Journal of Criminal Justice Vol. 20, pp. 227-236 (1992) All rights resewed. Printed in U.S.A.

0047~2352192 $5.00 + .OO Copyright 8 1992 Peqamon Press Ltd.

RETRIBUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF DEATH

PENALTY OPINION

ROBERT M. BOHM

Department of Criminal Justice University of North Carolina

Charlotte, North Carolina 28223

ABSTRACT

Although retribution appears to be the primary basis of support for the death penalty in the United States, the concept of retribution is ambiguous; thus, it is unclear what people mean when they express support for capital punishment for retributive reasons. This study attempted to discern the meaning of retribution as it relates to death penalty opinion. Two types of retribution were revealed: “vindictive revenge” and “revenge-utilitarianism.” Subjects clearly subscribed to the vindictive revenge concep- tion, one characterized by a strong emotional or visceral component.

INTRODUCTION

Retribution appears to be the primary basis of support for the death penalty in the United States (Bohm, Clark, and Aveni, 1991; Finckenauer, 1988; Harris, 1986; Lotz and Regoli, 1980; Kohlberg and Elfenbein, 1975; Sarat and Vidmar, 1976; Vidmar, 1974; Wan and Stafford, 1984). In a 1985 Gallup poll, the only recent Gallup poll to query respon- dents about their reasons, “revenge: an eye for an eye” was the reason given by the larg- est percentage of death penalty proponents (30 percent), and “murderers deserve punish- ment” was the reason given by the third larg- est percentage (18 percent) (Gallup Report, 198.5:3).’ However, Thomas (1977) claimed that beliefs about retribution are a minor

component of death penalty opinions and are less important than a belief that capital pun- ishment is morally just (one of the meanings of retribution) or that it serves a useful pur- pose (cf. Bohm, Clark, and Aveni, 1990; Ell- sworth and Ross, 1983; Thomas and Foster, 1975; Thomas and Howard, 1977; Vidmar and Ellsworth, 1974; Warr and Stafford, 1984). While many people, when asked, “give the deterrent effectiveness of the death penalty [and not retribution] as their major reason for support” (Ellsworth and Ross, 1983:121; Thomas and Foster, 1975; Vidmar, 1974; Vidmar and Ellsworth, 1974), Ellsworth and Ross (1983:149) have suggested that the re- sponse is disingenuous. Ellsworth and Ross (1983: 149) maintained that “the belief in de- terrence is seen as more ‘scientific’ or more

227

228 ROBERT M. BOHM

socially desirable than other reasons; people mention it first because its importance is ob- vious, not because its importance is real.”

As a theoretical term the concept of retri- bution is imprecise (Cottingham, 1979; Fein- berg and Gross, 1975; Finckenauer, 1988; Packer, 1968; Radin, 1980). Cottingham (1979:238). for example, has argued that “the term ‘retributive’ as used in philosophy has become so imprecise and multivocal that it is doubtful whether it any longer serves a useful purpose. ” Retired Justice Thurgood Mar- shall. in Furman v. Georgiu (408 U.S. 238, 1972), wrote that “the concept of retribution is one of the most misunderstood in all of our criminal jurisprudence” (342). In the same vein, Radin (1980: 1165) noted that “retri- butivism is espoused by both liberals and conservatives; it is seen as both a new way to limit inhumane practices and to exorcise permissiveness and coddling of criminals.”

The different meanings given to retribution probably account for disagreements over its influence on death penalty opinions and help explain why the acceptability of retribution as a justification for capital punishment is contested. Regarding the latter. in the Fur- mm decision Justice Potter Stewart, who voted with the majority. held that retribution was psychologically necessary for maintaining social stability (408 U.S. 238, 308), while Justice Marshall equated retribution with vengeance and argued that neither was com- patible with decent and civilized conduct (332). Did the Justices really have in mind the same definition of retribution? The pur- pose of this study was to attempt to discern what people really mean when they support the death penalty for retributive reasons.

