Rethinking the Civilian Surge: Lessons from the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan

8/20/2019 Rethinking the Civilian Surge: Lessons from the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan

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Rethinking the Civilian SurgeLessons from the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanist

By Ariella Viehe, Jasmine Afshar, and Tamana Heela December 2015

WWW.AMERICANPROGRESS.O


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Rethinking the Civilian SurgeLessons from the Provincial Reconstruction

Teams in Afghanistan

By Ariella Viehe, Jasmine Afshar, and Tamana Heela December 2015

On the cover: U.S. Ambassador toAfghanistan Robert Neumann, center,Nuristan Gov. Tamim Nuristani, left, andNATO Commander in Afghanistan BritishGen. David Richards cut a ribbon openinga Provincial Reconstruct ion Team inNuristan, Afghanistan, in 2006.


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1 Introduction and summary

5 History of civilian representatives in Afghanistan

11 Background of the study

17 Research findings

50 Recommendations for future deploymentof civilian representatives

58 Conclusion

62 Annex A: Methodology

66 Annex B: Definitions

68 Annex D: References

71 Endnotes

Contents


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1 Center for American Progress | Rethinking the Civilian Surge

Introduction and summary

In 2009, he Unied Saes announced a civilian surge1 o provinces across

Aghanisan, sending housands2 o U.S. civilian represenaives rom 2009 o

2014 rom agencies including he U.S. Deparmen o Sae; he U.S. Agency or

Inernaional Developmen, or USAID; he U.S. Deparmen o Jusice; he U.S.

Deparmen o Agriculure; and ohers.3 Tese civilian represenaives expanded

on he already several hundred4 U.S. civilian represenaives who had worked

across Aghanisan since 2002 as par o he U.S. Provincial econsrucion

eams, or Ps. Tis surge deploymen o Aghanisanwhich saw he larg-es surge o civilian represenaives in U.S. hisorybuil off several previous

deploymens hroughou U.S. hisory, including in Vienam in he 1960s and

immediaely prior in Iraq in 2006.5

In hese paricular conflics where he U.S. governmen has concluded ha here

is “no purely miliary soluion,” U.S. policymakers have jusified he deploymen

o civilian represenaives as capable o addressing he poliical and economic

drivers o a conflic.6 In urn, his jusificaion has heighened expecaions ha

civilian represenaives can and will resolve he deeply complex, long-erm

poliical, social, and economic needs driving conflic. I hisory is any indicaor,

he Unied Saes may again consider deploying civilian represenaives o con-

flic zones, perhaps o provide U.S. suppor in Syria, Yemen, or oher counries

ransiioning rom conflic. Feedback rom hese pas civilian deploymens,

however, has ofen been absen rom decision-making. Te unique opporu-

niy offered by he recen wihdrawal o mos civilian represenaives rom

Aghanisan’s provinces provides a criical momen o ake sock quaniaively

and qualiaively o civilian represenaives as a oreign policy ool.

Te resuls rom civilian represenaives’ mos recen and larges deploymen in Aghanisan show a mixed record o achievemens. Overall, civilian represena-

ives generally achieved small albei significan changes in confined areasa unc-

ioning school, a capable bureaucrabu no sysemic changes ha esablished

sel-sufficien sysems o governance, economic growh, or social developmen, all

o which underpin securiy in Aghanisan. Perhaps more concerning is ha he


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susainabiliy o he poliical and economic changes ha civilian represenaives

suppored in Aghanisan remains in doub. ecen polling suggess ha many

o he issues ha U.S. civilian represenaives sough o improve remain nascen:

Improving bu sill low levels o public confidence in he Aghan governmen,

increasing concern over employmen and economic opporuniy, and a growing

sense o insecuriy abouand acual increases ininsurgen atacks coninue oplague Aghans. I he Unied Saes considers a role or civilian represenaives in

uure effors, policymakers mus have a beter undersanding o wha civilian rep-

resenaives can and canno achieve; how hey can suppor U.S. naional securiy;

and wha, i anyhing, he Unied Saes can do o enhance heir effeciveness.

Tis repor oulines he resuls rom a qualiaive and quaniaive review o he

U.S. civilian represenaive effor in Aghanisan, in which more han 2,000 civil-

ians deployed rom 2002 hrough 2014. Firs, he repor idenifies he objecives

ha he civilian represenaives were charged wih achieving. Second, he repor

evaluaes civilian represenaives’ successes and ailures agains hose objecives,discusses overall findings, and offers recommendaions o guide uure deploy-

mens o civilian represenaives in conflic zones.

Aghanisan is he mos recen case sudy or he deploymen o U.S. civilians,

as well as he larges, providing an illusraive example or any uure conflic.

Aghanisan, however, remains in conflic, limiing research access and leaving

significan quesions or he uure. o compensae or he difficuly in accessing

locaions in Aghanisan, he auhors conduced an online survey and inerviews,

boh in person and by phone, wih U.S. civilian represenaives and pas and pres-

en Aghan officials. Tese inerviews and survey resuls rely on sel-reporing by

U.S. civilian represenaives and Aghan officials; as such, he research eam com-

pared hese resuls wih secondary-source daa abou Aghanisan’s developmen,

securiy, and poliical expecaions.

Summary of findings

Daa colleced rom civilian represenaives and heir Aghan counerpars reveal

a undamenal misalignmen beween he objecives se ou or civilian repre-senaives and he oolswheher policy, financial, or bureaucraicprovided

o achieve hose objecives. Frusraion among many o hose surveyed refleced

his misalignmen; one civilian represenaive described he mismach beween


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his objecives and his resources as “se up o ail.”7 While his repor does no find

ha U.S. policymakers inenionally undersuppored civilian represenaives, i

does find ha policymakers underappreciaed he misalignmen beween civilians’

objecives and heir acical suppor.

In he shor erm, civilian represenaives in Aghanisan played a criical role inreducing grievances ha ueled local conflics in he provinces and disrics where

hey were deployed. econsrucion projecs developed by civilian represenaives

ofen encouraged communiies o resolve local dispues, reducing grievances ha

he aliban could exploi. Wih he civilian surge in 2009, civilian represenaives

ook on a greaer role in advising he U.S. miliary. Kael Weson, a ormer civilian

represenaive in Aghanisan, described he civilian role in 2013 as showing Aghans

“ha he Americans were no jus a miliary orce, ha we were a parner ha [he

Aghans] waned o keep over he long erm.”8 Indeed, oher empirical sudies con-

duced hroughou he surge period have shown ha hese shor-erm relaionships

and reconsrucion projecs were inegral o reducing shor-erm grievances.9

Tese successes, however, do no appear o have produced susainable, naion-

wide progress, poenially undermining he uiliy o he civilian represenaives

as well as longer-erm U.S. objecives in Aghanisan. Aghanisan’s rajecory is

sill unolding, bu among boh Aghans and Americans here is a palpable sense

o disappoinmen abou wha he civilian surge achieved. Te sense o disap-

poinmen sems rom he deep poliical, economic, and social challenges in

Aghanisan afer hree decades o war, as well as a U.S. approach ha provided

insufficien or inappropriae resources o undamenally address hose challenges.

Combined, he repor’s findings rom Aghanisan provide a clearer picure o

wha civilian represenaives in Aghanisan and uure conflics can and should be

expeced o achieve or U.S. policy. In ligh o hese findings, he repor offers sev-

eral recommendaions or uure deploymens o civilians, including: prioriizing

objecives; evaluaing and re-evaluaing assumpions abou local environmens;

invesing in people, boh in he Unied Saes and in he region; acknowledg-

ing he ull span o resources and risk miigaion effors needed; improving and

expanding he policy eedback loop; and, finally, rehinking evaluaion a all levels.

