Rev POLISCI 1 - Societatea Academica Din Romania POLISCI 1.pdf · Adrian Cioflânc` (A.D. Xenopol Institute) Managing Editor Ionu] Vasiloiu. TABLE OF CONTENTS: FOREWORD POLSCI FOCUS

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DEFECTIVE DEMOCRACIESRomanian Journal of Political Science

Romanian Academic Society

DEFECTIVE DEMOCRACIES

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DEFECTIVE DEMOCRACIES Romanian Journal of Political Science


Editor

Alina Mungiu Pippidi

International Advisory Board

Larry Diamond (Stanford University)

Tom Gallagher (University of Bradford)

Alena Ledeneva (University College London)

Michael McFaul (Stanford University)

Philippe Schmitter (Central European University)

Vladimir Tism`neanu (Maryland University)

Hellen Wallace (European University Institute)

Editorial Board

Vasile Boari (Babe[-Bolyai University)

Anton Carpinschi (Ia[i University)

Daniel Dìanu (Romanian National School of Political Studies - SNSPA)

Andrei Marga (Babe[-Bolyai University)

Mihaela Miroiu (Romanian National School of Political Studies - SNSPA)

Dan Pavel (Bucharest University)

Aurelian Crìu]u (Indiana University)

Gabriel B`descu (Babe[-Bolyai University)

Sorin Ioni]` (Romanian Academic Society - SAR)

Cosmina T`n`soiu (American University in Bulgaria)

Adrian Cioflânc` (A.D. Xenopol Institute)

Managing Editor

Ionu] Vasiloiu

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

FOREWORD

POLSCI FOCUS

Administrative and Political Corruption in Bulgaria: Status and Dynamics (1998-2006)

Democratization in Eastern Europe: A Viable Model for the Middle East?

Transition as a Legacy

From Sofia to Brussels - Corrupt Democratization in the Context of European Integration

How Media and Politics Shape Each Other in the New Europe

POLSCI REVIEWS

The Romanian Revolution of December 1989

What`s Wrong With The European Union & How to Fix It

CALL FOR PAPERS; INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

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5

25

37

53

69

79

80

83

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DEFECTIVE DEMOCRACIES

Since the collapse of communism and communist states from 1989-1992, the twenty-eight states that currently

comprise postcommunist Europe and Eurasia have evolved to different political directions. Some regimes in this

region have completed a transition to democracy; others have been arrested at some point on the path to

democracy and became a sort of 'defective democracies'; and still others have yet to break with the communist

past. This issue focuses on this middle-ground category: countries where elections are regularly held, but the

behavior of political actors, notably the government, but not only, is not always democratic. Albania, Moldova,

Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, the Caucasus countries present a great variation among themselves, but have also

something in common: they do not fit well the classic patterns of either democracy or authoritarianism. The

regional trend, particularly noticeable over the past decade, showed hybrid regimes resisting to political change-

either in the direction of becoming authentic democracies or reverting back to dictatorship.

The purpose of this issue is to explore the lessons for democratization that can be drawn from the postcommu-

nist experience over the past seventeen years. First, what explains defective democracies? Second, what can and

cannot be transferred from successful Central Europe to the rest of countries? Finally, is there still a future for

democracy promotion in postcommunist Europe?

Foreword

Alexander Stoyanov*

Abstract:

Corruption, particularly in the high echelons of power, is one of the most serious problems faced by Bulgaria onthe eve of its accession to the European Union. The problem has remained on the monitoring agenda forBulgaria and extensively commented by the EC in its monitoring and evaluation reports in the last 2-3 years. Ina period of three years subsequent to EU membership the government and the European Commission willreport on the progress in countering administrative and political corruption in the country.

Keywords:

Bulgaria, European Union, administrative corruption, political corruption, countering corruption, EU monitoringagenda, CMS

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Administrative and Political Corruption inBulgaria: Status and Dynamics (1998-2006)

* Mr. Alexander Stoyanov works for the Center for the Study of Democracy, Bulgaria, as Director of the CSD sociological unit.

POLSCI FOCUS

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It is always difficult to say how much (or howlittle) corrupt the administration of a country is unlessa proper operational definition of corruption is used.There are two ways of dealing with the more generalapproach towards corruption. First, the denial-of-everything approach which claims that corruption istoo complex, too vague and too difficult to define andeventually measure and/or analyze. Many reports andanalyses of corruption adopting this approach usuallybegin with the notion that corruption is a complexsocial phenomenon that is practically immeasurableand difficult to define. In addition corruption (as mostsocial phenomena) is system dependent, i.e. its formsand involvement in different societies varies.Respectively, perceptions of corruption in differentcountries and governments differ substantially. Mostoften this approach is politically biased and is used toreject findings on corruption at all levels. The ration-ale is that one cannot measure something that couldnot be defined.

Secondly, the positivist approach, whichincludes the attempt to compose and decompose cor-ruption to its different forms and mechanisms and toconstruct a system of measures which aim to accountfor the levels of corruption in societies, social sectors,or among different population groups. The logic ofthis approach is that the function of science is tomeasure the immeasurable, i.e. to step by step createpreconditions (theory) that would make is possible toasymptotically get closer to the true understanding ofa given phenomenon.

In Bulgaria, a well-known and systematicapproach to analyze and counteract corruption hasbeen adopted by Coalition 20001. One of the instru-ments used by Coalition 2000 has been its CorruptionMonitoring System (CMS)2. The basic methodologicalassumptions and concepts on which the CMS is basedare:

Administrative corruption. This concept refers to thecorruption transactions in which lower and middlelevel officials receive kickbacks (money, gifts, favors)from citizens either to provide a better service or toviolate existing rules and laws. This type of corruptionhas been found to be characteristic for all post-social-ist countries and is manifested in forms and sectorsthat seem fairly unlikely for developed countries. Themain systemic reason for the existence of this type ofcorruption is the character of transition processes inthese countries. More specifically this is the dynami-cally shifting balance between the public and the pri-vate spheres within a short period of time.Administrative corruption seems to be the negativebyproduct of systemic adjustment to the new public-private balance in society.

Political corruption. This concept refers to corruption

of high level officials in the executive, the legislativeand the judiciary. In principle corruption transactionsof this type involve manipulation of substantialresources and more complicated corruption schemes(including political party financing).

Perception based measures. Perception based meas-ures of corruption include accounts for the perceivedspread of corruption in different social sectors (alsoinstitutions, professional groups, etc.). CMS researchfindings and other international research has shownthat perception based measures reflect attitudes ofdifferent targets groups towards corruption are notprecise estimates of the actual level of corruption. Inthis respect perception based measures are depend-ent on situational factors and are strongly politicallybiased. However they proved a fair account of publictolerance or intolerance of corruption practices insociety.

Experience based measures. Experience based meas-ures account for incidences of personal experiencewith corruption transactions. These measures arebased on anonymously provided reports. The sameapproach is used in crime victimization research andexperience accumulated since the 1960-ies hasproved that obtained results are fairly accurate. TheCMS includes both perception and experience-basedindicators. Collecting of information started in mid1998 and the last monitoring survey was conductedin November 2005. The main target groups addressedin CMS surveys are 1) general population (18+); 2)business sector representatives (managers of small,medium and large companies). CMS monitoring sur-veys address mainly administrative corruption. Whilethis is the most widespread form of corruptionobserved in Bulgaria, another important form of cor-ruption - political corruption - remains out of thescope of the CMS. However, many aspects of politicalcorruption have also been analyzed.

Corruption: Issues of Contemporary Social History

The forms and mechanisms of political andadministrative corruption in Bulgaria are essentiallysomething new for the country. They emerged in thebeginning of the 1990-ies are closely linked to thespecific driving forces of political and economic trans-formations. In the period 1990-2005 the structure ofproperty in the country changed dramatically. Theratio between state v/s private property of industrialassets changed from 96:4 (1989) to 20:80 (2005). Inthe context of an evolving legal system, the transfor-mation of property did not always follow the legiti-mate rules. Political power and influence have beendecisive in the first years of the privatization of thestate. At later stages mechanisms have become more

1 Coalition 2000 is a coalition of NGOs aimed and countering corruption in Bulgarian society [www.anticorruption.bg].2 The first description of CMS methodology, as well as the first results of is implementation, were published in CLEAN FUTURE.

Anti-Corruption Action Plan. Monitoring. Corruption Assessment Indexes., 1998.

1 Coalition 2000 is a coalition of NGOs aimed and countering corruption in Bulgarian society [www.anticorruption.bg].2 The first description of CMS methodology, as well as the first results of is implementation, were published in CLEAN FUTURE.

Anti-Corruption Action Plan. Monitoring. Corruption Assessment Indexes., 1998.

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sophisticated and this has lead to the involvement ofvarious levels of the administration into the process ofprivatization of the state.

The mechanism that has “facilitated” privati-zation and the establishment of the new propertystructure in the country has often been corruption.Now that privatization is practically completed, cor-ruption mechanisms that have been used to controlprivatization are being utilized to gain comparativeadvantages in the functioning of the new structure ofthe economy under the new rules (market economy).Corruption mechanisms are targeted to “benefit”from resources in several principle areas:

1. Violation of rules with imposed payments in favorof the state. Such rules are – taxes, VAT, customs fees,social benefit payments, excise payments, etc. Theseare contributions to the budget enforced by the state;their violation through corruption brings substantialadvantages to social actors.

2. Control over public procurement spending. Thistype of corruption transactions very often combineadministrative and political corruption and substan-tially modify specific markets.

3. Control over spending of EU funds. This corruptionarea is relatively new and its importance is most likelygoing to increase, as the amount of funds will sub-stantially grow after the EU membership of the coun-try.

4. Control of law enforcement mechanisms. This typeof control through corruption has proved to beimportant for the perpetuation of more complicatedcorruption schemes (involving various actors andoperating for a longer period of time). The intensifica-tion of government anticorruption policies and practi-cal measures in 2006 has show that a disturbingnumber of high level law enforcement officials havebeen involved in corruption schemes ensuring protec-tion for violations of the law.

5. Political party financing. Party funding is the crucialintersection of different corruption schemes, whichensures political lobbying. One of the basic precondi-tions for that (except economic interest of the politi-cal class) is the under-funding of parties by the budg-et. Financial needs, especially in election years, do nor-mally exceed state subsidies. According to expert esti-mates the latter account for 10-20% of actual partyspending.

6. Protection of “black businesses” (organized crimeactivities). For many reasons organized crime has beenone of the elements of transition. At the very earlystages of transition criminal groups have (through

corruption) managed to create relationships withinstitutions important for their sphere of activity.

These principle fields of corruption transac-tions generate both administrative and political cor-ruption. Depending on the specific corruption trans-action one or more levels the administration andforms of corruption could be involved.

For example large-scale customs fraud (ciga-rette smuggling) for a longer period of time necessar-ily involves officials from the customs administration,tax administration, border police, investigation andprosecution officials, “private law enforcement”, andpolitical protection combined with party financing.Lower level customs officials get paid to close theireyes when necessary, their superiors get paid to toler-ate the violation of agency rules and higher-levelpoliticians get paid (personally and/or their parties) totolerate the existence of such a situation. Lawenforcement officials get paid not to act, if somethinggoes wrong in smuggling operations and bank orfinancial institutions get paid to process the rev-enues3. Evidence that accounts for the existence ofcigarette smuggling is relatively easy to find. It is justnecessary to compare consumer spending of import-ed cigarettes (market research information) withaggregate customs information about official (legiti-mate) import. For specific periods of time the share oflegitimately imported cigarettes on the Bulgarian mar-ket has been down to 15-20%.

The above example and issues elaboratedmake it possible to deduce several important assump-tions about corruption assessment:

1. Administrative and political corruption are closelylinked. It is practically not possible to observe high lev-els of administrative corruption without assumingthat the higher political levels are not involved. Ifadministrative corruption levels are high and politicalcorruption level are low, this would mean that thehigher levels of the administration do not have anycontrol over their officials.

2. The existence and evolution of corruption over alonger period of time links different political partiesand get to one and the same corruption scheme. Inthis way parties practically block each other in anyattempt to counter corruption (more than one politi-cal actor is involved). The longer a given corruptionscheme operates the greater is the risk for a dominoeffect when attempting to stop it. This is why therepractically are no high level officials charged with cor-ruption in the country despite the fact, that all partiesaccuse each other of corruption.

3 Corruption schemes of similar type might be organized and initiated from top to bottom (by higher level officials) or from bottom to top(initiated by lower officials).

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Level of Administrative Corruption

The period between mid April 2004 and theend of November 2005 was marked by an increase ofthe level of administrative corruption. This increasegoes parallel to the increase of the number of corrup-tion pressure cases (public sector employees exertpressure on citizens in order to engage them in cor-ruption transactions). In 1998-1999, the averagemonthly frequency of self-reported involvement incorruption transactions was fairly high; it rangedbetween 180,000-200,000 cases a month. In theperiod July 2003-March 2004 it reached its lowest

level, dropping to 80,000-90,000 transactions permonth (Chart 1). The lowest frequency of cases of cor-ruption pressure by public officials was registered inMarch 2004.

In 2005, however, the pressure and the num-ber of concluded corruption transactions reverted tothe higher average values characteristic of the 1999-2001 period. Compared to March 2004, the numberof corruption transactions has increased from about80,000 per month to about 130,000 per month.Whether this will prove to be a lasting negative ten-dency or a short-term fluctuation resulting from tem-porary factors (for instance, the recurrent increase in

corruption by the end of each electoral cycle) remainsunclear.

The level of administrative corruption showsthe number of corruption transactions which citizensadmit to have been involved in over a certain periodof time. Corruption transactions, which for the mostpart constitute criminal acts, are commonly referredto as corruption victimization. The possibility of usingsampling methods to gauge crime levels (in particular,the number of administrative corruption transactions)is based on the assumption that the incidence of suchphenomena is sufficiently high; this allows a randomsample to identify an adequate number of victimswho can be subject to statistical analysis. Such amethod however is not applicable to political corrup-

tion which cannot be studied with statistical researchmethods and instruments. The existence of politicalcorruption is deduced largely based on indirect evi-dence: 1) high rates of administrative corruption usu-ally exist, if they are implicitly or explicitly tolerated bythe higher ranks of government; 2) the state of anumber of socio-political and economic processes inthe country (grey economy, organized crime, customsviolations, VAT fraud schemes, drug traffic, controver-sial privatization transactions, political party financ-ing, etc.) is impossible without the involvement ofrepresentatives of the senior state officials (legislature,the executive, and the judiciary); 3) statements bynumerous politicians and magistrates openly refer toa multitude of corruption transactions.

Chart 1. Average monthly number and relative share of concluded corruption transactions

The levels of corruption victimization and cor-ruption pressure are unevenly distributed among thevarious occupational groups. Some of them are char-acterized by a stable downward trend; others, by arise; and still others show little change (Table 2). Forsome occupational groups (e.g. university teachers,customs officers, local government representatives),substantial fluctuations have been identified depend-ing on the time of the survey. On the whole, corrup-

tion pressure has been on the decline in the judicialsystem over the past year. It has dropped for the mag-istrates (judges, prosecutors, investigators) and for thejudiciary’s administrative staff. The change is duemainly to the reforms (even if only partial) in the judi-ciary and to internal anti-corruption measures.However, the prevailing opinion of citizens that cor-ruption in the judiciary is unacceptably high has notchanged (Table 2).

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Table 1. Indicators and indexes measuring the level ofadministrative corruption

CMS methodology differentiates betweenactual and potential corruption. Each corruptiontransaction goes through at least two stages. First,negotiating the conditions (potential corruption) andsecond, conducting the transaction (actual corrup-tion). Measuring the incidence rates in both stages ofthe corruption transactions is essential since even thepresence of the first stage (offering/soliciting a bribeor other type of unlawful gain) constitutes a violation

of the law. The indexes measuring the dynamics ofpotential and real corruption victimization are, respec-tively, “corruption transactions” and “corruption pres-sure”. The corruption transactions index accounts forthe frequency of self-reported cases when citizens andbusiness organizations provided money, gifts, orfavors in order to have a problem solved. The indexreflects the level of actual corruption based on a peri-od of one month. The corruption pressure indexrecords the frequency of cases when citizens and busi-nesses were asked for money, gifts or favors in orderto have a problem of theirs solved. It reflects the levelof potential corruption.

There was the gradual decline in both actualand potential corruption in the period 1998-2004(Chart 2). Over the past year and a half, however,alarming indications of increased numbers of corrup-tion transactions have been identified.

1.7 1.61.5

1.2

1.51.4 1.4 1.4

1.0 1.0 1.01.1

0.8

1.3

1.6

1.0 1.0 1.1

0.40.3

0.50.6

0.81.0

1.5

2.1

0.40.3

0.90.8

0.70.8

0.4 0.40.50.4

0.70.8

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

June1998

Feb.1999

April1999

Sept.1999

Jan.2000

April2000

Sept.2000

Jan.2001

Oct.2001

Jan.2002

May2002

Oct .2002

Jan.2003

April2003

July2003

Oct.2003

March2004

Nov.2004

Nov.2005

Corruption Pressure Involvement in Corrupt Practices

Chart 2. Index dynamics of corruption transactions and corruption pressure

Notes: The two indexes register actual and potential corruption, respectively. Their minimum value is 0 when no corruptiontransactions at all have been concluded and 10, if all citizen interactions with the administration involve a corruption element.Source: Vitosha Research/CMS

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Table 2. Corruption pressure by occupational groups* (%)

When assessing the corruption pressureexerted by magistrates, it is important to take intoaccount the role of attorneys-at-law as intermediariesbetween their clients and the institutions of the judi-ciary. Data indicate that potential corruption levels forthis group are high and decrease slowly. This is due tothe fact that a number of attorneys-at-law act as cor-ruption mediators under pressure from the magis-trates or on the initiative of their clients. There is alsoreason to assume that, in some cases, attorneys-at-law take advantage of being better informed thantheir clients to secure immediate gains for themselves.In terms of the public visibility of judiciary corruptionthe focus tends to shift towards attorneys-at-law,rather than towards magistrates. It is however difficultto separate the actual amount of corruption pressureexerted by the magistrates and the judiciary’s admin-istrative staff through attorneys-at-law from pressureinitiated by attorneys-at-law themselves. Often thejudiciary also comes under political pressure.Regardless of how successful such attempts are, it is aprocess that generates speculations, undermines theindependence of the judiciary, and adversely affectspublic trust.

In the 2004-2005, police officers and doctorshave topped the administrative corruption pressure

ranking (Table 2). The fact that potential corruptionfor both groups is on the rise is alarming. Increasedcorruption pressure has also been registered for min-istry officials, tax administration officials, universityteachers and employees.

Perceptions of the Spread of Corruption

Regardless of the fact that the overall level ofcorruption victimization in 2005 dropped nearly byhalf compared to 1998, public perceptions of the levelof corruption in society practically have not improved(Chart 3).

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The data since 1998 shows that perceivedspread of corruption by far exceeds the level of actualcorruption victimization. This means that the subjec-tive perceptions reflect people’s moral assessment ofthe observed levels of corruption, showing whetherobserved corruption levels are perceived as too highor normal; i.e. perceptions are a qualitative assess-ment of the social and moral acceptability of the cor-ruption situation in the country and not a measure ofthe number of corruption transactions.

When citizens believe they live in a highly cor-rupt environment where corruption not only remainsunpunished, but is also perceived as an effectivemeans of solving problems, their own inclination toengage in corrupt practices increases. In Bulgaria, thepredominant public perception is that corruption iswidespread in all spheres of public life, at all levels ofstate governance, and among the various occupation-al groups (Table 3).

Perceptions of the spread of corruptionamong different occupational groups differ substan-tially from the data about actual acts of corruptionand corruption pressure exerted. For instance, despitethe registered drop in corruption pressure exerted bymagistrates and judiciary administrative staff this failsto find confirmation in citizens’ subjective perceptionsof the spread of corruption in those groups.Politicians, MPs, ministers, and tax officials are per-ceived to be far more corrupt than data on corruptiontransactions and direct corruption pressure they exertactually show. In terms of perceptions, the stable neg-ative attitudes about these groups tend to intensify -perceptions of the spread of corruption marked a

slight increase in late 2005.The possible reasons for the divergence

between registered levels of corruption victimizationand the predominant negative public perceptions ofthe spread of corruption may be sought in severaldirections:

Firstly, as already noted, the data on real cor-ruption and citizens’ subjective assessments refer todifferent social phenomena. Perceptions of the spreadof corruption are strongly influenced by moral, ideo-logical, and political factors. They rather reflect citi-zens’ trust in the institutions of the state and citizens’overall assessments of the effectiveness of gover-nance. Low levels of confidence in state institutionsmake citizens’ perceptions of the corruption situationmore negative.

Secondly, the public exposure of corruptionscandals without any tangible results (consequences)affects adversely public perceptions of the will of thegovernment to counteract corruption. The lack ofpolitical will does not influence corruption victimiza-tion but has direct impact on the growing public mis-trust in high-rank state officials and politicians. That iswhy, even while the corrupt practices registeredamong MPs, members of government, top state offi-cials, and political leaders are relatively few, the pop-ulation’s perceptions of the spread of corruption inthe high ranks of state power and among the repre-sentatives of the political class are disturbingly unfa-vorable.

Thirdly, the ranking of corruption amongpublic concerns is not influenced by the intensity ofmedia exposure (number of corruption-related publi-

Chart 3. Level of corruption victimization and assessments of the spread of corruption

Source: Vitosha Research/CMS

5.96.5 6.3

6.7 6.46.1

6.5 6.5 6.5 6.45.9

6.7 6.4 6.4 6.6 6.5 6.3 6.6

0.40.8 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3

0.80.70.81.10.91.01.00.5

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

06/9802/99

04/9909/99

01/0004/00

09/0001/01

10/0101/02

05/0210/02

01/0305/03

07/0310/03

03/0411/04

Spread of CorruptionInvolvement in Corrupt Practices

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Table 3. Perceptions of the spread of corruption among occupational groups* (%)

39.3

31.0

35.637.2

31.936.8

32.2

34.132.7

45.647.0

36.537.540.1

37.5

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1.2000'

3.2000'

5.2000

'

7.2000

'

9.2000

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11.200

0"

1.2001

'

3.2001

'

5.2001'

7.2001'

9.2001

'

11.2001"

1.2002"

06.200

2"

08.200

2"

10.200

2"

12.200

2"

02.2003"

04.200

3"

06.200

3"

08.2003"

10.200

3"

12.200

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02.200

4"

04.200

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06.200

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08.2004"

10.200

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12.200

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04.200

5"0

5

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20

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35

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45

50

Monthly Number of Articles on Corruption in the Pres sPublic concern about corruption

Chart 4. Intensity of media coverage of corruption and public concern about corruptionChart 4. Intensity of media coverage of corruption and public concern about corruption

Source: Vitosha Research/ CMS

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The dynamics of these rankings clearly showsthat Bulgarian society considers corruption one of themost important elements of the country’s politicalagenda. Expectations related to the countering of cor-ruption tend to rise in the periods of transition fromone government to another. A new government usu-ally heightens the priority of the problem and raisesthe performance standards for the political class.

Overall, the data covering the 1998-2005 period sug-gest that public expectations remain unmet. Setagainst the rising expectations for good governance,realities have been rather disappointing. The discon-tent stems from the actual status of the problem (thelevel of corruption victimization) and from the per-formance of the political class and the administration.In this sense, there is reason to believe that the public

cations in the media). More intensive media coverageof corruption neither increases its perceived spreadnor heightens concerns about corruption (Chart 4).The dynamics of this indicator is rather associatedwith changes in society’s political agenda as set by thepolitical class. Corruption tends to be high on peo-ple’s minds not when the level of corruption victimiza-tion is high, but when public expectations aboutresolving of this problem are high.

Public Values and Attitudes to Corruption

In the period since 1998, corruption has per-sistently been perceived as one of the most seriousproblems of Bulgaria. It is always among the top fivesocial problems, usually taking up the fourth or fifthposition. In 2004-2005, it rose making it the thirdmost important problem. The overriding concerns ofthe Bulgarian population were low incomes (firstplace) and unemployment (second place).

Chart 5. Ranking of corruption among public concerns (%)

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considers the tendency towards decline of the level ofcorruption victimization as not radical enough andthe government policies as failing to meet publicexpectations and standards. In addition, these actionsare not considered effective enough.

The significance of subjective perceptions ofcorruption is often downplayed with the argumentthat they do not provide an accurate view of the levelof corruption. While this is essentially true, it is alsotrue that public perceptions relatively closely followthe actual achievements and failures in various sectorsof society. Thus, for instance, the actual progress incountering unemployment and poverty runs parallelto the decline in their perceived social importance.The dynamics of the corresponding indicator concern-ing corruption, however, follows clearly the dynamicsof political will to deal with the problem: the rank ofcorruption among major concerns is high in the peri-ods before and after the coming into office of a newgovernment and tends to decline when its actions fallshort of public expectations. In this sense, toBulgarian society, late 2005 was a period of height-ened expectations with respect to countering corrup-tion – both in terms of the presence of political willand its effective practical realization in the policies ofthe administration.

Main Areas of Political Corruption

The involvement of the government in theeconomy generates a number of points of potentialconflicts of public and private interests in the businesssphere. The legal and institutional deficits in thebeginning of the transition, coupled with the lack oftraditions for openness and transparency and theunstable situation in Southeastern Europe, createdbroad opportunities for corruption in Bulgaria.Conversely, the progress of the country in the EUaccession process and the related legal and adminis-trative harmonization restrict and narrow the avail-able channels for corruption and crime.

As the delivery of administrative servicesgradually improves and the income level of Bulgariancitizens grows, administrative corruption in the busi-ness sphere connected with regulatory inefficiencytends to decrease. However, opportunities for politicalcorruption related to the economy remain. The mainforms/areas of political corruption in this respect are:rings of companies and state capture, procurementcontracts, VAT fraud.

Chart 6. Forms of corruption

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Political Corruption: Rings (Loops) of Companies andState Capture

The informal political and economic networkswhich evolved over the years in Bulgaria (commonlyreferred to as “friendly circles” and/or “rings of com-panies”) and the existing criminal networks and capi-tal will seek to continue their economic and/or politi-cal monopoly under the new conditions of EU mem-bership. This is particularly relevant to the sphere ofpolitical corruption. In the beginning of Bulgaria’stransition, political and economic corruption net-works had numerous opportunities to redistributenational wealth, by siphoning state-owned enterpris-es and banks, bogus privatization, tapping into smug-gling channels, etc. As these channels are graduallydrying off, the efforts of these networks currentlyrefocus on control over public procurement, conces-sions, EU funds, VAT fraud and appointments to theexecutive and the judiciary intended to facilitate cor-ruption schemes and to ensure their impunity fromprosecution.

Politically favored companies and organiza-tions in Bulgaria are typically financed through publicprocurement contracts and lease agreements. Inreturn, they reward their patrons through direct orindirect financing of party activities, hiring of partyfunctionaries or their associates, payment of scholar-ships for overseas studies to children of senior partyleaders, etc. The fact that on the eve of the 2005 par-liamentary elections the leader of one of the govern-ing political parties admitted that such practices arecommonplace corroborated the multitude of journal-ist investigations and NGO analyses of their existence

and reinforced the Bulgarian public’s conviction thatpolitical corruption and impunity were rampant.However, it is difficult to make an accurate assessmentof the operations of the rings of companies in theabsence of judicial prosecution and punishment oftheir actions; moreover, the transfer of resourcesbetween the public and private sector within suchrings is typically carried out through perfectly legiti-mate channels.

According to expert assessments (based onavailable data on parties’ election campaign spend-ing, survey research and official statistics) the rent (i.e.the resources deviated from the public procurementprocess by all parties’ rings of companies), rangesbetween 320 million and 370 million Bulgarian leva4

in 2005. The total direct rent is much greater, takinginto account also other possible payment channelssuch as concession agreements. Considerably larger,much more negative and difficult to calculate are theindirect effects on the Bulgarian economy of the exis-tence of the clientele companies – unfair competition,disheartening of entrepreneurship, brain-drain of thebest and brightest young people, low corporate citi-zenship standards, etc.

The phase of the political cycle in Bulgariaand the nature of the government majority determinethe time and amount of rent received and the num-ber of rings of companies in operation. For instance,the 2003 local elections were accompanied by a sub-stantial increase of the number of companies whichbelieved that corruption in party financing was wide-ly spread. That growth was likely to be partially gen-erated by the real pressure exerted on businesses bynewly emerged local political interests.

Chart 7. Spread of corruption in the financing of election campaigns

4 �164 mln and �190 mln respectively.

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The linkage between the political cycle and the distri-bution of rents among the party rings of companies isconfirmed also by the statistically significant correla-tion between the peaks in awarding public procure-ment contracts and elections in Bulgaria in 2001,2003 and 2005. It was particularly pronounced in2005 when the number of public procurement con-tracts signed by state institutions rose disproportion-ately high on a year-to-year basis without any specificunderlying reasons. The ostentatious government dis-cretion in the allocation of a part of the substantial

budget surplus accumulated in 2004 and 2005 with-out prior endorsement of the Bulgarian Parliamentand in violation of the existing fiscal policy agree-ments with the International Monetary Fund creates afavorable environment for the nourishment of partyrings of companies. Examples to this effect are theestablishment of the state-owned Public InvestmentProjects company, the election raffles intended toboost voter participation, the non-transparent func-tioning of the Agricultural Fund and the TobaccoFund, the national grain reserve, etc.

Whereas the formation of rings of companiesis seen primarily as a strategy of politicians, the sec-ond manifestation of political corruption - state cap-ture - is a strategy of the business. Generally, it takesthree forms:

First, lobbying for the adoption of laws andenforcement of specific regulations to the benefit ofcertain market players, in which neither lobbyists norMembers of Parliament disclose their interests;

Second, leaving deliberate loopholes in thelegislation to benefit certain businesses whose lobby-ists have taken part in the legislative drafting process;and

Third, “purchase” of selective application ofcertain laws to the detriment of competitors. Thethird type (although almost invariably complemented

with the first two types) is often characteristic of thestrategies of organized crime and is particularly diffi-cult to counter.