Meanings of Retribution

Jacoby (1983: 1) maintained that retribution and revenge are “virtually synonymous. ” However, Radin (1980: 1169) argued that there is an important difference between the two terms. For Radin, “revenge occurs when one person, with the idea of retaliation, injures someone she believes is responsible for an in- jury either to herself or to someone she cares about.” Revenge “is a private act between one

person or group and another” and may or may not be justified (Radin. 198O:l 169). Retri- bution, on the other hand, “is a public act” or, more specifically, “the formal act of a community against one of its members. and is carried out in the manner and for the rea- sons that are justified under the political con- stitution of the community” (Radin, 1980: 1169). The purpose of retribution is to prevent personal revenge; Radin refers to this goal as “revenge-utilitarianism” (1169).’

Packer ( 1968:37-38) described two ver- sions of retribution: “revenge theory” and “expiation theory.” Revenge theory is cap- tured in the idea of “lex talionis”: “an eye for an eye.” while expiation theory is based on the premise that only through suffering punishment can an offender atone for his or her crime (Packer, 1968:37-38). Fincken- auer ( 1988:92) similarly distinguished two versions of retribution:

In one version (the bad version, in some peo- ple’s view), the criminal is paid back. This is retribution as revenge and vindictive- ness. In a second version (the seemingly acceptable one according to the Supreme Court and some scholars of punishment philoso-

phy). “retribution” means that the criminal pays back for the harm he or she has done. which the desert theorists call “just deserts.”

Finckenauer (1988:93) has pointed out that

“the studies which examine the relation be-

tween retributive sentiments and support for the death penalty generally have employed the concepts of desert and retribution interchangeably. ”

Cottingham ( 1979) identified nine “theories”j of punishment that have been la- beled retributive. The first, and the one he argued captures the basic or fundamental no- tion of retribution, is “repayment theory.” Although it is ostensibly similar to Packer’s expiation theory (with elements of revenge theory), Cottingham claimed that there can “not be an atonement theory of punishment; atonement is something voluntarily under- taken, punishment something exacted” (1979:238). Another problem Cottingham noted with a repayment theory of punishment is the unanswered question of “how or why

Retribution and Capital Punishment 229

suffering something unpleasant . . should count as payment for an offence [sic]” (1979:238).

A second variety of retribution is “desert theory, ” the idea that punishment is imposed because it is deserved (Cottingham, 1979:239; see also Finckenauer, 1988; Gale, 198.5; Gibbs, 1978). This theory, taken literally, rests on the ludicrous (for me) idea that an of- fender receives punishment as a reward for wrongdoing (Cottingham, 1979:239). As noted above, Finckenauer (1988:92) maintained that “just deserts” is one of two versions of re- tribution (the other is revenge). Finckenauer (1988:91) argued that the principal difference between just deserts and revenge has to do with who repays whom, that is, whether the offender repays society (just deserts) or so- ciety repays the offender (revenge). Finck- enauer’s distinction seems specious for at least two reasons. First, Finckenauer’s conception of just deserts appears very similar to Pack- er’s expiation theory, and, as Cottingham reasoned, as long as punishment is not un- dertaken voluntarily, it is not atonement. Few offenders volunteer to repay society. Second, Finckenauer proposed that in just deserts the offender is the subject, that is, “the active

party, ” and in revenge the offender is the ob- ject, that is, “the passive target of society’s actions” (1990). However, it is not clear (to me) how, in most cases, the punished of- fender can be, except perhaps in a hypothet- ical way, the subject or active party. The of- fender does not seek voluntarily to be punished to repay society (in most cases); the offender is coerced. Moreover, how are the intentions of the offender in regard to punishment to be discerned? In either case, as Cottingham has pointed out in the work cited above, it is not clear why suffering punishment should count as repayment for an offense.

A third variety of retribution is “penalty theory, ” which is associated with the classi- cal Kantian notion that an offender is pun- ished automatically simply because he or she has committed a crime (Cottingham, 1979:239). This notion implies both propor- tionality and deserts in punishment. In other words, a “punishment must fit the crime and must not be more or other than the person

deserves” in order for a person’s status as an autonomous moral entity to be respected (Ra- din, 1980: 1164). Despite the emphasis on re- specting a person’s autonomy, penalty theory is still based on repayment, albeit circum- scribed repayment.