One undamenal lesson, however, underpins all o he recommendaions or U.S.

policy in uure deploymens: U.S. agencies mus do he upron work o acknowl-

edging and defining he sraegic raionale and purpose or civilian represenaives


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in a paricular conflic. Tis repor does no evaluae he meris o U.S. sraegy in

Aghanisan; raher, i examines he lack o prioriized and achievable objecives

or civilian represenaives wihin ha sraegy. Is conclusionha civilians’

work ofen creaed pockes o success ha were ulimaely undermined because

hey were no conneced o larger, sysemic poliical and economic shifsis a

cauion o uure policymakers. o creae naionwide, sysemic shifs, civilian rep-resenaives in Aghanisan needed o be incorporaed ino naionwide effors ha

linked heir work wih he Aghan naional governmen. Insead, hey were lef o

develop heir own localized plans wih limied resources, even as policymakers

ariculaed publicly much broader objecives or Aghanisan’s uure.


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History of civilian representatives

in Afghanistan

Te deploymen o civilian represenaives o Aghanisan evolved over ime as

i adaped o he unique conex o he counry. Aghanisan was unlike Kosovo,

a previous pos-Cold War conflic zone. No only was Aghanisan’s poliical,

economic, and social abric rayed afer hree decades o war, bu he Unied Saes

also had relaively less knowledge o he counry afer years o policy neglec. Tis

environmen led o a paricular se o challenges or U.S. civilian represenaives.

How the role of civilian representatives evolved

U.S. civilian represenaives began deploying o Aghanisan’s provinces in 2002 on

Provincial econsrucion eams, he firs o which was esablished in he ciy o

Gardez, in easern Pakia Province, in January 2003.10 (see Figure 1) Ps were ini-

ially organized as mulidisciplinary eams o 60 o 100 miliary personnel; one o our

represenaives rom one or all o he U.S. Agency or Inernaional Developmen, he

Sae Deparmen, and he Deparmen o Agriculure; and a represenaive o he

Aghan governmenusually Aghan police rom he Minisry o Inerior.11 As he

Ps expanded rom Gardezreaching a oal o 28 Ps12 across Aghanisan in

2011he role o he civilian represenaives also expanded, moving rom miliary

suppor saff o miliary counerpars and rom projec managers o poliical advisors.

A he ouse in 2002, he civilian role on U.S. Ps was vaguely defined. As par o

he miliary-cenric Psa ypical raio was 4 civilians o 84 miliary personnel

heir experise was in supporing he Ps’ miliary commanders o expand he

influence o he new Aghan governmen. (see Figure 2) In 2007, Presiden George

W. Bush described he mission o Ps as “helping he Aghan governmen exend

is reach ino disan regions, improve securiy, and deliver reconsrucion assisance.Tey will also underake new effors o rain provincial and local leaders so hey

can be more effecive in delivering real improvemens in he lives o heir ciizens.”13

As miliary-led eams, Ps drew mos o heir reconsrucion unding rom he

Deense Deparmen’s Commander’s Emergency esponse Program, or CEP; or

civilian represenaives, “here was no acual P budge or projecs, [which] placed

me ino an almos purely observe role,” according o one civilian represenaive.14


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Te limied unding refleced he policy inen, where reconsrucion and projecs

were only par o a more general role o overseeing Aghan officials in he provinces.

Assuming ha Aghan poliical and adminisraive capaciy was merely undersup-

pored, he original P mission included “monioring” and “assis[ing] … coordi-

naing bodies” and “acilia[ing] cooperaion.”15 A a P in he souh, he civilian

represenaive in his writen survey response lised his projecs in rough prioriy as

“securiy, ransporaion (roads), waer (wells, irrigaion, flood miigaion), commu-

nicaions (cell service), educaion.”16 As members o he Ps, hen, civilian repre-

senaives conribued paricular skills o a miliary-led mission, such as assising he

Aghan governmen wih physical consrucion and capaciy building.

By 2006, wih he dramaic rise in securiy incidens across Aghanisan, civil-

ian represenaives became increasingly cenral o combaing he expansion oaliban influence in he provinces. Civilian agencies, ciing inormaion gahered

by he civilian represenaives, ocused on he need o increase he visibiliy o he

Aghan governmen and economic opporuniies or Aghans. USAID civilians,

or example, became more enwined wih he Aghan governmen as “an effecive

ool or sabilizaion in Aghanisan, srenghening provincial and disric-level

insiuions and empowering local leaders who suppor he cenral governmen.”17

FIGURE 1

Map of regional commands and PRTs in Afghanistan

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “U.S. Civilian Uplift is Progressing but Some Key Issues Merit FurtherExamination as Implementation Continues” (2010), figure 2.


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In addiion o he miliary’s CEP unding, USAID esablished provincial-level

programs cenered on reconsrucion and developmen. Civilians, now backed by

heir own unding hrough USAID raher han he Deense Deparmen, ook on

an increasingly imporan role in building governmen insiuions. Tese asks

would become increasingly explici as he war deerioraed, and Ps offered an

exising plaorm or new policy approaches.

Wih he adven o counerinsurgency docrine in Aghanisan in 2009, he

Obama adminisraion elevaed he role o civilian represenaives by increas-

ing emphasis on heir poliical and economic work and ripling heir numbers o

“advance our miliary and poliical objecives.”18 Publicly, he adminisraion noed

ha here was no purely miliary soluion19 in Aghanisan, reerencing economic

and poliical disenranchisemen as underlying drivers o insecuriy. As a resul,civilian represenaives were recruied no jus o advance securiy goals bu also

o win he “hears and minds” o Aghans in major populaion ceners.20 Civilians

now had wo explici roles: o coordinae wih he miliary unis and o provide,

as he Sae Deparmen oulined, “civilian experise ou in key disrics ha will

allow our locally ocused sraegy o succeed.”21 (see Figure 3)

FIGURE 2

PRT core task organization in 2006

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “U.S. Civilian Uplift is Progressing but Some Key Issues Merit FurtherExamination as Implementation Continues” (2010), figure 1.

DoS/USAIDUSDA

3

PRT NCOIC

1

Commander

of the PRT1

GOA MOI

1 x ANP

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Admin/OPS

42

Force protection/

security13

Enablers

12

Combat servicesupport

S1/S4S1 adminS4 officerS2/S3S2 officer and NCOS3 OPS officerIO officerCommunicationsNCO + 2 SPCs

Drivers2 SPCs3 SPCsTranslators4 each

SupplyNCO + SPCFood serviceNOC + 2 SPCsMaintenanceNCO + 2 mechanicsMedicalPA+ NCO + 2 medics

PLT HQPLT leaderPLT sergeant2 x drivers2 x gunners4 x squads36 x squad members

CAT-A4 x civil affairsCMOC5 x civil affairsEngineerNCO or officer(project manager)MP team (PTAT)NCO + 2 SPCs

Total military: 83Total civilians: 4


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Te evoluion o civilian represenaives’ role in Aghanisan mirrors overall

changes in U.S. policy. Wih he miliary drawdown in 2014, civilian represena-

iveslong linked o miliary sraegyalso drew down.23 Tis was no always

he plan. As lae as 2012, he Obama adminisraion inended o coninue he

civilian represenaives wih consulaes a wo locaions in Hera and Mazar-e-

Shari. Heralded a he ime as evidence o U.S. commimen o Aghanisan,

only he consulae in Hera remains open, an arrangemen whose uure remains

unclear afer U.S. orces draw down.24 2015 marks he firs ull year wihou Ps

operaing in Aghanisan, wih all U.S. governmen civilians working in Kabul

or he Hera consulae. While civilian advising sill occurs as par o radiional

embassy work, he specific role o living, working advisers o Aghan disric and

provincial governors is no longer a U.S. or inernaional communiy uncion.25

The unique Afghan context

U.S. involvemen shared many similariies wih pas conflics in which civilian

represenaives were previously deployed. Firs, he core o he insecuriy was seen

as poliical, driven by he aliban governmen seeking o re-esablish is auhoriy,

much like Ho Chi Minh’s communis orces fighing in Vienam. Second, he U.S.

inervenion in Aghanisan reached 100,000 U.S. roops a is heigh in 2011, or

Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Intergency Assessment,

Appendix C” (2006).