Examples of such practices can be found inmany grey sectors of the Bulgarian economy like theimport of and trade in excise goods (oil products, cig-arettes, etc.), the trade in antiques, gambling, etc.They are also employed by organized crime to gainpolitical protection for continuing its illicit operations.In this sense, the rings of companies create opportu-nities for legitimization of criminal business activitiesand for “cleansing” of the public image of personsassociated with corruption and crime. These are someof the services, which politicians provide in return forthe financing they get. In fact, criminal business can-

Chart 8. Dynamics of public procurement contracts and elections in Bulgaria

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not thrive in Bulgaria without political protection andorganizational and technical support coming fromlegitimate business structures and public administra-tion officials. Thus racketeering groups, which sprungto life in the beginning of Bulgarian transition, havegradually merged or transformed into political andeconomic networks. Both experts and politicians have repeatedly statedthat duty-free shops at the land border crossingpoints of Bulgaria are an effective tax evasion instru-ment, which is a key component of the smugglingchannels for oil products, cigarettes and alcoholworth hundreds of millions of leva annually.Nevertheless, practical measures for shutting themdown have always been blocked by top politicians,Members of Parliament, and senior government offi-cials. As part of the government package of measuresto reduce hidden economy and corruption, theCouncil of Ministers approved an amendment to theLaw on Excise Goods in July 2003 whereby 44 duty-free shops at the land borders of Bulgaria were sched-uled for closure. However, after the Movement forRights and Freedoms party blocked the amendmentsin the Bulgarian Parliament, the Minister of Financewas compelled to issue an order to renew the licens-es of 14 companies. Another widely spread practice in Bulgaria, which isclosely related to political corruption and state cap-ture is the “migrations” of senior administrative andpolitical appointees (ministers, deputy ministers,chairs of independent regulatory committees, etc.) tobusinesses in the private sector directly or immediate-ly after they have taken important decisions concern-ing the development of these companies. This prac-

tice is most common in telecommunications, theenergy and defense sectors in Bulgaria. In advanceddemocracies, such practices invariably attract theattention of the prosecution and the conflict of inter-ests is strictly regulated in the legislation.

It is extremely difficult to counter politicalcorruption because it requires active measures to beundertaken precisely by representatives of those polit-ical elites which benefit from it. EU membership andthe related pressure for political and economicreforms make it easier to move against political cor-ruption. Undoubtedly, the most important first step inthis direction should be to unveil at least one “ring ofcompanies” and to hold the politicians and seniorgovernment officials involved in its establishment andfunctioning criminally liable. This would be almostimpossible at present because the methods used toredistribute resources and influence from the publicto the private sector within the rings are legal.

Administrative Corruption in the Economy

Political corruption nourishes the develop-ment of administrative corruption in the economy,especially where their channels coincide, for instance,in public procurement and the administering of taxrevenues. The spread of corruption in the economycontinues to be a major problem of the business andinvestment environment in Bulgaria. As a whole, actu-al corruption and corruption pressure experienced bythe business are twice higher than the one experi-enced by the public and they have been sustained forthe last five years.

Chart 9. Dynamics of the indexes of corruption in the business sector (October 2000 – November 2005)5

5 The 2005 corruption transactions index has been drawn up by preserving one of the aggregate data inputs from the survey conducted inApril 2004.

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There are some positive signs of a reductionof the share of businesses paying bribes in compari-son to 2004. This is most tangible in the avoidance ofcustoms duties and in the private sector and, morespecifically, the access to financing. However, thegrowing share of bribes associated with the issuance(or renewal) of permits and licenses is alarming. Adeeper analysis shows that these are predominantly

cases of companies in the construction sector and theoverall process of obtaining (or being refused) permitspending the completion of construction works. In thepublic procurement sphere the level of corruptionpractices has remained flat but this has been accom-panied by a negative trend of a concentration of bid-ding companies, i.e. only companies that enjoy cer-tain level of political support bid for public tenders.

What brings all these types of corruptiontogether is the unpunished violation of rules or thepreferential treatment, i.e. the obtaining of illegal orundue benefit in the administrative services and theenforcement of the legislation by the public adminis-tration. The objective is to gain time or money or toavoid losses, while the reasons lie in the poor rulesand excessive regulation, the corporate aspirations forprofiteering, or the quality of competition.

Public Procurement and Corruption

As the process of harmonization of theBulgarian legislation with the acquis communautaireis progressing, some substantial corruption channelsof the past like smuggling and privatization have beendiscontinued while there is increasing corruption pres-sure and risks in other areas such as public procure-ment and concessions. The use of the latter for polit-ical pay-backs makes them highly vulnerable toadministrative corruption, too. This is confirmed alsoby the latest report on the economies in transition ofthe European Bank for Reconstruction andDevelopment which pointed out that corruption pay-ments for awarding public procurement contractswere the only type of corruption in the businesssphere in Bulgaria which worsened in 2005 in com-parison to 20026. In fact, Bulgaria is the only South-eastern European country which reports deteriorationin comparison to the previous survey.

The public procurement market has grownsubstantially over the last five years both in terms ofnumber of contracts and total value of contracts.Experts estimate public procurement contracts at 1.5

billion leva in 2003 (19.6 % of the consolidated statebudget) and double that amount and number of con-tracts in 2005, at 3.3 billion leva (31.3 % of the con-solidated state budget). Since 2003, the public pro-curement tenders are won by a decreasing number ofcompanies. On the one hand, this is a natural conse-quence of market specialization of certain companiesin working with the central and local administration.On the other, companies do not consider bidding forpublic procurement contracts if they do not have anyform of political protection beforehand.

Thus, the share of companies paying bribesto win a public procurement contract decreased from54 % in 2003 to 35 % in 2005. However, their levelremained alarmingly high and even increased slightlyin 2005. Corruption in public procurement might bedefined as a quasi-market, on which the quasi-price(the kickback) goes to political entrepreneurs from thecentral and local government administration.Although real competition might exist on such mar-kets and the contract might be awarded to the mostefficient bidder, the losses to the budget and the ille-gal benefit remain. The quasi-price in administrativecorruption in public procurement in Bulgaria account-ed for an average of 7 % of the total value of the con-tract in 2005, i.e. some 55 million leva worth of pub-lic resources were siphoned to private benefit in 2005.This amount does not include the far more excessivelosses of market efficiency and the potential risks ofpoor procurement performance (e.g. the quality ofconstruction works and the risks in the case of anearthquake, the quality of infrastructure, etc.).

Table 4. Changes in the share of companies which paid bribes

6 Transition Report 2005, Business in Transition, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The EBRD data are based on BusinessEnvironment and Enterprise Performance Surveys of 2002 and 2005.

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Chart 10. Public procurement contracts and tenders

Chart 11. Portion of the tender worth paid for getting procurement contracts

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Corruption risks in the public procurementprocess in Bulgaria exist throughout its life cycle –from the stage of the call for tenders (e.g. artificialfragmentation of public procurement tender into sev-eral smaller bits to allow the application of less trans-parent procedures under the Law on PublicProcurement (LPA)) through the preparation of thetender documentation (terms of reference, technicalspecifications, documents required, etc.) and thefunctioning of evaluation committees (e.g. appoint-ment of preferred appraisers, information leaks, etc.)to actual contract changes in the implementationphase, re-negotiating elements, which were signifi-cant in winning the bid.

Tax and Administrative Services to Businesses andCorruption

More often than not, corruption related toadministrative services and the enforcement of regu-lations is the result of administrative pressure.However, corrupt transactions based on the mutualbenefit of the parties involved are also still common.In the latter cases, it is the competition, the budget orconsumers that suffer rather than the specific compa-ny involved in bribery which usually gets in profitsmuch more than it pays in bribes. Quite indicative in this respect are corruption practicesin the revenue administration. The typical reasons forbribing tax officers are to avoid penalties and to evadetaxes.

The list of cases where tax fraud was madepossible through a bribe includes mostly VAT fraud,avoidance of penalties, failure to register turnover,evasion of taxes and social security payments.Corruption is most widely spread in the Audit andOperational Control functional units of the revenueadministration.

Chart 12. Reasons for corruption payments to the revenue administration (% of companies who gave the respec-tive answer)

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Bulgarian businesses not only suffer fromunfair competition because of political corruption butalso sustain considerable losses due to widespreadcorruption in administrative services and control in thebusiness sphere. This is still a serious obstacle to mar-ket competition based on equality and clear and pre-dictable business rules.

VAT fraud and related corruption will besome of the greatest challenges which the revenueadministration in Bulgaria faces after EU accession.

The ‘missing/insolvent trader’ schemes7 and especial-ly their cross-border version (carousel schemes) repre-sent a serious problem in all European countries. Theefforts to combat them are focused primarily on theoptimal application of the joint liability principle andthe close operational interaction between the taxadministrations of the Member States in order totrace out the flows of goods and cash in the absenceof customs checks within the European Union.

Chart 13. Tax violations and fraud for which typically bribes are paid (% of companies which gave that answer)

7 In its various modifications, this type of fraud relies on a chain of fictitious transactions which concentrate a large portion of the VAT liabil-ity in a phantom undertaking, thus making it uncollectible.

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Bulgarian tax practice is characterized by anattempt to reduce VAT fraud through a specific solu-tion introduced as an alternative to the joint liabilityprinciple - the VAT account. The VAT account, howev-er, could not provide reliable protection against VATfraud because it may be siphoned out rather easilywithout any credible threat of penalties. Thus, the VATaccount arrangement increased the costs of compli-ant businesses, failing to restrict substantially theopportunities for VAT fraud from undue tax credit. Forall practical purposes, it rather relieves fraudsters fromthe burden of the joint liability principle. Therefore theexperience with the VAT account should be reviewedcritically. If the cost and benefit analysis confirms thatit generates more costs for compliant businesses thanbarriers to VAT fraud, this practice should be aban-doned. Instead, more fair versions of the joint liabilityprinciple should be sought. More specifically, theopportunities to restrict VAT fraud could be identifiedalong three main lines:Restriction of the opportunities for registration ortransfer of companies to fictitious or phantom own-ers;Restriction of the opportunities for increased refund-able tax credit through registration of transactions atprices deviating from market levels;

Restriction of the opportunities for the person receiv-ing the tax credit to avoid liability.

Equally important is the introduction of crim-inal liability for VAT fraud. At present, the BulgarianCriminal Code does not treat VAT schemes as a specialtype of tax or financial offence. In terms of its mech-anisms and scale, it comes closer to the forms oforganized crime rather than to conventional tax eva-sion. The pumping out of VAT, especially in bigamounts, needs the involvement of organized crimi-nal groups with the participation of senior tax offi-cials. The small number of effectively convicted per-sons compared to the size of VAT fraud is indicativethat these schemes often use political protection.

Conclusions

The analysis of anti-corruption efforts inBulgaria in 2005 and 2006 leads to some conclusionsabout anti-corruption policies seen in the context thecountry’s EU integration:

1. The potential of the “soft” measuresagainst corruption is being exhausted (awarenesscampaigns, training public sector employees, codes ofethics, etc). These are appropriate and indispensable

Chart 14. X-shaped VAT account fraud scheme in Bulgaria

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for success in the early stages of an anti-corruptiondrive. Currently, there is a need for more effective andconsistent political and institutional mechanisms tocurb corruption. These should be complemented by anational system for monitoring and assessment cover-ing not only the legislative and institutional measuresadopted, but also the results achieved.

2. Reforms have thus far affected mostlyadministrative graft but not large-scale, political cor-ruption. A particular challenge to anti-corruption pol-icy in Bulgaria is posed by the institutionalization ofpolitical-cum-business networks which came to bepopularly known as “friendly circles” or “loops ofcompanies”. Their public flaunting by leaders of gov-erning political parties further erode the already lowpublic confidence in democratic institutions. The “cir-cles” monopolize important markets in the Bulgarianeconomy and the opportunities arising from thecountry’s accession to the EU. With the advancementof the accession process, political corruption gradual-ly shifts from privatization and illegal trafficking to thespheres of concessions, public procurement, and theuse of EU funds. The economic cost of political cor-ruption, i.e. misused public funds, is far greater thanin the early stages of the transition although its rela-tive proportion in the economy has been declining.Yet, the political and institutional checks against thistype of corruption remain inadequate. Further, theinstitutionalization of political corruption makes iteasier for criminal interests to capture state institu-tions thus allowing organized crime to enter the legaleconomy of Bulgaria and the EU with impunity.

3. An alarming trend over the past year hasbeen the effort by government institutions to maskreluctance and incapability for coherent actionagainst political corruption behind “high-visibility”operations. Such an approach risks, however, damag-ing the reputation of innocent people and organiza-tions at the expense of continuing impunity of corrup-tion. It does not allow the consistent and proper useof the enforcement and preventive potential of penalpolicy. The election of the new prosecutor generalprovides an opportunity for urgently needed reform inone of the weakest links in the enforcement of crimi-nal justice – the prosecution. Reinforcing accountabil-ity, impartiality, and professionalism, as well as the willand resolve of prosecutors are indispensable for abreakthrough in the fight against corruption andcrime. These developments would open up the wayfor further reforms in the remaining bodies of thejudiciary and law-enforcement agencies and in thelonger term, for greater transparency of the politicalprocess in general.

4. Bulgaria’s accession to the EuropeanUnion will unquestionably step up the process ofcurbing corruption, the grey economy, and organizedcrime in the country, but it cannot be expected toautomatically do away with the internal factors thatbring them about. At the same time, membership inthe fairly complex political and institutional structures

and procedures of the EU will bring the country upagainst new challenges.

5. The internal risks have already been identi-fied by Bulgarian society and by European partners:political corruption and organized crime, and theimpunity from criminal prosecution of the membersof the corrupt political-cum-business networks. Theinfluence of some external factors should, however,not be ignored as they are of key importance if thecountry is to make the most of the benefits associat-ed with EU membership. Some of these factorsinclude:on-going reforms of the institutional dynamics of theEU and in particular, overcoming the constitutionalcrisis;the absence of a comprehensive European anti-cor-ruption policy;the lack of tradition of collaboration of the EuropeanCommission with civil society in the member countrieson developing and monitoring the policies aimed atimproving democratic governance, enhancing trans-parency, and reducing corruption.6. The European Union still does not have a compre-hensive anti-corruption policy. Moreover, in its ambi-tion to curb corruption the European Commission hasadopted complicated bureaucratic procedures whosenegative effect is commensurate with that of corrup-tion. Priority is often given to “input” indicators (reg-ulations, procedures, etc) rather than “output” indica-tors (actual impact), as done by a number of interna-tional financial institutions. An important element ofthe formulation and development of a co

nsistent anti-corruption policy within United Europe,as well as domestically, is the active involvement ofcivil society and business, which have an equal stakein the adoption of clear-cut and transparent rules inthe process of forging the new European identity ofthe countries in transition. These sectors need to playa stronger role in the implementation of modern stan-dards of transparency and visibility, which includeeffective civic control over the public sector, andspecifically, over the government agencies in chargeof European funds’ distribution. The near future willshow to what extent the European Union has thevision and political will to genuinely involve civil soci-ety in addressing these anti-corruption tasks.

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Gül M. Kurtoglu-Eski[ar*

Abstract:

Almost a decade before the end of the 20th century, most parts of Eastern Europe were still under the commu-nist rule and, with a few exceptions, the Middle East was checker squared with varying degrees of authoritari-anism. Almost a decade into the 21st century and many East European countries are now regarded as democ-racies. The Middle East, however, continues to be dominated by authoritarian regimes. This study outlinessome of the factors that can help to explain this contrasting outcome in a comparative framework.

Keywords:

Democratization, Eastern Europe, Middle East, MENA, islamization, terrorism

Democratization in Eastern Europe: A viablemodel for the Middle East?

* Dr. Gül M. Kurtoglu-Eski]ar is Assistant Professor to the Department of International Relations at Dokuz Eylul University, Izmir, Turkey.

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Introduction

Following the end of the Cold War and therapid democratization of Eastern Europe, expecta-tions that the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)would soon follow suit ran high.1 Due to the lack ofany significant changes that could be interpreted as asign towards democratization in that region, howev-er, such expectations were gradually replaced withincreasing pessimism. Numerous factors that empha-size the socio-cultural, economic and political charac-teristics of the region have since been offered toexplain the persisting authoritarianism throughoutthe MENA. Meanwhile, however, any possible impactof the nearby East European transformation—or itsabsence—over the same region remains unexplored,and constitutes the starting point of this study.

The significance of this issue is self-evident,given the fact that almost a decade before the end ofthe 20th century, most parts of Eastern Europe werestill under the communist rule and, with a few excep-tions, the Middle East was checker squared with vary-ing degrees of authoritarianism. Almost a decadeinto the 21st century and East European countries arenow considered as democracies.2 The Middle East,however, continues to be dominated by authoritarianregimes. What are some of the outstanding charac-teristics of the democratic transformation in EasternEurope? What are some of the conditions that helpprolong the lifespan of the current authoritarianregimes in the Middle East? In art, putting contrast-ing colours together intensifies their effect. Similarly,going over some of the basic points addressed bythese questions in this comparative exercise can helpto understand any problems identified with them bet-ter. It also constitutes the main goal of this simplestudy. While it does not offer an overarching theorythat explains the success of the one and the failure ofthe other, overviewing some of the factors that havemarked the political developments in both regionscan provoke some ideas toward constructing such atheory in later stages. On a wider theoretical scale, ifpursued further, a comparative overview of these twocontrasting outcomes can contribute to the generaltheories on democratization. From a non-scholarview, it can also form a step in developing policies andmeasures that can promote international peace andsecurity.

Although studies on the political reincarna-tion of Eastern Europe or the dearth of change in theMENA are plenty, they have not been conversant withone another. In a few studies that exist, this lacuna isattributed to two factors. One of them is the lack ofany dramatic or immediate effects of the East

European experience on the MENA. According toMoore (1994), the relative lack of communicationbetween two regions during the Cold War and certainkey differences in the state and administrative struc-tures, have engendered “the model of democratictransformation presented by Eastern Europe . . . gen-erally useless as a strategy to those aspiring for such atransformation in the Arab World.”

The second reason, meanwhile, stems frommundane academic realities. Valerie Bunce (2000:721) aptly describes it regarding regional studies as:most comparativists have spent their academic livesworking on one area. Given the invested amount ofintellectual capital, shifting to another area is verycostly. Moreover, regional studies tend to developtheir own concepts and their own research agendas.Both considerations carry one implication: Regionaldifferences can arise, not because of empirical validitybut because few studies cross regional divides and thedivides themselves may very well manufacture interre-gional contrasts. This is a real version of an old prob-lem, that is, case selection determining the conclu-sions drawn.

Nevertheless, at least two counter-points canbe made to justify the necessity of a general compar-ison between these two regions. One of them is his-toric. At least some parts of current Eastern Europe,to some degree, share some history with the MENA,due to the Ottoman Empire. As Kreutz (1999) under-lines, the southern tier of the former Soviet bloc coun-tries such as Bulgaria, Romania, Moldavia and evenparts of Hungary and Ukraine had for centuries beenpart of the Ottoman Empire, just as the Arab Worldhad been. The historical Ottoman, and at least thepartly Muslim background of countries such asYugoslavia and Albania which were not Soviet alliesbut still socialist and anti-Western, was even stronger.Far from being a distant memory, the effects of theOttoman rule on the contemporary political settingsof various parts of Eastern Europe are still debated(Mungiu Pippidi 2006).

Second, on an ideological level, the collapseof communism and the fall of socialist ideas fromgrace worldwide has closely affected those Arabregimes, such as Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia,Algeria and South Yemen, which based their ideolog-ical raison d’être at least to some extent on a form ofstatist, socialist and/or nationalist ideologies at somepoint since their independence (Albrecht andSchlumberger, 2004: 377). Above all, the ongoingtransformation of Eastern Europe since 1990s hasalerted the existing political regimes in the MENA to

1 "Eastern Europe" in this study is a general reference to the region consisting of Bulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia, the GermanDemocratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania, which are now also a part of the European Union.2 Democracy is a loaded term with a variety of definitions. Here, it simply refers to the general ability of all political groups to run in thepluralist elections that fulfil the following three criteria pointed out by Przeworski et al (2000: 16) as 1) the ability for incumbents to losetheir offices, 2) if defeated, incumbents vacating their offices in favour of the winner promptly following the elections and 3) the validityand application of the first two rules under all conditions.

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“[t]he apparent failure of viable alternatives to democ-racy around the world,” as well as the globally emerg-ing idea of spreading democracy as a desirable goal(Moore 1994). These challenges have further giventhe numerous authoritarian regimes in that region anincentive to seek new ways of prolonging their exis-tence.

Nonetheless, making generalizations acrossregions does carry certain risks. Despite sharing acommon communist past, Rose (2002: 39) warns that“[t]o lump all post-Communist states together is nomore sensible than putting the United States, Canada,Brazil and Chile together because they are all in theWestern Hemisphere.” Referring to the post-Communist world, Kitschelt (2003: 49-50) also pointsout that “[m]easured in terms of the civic and politi-cal rights indexes developed by Freedom House, thereis no region or set of countries on earth with a cur-rently larger diversity of political regimes.” Similararguments can also be extended to the Middle East;which both harbors countries like Turkey, which is cur-rently an EU candidate and a democracy, and SaudiArabia, where whether to allow women to drive ornot is still debated.

Differences notwithstanding, this study isbased on the assumption that sufficient similaritiesexist to compare these two regions. This assumptionis also supported by other observers, who refer to the“striking subregional similarities” while discussing thepolitical evolution of postcommunist countries (Ekiert2003: 91). It is consequently propelled by anothersimple observation that, despite all differencesbetween the region’s countries Eastern Europe hasachieved something in common: democratization.And the Middle East has not. Any lessons that can bedrawn from the successes of the former and the fail-ures of the latter are pertinent to scholars and policy-makers alike. And exceptions, as always, do not breakthe rules.

Eastern Europe

When communist regimes began collapsingone after another in 1989, the world was prepared tosee a politically uniform region with countries suffer-ing from identical weaknesses and dysfunctions thatwould take cookie cutter steps toward their existingpolitical and economic problems. The world wasbadly mistaken. The emerging collage from the ruinscomprised

a highly diverse set of more than twenty-fivesovereign polities with features that range from thoseof full-fledged competitive democracies with well-protected civic and political rights all the way toauthoritarian, personalist, if not despotic, rule.Measured in terms of the civic and political rightsindexes developed by Freedom House, there is noregion or set of countries on earth with a currentlylarger diversity of political regimes (Kitschelt 2003:49-50).

Nevertheless, within this wide diversity, EastEuropean countries have emerged with a number ofcharacteristics that have marked their transition todemocracy, which also set them aside from the previ-ous reformers in Southern Europe and Latin America.To start with, as earlier mentioned, there is the richpolitical diversity of the region despite its communistpast, which emerged shortly after 1989, and later alsoaffected the progress and outcome of each country inthe region. Ekiert (2003: 90) points out that the‘pacted’ transitions that took place in Poland andHungary, the displacement of the communist regimethrough ‘popular upsurge’ that occurred inCzechoslovakia and East Germany, or the transforma-tion from above that took place in Bulgaria produceddifferent transitional institutions and patterns of polit-ical conflicts. These distinctive modes of power trans-fer were in part engendered by specific conditions ineach country and interacted with both domestic com-munist legacies and broader regional developments .. . [Consequently] In many countries former commu-nists were able to retain political power; in othersnewly organized noncommunist oppositions emergedvictorious.

Attempting to break clean with the past to anextent unseen by the earlier democratic transitions inLatin America and Southern Europe constitutesanother significant characteristic of the East Europeantransition. Bunce (2000: 717-18) argues that—unlikethe earlier experiences in Southern Europe, such asSpain—this rejection has speeded up the democraticconsolidation process in Eastern Europe, particularlyin Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, andthe Baltic states. In cases where “bridging”—that is,using various devices, including pacts, to tie the oldregime with the new one—took place, however, “theconsequence was at best many detours on the road todemocracy and at worst either dedemocratization orthe continuation of authoritarian rule” (ibid).According to Bunce (2008:32), breaking clean withthe past in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria excepted) hasprovided “the political capital needed to move rapidlyon the democratic and economic reform fronts. It isonly through such electoral breaks with the past thatwe see both significant and sustained marketreforms.”

The third distinguishing factor of the EastEuropean democratic transition is its speed. As Linzand Stepan (1996: 235) note, many East Europeancountries, “began their transitions almost before anysignificant domestic changes had occurred” in theregion. Furthermore, [t]his postcommunist diversitycame about in the short window about three years(1990-93). Since that time, new regime structureshave been more or less ‘locked in’ in almost all poli-ties. Countries that by 1994 were more democratichave stayed that way. Countries that were authoritar-ian have not reversed course and become democratic. . . In a similar vein, postcommunist countries thatwere leaders in economic market reform in 1992-93

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are still in that position by the end of the millenium”(Kitschelt, 2003: 49-50).

Even a great number of those cases that ini-tially fell in between these two categories havebecome easier to identify as clearly belonging to theone or the other in recent years (Bunce 2008: 26). Inthe case of the countries undertaking political andeconomic changes, a leading reason of this haste wasrelated to the fear of failing to “take advantage of thepolitical honeymoon,” which, subsequently, couldjeopardize the path to democratization (Bunce 2000:718).

The fourth outstanding feature of the EastEuropean democratization process is its dual nature.Unlike the former transitions in Latin America andSouthern Europe, these countries pursued the proj-ects of democratization and transition into marketeconomies simultaneously (Linz and Stepan, 1996:244; Smith, 2001: 34). This was a risky enterprise,since the exact interaction of political and economicreforms on one another is still not fully understood.Meanwhile, in the case of economic reforms, risingunemployment only constitutes one of the unwantedside effects (Smith 2001: 34; Pravda 2001: 2-3). Insome cases, economic reforms also produced ironicresults. On the one hand, countries that tried differ-ent forms of economic reforms (e.g. Poland andHungary) ended up exposing themselves to Westernfinances, and their political influences, which latercontributed to their democratization process. On theother hand, they also ended up as one of the mostindebted countries in the world, which negativelyaffected their democratization experience. Contrarily,countries like the former Czechoslovakia where sucheconomic experiments did not occur, such externalinfluences were far less. Yet the lack of foreign debtsalso eased their path to democracy in the long run(Linz and Stepan 1996: 295-96).

Finally, the impact of external factors hasbeen frequently brought up as the most outstandingcharacteristic of the East European transition (Linzand Stepan 1996: 235-6; Kopecký and Mudde 2000:531-32). The starting point is given as the dissolutionof the USSR followed by the Eastern Bloc. However, itwas quickly supplanted by a variety of actors com-monly referred as the “West” in the literature. Puttingtheir differences aside, “[t]o a striking extent, Westernstates have worked collectively through multilateralEuropean organizations to support democratic con-solidation in Eastern Europe” (Smith 2001: 32). This“Western project” involved a wide range of actors,including “governments, multilateral organizations,non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and foun-dations” (Smith, 2001: 31).

Yet, among these actors, the EU particularlystands out. While the general role of the EU indemocracy promotion beyond its boundaries remains

debated3, scholars unite over its overall positiveimpact over the East European transformation.Among other things, they argue that the tangiblebenefits that the EU offered through membershiphave proved a potent propeller for many EasternEuropean to undertake the necessary reforms.Mungiu-Pippidi (2004: 15) points out that it certainlyencouraged these countries to engage in what hassince been called a ‘regatta’— a race to be the firstcountry to join the EU. In the early 1990s, not onlydid the race precipitate the reforms that were indis-pensable for the transformation of these countries,but since it enjoyed large popular support it alsoenticed post-communist parties (the strongest in theregion) into becoming genuinely pro-EU parties.Kopecký and Mudde (2000: 532) go further aheadand argue that a lot of the reforms undertaken by theEast European states were done to ensure the EUmembership, rather than a genuine interest to trans-form the political scene. Finally, the significance ofpositive EU gestures toward East European countriesalso stand out when compared with the ongoing can-didacy of a country like Turkey, whose ‘European’identity remains debated (Onis 2004: 4; Kurto?lu-Eski?ar 2007).

Nevertheless, a significant proportion of theEU contribution to the ongoing democratizationprocess in that region has been subtle, or indirect. Forinstance, Vachudova (2006: 2) points out that the EUfactor helped to strengthen the hand of liberal forcesagainst illiberal ones: not in a duel where good van-quishes evil, but in an iterated electoral game wheresooner or later most political actors—especially politi-cal parties—saw the benefits of moving their ownagenda toward compatibility with the state’s bid forEU membership.

In retrospect, scholars generally agree thatthese effects were intensified by some domesticfactors. The willingness of the East European politicalelites to quickly embrace the values and normspromoted by the EU is one of them. Alex Pravda(2001: 3-4) explains it by their “proximity to core, inessence West European, values and traditions.Historical affinity with Europe . . . continues toresonate.” Mungiu-Pippidi (2004: 15) makes a similarremark, while pointing out to the impact of what shecalls as “the ‘return to Europe’ myth, as shaped byintellectuals such as Milan Kundera, turned into apowerful anti-communist device . . . [which] was allthe more powerful as it seemed to be about identityand not a counter-ideology.”4

The role of the EU has not gone unchal-lenged, however, and numerous arguments on theless than benign, idealistic or altruistic motives behindthe zealous support for the democratic reforms inEastern Europe also exist. Smith (2001: 32), for

3 The impact of external factors, particularly the role of the EU on democratization for various countries is already discussed elsewhere(Pridham 1995: 166-203; Müftüler-Baç 2000; Ayd?n and Keyman 2004: 11; Phillips 2004, Kurto?lu Eski?ar 2007).4 See also Kaldor and Vejvoda (1997:60).

29



instance, argues that “[p]romoting democracy is notthe only Western aim, nor is it even the primary one.Western actors have paid considerably more attentionto aiding the economic transformation, and in certaincountries, to maintaining stability.” Similarly, the ten-dency to gloss over the shortcomings of the newlyestablished reforms and their possible long termeffects on the quality of democracy exercised in theregion have also received criticism (Mungiu-Pippidi2004; Bunce 2000: 713-14).

Ironically, the positive signals the EU has sentto the political elites and the enthusiastic response ofthe latter, the impact of the EU may be so subtle as tobe missed by the East European public altogether.Urbán (2003: 46), for instance, states that unliketheir national governments, key opinion formers out-side the capital cities were largely unaware of theimmense financial gains that most regions in theaccession countries will receive from EU regional sup-port. Despite the fact that some of the regions cov-ered had already received substantial EU aid, mostlocal opinion-makers identified the economic andsecurity dimensions of the Union as being importantand ranked the structural funds and subsidiarity rela-tively low when asked what the EU meant to them.

Middle East and North Africa

Since mid-1970s, the “third wave of democ-ratization” (a term coined by Samuel P. Huntington)has swept the world. It began with the transitions invarious European countries, such as Portugal, Spain,and Greece, and then spread into Latin America,some parts of Asia, and from 1990s onward to formercommunist countries, including Eastern Europe. Asthe 20

thcentury drew to an end, however, the “resist-

ance” of the authoritarian regimes in the Muslimworld, but particularly the MENA region to join this‘wave’ started attracting increasing attention.5

Indeed, regardless of country-specific variations, as asubset “[a]ll Arab regimes are nondemocratic; nopeaceful transfer of power has taken place in anyArab country for decades (except intergenerationalsuch as in Jordan, Syria, Morocco, or Bahrain)”(Schlumberger 2006: 34). Many variables have con-sequently been brought up in the literature to explainthe “Middle Eastern exceptionalism.”

While political scientists and regional expertswere busy trying to understand the lack of wide-spread political protests similar to those experiencedin Eastern Europe and elsewhere, the world wasabruptly shaken by a string of terrorist events perpe-trated by radical Islamists taking place in the heart ofnumerous western cities, ranging from New York to

Madrid. Many of the terrorists carried a MiddleEastern passport. What hitherto had been a more-or-less scholarly conundrum with regional consequencesthus quickly became a Western concern. The rapidpace of democratization in many parts of the world,but especially in Eastern Europe had already alertedthe scholars that something was going wrong in theMiddle East. The terrorist attacks starting withSeptember 11 have convinced many policymakers andscholars in the West, led by the USA, that spreadingdemocracy is the most effective way of eradicating therising security threat believed to emanate from theMENA. The EU has similarly stepped up its efforts inpromoting stronger political and economic ties withthe region through its strategically developed theEuropean Neighbourhood Policy. In the meantime,catching up with the recent developments in theregion, scholars have started to become more inter-ested in reversing the earlier question of why democ-ratization has not occurred to why authoritarianismhas proved so persistent in the MENA. As a conse-quence, several new arguments, including the follow-ing, have been developed to explain the phenome-non.