The fourth variety is “minimalism,” which

refers to the idea that “no one should be pun- ished ‘unless’ he is guilty of a crime and culpable” (Cottingham, 1979:240). Minimal- ism was dismissed (correctly, I think) by

Cottingham, who asked, “What on earth is supposed to be distinctly ‘retributivist’ about [this] thesis?” (1979:241).

The fifth is “satisfaction theory,” which is

similar to repayment theory and is based on a notion of reciprocity: “A man is rightly punished because his punishment brings sat- isfaction to others” (Cottingham, 1979:241). However, as Cottingham (1979:242) noted,

“if the underlying idea here is that the penal system provides a substitute for private re- venge,” then satisfaction theory is not a the-

ory of retribution at all but rather one of so- cial utility, furthering the goal of social stability.

A sixth variety is “fair play theory,” which

assumes that “failure to punish is unfair to those who practise [sic] self-restraint and re- spect the rights of others” (Cottingham,

1979:242). This theory, however, is in fact a form of repayment theory since the offender is made to pay “for the unfair advantage he has obtained” by his or her criminal acts (Cottingham, 1979:243).

The seventh is “placation theory,” which

is captured by Kant’s famous passage “even if a civil society were to dissolve itself by common agreement . . the last murderer re- maining in prison must first be executed so that . the blood guilt thereof will not be fixed on the people” (Cottingham, 1979:243). Cottingham pointed out that this theory “looks forward to the desired result of appeasing the wrath of God” and thus “is unlikely to have much appeal to present-day thinkers con- cerned to provide a secular justification for punishment” (Cottingham, 1979:243-44).

An eighth variety is “annulment theory,”

which, according to Cottingham, confuses

230 ROBERT M. BOHM

retribution with restitution. Annulment the- ory is based on the,idea that “we are obliged to punish because to do so is ‘to annul the crime which otherwise would have been held valid, and to restore the right”’ (Cottingham, 1979:244). The ninth and final variety of re- tribution identified by Cottingham is “den- unciation theory,” the idea that punishment is inflicted to denounce a crime ( 1979:245). Cottingham maintained that denunciation theory is not uniquely retributivist since there are other ways, besides punishment, of de- nouncing crime ( 1979:245).

At the end of his exercise Cottingham ad- mitted that most of the “theories” he de- scribed share much with the notion of retri- bution as repayment. Indeed, one must strain to identify differences. In any event, a close examination of the different meanings de- scribed above clearly shows that the concept of retribution is confusing and ambiguous. Clarification, therefore, is warranted, and it was the object of this study.

METHODS

Subjects

The subjects in this study were 215 stu- dents of a medium-sized university in Ala- bama. Fifty-three percent of the subjects were male, 47 percent were female, 71 percent were white, and 29 percent were Black. Seventy- three percent of the subjects favored the death penalty for some people convicted of first-de- gree murder, 20 percent were opposed, and 7 percent were undecided. The death penalty opinions of the subjects were comparable to the opinions of the United States population as measured by recent Gallup polls. National Gallup polls have shown that between 70 per- cent and 80 percent of the public favors the death penalty for persons convicted of mur- der (cf. Gallup Report 1985; 1986; 1989). Note that the subjects were not randomly se- lected.4 Thus, the study should be considered exploratory, and caution should be exercised when generalizing from the findings.

Measures

Opinions about the death penalty were measured in this study by responses to the question: Which of the following responses best describes your position toward the death penalty for some people convicted of first-de- gree murder?’ Response categories ranged from “very strongly opposed” (1) to “very strongly in favor” (7) on a seven-point Lik- ert-type scale. The questionnaire also in- cluded eight items that presumably assessed retributive feelings about the death penalty. The

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

eight items were:

If a murderer is not executed for the crime, the friends or family of the victim are likely to take it upon themselves to seek revenge. The very worst of the Nazi war criminals should have been executed for their “crimes against humanity. ” Those who take a life should forfeit their own in return. Killing is all right if the right people do it and think they have a good reason for doing it. Society has a right to get revenge when a very serious crime like murder has been committed. Sometimes I have felt a sense of personal outrage when a convicted murderer was sen- tenced to a penalty less than death. There are some murderers whose death would give me a sense of personal satisfaction. An execution would make me sad, regard- less of the crime the individual committed.