Regional

Command

Brigade

task force

PRT

DST

Regional commander Regional senior civilian representative

COMISAF Ambassador

Commander

Task force staff

Civilian team lead

DoS, USAID, and USDA

Commander Civilian team lead

DoS, USAID, and USDAPRT staff

Agribusinessdevelopment

team

Civilian team lead

DoS, USAID, and USDA

DST staff commander

Military elements include security forces,

ANSF mentors, and civil affairs teams

FIGURE 3

U.S. mission in Afghanistan field structure in 2010

Unity of effort


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boh counererrorism and counerinsurgency missions.26 As in pas conflics, he

civilian represenaives were able o use he U.S. miliary or securiy, logisics, hous-

ing, ransporaion, and oher daily operaional needs ha oherwise would have

required conracors o ulfill. Tird, and finally, he Unied Saes saw he appeal o

he aliban, and o local warlords, as linked o economic and social servicesjobs

and coursha creaed a leas aci suppor or insurgency and errorism.

A he same ime, Aghanisan’s condiions were unique. Unlike Iraq, Aghanisan

was impoverished in many human, economic, and poliical indicaors. Te

amoun o resources required o address even basic needs in he provinces would

prove dauning or many civilian represenaives. One civilian noed ha “we

waned o esablish a clinic, bu we ound ha hey needed somehing even more

basic: hand-washing beore handling children or ood. I was ha basic.”27 Civilian

represenaives, already on he ground, were quickly orced o adjus heir expec-

aions and rehink heir assumpions abou he economic, developmenal, and

physical easibiliy o heir work.

Similarly, he radiional governance and economic srucures had broken down as

he aliban sough o eliminae poenial opposiion hroughou is ime in power.

elaionships and rus among and wihin ribes was hereore weak, leading o

numerous microconflics beween villages and ribes unrelaed o broader insur-

gency or errorism. Noneheless, hese microconflics creaed he very insabiliy

ha he Unied Saes and he new Aghan governmen sough o resolve.

Aghanisan’s povery was all he more jarring because he Unied Saes had very

litle engagemen wih Aghanisan or Aghan officials afer he 1979 communis

coup. When he Unied Saes, oher counries, and inernaional organizaions

such as he Unied Naions arrived in Aghanisan in early 2002, he cenral Kabul

governmen was considered weak and o be in a sae o collapse.28 By 2004, once

he World Bank and he Aghanisan esearch and Evaluaion Uni were able o

ideniy he exising Aghan governmen insiuions, hey ound ha despie he

poliical collapse, he adminisraive governmen uncions were coninuing, wih

“a coheren managemen and accounabiliy ramework.”29 By 2004, however, U.S.

policy and civilian represenaives had spen wo years developing relaionships

and providing reconsrucion in he provinces, largely unaware and hereore inde-penden o his exising Aghan adminisraive nework.


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On he securiy ron, he aliban’s resiliency semmed in par rom is access

o sae havens in Pakisan. While sae havens or insurgencies are no unprec-

edenedIraq, Vienam, and oher conflics have seen similar regional access

Aghanisan’s dependency on economic resources hrough Pakisan, he very

counry ha harbored he insurgency, made building economic and ranspora-

ion more difficul.30

Furher, he ribal underpinnings o he aliban insurgencyand ribal links beween hose in Aghanisan and Pakisan challenged he basic

premise ha a Kabul-based Aghan governmen could compee wih hese more

localized relaionships. Indeed, he abiliy o he aliban o survive and grow rom

sae havens coninually mean ha civilian represenaives ocused on shor-erm

securiy effors raher han more sraegic and susainable developmen.

U.S. policymakers approached Aghanisan based on heir pas conflic experi-

ences. Te Bush adminisraion’s rame o reerence was Vienam, which led o

a preerence or small, miliary-led inervenion. Te Obama adminisraion,

meanwhile, made decisions wih Iraq as he primary reerence poin, which led oan adopion o counerinsurgency acics bu wih limied ime and resources. As

he conflic evolved, however, hese approaches were unable o adjus, complica-

ing he achievemen o U.S. naional securiy objecives and prooundly limiing

he abiliy o civilian represenaives o achieve heir objecives.


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Background of the study

During conflic, governmen and policy debaes are ofen ocused on immediae

objecives: fixing he laes ailure or responding o he recen media revelaion.

Tis sudy akes a longer view, assessing he U.S. civilian represenaive program

over is enire duraion. Tis approach presens challenges bu generaes more

comprehensive findings, which can inorm he nex deploymen o U.S. civilian

represenaives in a conflic zone.

Purpose and timing

Te Unied Saes has consisenly deployed civilian represenaives rom U.S.

civilian agencies o conflic zones, including large-scale miliary effors such as

Vienam,31 Iraq in 2003,32 and Aghanisan. Tere is mixed evidence and wide-

spread disagreemen, however, boh wihin and ouside he U.S. governmen, over

wheher civilians can, should, or do effecively address he poliical and economic

drivers o conflic. For many Americans,33 he increase in violence and poliical

insabiliy in Aghanisan in 2015 indicaes ha U.S. policy was uile in is effor

o aid Aghanisan’s posconflic ransiion. Tis popular conclusion, which labels

deploying civilian represenaives as a ailed policy opion, increases he poliical

difficuly o uilizing civilians in uure conflic zones.

By conras, he U.S. governmennamely he Deparmen o Deense34

regards he use o civilian represenaives as increasingly imporan, claiming

ha he miliary requires more suppor rom civilian agencies. Tis viewpoin

is parially due o a desire o offload responsibiliy or medium- and long-erm

sabiliy bu also o a recogniion ha conflic has many nonsecuriy drivers. Tese

differing perspecives will become embedded wihin he American public, iscongressional represenaives, and U.S. governmen agencies, influencing policy

argumens and decisions regarding civilian represenaives in he nex conflic.


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Amid hese differing conclusions, he ime or a comprehensive, empirical assess-

men o civilian effeciveness in Aghanisan is waning. Poliically, he atenion

o he Unied Saes and he inernaional communiy is shifing away rom

Aghanisan. Civilian agencies mus move personnel o ocus on he nex crisis

raher han assessing he las. Nongovernmenal organizaions, including research

insiuions, ace securiy concerns in Aghanisan, making an already significanask more expensive and ime consuming.

Funcionally, 2015 marks he firs year in which U.S. civilian represenaives

now consolidaed in he U.S. Embassy and he regional office in Heraare no

in he provinces and disrics o Aghanisan.35 Te personnel ha have worked

on, wih, and or Provincial econsrucion eams are rapidly dispersing. As U.S.

and inernaional civilians move o new posiions, and as he ime since heir work

in Aghanisan increases, heir memories and sense o conribuion ade. Te

Aghans who were involved are also leaving. Wih he elecion o Aghan Presiden

Ashra Ghani, he majoriy o boh provincial and disric Aghan governors who were poliically appoinedare being replaced. As U.S. orces commence

wihdrawal rom Aghanisan, i has become more difficul o connec wih

Aghans in areas once easily visied and which hosed U.S. civilians and miliary.

Tese acors make 2015 he opimal ime o examine he role and conribuion o

civilian represenaives in Aghanisan. Afer 13 years o deploymenrom 2002

hrough 2014civilian represenaives have accumulaed a breadh o experi-

ences and deep knowledge o heir work. Teir experiences hold invaluable les-

sons or U.S. policymakers concerning he use o civilian represenaives in boh

Aghanisan and uure conflic zones.

