk Jupiter left KuantanMalaysia bound for Qingdao China with 46400 tonnesof bauxite on board and stability intact After clearing thebreakwater the vessel was observed to be rolling about 2 to3 degrees in low swell The pilot did not note any abnormalbehaviour in the way the vessel handled while she was beingpulled off the berth or while being manoeuvred through theport and channel [28]

On 31 December part way into the voyage the weatherdeteriorated Wind was forecast north-east at a force of 6 to7 wind speed 24 to 34 knots and sea state from 4 to 6 andwith an averagewave height of 22mOn 1 January theMasterreceived a weather forecast that included alternate waypointsfor the vessel to travel to reduce the exposure to gale forcewinds and waves between 25 to 4m from a tropical storm inthe north east [28]The route of the Bulk Jupiter and locationthe bulk carrier lost can be seen in Figure 27

On 2 January 2015 at approximately 0600 the Chief Cookawoke and noted the weather was starting to deteriorate andthe vessel was rolling more heavily than the previous day Atapproximately 0640 the general alarmwas sounded followedby an announcement by the Master directing all crew toproceed to the bridge The Chief Cook made his way tothe bridge but was told by fellow crewmembers to insteadproceed to the port side lifeboat [28]

At 0654 a distress signal was sent out by the Bulk Jupiterwhich initiated search and rescue operations As the ChiefCook returned to his cabin to collect some belongings he feltthe vessel suddenly start to roll more heavily particularly tostarboard As he left his cabin the vessel suffered a blackoutand emergency lights illuminated The vessel then stopped

rolling and adopted a 45-degree list to the starboard sideAfter meeting the Master they both abandoned the vessel onthe starboard side [28]

The Bulk Jupiter was founded southeast of Vietnambetween the time of the distress signal and 0700 As the searchfor survivors continued throughout the day at 1556 the ChiefCook was recovered Search and rescue operations ceased onthe 06 January The Chief Cook was the only survivor of the19 crewmembers on board [28]

Bauxite cargo in the hold of another bulk carrier theOrchid Island which left the Port of Kuantan on 1 January2015 shortly after the Bulk Jupiter can be seen in Figure 28This cargo of bauxite was suspected to have liquefied duringthe voyage Note the extensive ldquosplatterrdquo on the sides of thecargo hold An additional photo seen in Figure 29 takenfrom the Medi Okinawa shows bauxite on the quaysideopen to the elements The Medi Okinawa arrived at Kuantanshortly before the Bulk Jupiter but sailed on 21 January 2015after discharging the cargo of bauxite that was loaded becausethe cargo failed to meet the description contained in thedeclaration provided [28]

272 Investigation Conclusions The following are the mainconclusions from the investigation into the sinking of theBulk Jupiter [28]

(1) There is significant documentary evidence to identifythat the 46400 t of bauxite loaded over the course ofthe 13-day period had an average moisture content of213 Despite this there is no physical evidence toconfirm what caused the vessel to adopt an unrecov-erable list to starboard and subsequent capsize

(2) It was found that the cargo declarations were con-sidered generic including the declared 10 moisturecontent of the cargo This was found when compar-isons weremade between the Bulk Jupiterrsquos cargo dec-laration and declarations of the bulk carriers OrchidIsland and Medi Okinawa

(3) Communications between the Master and the com-pany ship manager indicated the Master had a lackof understanding of the practical method for deter-mining excessive moisture content of a bulk cargospecifically the ldquoCan Testrdquo

(4) In total 18655 hours of loadingwas lost due to rainfallthe equivalent of 7 days of loading over the periodThe infrastructure available to adequately store andtransport bauxite in Kuantan increased the exposureof the bauxite to the elements Despite the crewrsquos dili-gent response to the rain by continually opening andclosing the hatch covers to reduce the ingress of waterthe cargo remained exposed while on the quayside instockpiles and in the trucks

(5) An independent inspection was not requested by theMaster to verify the properties of the cargo prior toloading on board Considering the extreme weatherconditions and storage facilities available it wasacknowledged that the cargo was very wet and that


Figure 26 Cargo being loaded onto a bulk carrier from the quayside at the Port of Kuantan Malaysia [28]

Date Time (UTC) Lat N Long E Av spd last6 hours (kts)

Distance

30 Dec 14 1200 Departing Kuantan1434 03 591 103 400 24 1472034 04 187 104 359 99 592

31 Dec 14 234 04 337 105 378 106 637834 05 024 106 231 89 536

1434 05 593 106 459 102 6132034 06 549 107 084 100 600

1 Jan 15 234 07 389 107 385 89 533834 08 156 108 098 80 481

1434 08 340 108 395 63 3772034 08 546 109 049 49 296

Sank 2254 09 010 109 155 54 127

Figure 27 Route of the Bulk Jupiter and location lost [28] (source Google Maps)

measures to protect the cargo on shore from furtherrain were not effective in preventing further wettingThe absence of an independent inspection resulted inthe cargo being loaded without its physical proper-ties and moisture content being verified against theparameters of the IMSBC Code schedule or the cargodeclaration form

(6) Every 48 hours a report should be generated and pro-vided to the Charterers if any water had been drainedfrom the bilges during the transit in accordance withthe Charterers Voyage Instructions No correspon-dence has been received from the Charterers andtherefore it cannot be determined whether the cargowas draining free water andor whether anyone on


Figure 28 View of bauxite cargo in hold number 4 of the Orchid Island after voyage from Kuantan Malaysia to Qingdao China [28]

Figure 29 Bauxite cargo quayside exposed to the elements Phototaken from the Medi Okinawa at Port of Kuantan Malaysia [28]

board was aware and was taking action to dischargeany water accumulating in the hold bilges

(7) The previous class and special survey inspectionsindicate no structural integrity failures the vessel hadfulfilled diligently all prior certification conformityrequirements and as such the likelihood of a catas-trophic structural failure is considered low

(8) Having presumed that the probability of structuralfailure is low as a singular causal event it can be con-cluded that either liquefaction or a free surface effectinduced an unrecoverable list When considering theconditions in the order that they occurred there canonly be very few circumstances that cause a vessel tocapsize so quickly with minimal warning Due to thereliability of the information provided on the cargodeclaration in particular the composition of cargoit has been determined that the probability of lique-faction occurring is considered high A further causalevent for which it would only occur if the cargo is suf-ficiently compacted is a free surface effect generatedon top of the cargo Notwithstanding this if the cargohad liquefied a free surface effect will also occurwith similar catastrophic effect Another related phe-nomenon associated with both liquefaction and freesurface effect occurs when the cargo slides to one sideof the vessel and fails to return to where it came fromThis particular effect would be inevitable once the

angle of heel is greater than the angle of repose of thecargo if untrimmed or if the cohesion between theparticles of the cargo is insufficient when an angle ofheel is induced