Earlier studies had sought the roots ofauthoritarianism in the Middle East in its culture.According to this debate, Islam and/or the MiddleEastern culture—Arab culture in particular—is inher-ently averse to nurturing democratic values and insti-tutions.6 Based on simple yet powerful assumptions(e.g. Islam’s inherent incompatibility with democraticinstitutions), such primordial explanations persist inpopular imagination and nonacademic circles.Nevertheless, their validity has never been definitivelyproven in academic studies.7

This is not to reject the significance of culturalfactors altogether, however. New research indicatesthat, unlike the political elites in Eastern Europe,moderate8 political Islamist movements in the MENA,which remain the most resilient strain of politicalopposition against the existing authoritarian regimesin that region, for instance, often explicitly expresstheir misgivings about democracy as a style of politicalregime, especially as practiced in the west. Thegeneral Islamist tendency is to treat Europeandemocracies as a cultural artifact produced by theEuropean civilization instead of a set of politicalinstitutions based on shared universal values andnorms (Kurto?lu Eski?ar 2008). This view may berelated to the emergence of political Islam as acounterparadigm . . . that offers an ideologically richand inspiring alternative to the liberal democraticvision (in contrast to the experience of Eastern Europeafter the fall of communism). Although Islamist

5 See Karatnycky 1999: 121.6 The literature on the subject is too vast to discuss in detail here. Some of the prominent works include Huntington 1996; Ben-Dor 1996;Lewis 1993: 89-90; Kedourie 1994: 5-6. 7 See, for instance, Midlarsky 1998; Tessler 2002; Fox 2001; Fish 2002. 8 Moderate in the sense that they advocate peaceful means to reach their ultimate goal, i.e., building an Islamic state, as opposed totheir radical counterparts, who advocate immediate and violent action to achieve the same result.

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ideologies need not be posed as an alternative toliberal democratic world views, they often aredeveloped in this way for reasons of politicalexpedience (Bellin 2005:35).

Meanwhile, on a wider scale, for Islamistsand nonreligious groups alike, unlike in EasternEurope, political liberalization is often associated withthe Western colonialism, which further diminishes thegeneral willingness to mobilize for democratization inthe region (ibid). More specifically, in countries likeEgypt, “democracy is indeed associated with the col-onizing West and its attempts to dehumanizeMuslims, to take away their identity and authenticity”(Korany 2006: 88). The mistrust in the Westernmotives is exacerbated by the conflicting signals com-ing from the West itself, which bolster the hand of theexisting authoritarian regimes in the Middle East(Smith 2001; Shahin 2005; Youngs 2005; Albrechtand Schlumberger 2004: 384).

While discussing the economic factors behindthe persistence of authoritarianism in the MENAregion, scholars also often underline the rentier struc-ture of many Middle Eastern states, used as a deviceto sustain the existing authoritarian regimes fordecades. Giacomo Luciani (1994: 131) defines a ren-tier state as one “whose government most or a sub-stantial part of its revenue from rents accruing fromthe outside world.” As such, they differ from the“production states” where the chief government rev-enue is accrued through taxation (ibid). Since theargument assumes that with taxation comes thedemand for representation, its absence enables theruling regimes to continue their authoritarian policies.Although the classic definition of rentier regimes isbased on those states deriving their wealth from theexport of hydrocarbon revenues, other types of rentincomes, especially in the form of foreign aid and bor-rowing also exist (Anderson 1987: 10). Rentier statesare assumed as able to resist the pressures for democ-ratization as long as the conditions that nurture therent-based structure (i.e. hydrocarbon revenues orother rents and their distribution pattern) remainintact.

Nevertheless, the classic rentier system as avariable seems unable to explain the persistence ofauthoritarianism on its own. Data from 1950s to themid-1980s indicate that in at least several MiddleEastern countries, where democratization or demo-cratic consolidation remains a problem, taxation rateswere quite above the expected levels (Henry 1996: 4-5; Heydemann 1993). Furthermore, while the oilcrises that shook the rest of the world helped to con-solidate the authoritarian regimes in the Middle Eastduring 1970s, the conditions were reversed with thecollapse of state-led economies and the rising unem-ployment fueled by the increasing birthrates through-out the region since 1980s (Albrecht and

Schlumberger 2004: 382-83). Bread riots began sur-facing in countries like Algeria and Egypt. The condi-tions were getting ideal for a political transition.Contrary to Eastern Europe, however, the expectedregime shifts never occurred. In fact, to this date“popular mobilization on behalf of political reformremains weak. Nowhere in the region do you seemammoth cross-class coalitions mobilizing on thestreets to push for reform” (Bellin 2005: 35).9

Even so, the Islamist terrorist attacks world-wide have increased the Western inclination to sup-port the spread of democracy in the MENA. Similarly,the mounting political opposition posed by the nonvi-olent and widely popular Islamist groups at home hasincreased the pressure on the existing authoritarianregimes to find alternate ways to maintain their gripover the political scene. Reinventing the classic ‘rent’structure to disperse the current pressures on theauthoritarian regimes has been a result of their quest.New research on the changing rentier structures out-lines this process well. Gandhi and Przeworski(2006:13), for instance, argue that in our model ‘ren-tier states,’ which need little or no cooperation togenerate rents, make substantial policy concessionswhenever the power of the dictator is threatened.This conclusion goes against the vast rentier state lit-erature, which typically claims that dictators inresource-rich countries counter political threats onlyby distributing rents.

Meanwhile Pripstein Posusney (2005:7)underlines that while decreasing rentier resources caneventually lead to some form of political pluralization,it may or may not lead to democratization in the longrun. Indeed, a rising number of new studies refer tothe ability for the existing authoritarian regimes in theMiddle East “to make use of inconsistent Westerninterests in their struggle for regime maintenance[and] . . . successfully turned constraints into opportu-nities” (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004: 384).

Thus, the Arab governments in particularhave generally responded to the increasing Westernpressures for democratization in recent years in threeways. One of them has been to use the democratiza-tion discourse to channel funds—a la rents—to pro-mote or prolong their regime. Ironically, afterSeptember 11 attacks, the authoritarian regimes inthe Middle East have discovered a new income—orrent—in the form of the rising Western interest andconsequent aid in democratizing the Middle East(Menéndez and Youngs 2006; Shahin 2005). In fact,as Albrecht and Schlumberger (2004: 376) brilliantlysummarize Arab incumbents quickly learned the les-son of what was expected internationally and adopt-ed the ‘democracy language’; talking the ‘donor talk’became a prerequisite for political rent-seeking.‘Democracy-money’ that results from the successfuladoption of this language is extremely attractive toArab regimes because it consists almost exclusively of

9 Such observations have even been made for Turkey; one of the few existing democracies in the region (Yalcin Mousseau 2006: 304).

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nonrefundable grants and does not increase thestate’s financial burden as much as economic devel-opment assistance, where the share of loans is higher.

In cases where they have been unable to con-trol the grants directly, the same regimes haveattempted to infiltrate the existing non-governmentalorganizations and/or form their parallel ‘grassroots’organizations. This is considered an extreme attemptto suffocate any kind of dissent among the public,claimed to even surpass the undemocratic methodsemployed by authoritarian governments elsewhere,including the former East European regimes (Albrechtand Schlumberger 2004: 383-386). Consequently,unlike in Eastern Europe, where the NGOs generallybecome mouthpieces of their societies’ demand forchange and democratization, those that exist in theMiddle East have been moving in the exact oppositedirection. Compared with the East European coun-tries, the whole situation constitutes an irony, since“[c]ivil society in many countries was rightly consid-ered the celebrity of democratic resistance and transi-tion” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 9).10

Referring to the grassroots organizationsestablished and maintained without any foreign sup-port in the region, some observers offer a contradic-tory view, and argue that in countries like Egypt,“[t]he expansion of civil society . . . is best understoodas a reflection and cause of local states’ decliningeffectiveness and legitimacy. Civil society has served .. . as the base from which Islamist revolutionaries havelaunched an impressive challenge to the status quo”(Berman 2003:13). Pointing out to the vibrant civilsociety that existed during the Weimar Republic andits inability to prevent the later catastrophe, Bunce(2008:29) similarly warns against the “cliché to arguethat the best investment in democracy is the expan-sion of civil society” and adds that in the Weimar case,“a large civil society could not compensate for . . . theanti-democratic agenda of many of these associationsand the striking failure of civil society networks tobring diverse groups in German society in contact andcollaboration with one another.” Even if most grass-roots organizations in the MENA region are indeedinfiltrated and operated by the political opponents,the latter is mostly represented by political Islamists,whose attitude toward democracy and democraticinstitutions as understood by the west remain mixed,at best.

The second response of the Middle Easterngovernments has revolved around creating newsources of rent in the form of foreign aid propelled bythe existing fears on Islamist terrorism sinceSeptember 11 attacks to exacerbate the existing sus-picion between the West and their opponents.Internally, it has given them a new excuse for repress-ing political opposition. For instance, Shahin (2005:

126) argues that The Egyptian government has beenexploiting this state of indecisiveness to pit domesticand external actors against each other. It has intimi-dated the pro-reform movements and the independ-ent, nongovernmental organisations by raising issuesof national sovereignty, violation of the country’sindependence and even treason.

Meanwhile, in Jordan the new measuresenable the state to prosecute any movement that vio-lates the “integrity of the state.” The latter term isconveniently left without an explicit definition to fitinto the needs of the existing regime (Bank andSchlumberger 2004: 53). The fact that many of theorganized opposition movements throughout theMiddle East also display varying shades of Islamismand anti-systemic characteristics has also played intothe hands of the authoritarian governments.

Finally, there is the attempt of the authoritar-ian regimes to divert both the Western and domesticfocus from democratization through controlled eco-nomic liberalization. Perthes (2004: 24) points outthat in recent years the governments of Algeria,Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, andTunisia have all placed emphasis on securing the skillsand knowledge of technocrats with economic expert-ise or have at least tried to incorporate business peo-ple and private sector representatives into formal deci-sion making or consultative structures.

The underlying idea is to depoliticize the pub-lic sphere by emphasizing the necessity of implement-ing economic reforms before launching into the polit-ical realm. While propelled by a genuine concern tomodernize the economic system of their countries tosome degree, the authoritarian regimes in the MiddleEast nevertheless also seem devoted to circumscribeany sparks that can light the political field againstthemselves (Bank and Schlumberger 2004: 50-52).

Conclusion:

The recent political and economic transfor-mation of Eastern Europe remains one of the mostoutstanding events of modern history. Meanwhile,the lack of wide-sweeping democratic transitions inthe MENA is similarly noteworthy due to its increas-ingly alienated status in the face of the ongoingworldwide democratization trend. A subject awaitingfurther inquiry for scholars is the impact of the politi-cal transformation or democratization of the formerEastern bloc on the—now—neighboring the MENAregion. An implicit—yet unexplored—hypothesis ofthis paper is that the successful political transforma-tion of Eastern Europe has raised the stakes of thedemocratization attempts in the MENA. If nothing, ithas increased the pressure over the authoritarianregimes there to find new ways of justifying their pro-longed existence.

10 See also Berman 2003:13; Bunce 2008:30). Here the term "civil society" follows the definition of Linz and Stepan (1996:7), who describeit as "that arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt toarticulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests."

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In recent years, the EU has stepped up itsefforts to promote democratization in the MiddleEast, most recently through the EuropeanNeighborhood Policy. Within the EU, such attemptsare often spearheaded by the former colonizers whodesire to foster stronger cultural and economic tieswith the region (Attinà 2003: 191; Emerson et al2005: 177; 217). However, its Eastern Europeanmembers need not be a bystander in this processeither. In fact, with its transition experiences stillfresh, this region has more to offer than the consoli-dated democracies of the West. Meanwhile, for aca-demicians, the remaining lacuna between these twobodies of literature remains real and requires bridg-ing.

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37



Maximilian Spinner*

Abstract:

Almost two decades after their transition to democracy it is no longer questioned whether the new EU memberstates of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are democratic in the minimalist, procedural sense. Academic atten-tion has turned to analysing various pathways of democratic development in the region and the consolidation ofdemocracy (CoD). CoD in the broadest sense investigates the stability and survival of democratic regimes.1 Inopposition to transitologists (which focuses on the regime question), CoD addresses the question of what kind ofdemocracy is actually developing in various countries.2 Next to institutional and behavioural factors cultural or atti-tudinal variables are increasingly considered in this context. Elite commitment to the existing democratic systemis seen as a crucial component of CoD.3

Keywords:

Democracy, transition, CEE countries, EU acquis, EU accession, consensualism

Transition as a Legacy

* Mr. Maximilian Spinner works for the German Foreign Ministry. This article was prepared for the conference "New Democracies in SouthEast Europe", New Europe College, Bucharest, 31 May - 3 June 2007, sponsored by Hertie School of Governance Berlin and represents thepersonal opinion of the author.1 G Munck, 'The Regime Question - Theory Building in Democracy Studies', World Politics, Vol.54, October 2001, p.130.2 P Schmitter / N Guilhot, 'From Transition to Consolidation: Extending the Concept of Democratization and the Practice of Democracy', in:M. Dobry (ed.), Democratic and Capitalist Transitions in Eastern Europe: Lessons for the Social Sciences, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000, p.132.3 J Higley / Gy Lengyel (eds.), Elites after State Socialism - Theory and Analysis, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

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In spite of the increasing differentiationbetween CEE democracies one striking commonalityappears to be the fact that virtually all ended up hav-ing an institutional set-up with a high number of“veto players” in decision-making, or somethingArend Lijphart would call consensus democracy.4

Most CEE systems are marked by the following fac-tors: strongly proportional electoral systems, weak,short-lasting coalition governments, multi-party sys-tems, rigid constitutions with a strong judicial review,independent Central Banks and an increasing degreeof decentralisation. These features endow the demo-cratic systems of these states with a high number ofveto players and require much more negotiation andaccommodation between participants in the politicalgame than more majoritarian systems.

However, both domestic and externalobservers find little signs of accommodative and con-sensual patterns of elite interaction in the regionreaching the standards of established Western con-sensus democracies.5 Moreover, having successfullyconcluded EU accession some external incentives forenforcing consensualism on a narrower range of poli-cies and institutions have diminished. Indeed, the firstpost-accession years saw a surge in electoral supportfor parties lacking commitment to both Europeanintegration and certain core values of liberal, Westernstyle democracy (as seen in Poland or Slovakia). Thisincluded a startling revival of authoritarian, national-istic, xenophobic, and illiberal ideas as well as a ques-tioning of certain constitutionally enshrined key ele-ments of consensus democracy and the EU acquis(such as minority representation in parliament) bysome political leaders.

In many instances it seems that institutionscannot regulate political conflict the way they areexpected to do and conflicts are carried out beyondboundaries of the established institutions. Elster, Offeand Preuss see democracy consolidated when therules according to which political and but also con-cerning distributional conflicts are carried out are nolonger object of conflict themselves.6 According tothis definition we cannot really talk about fully consol-idated democracies in CEE: In some countries such as

Poland, Hungary, Slovakia or Romania political elitesappear to be more and more separated by unbridge-able cultural-ideological divides impacting day-to-daypolitics and a lack of agreement on the fuctioning ofbasic political institutions. Hungary, a so far seeming-ly stable democracy experienced a partial breakdownof routinized democratic politics in favour of partlyviolent street politics. Conflicts touching upon thelegitimacy of basic democratic institutions (parlia-ment, presidency, justice) and their rights have beenseen in Hungary, Romania or Poland. Populist, polar-izing policies seem to be increasingly adopted bypolitical leaders in a number of countries. More gen-erally, these observations shed doubt on the expecta-tion that institutional convergence with mainstreamEuropean institutions would also lead to a conver-gence in elite political culture in terms of commitmentand adaptation to the values of the new democraticsystem. This paper therefore focuses on some of thesources of the (lack of) commitment by political elitesto the existing democratic set-up, in particular theirlimited ability to interact in a consensus-democraticinstitutional setting. Finally, some consequences shallbe discussed.

In this regard, I view institutions and institu-tional changes as following both rationalist and soci-ological dynamics. This means that actors aim at effi-ciently pursuing certain pre-existing preferences inpicking institutions and interacting through them (i.e.the “logic of consequentialism”), and they also actaccording to the logic of “appropriateness” (i.e. intheir behaviour they adapt to collective norms of“what is right,” which are embodied in institutions).7

For the context of consensus democracy this meansthat institutional constraints, such as a high numberof veto players in the democratic game, forces actorsto some extent to co-operate, exchange information,and seek commonly acceptable solutions for pursuingtheir individual interests. On the other hand, institu-tional constraints themselves are not sufficient to con-solidate consensus democracy. As Körösényi pointsout: a power-sharing consensus-democratic set-updoes not create consensus by itself, but makes it moredifficult, if not impossible, to govern in a majoritarian,

4 In this place I will not discuss the merits and shortcomings of Lijphart's typology and just take the notion of consensus democracy and theconcept of veto players as a broad characterization of CEE democracies. For a detailed critique of Lijphart and the application of his typolo-gy to CEE countries see M Spinner, Compulsory Consensus? The Sources of Elite Political Culture and the Consolidation of Central and EastEuropean Democracies, unpublished PhD thesis, Central European University Budapest, 2007.5 E.g. A Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999, pp.292-5; R Tökés, 'Hungary: Elites and the Use andAbuse of Democratic Institutions', in: J Higley / Gy Lengyel (eds.), Elites after State Socialism - Theory and Analysis, Lanham: Rowman &Littlefield, 2000 for the case of Hungary.6 J Elster, C Offe, U Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies - Rebuilding the Ship at Sea, Cambridge University Press, 1998,p.28.7 J March, J Olsen, 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', American Political Science Review, Vol.78, No.3,Sept.1984, pp.734-749; J March, J Olsen, 'The logic of appropriateness', Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo, ARENAWorking Papers 04/09, Oslo, 2004.

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confrontational style.8 In fact, a consensus-democrat-ic set-up with a high number of veto players actuallyoffers actors the resources for both confrontationaland co-operative strategies.9

Put differently, if the survival of a consensus-democratic system is only dependent on either contin-uously favourable output for all players or upon coer-cion, it is built upon shaky ground indeed. This isespecially the case if democratic consolidation is to goalong with the upheavals of economic reform orsocial change. Therefore, I do not regard mere instru-mental support for the democratic system as a suffi-cient indicator for CoD. Instrumental support meansthat “actors follow the rules of the democratic gamebecause they do not see a chance to, or advantage in,changing them”.10 Yet if actors are only to pursue pre-defined, egoistic interests, they might not regularlyprefer co-operative strategies over confrontationalones in the context of a consensualist institutional set-up (i.e. a democracy with many inbuilt veto-players).Thus, next to mere instrumental support for consen-sus democracy, we should also pay attention to thenormative foundations of consensus democratic insti-tutions and their reflection in political culture.Consequently, the persistence of consensus democra-cy becomes more likely if political elites not onlyregard consensus democracy as serving their interestsbest but also come to embrace its underlying normsand values. Here are six dimensions of elite politicalculture, which express the “spirit of accommodation”of consensus democracy:

1. the centrality of compromise and consensus(opposed to free-for-all competition only) 2. politicians as keepers of the common good(and not just representatives of particular inter-

ests) 3. an emphasis on established procedures (asopposed to a focus on outputs only)4. support for preserving the institutional sta-tus quo 5. respect towards “the other”.11

In this paper I will discuss some hypotheses ofwhy some of these dimensions are rather absent inCEE elite political cultures.

Around 1990, when the outcome of the transi-tion processes was still unsure scholars theorizedabout various “modes of transition”. They discussedthe chances and pitfalls of installing democracy grad-ually or quickly, the various constellations betweenmasses and elites, and between old and new leaders.12

In the end, liberal democracies were rather quicklyand successfully installed in all CEE countries. Lateron, scholars of CoD turned to more long-term struc-tural conditions as explanatory variables such as thelevel of economic development, the absence of deep-cutting cleavages, neighbourhood to other democrat-ic countries etc.13 Therefore, most students of democ-racy basically agree to Dankward Rustow’s insightthat the factors that keep a democracy stable may notbe the ones that brought it into existence in the firstplace. Differently from that, I argue in this paper thatalso the dynamics of transition do leave a legacy andkeep impacting upon the stability and future develop-ment of an existing democracy.

Historically, consensus democracies are to befound in a number of West European countries asopposed to majoritarian forms predominantly foundin the English-speaking world or South America.14

West European countries developed consensus

8 A Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999, p.293.9 T Börzel, 'Demokratien im Wandel der Europäisierung', in: J Katenhusen, W Lamping (eds.), Demokratien in Europa - Der Einfluß dereuropäischen Integration auf Institutionen und neue Kulturen des demokratischen Verfassungsstaates, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2003,p.191; similarly Steiner et al. 2004.10 C Schneider, Patterns of Consolidated Democracies. Europe and Latin America Compared, PhD dissertation, European University Institute,Florence, 2004, pp.53-54.11 M Spinner, Compulsory Consensus? The Sources of Elite Political Culture and the Consolidation of Central and East EuropeanDemocracies', PhD thesis, Budapest, Central European University, 2007, online: www.ceu.hu/polsci/theses.html.12 T Karl, 'Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America', Comparative Politics, Vol.23, No.1, Oct.1990, pp.1.-21. T Karl / P Schmitter,'Modes of transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe', International Social Science Journal, No.128, May 1991, pp.269-284;O Encarnación, 'Do Political Pacts Freeze Democracy? Spanish and South American Lessons', West European Politics, Vol.28, No.1, January2005; G Munck / C Skalnik Leff, 'Modes of Transition and Democratisation: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective',in: L Anderson (ed.), Transitions to Democracy, New York: Columbia UP, 1999, pp.193-216; J Higley / Gy Lengyel (eds.), Elites after StateSocialism - Theory and Analysis, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000; J Higley, J Pakulski and W Wesolowski (eds.), Postcommunist Elitesand Democracy in Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1998; S Huntington, The Third Wave - Democratization in the late twentieth centu-ry, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.13 J Linz / A Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe,Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996; A Schedler, 'What is Democratic Consolidation?', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1998, pp. 91-107; L Diamond, Developing Democracy - Toward Consolidation, Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1999.14 A Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy -Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven: Yale UP, 1999; J Colomer,'Strategies and Outcomes in Eastern Europe', Journal of Democracy, Vol.6, No.2, 1995, pp. 74-85; H Kitschelt/ Z Mansfeldova/ R Markovski/G Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems - Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation, Cambridge, CUP, 1999, pp. 345-346; ARoberts, 'What Type of Democracy Is Emerging in Eastern Europe?', paper presented at the American Political Science Association annualmeeting, September 2004.

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democracy with a power-sharing institutional set-upand utilized coalescent, co-operative elite strategies asan answer to the threats of deep societal cleavages(e.g. religion, language, class). CEE countries endedup with power-sharing institutions due to the contin-gent dynamics of the transition process, though large-ly lacking the differentiated cleavage structures andnot featuring particularly consensus-oriented elitepractices. A high number of veto players in the politi-cal system became an outcome almost by default, andthus a point of convergence among the differentcountries of the region. Institutional designers deliber-ately chose to insert power-sharing elements insteadof opting for majoritarian solutions in response to ahigh degree of uncertainty and political volatility,which soon became visible in the rapid proliferation ofmultiple parties and rather instable party systems.Consensus institutions in the East were the outcomeof short-term contingencies as transition took place inan ‘underdetermined political situation.’15 In this con-text institutions were hardly the outcomes of endoge-nous structural or cultural conditions, but ratherdepended on contingent power constellations, indi-vidual agency, and exogenous factors (e.g. WestEuropean models).

Majoritarian solutions were preferred only bypost-communist parties when they were clearly in astrong position assuming the popularity of their indi-vidual leaders.16 Later these arrangements were oftenreverted once the former opposition came to power.Consensus solutions from the beginning were usuallythe result of a balance of power between the old eliteand the opposition during transition. Cases with thedominance of opposition groups in the transition alsomostly ended up with consensus set-ups as an insur-ance against a potential return of communists intopower.

Also, the motivation to strengthen the rule oflaw supported the development of consensus institu-tions as it led to rather rigid constitutions and a strongjudicial review in deliberate opposition to the commu-nist dead-letter constitutions. Once installed, consen-sus systems also have the tendency to reinforce them-

selves due to their inherent brakes on constitutionalchange.17 Finally (and quite importantly), the processof Europeanization with its focus on subsidiarity,minority representation, civil society involvement,regionalization, decentralisation and monetary stabil-ity constrained the choices of aspiring EU memberstates in CEE and supported the development of moreconsensual institutions. In fact, EU conditionality foraccession put a particular focus on “getting the insti-tutions right”. The existence of prescribed formalinstitutions is, of course, much easier to ascertain andto monitor than their subsequent operation.Nevertheless, by this approach the EU seems to followLijphart’s and others’ somewhat optimistic assump-tion that the existence of a specific formal institution-al set-up will transform political culture (as well asbureaucratic, business, and legal cultures).

CEE countries in their constitutional featuresthus increasingly resemble West European consensusdemocracies but lack the differentiated social land-scape of Western European societies in the mid-20th

century. Save for re-emerging ethnic cleavages insome countries, the post-communist social landscapeis rather flat, unstructured, and de-mobilised.18

Therefore, there are no deep cleavages posing animmediate danger to democratic stability whichwould require power-sharing approaches. Moreover,in the West European context, political leaders andparties can organize political conflict and still repre-sent more or less stable and homogeneous groups ofvoters. This is much less true for the much morevolatile and socially disconnected party systems inCEE.19

Consequently, one might wonder which fac-tors might actually condition elites’ support for con-sensus democracy if domestic pressure from below isabsent. In terms of historical factors, pre-transitionlegacies are rather mixed and ambiguous in terms ofcarrying consensual elite political cultures in theregion. Unlike the West European tradition, most CEEpolitical elites do not have a long experience of suc-cessful, consensual cooperation in democratic set-tings.20 Rather than bridging internal divisionsthrough domestic demands one could argue that CEE

15 P Schmitter / N Guilhot, 'From Transition to Consolidation: Extending the Concept of Democratization and the Practice of Democracy', in:M. Dobry (ed.), Democratic and Capitalist Transitions in Eastern Europe: Lessons for the Social Sciences, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000, p.134.16 H Kitschelt/ Z Mansfeldova/ R Markovski/ G Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems - Competition, Representation and Inter-PartyCooperation, Cambridge, CUP, 1999, p.32.17 J Colomer, 'Strategies and Outcomes in Eastern Europe', Journal of Democracy, Vol.6, No.2, 1995, pp. 74-85; A Roberts, 'What Type ofDemocracy Is Emerging in Eastern Europe?', paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, September2004.18 Zs Enyedi, 'The role of agency in cleavage formation', European Journal of Political Research, Vol.44, No.3, 2005, p.697.19 I van Biezen, 'On the theory and practice of party formation and adaptation in new democracies', European Journal of Political Research,Vol.44, 2005, pp.147-174; K Armingeon, 'Forms of government in post-communist countries', paper prepared for the ECPR JointWorkshops, Granada, Spain, April 2005.20 A Seleny, 'Old Political Rationalities and New Democracies - Compromise and Confrontation in Hungary and Poland', World Politics,Vol.51, July 1999, pp.481-519; H Kitschelt/ Z Mansfeldova/ R Markovski/ G Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems - Competition,Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation, Cambridge, CUP, 1999.

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elites, throughout the last century, were actuallyforced into mutual cooperation through external pres-sures by neighbouring great powers. Thus, exogenousfactors rather than domestic developments enforcedelite unity and covered deep divisions, if only tem-porarily and under non-democratic circumstances.Collaboration with Nazi Germany, Sovietization andlater endeavours to appease Moscow against interfer-ing with certain national variations of socialism notonly determined the outlook of the respective politicalelites but surely had a lasting and formative impact onnational collective memories until today.

The history of externally constrained or evenimposed choices goes on with the countries’ integra-tion into the European Union or, more generally, CEEintegration into global capitalism and internationalcompetition for access to markets and investment.Lack of adaptation to the European mainstream nowthreatens economic marginalization and replaces thethreat of aggression from hegemonic neighbours asin the past. Unlike other small, capitalist economiessuch as the Netherlands or Denmark after the WorldWar II, CEE countries are facing a much more narrow-ly constrained choice of institutions and policieswhich need to be employed in order to be acceptedinto the European or global capitalist mainstream. Atthe same time, they have much less opportunity tocontribute to determine these policies on the supra-national level.21

This makes it even more difficult to establishin how far institutional choices such as consensusdemocracy might not just be another external modelwhich is somewhat ritualistically and opportunisticallybacked for lack of leeway. Geoffrey Pridham’s claimthat CEE political elites seemingly “hardly developedtheir own ideas about democratic development” or“were too busy” for elaborating alternative conceptstherefore has to be seen in the light of the overridingpriority of EU accession.22 He concedes that EU acces-sion resulted in removing institutional uncertainty fol-lowing transition, but did not necessarily lead to aremaking of political culture or the dissemination andinternalisation of the principles and norms underlyingthe new institutions.23 Hughes, Sasse and Gordonargue that there was an underlying assumption thatEU conditionality would have a “normative power”;that actors would be socialized into their underlying

values, along with the power of hard economic incen-tives and bureaucratic leverage. However, investigat-ing regionalization policy the authors show that theEU Commission was not so much concerned with thenormative content of “capacity-building,” but prima-rily with organizational and technical issues. Theauthors conclude that actually little socialization of(sub-national) elites had taken place and thatEuropeanization had much weaker effects thanexpected. They also find path dependent factors indomestic political settings to be more important thanexternal conditionality. 24

When it comes to explain the lack of adapta-tion to the existing consensus democratic system areaspecialists often advance deep historical, culturalexplanations e.g. by pointing to “eternal” culturalcleavages. These explanations often imply a determin-istic or tautological causality and have little explanato-ry power in themselves. However, I think we shouldnot dismiss pre-democratic historical legacies at oncebut rather try to introduce them in systematic fashion.In this paper I claim that the dynamics of elite-driventransitions in 1989 still leave a mark on contemporarypolitical culture and impede the development of a“spirit of accommodation”. The relaxation of external-ly enforced elite unity with succssful EU accessionthese unsolved legacies have come to the fore again.In this regard I also try to propose a non-reductionist,non-tautological concept of political culture.