Past evaluations

A number o pas sudies and assessmens have examined civilian represenaives’

role in Aghanisan, some o which have ocused on he bureaucraic suppor sruc-

ure. Te Special Inspecor General or Aghanisan econsrucion, or SIGA,

mainly evaluaed he civilian program’s inpus during he surge: coss and bureau-

craic recruiing by he Sae Deparmen. SIGA ound ha he slow bureaucraicprocedures, such as hiring difficulies coupled wih congressional budge processes,

limied P civilian deploymens during he iniial surge rom 2009 hrough 2010.36


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In anoher se o sudies, conduced by governmen agencies and hink anks

midway hrough he P program rom 2007 o 2010, noed Ps shared

lessons learned and idenified bes pracices primarily aimed a improving

curren operaions. For example, he U.S. Insiue o Peace, or USIP, surveyed

several P civilians midway hrough he P program in 2007 and noed

lessons learned and bes pracices aimed a improving P operaions a haime.37 Similarly, he Governmen Accounabiliy Office, or GAO, reviewed he

srucure and unding o Ps or congressional commitees.38 Oher, firshand

accoun o Ps in Aghanisan39 also emerged, offering lessons and recom-

mendaions. Some o he suggesed recommendaions were adoped by U.S.

policymakers, while oherssuch as recommendaions or civilian leadership

o Ps40proved oo bureaucraically difficul o implemen.

Oher U.S. and inernaional officials ook issue wih he Ps’ concep as a policy

ool, criicizing heir mixing o civilian and miliary roles and responsibiliies.

As early as 2002, Barbara Sapleon, hen a poliical advisor o he Office o heEuropean Union Special epresenaive or Aghanisan, disagreed wih he move

o implemen Ps. Sapleon hough ha Ps’ saed ocus on physical recon-

srucion undamenally overlooked he Aghan insurgency’s poliical roos, and

she raised concerns over Ps providing humaniarian and reconsrucion ser-

vices normally provided by apoliical, nongovernmenal organizaions. Similarly,

in 2009, Mathew Hoh, a U.S. civilian represenaive rom P Zabul and one o

he ew o resign over he war, publicly criicized he Ps or narrowly ocusing

on supporing he Karzai governmen’s ofen corrup personnel.41

Several U.S. and Aghan surveys have managed o obain quaniaive daa, much

o which inorm his sudy. From 2009 o 2013, several scholars sough o measure

saisical correlaions beween aid and securiy. Te Sraegic Sudies Insiue42

and he Naional Bureau o Economic esearch43 boh deermined ha increases

in unding or reconsrucionmuch o i implemened by civilian represena-

iveshad a posiive impac on shor-erm securiy; a 2011 ufs Universiy/

USIP sudy, however, argued ha increased unding decreased securiy in he

long erm.44 Oher, more general daa on developmen was and coninues o be

annually developed and compiled in Te Asia Foundaion’s annual survey o he

Aghan people and he Aghan governmen’s Cenral Saisics Organizaion’s“Naional isk and Vulnerabiliy Assessmen.”45 Ulimaely, his quaniaive inor-

maion gives conex o he qualiaive assessmens provided by pas scholars and

he daa gahered rom civilian represenaives in his sudy.


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Boh he U.S. and Aghan paricipans were conaced rom May o Sepember

2015, a a ime o growing insecuriy in Aghanisan. During he conduc o he

survey and he inerviews, he siuaion in Aghanisan was marked by repors o

aliban offensives in Kunduz, Badakhshan, Kunar, Helmand, and Kandahar. Te

oucome o he securiy siuaion remains in flux. Similarly, he poliical siuaion

in he provinces and disrics was in a sae o ransiion as he newly eleced gov-ernmen o Presiden Ghani appoined new provincial and disric governors.

Te repor uses he survey and inerview responses o draw conclusions abou he

program o civilian represenaives in Aghanisan. o ensure ha hese responses

refleced acs in Aghanisan as much as possibleand no merely rusraions

agains U.S. sandards or overly posiive response biases o Aghans driven by per-

sonal welare concernshese resuls were compared wih and supplemened by

secondary-source daa rom Aghanisan. Tese daa included he Aghan govern-

men’s “Naional isk and Vulnerabiliy Assessmen”; he Deparmen o Deense

quarerly repor on “Securiy and Sabiliy in Aghanisan”; Te Asia Foundaion’sannual survey o he Aghan people; media aricles; and a variey o published

repors, all lised in he eerences.

Tis breadh o daa allowed or rends o emerge and, in some cases, explained

conradicory conclusions in previous repors. Overall, however, when compared

and conrased, he survey resuls rom he hree groupsU.S. civilians, P

Aghans, and non-P Aghansover he 13 years o U.S. civilian deploymen in

Aghanisan, as well as he secondary-source daa, were surprisingly consisen.

Tese daa were hen used o evaluae wheher civilian represenaives achieved

he objecives se by U.S. policymakers. Originally, he survey and inerviews

were used solely o deermine he conribuion o civilian represenaives on hree

specific and publicly saed objecives or Aghanisan: increasing securiy; recon-

srucion; and promoing effecive governance. Over he course o he survey and

inerviews, however, U.S. and Aghan paricipans coninually reerenced implici

objecives ha demanded equal ime and obscured heir abiliy o achieve hese

hree original objecives. Tese challenges became so cenral o he evaluaion ha

he researchers widened he scope o he survey o include implici objecives as

well. As a resul, his repor akes ino accoun boh explici and implici objecivesor civilian represenaives and uses survey responsesalong wih independenly

colleced daao evaluae wheher hese objecives were achieved.


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In addiion o examining he achievemen o explici and implici objecives,

he repor presens 10 findings, which all ino hree broader caegories: iming;

resources; and policy suppor. Based on hese findings, alongside evaluaions o

objecives se or civilians, his repor provides recommendaions or deploying

civilian represenaives in uure conflic zones.

Te repor purposeully does no cover he miliary ’s role in he Ps or

oher miliary unis operaing in he area. Given he srucure o he Ps in

Aghanisan, which were miliary led, many civilians highlighed how civilian-

miliary relaions affeced heir abiliy o achieve objecives.46 Tis sudy chose o

exclude he miliary objecives and achievemens o narrowly define he purview

o he civilian represenaives and heir achievemens. Likewise, issues o logis-

ics, managemen, and daily living were excluded. While imporan o he daily

uncioning and objecives, many o hese issues have been previously examined

by inernal agency and congressional reviews.

Addiional inormaion on he survey can be ound in “Annex A: Mehodology.”


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Research findings

o assess he work o U.S. civilian represenaives in Aghanisan, researchers

firs had o ideniy goals agains which achievemens could be measured. Tis

repor idenifies seven objeciveshree explici and our impliciand assesses

wheher U.S. civilian represenaives achieved hose objecives. I hen idenifies

10 broader rends ha emerged when he daa was compared o hose objecives.

Identifying objectives: What were civilian representativestrying to achieve?

As he conflic in Aghanisan evolved, U.S. policymakers used civilian represena-

ives o achieve a variey o securiy and poliical objecives. Te ollowing seven

objecives are disilled rom explici governmen sources; personal inerviews;

implici assumpions in U.S. policy saemens; and rom previous civilian repre-

senaive deploymens, including o Vienam and Iraq. Te firs hree objecives

are explici, derived rom governmen saemens. Te ollowing our are implici;

alhough several governmen sources allude o hese objecives,

civilian represenaives noed in inerviews and survey responses

ha hey believed hese objecives were o equal imporance o

hose saed explicily.