3 Discussion and Recommendations

As discussed in Section 1 there are many factors that influ-ence the liquefaction potential of cargoes Although this is thecase themoisture content is one that can change significantlyduring extraction storage and transportation It can changesignificantly based on the implemented procedures and theactions of the people involved in these processes Despite thefact that some reports indicate that excessmoisturewithin thecargo is only assumed to have been the cause of the incidentwe will assume that in all cases excess moisture within thecargo was the cause of the incident

Determining if a cargo is safe to transport is relativelysimple if the correct sampling and testing techniques areimplemented The importance of sampling is commonlyoverlooked but is the most imperative aspect of any labora-tory testing [38] If the sample does not represent the cargobeing transported then the results will be misleading Thereare many techniques for sampling stockpiles depending onthe type of material and standards being followed (ie ironore [39]) Section 46 of the IMSBC Code outlines samplingprocedures that are to be followed when sampling stockpilesconsigned to vessels [19] It is recommended these samplingtechniques be used when determining the moisture contentand transportable moisture limit of a cargo

Once a representative sample of the cargo has beenobtained prior to the arrival of a vessel it is recommendedto determine both the average moisture content and trans-portable moisture limit of the stockpile For bauxite andnickel ore there are no test methods specifically designed todetermine the transportable moisture limit Until such a testis developed it is recommended to utilize either the penetra-tion test or flow table test stated in Appendix 2 of the IMSBCCode [19] These tests are recommended as they measure thedirect liquefaction potential with visual observations [11 21]Like iron ore fines and coal it is recommended that a testbe developed that is specifically designed for determining thetransportable moisture limit of bauxite and nickel ore and theIMSBC Code specify mandatory testing of all variations ofthese cargoes [40ndash44]


From the reports it is clear that the ingress of water intothe cargo is a major problem during transportation storageand loading prior to a vessels departure from port It iscommonly reported that trucks and barges are not equippedwith tarpaulins to protect the cargo from rain Additionallystockpiles at the mines and quayside also lack this essentialequipment Cargoes such as nickel ore and bauxite cancontain a significant amount of fine particles [45 46] Thisproperty can also increase the cargoesrsquo hygroscopic proper-ties [47] Protective equipment should be easily accessible andreadily available for use when rain is forecast Masters shouldinsist on checking if this protective equipment is available asif this equipment is unavailable it can be an indication of poorpractices at the site and therefore the Master should be extravigilant

ldquoSolar dryingrdquo of stockpiles of cargo is an ineffectivemethod for rapidly reducing the moisture content Themethod merely dries the surface of the stockpile leaving thecore of the stockpile unaffected [48 49] If ldquosolar dryingrdquo isto be carried out it is recommended that the cargo be evenlyspread on a pad and frequently turned over using a bulldozeror excavator to increase the rate of evaporation and distri-bution of desiccation Drying or dewatering a cargo can takesome time to accomplish therefore prior to arrival of a vesselit is recommended that the moisture content of the cargo isdetermined and compared with the transportable moisturelimit in order to decide if drying is needed

Moisture content testing is inexpensive when comparedto the cost that will be incurred if a vessel is lost due to acargo liquefying or shifting After the arrival of a vessel priorto loading the exact moisture content of the cargo shouldbe known Section 45 of the IMSBC Code states that theinterval between moisture content sampling should not bemore than seven days prior to loading [19]This statement canbe misleading as the moisture content of a cargo can changesignificantlywithin seven days If rainfall has occurred duringthis time or the air humidity has been high it is highly recom-mended that a few hours prior to loading additional moisturecontent tests be performed for confirmation

It is recommended that an accredited independent testinglaboratory is available to perform the required moisturecontent and transportable moisture limit testing These lab-oratories may be located at the mine or port and be under thesupervision of the International Maritime Organization andfunded by the export company After testing if the Mastersuspects that a cargo may contain a moisture content thatexceeds the transportable moisture limit then it is recom-mended that a ldquoCan Testrdquo is also performed on the cargo

The ldquoCanTestrdquo is an in situ complementary test procedurefor determining the liquefaction potential of a cargo given inthe IMSBC Code [19] The ldquoCan Testrdquo provides an estimateon whether the cargo may exceed the transportable moisturelimit Masters should be familiar with the ldquoCan Testrdquo andmoisture content test if they are frequently transportingpotentially liquefiable cargoes The ldquoCan Testrdquo is usually thelast line of defense for preventing cargoes exceeding thetransportable moisture limit being loaded onto a bulk carrierFailure of this test indicates the cargo is not safe to transportand should be rejected unless it is proven that the cargo has

a moisture content less than the transportable moisture limitEven then extra precautions should be taken and the validityof the transportable moisture limit test should be questioned

Once a cargo is loaded onto a bulk carrier it is still sus-ceptible to the ingress ofmoisture During loading it is highlyrecommended that when rain is forecast all cargo holds beclosed The ingress of water into the holds can sometimesbe removed by bilge pumps but due to some cargoes abilityto retain moisture it can be preserved within and migrateout during transportation

During transportation dynamic loading caused by theocean waves and vessel vibrations can cause a cargo todensify Dynamic loading can reduce the voids of a cargo andin turn this increases the degree of saturation and induceschanges in the pore pressures within the material A cargothat is highly saturated may be at risk of liquefying andshiftingwithin the hold of a bulk carrier [50] InAppendix 1 ofthe IMSBC Code it is recommended that cargoes be checkedregularly to make sure that there are no changes in the stateof the material The IMSBC Code states ldquoThe appearance ofthe surface of the cargo shall be checked regularly during avoyage If free water above the cargo or fluid state of the cargois observed during a voyage the Master shall take appropriateactions to prevent cargo shifting and potential capsize of theship and give consideration to seeking emergency entry into aplace of refugerdquo [19]

As the degree of saturation of a cargo increases so doesthe degree to which it can densify Densification may causeexcess moisture to migrate to the surface It has been proventhat this process occurs graduallywith the speed related to themagnitude and time of dynamic loading It is recommendedthat regular check on the cargo be made with frequentlyincreasing checks being performed if the vessel experiencesrough sea states

4 Conclusion

The objective of this study was to investigate the collectivecauses of liquefaction of solid bulk cargoes on board bulkcarriers in order to make recommendations to prevent futureincidents from occurring This was achieved by analysingthe available investigative reports relating to the incidentsfocusing on the key findings and exploring the effect ofexcessmoisturewithin the cargoThis study placed significantemphasis on the importance of preventing ingress of waterinto the cargo during transportation loading and storage