In order to operationalize the above-men-tioned five dimensions of a consensus-oriented politi-cal culture our theoretical understanding of politicalculture needs to be clarified. In my dissertation I dis-cuss extensively the advantages and disadvantages ofthe classical understanding of political culture in thetradition of Almond and Verba and based on my crit-icism propose a different conceptualization.25 Mostapproaches to political culture use the socio-psycho-logical, attitude-based approach. Basically, accordingto these approaches, individually internalised values inthe form of attitudes contribute to shape people’sbehaviour by prescribing or prohibiting ways of action(without contextual factors). For political elites specif-ic approaches along the lines of this model weredeveloped in which politicians are seen as being influ-enced by an “operational code”, i.e. certain cognitivepredispositions, ideals about the world and profes-

21 S Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy - Building Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland, New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2005, pp.37-54.22 G Pridham, 'EU Accession and Democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe: Lessons from the Enlargement of 2004', in: R Di Quirico(ed.), Europeanization and Democratisation - Institutional Adaptation, Conditionality and Democratisation in the EU's Neighbour Countries,Florence: European Press Academic Publishing, 2005, pp.67-68.23 G Pridham, 2005, p.78.24 J Hughes, G Sasse, C Gordon, Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU's Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe - The Myth ofConditionality, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.25 G Almond & S Verba, The Civic Culture - Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Princeton UP, 1963.

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sional values implicitly guide action.26 Unlike the masspopulation, political leaders, according to the classicalmodel of political culture, are claimed to hold morecoherent beliefs which are more intensely held andrelatively stable as compared to those of the generalpopulation.27 According to Almond & Verba and theirfollowers, an appropriate political culture in a moderndemocracy (“civic culture”) is developed over time bybecoming socialised into the system. Socio-economicbackground factors (e.g .origin, education) are seento mediate this process. Thus, ultimately, according tothis approach political elites in CEE democraciesshould over time become increasingly socialised intoconsensus democracy by practicing it, internalise its underlying values (as embodied in the above-mentioned five dimensions) and act accordingly.

My approach to political culture divergesfrom the above-outlined as it focuses on explicitrather than implicit values and orientations. Moreover,I do not regard political culture as reducible to individ-ual attitudes. Thus, rather than inferring individuallyinternalised attitudes I focus on collectively shared dis-courses among political leaders about the existingdemocratic system. By focusing on explicit discoursesrather than implicit attitudes also the problem of hon-esty in reporting (e.g. as in traditional survey-basedresearch) is circumvented. This problem is particularlyevident with political elites, who may conceal theirindividual opinion behind rhetoric while being skilfulat finding the right messages appealing to the public.Rather than expose their inner self, they know whatkind of beliefs they should advocate (what is appropri-ate, expected, or seen as politically correct etc.) in agiven context.

Thus, rather than a “strong” socialisation intothe values of consensus democracy, i.e. internalisationand subsequent compliance with them, I will focus onexpressions of a “weak” socialisation which meansthat actors must come to publicly acknowledge cer-tain statements or claims as true (repeatedly and overtime), but not necessarily alter their individual ways ofcognition and private normative appraisal of these

values. As a result, political culture is both constrain-ing and enabling by informing or precluding certainkinds of action through the availability of certain dis-courses, which are both descriptive and prescriptive.28

Therefore, in the given context of the discursive field,actors do make choices and act ‘rationally’. Discoursesdefine the boundaries of the possible; they contributeto shape expectations and create incentives.29 As aconsequence, political elites have to submit to a cer-tain degree of consistency in applying these discours-es when interacting among themselves or when com-peting for voters’ support.30 However, we cannotexpect them to fully submit their behaviour to theseexpressed values.

The expectation of traditional approaches isthat deeply internalised values should turn into con-forming behaviour. The focus on discourses ratherthan attitudes relaxes the assumption that values onlyinfluence action as long as they are internalized andsincerely believed. Discourses shared in the socialspace have a power on their own to evoke coopera-tion and conflict, or to give a certain meaning to par-ticular situations or actions.31 For example, actors can“rhetorically entrap” or “shame” other actors by pub-licly exposing behaviour that contradicts the sharedvalues of the community to which also the shamedactor has publicly committed. This way, actors whopublicly pledge to certain ideals are either disciplinedby other actors into conforming behaviour, or facepossible electoral punishment and/or marginalizationwithin the elites for “breaking the rules”. For this tohappen, neither the shamer nor the shamed need tohave individually accepted and internalised the validi-ty of the truth claims on which the shaming takesplace. In fact, the shamer can use commonly upheldvalues in an instrumental way to advance his owninterests, while the shamed has left the commonlydeclared values once they stood in the way of his ego-istic interests.32 Still, these values constrain and indi-rectly regulate behaviour.

Not only political leaders approach realityrhetorically by making use of these common discur-sive resources.33 Yet, being the major actors in a coun-

25 G Almond & S Verba, The Civic Culture - Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Princeton UP, 1963.26 R Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians - Ideology, Conflict and Democracy in Britain and Ital', New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973; RRohrschneider, Learning Democracy - Democratic and Economic Values in Unified Germany, Oxford UP, 1999.27 R Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1976, p.116.28 C. Cruz, 'Identity and Persuasion - How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make Their Futures', World Politics, Vol. 52, April 2000, p.278.29 C Cruz, 2000, p.279.30 S Neckel, 1995, p.665; C Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua - World Making in the Tropics,New York: Cambridge UP, 2005, p.29.31 A Seleny, 'The Foundations of Post-Socialist Legitimacy', in: A Braun, Z Barany (eds.), Dilemmas of Transition - The Hungarian Experience,Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, p.135.32 F Schimmelfennig, 'The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,International Organization, Vol.55, No.1., winter 2001, pp.47-80.32 F Schimmelfennig, 'The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,International Organization, Vol.55, No.1., winter 2001, pp.47-80.

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try’s political discourse, contrary to other types ofelites (academics and artists, for instance), politicalelites are constantly required to publicly justify theiractions in order to gain the support of their elec-torates and constituencies.34 Similar to a “tool-kit,” 35

actors apply particular discourses in order to legitimisecertain institutional designs or actions, or in order toexclude other arguments from the “field of the imag-inable”. They engage in “normative scheming,” asConsuelo Cruz calls it.36 Thus, they are not fully deter-mined by fixed value orientations, but do have a lim-ited choice among a number of existing idioms. Thisconcept of political culture does not require people toput faith in certain values or ideologies, but to respectthem through their way of talking and behaving.37

Thus, we can conceptualize commitment to aset of certain values (e.g. those of consensus democ-racy) as a continuum leading from mere rhetorical“lip-service” to deeply internalized beliefs and achange in identity that incorporates these values.Depending on the position on this continuum, behav-iour is constrained to a lower or higher degree or, inthe unrealistic and extreme case of full internalisation,it is virtually fixed along the lines of these values.“Weakly” socialised actors rhetorically uphold the val-ues of the community which, however, do not over-ride or replace their egoistic material interests at alltimes. Moreover, as mentioned, this approach doesnot exclude the possibility that actors use communityvalues in an instrumental way to pursue preferences inline with, but not necessarily inspired by, the standardof legitimacy.38 Thus, this concept of political culturesubscribes to the logic of appropriateness, but in aless rigid way by accepting that (weak) socializationinto certain values does not necessitate a change ofinterests. Subsequent internalisation of these valuesthrough arguing, collective deliberation or individualreflection (or through psychological mechanisms suchas cognitive dissonance) is nevertheless possible. Inepistemological and methodological terms, however,strong socialization (with the full internalization ofthese values) can only be inferred. Explicit rhetoricalcommitment is much easier operationalized as we can

investigate the extent to which a discourse is shared,but we cannot establish directly as to how deeply it isanchored in individual mind-sets. This we can onlyinfer by relating pronounced values to real behaviour.

Separating implicit normative support for agiven system from explicit respect for certain rulesconsequently leads to an ontologically differentunderstanding of the consolidation of democracy,too. Consolidated democracy is not a material thing“out there”; it is not an object, but an inference, oreven just an argument.39 Andreas Schedler rightlypoints out that the notion of democratic consolida-tion resembles the concept of legitimacy. Legitimacy isnot an objective feature of a system, but it is attrib-uted to it by individuals on a subjective basis: noregime is intrinsically legitimate but it is perceived orassigned to be so. The same can be argued for dem-ocratic consolidation. As Max Weber spoke aboutbelief in legitimacy (Legitimitätsglaube) consolidationmeans a “belief in stability” or an “expectation of per-sistence”. It is expressed by domestic actors, or byexternal observers such as students of democratisa-tion.40 Linz and Stepan (i.e. two of the most promi-nent students of democratisation) view (attitudinal)consolidation of democracy as being achieved “when,even in the face of severe political and economiccrises, the overwhelming majority of the peoplebelieve that any further change must emerge fromwithin the parameters of the democratic game.”41

Instead, Schedler argues, the concept should rest onthe claim that actors in the democratic game believethat “further change will emerge from within theparameters of the democratic game.” 42

For this, actors must share a similar under-standing of the desirability of the existing system, andthe legitimate way to operate it, i.e. a similar kind ofcommitment. Therefore, students of democracy intheir judgement concerning democratic consolidation(i.e. their expectations concerning the persistence ofthe existing system) should rely not so much onexogenously imposed measurements, but on the“indicators” and yardsticks used by the actors them-selves. Legitimacy, being a subjective attribution as

33 C Cruz, 2000, p.275.34 M Marcussen, Thomas Risse, Daniela Engelmann-Martin, Hans Joachim Knopf and Klaus Roscher, 'Constructing Europe? The evolution ofFrench, British and German nation state identities', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.6, No.4 (Special Issue), 1999, pp.614-633.35 A Swidler, 'Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies', American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, April 1986, pp. 273-286.36 C Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua - World Making in the Tropics, New York: CambridgeUP, 2005, p.6.37 J Schull, 1992, pp. 728-741.38 F Schimmelfennig, 'The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,International Organization, Vol.55, No.1., winter 2001, pp.62-77.39 A Schedler, 'Measuring Democratic Consolidation', Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2001, p.67.40 A Schedler, 'How Should We Study Democratic Consolidation', Democratization, Vol.5, No.4, winter 1998, p.11; M Weber, Wirtschaft undGesellschaft, (Economy and Society, English translation by G Roth and C Wittich, eds.), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, p.37.41 J Linz / A Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe,Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996, p.6.42 Schedler, 2001, p. 67.

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mentioned above, is established “by showing that thedecisions accomplish appropriate objectives or inten-tions, or by showing that they are made in appropri-ate ways”.43 A habitus shared by the political elite of apolity embodies this concept of appropriateness.Therefore, consensus democracy is consolidated ifactors treat it as legitimate based on similar collectiverepresentations (in turn, reflecting the spirit of accom-modation in their shared habitus). This verstehendeperspective also avoids a normative bias for or againstparticular democratic systems through exogenouslyassigned, often arbitrary or highly demanding indica-tors of CoD.

Using the concept of habitus CoD thenmeans that actors share similar conventions, interpre-tations and justifications for the existing democraticsystem employing a limited set of collective discours-es. For the cases of consensus democratic settings thismeans that actors share common discourses based onthe above-mentioned, interlinked five ideationaldimensions of consensus democracy. In line withBourdieu we could therefore define the stability andpersistence of the democratic set-up of CoD as a thecreation of a common-sense, self-evident “consensuson the meaning of the [democratic] practices […], theharmonization of agents’ experiences and the con-stant reinforcement each of them receives fromexpression […] leading to durable dispositions to rec-ognize and comply with the immanent demands”.44

Already Gaetano Mosca, one of the earliest elite the-orists in social science, emphasises the need for aclose correspondence between the political systemand the so-called “political formula” (i.e. the moraland legal principles which are used to justify any polit-ical regime).45 Similarly, Vilfredo Pareto argues thatsimilar values define the identity of any elite.46 EvenJoseph Schumpeter (who is often credited with hav-ing defined a “minimalist” understanding of democ-racy based on peaceful elite circulation via elections)laid down a number of key preconditions for its prop-er functioning: a well-established political elite shouldbe fit to govern, hold a professional code of conductand a common fund of views. Members of parliamentshould exercise self-control and resist selfish tempta-tions.47

Unlike other notions of CoD, this approachapplies a descriptive rather than a prescriptive per-spective. Thus, it does not imply a normative prefer-ence for the democratic status quo put in place bytransition, the persistence of a particular kind ofdemocracy (e.g. consensus democracy), or the stabili-ty of certain institutional arrangements as such.Rather, it tries to situate political culture in the histor-ical context. Moreover, it aims at outlining some ofthe implications for the future of democracy based onthe relationship between the institutional setting andelite commitment embodied in the habitus (as the lat-ter “tries to create favourable conditions for its ownsurvival”).48 According to Leonardo Morlino, politicalleaders, in the case of a mismatch between institu-tions and political culture, might consequently eitheropt for strategies of (institutional) adaptation or(behavioural) appropriateness.49 Thus, explicit politicalculture is also offering a limited set of interpretationsand options for “reasonable” political change. In caseof widely shared discourses, it is more likely thatendogenous political change will go along the linesprescribed by political elites’ collective representationsof democracy rather than in a different way.

So, how do collectively shared discoursesdevelop in the first place, and how do they change?In order to be widely adopted, a discourse must drawon empirical experience of a given group. It must“make sense” or “ring true” (i.e. be based on thefamiliar). The same way as attitude-base political cul-ture is not just a psychological syndrome, discursivepolitical culture cannot be reduced to some kind ofsemiotic “superstructure” either. Thus, it cannot justbe ‘constructed’ ex nihilo, but rather it has to be root-ed in historical experience as reflected in collectivememories. This limits the leeway for newly “inventedtraditions” or “imagined communities” by politicalentrepreneurs.50

Changing a dominant discourse is difficultand costly. This, however, does not exclude the possi-bility of behaviour outside of the rhetorical bound-aries of the permissible. Yet this behaviour cannot beeasily justified with the dominant discourse. It isviewed as being illegitimate, or it undermines a dom-inant discourse and thus the power of its advocates.

43 J March, J Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions - The Organizational Basis of Politics, New York: Free Press, 1989, p.49.44 P Bourdieu, 1992, p.58.45 G Mosca, The Ruling Class, (ed. and rev. A Livingston), New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939, p. 71, quoted in R Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians- Ideology, Conflict and Democracy in Britain and Italy', New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973, pp. 232-233.46 V Pareto, Allgemeine Soziologie (transl. by C Brinkmann), Tübingen, 1955.47 J Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1950, pp.290-295.48 P Bourdieu, 1992, p.61.49 L Morlino, Constitutional Design and Problems of Implementation in Southern and Eastern Europe, in: J Zielonka (ed.), DemocraticConsolidation in Eastern Europe - Volume I: Institutional Engineering, New York: Oxford UP, 2001, pp.48-108.50 C Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua - World Making in the Tropics, New York: CambridgeUP, 2005, pp.29-32; E Hobsbawm / T Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, New York: Cambridge UP, 1992; B Anderson, ImaginedCommunities - Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, revised edition, London: Verso, 1991.

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51 G Eyal, The Origins of Post-Communist Elites - From Prague Spring to the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia, Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 2003, p.21.52 S Roßteutscher, 'Competing Narratives and the Social Construction of Reality - The GDR in Transition', German Politics, Vol.9, No.1, April2000, p.63; Neckel, 1995, p.665.53 "Most of the time when I remember it is others who spur me on, their memory comes to the aid of mine and mine relies on theirs. […]There is no point in seeking where they [i.e. the memories, MS] are preserved in my brain or in some nook of my mind to which I alonehave access: for they are recalled to me externally, and the groups of which I am part at any time give me the means to reconstruct them,upon condition, to be sure, that I turn towards them and adopt, at least for the moment, their way of thinking. It is in this sense that thereexists a collective memory and social frameworks for memory; it is to the degree that our individual thought places itself in these frame-works and participates in this memory that is capable of the act of recollection." M Halbwachs (ed. and transl. by L Coser), On CollectiveMemory, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp.38-39.54 Bar-Tal uses this example in a similar way to explain his (socio-psychological) model of societal beliefs (D Bar-Tal, Shared Beliefs in aSociety, London: Sage, 2000, pp.xiv-xv.)

Tabel 1

Therefore, consistency of discourses is an importantcriterion for validation next to its capability to draw onempirical evidence. Furthermore, the producers of“true discourses” (such as intellectuals, and politicalentrepreneurs in particular) are also subject to thetruth claims of these community values. They cannotescape the logic of their own discourses without los-ing credibility and legitimacy within the polity.51

The ‘life course’ of a discourse (i.e. its persist-ence and reproduction over time), is often determinedby exogenous factors: contingent circumstances, the

social standing of its protagonists, resonance with thepublic influence the reproduction, or replacement of acollectively shared discourse.52 Particularly “successful”discourses are those which resonate well with thepublic and which are convincingly “confirmed” byempirical experience. They might very well outlivetheir original promoters, and be further reproducedby future generations of politicians. Protagonists of adiscourse might not even have experienced the initialhistorical impetus for the emergence of a certain dis-course, but are still able to credibly reproduce it by

referring to well known symbols and themes. Thisagain stresses the relevance of the national collectivememory (i.e. the way history is publicly rememberedand the repertoire of discourses it offers to politi-cians).53 An extreme example is the obvious success ofpopulist politicians in some post-communist countriesin presenting their nations as the eternal victims ofgreater powers. This is done by discursively relatingcurrent conflicts (e.g. the question of Kosovo’s politi-

cal status) to medieval history (e.g. the battle ofKosovo Polje in 1389) in a way which obviously res-onates convincingly with many voters (but not neces-sarily with external observers).54

According to Ann Swidler new systems ofmeaning develop during unsettled times. Thus, histor-ical junctures and structural change requires people toreorganize their “cultural tool kit” in order to develop

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new ways of relating to their environment.55 Moscovicicalls these events “points of cleavage”.56 According toConsuelo Cruz, who applies and partly modifiesSwidler’s approach, endogenous change of discursiveframes becomes possible by way of constant contes-tation (i.e. internal interpretive conflicts within onedominant frame) which then leads to historical junc-tures. Consequently, this opens the discursive field forother frames to compete with the dominant ones.57

This contestation is mostly done by political entrepre-neurs (i.e. the political elite) while most of the timemost people are passive “users” of political culture.For political change to occur, political entrepreneursmust either advance their competing political visionsand agendas within a dominant rhetorical frame, oralternatively “adjust reality” by changing the bound-aries of the field of the permissible. According to Cruz,this happens simultaneously with a reconfiguration ofpower relations. Political conflict and political changeis thus a struggle over meaning.58 This struggle,according to Jan Kubik, also takes place by the delib-erate, selective transmission of certain historical dis-courses while suppressing others.59 Again, a key role isplayed by political elites. For the economic sphere,Yoshiko Herrera shows how the fluidity of politicaland economic categories during perestroika openedthe way to heterodox challenges to the orthodoxmainstream, Leninist discourse. New understandingsof the economy, some of which local elites used tomake demands for more autonomy, replaced the pre-vious categories.60 For the cases of CEE democracies Itherefore hypothesize a lasting legacy of the historicaljuncture of the 1989/90 transition to democracy on(elite) political culture.

I differentiate between two ideal types oftransition. The first type, which I call multilateral tran-sition, is characterized by an equal distribution of con-tending factions in the transition process. Owing tothis there is a stronger need to accommodate and

negotiate a compromise, and a higher degree in elitecontinuity between old and new system. Transition is,therefore, more gradual, cautious and aiming for abalance between different groups. There is moreemphasis on a legalist approach and “backward legit-imacy” as Huntington calls it (i.e. changes are madethrough the established procedures of the undemoc-ratic regime).61 Moreover, there is less emphasis onexplicit policy goals for which it is harder to find com-mon ground. This makes the process rather lengthy;in the beginning it is more vulnerable to reversion andless certain in terms of its substantial objectives.Moreover, legal continuity appears to be a higherobjective than popular legitimacy (i.e. there is a lessclear “new beginning”). Thus, competing claims ofhistorical legitimacy for the new democracy live on inthe polity, and protagonists of the old regime remain-ing in the new polity are vulnerable to questioning oftheir legitimacy. 62

The second transition type, unilateral transi-tion, is characterized by the domination of the processby the opposition, who holds sway over politics forsome time after the first free elections. There is lessneed and pressure to negotiate with the post-com-munists, who are weakened and/or soon marginal-ized. This constellation allows more leeway to theopposition to push through substantial policies,implementing far-reaching political and socio-eco-nomic changes (thus being closer to the tabula rasaapproach). Transition is therefore rapid, has a set goaland appears rather irreversible from an early point intime. It also involves a higher degree of elite turnover.This way, the break with the past regime becomesmore visible as the new regime seeks to build itself ona new legitimacy, not legal continuity. Thus, the win-ning former opposition also imposes a historical clo-sure and a condemnation of the old regime.

According to the outlined model, whichviews critical junctures such as the transition period as

55 Swidler 278-279.56 S Moscovici (ed. by G Duveen), Social Representations - Explorations in Social Psychology, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, p.8.57 Cruz, 2000.58 For the case of Spain see L Edles, Symbol and Ritual in the new Spain - The transition to democracy after Franco, Cambridge UK:Cambridge University Press, 1998.59 J Kubik, 'Cultural Legacies of State Socialism: History Making and Cultural-Political Entrepreneurship in Postcommunist Poland and Russia',in: G Ekiert / S Hanson, Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule, Cambridge UK:Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 319.60 Y Herrera, Imagined Economies - The Sources of Russian Regionalism, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005.61 S Huntington, The Third Wave - Democratization in the late twentieth century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p.141.62 H Arendt, On Revolution, Hamondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973; János Kis on "radical reformism", Jacek Kuron on "self-limitation", AdamMichnik on "new evolutionism" etc. (B Falk, The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe, Budapest: CEU Press, 2003.); J Kis, 'BetweenReform and Revolution', East European Politics and Societies, Vol.12, No.2, sSpring 1998, pp.300-383.For a similar typology - differentiating three types of transition, i.e. transformation, replacement and transplacement see Huntington, 1991,pp.124-174. Huntington puts more emphasis on the major players and agents of change in the transition process, i.e. reformers and stand-patters (WHAT'S A STANDPATTER?) in the old regime, as well as moderates and radicals in the opposition whereas my typology is more con-cerned with the overall dynamics of the process. In the end, his three types of transition (transformation, transplacement and replacements)are quite close to mine with an added intermediate type.

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being crucial for offering political elites collective rep-resentations of democracy, we should expect to findsome systematic differences through the impact ofthese basic differences in the transition process.Moreover, if these collective representations aredurable and relevant we should expect to find at leastparts of them in this noticeable constellation up totoday. Therefore, the basic approaches to politicalchange and the dominant ways of interaction in thetwo ideal types of transition are expected to have lefttheir mark on collective representations of the newdemocracy. At least partly, they are expected to bereproduced until today. Following from that we canformulate the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Political elites’ collective representationsin countries with the experience of unilateral transi-tion promote a more competitive understanding ofdemocratic practice than countries with a multilater-al transition, where we expect to find a more consen-sus-oriented outlook in elite discourses on democracyin which compromise and consensus are presented asa value in itself.

This hypothesis rests on the premise that,during transition, political elites came to develop akind of collective identity by reconfiguring their way ofinteraction according to the above-developed modelof political culture. In the rather unstructured andempty public realm of collapsed communism newways of organizing politics had to be found. Due tothe described very different constellations betweenopposition and post-communists in the two idealtypes of transition, very different practices and formsof interaction were newly developed (or were revivedfrom earlier periods). In multi-lateral transitions, bothopposition groups and former communists are morelikely to have developed a common notion of respon-sibility for the new system. This required them to tem-porarily leave aside deep differences of opinion and todevelop an inclusive, coalescent approach (if only untila basic agreement about the terms of regime changewas found and the first free elections held). At laterpoints the legacy of peaceful and co-operative politi-cal change would be revived in order to achieve fur-ther decisive reform steps (e.g. constitutional reform,economic adjustment etc.) even if only rhetorically, orultimately unsuccessfully in terms of substantiveresults. In unilateral transitions we would expect thiscommon identification with the system and consensu-al decisionmaking to be less strong (at least with

those players who were marginalized from theprocess) and therefore to find less emphasis on con-sensus-seeking positions. Instead, differencesbetween government and opposition were fullyplayed out, and concluded with the opposition win-ning their way when establishing the new system.

Hypothesis 2: Formal and predictable proceduresshould have a much stronger weight in the elite polit-ical culture of countries with a multilateral transition.Politicians in countries with a more unilateral legacy oftransition would rather emphasise the achievement ofconcrete policy results rather than valuing proceduresfor their own sake.

Through the experience of transition as ahighly formalized and legalistic approach, politiciansin countries of multilateral transition have at theirhand discourses presenting democracy as embodiedin predictable, formal procedures and balanced par-ticipation of all groups. New mechanisms of negotia-tion, accommodation, and inclusive decision-makinghad to be developed before substantive reforms werestarted. In countries with unilateral transition, regimechange and later reforms had to be pushed throughby some (opposition) groups against the uncompro-mising communists and without an inclusive negotiat-ing process. The quick and irreversible achievement ofprecise goals stood in the foreground. These substan-tive goals (i.e. creating a liberal democracy and a mar-ket economy), which were mostly supported by amajority of the (mobilized) people, can be presentedby them as being more important than particular pro-cedures to reach these goals.

In unilateral transitions, while acting as a uni-fied group in overcoming communist rule and prepar-ing free elections, very soon competition startedbetween increasingly differentiated parties whichdeveloped out of the former opposition while the(unreformed) post-communists would remainostracised. In multilateral transitions, the post-com-munists remained strong political players and (after afew years) became a serious contender for power.63

Hypothesis 3: In societies with the legacy of unilater-al transition, collective representations of democracycontrast quite strongly between the post-communistson the one side and parties developed out of formeropposition groups on the other side. In this regard,they differ from the cases of multilateral transitions,where both sides have a common stake and share

63 Kitschelt et al. point out that in democracies following "national-accommodative" communism the regime cleavage is less pronouncedthan in democracies after "bureaucratic authoritarianism". Assuming a strong connection between previous regime types and transitiondynamics my hypotheses to some extent mirror Kitschelt's. However, my focus is slightly different as I am not concerned with comparingparty systems but political culture and the way political elites relate to the democratic system (H Kitschelt/ Z Mansfeldova/ R Markovski/ GTóka, Post-Communist Party Systems - Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation, Cambridge, CUP, 1999, p.306).

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rather similar rhetorical frames concerning the sys-tem).

Countries with a legacy of unilateral transi-tion should therefore feature a more competitive, out-come-oriented approach to politics which is present-ed as the ideal in elite discursive frames (at least fromthe side of the former opposition), as opposed to theconsensual and more procedure-oriented approach ofmultilateral transitions. Collective representations ofdemocracy might therefore also feature a very differ-ent role model for politicians.Hypothesis 4: In countries of multilateral transition,political elites share a collective representation ofpoliticians as playing the central role in the democrat-ic process in being rather aloof of particularistic inter-ests and collectively finding the best solution for thecountry, the “common good” (i.e. closer to the utilitar-ian model of democracy). Political elites in countrieswith unilateral transitions should present their ownrole as being representative of competing interests inthe first place.

Political elites (with the legacy of multilateraltransition) should thus find their collective representa-tions of democracy embodied best in the consensusinstitutional set-up, whereas political elites from uni-lateral backgrounds might present the requirementsof consensus institutions as being in the way of deci-sive, efficient and outcome-oriented politics. Hypothesis 5: Political elites in societies with a unilat-eral transition background advocate changes to thepolitical system more strongly/extensively than politi-cal elites from multilateral transitions.

Political elites from countries with multilater-al transitions do not share a societal consensus onhow to evaluate the past as opposed to those fromcountries with the legacy of a unilateral transition. Thelatter involved not only a “new beginning” in terms ofpolitical legitimacy, but also the (at least temporal)expulsion of the protagonists of the old regime, andgenerally a more forceful (sometimes imposed) “com-ing to terms with the past” resulting in a predominantcondemnation and public de-legitimation of the oldregime. Multilateral transitions allowed for the per-

sistence of competing concepts of legitimacy of thenew polity, or at least did not require actors to fullydissociate themselves from the communist (or anyother previous) regime(s). Therefore, the absence ofan (imposed) condemnation of the old regime(s) maylead to clashing definitions of legitimate leadership incountries with the legacy of multilateral transition,and consequently result in a lack of mutual accept-ance and respect as legitimate players in the demo-cratic system. Hypothesis 6: Political elites in democracies developedout of multilateral transition will be found to be moreexplicitly aiming at demarcating themselves culturallyand ideologically from political opponents than in uni-lateral transitions.

For the cases of Romania and Bulgaria onemight have to introduce a third type of transitionwhich started as a pre-emptive reform-attempt by theold elites with only moderate contributions from aweak opposition in the beginning. In my thesis I didnot consider these cases but one can surely constructsimilar hypotheses for these cases. For example, onecould hypothesize the continued absence of commonunderstanding of historical legitimacy among thepolitical leaders in these countries leading to a lack ofrespect for political opponents as in the cases of mul-tilateral transitions. Yet, similarly as in cases of unilat-eral transitions one would not find consensus on thepreservation of the institutional status quo.

From a theoretical perspective the observa-tion of strongly non-consensual politics in CEE ques-tions traditional understandings of political cultureand its underlying factors. Mainstream political cul-ture research in the tradition of Almond and Verba ingeneral, and elite political culture in particular basical-ly postulates a causality between institutions andpolitical culture in the form of attitudes over time. Thisadaptation process is supposed to be mediated bysocio-economic background factors such as age/gen-eration, education or ethnic/geographic origin.64 Theassumption of an adaptation of political culture toinstitutions also seems to be reflected in many main-stream studies on CoD.65

64 G Almond & S Verba, The Civic Culture - Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Princeton UP, 1963; L Pye / S Verba (eds.),Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton University Press, 1965; N Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo, New York:McGraw-Hill, 1951; A George, 'The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making,"International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13 No. 2, 1969, pp. 190-222; R Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, Eaglewood Cliffs:Prentice Hall, 1976; D Easton, 'A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support', British Journal of Political Science, Vol.5, No.4, 1975,pp.435-457; R Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians - Ideology, Conflict and Democracy in Britain and Italy', New Haven: Yale University Press,1973; R Rose / W Mishler / C Haerpfer, Democracy and its Alternatives - Understanding Post-Communist Societies, Cambridge: Polity Press,1998; R Rohrschneider, Learning Democracy - Democratic and Economic Values in Unified Germany, Oxford UP, 1999; D Pollack / J Jacobs /O Müller / G Pickel (eds.), Political Culture in post-communist Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003; 65 J Linz / A Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation : southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe,Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996; L Diamond, Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation, Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1999; ASchedler, 'Measuring Democratic Consolidation', Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2001, pp. 67-68.

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In my own research on Hungarian and EastGerman MPs (with a West German control sample)66

I employed content analysis of a representative sam-ple of MPs’ speeches over two parliamentary cycles. Itook Hungary as the case closest to the ideal type ofmultilateral transition, East Germany as the case clos-est to the ideal type of unilateral transition (with theunification process even further speeding up transi-tion). Coding for an either consensus or competitivepositions in the mentioned five dimensions I foundHungarian MPs sharing an expressed preference forconsensus as a practice (1). They present democraticpolitics predominantly as an undertaking whichshould aim at finding the common good rather thanconsidering particular interests (2). They emphasisethe value of formalised democratic procedures andthe interplay between constitutional bodies (3) andbasically present the current political and socio-eco-nomic system as the best possible solution denyingthe need for far-reaching changes (4). However,Hungarian MPs are not respectful towards each other,according to the last indicator (5).