Improve security

Te firs and oremos objecive or civilian represenaives was

o improve securiy. Civilian represenaives brough several non-

miliary ools o he securiy effor, including diplomaic nego-iaion, dispue resoluion, and reconsrucion and governance

advice. Te Sae Deparmen’s 2010 “Aghanisan and Pakisan

1. Improve security

2. Implement reconstruction

3. Professionalize government

4. Build trust among and with Afghans

5. Promote democratic principles

6. Provide oversight, intelligence, and repo

7. Demonstrate commitment to the Afgha

government and buy political time

Objectives of U.S. civilianrepresentatives in Afghanis


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Sabilizaion Sraegy” explicily confirmed he use o governance and economic

developmen as ools o improve securiy: “Te provinces and disrics are where

our mos consequenial programs will be delivered, where we mus help he

Aghan governmen provide economic opporuniies ha increase sabiliy and

reduce he srengh o he insurgencyand where we are mos visibly expanding

our civilian commimen.”47

Tis objecive, however, was unclear on wheher such securiy objecives were

shor erm or longer erm. Te disincion maters or civilians: Funding weekly

garbage pickup may reduce shor-erm daily unemploymen, while building a

mosque or school may ake longer bu creae lasing insiuions and long-erm

jobs. Te objecive was hereore deeply dependen on how U.S. miliary com-

manders believed securiy in heir area could be bes achieved. For some miliary

commanders, especially in highly insecure areas, shor-erm securiy measures

such as argeed operaions agains Al Qaeda and aliban membersook prior-

iy. Paradoxically, emphasis on shor-erm securiy someimes hampered efforsa enhancing long-erm securiy: One 2008 civilian represenaive recalled ha

he U.S. miliary’s ocus on shor-erm operaions, including operaions agains Al

Qaeda and aliban insurgens, lef local Aghan leaders unwilling o mee wih her

a all, even on economic or reconsrucion issues ha were in heir ineres.48

Tis advising also included he aciliaion o conversaions beween he mili-

ary and Aghan governmen leaders such as governors or village elders. Civilian

represenaives repor serving as he “inermediary” beween miliary and local

Aghans, building Aghan undersanding o miliary objecives.49 Likewise, he

civilian represenaive became he credible communicaor o he miliary abou

Aghan objecives and needs. For many civilian represenaives, his objecive o

advise he miliary made hem ino he “conscience” ha could help miliary unis

inegrae boh poliical and securiy effecs ino heir operaions.50

Te direc civilian-miliary collaboraion on Provincial econsrucion eamsa

uncion o heir objecive o improve securiyalso provoked inense criicism

rom humaniarian assisance groups.51 In heir view, Ps violaed he poliical

neuraliy o humaniarian assisance by combining miliary orces wih radiion-

ally neural humaniarian assisance and reconsrucion. Over ime, however,some organizaions came o see he Ps as filling a gap, able o provide humani-

arian and civilian assisance using miliary suppor in areas ha he independen

nongovernmenal organizaions could no reach due o securiy concerns.52


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Implement reconstruction

Te second explici objecive rom U.S. policymakers was o use civilian exper-

ise o reconsrucand in some cases, consrucphysical buildings, gov-

erning skills, and processes or Aghanisan’s governmen a he local level.

econsrucion was designed o highligh he governmen o is consiuenshrough physical displays o governmen uncions. Indeed, hen-Presiden Hamid

Karzai specifically requesed in 2002 ha he name change rom Join egional

eams o Provincial econsrucion eams, saing ha “warlords rule regions;

governors rule provinces.”53

In some locaions, reconsrucion was primarily abou physical inrasrucure

as an end in isel: rebuilding a deeply poor counry afer exended conflic. In a

disric o Nimroz Province, or example, reconsrucion improved lives: “Tere

was no healh clinic eiher, and he governor waned one. I wen o Kabul, go

USAID and go a meeing wih he Minisry o Healh and he World Bank, and we convinced hem or he need or a clinic,” explained he firs civilian repre-

senaive o Nimroz Province in 2009. “Tis efforrening a building, hiring a

docor, a midwie, and a vaccinaoresablished a clinic ha allowed he docor

o see 2,500 paiens a monh.”54

Afer he civilian surge in 2009, however, reconsrucion ocused largely on deliv-

ering services as a means or he Aghan governmen o srenghen is legiimacy.

In 2009, U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and U.S. miliary commander Gen.

Sanley McChrysal esablished a new civilian-miliary plan, which used civilian

unding o promoe local cooperaion, build jobs o “provide a viable alernaive o

violence or criminaliy,” and “‘oubid’ he aliban and promoe a sense o progress

o couner insurgen propaganda.” Te plan also uilized civilian resources o “pro-

vide access o jusice and enhance agriculural opporuniy and marke access.”55

By 2011, hen-Secreary o Sae Hillary Clinon was able o esiy ha,

“Economic growh is up, opium producion is down. Under he aliban, only

900,000 boys and no girls were enrolled in schools. By 2010, 7.1 million sudens

were enrolled, and nearly 40 percen o hem girls.” Te secreary old Congress

ha, “Hundreds o housands o armers have been rained and equipped wihnew seeds and oher echniques. Aghan women have used more han 100,000

microfinance loans. Inan moraliy is down 22 percen.”56 econsrucing he

kinds o economic and governmen services ha could lend credibiliy and legii-

macy o he Aghan governmen became a criical ool in counering he insur-

gency and he grievances ha i exploied.


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Professionalize government

Te hird explici objecive o civilian represenaives was o build he capaciy o he

Aghan governmen, primarily o governors and legislaive councils a he provincial

and disric levels. Iniially, his capaciy building was inended o provide suppor o

exising governmen srucuresor example, holding shuras, described as meeingso local leaders, ofen elder men, or decision-making or dispue resoluion. Amid

he civilian surge, however, Presiden Barack Obama expanded his charge o civilian

represenaives o include “helping he Aghan governmen serve is people.”57 Tis

broadened mandae was designed o expand effecive, represenaive, and accoun-

able governance; suppor elecoral reorm; couner corrupion; and improve access

o jusice.58 As he Sae Deparmen laid ou in is 2010 sraegy, “Our governance

effors will help develop more responsive, visible, and accounable insiuions in

Kabul, paricularly a he provincial, disric, and local level, where mos Aghans

encouner heir governmen.”59 In a counry where ormal governmen srucures

and processes had broken down over decades o war, civilian represenaives werenow charged wih a significan and sraegic effor o improve Aghan insiuions

sysemicallyworking rom he local o he naional level.

As U.S. personnel began o wihdraw in 2012, achieving his governance objecive

required susainabiliy o ensure ha he achievemens oulased he civilian repre-

senaives’ deploymen o he provinces. A he 2012 NAO summi, Aghanisan

and he Unied Saes had agreed o draw down he miliary and civilian surge by

2014.60 In preparaion, he Sae Deparmen announced a shif in governance

effors, moving rom “shor-erm sabilizaion projecs o longer-erm susainable

developmen.”61 Governance objecives became less abou creaing shor-erm secu-

riy and more abou responsive, corrupion-ree, and accounable governmen offi-

cials who could susain governmen uncions wihou U.S. civilian represenaives.

Build trust among and with Afghans

U.S. civilian represenaives had he objecive, ofen implici, o influence Aghan

leaders and heir consiuens o suppor U.S. effors. Gaining local suppor

or securiy operaions was one elemen o ha suppor. Anoher elemen washrough elecions. For Aghanisan, elecions served as sraegic inflecion poins

ha provided Aghan affirmaion o boh he democraic process and he exising

Aghan governmen ha U.S. miliary and civilian invesmen deeply suppored.62

Consequenly, in 2004, 2005, 2009, and 2014, civilian represenaives in he field

urged, promoed, and aciliaed elecions and associaed evens.