Although the International Maritime Solid Bulk CargoesCode (IMSBCCode) was implemented on amandatory basisfrom January 2011 incidents involving liquefaction ofmineralbulk cargoes continue to occur

The findings of this study indicate that liquefaction inci-dents on board bulk carriers are caused by a combination ofbelow par procedural implementation along with insufficientknowledge about liquefaction of cargoes and the possibleconsequences of transporting themwith a highmoisture con-tent Sampling and testing techniques thatmay not bemanda-tory are necessary in order to reduce liquefaction incidentsfrom occurring


Many mines where bauxite and nickel ore are beingextracted are very basic and situated in remote locationsThis makes it hard for surveyors and experts to attend themHence it is not easy to arrange for cargo samples to be testedindependently due to the lack of reliable laboratories in theseremote areas Due to this the responsibly falls back ontothe individual mine operators the port authority and theMaster of the vessel to make sure that the test results are validand representative of the cargo as well as that all necessaryprecautions are taken to reduce the potential for the cargo toliquefy

Although it is not mandatory to determine the trans-portable moisture limit of certain bauxite and nickel ore car-goes it is highly recommended to do so as incidents are con-tinuing to occurwhen transporting these cargoes on bulk car-riers Additionally although a cargo may appear dry it couldcontain excessive moisture and become saturated underdynamic loading It is essential that the moisture content ofa cargo is kept low to reduce the risk of liquefaction or cargoshift and that further research is performed to determinethe physical properties and system variables that increase theliquefaction potential of these cargoes

Abbreviations

FMP Flow moisture pointIMO International Maritime OrganizationIMSBC Code International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes

Code (formally the Code of Safe Practice forSolid Bulk Cargoes (BC Code))

TML Transportable moisture limit

Competing Interests

The authors declare that they have no competing interests

Acknowledgments

The results presented in this publication are from an ongoingstudy at RMIT University in Melbourne Australia on theliquefaction potential of mineral cargoes on board bulkcarriers

References

[1] L A van Paassen P J Vardon A Mulder G van de Wegand P Jeffrey ldquoInvestigating the susceptibility of iron ore toliquefactionrdquo in Proceedings of the Fifth Biot Conference onPoromechanics (Poromechanics V rsquo13) pp 1478ndash1487 ViennaAustria July 2013

[2] Y Zou C Shen and X Xi ldquoNumerical simulations on the cap-sizing of bulk carriers with nickel oresrdquo Journal of Navigationvol 66 no 6 pp 919ndash930 2013

[3] D Cabai ldquoDealing with dry cargo liquefactionrdquoNaval Architectpp 16ndash18 2011

[4] K Ishihara ldquoStability of natural deposits during Earthquakesrdquoin Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on SoilMechanics and Foundation Engineering pp 321ndash376 San Fran-cisco Calif USA 1985

[5] K Ishihara ldquoLiquefaction and flow failure during earthquakesrdquoGeotechnique vol 43 no 3 pp 351ndash415 1993

[6] H B Seed and I M Idriss ldquoSimplified procedure for evaluatingsoil liquefaction potentialrdquo Journal of the Soil Mechanics andFoundations Division vol 97 no 9 pp 1249ndash1273 1971

[7] H B Seed and I M Idriss Ground Motions and Soil Liq-uefaction during Earthquakes Monograph Series EarthquakeEngineering Research Institute 1982

[8] B Fagerberg and A Stavang ldquoDetermination of critical mois-ture contents in ore concentrates carried in cargo vesselsrdquoMinerals Transportation pp 174ndash191 1971

[9] M M Rahman M A L Baki and S R Lo ldquoPrediction ofundrained monotonic and cyclic liquefaction behavior of sandwith fines based on the equivalent granular state parameterrdquoInternational Journal of Geomechanics vol 14 no 2 pp 254ndash266 2014

[10] M Rahman and S R Lo ldquoPredicting the onset of staticliquefaction of loose sand with finesrdquo Journal of GeotechnicalandGeoenvironmental Engineering vol 138 no 8 pp 1037ndash10412012

[11] M C Munro and A Mohajerani ldquoDetermination of thetransportable moisture limit of iron ore fines for the preventionof liquefaction in bulk carriersrdquoMarine Structures vol 40 no 1pp 193ndash224 2015

[12] C Andrei and R H Pazara ldquoThe impact of bulk cargoes liq-uefaction on shiprsquos intact stabilityrdquo UPB Scientific Bulletin vol75 no 4 pp 47ndash58 2013

[13] K Terzaghi R Peck andGMesri SoilMechanics in EngineeringPractice John Wiley amp Sons New York NY USA 3rd edition1996

[14] G R Martin H B Seed and W D L Finn ldquoFundamentals ofliquefaction under cyclic loadingrdquo Journal of the GeotechnicalEngineering Division vol 101 no 5 pp 423ndash438 1975

[15] J A Sladen R D DrsquoHollander and J Krahn ldquoThe liquefactionof sands a collapse surface approachrdquo Canadian GeotechnicalJournal vol 22 no 4 pp 564ndash578 1985

[16] A L Baki M Rahman and S R Lo ldquoCyclic instabilitybehaviour of coal ashrdquo in Proceedings of the GeoCongress 2012GSP 225 pp 849ndash858 Oakland Calif USA March 2012

[17] R Mohamad and R Dobry ldquoUndrained monotonic and cyclictriaxial strength of sandrdquo Journal of Geotechnical Engineeringvol 112 no 10 pp 941ndash958 1986

[18] P Grunau Cargo Handling and Stowage A Guide for LoadingHandling Stowage Securing and Transportation of DifferentTypes of Cargoes Except Liquid Cargoes and Gas 2012

[19] International Maritime Organization International MaritimeSolid Bulk Cargoes Code International Maritime OrganizationLondon UK 2013

[20] International Maritime Organization Adoption of the Interna-tional Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes (IMSBC) CodemdashResolutionMSC268(85) IMO London UK 2008

[21] M Munro and A Mohajerani ldquoMoisture content limit of ironore fines for the prevention of liquefaction in bulk carriersrdquoin Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Hydrody-namics (ICHD rsquo14) Singapore October 2014

[22] M C Munro and A Mohajerani ldquoMoisture content limits ofIron Ore Fines to prevent liquefaction during transport reviewand experimental studyrdquo International Journal of Mineral Pro-cessing vol 148 pp 137ndash146 2016

[23] PanamaMaritime AuthoritymdashMaritime Accident InvestigationDepartment Report MV ldquoJian Fu Starrdquo R-011-11-DIAM 2011


[24] Met Office National Meteorological Library Archive Fact Sheet6mdashThe Beaufort Scale (Version 01) Met Office 2010