Response categories for the retribution items ranged from 1 to 5 on a Likert-type scale, with 1 indicating strong agreement with a statement, 3 indicating uncertainty, and 5 in- dicating strong disagreement. Item 8 was re- verse-scored.

Finally, race and gender also were in- cluded in the analysis since they have been shown to be significant discriminators in death penalty opinion (see, for example, Bohm 199 1). Race was coded as 0 = Black and 1 = white; gender was coded as 0 = male and 1 = female.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Ordinary least squares regression was em- ployed to determine the relationship between

Retribution and Capital punishment 231

TABLE 1

MULTIPLE REGRESSION OF RETRIBUTION

ITEMS, RACE, AND GENDER ON DEATH

PENALTY OPINION

Variable b SE B t-value p

Retrib 1 -.06 ,083 -.038 .72 .4727

Retrib 2 -.313 ,091 -.202 3.457 .0007

Retrib 3 -.247 .085 -.165 2.894 .0043

Retrib 4 -.14 ,085 -.088 1.641 .1027 Retrib 5 -.021 ,082 -.014 .252 ,801

Retrib 6 -.27 ,086 -.184 3.14 ,002

Retrib 7 -.202 ,077 -.158 2.619 .0097

Retrib 8 ,315 ,082 ,223 3.834 .0002

Gender .224 ,189 ,059 1.186 .2375

Race -.882 ,221 -.227 3.996 .OOOl

Intercept 8.012

R2 ,655

death penalty opinion (the dependent vari- able) and each of the retribution items, race, and gender (the independent variables). An advantage of this analytic technique is that it reveals the relationship between an indepen- dent and a dependent variable while statisti- cally controlling for the other independent variables. Table 1 presents the results of this analysis.

As shown in Table 1, there were statisti- cally significant negative relationships (p < .OS) between death penalty opinion and re- tribution items 2, 3, 6, and 7 and race and a statistically significant positive relationship between death penalty opinion and retribu- tion item 8. In other words, the more likely a subject was to favor the death penalty (and less likely to oppose it), the more likely that he or she would agree that “the very worst of the Nazi war criminals should have been executed for their crimes against humanity” (item 2), that “those who take a life should forfeit their own in return” (item 3), that “sometimes I have felt a sense of personal outrage when a convicted murderer was sen- tenced to a penalty less than death” (item 6), and that “there are some murderers whose death would give me a sense of personal sat- isfaction” (item 7). Whites also were signif- icantly more likely to be proponents of the

death penalty than were Blacks. Conversely, the more likely a subject was to support the death penalty (and less likely to oppose it), the less likely that he or she would agree with the statement that “an execution would make me sad, regardless of the crime the individual committed” (item 8). Item 8 is an anti-retri- bution statement and was included as a check for response bias.

The relative appeal of each of the retribu- tion items for all subjects (regardless of death penalty opinion), as well as for subjects by gender and race, is displayed in Table 2, which provides the results of contingency table analyses.

Results can be summarized as follows. First, on each of the eight retribution items there were statistically significant differences (p < .05) between whites and Blacks, and on items 1, 2, and 8 (but not on items 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7), there were statistically significant differ- ences between males and females. Second, item 2 is the retributive statement with which the most subjects as a whole strongly agreed or agreed (the two response categories were combined). Seventy-eight percent of all sub- jects, 82 percent of males, 75 percent of fe- males, 85 percent of whites, but only 63 per- cent of Blacks strongly agreed or agreed with the statement: “The very worst of the Nazi war criminals should have been executed for their crimes against humanity” (item 2). Third, 78 percent of Black subjects, but only 62 per- cent of all proponents, 68 percent of males, 55 percent of females, and 55 percent of whites strongly agreed or agreed with the statement: “If a murderer is not executed for the crime, the friends or family of the victim are likely to take it upon themselves to seek revenge” (item 1). Fourth, 75 percent of whites, but only 67 percent of all subjects, 48 percent of Blacks, 66 percent of males, and 68 percent of females strongly agreed or agreed with the statement: “Sometimes I have felt a sense of personal outrage when a convicted murderer was sentenced to a penalty less than death” (item 6). Fifth, no more than 57 percent of the subjects, regardless of gender or race, strongly agreed or agreed with any of the other items.