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Similarly, civilian represenaives undersood heir objecive o build suppor or

a ormal governmen among he Aghan populaion. Civilian represenaives were

no only asked wih proessionalizing he Aghan governmen bu also were ine-

gral o communicaing ha proessionalizaion o he Aghan people. Civilian rep-

resenaives used heir saure in provinces or disrics o join radio shows, shuras,

and oher evens where hey would explicily highligh he local Aghan govern-men work.63 As one civilian represenaive explained in 2009, “Our goal was o

mee he basic needs o he province, and credi he Aghan Governmen, so ha

people would know ha he Aghan Governmen was relevan. We buil schools,

wells or waer, and medical clinics, and old everyone ha his was he work o

he Aghan Governmen.”64 Using heir poliical influence, civilian represenaives

saw hemselves as inegral o esablishing and mainaining he credibiliy o he

ormal Aghan governmen among he Aghan people.

Civilian represenaives also influenced he Aghan governmen and buil relaion-

ships ha allowed U.S. policymakers o undersand Aghanisan’s poliical errain.Civilian represenaives quickly came o undersand ha Aghan governors were

appoined rom Kabul and hereore had variable local influence and suppor.

Consequenly, many disric and provincial Aghan governors were ocused on

managing up o Kabul raher han down o consiuens. Civilian represenaives

could leverage heir relaionships wih he governors o develop heir local sup-

por base. A he same ime, civilian represenaives undersood ha heir suppor

ofen enabled Aghans o make poliically difficul decisions, such as supporing

he reconciliaion or reinegraion o fighers who had rejeced he aliban and

rejoined heir local Aghan communiy. An Aghan leader could overly or coverly

draw on suppor rom U.S. civilians o pursue local reconciliaion objecives ha

ulimaely would eed ino naional U.S. objecives or aliban reconciliaion.

Promote democratic principles

From he ouse o U.S. inervenion in Aghanisan in 2001, promoing democ-

racy was a pillar o U.S. policy. Presiden Bush consisenly reerred o building

a “new and democraic” Aghanisan and supporing he “insiuions o democ-

racy.”65

By he ime o he surge, however, eedback rom inerviews wih hecivilian represenaives noed a shifhese surge civilians ocused more on pro-

essionalizing governance han on promoing democraic principles. Noneheless,

civilian represenaives pursued projecs and programs ha suppored democraic

principles, such as providing suppor or elecions, hroughou heir deploymens

rom 2002 hrough 2014.


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For example, projecs around “improving he saus o women,”66 such as develop-

ing enrepreneurship and business raining programs or expanding girls’ schools,

elevaed democraic principles o equal opporuniy. Alhough hese opporuni-

ies fi wihin he ideal o a democraic and more sable sociey, hey ofen con-

fliced wih local norms, orcing civilian represenaives o grapple wih wheher o

creae local conflic in pursui o democraic principles. Indeed, civilian represen-aives ofen had o choose beween conflic and principles, wih litle indicaion

rom U.S. policymakers abou which should ake prioriy.

Provide oversight, intelligence, and reporting

Te reporing and oversigh uncions o civilian represenaives became

increasingly imporan or U.S. policymakers wih he locally ocused counerin-

surgency approach adoped in he 2009 surge. Civilian represenaives provided

a wealh o inormaion abou local poliics, atiudes, economic growh, andoher saus repors on heir objecives. Tis reporing hen ed ino U.S. policy

discussions on he progress o miliary and civilian developmens. In 2015,

absen he breadh o civilian reporing, he Deparmen o Sae and he U.S.

Agency or Inernaional Developmen have had o develop new mehods o

collecing inormaionparicularly abou U.S.-unded projecs in areas where

civilian represenaives previously operaed.67

While in he provinces and disrics, civilian represenaives had he objecive

o overseeing U.S. assisance unds rom USAID and he Deparmen o Sae.

For example, civilian represenaives rom he Sae Deparmen had he legal

oversigh uncion o accoun or, repor, and rack Sae Deparmen assisance

unds.68 USAID civilian represenaives in he provinces and disrics, however,

explicily lacked a legal oversigh uncion or mos projecs. Insead, USAID

program managemen was consolidaed in Kabul or mos projecs,69 leaving day-

o-day managemen in Kabul raher han wih USAID civilian represenaives in

he field. USAID civilian represenaives noed in he survey ha his lack o direc

oversigh mean ha hey had litle conrol or abiliy o adjus planned reconsruc-

ion projecs in heir respecive provinces.

Less emphasized, bu perhaps equally imporan, was he inheren abiliy o civilian

represenaives o repor on he acions and decisions o Aghan officials, essenially

overseeing heir work. Such oversigh was an imporan acor in wha hen-Secre-

ary Clinon highlighed in 2010 as anoher objecive or civilian represenaives:

“raise he sandards o he Aghan counerpars.”70 In Helmand71 and Kandahar,72 or

example, he reporing o U.S. and U.K. civilian represenaives provided sufficien


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evidence o corrupion and incompeence in some provinces, leading o pressure

on Aghan Presiden Karzai o remove he governors o hose provinces. Similarly,

civilian represenaives who could send repors o civilian counerpars serving in

Aghan minisries could urge coordinaion beween he minisry and he local level.

Tis abiliy o inernaional civilians o oversee and communicae across he Aghan

governmen may have made i more difficul or Aghan officials o pursue corruppracices. Te abiliy o repor independenly on Aghan counerpars creaed pres-

sure or Aghan counerpars o a leas minimize bad pracices.

Demonstrate commitment to the Afghan government and buy political time

In 2002, U.S. policymakers iniially saw Ps as a way o bridge a gap in govern-

men uncions, providing services ha he nascen Aghan governmen in Kabul

was incapable o providing. Bolsered by Ps rom oher NAO allies such as

Germany and Ialy, he U.S. Ps were, in essence, designed o buy ime unil Aghan governmen officials were meeing he U.S. goal o providing “effecive and

accounable governmen services” in he provinces, including securiy, educaion,

healh care, and economic growh.73

By he ime o he surge in 2009, civilian represenaives and heir reconsrucion

and governmen capaciy-building abiliies had become anoher ool or he Kabul

governmen o comba he influence o he aliban insurgency. Te surge, wih is

ripling o civilian represenaives, acknowledged he need o suppor he Aghan

governmen in as many provinces and disrics as possibleparicularly hose

heavily argeed by he aliban in he souh and eas o Aghanisan. Tese civilian

represenaives’ objecive essenially was o keep he Aghan governmen unc-

ioning as a v isible alernaive o he aliban; wihou such suppor, he aliban

could gain influence, making i more difficul or Kabul o cones alone.

Such a commimen o civilians, paricularly wih he surge in 2009, urher aimed

o demonsrae U.S. poliical commimen o he new Aghan governmen’s survival.

Te deploymena a significan cos and risk o he Unied Saeswas designed

o reassure he Aghan governmen and undermine he aliban. U.S. civilian repre-

senaives were closely aligned wih Aghan governmen officials, ofen living and working on or nex o he provincial governor’s compound. While his arrangemen

bolsered he physical and poliical alignmen o he U.S. and Aghan governmens, i

orced civilian represenaives o become advocaes or Aghan governmen employ-

ees. Many o hese employees, however, did no consisenly believe or espouse U.S.

democraic principles, rule o law, or accounabiliy.


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Tese objecives were boh he goal and jusificaion or deploying more han

2,000 U.S. civilian represenaives o Aghanisan. Te suppor provided by civil-

ians o he miliary and Aghan governmen was essenial o U.S. policy. Ye as

many civilian represenaives learned over ime, objecives ofen confliced wih

one anoher, and each one presened resh challenges.

Assessment: What was achieved?