[25] Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) Marine SafetyInvestigation (Report 148)mdashInvestigation into the Shift of Cargoon Board the Singapore Flag Bulk Carrier Padang Hawk Aus-tralian Transport Safety Bureau 2000

[26] Panama Maritime AuthoritymdashMaritime Accident Investiga-tion Department ldquoNasco diamondrdquo Report MV R-020-2011DIAM 2011

[27] PanamaMaritime AuthoritymdashMaritime Accident InvestigationDepartment Report MV ldquoHong Weirdquo R-007-2011-DIAM 2011

[28] The Bahamas Maritime Authority ldquoMV Bulk JupiterrdquomdashReportof the Marine Safety Investigation into the Loss of a Bulk Carrierin the South China Sea on January 2nd 2015 2015

[29] The Hong Kong Special Administrative RegionmdashMarineDepartmentmdashMarine Accident Investigation Section Reportof Investigation into the Sinking of MV Hui Long on 20 May2005mdashPreliminary Imquiry No 2 of 2005 2005

[30] The Hong Kong Special Administrative RegionmdashMarineDepartmentmdashMarine Accident Investigation Section Reportof Investigation into Sinking of Hong Kong Registered BulkCarrier ldquoTrans Summerrdquo at Position 21∘5531015840N 113∘4041015840E Westof Dawanshan Dao Mainland China on 14 August 2013 2015

[31] International Maritime Organization IMO Identification Num-ber Schemes 2015 httpwwwimoorgenOurWorkMSASPagesIMO-identification-number-schemeaspx

[32] UNCTAD Secretariat ldquoReview of maritime transportrdquo inUnited Nations Conference on Trade and Development UnitedNations Geneva Switzerland 2014

[33] MarineTraffic Bulk CarriermdashTong Ji Men 2015 httpwwwmarinetrafficcomplaisdetailsshipsshipid407433mmsi351305000imo9109354vesselCHC20NO3

[34] MarineTraffic Bulk CarriermdashJian Fu Star 2015 httpwwwmarinetrafficcomaisdetailsshipsshipid9845mmsi-8106379imo8106379vesselJIAN FU STAR

[35] Sea Breezes ldquoBulk Carrier Lossesrdquo 2010 httpwwwseabreezescoimindexphpoption=com contentampid=467bulk-carrier-lossesampItemid=50

[36] MarineTrafficHongWeimdashBulkCarrier 2015 httpwwwmari-netrafficcomaisdetailsshipsshipid6708mmsi-9230139imo9230139vesselHONG WEI

[37] ShipSpotting DARYA DHYANmdashIMO 9230139 2006 httpwwwshipspottingcomgalleryphotophplid=214774

[38] A S Gard Loss Prevention Circular No 01-12mdashLiquid BulkCargo SamplingmdashCollecting Evidence 2012

[39] International Standards Organization ISO 3087mdashIron OresmdashDetermination of Moisture Content of a Lot 1998

[40] Australian Coal Association Research Program (ACARP)TML0036mdashCoal Transportable Moisture Limit ProjectmdashTech-nical Submission to the Australian Maritime Safety Authority(AMSA) 2014

[41] Australian Coal Association Research Program (ACARP)TML0037mdashModified ProctorFagerberg Method for Coal Aus-tralian Coal Association Research Program (ACARP) Bris-bane Australia 2014

[42] InternationalMaritimeOrganization ldquoAmendment 02-13 to theIMSBC Code and Supplements Inadequacy of current IMSBCcodemethodologies to transportable moisture limit determina-tion on Brazilian iron ore fines 17th session Agenda Item 4DSC 17INF10rdquo in Sub-Committee on Dangerous Goods SolidCargoes and Containers 2012

[43] International Maritime Organization Early Implementation ofDraft Amendments to the IMSBC Code Related to the Carriageand Testing of Iron Ore Fines (DSC1Circ71) London UK 2013

[44] International Maritime Organization MSC 953Add1mdashAmendments to the International Maritime Solid Bulk CargoesCode (IMSBC Code) London UK 2015

[45] Gard AS Liquefaction of Solid Bulk CargoesmdashA Selection ofArticles Previously Published by Gard AS 2014

[46] UKPampIClubBauxite Loadings 2015 httpwwwukpandicomknowledgearticlebauxite-loadings-131638

[47] H Xinwei CHao L Xiangquan C Xiaomei L Lingxia andWZhenxing ldquoThe influence of soil particle on soil condensationwaterrdquo Advance Journal of Food Science and Technology vol 5no 6 pp 712ndash720 2013

[48] The American Club Dangers with Respect to the Carriage ofNickel Ore and Other Bulk Cargoes Prone to Liquefaction 2010

[49] BritanniamdashThe Britannia Steam Ship Insurance AssociationLimited ldquoCarriage of nickel ore from the Philippinesrdquo BulletinJuly 2015 httpwwwbritanniapandicomassetsUploadsdocu-mentsCarriage-of-nickel-ore-from-the-Philippines-07-2pdf

[50] I A Koromila C C Spandonidis and K J Spyrou ldquoExperi-mental investigation of cargo liquefaction and impact on thestability of a bulkmdashcarrierrdquo in Proceedings of the 13th Interna-tional Ship StabilityWorkshop Brittany France September 2013

Submit your manuscripts athttpwwwhindawicom

ScientificaHindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

CorrosionInternational Journal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Polymer ScienceInternational Journal of



CeramicsJournal of


CompositesJournal of

NanoparticlesJournal of



International Journal of

Biomaterials


NanoscienceJournal of

TextilesHindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Journal of

NanotechnologyHindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Journal of

CrystallographyJournal of


The Scientific World JournalHindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014


CoatingsJournal of

Advances in

Materials Science and EngineeringHindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

Smart Materials Research



MetallurgyJournal of


BioMed Research International

MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials


Journal ofNanomaterials


Table 1 Major incidents investigated during this study along with the main vessel and incident details [23 25ndash30]

Casestudy Vessel name IMO

numberaDate ofincident

Casualtiescrew Vessel lost Disembarked Cargo Cargo

(tonnes)

1 Padang Hawk 9109354 26 July 1999 020 No Kouaoua NewCaledonia Nickel ore NA

2 Hui Long 9037032 20 May 2005 023 Yes Sungai PakningIndonesia Fluorspar 5185

3 Jian Fu Star 8106379 27 Oct 2010 1325 Yes Obi Island Indonesia Nickel ore 43000

4 NascoDiamond 9467861 09 Nov 2010 2225 Yes Kolonodale

Indonesia Nickel ore 55150

5 Hong Wei 9230139 3 Dec 2010 1024 Yes KolonodaleIndonesia Nickel ore 40000

6 TransSummer 9615468 14 Aug 2013 021 Yes Subaim Indonesia Nickel ore 54067

7 Bulk Jupiter 9339947 02 Jan 2015 1819 Yes Kuantan Malaysia Bauxite 46400aThe IMO number is a distinctive reference number of a vessel [31]