Sixth, by contrast, only 12 percent of all

232 ROBERT M. BOHM

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGES OF SUBJECTS WHO STRONGLY AGREED OR AGREED WITH RETRIBUTION ITEMS, BY GENDER AND RACE

Retribution Item All Subjects Males

1 62 68 2 78 82 3 46 44 4 12 18 5 49 54

6 67 66 7 50 52 8 29 20

N (215) (113)

Females Whites

5.5” 55 75* 85 49 52 06 14 43 56

68 75 49 57

42* 22

(102) (152)

Blacks

78* 63* 32* 08* 32*

48* 37* 41*

(63)

Note: Asterisks indicate statistically significant gender or race differences. Chi-square values * .05 or less.

subjects, 18 percent of males, 6 percent of females, 14 percent of whites, and 8 percent of Blacks strongly agreed or agreed with the statement: “Killing is all right if the right people do it and think they have a good rea- son for doing it” (item 4). Seventh, likewise, only 29 percent of all subjects, 20 percent of males, 42 percent of females, 22 percent of whites, and 41 percent of Blacks strongly agreed or agreed with the statement: “An ex- ecution would make me sad, regardless of the crime the individual committed” (item 8). Note that nearly twice as many females and Blacks would be saddened by an execution than would males or whites.

In sum, among subjects in this study, sup- port for retribution was expressed primarily through items 1, 2, and 6 (though there were statistically significant differences by race and sex for items 1 and 2 and by race for item 6). These findings raise the important ques- tion of what theoretical meaning of retribu- tion is conveyed by items 1, 2, and 6 or, stated differently, do the three items measure the same meaning of retribution? To answer this question a factor analysis of the eight items was conducted.

The total matrix sampling adequacy (MSA) for the eight retribution items was .762, in- dicating that the items were appropriate for factor analysis (cf. Kaiser, 1970). However, the variable MSA for retribution item 1 was only .554 (the next lowest variable MSA was

,705 for item 4), suggesting that the total MSA might be increased appreciably by eliminat-

ing item 1 from the analysis. Elimination of item 1, however, only increased the total MSA from .762 to .767. Given the importance of this item (see discussion above), especially for Blacks, it was decided to retain item 1 rather than drop it from the analysis.

Besides determining the total matrix sam- pling adequacy, another evaluation that should

be performed prior to any attempts to inter- pret the results of a factor analysis is a test of the statistical significance of the item cor- relations. To accomplish this, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1950; 1951) was per- formed. The test produced a chi-square value

of 282.713, which was significant at the .OOOl

level, suggesting that the intercorrelations for

the eight retribution items were different from

zero and did not occur by chance (see Table

3 for correlation matrix).

A final calculation performed prior to the factor analysis was the estimation of the total

proportion of variance predictable by the

squared multiple correlations (SMC) . Both the communality estimates and the SMCs are

reported in Table 4.