One o he mos powerul jusificaions underpinning he use o civilian represen-

aives in conflics is he belie among policymakers ha civilian represenaives

are able o address he drivers o conflic: poliical, economic, and social acors

ha conribue o insecuriy and insurgency. Using survey resuls, inerview

responses, and pas publicaions rom boh U.S. civilian represenaives and

Aghans rom 2002 hrough 2014, he able below aligns he realiy o wha was

achieved wih saed objecives. (see able 1)

TABLE 1

Reported achievements and challenges of civilian representatives

aligned against their 7 objectives

Objective Indications of achievement Complications to achievement

Improve

security

• Shaped some military operations.

• Assisted military spending of the Commander’s

Emergency Response Program.

• Provided some oversight to military-funded

projects, as possible.• Communicated and advocated for Afghan

concerns during U.S. military planning.

• Struggled to pursue civilian objectives

independently of military objectives.

• Relied on military commander for resources.

Implement

reconstruction

• Improved some Afghan quality-of-life indicators,

such as education and health.

• Provided short-term political and security

support through quick-impact projects.

• Projects and programs sometimes used as

access to powerful Afghans; projects enabled

civilian representatives to have a role in

dispute resolution.

• Had few resources—financial or personnel—

to oversee projects.

• Inconsistently focused on sustainability of projects.

• Contributed to increased Afghan desire for more

long-term, large infrastructure.

• Focused security-linked projects on insecure areas

at the expense of secure areas.

• Long-term development now minimal.

• Faced funding requirements that created

disincentives to development and fueledcorrupt practices among Afghans.

• Unable to develop effective alternative to services

provided by the Taliban, notably justice and courts.

• Provided skills training to Afghan counterparts

that often went underused.


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Objective Indications of achievement Complications to achievement

Professionalize

government

• Communicated military actions and priorities

to Afghans.

• Built trusted relationships with Afghans, often

due to specific skills or traits of the representative.

• Provided disincentive for bad behavior and

mitigated overt corruption.

• Began localized reconciliation programs to

address fundamental political grievances.

• Built some government capacity, primarily

with existing technocrats.

• Faced time constraints so that time spent ad vising

Afghans reduced time spent advising military;

objectives conflicted.

• Faced too few resources and were spread too thin

to build system of governance; minimal contact

with civilian representatives in ministries or U.S.

Embassy.• Faced unclear policy on support to formal

government—Afghan governor—and informal

local officials—shuras.

• Unable to adjust the Afghan power dynamics

often relied on by nontechnocrats.

• Had limited time, incentives, or resources to

address micro-conflicts or to disaggregate

them from the larger counterinsurgency.

Build trust among

and with Afghans

• Promoted Afghan government publicly

to Afghan constituents.

• Urged Afghan leaders to pursue U.S.

objectives, often military.

• Raised expectations from Afghan constituents

for Afghan government capability. Afghans

disillusioned with government unable to deliver

like the United States did.

• Discredited by some Afghan constituents solelydue to alignment with Afghan officials.

Promote democratic

principles

• Supported elections, the results of which

Afghans generally accepted.

• Alienated some conservative Afghans with

democracy promotion programs, such as

women promotion programs.

Provide oversight,

intelligence,

and reporting

• Increasingly developed civilian-military

campaign plans.

• Reported weekly through U.S. government.

• Struggled with few resources to develop metrics

and measurements or to gather data.

• Received minimal guidance or policy feedback

from embassy or Washington agencies.

Demonstrate

commitment to the

Afghan government

and buy political time

• Galvanized international partners to increase

civilian representatives and civilian programs

in Afghanistan.

• In the United States, demonstrated civilianagencies’ commitment to national security

objectives.

• Viewed by Afghan government as creating

a parallel government.

Source: Aggregated responses from authors’ survey and interviews with civilian representatives and Afghan officials, May to September 2015.

Based on he daa gahered rom U.S. civilian represenaives and Aghans, he

char above liss he seven objecives idenified in he previous secion alongside

he achievemens and complicaions relaed o each objecive. Overall, he resuls

are mixed. As hey relaed o each U.S. policy objecive, he achievemens o civil-

ian represenaives are primarily shor erm; he complicaions hey aced largelyprevened hese shor-erm achievemens rom coninuing ino he long erm.


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he elecion crisis o 2014which in some respec coninueswas by ar he

mos significan issue we deal wih and our work on ha (which was consan

and inensive) was ar more imporan o policymakers han he saus o any

[developmen] projec.”75 Te recen ranser o power o new Presiden Ghani

is anoher sep oward cemening democraic pracices and values.

Ye he objecives ariculaed or he civilian represenaives were so expansive

and sraegic ha even hese small, albei essenial, gains appear insufficien

or long-erm success. One reason is ha he P program as a whole has ew

merics by which o demonsrae is impac. A second, and more imporan,

reason is ha he U.S. governmen did no se up he civilian represenaives

o have specific effecs as an inegraed, naionwide sysem, rom he naional

level in Kabul down hrough he provincial and local governmens. As a resul,

significan accomplishmens wih Aghan officials, wih specific communiies,

or on paricular developmen issues remained relaively localized and did no

conribue o a susainable naionwide shif.

Several civilian represenaives noiced his missing sysemic approach; hey saw

he limied oucome o heir work on he ground. For hem, his missing sep

was due o limied policy eedback beween he sraegic and he deeply local

levels. Wihou i, neiher civilian represenaives in he field nor policymakers in

Washingon were consisenly assessing changing circumsances on he ground

and adjusing policy accordingly. For policymakers considering civilian represen-

aives in he uure, hen, i will be criical o undersand no only he above char

on wha civilian represenaives did and did no achieve in Aghanisan bu also

how hese achievemens affeced overall rends eviden in Aghanisan oday.

Overall trends

o clearly undersand why his difference beween shor- and long-erm

achievemens emerged, he research disilled daa colleced rom civilian

responses ino 10 cross-cuting rends. Tese 10 rends all ino hree general

caegories: shor-erm gains; resource challenges; and policy suppor limia-

ions. Combined, he 10 rends illusrae how, why, and when civilians wereable o make shor-erm progress bu largely unable o produce ully susainable

economic, poliical, and social sysems.


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o arrive a hese rends, researchers ocused on hose ha cu across he ime

span or became more acue over he 13 years o U.S. civilian represenaives. Even

when daa were broken down by agency, he research revealed minimal difference

beween civilian responses. Te one difference ha did emerge was beween he

responses o surge and presurge civilianslikely a reflecion o he bureaucraic

and policy shifs ha came wih he surge’s laer ocus on counerinsurgency andpromoion o civilian skills. Despie hese shifs and he surge’s ripling o civil-

ian represenaives, he rends idenified below coninued due o he unchanged,

underlying assumpion ha civilians could achieve undamenal poliical, social,

and economic shifs in Aghan sociey and governmen.

Short-term gain; long-term weakness

Projects were useful in galvanizing rebuilding, whether political, economic, or social

Afer 13 years o reconsrucion, raining, and developmen, Aghans repored hahey had improved access o services and viewed economic growh as improving

and increasing happiness.76 Alhough press and repors by he Special Inspecor

General or Aghanisan econsrucion have ound many insances o aban-

doned and unused inrasrucure, here are no naionwide daa on wha U.S.-buil

inrasrucure coninues o be used. As a small sample, according o he 10 Aghan

officials surveyed, much o he local inrasrucure buil by civilian represenaives

in heir areas o Aghanisan coninues o be used.77

While comprehensive research needs o be underaken by hose who are able o

ravel around Aghanisan oday, several anecdoes rom his research indicae

ha some U.S. invesmens coninue o be criical o Aghan economic and social

developmen in 2015. For example, in Kunar Province, seven bridges now span

he Kunar iver, reducing he ravel ime rom Asadabad o Kabul rom 6 hours o

1.5 hours.78 ruck raffic coninues o increase, axing he roads and bridges in he

area. Eigh o he 10 Aghans inerviewed or his research repored ha schools

ha civilians suppored coninue o uncion as schools, as do hospials, in heir

Aghan communiies, hough hey are concerned or heir qualiy.79

Tose surveyed noed ha, on he local level, small projecs were insrumenal inre-esablishing poliical sysems o governance, boh ormal and inormal. Insead

o simply reconsrucion, civilian represenaives repored improved sabiliy in

villages and communiies when hey ied poliical objecives o heir reconsruc-

ion work, using reconsrucion as a ool raher han simply as an oupu or is

own sake. (see Figure 5) One Aghan mayor relaed how he used projecs unded

by U.S. civilian represenaives o improve his poliical sanding:


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[Te PR] buil numerous buildings like: Atorney General Office’s build-

ing, Educaion Deparmen building, clinics in cenral and suburbs o Farah,

roads and asphaled highways. A big road projec is building he 75-kilomeer

road connecing cenral [par o he province] o oher par o [he province].