This ldquosaferdquo moisture content is known as the trans-portable moisture limit (TML) and its inferred definitionis ldquothe maximum gross water content that a liquefiablecargo may contain without being at risk of liquefying whilebeing transported in a bulk carrierrdquo [19] The flow moisturepoint (FMP) is also determined using two of the threemethods stated in the IMSBC Code The TML is 90 ofthe FMP [19] Along with these test methods other policiesand procedures are included to reduce the occurrence ofliquefaction incidents and ensure liquefiable cargoes do notget loaded on a bulk carrier if it exceeds its TML

One final method in the IMSBC Code used to determineif a cargo is potentially liquefiable is the ldquoCanTestrdquo If aMasterhas doubts in regard to the appearance or condition of thematerial a simplified in situ testing method for providing arough idea on the possibility of flowmay be carried out by halffilling a cylindrical vessel of about 1 litre capacity with a sam-ple of the cargo and striking it against a hard surface at least 25times If free moisture appears on the surface of the sampleadditional laboratory tests should be conducted [19 23]

Some other physical properties that influence the lique-faction potential of ldquoGroup Ardquo cargoes are the particle sizevoid ratio degree of saturation hydraulic conductivity andpore airwater pressure characteristics [9ndash11] Additionallysome system variables is the induced cyclic loading drainageconditions and rate of loading The moisture content is con-sidered the major factor regarding the liquefaction potentialof ldquoGroup Ardquo cargoes It is noted that all the test methodsgiven in the IMSBC Code use the moisture content of thecargo as a variable that can be monitored and adjustedaccordingly to prevent cargoes from liquefying Other phys-ical properties of the cargo are not considered changeable toprevent liquefaction of the cargoes [19] This is because themajority of cargoes being transported on bulk carriers areconsidered products and therefore their physical propertiesare more or less unalterable

The objective of this study is to investigate the collectivecauses of liquefaction of solid bulk cargoes on board bulkcarriers in order to make recommendations to prevent futureincidents from occurring This will be achieved by analysing

the available investigative reports relating to the incidentsfocusing on the key findings and exploring the effect of excessmoisture within the cargo

2 Case Studies

In order to make recommendations to prevent future liq-uefaction incidents from occurring investigation reportswill be utilized to summarize seven incidents includingthe conclusions and key findings These seven investigationreports are the only publicly available reports of suspectedliquefaction incidents from 1988 to 2015 The list given inTable 1 shows themajor incidents that are investigated duringthis study along with the main vessel and incident details

It is noted that the terms ldquosea staterdquo and ldquowind forcerdquogiven herein are stated using theDouglas andBeaufort scalesrespectively [24] All the case study summaries and conclu-sions presented in Section 2 have been obtained from theirrespective investigation reports [23 25ndash30] By summarizingand analysing these incidents we hope to determine trends orsimilarities that may be causing these incidents to occur

21 Case Study 1 Padang Hawk Built in 1995 the Singaporeflag PadangHawk (IMO 9109354) is a handymax bulk carrierwith a summer deadweight of 46635 tonnes [32] The vesselwhich has a length of 190m breadth of 31m and summerdraught of 12m has five cargo holds serviced by four on-board cranes [25] At the time of producing this report thePadang Hawk now Panama flag Tong Ji Men is still in activeservice [33] The Padang Hawk along with its hold and tanklayout can be seen in Figures 1 and 2

211 Summary of Incident On 17 July 1999 at 1224 thePadangHawk arrived at the port of KouaouaNewCaledoniaseen in Figure 3 to begin loading a cargo of nickel ore fromshore barges Loading commenced at 1440 andwas completedon 23 July by 2140 Each day during loading soundings weretaken to record if any water was present in the cargo holdsAlthough no bilge water was recorded during these sound-ings the crew noticed that some of crane ldquograbsrdquo of the cargo

























Deep FOT

Deep FOT (P)

(PS)

DOT(PS)

CWT

APT

FWT (P)DWT (S)



DO (S)



WBT (P)

FPT


Deep FOT (S)

DOT (S)

CL DR TDWT

APT BTFWT

WOTBTM lost

DOT (P)

Number 5 BTM













Kouaoua

IncidentPosition


GraftonPassage

PalmPassage















4685358 MTin bulk



948 units1896 tons


Balallpur

Balallpur

607 units1214 tons



Mumbai EX Singapore

Machinery and pipes




[ = illegible]

Melanie

BTN MB102-01[]

Sungai Pakning[]

150300

BTN MB102-01

Sungai Pakning-

Mumbai Melanie

100200 MT















Nickel ore9500 MTS

Nickel ore9400 MTS

Nickel ore9500 MTS

Nickel ore9300 MTS

Nickel ore6100 MTS



Stowage plan





































Nickel ore11000 MT

Nickel ore10350 MT

Nickel ore11000 MT

Nickel ore11400 MT

Nickel ore11400 MT



























1 86002 101003 97004 101005 10400Total 48900





























Loaded(tonnes)



1807 0000ndash03001700ndash1900 4800


2107 0030ndash02300800ndash1040 808 1

2207 1430ndash15302255ndash2330 1830


towed back


check2407 1730ndash2140 2204 1


2657 1


5587

2707 2833


2907 2213 1



5549

0108 2115ndash2400 1382 1 1

0208 4896





loaded ob0308 3040 3 10408 1340ndash1800 1809 2 2


1839








1 107082 116023 99484 111595 11333Total 54750




















1500Z

1412Z

Yangjiang

1400Z

1300Z

1312Z

1112Z1200Z

1212Z

Trans Summer

Hainan Dao

Hanoi









0306090

120150180210240270300

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31

Rain

fall

amou

nt (m

m)

Days




















Distance


31 Dec 14 234 04 337 105 378 106 637834 05 024 106 231 89 536

1434 05 593 106 459 102 6132034 06 549 107 084 100 600

1 Jan 15 234 07 389 107 385 89 533834 08 156 108 098 80 481

1434 08 340 108 395 63 3772034 08 546 109 049 49 296

Sank 2254 09 010 109 155 54 127

























4 Conclusion







Abbreviations




Competing Interests


Acknowledgments


References



























































CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials



























Deep FOT

Deep FOT (P)

(PS)

DOT(PS)

CWT

APT

FWT (P)DWT (S)



DO (S)



WBT (P)

FPT


Deep FOT (S)

DOT (S)