East German MPs in turn (with the notableexception of the PDS) seem not to be designating aparticular value to consensus solutions in politics (1).They present democratic politics as being about thecompetition of different interests with politicians rep-resenting them rather than the quest for the commongood (2). They do not assign any particular value toformalized procedures (3), or the existing institutionalstatus quo (4). Still, they are more respectful towardseach other than Hungarian MPs. Only the PDS pro-motes a partially consensual outlook on democracy byemphasising procedures over outcomes (3) and, inter-estingly, by arguing for the perseverance of the statusquo of the existing (West German) system (4). I foundneither a development towards more consensus-ori-entation over time, nor a plausible relationshipbetween consensualism and socio-economic or posi-tional background variables (party membership, timein office etc). Neither did I find support for an expla-nation based on “deep” national political cultures inthis regard since East and West Germany showedmarkedly different patterns. (The numerical differ-ences in the five dimensions were actually much larg-er between East and West Germany, than betweenHungary and West Germany). In short, explicit, rhetor-ical commitment of political elites to consensusdemocracy (without knowing how strongly it is inter-nalised individually) in the two cases appears to followmore the logic of collective rather than individualsocialization as expected by my approach.

Consequently, a medium-term legacy-based explana-tion on the aggregate level as proposed in the discur-sive model of political culture appears much more rea-sonable.

The quantitative patterns established throughcontent analysis of parliamentary speeches are furthersupported by a discourse analysis conducted with thetranscripts of around 30 interviews with MPs from thetwo cases. Basically, neither type of transition offers adiscursive repertoire fully supportive of consensusdemocracy. For the case of Hungary (and I wouldargue for cases of multilateral transition in general)due to the persistence of competing notions of histor-ical legitimacy, political entrepreneurs are able toestablish sharp cultural-ideological divisions anddeprive each other of recognition as equal partici-pants in the democratic game. East Germany, as acase closer to the ideal type of unilateral transition,experienced an abrupt, imposed regime change withthe complete initial exclusion of the protagonists ofthe old regime. This marked a “new beginning” withlittle legal or historical continuity. As a consequence,East Germany was found to lack a common elite dis-course with regards to the democratic system con-necting the other parties with the post-communistPDS, as well as connecting East and West GermanMPs (even within the same parties).

Using Bourdieu’s concept of habitus I thenillustrate how these shared discourses might constrainor enable political behaviour by demarcating legiti-mate avenues for change and persistence and thusimpact upon the persistence of the democratic sys-tem, i.e. the consolidation of democracy. Thus, for theHungarian case I discuss how the expressed prefer-ence for consensualist decision-making delegitimizesand impedes fully legal majoritarian decisions, whileon the other hand the lack of respect for “the other”undermines co-operation by rhetorically externalisingpolitical opponents from the system.

For the East German case, the rather anti-consensualist discourses of non-PDS MPs clash withthe established traditions of West German “quasi-consociationalism”. This way, East German MPs fail todevelop a commonly shared supportive habitus forthe existing system, with PDS MPs (in line with WestGerman MPs) mostly supporting conservation or fur-thering of the consensualist system, and the otherEast German MPs arguing for change.

Following from this differentiated perspec-tive, the conclusions about CoD must also be differen-tiated between the CEE countries. In countries withthe legacy of a multilateral transition the absence of a

66 I picked East and West German MPs from the Bundestag based on the geographical location of their constituency, not their origin orplace of birth. Nevertheless, 95% of East German MPs and 100% of West German MPs were born and grew up in East and West Germanyrespectively.

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comprehensive debate about the past makes the newpolity vulnerable to potential usurpation by both leftand right with mutually exclusive understandings ofhistorical legitimacy. Unlike in unilateral transitions,there was no “new beginning” in the Arendtian sense(i.e. the building of the new polity on a clear breakwith the old regime). Next to a higher degree of per-sonal continuity in politics there are, in these coun-tries, a higher number of members of the old regime’spolitical elites that have benefited from “sponta-neous” or insider privatisation and moved from polit-ical into economic leadership positions.67 This factoffers a target for attacks from the right against post-communist parties accusing the latter as illegitimatelystill profiting from their former position, or even asconspiring against the new system. As the old regime,or any previous regimes prior to communism, are notunivocally delegitimized and can be taken up again bypolitical entrepreneurs to promote alternative visionsof modernization and democracy (e.g. corporatist-clerical and ethnocentric authoritarianism or somekind of reform socialism) in order to deny equal legit-imacy to political opponents as demonstrated in theHungarian case. This danger stands particularly highin the post-EU-accession context and the disaffectionconnected to it with some groups in society.

Thus, while promoting an otherwise consen-sus-oriented political culture and commitment to theinstitutional status quo, the lack of mutual respectand acceptance as equal players in the democraticgame can severely undermine the daily working andthe credibility of consensus democracy. The consolida-tion of democracy in the case of multilateral transi-tions therefore depends on the ability of political elitesto mutually accept each other and engage in a con-structive dialogue over the past.

If the confrontational style between the dif-ferent parties in countries such as Hungary, Polandbut also Romania continues, it will further underminethe working and the popular acceptance of the dem-ocratic system, in particular given the high expecta-tions raised by political elites themselves. Politicalleaders from different parties or camps who do notaccept each other as legitimate opponents but ratherregard each other as enemies cannot make a consen-sus (and actually not even a majoritarian) democracyrun well. Moreover, if democratic politics is presentedas being based in defining the common good, in

avoiding disagreement or conflict, and in assuming amorally superior, truthful position it becomes vulnera-ble to be overtaxed by disappointed expectations. Thismight be particularly the case if consensus democracyis associated with elitist, non-transparent and some-times anti-participatory discourses and practises. Alack of pragmatism by political elites and a de-politi-cization of the masses are blamed for the failure ofconsensus or consociational democracy in the past(e.g. in the case of France).68

As Manfred Schmidt notes, consociationalismpresupposes the existence of autonomous segmentsin society while consensualism furthers their develop-ment.69 In this regard, the consolidation of consensusdemocracy in CEE appears problematic due to theconspicuous absence of well-defined and rather sta-ble social groups. Therefore, political parties mightengage in “cultural engineering” from above and tryto achieve social embeddedness. As mentionedabove, in the Hungarian case this is one of the strate-gies pursued by the right who lack organisationalembeddedness more than the post-communist left.The left can still rely on relatively extensive local partyorganisations. Moreover, managers affiliated with theold regime enjoyed a head-start in the privatisationprocess, as well as a continuous presence in otherorganizations (media, trade unions etc.). Historically,the establishment of clear ideological boundaries hasoften increased political stability. Perhaps we arealready observing new cleavages in the making assome authors argue that parties in countries such asHungary and Poland attempt to turn political differ-ences into primary ones.70 This could result in two (ormore) relatively stable camps which have their owndefinitions of basic values, modern society and thecommon good and in which voters only elect theircamp’s leaders (but also where consensus is requiredfor the highest national offices and policies). As oneMP put it: “Hungarian politicians are unable to com-promise because they do not know their positions.When you do not have a position, a standpoint or agoal you are unable to compromise.”71 Therefore,consensus democracy might work better once politi-cal parties have developed clear-cut, stable socio-cul-tural profiles and at the same time have establishedthe boundaries of acceptable discourse.

Cases with the legacy of unilateral transitionare, in turn, are less vulnerable to competing concepts

67 G Eyal, I Szelényi, E Townsend, Making Capitalism Without Capitalists - Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist CentralEurope, London: Verso, 1998; D Stark / L Bruszt , Post-Socialist Pathways - Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe,Cambridge University Press, 1998.68 A Lijphart, 'Consociational democracy', World Politics, Vol.21, No.2, 1969, pp.222-224.69 M Schmidt, Demokratietheorien, Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 3rd ed., 2000, p.340.70 Zs Enyedi, 'The role of agency in cleavage formation', European Journal of Political Research, Vol.44, No.3, 2005, pp.697-72071 MDF #2.

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of democracy and modernization since the previousregime(s) alongside with its claim to historical legiti-macy was fully discarded during the revolutionarytransition to democracy. Also, a higher extent ofVergangenheitsbewältigung was imposed upon soci-ety e.g. through far-reaching and systematic lustra-tion campaigns, the opening of secret service andstate archives, public commemorations, teaching atschools etc.72 However, the initial exclusion of protag-onists of the former regime and the imposition of thenew system by the former opposition furthers a rathermajoritarian democratic discourse, prevents all playersfrom developing of a common stake in the systemresulting in a lack of understanding for the worth ofconsensus-democratic arrangements.

In countries with the legacy of unilateral tran-sition, political elites might therefore come to findtheir understanding of democracy to be better servedby more competitive, majoritarian institutions. Thus,institutional adaptation towards diminishing thenumber of veto players might be a possibility toincrease the acceptance of the system (e.g. asattempted by the two major Czech parties in the 1998“opposition agreement”).73 This might increase theireffectiveness and output-orientation, which is a majorpillar of their political leaders’ yardsticks for democrat-ic legitimacy. At the same time destructive polariza-tion (as in the cases of multilateral transitions) appearsless likely. Therefore, there is also little reason to fearfrom more competition. In these polities, dangerlooms rather from the fringes of the political spectrumif consensus politics remains unchanged.

Conclusion

I am convinced this approach can beemployed with some modifications to other CEEcountries and the construction of another type oftransition dynamics as mentioned above is feasible.Thus, similarly as in the cases of multilateral transi-tions the absence of a comprehensive break with thepast still impedes mutual acceptance by different par-ties. At the same time, there appears to be a lack ofagreement on preserving the existing set of institu-tions as in the cases of unilateral transitions.

However, there are also differences betweenthe South East European countries and the Centraland East European countries upon which I focused inmy thesis. As Higley and Burton I would differentiatebetween the cases of Hungary, Poland and Slovenia(which basically upheld their elite settlementsthroughout the upheavals of post-transition politics),the Czech Republic and Slovakia (where political elitesonly converged in the late 1990s) and countries suchas Romania, Bulgaria or Albania which are character-ized as still lacking a lasting elite pact or full post-tran-sition elite convergence.74 In this regard, also elitepolitical culture might still be more fluid and change-able. Also, for SEE countries the transition of 1989/90was followed by other critical junctures such as the1996 elections in Romania with the first electoralturnover of power which might have left lasting markson political culture.

72 Vergangenheitsbewältigung has surely also taken place in countries such as Hungary and Poland yet with largely competing interpreta-tions of the past and without a serious dialogue between the opposing camps. In Hungary different symbols have been used and evenmajor national holidays are celebrated separately by left and right parties. Different versions of history have been promoted by various gov-ernments and were subsequently institutionalised through competing museums, memorials or historical institutes. Lustration and trans-parency about the old regime's archives has been initiated in a more selective and opportunistic fashion (e.g. the campaign by the Oleksygovernment in Poland in the early 1990s). 73 A Roberts, 'Demythologising the Czech Opposition Agreement', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.55, No.8, December 2003, pp.1273-1303; MNovák, 'The Relevance of Small Parties - From a "General Framework" to the Czech Opposition Agreement', Czech Sociological Review, 2000,Vol.36, No.1, pp.27-47; S Saxonberg, 'A New Phase in Czech Politics', Journal of Democracy, Vol.10, No.1, 1999, pp.96-111; J Higley, MBurton, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, pp.168-170.74 J Higley, M Burton, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, pp.84-89, 168-173.

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* Mrs. Gergana Bulanova is affiliated to the Free University Berlin, Otto-Suhr Institute for Political Science.

Gergana Bulanova*

Abstract:

This paper examines the correlation between corruption, democracy and transformation. It is designed asa study of the quality of the established model of democracy, focusing on the governance capacities of one of thenewest EU-member states – Bulgaria to effectively counter political corruption. Taking into account the levels ofcorruption spread in Bulgaria since 1989, I address the following question: why does Bulgaria fail to effectivelycounter political corruption, notwithstanding the large scale anticorruption campaign, launched in the course ofthe democratization and Europeanization processes of the last years? I suggest that the state failure in anticor-ruption is tightly connected to the quality of the established (achieved) democratic model. Furthermore, I arguethat this state weakness refers to profound institutional shortcomings, which in turn cause the contamination ofthe exchange of wealth and power. Respectively the study’s main goal is to offer an analyse of the influence ofthe level of attainment of a balanced, liberal democracy over the state capacities to effectively counter politicalcorruption, while taking into account the role played by particular context factors.

Keywords:

political corruption, transformation, democratization, Europeanization, Bulgaria, CEE countries

From Sofia to Brussels – Corrupt Democratization in the Context ofEuropean Integration

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Defining the problem

The phenomenon of corruption enjoys anincreasing amount of attention worldwide at leastsince the political change of 1989. The growing num-ber of corruption surveys commissioned by differentinternational organizations and research institutes, aswell as the almost daily press releases about corrup-tion affairs within local and national administrations,political parties, multinational companies, even ininternational organizations1 demonstrates firstly thatthe topic of corruption is undoubtedly on the rise, andsecondly that the phenomenon obviously affects allsocieties, social systems, institutions and states. It isundisputable however, that in some countries, andespecially in times of intensive developmental periodscorruption can have a devastating impact on society,politics and economy.

Concerning the corruption spread in the“third world” countries for about 40 years the „mod-ernists“ suggested that corruption is the outcome ofthe modernization. It is perceived to be most preva-lent during the most intense phases of transformationfrom traditionalism to modernity. Thus the phenome-non of corruption can be seen as a signifier of deepsocial changes. In the most “third wave” democratiza-tion countries corruption appears to a barely manage-able extent, affects all socio-political levels and infil-trates the every day life.

This article examines the correlation betweencorruption, democracy and transformation. The studydeals with the societal accumulation, use andexchange of wealth and power in the context of asubstantive transformation and seeks to assess theways a transformation society and its economy aregoverned. It is designed as a study of the quality ofthe established model of democracy, focusing on thegovernance capacities of the newest EU-member state– Bulgaria to effectively counter corruption.

The collapse of the ancient regime inNovember 1989 and the nature of the Bulgariantransformation to a liberal, “western” democracyopened up many institutional and judicial deficienciesthat were loaded with tremendous corruption poten-tial. Corruption however, began to be perceived asone of the major societal problems in democraticallygoverned Bulgaria, only after the stabilization follow-ing the economic breakdown in 1997, when the peo-ple’s worries about their immediate survival were alle-viated. According to opinion polls since 1997 corrup-

tion was normally placed, after the low incomes andthe unemployment, on the third place of the worsthardships of democracy. More shocking was the resultof the last corruption monitoring report, carried outby the nongovernmental organisation “Center for theStudy of Democracy”, showing that as of January2007, 54% of the respondents perceive corruption,for the first time in the last 10 years as the mostimportant societal problem.2 Bribery scandals at allpolitical levels, imperfect jurisdiction and internalsecurity bottlenecks brought so much importance tothe issue of corruption that in the fall of 2006 it stillseemed like Bulgaria’s accession to the EU would bedelayed, precisely because of the widespread corrup-tion.

Notwithstanding the problems, Bulgaria suc-ceeded to join the union on the 1st of January 2007as planned, whereas the Commission installed moni-toring measures, unprecedented for its enlargementhistory. The mechanism for verification of the progressof Bulgaria to address specific benchmarks was estab-lished to assure further control over the pace of thejudicial reforms and the fight against corruption andorganized crime.

The scope of corruption in Bulgaria

Despite the difficulties to diagnose corruptionand its impact, I will try to draft a snap-shot of theactual volume of corruption in Bulgaria, relying on thefindings of international (the EU-Commission andTransparency International) and local (Center for theStudy of Democracy, statistics of the Ministry ofInterior) observers.

Since the late 90es corruption was one of themost criticized issues in the regular reports of the EU-Commission on Bulgaria’s progress towards acces-sion. The report from 2005 was perceived as a sensa-tion, because for the first time Bulgaria’s performancewas jugged worse than that of the other EU-accessioncandidate - Romania. Besides, also for the first time,the Commission identified the “week results” in theinvestigation and prosecution of corruption on the“highest political levels” as the “main problem” inanticorruption.3 The assessment of the report fromSeptember 2006 was even more negative, requestingthe presentation of “clear evidence of results” ininvestigating and prosecuting cases of high-level cor-ruption, as a condition for the accession in January2006.4 Bulgaria entered the union as planned, but the

1 There are plenty of examples for corruption in international organisations. Here are just some of them: the latest corruption scandal fromMarch 2007 concerning EU-Commission-staff; the resignation of the entire EU-Commission under the Commission President Jacques Santerin November 2000, because of allegations of fraud, mismanagement and nepotism; the investigations of corruption transactions within the“Oil for Food Program” of the UN; the latest World-Bank scandal concerning the promotion of Paul Wolfowitz’s girlfriend etc. 2 Center for the Study of Democracy, Anti-Corruption Reforms in Bulgaria: Key Results and Risks Sofia, 2007,http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=2152., p. 19. 3 European Commission, Bulgaria 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report, , Brussels, 25 October 2005, SEC (2005) 1352, 2005,http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/sec1352_cmr_master_bg_college_en.pdf, p. 11. 4 European Commission, Communication from the Commission: Monitoring Report on the State of Preparedness for Eu Membership ofBulgaria and Romania, Brussels, 26.9.2006, COM(2006) 549 final, 2006http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/sept/report_bg_ro_2006_en.pdf, p.5-6.

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Commission established a grave mechanism for verifi-cation of Bulgaria’s progress to address six specificbenchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and thefight against corruption and organized crime.

According to the 2006 Corruption PerceptionIndex (CPI) issued annually by TransparencyInternational, Bulgaria turned back to its corruptionlevel form 2002.5 With 4.0 points and place 57 in theinternational comparative corruption scale the level ofthe perceived corruption spread in 2006 is better thanthat of Poland, Turkey, Croatia, Romania, Serbia,Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. However, arating of around 3 points is assumed as indication ofdeeply rooted, systemic corruption. Thus the 2006 CPIlines up Bulgaria next to countries like El Salvador andColumbia, where corruption is perceived to be the“rule”. This means that the problem of the effectivefight against corruption is essential for Bulgaria.

The national assessments of the spread of thephenomenon show similar results. In 1997 the non-governmental organisation “Center for the Study ofDemocracy” developed an excellent CorruptionMonitoring System (CMS) for annual assessment ofthe spread of corruption in the country. The resultsfrom 2007 on administrative corruption reveal posi-tive trends. The most alarming tendency, however, isthat both the business and the citizenry perceive theso called “grand corruption”6 (amongst members ofthe government, members of the parliament, mayors)as growing and becoming better institutionalizedthrough the so called “loops of companies”, or “partyrings”.7 The study’s assessment is that “given the cur-rent environment of virtual impunity for political cor-ruption, there is a real threat that the opportunities ofthe EU membership will be hijacked by private inter-

ests.”8 The annual loss thought corrupt transactions isestimated to the amount of 2 Milliard Levs per year,which exceeds the expected annual EU-allocation.9

The statistics of the Ministry of Interior, asreported by the media show that in 2006 a total of18810 criminals were jugged on grounds of corruptioncrimes. At the same time the research of the Centerfor the Study of Democracy measures more than 110000 – 115 00011 corrupt transactions per month.According to a study of the Ministry of Justice on thecorruption sentences issued, the majority of convictedare financial auditors or accountants, with usualamounts abused ranging from 250 to 300 US $ andonly in 4,2% of the cases – from 5 000 to 10 000 US$.12

Another alarming tendency is the number ofthe commissioned murders – 173 for the period1992-200513. None of them has been disclosed,respectively no effective sentence has been issued.With regard to the grand-corruption, in its report tothe EU-Commission from June 2006 the governmentreported to have launched investigations against twohigh-level officials, one from the Ministry ofAgriculture and another from the Ministry ofInterior.14 In addition, seven MPs lost their immunityon grounds of corruption allegations.15 Yet, up to nowthere is no evidence of effectively prosecuted andjugged grand-corruption crimes.

The state seems powerless in the face of“grand corruption”. At the same time, Bulgaria is per-ceived to be a democratic country with functioninginstitutions, which have met the political criteria forEU-membership as far back as in the year 1997. Thevalues of the international democracy indexes also sig-

5 The CPI is based on the estimations of international experts and businessmen about the corruption spread and arrays the countries on ascale from 10 (free from corruption) to 0 (extremely corrupt): The 2006 CPI contains estimations for the spread of corruption in 163 coun-tries; for more Information see: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi.6 Political corruption (the so called “grand” or “high-level” corruption) means corruption that affects the high political and societal levels,and comprises in its core, the misuse of entrusted power for private gain, committed by political decision-makers. The decisive characteristichere is that the misuse on the part of politicians implies the evasion of the public interests in order to achieve personal benefit. The defini-tion of corruption will be discussed further in detail. (The notions of grand/ high-level and petty/low-level are broadly accepted, see forexample: Center for the Study of Democracy, On the Eve of Eu Accession: Anti-Corruption Reforms in Bulgaria Sofia, 2006,http://www.csd.bg/files/CAR-III_Eng.pdf, Huntington, Samuel Modernization and Corruption, Political Order in Changing Societies, 1968 inPolitical Corruption, a Handbook,, ed. Arnold J. Johnston Heidenheimer, Michael, Le Vine, Victor T (New Brunswick (USA) and London (UK),: Transaction Publishers, Third printing 1993). 7 Center for the Study of Democracy, Anti-Corruption Reforms in Bulgaria: Key Results and Risks , p.6.8 Ibd. p.7.9 Cited from: Angarev, Panaiot, “Attention political Corruption”, in Dnevnik, 23.04.2007, available at: www.dnevnik.bg/show?sto-ryid=33369510 Ibd.11 These statistics differ from the statistics of the police, which are perceived as inexact, because of the fact that only few of the corruptioncrimes are officially reported. The survey of the Center for the Study of Democracy is measuring the level of corruption, registering the num-ber of corruption transactions which citizens admit to have been involved in over a certain period of time. Center for the Study ofDemocracy, Anti-Corruption Reforms in Bulgaria: Key Results and Risks ,p.12. 12 Cited from: Resume of the criminological report: “Court practices concerning the implementation of the rules of the chapter “Bribe” – art.301-307 of the Penalty Code in the transformation years (1989-2003)”, available at:www.mjeli.governement.bg/%5Cstructure_files%55Docs5404122006_izsledvane_mj.doc.13 Jansen, Klaus, Peer Review: Justice and Home Affaires, Focus Area: Fight against Organizied Crime Rheinbach, Germany March 2006,www.europe.bg/htmls/page.php?lang=en&caategory=82&id=5050/ 14 Cited from: „Sofia reports the fire department and the state reserve as red points in front of Brussels”, Portal Evropa, 25.07.2006, availa-ble at: www.europe.bg/thmls/page.php?id=5971&category=223. 15

Bolzen, Stefanie, Die Katze muss Mäuse fangen. Das Parlament, Nr.21-22/ 22.05.2006, www.bundestag.de/cgibin/druck.pl?N=parlament.

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nify the positive development of the democracy inBulgaria. This evidence creates the impression thatBulgaria is a well developed country in political andeconomic terms, on its best way to establish soundand sustainable democracy. Against the backgroundof the outlined statistics on corruption spread in therecent years of transformation, the daily reports oncorruption scandals that flood the media and the highnumber of unsolved commissioned killings, the ques-tion about the actual preparedness of Bulgaria, nowas an EU-member state, to effectively and in foresee-able future counter political corruption gains crucialimportance.

Main questions

Conditions, impact and consequences of cor-ruption over Bulgaria’s politics are the main researchareas of my study, while the notion of sustainabledemocracy will be used as a fundamental point of ref-erence. Further, the research is focused on the explo-ration of the topic of political corruption and does notdeal with other forms of the phenomenon such aslow-level or administrative corruption, corruption inthe business sector, in the education system, in thecustoms etc.16

Taking into account the levels of corruptionspread in Bulgaria since 1989, measured by interna-tional and local observers and the considerable vol-ume of high-level corruption, I manly address the fol-lowing question: Why does Bulgaria fail to effectivelycounter political corruption, despite the large scaleanticorruption campaign, launched in the course ofthe democratization and Europeanization processes ofthe last years?

I suggest that the state failure in anticorrup-tion corresponds directly to the quality of the estab-lished (achieved) democratic model. Furthermore, Iargue that this state weakness refers to profoundinstitutional shortcomings, which in turn cause thecontamination of the exchange of wealth and power.Therefore corruption has to be seen as a signal forinsufficient political and administrative capacities andthus as a symptom of “bad governance”.

Accordingly I further raise the question: whatis wrong with the Bulgarian democracy, or morenotably – what are the actual shortcomings in thecapacities of the national governance to effectivelyfight corruption?17 Since I also suggest that the studywill identify a particular imbalance between the distri-bution of power, economic resources and privateinterests, the question about the depth of the liaisonbetween politics and organized crime (respectivelymafia structures) in Bulgaria will be also addressed.

The main goal of the project is to create acomprehensive analysis of the quality of political gov-ernance, while focusing on the assessment of thenation-state capacities to successfully counter politicalcorruption. The study however, is not designed as anoverall evaluation of the democracy established. It israther intended to explore the dimensions and theimpact of the state weaknesses concerning Bulgariananticorruption policy.

However, the research of the phenomenon ofcorruption, as a highly sensitive, yet “explosive” polit-ical issue, is in fact extremely difficult. It is not only thevague definition of corruption, with all its variousforms and complicated criminalization. The verynature of the corrupt deal, one from which both sidesare profiteering and therefore sharing an interest tokeep it hidden, is turning any attempt to gather reli-able information and to analyse it scientifically into avital challenge. A corrupt transaction is normally notdocumented and according to the current experience,becomes illuminated only when, one of the sides isnot satisfied with the deal, when somebody getsinjured or even killed, or, more rarely – by accident.The research on corruption in Bulgaria is additionallyhindered as there are still no successful investigationson high-level corruption cases, which means – noconvictions and dissuasive sentences against politi-cians. For that reason as of May 2007, there is no judi-cially proven evidence to clearly disclose the relationsand processes at work within a corrupt network. Thusmy only alternative is to use the media as mainresource for the corruption scandals occurring. Ofcourse only information that has been confirmed byrepresentatives of the investigation and prosecutioninstitutions is going to find place as empirical materi-al in the study.

Relation between the quality of democracy and theanticorruption capacities

There is a strong correlation between thedemocratization and the corruption spread in theEastern European countries, whereas the transforma-tion to a liberal democracy was rather expected toeffect a crucial reduction of the corruption volume.Instead in many postsocialist countries the oppositeprocess occurred, while depriving the countries fromany protection and reaction capacities for effectiveanticorruption. I argue that this could be explained bythe nature of the democratization process, associatedwith tremendous loss of statehood in all three fields –leadership, security and affluence. Namely the waythe transformation reforms were implemented, deter-mined the low grade of resistance against corruption,

16 While further writing “corruption”, I mean – “political corruption”. 17 I define governance capacities as administrative (the state’s ability to law enforcement, resulting from the sum of its judicial competences,financial, military and human resources) and political capacities (the state’s autonomy in decision making) and follow thus the definition of:Börzel, Tanja, Allgemeine Angaben Zum Teilprojekt B2: Gutes Regieren Ohne Den Schatten Der Hierarchie? Korruptionsbekämpfung ImSüdlichen Kaukasus Im Rahmen Der Eu-Nachbarschaftspolitik, Projektbeschreibung, FU Berlin, Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft BerlinNovember, 2005, http://www.sfb-governance.de/teilprojekte/projektbereich_b/b2/sfb700_b2.pdf., p.12.

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which on its part is an indicator for bad governanceand consequently – for low quality of the democracyestablished (“something resembling liberal democra-cy”18).

Correlation between particular contextual factors andthe state capacities for effective anticorruption fight

As in the most postsocialist countries, thedemocratization in Bulgaria occurred in two mainphases. Firstly there was a relatively short, but dramat-ic transformation on the top of the state, followed bya long and extremely hard consolidation period,marked by the legitimization of the new state elites. Incontrast to most postsocialist countries, the transfor-mation in Bulgaria was a kind of “velvet revolution”,or “controlled transition”19 of the state power, led bythe regime’s elites themselves, since there was neithera powerful economic diaspora, nor a potent dissenterscene. Thus a perpetuation of the clientelistic gover-nance was secured, which implied the “natural”spread of political corruption.

Another specific feature of the transforma-tion in Bulgaria is the failed simultaneity of the politi-cal and economic reforms. The actual, country-wideeconomic liberalization was introduced by the“Kostov-government” after the economic collapse in1997. Hence, privatization was carried out extremityslowly and is only now in 2007, more than 15 yearsafter the fall of communism, perceived to be concluded.

There is a further contextual characteristic,related to one of the most important structural lega-cies of state socialism that has to be added to com-plete the picture of postsocialst Bulgaria. The over-centralized state with its centrally planned economyleft huge resources, which had to be transformedfrom state owned to private. This process triggeredthe rise of a qualitatively new dominant elite project –the so called “extraction from the state”.20 The elites,capable to manipulate the flow of resources withinthe existing state edifice, and of course fully indiffer-ent in building sound democratic institutions, extract-

ed the state owned resources. As a consequence theyoung Bulgarian democracy lost very soon its “logis-tic” capabilities to organize and control the politicaland economic processes occurring.

In this sense, another legacy of state social-ism also played a crucial role for the creation of a fer-tile corruption environment in postsocialst Bulgaria,namely the good structured social networks. Some ofthe “networked people”, for example that part of thenomenklatura, with the “better survivor skills”21, ori-entated themselves and adapted relatively quickly inthe new situation and transformed their own influ-ence into wealth, by relying on the old, valuable con-nections.22

The analysis of the overall corruption environ-ment in postsocialist Bulgaria shouldn’t ignore onemore characteristic of the young Bulgarian democra-cy, which I see as fundamental with regard to thestate capacity to adequately address corruption. Thatis the appearance of organized, violent groups, estab-lished mainly by the former heavyweight wrestlers(“borci”), which characterized to a crucial extent theprocesses of accumulation, use and exchange ofwealth and power, especially till the late 90es. Due totheir economic power and extensive network thesegroupings succeeded to establish their position asimportant player, while acting more efficiently thanthe state in the field of security supply. This way, theyestablished their power as a kind of functioning illegalinstitution, which also contributed to the further“deinstitutionalization of the infrastructure of gover-nance”.23

Parameters of the imbalance of the Bulgarian democracy

In the ideal case the modern model of liberaldemocracy comprises not only pluralistic party system,free elections, market economy, and influential civilsociety. It also suggests the existence of two types ofbalance – a balance between political and economicopportunities for participation and a balance betweenthe accessibility and autonomy of political elites.24 So

18 Johnston, Michael, Public Officials, Private Interests, and Sustainable Democracy: Connections between Politics and Corruption June1996 http://www.iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/12/3iie2334.pdf, p. 26.19 Beichelt, Timm Demokratische Konsolidierung Im Postsozialistischen Europa. Die Rolle Der Politischen InstitutionenLeske Budrich, Opladen2001., p. 70-71.20 More on the theory of the postsocialist extraction from the state in: Ganev, Venelin, I. , Post-Communism as an Episode of StateBuilding: A Reversed Tillyan Perspective Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 38 2005: 425-45, available at: www.sceincedirect.com 21 Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina (pref), A Quest for Political Integrity, with an Introductory Essay by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Romanian coalition for aClean Parliament 2005, www.polirom.ro., p. 13. 22 More on the theme of „networked people“ in postsocialism, culture of privilege and particularism as communism legacies in: Ibd. ,Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina., Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment, Journal of Democracy, National Endowment for Democracy and The JohnsHopkins University Press, Volume 17, Number 3, July 2006: 86-99, 23 Ganev, Post-Communism as an Episode of State Building: A Reversed Tillyan Perspective ,p. 436.24 More on the theory of the ideal democratic balance in: Johnston, Michael, Corruption and Democracy: Threats to Development,Opportunities for Reform, October 1999, http://anti-corr.ru/archive/Corruption%20and%20Democracy.pdf, Johnston, Michael, Corruptionand Democratic Consolidation, prepared for a Conference on “Democracy and Corruption”, Shelby Cullom Davis Center for HistoricalStudies, Princeton University http://people.colgate.edu/mjohnston/MJ%20papers%2001/Princeton.pdf , Johnston, Public Officials, PrivateInterests, and Sustainable Democracy: Connections between Politics and Corruption , Johnston, Michael, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth,Power and Democracy Hamilton, New York, 2005.