After it was determined that key assump-

tions of the method were satisfied, factor analysis was performed. The factor extrac-

tion method employed was principal com-

ponents analysis (Hotelling, 1933). The

Retribution and Capital Punishment 233

TABLE 3

CORRELATION MATRIX OF RETRIBUTION ITEMS

RET1 RET2 RET3 RET4 RET5 RET6 RET7 RET8

RET1 RET2 .172 RET3 .162 .359 RET4 -.122 .215 .017 RET5 .037 .426 .35 .363 RET6 .019 .374 .41 .194 .289 RET7 .009 .323 .281 .28 .295 ,498 RET8 -.049 - .393 -.211 -.271 -.341 - .282 -.49

TABLE 4 TABLE 5

COMMUNALITY SUMMARY: TOTAL FACTOR ANALYSIS ON THE EIGHT PROFQRTION OF VARIANCE OF A RETRIBUTION RETRIBUTION ITEMS: OBLIQUE SOLUTION

ITEM THAT CAN BE PREDICTED BY THE PRIMARY PAWERN MATRIX-ORTHOTRAN/ FACTORS VARIMAX

Item SMC Final Estimate Retribution Item Factor I Factor 2

Retrib 1 .07 .567

Retrib 2 .332 .531

Retrib 3 .285 .554

Retrib 4 .216 .586

Retrib 5 ,324 .463

Retrib 6 .355 .475

Retrib 7 .395 ,531

Retrib 8 .324 .472

1 2 3 4

5 6 7

8 -

.021

.672

.520

.544

.683 ,671 .730 .687

.751

.231

.491 -.587 - .057

.109 -.112

,120

number of factors to be extracted was deter- mined by the 75 percent variance rule (Gor- such, 1983) and root curve analysis (Cattell, 1966). The transformation method used was the orthotran/varimax solution (Kaiser, 1958). Two factors were defined.

Table 5 shows the oblique solution primary pattern matrix for the two factors. Exami- nation of Table 5 reveals that all of the re- tribution items except item 1 load on factor 1, and items 1, 3, and 4 load on factor 2. Items 3 and 4 load on both factors. The cor- relation between the two factors is .085, in- dicating that the two factors extracted in the initial solution are adequate. Factor 1 ac- counts for 70 percent of the common or ex- plained variance (i.e., of the intercorrelations of the variables) (Eigenvalue = 2.948), while

factor 2 accounts for 30 percent (Eigenvalue = 1.231). Less than 1.5 percent of the com- mon variance is attributable to the covaria- tion of the two factors (.013 of factor 1 and .004 of factor 2).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Results of the factor analysis show that re- tribution items 2 and 6 both load on factor 1 and thus, at least theoretically, share the same underlying meaning. The items of factor 1 clearly have an emotional or visceral com- ponent, as is indicated by the high positive loadings of item 2 (“The very worst of the Nazi war criminals should have been exe- cuted for their ‘crimes against humanity. ’ “),

234 ROBERT M. BOHM

item 6 (“Sometimes I have felt a sense of personal outrage when a convicted murderer was sentenced to a penalty less than death. “), and item 7 (“There are some murderers whose death would give me a sense of personal sat- isfaction. “) and the high negative loading of item 8 (“An execution would make me sad, regardless of the crime the individual com- mitted.“). Repayment is at least implicit in items 2, 6, 7, and 8, but it is also implicit in the other four items. Thus, repayment is not a unique feature of either factor. What items 2, 6, 7, and 8 appear to share, besides re- payment, is self-interest, individual desire, angry inner-directedness, personalization or internalization of offense, and vindictive- ness. For these reasons, factor 1 has been given the label of “vindictive revenge.”

One also could argue plausibly that all of the items, with the possible exception of item 1, imply “just deserts” in the sense that the offender is getting what he or she deserves. But how, then, is just deserts different from revenge/repayment? Does the concept of just deserts lack the anger or the visceral com- ponent of vindictive revenge‘? Perhaps, but this distinction was not revealed by the factor analysis. Rather, results of the factor analysis suggest that it may be impossible to disen- tangle these two conceptions of retribution because, ultimately, they may not be con- ceptually distinct. The difference between re- tribution as revenge/repayment and retribu- tion as just deserts may be a difference in the degree of emotional investment but not a dif- ference of kind. Perhaps that is why “studies which examine the relation between retribu- tive sentiments and support for the death penalty generally have employed the con- cepts of desert and retribution interchangea- bly” (Finckenauer 1988:93). Alternatively, it may be that none of the eight retribution items in this study capture the real distinction be- tween the two terms.