CL DR TDWT

APT BTFWT

WOTBTM lost

DOT (P)

Number 5 BTM













Kouaoua

IncidentPosition


GraftonPassage

PalmPassage















4685358 MTin bulk



948 units1896 tons


Balallpur

Balallpur

607 units1214 tons



Mumbai EX Singapore

Machinery and pipes




[ = illegible]

Melanie

BTN MB102-01[]

Sungai Pakning[]

150300

BTN MB102-01

Sungai Pakning-

Mumbai Melanie

100200 MT















Nickel ore9500 MTS

Nickel ore9400 MTS

Nickel ore9500 MTS

Nickel ore9300 MTS

Nickel ore6100 MTS



Stowage plan





































Nickel ore11000 MT

Nickel ore10350 MT

Nickel ore11000 MT

Nickel ore11400 MT

Nickel ore11400 MT



























1 86002 101003 97004 101005 10400Total 48900





























Loaded(tonnes)



1807 0000ndash03001700ndash1900 4800


2107 0030ndash02300800ndash1040 808 1

2207 1430ndash15302255ndash2330 1830


towed back


check2407 1730ndash2140 2204 1


2657 1


5587

2707 2833


2907 2213 1



5549

0108 2115ndash2400 1382 1 1

0208 4896





loaded ob0308 3040 3 10408 1340ndash1800 1809 2 2


1839








1 107082 116023 99484 111595 11333Total 54750




















1500Z

1412Z

Yangjiang

1400Z

1300Z

1312Z

1112Z1200Z

1212Z

Trans Summer

Hainan Dao

Hanoi









0306090

120150180210240270300

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31

Rain

fall

amou

nt (m

m)

Days




















Distance


31 Dec 14 234 04 337 105 378 106 637834 05 024 106 231 89 536

1434 05 593 106 459 102 6132034 06 549 107 084 100 600

1 Jan 15 234 07 389 107 385 89 533834 08 156 108 098 80 481

1434 08 340 108 395 63 3772034 08 546 109 049 49 296

Sank 2254 09 010 109 155 54 127

























4 Conclusion







Abbreviations




Competing Interests


Acknowledgments


References



























































CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials





Deep FOT

Deep FOT (P)

(PS)

DOT(PS)

CWT

APT

FWT (P)DWT (S)



DO (S)



WBT (P)

FPT


Deep FOT (S)

DOT (S)

CL DR TDWT

APT BTFWT

WOTBTM lost

DOT (P)

Number 5 BTM













Kouaoua

IncidentPosition


GraftonPassage

PalmPassage















4685358 MTin bulk



948 units1896 tons


Balallpur

Balallpur

607 units1214 tons



Mumbai EX Singapore

Machinery and pipes




[ = illegible]

Melanie

BTN MB102-01[]

Sungai Pakning[]

150300

BTN MB102-01

Sungai Pakning-

Mumbai Melanie

100200 MT















Nickel ore9500 MTS

Nickel ore9400 MTS

Nickel ore9500 MTS

Nickel ore9300 MTS

Nickel ore6100 MTS



Stowage plan





































Nickel ore11000 MT

Nickel ore10350 MT

Nickel ore11000 MT

Nickel ore11400 MT

Nickel ore11400 MT



























1 86002 101003 97004 101005 10400Total 48900





























Loaded(tonnes)



1807 0000ndash03001700ndash1900 4800


2107 0030ndash02300800ndash1040 808 1

2207 1430ndash15302255ndash2330 1830


towed back


check2407 1730ndash2140 2204 1


2657 1


5587

2707 2833


2907 2213 1



5549

0108 2115ndash2400 1382 1 1

0208 4896





loaded ob0308 3040 3 10408 1340ndash1800 1809 2 2


1839








1 107082 116023 99484 111595 11333Total 54750




















1500Z

1412Z

Yangjiang

1400Z

1300Z

1312Z

1112Z1200Z

1212Z

Trans Summer

Hainan Dao

Hanoi









0306090

120150180210240270300

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31

Rain

fall

amou

nt (m

m)

Days




















Distance


31 Dec 14 234 04 337 105 378 106 637834 05 024 106 231 89 536

1434 05 593 106 459 102 6132034 06 549 107 084 100 600

1 Jan 15 234 07 389 107 385 89 533834 08 156 108 098 80 481

1434 08 340 108 395 63 3772034 08 546 109 049 49 296

Sank 2254 09 010 109 155 54 127

























4 Conclusion







Abbreviations




Competing Interests


Acknowledgments


References



























































CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials




Kouaoua

IncidentPosition


GraftonPassage

PalmPassage















4685358 MTin bulk



948 units1896 tons


Balallpur

Balallpur

607 units1214 tons



Mumbai EX Singapore

Machinery and pipes




[ = illegible]

Melanie

BTN MB102-01[]

Sungai Pakning[]

150300

BTN MB102-01

Sungai Pakning-

Mumbai Melanie

100200 MT















Nickel ore9500 MTS

Nickel ore9400 MTS

Nickel ore9500 MTS

Nickel ore9300 MTS

Nickel ore6100 MTS



Stowage plan





































Nickel ore11000 MT

Nickel ore10350 MT

Nickel ore11000 MT

Nickel ore11400 MT

Nickel ore11400 MT



























1 86002 101003 97004 101005 10400Total 48900





























Loaded(tonnes)



1807 0000ndash03001700ndash1900 4800


2107 0030ndash02300800ndash1040 808 1

2207 1430ndash15302255ndash2330 1830


towed back


check2407 1730ndash2140 2204 1


2657 1


5587

2707 2833


2907 2213 1



5549

0108 2115ndash2400 1382 1 1

0208 4896





loaded ob0308 3040 3 10408 1340ndash1800 1809 2 2


1839








1 107082 116023 99484 111595 11333Total 54750




















1500Z

1412Z

Yangjiang

1400Z

1300Z

1312Z

1112Z1200Z

1212Z

Trans Summer

Hainan Dao

Hanoi









0306090

120150180210240270300

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31

Rain

fall

amou

nt (m

m)

Days




















Distance


31 Dec 14 234 04 337 105 378 106 637834 05 024 106 231 89 536

1434 05 593 106 459 102 6132034 06 549 107 084 100 600

1 Jan 15 234 07 389 107 385 89 533834 08 156 108 098 80 481

1434 08 340 108 395 63 3772034 08 546 109 049 49 296

Sank 2254 09 010 109 155 54 127

























4 Conclusion







Abbreviations




Competing Interests


Acknowledgments


References



























































CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials





4685358 MTin bulk



948 units1896 tons


Balallpur

Balallpur

607 units1214 tons



Mumbai EX Singapore

Machinery and pipes




[ = illegible]