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the ideal liberal democracy implies the existence ofopen, but structured competition within the econom-ic and political arenas, and institutionalized bound-aries of access between them.25

I assume that my research on Bulgaria’s anti-corruption capacities will diagnose a particular devia-tion from the ideal case of liberal democracy, charac-terized by: relatively open and easy accessible elites(semi-independent politics) and narrow, still statecontrolled economic possibilities; a situation of asym-metric decay of the old governance structures, accom-panied by tedious, difficult and inconsistent buildingof the new, democratic institutional and regulativesystems, embedded in a context of substantive, deepeconomic crises and poverty; a situation, in which thebest way to secure the own capital (eventually that ofthe family or the adherents) is to become a politician(„politics becomes the road to wealth“26).

Thus there exists an enormous drive to get aplace in the politics, which additionally aggravates thesituation by endorsing frequent changes of politicalelites, or at least by bringing more insecurity for theincumbent. The high level of uncertainty, on its part,induces the so called “hand over-fist”27 corruption,which means that the office holders are strongly inter-ested in capturing as much as possible, as quickly aspossible, in order to secure the existence of the fami-ly, the followers, or the party. Under such conditionsit is almost impossible for broad supported politicalparties to rise. Instead, personal followings aroundthe political leaders emerge, who are awarded withmaterial inducements and spoils. Hence political lead-ers need access to more and more resources in orderto assure enough support for themselves, which con-sequently makes politics more costly.

Therefore, I argue that as long as such“imbalanced” setting exists with no sound institutionsto support the competitive participation and to pre-vent its excesses, politics will continue to be the bestway to acquire wealth. This means that the main pur-pose of politics will not be the pursuit of public goalsbut the promotion of individual interests.28

Accordingly the establishment of institutionalized andclear boundaries between state and society, publicand private interests is crucial in order to effectivelyreduce the particularistic mode of allocation.However, maintaining the balance is complicatedenough even for the evolutional, western democra-cies. For the “third wave” democratization countriesthe building of functioning rules of access betweenthe political and economic arenas seems to be a fun-

damental challenge.29

Definitions and relevant theoretical concepts

Corruption as an embedded problem: In the narrowsense of the word I define corruption as “the abuse ofpublic power for private benefit“ and thus follow thedefinition of Transparency International and theWorld Bank. However, it is important to underline,that the notions of “abuse”, “public”, “private” andeven “benefit” are not easy to define precisely, whichin its turn contributes to a rather contested definitionof the phenomenon.30 However, I am focusing not oncorruption as a dimension of abnormal behaviour, buton its systemic characteristics.

The political, or the so-called – “high-level”,or “grand corruption” – is, as already outlined, thecenter of the study. In general, the political corruptionis seen as a subtype of corruption, which differsaccording to the persons involved (namely office/man-date holders) and its forms (not only bribe, but alsovote buying, extortion, influence-peddling, clientelismetc.).

The political corruption takes place at thedecision-making end of the political process, wherethe rules concerning the distribution of public goodsand the access paths to power and wealth are beingtaken. By positioning corruption within the politicalcycle it is easier to detect the difference with theadministrative, or the so called “low-level” or “pettycorruption”, which occurs at the implementation endof the political process and involves the public admin-istration.31

The classical approach for defining corrup-tion, used mostly by the economists, is the so-called“principal – agent” model, where corruption isexplained through institutional determinants of thecitizenry’s (the principal) ability to monitor and holdthe politician (i.e. the entrusted agent) accountable.32

However, the postsocialist experience showed that themere change of the incumbent in the course of a free,electoral process, is by far not enough to make politi-cians more accountable, and in no case – to makethem fight political corruption. Accordingly, politicalcorruption has to be seen as a phenomenon deeplyrooted and signifying substantive shortcomings in theexercise of political governance.

Therefore I am defining corruption as an indi-cator of complex problems concerning the exchangeof financial resources for political power, and viceversa, that harm the open and fair functioning of the

25 Johnston, Corruption and Democratic Consolidation, , p. 9.26 Huntington, Modernization and Corruption, Political Order in Changing Societies, 1968 ,p.383.27 Johnston, Public Officials, Private Interests, and Sustainable Democracy: Connections between Politics and Corruption , p. 11.28

Huntington, Modernization and Corruption, Political Order in Changing Societies, 1968 , p. 384.29 Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy., p. 930 Ibd. ., p. 12. 31 Fjelde, Hanne, Hegre, Havard, Democracy Depraved. Corruption and Institutional Change 1985 - 2004, the 48th Annual Meeting of theInternational Studies Association, Chicago, USA 28 February - 3 March 2007, http://www.prio.no/files/file49375_corr_stab_isa.pdf?PHPSES-SID=b8a30ac p. 4.32 The model is based on the research of Susan Rose-Ackermann, Robert Klitgard a.o., cited :Ibd.

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political and economic institutions. From this point ofview corruption is, particularly in the postsocialistcountries, a symptom of important developmentaldifficulties, and at the same time – it is their support-ing cause.33 Thus, corruption – especially where itoccurs in an enormous volume – has to be seen as“embedded” within the state’s broader political andeconomic developmental situation.34 So corruptionrepresents then no isolated societal phenomenon, butit can be linked to a variety of deeper problems, rang-ing for example from a lack of legitimacy to the inabil-ity of the state to pay the wages of the public ser-vants.35

Theoretical framework: From a theoretical point ofview the study is based on the so called “moderniza-tion theory” of the corruption studies, more precisely– on the theory, developed in the late 60es by SamuelHuntington, describing the correlation between cor-ruption spread and transformation phases. Thisapproach suggests that corruption, seen as the secretexchange of political action for economic wealth,becomes serious during phases of rapid, political andeconomic development and is a signal of weak andunstable institutions. Accordingly, the easy of accessi-bility to wealth, and to political power defines theform and scale of corruption. This means that in soci-eties with numerous opportunities for accumulationof wealth and few positions of political power, theavailable capital will be used to buy political influence(“wealth seeks power”).36 On the contrary, in societies(especially transformation ones), where the opportu-nities for accumulation of wealth through privateactivity are limited, the politics is the only way toacquire money (“power seeks wealth”).37

At the begging of the 90es Michael Johnstonexpanded this approach and created four differentcorruption syndromes, while using combinations ofthe political and economic opportunities just outlined.Furthermore on the basis of Dahl’s democracy theoryhe concretized the ideal of the liberal democratic sys-tem as a comprehensive balance between the politicaland economic opportunities for participation (balanceof opportunities) and the institutional guarantees(state/society balance). The different deviations fromthe ideal type democratic system, based on the com-binations of strong/weak institutions and multiple/few

opportunities, shape the scope and the incidence ofcorruption and create the four syndromes mentioned.

Crucial for the study are also the premises ofthe democratization theories, in their part suggesting,that corruption is negatively correlated with democra-cy and good governance, because corruption subvertsthe open and free participation, threatens the trans-parency of the decision making process, and hindersthe opportunities for accountable and legitimate gov-ernance.38 At this stage, it is important to underlinethat the definition of democracy is also highly contest-ed, and the term is indeed at least as difficult to defineas corruption.

It is undisputable, as the evidence from thepostsocialist countries clearly demonstrated, that the“minimalist concept of democracy”, including theintroduction and the implementation of free elec-tions, is not enough in order to establish a function-ing, sustainable democracy. In Bulgaria it is indeedeasier to change the government, than to influencethe politics through effective collection and represen-tation of the public interests. Therefore I am adoptinga broad concept of democracy, which goes beyondthe key democratic condition – regular and free elec-tions, and takes into account those context factors,which are responsible to ensure accountable andtransparent governance.

At the heart of this understanding are theprinciples of civil freedom, political equality and at thesame time – effective and responsible governance inthe fields of affluence, security and legitimacy,accountable before the civil society.39 Democracy inthis view is to a lesser extent a matter of institutionalsettings, than of the relation between governmentand society.40 Democracy does not only mean thatpeople can vote in free and fair elections, but thatthey can influence public policy as well.41

Therefore I approach democratization notonly as establishment of democratic institutions andcommitment to market economy, but also as move-ment towards the ideal democratic system, throughbalanced reforms, including the pursuit of more open,yet structured participation in the political and eco-nomic arenas, guaranteed and controlled throughaccountable, democratic institutions.42 Accordinglymy understanding of democracy includes both keyconcepts – participation and institutions, the balance

33 Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy.p.12. 34 Johnston, Corruption and Democracy: Threats to Development, Opportunities for Reform, ,p. 4, 5. 35 Ibd. 36 Huntington, Modernization and Corruption, Political Order in Changing Societies, 1968 37 Ibd. .38 Lauth, Hans-Joachim, Informelle Institutionen politischer Partizipation und ihre demokratische Bedeutung: Klientelismus, Korruption,Putschdrohung und ziviler Widerstand, in Lauth, Hans-Joachim, Liebert, Ulrike, (Hg.), Im Schatten demokratischer Legitimität, Opladen1999, Warren, Mark, What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy? In: American Journal of Political Science, 2/2004, S. 328-334.39 Offe, Claus, Reformbedarf Und Reformoptionen Der Demokratie in Demokratisierung Der Demokratie: Diagnosen Und Reformvorschlägeed. Claus Offe (Frankfurt/ New York Campus Verlag 2003).p. 1240 More on democracy as a matter of the relation between government and society in: Krastev, Ivan, The Balkans, Democracy withoutChoices, , Journal of Democracy, National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press, 13, 3, 2002: 39-53, , p. 45.41 Ibd. 42 Johnston, Public Officials, Private Interests, and Sustainable Democracy: Connections between Politics and Corruption , p.10.

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of which embodies the ideal liberal democratic sys-tem.43 The reference to that balance provides a directconnection to corruption, as far as in its core the cor-rupt deal entails the hidden exchange of politicalpower for economic benefit. Accordingly the combi-nations of the different participation and/or institu-tional imbalances imply the existence of a fruitfulground for extensive corruption spread.

Corruption and democratization: The liberal democra-cy argument suggests that corruption and democrati-zation are negatively correlated. So here the questionhas to be: Can democratization hinder corruption inthe postsocialist countries? Numerous studies providestatistical and descriptive evidence proving this nega-tive correlation.44 But apparently corruption spreadcan not be addressed merely as the consequence oflow political and democratic development, becausethe western “model democracies” are in no case freeof corruption. On the other hand we cannot deny theargument that corruption stifles democratic institu-tions, eliminates the fair economic completion, facili-tates the establishment of “grey economy”, createslinkages between politics and organized crime anddamages further democratic development.

The scandals with illegal party donations, taxevasions of extra high amounts, the notorious „blackexchequer“45 of the international companies, that per-manently shake western democracies (Germany,France, Italy, the USA) are undoubtedly grave crimes,but they are not threatening the viability of the wholesystem. The contrary trend is characterizing the mostpostsocialist countries, where corruption turned into acommon instrument for distribution of resources at allpublic levels and has been established as daily routine.

It is obvious that corruption in the formersocialist world exhibits features different to thoseobserved in the western democracies. In the latter,corruption occurs more as an infringement of therule, which is normally prosecuted and punished bymeans of the entire severity of the state apparatus. Inthe former on the contrary, corruption thrives as amode of social organization, characterized by the dis-tribution of public goods, not in a universal, but in aparticularistic manner.46 That means corruption inthose societies is the norm and actually the common

way for exchange of wealth and power. This argu-ment supports my view outlined above that corrup-tion is not only a matter of developmental difficultiesbut is also a matter of the quality of state governanceas well.

However, I do not argue that the implemen-tation of further reforms to strictly follow the princi-ples of the western evolution democracies is to be apanacea for corruption, at least because we see thatthe “example” societies are also not free of corruptionand have their own “imbalances”. My point is ratherthat the achievement of a more stable, transparentand accountable governance would effectivelyaddress corruption by establishing viable mechanismsable to squeeze its “daily routine” character. Of coursethe additional reforms needed in Bulgaria have to be“balanced” as well, because the further transforma-tion of the economy in the context of the existingchaos and defective law enforcement would only rein-force the already established corrupt linkagesbetween political parties and economic interests.

Empirical parameters of the Bulgarian imbalance

What happened actually in postsocialistBulgaria? What made it possible for corruption toexplode? What role did the external pressure and theintegration process play on the development ofdemocracy and institutions? Here I will present asketch of some initial thoughts that address my mainquestion – why did the state fail to effectively count-er corruption?

Since the late 90s the external pressure onBulgaria to reduce the volume of corruption has beengrowing and getting more vigorous. Under the regu-lar control and thanks to the expert help on the partof the EU, Bulgaria succeeded to adjust the judicialsystem and to adapt the acquis communautaire. Inaccordance with this process numerous law amend-ments were carried out (plus four constitutionalamendments), new laws and sets of regulations wereadopted and an impressive institutional building tookplace (respectively is still taking place).

At the same time Bulgaria is in possession ofa good legislative and institutional anticorruption

43 According to: Dahl, Robert, A, Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1971.and Johnston,Public Officials, Private Interests, and Sustainable Democracy: Connections between Politics and Corruption , Johnston, Syndromes ofCorruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy.44 In order to prove the correlation of economical and political development M. Johnston constructs a comparative scale based on a combi-nation between the Human Development Index (HDI) issued of the United Nations Development Program and the Corruption PerceptionIndex (CPI) of Transparency International. He refers to the HDI, not only because of its GDP per capita indicators, but factors like “humanwellbeing”, alphabetization and access to education as well. Therefore, he suggests, the HDI entails not only affluence information, but alsodata on the efficiency of public institutions and politics. See: Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy.p. 32-35.More evidence on the correlation between democracy and corruption in: Fjelde, Democracy Depraved. Corruption and Institutional Change1985 - 2004, .45 The notion of “black exchequer/ cash boxes” became entrenched in the course of the big misappropriation scandals within Europeancompanies as Elf Aquitaine,VW, Siemens a.o. and means in the regular case - cash flows paid as bribes for receiving contracts. 46 More on corruption as a mode of social organization for distribution of public goods on a nonuniversalistic basis in: Mingiu-Pippidi, AQuest for Political Integrity, with an Introductory Essay by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, , Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina, Deconstructing BalkanParticularism: The Ambiguous Social Capital of Southeastern Europe, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies Volume 5, January 2005:49-68, www.eliamep.gr/eliamep/files/Deconstructing-Balkan-Particularism.pdf , Mungiu-Pippidi, Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment,

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infrastructure. Almost all crimes related to corruption(active and passive bribery; abuse of public office; taxevasion; conflict of interests, money laundering, influ-ence-peddling etc.) are criminalized. New anticorrup-tion laws were adopted in the last 2-3 years, such asthe Law for the Protection of Witnesses in CorruptionInvestigations, the Law on Political Parties, the Law forthe Forfeiture to the State of Property Acquiredthrough Criminal Activity, to name just three. In addi-tion, a new Penal Code was adopted last year. Thecurrent coalition government is already implementingthe second “Strategy for Transparent Governance,Prevention and Counteraction against Corruption”,the main focus of which is the fight against high-levelcorruption. Each state authority disposes of an ownanticorruption commission.

A positive signal of Bulgaria’s determinationto finally start a more firm fight against corruption atall societal levels was the choice and the consequentengagement of the new chief prosecutor in March2006 – Boris Velchev. Because of his professionalismhe has already become one of the most trusted andpopular personalities in Bulgaria and what is more –the EU-Commission also expressed its content withthe new appointment. Since he is in charge on the topof the prosecution office in Sofia the notorious repu-tation of that institution is clearly improving.Journalists and correspondents from all media dohave access to information about the running investi-gations and about the situation inside the prosecutionoffice itself, something, which was a taboo before.

The number of investigations on corruptionconnected crimes is indeed rising. Even in the “ownrows” there are unprecedented (for the Bulgarian set-ting) inspections over the past work of prosecutors inthe whole country. In the meantime there are fourhigh magistrates, who are under investigation onaccusations of illegally stopped proceedings, or con-nections to scandalous businessmen.47 The immunityof ten members of the parliament is supposed to belifted by the parliament on request by the prosecu-tor’s office, on grounds of corruption accusations.These measures for improvement of the law enforce-ment and the prosecution are indeed unprecedentedin Bulgaria.

Regarding the ways the current governmentaddresses corruption cases concerning politiciansthemselves, one positive step could be noted. It isconnected to the latest and biggest in scope corrup-tion scandal up to now, one that unveiled tight and

hard to comprehend liaisons between the NationalInvestigative Service, the Ministry of Economy andEnergy, the district Heating Service of the municipali-ty of Sofia and the biggest, still not privatized tobac-co producer “Bulgartabak”. The reaction of the primeminister Stanishev who dismissed from office twodeputy ministers one from the Ministry of Economyand Energy, and another from the Ministry of Disasterand Management Policy and temporarily removedfrom office the Minster of Economy and Energy –Rumen Ovcharov (member of the same party as thePM – Bulgarian Socialist Party), is actually without aprecedent in Bulgaria, where such “rigours steps”were up to now only undertaken, if the situation getscompletely hopeless. Surprising reaction also camefrom the Chief prosecutor and the Minister of Interior,who officially invited a European expert to monitorthe investigation process of the scandal. However, thisis in no case an evaluation of the strength of the statecapacities effectively, and moreover - by own means,to enforce the law. I am assessing here the expressedwillingness to open the state apparatus for externalcontrol.

A huge step forward is the gradual progresstowards a better cooperation with civil society organ-izations, engaged in anticorruption. Exemplary is theadmission of the nongovernmental organizationCenter for the Study of Democracy to monitor andasses the process of implementation of the anticor-ruption strategy of the government. The first results ofthat monitoring were included in the last governmen-tal report on Bulgaria’s progress from March 2007.The document was prepared in accordance to the sixanticorruption benchmarks, which were identified bythe EU-Commission as the areas in which additionalanticorruption efforts are urgently need.

Searching for the weak points

Referring back to the country’s specific con-text, these tendencies have to be interpreted as stepsin the right direction. Nevertheless, there is a “mafiawind” blowing in Sofia and on the territory of theentire country. ”The feeling of corruption is every-where“ stated the head of the EC-Representation inSofia Michael Humphreys.48 The flow of breathtakingcorruptions scandals in the daily news, the frequentcommissioned murders on the streets of the country,

47 Here an absurd occurrence has to be mentioned. These magistrates, who get into rumor, denounce their contracts prior to the official ini-tiation of the investigations. Thus, there is no legal way to carry out the discipline procedure against them and they withdraw their officewithout being punished, and receive the legally designated compensation (20 monthly wages) for the time being in office. As of11.04.2007 the media reported four such cases; cited from: Zeleva, Pavlina, „The euro-inspection over the prosecution office starts.”,Dnevnik, 11.04.2007, available at: http://evropa.dnevnik.bg/show/?storyid=329814. 48 Cited form: Zeleva, Pavlina, “Stanishev and the EU-Commission are not at the same opinion about the anticorruption successes.”,Dnevnik, 12.04.2007, available at: http://evropa.dnevnik.bg/show/?storyid=330219 .49 There is almost no politician, and no government since 1989 who were not involved in allegations for being connected in corrupt deals.

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the expensive vehicles in front of the parliament’sbuilding.49 All that creates a climate of uncertainty andfeeling of impunity in Bulgaria.

The very facts that Bulgaria is the crossroad ofthe east-west drugs’ channels,50 and that there aremore than 150 uncovered commissioned killings inthe last years confirm the assumption that all this hap-pens, just because it is possible, because the state istolerating it, because “the risk to get injured in a caraccident is much greater, than to get caught whileoffering, or accepting a bribe”.51 Therefore the ques-tions to be raised are, why does the state fail in anti-corruption, which are the weak points of the achieveddemocratic model, why the law enforcement andprosecution mechanisms do not function?

The clear and objective identification of theentrenched weaknesses of the state to undertake ade-quate action against political corruption is an almostimpossible task. A number of approaches are think-able. Therefore I am launching an attempt to bunchthe numerous interpretations in a comprehensive sys-temic study on the quality of political governance,while combining political, institutional, historical andindividual factors. What follows below is the first draftof an initial effort to assess some of the most obviouscapacity bottlenecks, which I am generalizing here inthe following three areas: justice and internal security;institutional weaknesses within the state/society bal-ance; political determination.

Weaknesses in the fields of justice and internal security

Internal security and counteraction againstorganized crime: Some important instruments for aneffective fight against high-level corruption andorganized crime (e.g. instruments of witness protec-tion, fulltime undercover agents, wire tapping), whichwere adjusted by the new Penalty Procedure Code,enacted in 2006, are not new and could be used since1997.52 Because of the fact, that these instrumentswere obviously not being used adequately, a lot oftime has been lost and a vital chance was given to theorganized crime structures to rise and establish theirnetworks in a setting of guaranteed impunity. This isone of the main conclusions made by the criminalexpert Klaus Jansen, sent by the EU-Commission to

Bulgaria in February 2006 to assess the capacities inthe field of fighting organized crime. However, thenew Penalty Procedure Code is providing some facili-tation for the Police through the allowance for infor-mation, gathered by agents undercover to be directlyintroduced to the case and so to be presented as evi-dence in court.53 Still one of the major weaknesses ofthe current legislation is that a conviction can not bebased only on the testimony of an anonymous wit-ness or undercover agent.

Uncoordinated and inadequate investigativeprocedures, no coherent method for a simultaneousinvestigation of crimes, connected to drugs’ smug-gling and money laundering are some of the furtherweaknesses detected by the expert. The NationalService for Fighting Organized Crime is being assessedas a “reactive” structure, waiting for signals in orderto react. Therefore, according to Jansen it would beuseful to develop approaches and structures for effec-tive information gathering, which have to be able toassure the independent and responsible initiation andconduct of investigations against the 233 identifiedorganized crime groups in Bulgaria.54

Almost all of the experts, I talked to duringmy field work expressed the opinion that the poorfinancial resources and insufficient technical equip-ment are also crucial for the unequal fight of thenational security services against the powerful organ-ized crime groups. This fact, combined with the per-manent lack of qualified specialists on the one hand,and the wide spread nepotism, which became therule by recruitment and promotion procedures withinthe police and intelligence organs, on the other,aggravates furthermore the state’s potency to count-er organised crime and high-level corruption.However, one of the gravest difficulties in this fieldundoubtedly is the lack of motivation among civil ser-vants, which is certainly due not only to the poorwages, but mostly to the overall reality of impunity forcorruption crimes. Accordingly, the missing investiga-tory and prosecution practice of high-level corruption,money laundering, influence-peddling, vote buyingetc. contributes further to the poor results in the anti-corruption fight.

Judicial system: The entire judicial system wasperceived up till quite recently as extremely secluded

The examples are numerous: the cabinet of Jan Videnov, changed prior to the end of his mandate in course of the gravest financial crisessince the democratic change, not at the last place because of corruption allegations; the reformation government of prime-minister IvanKostov, who was also forced to dismiss from office 11 of his ministers, on grounds of heavy corruption accusations; the succeeding govern-ment of Simeon von Sachsen Coburg-Gotha, which reputation was also shacked by corruption scandals, involving the prime-minister him-self, and of course the current coalition government, which is also experiencing tense turmoil under the newest scandal including theMinister of Economy and Energy Rumen Ovcharov.50 As noticed even in the report of the EU-expert Klaus Jansen: Jansen, Peer Review: Justice and Home Affaires, Focus Area: Fight againstOrganizied Crime .51 This is one of the conclusions made on the basis of the last corruption survey of the Center for the Study of Democracy: Cited from:Angarev, Pamajot, „Attention, political Corruption!“, 23.04.2007, Denvnik, el. ed., available at: http://www.dnevnik.bg/show/?sto-ryid=333695.52 Jansen, Peer Review: Justice and Home Affaires, Focus Area: Fight against Organizied Crime .53 Ibd. 54 The amount of the identified organized groups in Bulgaria is cited form the report of the EU-Commission controller Klaus Jansen: Jansen,Peer Review: Justice and Home Affaires, Focus Area: Fight against Organizied Crime

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and nontransparent.55 Notwithstanding some new,positive trends, it remains highly hierarchical. This canbe exemplified by the fact that without the co-opera-tion of the court president it is almost impossible tolaunch disciplinary proceedings against a magistrate.There are still no mechanisms for external control, noclear regulations for recruiting, promoting and pun-ishment of the magistrates. Besides, the extensiveimmunity the magistrates enjoyed was restricted to a“functional immunity” only as of January 2007 whenthe fourth constitutional amendment came into force.A great amount of new laws with the respective insti-tutions were enacted. Most of them do not have aclear mandate, financial and human resources. Allthat points to a hectic reform process, with no struc-ture and vision for implementing a coherent legalreform strategy, which on its part raises doubts on theseriousness of the reforms. Both EU-experts that weresend in February 2006 to Bulgaria expressed the opin-ion that they encountered a “it might just be a paperin order to please the Europeans” attitude.

In general the court proceedings could beassessed as arduous, bureaucratic and hardly trans-parent. Regarding the number of 10 000 cases, whichbecame void by prescription, doubts arise concerningthe capacity to prosecute effectively not only corrup-tion crimes.56 Out of the total 10 000 cases, 3700 areagainst identified offenders, and 800 of them wererelated to particularly grave crimes, such as homicide,corrupt dealing or even money laundering.57 Thismeans that hundreds of criminals are receivingamnesty because of incompetence, or reluctance toexecute duties.

Another important weak point is the insuffi-cient and actually missing transparency in the recruit-ment and appointment procedures not only withinthe judicial system. Exactly because of the “opennepotism”58 detected by both EU-experts in their peerreviews in February 2006, they concluded, this was aclear sign of low professional standards even of highranking magistrates.59

There is still a lot to be desired in the field ofanti-corruption in the sphere of Judiciary. Exemplary inthis case is the confusing fourth amendment of theconstitution which is going to be contested by theConstitution Court, as it grants the Minister of Justicewith exclusive competence over the entire budget ofthe judiciary. Besides, the new judiciary law is stillunder discussion, there is no law on lobbying. Thechaotic and fast law reforms,60 the slow and obscuredprocess of institutions’ building, the vague formula-tions in the new laws, all this is an indication of theoverall confusion with which the reform process isbeing implemented. All in all the new laws and regu-lations are still not sufficiently operationable. At thesame time these laws are already in force, which inpractical terms means the implementation is hinderedat the very begging. Thus it seems that in the name ofa successful integration, Bulgaria dedicated itself toan ambitious project, which brought barely achiev-able tasks.61

Institutional weaknesses within the state/society bal-ance

As outlined above, because of the belatedand chaotic carrying out of the economic and judicialreforms, much of precious time was lost. The corruptconnections between magistrates, politicians and pri-vate interests were given enough time to get estab-lished and are already functioning at a new level.Now, following the completion of the privatizationand the decrease of the discretionary customs controlzones since the 1st of January 2007, the managementof state assets (including land, public buildings andother assets) together with public procurement andconcession granting mechanisms are becoming thekey areas of political corruption risks.62 In addition, theinstitutionalization of the so-called “friendly circles”,or “party rings” is certainly one of the most alarmingappearances of political corruption, and still one ofthe major ways for privatization of the public inter-

55 This observation was shared with me in the course of the interviews carried out up till now, mainly with experts from the formerAnticorruption commission, and experts from the European Commission, observing the judicial reforms. 56 Cited according to the interview with the member of the Supreme Judicial Council – Kamen Sitlinski in Standart News from March 2007:Dimitrov, Bozidar, „The criminals change the paddle for internet.“ in Standart News, 23.03,2007,http://standartnews.com/bg/article.php?article=183051.57 Ibd. 58 Schuster, Susette, Report, 4th Peer Review, Justice, Düsseldorf, Germany February 2006,www.http://www.europe.bg/htmls/print_page.php?lang=en&category=82&id=5050.59 The nepotism is one of the biggest problems in Bulgaria, explaining the law professionalism of large segments of the state apparatus andat the same time assuring the building of loyal followings of civil servants, which normally lose their jobs as a result of eventual politicalchange. In the daily press releases there is a lot of information about the nepotistic appointments even on the top positions, e.g.: Baleva,Mariela, “Equatation with Wolfowitz in the Bulgarian way”, Trud, 17.04.2007, LXXII, issue 105/20140; el. ed. Capital, “Who doesn’t knowDelian Peevski?”, issue 17, 20.04.2007, available at: http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=335044. 60 According to information of the Minister of Justice, Georgi Petkanov, up till January 2007 20 Laws were being enacted, within the last 15months, in: Tomova, Juliana, “Within one year the Ministry of Justice worked out 20 law drafts.”, Interview, 18.01.2007, available at:www.diplomatic-bg.com/c2/component/option.com_frontpage/ltemid.1/lang.bg/. 61 This conclusion is based on the report of Susette Schuster, the EU-ovserver over the judicial reform. Schuster, Report, 4th Peer Review,Justice.62 An observation originally summarized by the Center for the Study of Democracy in the report of January 2007. Center for the Study ofDemocracy, Anti-Corruption Reforms in Bulgaria: Key Results and Risks , p. 6.