Factor 2, on the other hand, seems to cap- ture what Radin referred to as revenge-utili- tarianism. The prevention of private revenge (item 1) is clearly utilitarian (see note 2). Items 3 and 4, which load on both factors, also sug- gest social utility.(’ The notion that ‘those who take a life should forfeit their own in return”

(item 3) implies a purpose or a consequence, as does the statement that “killing is all right if the right people do it and think they have a good reason for doing it” (item 4). The “good reason” of item 4 alludes to a purpose or a consequence. The items of factor 2 con- vey less self-interest, individual desire, and anger than do the items of factor 1. The ben- efits of capital punishment, that is, the pur- poses or consequences, are seemingly exter- nalized; they reflect a more detached or other- directed view. Nevertheless, like the items of factor 1, the items of factor 2 also imply repayment.

In sum, the factor analysis conducted in this study revealed two types of retribution. The first type might be called vindictive revenge; the second, revenge-utilitarianism. The items of both factors imply repayment. A distinct just deserts conception of retribution was not identified, though that conception might be imbedded in the notion of revenge-utilitar- ianism. Subjects in this study (Blacks to a lesser extent) clearly subscribed to the vin- dictive revenge conception of retribution, one that can be characterized as having a strong emotional or visceral component.

Future efforts to discern what people mean when they express support for the death pen- alty for retributive reasons should attempt to identify other possible conceptual distinc- tions between vindictive revenge, revenge- utilitarianism, and just deserts. If a meaning- ful distinction between vindictive revenge and just deserts is not uncovered, and it turns out that people support the death penalty primar- ily for vindictive revenge, then the propriety of retribution as a legitimate justification for capital punishment, at least according to Justice Marshall’s standard, should be reconsidered.

NOTES

I. The other reasons provided by death penalty pro- ponents were “acts as a deterrent” (22 percent), “costly to keep them in prison” (11 percent), “keeps them from killing again” (9 percent), “removes potential risk to the community” (7 percent), and “all others” (13 percent) (Gallup Report, 19X5:3).

2. Without delving too deeply into philosophical controversy, for purposes of this study, utilitarianism.

Retribution and Capital Punishment 235

in the context of the capital punishment debate, may be defined by two commonly accepted criteria: (1) that ac- tions are to be judged entirely by their consequences and not by whether they are ‘tight” or “wrong” and (2) that which contributes to the greatest happiness or good for the greatest number. Utilitarianism is against (1) self- interest and individual, desire, when they do not con- tribute to the greatest happiness or good, and (2) moral rules that are binding apart from their consequences (Monro, 1973).

3. According to Cottingham (1979:245), ‘If we look at our basic (repayment) sense of ‘retribution’ it is evident that what we really have is not so much a theory as a ‘metaphor’; a metaphor which, I claim, is central to the basic signification of ‘retribution’, but which cuts remarkably little ice as a justificatory device.”

4. Subjects were part of a larger study of the influ- ence of knowledge on death penalty opinions and rea- sons for death penalty opinions conducted during the spring of 1988 (N = 98) and spring of 1989 (N = 117). Fifty-four of the 1988 subjects and sixty-five of the 1989 subjects were enrolled in my special topics class on the death penalty. The remaining forty-four subjects in 1988 and fifty-two subjects in 1989 were enrolled in other courses (a physical education class, a math class, and a sociology class) offered at the same time as the death penalty class. Approximately one-half of the subjects were criminal justice majors. The responses to the death penalty opinion question and the retribution items in this study were drawn from questionnaires administered on the first day of class. Thus, like the general public, all subjects were relatively ignorant about the death penalty when they responded to the death penalty opin- ion question and the retribution items (cf. Bohm et al., 1991).

5. Other questions could have been used to mea- sure the death penalty opinions of the subjects. How- ever, the question about the death penalty for .yome people convicted of first-degree murder probably is the most relevant question for tapping public opinion about the subject because currently only Qume people convicted of first-degree murder are executed.

6. Besides purpose, there also is a hint of vindictive revenge in items 3 and 4, which probably accounts for why the items load on both factors.

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