Melanie

BTN MB102-01[]

Sungai Pakning[]

150300

BTN MB102-01

Sungai Pakning-

Mumbai Melanie

100200 MT















Nickel ore9500 MTS

Nickel ore9400 MTS

Nickel ore9500 MTS

Nickel ore9300 MTS

Nickel ore6100 MTS



Stowage plan





































Nickel ore11000 MT

Nickel ore10350 MT

Nickel ore11000 MT

Nickel ore11400 MT

Nickel ore11400 MT



























1 86002 101003 97004 101005 10400Total 48900





























Loaded(tonnes)



1807 0000ndash03001700ndash1900 4800


2107 0030ndash02300800ndash1040 808 1

2207 1430ndash15302255ndash2330 1830


towed back


check2407 1730ndash2140 2204 1


2657 1


5587

2707 2833


2907 2213 1



5549

0108 2115ndash2400 1382 1 1

0208 4896





loaded ob0308 3040 3 10408 1340ndash1800 1809 2 2


1839








1 107082 116023 99484 111595 11333Total 54750




















1500Z

1412Z

Yangjiang

1400Z

1300Z

1312Z

1112Z1200Z

1212Z

Trans Summer

Hainan Dao

Hanoi









0306090

120150180210240270300

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31

Rain

fall

amou

nt (m

m)

Days




















Distance


31 Dec 14 234 04 337 105 378 106 637834 05 024 106 231 89 536

1434 05 593 106 459 102 6132034 06 549 107 084 100 600

1 Jan 15 234 07 389 107 385 89 533834 08 156 108 098 80 481

1434 08 340 108 395 63 3772034 08 546 109 049 49 296

Sank 2254 09 010 109 155 54 127

























4 Conclusion







Abbreviations




Competing Interests


Acknowledgments


References



























































CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials






Nickel ore9500 MTS

Nickel ore9400 MTS

Nickel ore9500 MTS

Nickel ore9300 MTS

Nickel ore6100 MTS



Stowage plan





































Nickel ore11000 MT

Nickel ore10350 MT

Nickel ore11000 MT

Nickel ore11400 MT

Nickel ore11400 MT



























1 86002 101003 97004 101005 10400Total 48900





























Loaded(tonnes)



1807 0000ndash03001700ndash1900 4800


2107 0030ndash02300800ndash1040 808 1

2207 1430ndash15302255ndash2330 1830


towed back


check2407 1730ndash2140 2204 1


2657 1


5587

2707 2833


2907 2213 1



5549

0108 2115ndash2400 1382 1 1

0208 4896





loaded ob0308 3040 3 10408 1340ndash1800 1809 2 2


1839








1 107082 116023 99484 111595 11333Total 54750




















1500Z

1412Z

Yangjiang

1400Z

1300Z

1312Z

1112Z1200Z

1212Z

Trans Summer

Hainan Dao

Hanoi









0306090

120150180210240270300

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31

Rain

fall

amou

nt (m

m)

Days




















Distance


31 Dec 14 234 04 337 105 378 106 637834 05 024 106 231 89 536

1434 05 593 106 459 102 6132034 06 549 107 084 100 600

1 Jan 15 234 07 389 107 385 89 533834 08 156 108 098 80 481

1434 08 340 108 395 63 3772034 08 546 109 049 49 296

Sank 2254 09 010 109 155 54 127

























4 Conclusion







Abbreviations




Competing Interests


Acknowledgments


References



























































CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials






















Nickel ore11000 MT

Nickel ore10350 MT

Nickel ore11000 MT

Nickel ore11400 MT

Nickel ore11400 MT



























1 86002 101003 97004 101005 10400Total 48900





























Loaded(tonnes)



1807 0000ndash03001700ndash1900 4800


2107 0030ndash02300800ndash1040 808 1

2207 1430ndash15302255ndash2330 1830


towed back


check2407 1730ndash2140 2204 1


2657 1


5587

2707 2833


2907 2213 1



5549

0108 2115ndash2400 1382 1 1

0208 4896





loaded ob0308 3040 3 10408 1340ndash1800 1809 2 2


1839








1 107082 116023 99484 111595 11333Total 54750




















1500Z

1412Z

Yangjiang

1400Z

1300Z

1312Z

1112Z1200Z

1212Z

Trans Summer

Hainan Dao

Hanoi









0306090

120150180210240270300

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31

Rain

fall

amou

nt (m

m)

Days




















Distance


31 Dec 14 234 04 337 105 378 106 637834 05 024 106 231 89 536

1434 05 593 106 459 102 6132034 06 549 107 084 100 600

1 Jan 15 234 07 389 107 385 89 533834 08 156 108 098 80 481

1434 08 340 108 395 63 3772034 08 546 109 049 49 296

Sank 2254 09 010 109 155 54 127

























4 Conclusion







Abbreviations




Competing Interests


Acknowledgments


References



























































CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials






Nickel ore11000 MT

Nickel ore10350 MT

Nickel ore11000 MT

Nickel ore11400 MT

Nickel ore11400 MT



























1 86002 101003 97004 101005 10400Total 48900





























Loaded(tonnes)



1807 0000ndash03001700ndash1900 4800


2107 0030ndash02300800ndash1040 808 1

2207 1430ndash15302255ndash2330 1830


towed back


check2407 1730ndash2140 2204 1


2657 1


5587

2707 2833


2907 2213 1



5549

0108 2115ndash2400 1382 1 1

0208 4896





loaded ob0308 3040 3 10408 1340ndash1800 1809 2 2


1839








1 107082 116023 99484 111595 11333Total 54750




















1500Z

1412Z

Yangjiang

1400Z

1300Z

1312Z

1112Z1200Z

1212Z

Trans Summer

Hainan Dao

Hanoi









0306090

120150180210240270300

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31

Rain

fall

amou

nt (m

m)

Days




















Distance


31 Dec 14 234 04 337 105 378 106 637834 05 024 106 231 89 536

1434 05 593 106 459 102 6132034 06 549 107 084 100 600

1 Jan 15 234 07 389 107 385 89 533834 08 156 108 098 80 481

1434 08 340 108 395 63 3772034 08 546 109 049 49 296

Sank 2254 09 010 109 155 54 127

























4 Conclusion







Abbreviations




Competing Interests


Acknowledgments


References



























































CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials
















1 86002 101003 97004 101005 10400Total 48900





























Loaded(tonnes)