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est.63 Particular market segments of the Bulgarianeconomy, as well as huge financial flows, comingfrom the EU structural funds, were monopolizedthrough the “rings”. According to the report of theCenter for the Study of Democracy the cost of politi-cal corruption, this means the amount of abused pub-lic resources for 2006 exceed the money the countryis supposed to receive from the EU per year.64

One of the classical forms of political corrup-tion, the irregular party financing, is also “well” pre-sented in Bulgaria. The national Audit Office, as wellas the civil society organizations report particular“irregularities” by the party financing. According tothe results of the annual party finance revision of theAudit Office announced in November 2006, theBulgarian Socialist Party received donations from com-panies with more than the allowed 5% state share.65

But this finding underlines no penalty firstly becausethis is categorized as “law infringement” and not as“law offence”, and secondly, because a year longinfringements can not be prosecuted.66

Another manifestation of the virtual impunityfor some echelons of power is also the fact, that theparty leader of the ethnical Turks (the Movement forRights and Freedoms) Ahmed Dogan, spoke quiteopen in a TV interview in 2005, before the nationalparliament elections, that in Bulgaria there are rings,or “loops of companies” around each political party,and that during the last 15 years the above-averagebusinessmen in Bulgaria grew up, due to his support,or at least, thanks to “his smile”.67 Moreover, he him-self is in possession of possibilities equal to these of abanker, and if somebody is not aware of that, sohe/she doesn’t understand the real potential of apolitician in Bulgaria.68

Another weak point, which is commonly (mis)used bythe political elites in order to pursuit their own inter-ests, are the slackly rules in the field of the conflicts ofinterests. Unlike the binding rules (enacted by the CivilServants Law) for compulsory declaration of eventualconflicts of interests and obligatory disclosure ofincomes and assets concerning the public servants,

politicians (members of the parliament, ministers andthe office holders of the highest political positions) arebound to disclosure of assets only by ethical codes.However, with the amendments of the “Law onDisclosure of the Property of Individuals, Occupyinghigh-level State Positions” that came into force onJanuary 1st, 2007 nearly 7000 representatives of thepolitical power have been legally obliged to annuallyreveal their incomes before the national Audit Office.The Bulgarian National Audit Office, together with theNational Agency for Revenues received broader com-petences to control the submitted financial declara-tions.69 Notwithstanding the new rules on the disclo-sure, the regulations concerning the declaring of con-flict of interests remains on the “ethic level”.70

The fact of wide-spread corruption in thefield of public procurement generates further con-cerns.71 This does not only spoil the free competitionand channel a huge amount of money in the hands ofparticular politicians and loyal businessmen, but rep-resents an actual threat for privatizing the financialflows coming from the EU that have to be distributedby the Bulgarian government. The huge corruptionrisks related to the quick and substantial increase ofthe public finances (in the period 2007 and 2013 theEU-resources for Bulgaria might reach more than 600million Lev) might be aggravated by the law absorp-tion capacities of the administration on the one hand,and by the problematic monitoring and control mech-anisms over the granting and distribution of the struc-tural help, on the other.72

Concerning the state/society balance, there isanother weak point within the Bulgarian democracymodel, which is important to underline. That is theweak, yet missing “soft control” over the governmentby the civil society.73 Since the free elections are anindispensable and established part of the democraticsystem, there is no possibility to make the governmentresponsible to the articulated interests of the society,especially between elections. As outlined above, inBulgaria it is easier to change the government, than toeffectively influence the politics implemented.

63 Ibd. 64Center for the Study of Democracy, On the Eve of Eu Accession: Anti-Corruption Reforms in Bulgaria , S. 6.65 Cited from: BSP, NDSV, SDS and DSB are receiving donations from companies, implementing public procurement contracts. “6.11.2006,available at: www.btv.bg/news/newssave.php?story=53809.66 Ibd. 67 Cited from: Obretenov, Luben, “Ahmed Dogan conceded his business in Devin.”, Sega,12.04.2007, available at:http://www.segabg.com/online/article.asp?issueid=2614&sectionid=16&id=0000101.68 Ibd. 69 Information as of the last governemtal report to the EU-Commission from March 2006, available at:http://www.mvr.bg/EUIntegration/doklad_13.12.2006.htm, p. 15.70 Just two examples: the private interests of two members of the Parliament – Borislav Velikov, and Dolores Arsenova, both from NationalMovement Simeon II. According to press releases both of them are either directly or through family relatives connected to the pharmaceuti-cal business. Although they voted by the passing laws in their field of interests without declaring the obvious conflicts. Besides, there isinformation, that the companies, near to both MPs are receiving contracts from the Ministry of Healthcare. More in: „Members of theParliament conceal connections to the pharmacological business”, Sega, 02.03.2007, available at:http://www.segabg.com/online/article.asp?issueid=2576&sectionid=16&id=000010171 The fiscal costs of the corruption in the sphere of public procurement are perceived to amount in 2006 1, 2 Milliard Leva; Estimation of

the Center for the Study of Democracy, presented on May, 16th 2007, Information at: http://www.csd.bg/bg/artShow.php?id=8611.72 Center for the Study of Democracy, Anti-Corruption Reforms in Bulgaria: Key Results and Risks p. 57 f. 73 The notion of “soft control” is adopted from: Merkel, Wolfgang, “Eingebettete” Und Defekte Demokratien: Theorie Und Empirie, inDemokratisierung Der Demokratie: Diagnosen Und Reformvorschläge, ed. Claus Offe (Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/ New York, 2003).p.52.

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In the context of the corruption issue, thisassumption could be endorsed as follows: the publicpressure and disgust towards the above-average livingstandards of almost all representatives of the politicalelites lead only to the dismissal of some of the mostinfamous ministers within the Kostov government(1997-2001), as well as within the next governmentof Simeon von Sachsen Coburg-Gotha (2001-2005).The resignations of some “black sheep” could solvethe mandates of both governments. Neverthelessnobody was made accountable for abusing publicoffice. The remarkable efforts of the media and thecivil society to light up the most obvious corruptionaffairs are playing only their original role – to inform,but nothing more. Corruption scandals erupt quicklyand are being perceived by the wide public as shock-ing. However, as a rule they remain short lived and aresoon forgotten.

Political will to counter corruption

While searching for appropriate way to con-sistently approach and analyse the political will forcoherent anticorruption action, I refer initially to thetwo, already mentioned governmental reports onBulgaria’s progress in anticorruption to the EU-Commission. Both of them report prevailingly theimplementation of the so-called “soft measures”– liketraining, workshops, educational material (CDs andbrochures), the installation of corruption hotlines andinternet portals. Meanwhile, as the level of the admin-istrative corruption decreased, it is clear that theimpact of such measures is exhausted. Thus, the sus-picion rises that by the broad affirmation of the com-pletion of the “soft measures”, the government is try-ing to avoid the question of the still unsuccessful fightagainst political corruption. Therefore the implemen-tation of the governmental anticorruption strategy forthe period 2006-2008, dealing with the fight againstthe grand corruption, cannot be assessed as convinc-ing.

At the same time there are scary rumours onpresumed corrupt affairs, misuse, graft and fraud athigh scale. That means that the government perpetu-ally fails to pace down the rumour flow that floodsthe society daily, by undertaking effective investiga-tions to clarify at least some of the most popular cor-ruption scandals. Accordingly, no politician is jugged,or forced to forfeit assets, which at least obviously

mismatch with the average remuneration for respec-tive positions. No politician until now was forced toreveal the own connections to the well popular “loopsof companies”. Hence it is very tempting to draw theconclusion that a functioning mechanisms of mutualloyalty inside the governing coalition are in force.Taking into account the outlined “soft” regulation onthe disclosure of conflicting interests for the personal-ities on high positions, enacted by the current govern-ment, an assumption easily invokes, namely that thewill to publicly demonstrate successful fight againstcorruption inside the “own rows” overweighs theactual determination for effective prosecution of suchcases.

Further, Bulgaria adopted a comprehensiveanticorruption model,74 which practically means, that:all state organs take part in fighting corruption; eachstate’s authority disposes of an own anticorruptioncommission; each ministry has its own Inspectorate.Thus it is completely unclear, who and when isresponsible for what. The creation of a detailed andaccurate organization chart, displaying all institutions,with their mandates and competences turns out to bea barely feasible task, which means that within thegovernment it won’t be that hard to shift responsibil-ity. Moreover the central anticorruption commission,constituted under the direction of the Council ofMinisters doesn’t have any publicity mechanisms andstill no internet presentation. It is indeed hard to gath-er information on its actual work, although trans-parency and “zero tolerance” against corruption arethe major principles declared in the anticorruptionstrategy.

To sum up, because of the vague reports con-cerning the real situation of the capacity to fight high-level corruption; the attempt to impress by the com-pletion of a number of “soft measures”; the reluc-tance (or incapability) to conduct investigationsagainst anyone from the “own rows”; and the adop-tion and implementation of a highly decentralized, yetuncoordinated anticorruption infrastructure, it is notunjustified to assume, that the government doesn’tshow credible determination to coherent anticorrup-tion actions. On the contrary, the delegation of infa-mous representatives of the state power, who weresubjects of “unhealthy interest” on the part of theprosecution office, abroad, supports the assumption,that immunity is still used as a “political umbrella”.75

74 This comprehensive anticorruption model was not invented and launched by the current government. It has its origin in the state traditionbefore and was institutionalized for the first time with the first Anticorruption Strategy, implemented by the Government of Simeon vonSachsen Coburg-Gotha (2001-2005). 75 Here I am referring to the delegation of the former Chief Prosecutor Nikola Filchev as ambassador in Kazakhstan. His name was oftenconnected with shocking offences (including murder on the lawyer Nadezda Georgieva, information from: “Nikola Filchev has murdered thelawyer from Jambol Nadezda Georgieva, claim witnesses”, BgNews, 09.01.2007, available at: http://lex.bg/news.php?lang=bg&id=6728).Nevertheless, fact is that during his mandate thousands of cases were left without prosecution and now many criminals received amnesty,because of legal prescription. Fact is also that the amount of unresolved contract killings accumulated mostly during his time at the top ofthe prosecutors’ office. Another appropriate example here is the sending of the former mayor of Nessebar Nikolai Trifonov to work in theconsulate of the Bulgarian embassy in Odessa. He was granted his new position although there were (according to press releases) investiga-tions launched against him, because of illegally issued building licences. (Information in: Russeva, Luboslava, “Between the dark past andthe sunny future”, Dnevnik, 02.03.2007, www.denvnik.bg/show/?storyid0315660; BTV, “The municipality’s council of Nessebar will demandthe revision of the whole work of Nikolai Trifonov”, 24.02.2007, http://btv.bg/news/?magic=bulgaria&story=56720&page=1.

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Conclusion

The establishment of fundamental participa-tion opportunities and sound democratic institutions,turned to be a more challenging process, than theimplementation of free elections in the most postso-cialist countries. Besides, because of the seriousdefects in the spheres of opportunities and accounta-bility the established free elections lost their demo-cratic importance.76 One of the greatest problems ofpostsocialism however, should be identified in thegradual loss of statehood, manifested in the failure toprovide security, affluence, and responsible gover-nance. Thus a huge discrepancy appeared betweenthe elites and the voters, who are by no means able torequire their interests to be equally weighted in theconduct of the government.

What happened in postsocialist Bulgaria dur-ing the transformation? At first the democratizationprocess brought political liberalization, and thenslowly introduced growing opportunities for privatecapital accumulation (with networked social groupsbeing the common winners of these growing oppor-tunities), embedded in a context of “rulelessness” andlack of a functioning legal system. This turned into afruitful ground for the long process of the “extractionfrom the state”, facilitated by the complete disintereston the part of the governing elites, while “extracting”for themselves, to build up new functioning institu-tions. The combined forces of all these factors causeda rapid loss of statehood in Bulgaria in all three classi-cal areas – affluence, security and legitimacy, so thatthe state was no more able to hamper, or even con-trol the spread of corrupted accumulation, use andexchange of economic resources for political power.

The European orientation of the country rep-resented additional challenge to the governing elites.In the course of the integration process, launched in1995 Bulgaria was forced to change the entire judicialsystem in order to adapt to the acquis communau-taire. Under external pressure new priorities had to beset in the political agenda, that comprised not onlythe fight against the low-level corruption, but thecounteraction against the political corruption, as well.Accordingly the government adopted new, ambitiousgoals, promulgated great number of new regulationsand laws, built up new institutions and created com-prehensive anticorruption strategies.

Although the weak state capacities of thenew EU-member state Bulgaria to counter corruptionand organized crime are manifesting in a shockingmanner. Exemplary in this sense is the latest corrup-tion scandal, capturing more and more state organs,revealing appalling, nepotistic connections, while

comprising the entire scale of corruption crimes –abuse of public office, money laundering, bribery,conflict of interests.77 At the same time controversialinterests are being solved in Bourgas in a manner,most unacceptable for a democratic EU-memberstate.78 This last victim however did not come from the“underworld”, but was a representative of the localstate authority, the chairman of the municipality’scouncil of Nessebar. Thus the weak state capacities toestablish and guarantee a decisive framework for theparticipation in the political and economic arenas aremanifesting in a very demonstrative way.

Therefore, it is not surprising that illegalstructures are being formed in parallel to the officialinstitutions. In that sense, as stated in the literature,the density between the legal and the illegal institu-tions is one of the greatest threats to the persistenceof accountable and transparent democratic state.However, it seems that organized crime in Bulgariasucceeded to establish itself as a potent mechanismfor allocation and influence. Therefore, I argue thatthe further reforming of the present institutional andregulative structure of the achieved democraticmodel, to assure clear boundaries between state andsociety and to guarantee open and competitive partic-ipation opportunities, will enable the gradual separa-tion of the unhealthy linkages between politics andeconomy and will thus weaken the potency of corrup-tion as an allocation mechanism. It would be tragic, ifdue to weak capacities and reluctant political will,Bulgaria fails to use all opportunities coming from theEU-membership and to undertake effective actionagainst the political corruption.

According to press releases,79 one knows inadvance the prices of a signature of a Bulgarian min-ister, of a court procedure thwart, and of false univer-sity diploma. In theoretical terms that means that insuch system the corruption is not only a systemic phe-nomenon, but the system itself. Notwithstanding thegrave problems outlined above I remain hopeful thatBulgaria will succeed to demonstrate enough politicaldetermination and wisdom, to accept the supportfrom the civil society, in order to follow and improveeven the few positive trends in fighting corruptionand to efficiently proceed in establishing a participa-tory and institutionally balanced democratic system.

76 Merkel, “Eingebettete” Und Defekte Demokratien: Theorie Und Empirie.p. 67.77 Here I am referring to the above mentioned scandal, concerning Minister Rumen Ovcharov and the Chief of the National InvestigationService Angel Alexandrov. 78 In the night of May 9th 2007 Dimitar Jankov, the chairman of the municipal council of the city of Nessebar (a tourist city at the Black Seacost) was shot in his car, Porsche Cayenne, while in Bourgas. 79 This statement is based on: “Wo Unterschriften etwas kosten: Firmen kämpfen in Bulgarien gegen Korruption , aber es lockt rasantesWachstum“, Der Standard, 14.02.2007, available at: http://derstandard.at/?url=/?id=2767308 Romanian Journal of Political Science

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Beichelt, Timm Demokratische Konsolidierung im postsozialistischen Europa. Die Rolle der politischenInstitutionen: Leske Budrich, Opladen 2001.

Börzel, Tanja, Allgemeine Angaben zum Teilprojekt B2: Gutes Regieren ohne den Schatten der Hierarchie?Korruptionsbekämpfung im südlichen Kaukasus im Rahmen der EU-Nachbarschaftspolitik,Projektbeschreibung, FU Berlin, Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft Berlin November, 2005,http://www.sfb-governance.de/teilprojekte/projektbereich_b/b2/sfb700_b2.pdf.

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———, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION: Monitoring report on the state of preparedness for EUmembership of Bulgaria and Romania, Brussels, 26.9.2006, COM(2006) 549 final, 2006http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/sept/report_bg_ro_2006_en.pdf.

Fjelde, Hanne, Hegre, Havard. “Democracy Depraved. Corruption and Institutional Change 1985 - 2004.” In the48th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association. Chicago, USA March 2007, .

Ganev, Venelin, I. , Post-communism as an episode of state building: A reversed Tillyan perspective Communistand Post-Communist Studies.38 2005:425-45, available at: www.sceincedirect.com

Huntington, Samuel Modernization and Corruption, Political Order in changing Societies, 1968 In PoliticalCorruption, A Handbook,, edited by Arnold J. Johnston Heidenheimer, Michael, Le Vine, Victor T. NewBrunswick (USA) and London (UK), : Transaction Publishers, Third printing 1993.

Jansen, Klaus, Peer Review: Justice and Home Affaires, Focus area: Fight against Organizied Crime Rheinbach,Germany March 2006, www.europe.bg/htmls/page.php?lang=en&caategory=82&id=5050/

Johnston, Michael, Corruption and Democracy: Threats to Development, Opportunities for Reform, October1999, http://anti-corr.ru/archive/Corruption%20and%20Democracy.pdf

———. “Corruption and Democratic Consolidation.” In prepared for a Conference on “Democracy andCorruption”, Shelby Cullom Davis Center for Historical Studies, Princeton University March, 1999

———, Public Officials, Private Interests, and Sustainable Democracy: Connections between Politics andCorruption June 1996 http://www.iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/12/3iie2334.pdf

———. Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy. Hamilton, New York, 2005.Krastev, Ivan, The Balkans, Democracy without Choices, , Journal of Democracy, National Endowment for

Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press, 13.3, 2002:39-53, Merkel, Wolfgang. “Eingebettete” und defekte Demokratien: Theorie und Empirie. In Demokratisierung der

Demokratie: Diagnosen und Reformvorschläge, edited by Claus Offe, 43-71: Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 2003.

Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina (pref), A Quest for Political Integrity, with an introductory essay by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi,Romanian coalition for a Clean Parliament 2005, www.polirom.ro.

Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina, Deconstructing Balkan Particularism: The Ambiguous Social Capital of SoutheasternEurope, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies Volume 5, January 2005:49-68,www.eliamep.gr/eliamep/files/Deconstructing-Balkan-Particularism.pdf

Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina., Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment, Journal of Democracy, National Endowment forDemocracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press, Volume 17, Number 3, July 2006:86-99,

Offe, Claus. Reformbedarf und Reformoptionen der Demokratie In Demokratisierung der Demokratie:Diagnosen und Reformvorschläge edited by Claus Offe, 9-23. Frankfurt/ New York Campus Verlag 2003.

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* Mrs. Alina Mungiu Pippidi is the director of the Romanian Academic Society and teaches at the National School of Political Sciences andAdministration, Bucharest.

Alina Mungiu-PPippidi*

Abstract:

Denying the huge influence of ‘new’ media over politics in our times would be foolish: and since politicians areno fools the development of the new media seems to be accompanied by the development of new strategies tocontrol media contents and influence. While it remains undeniable that the social control patterns of a givensociety have a considerable influence over how the media system is shaped, I believe that globalization hasopened the door to outside influences on a scale undreamed at the times of Four Theories of the Press.

Keywords:

Media, media freedom, captured media, censorship, Eastern Europe, democracy

How Media and Politics Shape Each Other inthe New Europe

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Line of inquiry

How well do media theories from the devel-oped West fit postcommunist Europe? Surely sincethe late eighties of the 20th century to nowadays theevolution of the media in Eastern Europe (EE) wasspectacular and often unpredictable for media theo-rists. In their classic Four Theories of the Press, authorsSibert, Peterson and Scramm1 famously claimed that‘the press has always taken on the form and col-oration of the social and political structures withinwhich it operates. Especially, it reflects the system ofsocial control whereby the relations of individuals andinstitutions are adjusted’. How does this fit the rolethat media seems to play in prompting revolutions,insurrections and other forms of rapid politicalchange, a role so obvious in Eastern Europe that itshaped the budgets of democracy promoters donorseverywhere for the last two decades? The ascension ofAl-Jazeera, ignored for many years by the Americangovernment also opened the door to fresh reflectionon the influence of media. Some believe that haveentered an age where electronic transnational mediacan be more influential than any government. It canmobilize or discourage government action, but canalso play a role towards other politically influentialgroups: political oppositions, subversion movementsand civil society. In American military academiesmedia studies re-experience the flourishing of theVietnam War days, the previous war lost by US innewsrooms prior to being settled in the battlefield.Media researchers side either with classical theory,which denies much political influence to the media, ornew, post-CNN theory, which goes to great lengthemphasizing it. It is only fair to say that history movedfaster than theory and there is considerable catchingup to do by scholars in this field.

The history of the media in postcommunistEurope in the last two decades could find an equiva-lent in a history of the French media between 1788,with the invitation by the King to citizens to addresspamphlets to the General States and 1800, withBonaparte’s law, which reestablished control. In-between, one can find moments of triumph andmoments of agony, journalists rising to be heads oflegislatures as well as journalists sentenced by revolu-tionary tribunals. One needs a broad historical frame-work to examine the relationship between media andpolitics before, during and after times of upheaval, or,depending on the point on the time curve a studyfocuses (ascending-revolutionary or descendingcounter-revolutionary) results may seriously distort thegeneral picture. Alexis de Tocqueville famously saidthat the Revolution that began in 1848 was notanother one, but another chapter of the one which

had started in 1789. This sheds some light on whatcould be a good time frame to study revolutionarytimes.

The new era of media influence we enteredwith the 1989 revolutions is certainly related to tech-nology progress. The main newspaper of theUkrainian Orange Revolution, Ukrayinska Pravda, wasan Internet based publication which had 1.5 millionhits a day during the 2004 elections. When Serbauthorities cracked down on Belgrade B-92 radio sta-tion it could move to the Internet and continue tobroadcast. Classic media consumption may be pathdependent of the national context2: however, it is the‘new’ media which has a growing public, and theexchanges between the new and the old, as well asdirectly between new media and politics allow amedia system presently to develop more independ-ently from the local circumstances. This gives themedia higher potential for playing an influential roleand makes it harder to control by traditional means.

To understand the relation between media andpolitics in postcommunist Eastern Europe this paperbuilds on scholarship that presumes a two-way rela-tionship3 and discusses a circular model. It also looksat a broad timeframe, to cover revolutionary after-maths as well as revolutions themselves. I attempt ini-tially to propose a historical explanation for the birthof free media in postcommunist Europe, and the dif-ferent paths that national media systems travel from amoment on, as well as the causes of this divergenceand of change more generally. Once this frameworkestablished, I discuss the direct influence of mediaover politics looking at two different periods. For rev-olutionary times, and the influence of media onchanging governments, I review briefly the role of themedia in the recent ‘colored’ Revolutions in non-European Union accession countries Georgia andUkraine. For aftermaths, and the role of media in ‘nor-mal’ policymaking, I use a survey of cabinet membersin ten (postcommunist) new EU member countries.

Divergent Development Paths

The fall of Communism triggered intenseprocesses of change across Eastern Europe, especiallythe part geographically closer to the West and sub-jected to greater Western influence. The transitionsthat followed were supposed to accomplish transfor-mations from command economies to marketeconomies and from authoritarian/totalitarianregimes to liberal democratic ones. In fact, even morecomplicated processes were initiated in order toaccomplish these goals. These can be defined asnation-building (agreeing who belongs to the politicalcommunity), state building (moving from despotic to

1 Siebert, Fred. S, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Shramm (1956). Four Theories of the Press. Urbana. University of Illinois Press (1956: 1,2)2 Hallin, D. and C. Mancini (2004). Comparing Media Systems. Three Models of Media and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press3 For a review, see Robinson, Piers 2001 Theorizing the Influence of Media on World Politics. Models on Media Influence on World Policy.European Journal of Communication, Vol 16 (4) 523-544.

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infrastructural power), and, last but not least, society-building. Out of the social standardization imposedby Communism new social categories were neededto emerge during transition, in order to build capital-ism and democracy, the entrepreneurs, the politicians,the journalists. Politicians and journalists are thereforeequally newcomers on the public scene of EasternEurope, at least in the democratic framework, andboth the political system and the media system had tobe created from scratch.

To what end? Following the fall ofCommunism, nearly all East European countriesembarked in the building of a new, free media.Countries that have made the most rapid progresswith the reforms did also privatize the state media,took it off the budgets of the national and regionalauthorities, and pursued economic and regulatorypolicies aimed at creating an environment in whichthe media business could take hold. As in WesternEurope, there was one great exception to this- statebroadcasting. In the same time, an alternative, unau-

thorized and unregulated media erupted in many ofthese countries soon after the fall of the wall, some-times preceding the privatization of state media.

By 2006, the Freedom of the Press surveycaptured a mixed picture of postcommunist EasternEurope. Less than half of the former communist coun-tries are free (EU new members plus a few Balkancountries), with the rest stranded between partly freeand not free. If we look back in time, we find Poland,Hungary and the Czech Republic evolving from notfree to free in the space of only two years (1989-1991), with a year of ‘partly free’ in between. This is‘revolution’. Countries that secede from federal USSR(Baltics especially) or Yugoslavia also record the great-est evolution for the media during the politicalupheaval. But later the trends become more mixed,and even revert in some cases. Countries likeRomania, Bulgaria, Belarus, the Ukraine have knownalternate periods of progress and regress. So trendsdo not only vary across countries, but also over timefor some of them.

Source: Freedom House 2004, www.freedomhouse.org Legend: Greater scores mean less freedom.

Table 1. Freedom House scores of media freedom in EE

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By and large, we can identify two first phasescommon to all the countries, liberalization, or the pas-sage from total control to limited pluralism, with cen-sorship and repression replaced with self-censorshipand partial control. The second phase is of deregula-tion, mixing planned and spontaneous elements.From here on, national paths travel in different direc-tions. The explanation of these divergent paths farexceeds the role of the media and falls within moregeneral democratization theory. The trajectory of acountry is greatly influenced by its proximity to theWest and all that derives from it (Western interest,affluence of FDI), and of its own social pluralism(development of civil society, itself influenced by arange of other factors). However, it is fair to say, asWay does4, that a phase of pluralism by default of theearly nineties (due mostly to the inability of incum-bents to enforce authoritarian rule) is followed by adivergence of paths, postcommunist countriesbecoming either more democratic or, indeed, moreautocratic. I do not discuss more distant traditionshere, as none of East European countries, with theexception of the Czech Republic, had a serious demo-cratic tradition. And yet, the European Union andFreedom House consider many of them accomplisheddemocracies presently. Whatever it is at the source ofpath divergence in Eastern Europe, it is not pre-Communist tradition.

Communist tradition seems to matter more,and indeed different types of Communism operatedin Eastern Europe. Censorship in Soviet Union,Romania and Albania was far harsher than in Polandor Yugoslavia, and this impacted on the formation ofa class of real journalists with aspirations to be morethan just propagandists for the party. Otherwise, cen-sorship was a general rule, broken only byGorbachev’s decision to replace outdated appa-ratchik-censors with professional editors with the taskto urge self-censorship from journalists themselves.

The first two phases, from full control to par-tial control during glasnost, and then next to deregu-lation, either partial or total were common to mostpostcommunist societies, excepting some CentralAsian countries. The fall of the Berlin Wall brings fastderegulation and anarchy, with underground newspa-pers surfacing without license, pirate radio stationsand a strong Western pressure to liberalize the media.The state media is first de-monopolized, and then lib-eralization follows as state frequencies are offered forthe bidding of the private sector. The deregulationwent faster and deeper in Central Europe than in for-mer Soviet Union, except for the Baltic States, wherefreedom of the media was inseparable from thenation building process. In any event, more decisivesteps were taken to protect the new nascent freemedia in countries where anticommunists won thefirst round of free and fair elections. As shown inFigure 1, from deregulation on following the demiseof Communism, three different paths were available,so as national political systems traveled different jour-neys so did the respective media systems. In somecountries, politics became more and more competi-tive, and the media more and more pluralistic,although it has remained a complex mixture of pro-fessional with partisan media. In others, control of themedia returned, as the media was captured again,either directly by governments or by vested interestsnetworked with politics.

At the extreme end of path 2, in some FSUcountries, the media, even after a promising begin-ning, ended up captured. On the other end, in coun-tries with very competitive politics, the media land-scape has become gradually more plural and mostlyfree, with considerable partisanship and only limitedcapture. The freedom of the media score computedby Freedom House and presented in Table 1 correlatesstrongly with the corruption scores of postcommunistcountries also given by Freedom House within itsNations in Transit project5. This means that in an envi-

4 See Lucan A. Way ‘Authoritarian State Building and Transitions in Western Eurasia’A paper prepared for the workshop on “Transitions from Communist Rule in Comparative Perspective”, Encina Hall, Institute forInternational Studies, Stanford University, CA. USA, November 15-16. 2002.5 Correlation between Nations in Transit Corruption Score for 26 postcommunist states (scores range from one to seven, with seven themost corruption) and the FH Freedom of the Press scores (scores ranged from 17, for Estonia and Latvia, as the most free, to 96 forTurkmenistan and 86 for Belarus, where the greatest infringements of media freedom were found. The correlation was highly significantwith a Pearson index of 0.81. The two scores are both ‘subjective’, but as they are computed through two different methodologies they canbe correlated.

Figure 1. Divergent paths from Communist media control

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ronment of systemic corruption we are likely to find acaptured media alongside a captured state. By mediacapture I mean a situation in which the media has notsucceeded in becoming autonomous to manifest awill of its own and to exercise its main function,notably of informing people, but has persisted in anintermediate state, whereas various groups, not justthe government, use it for other purposes. State cap-ture in a postcommunist context designates the situa-tion in which the postcommunist state has not suc-ceeded in becoming an autonomous actor towardsinterest groups or vested interests. Media capture inpostcommunist Europe is therefore not necessarilycaptured by the state. As the groups which capturethe media either have already captured the state orseek to do so, capture of the media (either public orprivate) should be seen as a companion of state cap-ture, a complementary phenomenon. Among the fea-tures that make the landscape of media capture wecan count concentrated, nontransparent ownershipof media outlets, with important political actors con-trolling the media, a strong linkage between mediaand political elites, and important infiltration of themedia by secret services. Indicators of media capturecan give us important information on the trend themedia is on, towards more freedom or more capture.We can find precise indicators to measure capture,although indirectly. For instance, a large sector ofnonviable media living on covert sponsorship6 indi-cates a captured, not an autonomous media. Theexpectation towards media in democratic countries isof economic viability, if not of clear profit.

Capture distorts the main role of the media:captured media outlets exist to trade influence andmanipulate information rather than to inform thepublic, a phenomenon hard to fit into the classic gov-ernment-perpetrator and media-victim paradigm. Thisalso indicates that media influence does exist,although it could not be further from the influence ofprofessional journalism, be it more or less framed,measured in laboratories of Western universities.When media practices ranges from sheer disinforma-tion to blackmail it can be remarkably influential inpolitics. An influential media mogul in Romania creat-ed a small party, and despite its never passing theelectoral threshold he managed to participate in bothleft and right government coalitions. He has evenmanaged to prevent the first nominated Romanian

politician to become an EU commissioner, claiming –without any foundation – that he was an informant ofCommunist secret police. Disinformation wars raged‘transitional’ Russia and are frequent in other coun-tries as well.

The extent of media capture varies across thespectrum of countries taking path 2. Scandals havesurfaced even in the most advanced democracies inthe region bringing evidence to document ‘capture’attempts. In the Polish Rywingate scandal, director ofGazeta Wyborcza Adam Michnik, who needed achange in legislation so to buy TV network Polsat wasoffered an informal ‘deal’ by a government intermedi-ary. Such deals are actually carried out in other coun-tries and nothing more is heard of them. Path 2 andPath 3 (simple regression to censorship) can go sepa-rately, or can coexist, for instance the private mediatakes path 2 and the public one returns to path 3.Ukraine and Russia are countries where the systemhas been ‘mixed’ during most of the transition. Priorto the 2004 Orange Revolution, the Ukrainian govern-ment had fallen back to ‘temnyky’, written indicationsfor the media to know how to interpret the news. Inthe leaked transcripts of the 2000-2004 Romaniangovernment meetings, two major government char-acters compared the two types of control: capture(indirect control) and open censorship (direct), to findthe latter much more effective. In their words: ‘I keepwondering why do we continue to support the mediawith the old tax breaks, with sponsoring and advertis-ing, while what we get in return is just some vague,individual reprieve’7.

Governments unable or unwilling to resort todirect media control contribute to media captureeither directly or indirectly. State subsidies, bailouts incase of debts, preferential distribution of state adver-tising and tax breaks for media owners are traded inexchange for favorable treatment of the media. In thecase of public broadcasting, anticommunists andpost-communists alike showed remarkable firmbeliefs in direct media effects8. Inheriting a system inwhich public broadcasting was legally and financiallydepending upon government, they have slowlyreformed it so to make it dependent of the politicalmajority in Parliament, practically legalizing politicalcontrol, a model also found in some EU countries.Tenure of top executives, for instance, general manag-

6 Belin, L. (2001). “Verdict against TV-6 is Latest Warning to Opposition Media,” in Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty: Russian PoliticalWeekly.1: 25.7 The Standing Committee of PSD, Oct 20th 2003. Stenogramele PSD. Editura Ziua, 3 volumes, Bucure?ti: 2004. The leaked transcripts ofthe Romanian then government party Social Democrat (postcommunist) were under investigation by national anticorruption Prosecutorbeginning 2005. Former Affairs Minister Mircea Geoana was quoted by BBC World Service acknowleging the transcripts are genuine.Several others PSD members made similar statements to the Romanian press. The Prime Minister Adrian Nastase (after January 2005 chairof the Chamber of Deputies) denied their authenticity. See the review of transcripts in Romanian Journal of Political Science, fall 2004, pp54-56, www.sar.org.ro/polsci/8 See Sukosd, M. and P. Bajomi-Lazar (2003) Reinventing Media. Media Policy Reform in East Central Europe. CPS Books. Budapest: CentralEuropean University Press: 2003: 11 and Hall, Richard A. and O’Neil, Patrick (1998) “Institutions, Transitions, and the Media: A Comparisonof Hungary and Romania”, in O’Neil, Patrick (ed.) Communicating Democracy: The Media and Political Transitions. Boulder and London:Lynne Rienner Publishers: 143

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formal regulations, but as those are influencedstrongly by international actors, it also uses less overtmeans to control the media. External influence of var-ious types varies greatly across the countries. Unlikefor other regions of the world, however, Westerninfluence mattered enormously in postcommunistEurope. First, for providing an accessible culturalmodel to be followed by journalists and politiciansalike; second, for the conditionality related to Councilof Europe, NATO and EU accessions; third, throughthe permanent channels of communication betweenprofessions, contributing to the re-socialization ofEasterners according to Western standards. This thirdinfluence is mostly exercised directly on the media,through training and assistance programs.

A mix of incentives and penalties, conditionali-ty played the most direct and impressive role.President Francois Mitterand famously calledRomania’s President Ion Iliescu in the summer of 1990when opposition newspapers were closed to arguefor a softer handling of political opposition and themedia. International influence tuned Ion Iliescu intoan EU accession promoter and this conversion eventu-ally changed the path of the country. No such call onrecord exists for Alexander Lukashenko, the BelarusianPresident, already elected four times (Mr. Iliescustepped down after a third mandate). Internationalconditionality seems to be powered only by strongincentives, such as a prospect of EU accession, which

converts captors into more or less convincing pro-Europeans. Most of the behavior described hereunder ‘media capture’ falls in the realm of ‘informalpractices’. Practices can complement formal regula-tions, but can also be competitive or substitutive inothers, where formal freedom (as enshrined in theConstitution) is effectively sabotaged by capture ordirect control.

The public has an important feedback, to themedia via audience and circulation, to the govern-ment through elections or opinion polls. The questionis why should governments care about media, if theycan buy or bully it at their will? The model suggeststwo important answers to this question. The first is onthe role of the international community. As EU acces-sion progresses or non-EU countries ask for foreignassistance (such as grants from MillenniumCorporation) the cost of repressing the media growsand becomes unaffordable for any government butan isolated one, which either does not care for theopinion of the international community or is able tobuy a good one by resources (such as oil or gas).Capture develops as a substitute, but Freedom HouseNations in Transit or IREX Sustainability Index devel-oped precisely in order to be able to look more quali-tatively at media freedom. The second explanationrefers to the direct feedback of the public to the gov-ernment presented in the model. In electoral democ-racies or in times when revolutions occur as ‘waves’

er and news director, was less than a year during tran-sition excepting the Baltic States and legislation hasoften been revised to provide fresh opportunities todismiss executives who were not obedient enough.9

By and large, a model summarizing the com-plex relationship between press and government intransition accession countries is approximated inFigure 2. The government regulates media through

9 See Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2004). ‘State into Public: the Failed Reform of State TV in East Central Europe’, Shorenstein Center on Press andPolitics, Harvard University, Working paper 2000#6, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/presspol/publications/pdfs/alina.PDF

Figure 2. Context of the interaction media-government

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defying the media can only be afforded by populargovernments. Some governments, such as Putin’s orLukashenko’s had enough resources to subsidy house-hold energy and come up with a variety of perks forthe public. These governments will not be broughtdown by the media, as they are genuinely popular.The largest share of the budget of the city of Rostov,in Southern Russian Federation, is used to cover utili-ties bills from private households: the majority ofinhabitants are beneficiaries. A comparable city,Bucharest in Romania dedicates less than 3% to thesame purpose, at a comparable purchasing paritypower of the population. But most countries cannotafford such strategies, they do not have the naturalresources. In those countries the voters’ feedback islikely to work and the media can be very influential.

The three paths of the relations between mediaand government in Figure 1 thus amount to threegovernment strategies: 1. direct control throughrepression 2. indirect control through capture 3.accommodation. The third strategy might be inspiredby genuine concern on how to sell policy acts to themedia or incorporate the views of public opinion intopolicy, as well as by rational calculations of how to‘look good’ to the media.

Media Strikes Back

The overriding concern of the first years, bothin Eastern Europe itself and the West, was on secur-ing media freedom in postcommunist Europe andestablishing it on a firm legal and economic basis. Buteven prior to setting up media as an autonomousactor – a process completed only partly in some coun-tries - media had been at the center of politicalchange in Eastern Europe, right from the very begin-ning. Starting with the 1989 Romanian Revolution,public television became not just a mouthpiece ofgovernment or the victim of abuse, but also a crucialactor. In 1989 Romania, public television extendedwhat could have arguably been a manageable revoltin Bucharest only, into a national scale collapse ofCommunism, by broadcasting the news thatCeausescu had fled. One year later in Bulgaria, a shiftin the attitude of journalists working in public televi-sion led directly to the fall of Communist PM PetrMladenov, and opened the door to radical politicalchange. Seen as the main reason why the Milosevicregime was still popular in rural areas, Serb nationalTV was bombed by NATO in 1998, on charges of …disinformation.

Two more recent examples illustrate how mediacan help prompt decisively a breakthrough for radicalpolitical change. The Ukrainian Orange revolution hadits origins in the President of the country losing his

patience with a journalist. A tape alleging that thePresident was involved in the killing of investigativejournalist Georgy Gongadze, recorded by a formerpresidential bodyguard was posted on the site of hisnewspaper, Ukrayinska Pravda, turning this smallInternet publication into number one rated Ukrainianmedia website. This also made the support for theregime an ‘immoral’ option. During the electoral cam-paign the number of Internet users tripled in Ukraine,as official censorship pushed voters to Internet cafesin search of real news. Only three days before the firstround of elections 40 journalists, representing five TVchannels, publicly declared that they would not workunder “temnyky.” Later representatives of another 18TV channels and media companies joined the petition.The breaking point was November 25, when the sys-tem of censorship and capture fell like a house ofcards, in the words of a journalist10. On the day whenofficial results were to be reported by the central elec-tion commission the sign interpreter Natalia Dmytrukignored the text of the main presenter about the out-come of the election. Instead she gestured to her deafviewers: “The official results by Central ElectionCommittee are falsified. Do not trust them.Yushchenko is our president. I’m really sorry that I hadto translate the lies before. I will not do this again.Not sure if I will see you then.” Her statement trig-gered others as well.

Georgia’s Rose Revolution was another betwon by donors who believed in the power of themedia. The key actor was a provincial TV, Rustavi-2,founded in 1994 in the town of Rustavi, not far fromTbilisi. It was initially a tiny private local TV station. Itsmain founder, with help and advice from the U.S.media assistance Internews (USAID backed), built itinto a professionally sound media company, both ineconomical and journalistic terms. In the space ofmere two years Rustavi-2 moved into Tbilisi, survivedtwo attempts of the regime to close it, was madestronger by the assassination of one of its journalistsand became a national model where other stationsand journalists looked for inspiration. CurrentPresident Michael Saakashvili, then the challenger,later said that ‘Most of the students who came out onthe streets were brought out by Rustavi 11”. Its rolebecame crucial on elections’ day, as it ran a scroll atthe bottom of the screen 24 hours a day showing theofficial results compared to a credible NGO exitpolling and parallel vote count.”

The assembled evidence that democracy pro-motion of this kind can be more effective than embar-gos or military interventions, has by now persuadedthe donor community and endowed it with a strongargument when facing policymakers12. In the ten yearsleading up to the Georgian revolution, the U.S. gov-

10 Based on Olena Prytula, Journalism at the Heart of the Orange Revolution, an address to Knight Fellowships Reunion and Conference,Stanford, California, July 9, 2005 11 See David Anable ‘The Role of Georgia’s Media—and Western Aid—in the Rose Revolution’. Joan Shorenstein Center on thePress, Politics and Public Policy Working Paper Series 3:2006 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 12 Idem note 11.

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Influence on policymaking is, of course, muchharder to prove than influence on revolutions. Thestudy of the media’s direct effects on politics general-ly looks at how media might influence who makespolitical decisions through the selection of politicalpersonnel; how media affects political styles and pro-cedures, therefore how it influences political actorsbehavior; how media might co-determine about whatdecisions are taken due to their agenda-setting role;and finally, how media might affect the actual con-tent of political decisions, via their directional cover-age or framing through bias or partisanship. The role

of the media in elevating issues to the systemic agen-da and increasing their chances of receiving consider-ation on policy agendas is subject of considerablecontroversy nowadays, after being nearly orthodoxy inthe seventies15. In their influential overview of agenda-setting research, Dearing & Rogers state that “Themass media often have a direct influence on the poli-cy agenda-setting process”16. Reviewing a large bodyof research, Walgrave and Nuytemans17 found thatthe media’s impact on agenda setting depends onplace, issues, political agendas, media agendas, andtime.

ernment spent just over $154 million on democracyassistance projects in Georgia, most of it under theFreedom Support Act of 1992.13 In Eastern Europeand the former Soviet Union as a whole, $350 millionhas been spent since 1991 specifically to developindependent media.14 Some critical reservations weremade that following the victory of opposition in elec-toral revolutions, media again did not show muchautonomy, but instead became more partisan. This isin all likelihood true, and the concern is justified.Good media is autonomous media. Partisanship,however, is an indication that pluralism exists, andpluralism is superior to autocracy. There is anotherevolutionary cycle to go from pluralism to substantialdemocracy.

What about ‘normal’, non-revolutionary times,for instance during and after EU accession, does themedia still matter? Seeing the public trust in media(television especially) and government the likelihood isthat media has a good position. It enjoys far morepublic trust than the government does. Around theiraccession date in 2004, even EE governments with agood record on EU accession were facing major pop-ularity problems; after accession, a period of politicalinstability followed in Poland, Czech Republic andHungary. Television has more than double the popu-larity of government in most countries, three or fourtimes in some. Television is a strong actor, and TVowners a force to be reckoned with.

13 Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, U.S. Dept. of State. 14 O’Connor, Eileen and David Hoffman, International Herald Tribune, “Media in Iraq: The Fallacy of psy-ops” December 16, 2005. 15 See Cobb, R. and T. Elder (1971). “The politics of agenda-building: an alternative perspective for modern democratic theory.” Journal ofPolitics 33: 892-915. Also Kingdon, J. W. (1995). Agendas, alternatives and public policies. Boston: Little Brown.16 Dearing, J. W. and E. M. Rogers (1996). Communication concepts 6: Agenda-setting. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage: 7417 Walgrave, S & Michiel Nuytemns (2004) "Specifying the media's political agenda-setting power. Media, civil society, parliament and gov-ernment in a small consociational democracy" (Belgium, 1991-2000) Paper presented at ECPR's Uppsala Workshop Session, April 2004

Table 2. Trust in media and the government

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What does evidence from Eastern Europe tellus? In 2003-2004 I participated to the organization ofa survey in the ten East European EU accession coun-tries asking cabinet members on the role of media onpolicymaking. Ministers were asked to provide theirsubjective views on the amount of media influenceduring their tenure, specifically in reference to topicsof cabinet discussions, amount of time given to mediain cabinet discussions, presentation of decisions andfinally substance of cabinet decisions. These questionsshould be judged together to get a complete pictureof media’s weight. If the media influence governmenttopics and prompt discussion in the cabinet, this

means it influences agenda setting. The third questionon presentation or wrapping up of cabinet decisionsis more ambiguous, referring both to the communica-tion skills of the government as well as to the media’sinfluence. The fourth question, on influence over sub-stance of decisions, which should provide the clearestcut evidence of impact, depends strongly of aware-ness of politicians of being influenced and their readi-ness to admit this publicly. While politicians love topresent themselves as oversensitive to media’s policywarnings, they do not want to give the impressionthat they are ruled by the media.

The results of the survey suggests that media

in East Central European countries influence bothagenda-setting and substance of policy decisions.From our pooled sample of ministers, 47% acknowl-edge influence over topics, 49% over discussion time,and 33% over content of decisions. Variation is mini-mal across political ideology and type of cabinet, andis significant by country only. The great exceptionseems to be the Czech Republic, whose ministerssteadily denied influence of media, to the extent thatnone of them named an influential TV program. Thecountries where ministers acknowledged that mediainfluences the substance of decision to a greaterextent are Bulgaria, Hungary and the Baltic states.Lithuanian ministers come on top with the greatestparticipation of the media to their agenda, andRomanian ministers seem to lose considerable timediscussing in cabinet meetings what they have seenon TV the evening before.

Answers show some inconsistency of respon-dents. Slovak ministers allow discussing topics raisedby media a lot in the cabinet, but claim their choice of

topics and decisions are their own. This makes us sus-pect that ministers are reluctant to admit that they areinfluenced by public opinion as expressed throughmedia. The Czech and Slovak ministers did not indi-cate any specific programs and newspapers as moreinfluential than others, although it is hard to believethat those do not exist. In other countries, withRomania on top, ministers acknowledge the particularinfluence of some newspapers or TV programs. Somegovernments seem more professional in passing theirmessage to the media, especially the Czech and theBaltic ones. Countries which do better on freedom ofthe press seem also to be more careful in dealing withthe media, while a great difference between the timeallocated to discussing media (73, 64 respectively) asin Romania and Slovakia and the relative carelessnesstowards communicating to media (24, 14 respective-ly) might be because other informal means of han-dling the media are preferred. The survey of EastEuropean ministers seems to confirm what RobertDahl wrote in his classic Who governs?: ‘The more

Table 3. Media influence as acknowledged by cabinet ministers

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uncertain a politician is about the state of public opin-ion or the more firmly believes in the ‘power of thepress’ the more reluctant he would be to throw downthe gage to a newspaper publisher’18. In other words,power of the media in normal times depends on theextent that decision makers believe in it, and thismight explain the wide variation of media effectsstudies, as this belief varies greatly across nationalmedia environments, and from one moment in timeto another.

Conclusion

Research often ends up in more questions.Rather than asking ourselves if the media is influen-tial19, and if investment in freedom of the media bythe international community can bear fruit – it clearlyis, and it clearly does - I suggest we focus on the cir-cumstances that empower the media. This means thata comparative politics research design across a broadinterval of time, rather than generalizations from thecross-sectional study of one country might providebetter answers as to what specific set of circum-stances makes a politically influential media. I alsosuggest that informal aspects of media control andmedia behavior should not be neglected in favor ofclassic ones, and that corruption of the media is anunderrated and understudied phenomenon.

Does the history end if a country reaches therelatively happy phase of accommodation, and wewitness far less interaction between media and poli-tics, as in liberal democracies? By and large, judgingby the EE experience I would say it does, but actors inthe field might not agree. The media in most of thecountries discussed here differ sharply in style fromthe rest of continental Europe. The violent critical toneand the poignancy of the investigative journalists inEastern Europe (as well as their inaccuracy) are hardto accept in some Western European countries, suchas France or Switzerland, with their mild media, andare closer to the British press only from ‘old Europe’.One would be tempted to say that such governmentsdeserve the media that they get, and the other wayaround. It would be an easy way out, though. EastEuropean governments rule through exceptionaltimes, when the constitutional and economic order isdaily overhauled to push transition further towardswhat their citizens black-humouredly call ‘the light atthe end of the tunnel’ . Politicians are often amateurpolicymakers trying to acquire some skill during office.Publishers and journalists often picture themselves asbetter at the job of government and give strong indi-cations what policy decisions should be taken. Somemay even get a position in the next government. Until

the process of consolidation of new professional elitesmake such shifts between professions the exceptionrather than the norm, governing in Eastern Europewould remain a sort of athletic game in which specta-tors are allowed to throw in various objects and evendescend from the amphitheatre into the playing field,while the results of the game are established by theiropen vote. It would sound anarchical and unprofes-sional indeed if the mere word ‘democracy’ was notborn precisely on such amphitheatres.

18 Robert Dahl Who Governs? New Haven: Yale University Press 1974: 25919 See K. Novak, 'Effects no more?' in U. Carlsson (ed) Beyond Media Uses and Effects, Gothenburg University: Nordicom, 31-40

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POLSCI REVIEWS

The Romanian Revolution ofDecember 1989Peter Siani-Davies, Cornell University Press, Iataca andLondon, 2005

Milena… *

After almost 10 years since the Romanian rev-olution of December 1989, both the academic com-munity and public opinion of Romania, have stillmany doubts regarding the nature and the exactunfolding of those events. Peter Siani- Davies, one ofthe few western researchers involved in the study ofthe Romanian society, through his excellent work “TheRomanian Revolution of December 1989”, offers adetailed account of the Romanian revolutionaryupheaval and of the difficult birth of democracy inRomania, giving at the same time an important con-tribution on the elucidation of the myths and realitiesof the Romanian revolution.

Following a linear and chronological struc-ture, the author begins by analysing the causes of theRomanian revolution of December 1989, identifyinggrounds like the extreme food rationing that kept foryears the population to the limit of starvation, the per-sistent human rights abuses with a particular focus onthe restriction of abortions that determined the high-est rates of maternal mortality in Europe, the rigidityof command economy, the peculiarities ofCeausescu’s neo-Stalinist coercion-based regime, thelack of an organised dissidence correlated to the gen-eral popular discontent and the changed internation-al context.

The author emphasises that this hardship oflife conditions and the brutality of the communistregime in Romania was not a novelty in 1989, andseeks in-depth explanations of why the country erupt-ed in revolution in December 1989 analysing themechanisms of revolt and using detailed examples inconnection to a solid theoretical foundation.

The following chapters provide the readerwith a descriptive, but also analytical perspective ofthe events of December 1989, dividing it in two phas-es, prior and post December 22nd, the date of thecapture of Nicolae Ceausescu and the establishmentof the new leadership. With regard to the first phase,the author pays a particular attention to events likethe eruption of the revolution in Timisoara, the esca-lation of the crisis through the spreading of revolts allover the country and the succession of events in

Bucharest, describing it literary hour by hour. As forthe second phase, the author concentrates on thedescription of the general chaos generated by the fearof the so called “terrorists” and on the active roleplayed by the television in the shaping of the events.The establishment of the new structure of power wasbased mainly on the removal of the twin pillars of theold regime, namely the Ceausescu family and theSecuritate, the political police of the communist rule.

A particular emphasis is given by the author,in a separate chapter, to the counter-revolutionaryforces who were responsible for the impressive num-ber of victims, for the general confusion during thesecond part of the revolution and for the violent char-acter of the revolution. As this book brings out, manyof the above mentioned terrorists were part of theSecuritate units, but their importance was generallyexacerbated, being manipulated by the new-formedgovernment in order to gain legitimacy and to justifythe unnecessary victims. Regarding the central argu-ment of the role of the Securitate forces in theRomanian Revolution, the author also takes intoaccount the conspiracy theories about certain plottinginside the system against the rule of Ceausescu, butconcludes that the importance of such conspiracyprior to the overthrow of the communism should notbe over exacerbated.

The book under review also offers a conciseand well documented account of the formation of thenew state administration under the leadership of IonIliescu and the National Salvation Front (NFS) andexamines the matrix of ideas taken up by the Front.Beside giving a detailed picture of the structure andcomposition of the Council of the National SalvationFront, the author puts forward solid arguments forfact that even though apparently the general platformof the NFS was based on a reformed socialism associ-ated to a socialist model of the market economy, inreality it was a non-ideological party appealing only tothe creation of a general consensus and an organicsolidarity.

“The Romanian Revolution of December1989” has an excellent theoretical background, exam-

* Mrs. Milena Marin is currently enrolled at MIREES, Bologna University, Italy

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ines the most notorious revolution theories and analy-ses in-depth the events in 1989 in accordance tothem. Moreover, it brings a valuable contribution tothe elucidation of the myths and realities of theRomanian revolution, by analysing different perspec-tives on the events such as “revolution”, “coup d’état”and “popular uprising”, and by giving space for afierce polemic over the nature of the revolutionary act.

It is important to notice that even if it takesinto consideration the hypothesis of “coup d’état” or“coup de palace”, widely debated among the interna-tional academic community, the book under reviewconcentrates strictly on the revolutionary perspectiveof the analysed events, concluding that it was a “vio-lent and involved mass mobilisation , which led to thestorming of the institutions of the old regime, fol-lowed by the establishment of revolutionary councils”.Hence, the author provides us with a very prudentconclusion and leaves the debate open. We considerimportant to point out that, event if the reviewedbook is based on excellent sources, it fails to bringinto discussion the documents of the communistarchives, relying mainly on academic books and onjournalistic sources. This is a fundamental aspect con-sidering that the very truth about the Romanian revo-lution of December 1989 can be known only whenthe entire archives will be available to the researches,fact that can only occur when all the ones account-able for the violent events will leave the political sceneof Romania.

To conclude, we can certainly argue thatmany of the unanswered questions on the events ofDecember 1989 can find their response in Peter Siani-Davies’s brilliant work about the Romanian revolution.

What`s Wrong With The

European Union & How to Fix It

Simon Hix, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2008

Cristian Ghinea*

However different they are, John McCain andBarack Obama have a common message: unifying adivided America. Both candidates aim to come acrossthe aisle for less divisive politics. This sort of messageseems to become a mantra for politicians and schol-ars. And yet Simon Hix swims against the current inhis newly released book `What`s Wrong With TheEuropean Union & How to Fix It`. Hix analyses the

political system of EU as a classical case of a consen-sualist democratic model. And he points out preciselyto this consensualism as being the main problem ofthe EU. The political game at European level needs areal stake, with clear winners and clear losers.

Author of a well known study text about thepolitical system of EU and a reputed scholar ofEuropean studies, Hix offers the readers a spectacularmélange between academic research, political realismand bold anticipation literature. He starts by under-pinning the historic achievements of the EuropeanUnion. Sustainable peace and internal market wentfurther than many hoped 50 years ago. But that erahas ended in the early `90s. In that sense, EU couldbe considered a victim of its own success. Given itsachievements, what is wrong with it? Why hasdecreased the trust of Europeans in that project with20% in the last decade only? Could it be the lack ofinformation about EU? The European bureaucracyprefers to blame the lack of information for its unpop-ularity and pays for propaganda like activities thatbore the public. Actually, the citizens are moreinformed today about the EU than in the past. Why isthat? Hix says that EU`s problem is deeper than badPR: `Citizens who perceive that they gain new eco-nomic opportunities from market integration inEurope tend to support the EU, while citizens thatperceive that market integration threatens their eco-nomic interests tend to oppose the EU` (64). Thisexample illustrates the Hix`s argument at its best.Given the nature of the problem, more politics couldhelp EU in gaining popular legitimacy: Ìn democrat-ic political systems, if a citizens loses from a particularpolicy or suffers economic hardship, the citizen doesnot blame the political system as a whole, but ratherblames the government of the day. In the EU, in con-trast, those who lose from economic integration orfrom policy reform simply blame the EU system awhole, as they do not perceive a governing coalitionat the European level who they can replace` (66).

But the popular mood is not the biggestproblem identified by the Simon Hix. The EU suffersfrom a deep policy gridlock. For many years its politi-cians believed this was a result of bad constitutionalarrangements. Consequently they made enormousefforts to solve the problem at constitutional level. Butthey ended up with a failed Constitution and endlessnew negotiations with little effects. This is the badnews: the Lisbon treaty will not fix the EU. The goodnews is given also by Hix: the problem is not there. Hesimply demonstrates that EU functioned satisfactoryuntil early `90s with worse institutional mechanismsthan today. Simply put, a huge volume of legislationwas adopted in creating the single market when theunanimity was the rule, not the exception as it is thecase today. Isn’t it ironical that once the decision-mak-ing became simpler the decisions were increasinglydifficult to be made? What is the problem then?

* Cristian Ghinea is a Romanian journalist currently following a MsC in Governments and Politics in EU at London School of Economics.

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Hix changes the topic from institutional shap-ing to policy making. The very nature of EU`s deci-sions changed dramatically. Internal market was builton a centrist platform. Very different political forces,from French socialists to British thatcherites, were ableto agree on this issue. But once internal market creat-ed, the EU played more and more a redistributionrole. In other words, it is more and more difficult tohave win-win situations. Someone has to lose. Andmany actually lose, as many really win. For instance,deregulation of labor market creates new opportuni-ties for investors but the well-protected Westernworkers are losing. The historical consensual model ofEU was appropriate for agreeing on the internal mar-ket but creates tensions once the redistributionrequests more competitive politics.

EU functions de facto as a system divided onideological lines. Moreover, Hix says, more conflict isinevitable. After 2005, a right wing political coalitiongoverns the EU both in Parliament (the dominance ofEPP), Commission (Barroso and most of his commis-sioners) and in the Council (a right-wing majority ofgovernments). But this coalition does not have a spe-cific political mandate to move the policies rightward.This combination between more ideological decisionsmaking and lack of political mandate creates popularfrustration and political stalemate: `The current polit-ical majority in the Commission, the council and theEuropean Parliament is on the centre right, whichmeans that the current policy of the EU are in a morefree market direction. Without open democratic poli-tics, this particular ”governing coalition” is not recog-nized by most citizens. So, rather than recognizingthat the current right wing policies are the product ofthis particular governing coalition and would changeif a different coalition emerged as the governingmajority, those parties and citizens on the losing sidein the current policy battles (on the left) believe thatfree market policies will be a permanent feature of theEU. This explains why many citizens on the left, partic-ularly in Western Europe, increasingly oppose thewhole EU project rather than opposed the currentpolicies of the EU` (106).

This could be the main message of Hix`sbook: the consensus era is over. You have to fight forreal, he transmits to European politicians. The authorseems to treat them as a bunch of toothless pit-bullsthat forgot their goal. Moreover, they do not have tochange the treaties in order to make the EU a realpolity. On the contrary, Hix proposes just somechanges within the current constitutional system. Hemakes some recommendations for each of the mainEuropean institutions. The Parliament shouldrenounce to distribute the internal positions (from theEP president to chairs of the committees) on propor-tional basis. Thus the real competition between thepolitical groups would be encouraged. The Councilshould open its meetings to the public and to proceedvoting for each issue rather than making behind doorarrangements. Finally the most provocative proposal

is to transform the election of Commission`s Presidentinto a real political competition. Each political groupin the European Parliament should announce a candi-date for this position prior the European elections.Electing a sort of `prime-minister` for EU would cre-ate a real stake for these elections. Hix brings argu-ments for each of his proposals, makes comparisonswith the current situation and underpins the advan-tages of the alternatives.

Hix uses good academic skills in order toshape the reality. His fresh angle is welcomed in thedebates about EU, which are usually good in identify-ing the problems and depressingly poor in findingsome solutions. Hix thinks out of the box and his newbook will shape future debates about Europe. As thehistory of EU often proved, this could be the first stepin shaping Europe itself.

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CALL FOR PAPERS;

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

Elections in Russia and USRussians elected this year a new leadership for the country. Although some analysts claim it is the same

leadership as the old, some things are bound to change. More important changes are expected from Americanelections, whose unfolding has captured the imagination of the whole world. Results of both elections are likelyto play an important role for shaping the world of 21st century.

What lessons can we learn by studying the process of these two elections? How does Eastern Europeposition itself towards Russia and US after Iraq and Afghanistan? How does Iran play into this equation? CanCentral Europe find an alternative to the position of implementing agent of US foreign policies? Is there a role toplay for the EU between these two former and still great powers?

Submissions are expected by October 31st, 2008.

The Romanian Journal of Political Science encourages contributions from the community members ofRomanian or foreign social scientists regardless of age, academic background or topic. We are mainly interestedin theory-grounded papers based on solid empirical work. Contributions drawing upon inferential analysis areespecially encouraged, as are papers from fields currently under-covered, such as comparative politics, public pol-icy, political economy, political psychology. The publishing language is English. Please use footnotes or endnotes,limit their number to a minimum and use consistently one citation system throughout your article. Electronic sub-missions are acceptable in Word for Windows at [email protected] If you prefer snail mail send a floppy disk/CDwith the article in Word for Windows and a hard copy at Societatea Academica din Romania, str. Mihai Eminescu61, Bucuresti, Romania. The ideal length of an article is anywhere between 4000 and 8000 words, but longer arti-cles can be considered on the basis of exceptional merit. Foreign policy scientists writing on Romanian or broad-er Central European issues are also encouraged to contribute. We do not publish unsolicited essays or op-eds.

This is the first Romanian peer-reviewed journal of political science. Papers will be reviewed by board andstaff members. The reviewers’ names are confidential and the authors may be asked to make some modificationsin order to have the article published. Essential for a successful submission is that the article addresses an impor-tant topic, respects the canons agreed in contemporary political science, and shows perfect knowledge of previ-ous theoretical contributions, Romanian or international or both. Contributions are welcomed at any time of theyear and will be considered for the next issue.

Societatea Academic` din RomâniaRomanian Academic Society

Mihai Eminescu Street 61, Bucharest 2tel/fax: +40 21 2111477

[email protected]

© 2007 Romanian Academic SocietyISSN 1582-456X

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Documents

Rev POLISCI 1 - Societatea Academica Din Romania POLISCI 1.pdf · Adrian Cioflânc` (A.D. Xenopol Institute) Managing Editor Ionu] Vasiloiu. TABLE OF CONTENTS: FOREWORD POLSCI FOCUS