1807 0000ndash03001700ndash1900 4800


2107 0030ndash02300800ndash1040 808 1

2207 1430ndash15302255ndash2330 1830


towed back


check2407 1730ndash2140 2204 1


2657 1


5587

2707 2833


2907 2213 1



5549

0108 2115ndash2400 1382 1 1

0208 4896





loaded ob0308 3040 3 10408 1340ndash1800 1809 2 2


1839








1 107082 116023 99484 111595 11333Total 54750




















1500Z

1412Z

Yangjiang

1400Z

1300Z

1312Z

1112Z1200Z

1212Z

Trans Summer

Hainan Dao

Hanoi









0306090

120150180210240270300

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31

Rain

fall

amou

nt (m

m)

Days




















Distance


31 Dec 14 234 04 337 105 378 106 637834 05 024 106 231 89 536

1434 05 593 106 459 102 6132034 06 549 107 084 100 600

1 Jan 15 234 07 389 107 385 89 533834 08 156 108 098 80 481

1434 08 340 108 395 63 3772034 08 546 109 049 49 296

Sank 2254 09 010 109 155 54 127

























4 Conclusion







Abbreviations




Competing Interests


Acknowledgments


References



























































CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials























Loaded(tonnes)



1807 0000ndash03001700ndash1900 4800


2107 0030ndash02300800ndash1040 808 1

2207 1430ndash15302255ndash2330 1830


towed back


check2407 1730ndash2140 2204 1


2657 1


5587

2707 2833


2907 2213 1



5549

0108 2115ndash2400 1382 1 1

0208 4896





loaded ob0308 3040 3 10408 1340ndash1800 1809 2 2


1839








1 107082 116023 99484 111595 11333Total 54750




















1500Z

1412Z

Yangjiang

1400Z

1300Z

1312Z

1112Z1200Z

1212Z

Trans Summer

Hainan Dao

Hanoi









0306090

120150180210240270300

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31

Rain

fall

amou

nt (m

m)

Days




















Distance


31 Dec 14 234 04 337 105 378 106 637834 05 024 106 231 89 536

1434 05 593 106 459 102 6132034 06 549 107 084 100 600

1 Jan 15 234 07 389 107 385 89 533834 08 156 108 098 80 481

1434 08 340 108 395 63 3772034 08 546 109 049 49 296

Sank 2254 09 010 109 155 54 127

























4 Conclusion







Abbreviations




Competing Interests


Acknowledgments


References



























































CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials






Loaded(tonnes)



1807 0000ndash03001700ndash1900 4800


2107 0030ndash02300800ndash1040 808 1

2207 1430ndash15302255ndash2330 1830


towed back


check2407 1730ndash2140 2204 1


2657 1


5587

2707 2833


2907 2213 1



5549

0108 2115ndash2400 1382 1 1

0208 4896





loaded ob0308 3040 3 10408 1340ndash1800 1809 2 2


1839








1 107082 116023 99484 111595 11333Total 54750




















1500Z

1412Z

Yangjiang

1400Z

1300Z

1312Z

1112Z1200Z

1212Z

Trans Summer

Hainan Dao

Hanoi









0306090

120150180210240270300

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31

Rain

fall

amou

nt (m

m)

Days




















Distance


31 Dec 14 234 04 337 105 378 106 637834 05 024 106 231 89 536

1434 05 593 106 459 102 6132034 06 549 107 084 100 600

1 Jan 15 234 07 389 107 385 89 533834 08 156 108 098 80 481

1434 08 340 108 395 63 3772034 08 546 109 049 49 296

Sank 2254 09 010 109 155 54 127

























4 Conclusion







Abbreviations




Competing Interests


Acknowledgments


References



























































CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials






1 107082 116023 99484 111595 11333Total 54750




















1500Z

1412Z

Yangjiang

1400Z

1300Z

1312Z

1112Z1200Z

1212Z

Trans Summer

Hainan Dao

Hanoi









0306090

120150180210240270300

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31

Rain

fall

amou

nt (m

m)

Days




















Distance


31 Dec 14 234 04 337 105 378 106 637834 05 024 106 231 89 536

1434 05 593 106 459 102 6132034 06 549 107 084 100 600

1 Jan 15 234 07 389 107 385 89 533834 08 156 108 098 80 481

1434 08 340 108 395 63 3772034 08 546 109 049 49 296

Sank 2254 09 010 109 155 54 127

























4 Conclusion







Abbreviations




Competing Interests


Acknowledgments


References



























































CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials




1500Z

1412Z

Yangjiang

1400Z

1300Z

1312Z

1112Z1200Z

1212Z

Trans Summer

Hainan Dao

Hanoi









0306090

120150180210240270300

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31

Rain

fall

amou

nt (m

m)

Days




















Distance


31 Dec 14 234 04 337 105 378 106 637834 05 024 106 231 89 536

1434 05 593 106 459 102 6132034 06 549 107 084 100 600

1 Jan 15 234 07 389 107 385 89 533834 08 156 108 098 80 481

1434 08 340 108 395 63 3772034 08 546 109 049 49 296

Sank 2254 09 010 109 155 54 127

























4 Conclusion







Abbreviations




Competing Interests


Acknowledgments


References



























































CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials




0306090

120150180210240270300

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31

Rain

fall

amou

nt (m

m)

Days




















Distance


31 Dec 14 234 04 337 105 378 106 637834 05 024 106 231 89 536

1434 05 593 106 459 102 6132034 06 549 107 084 100 600

1 Jan 15 234 07 389 107 385 89 533834 08 156 108 098 80 481

1434 08 340 108 395 63 3772034 08 546 109 049 49 296

Sank 2254 09 010 109 155 54 127

























4 Conclusion







Abbreviations




Competing Interests


Acknowledgments


References



























































CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials






Distance


31 Dec 14 234 04 337 105 378 106 637834 05 024 106 231 89 536

1434 05 593 106 459 102 6132034 06 549 107 084 100 600

1 Jan 15 234 07 389 107 385 89 533834 08 156 108 098 80 481

1434 08 340 108 395 63 3772034 08 546 109 049 49 296

Sank 2254 09 010 109 155 54 127

























4 Conclusion







Abbreviations




Competing Interests


Acknowledgments


References



























































CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials
























4 Conclusion







Abbreviations




Competing Interests


Acknowledgments


References



























































CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials













4 Conclusion







Abbreviations




Competing Interests


Acknowledgments


References



























































CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials






Abbreviations




Competing Interests


Acknowledgments


References



























































CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials






































CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials










CeramicsJournal of







Biomaterials




Journal of


Journal of





CoatingsJournal of

Advances in








MaterialsJournal of


Nano

materials



Documents

Review Article Liquefaction Incidents of Mineral Cargoes on …downloads.hindawi.com/journals/amse/2016/5219474.pdf · 2019-07-30 · Review Article Liquefaction Incidents of Mineral