Inside he ciy, we had grea developmen projecs; or example, we esablished

a park in he ciy. Almos 5,000 people had job or one year wih he projecso PRs and USAID. Also, PRs buil a canal or flooding and waer 2–3

kilomeers; hree bridges were buil on ha canal. Te municipaliy did no

have a lo o money, so all hese work was impossible or he governmen; we

could no mee heir expecaion, and we received a big help fom PRs in all

areas. In he assessmens o 1390 (2010), I was praised and named as he

bes mayor o he year a counry level.80

Generally speaking, projecs alone did no resolve local conflics driven by

complex acors and pas incidens. Bu civilian represenaives did repor ha

projecs provided an opporuniy or paries o a local conflic o come ogeherand resar poliical discussions.

Note: Number of responses vary by question.

Source: Authors’ survey of U.S. civilian representatives and Afghan government officials, conducted online and in Washington, D.C., from

May to July 2015. For more information, see Ariella Viehe, J asmine Afshar, and Tamana Heela, "Rethinking the Civilian Surge"(Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015).

FIGURE 5

Short-term gains were temporary

"Please rate the effect of PRT project implementation on the coordination among

Afghan groups (tribes, communities , line min istries, gende rs)."

"Improved and was sustained"

14

21

5

2

"Improved and was temporary"

"Did not improve"

"No coordination occurred"

33%

50%

12%

5%

Number ofresponses


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Building Afghan government functions was unsystematic

Over 13 years, civilian represenaives repored differen ocuses: Te civilians

ocused on inrasrucure and general developmen in he presurge years, shif-

ing o sabilizaion projecs in he early surge years o 2009 o 2011 and finally

o capaciy building in he laer surge years o 2011 o 2014. Te shif semmed

rom boh improved undersanding o needs wihin Aghanisan and recogni-ion o he impending drawdown o U.S. civilian represenaives rom he prov-

inces in 2014. As one civilian noed, “ We finally sared o ge i righ owards

he end: ocusing on budgeing, linking he Aghan governmen o do is own

projecs” as he drawdown approached.81

In 2015, as Aghan governmen a he naional, provincial, and disric levels oper-

aes wihou civilian represenaives, confidence in Aghan governmen minisries

is he lowes ou o all insiuions a 47.3 percen.82 Tis is lower han in 2012, a

he heigh o he surge, when confidence measured around 56 percen; levels are

more reflecive o 2007, prior o he surge o civilian represenaives, when con-fidence hovered a around 48 percen.83 Te drop-off in confidence suggess ha

he drawdown o civilian represenaives has brough on a period o uncerainy

regarding cenral governmen capabiliies.

Many civilian represenaives also expressed concern ha heir work had raised

expecaions o local Aghansexpecaions ha local governmen could no

mee given he more limied capaciy and financial resources ollowing civilian

wihdrawal. (see Figure 6) One Aghan inerviewee described84 his develop-

men in his provincial capial:

In 35 years o war, we los everyhing and now, while we reached a period ha

people are amiliar wih modern and high qualiy living sysems, hey expec a

lo fom he governmen. A lo o immigrans ha reurned fom oher counries

have seen all he improvemens abroad, and now heir expecaion is raised up;

hey wan bes schools or heir children, clinics, roads, parks, elecriciy, and

agriculure mechanismshey wan o kind o increase heir living sandards o

heir neighboring counries’. Aghans are poor, so wihou he help o PRs we

would never be able o do anyhing in Aghanisan.

I remains o be seen i he capaciy o he Aghan governmen will be able o

mainain Aghans’ poliical suppor in he coming monhs and years.


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Civilian-led projects provided some short-term, but rarely long-term, security gains As oher sudies have shown and as his assessmen ound, here was a minimal

correlaion beween governance, projecs, and reducions in violence or increases

in sabiliy.85 Daa compiled by oher research eams have shown ha projecs and

engaged governors have managed o reduce violence in he shor erm, suppor-

ing paricular U.S. miliary operaions.86 For oher areas, primarily in he eas,

P civilians repored ha “violence increased where projecs were implemened

because he aliban saw hem as a hrea o heir influence.”87 Boh U.S. civilians

and Aghans repored ha projecs were more successul and susainable in ciies

and communiies ha were already less violen.88

Over he medium o long erm, however, hese governance and service delivery

improvemens do no appear o have made a susainable difference in he percep-

ion o local Aghans or heir poliical behavior. As one U.S. civilian who worked

in boh Iraq and Aghanisan noed, “I have no seen developmen aler securiy

wihou poliical grievances being me. esoraion o a poliical order is wha is

needed. Buying off local leaders will work or a shor ime, bu i is no susainable

and any ‘gains’ made in his manner will disappear as soon as he money does.”89

Te assessmen o he World Bank-unded Naional Solidariy Program, or NSP,

reached a similar conclusion, finding ha NSP-unded projecs had litle, i any,long-erm impac on poliical, economic, or governmenal sabiliy.90

Yes No


Source: Authors’ survey of U.S. civilian representatives and Afghan government officials, conducted online and in Washington, D.C., fromMay to July 2015. For more information, see Ariella Viehe, J asmine Afshar, and Tamana Heela, "Rethinking the Civilian Surge"

(Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015).

FIGURE 6

Afghans may have had heightened expectations due to civilianrepresentatives

Perception among U.S. civilian representatives

"At the end of your tour, did you believe Afghans had an increased demand for service

delivery based on PRT/DST projects/programs?"

Number of responses 34 9

79% 21%


35/80


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Capaciy building among local officials did occur, however, largely rom 2012 o

2014 as civilian represenaives were planning o draw down. In ha environmen,

civilian represenaives repored working increasingly wih local officials o buildhe capaciy o susain securiy, governance, and developmen improvemens. For

one 2012 civilian represenaive, building he capaciy o he local Aghan gover-

nor and mayor required a sysem o suppor based around daily ineracion: “ We

deailed civilian represenaives o work wihin heir offices,” recalled he represen-

aive. “We ook guidance rom hem on when, where, and how o execue proj-

ecs. We saw hem regularlyand as requenly as possible, wen o heir offices

raher han asking hem o come o [us].”98

Tis same civilian represenaive also recognized ha discussions alone were insu-

ficien; he Aghan officials needed o join imporan conversaions abou he uure

o heir communiies. As a resul, he represenaive “empowered he Governor and

Mayor on securiy issues, helping hem build relaionships wih senior U.S. miliary

officials and increasing heir undersanding o securiy issues. Tis helped heir

overall leadership and credibiliy, reducing he poenial or excessive influence by

Aghan securiy officials.”99 Such leadership, relaionships, and credibiliy were one

imporan componen o ensuring he susainabiliy o governmen-run services.

Ye here was minimal suppor or reorm a he cenral minisries ha could con-

nec hese increasingly capable Aghan officials a he local level wih naional-level sysems.100 Aghanisan’s governors required resources such as budges and

personnel o flow rom he cenral governmen in Kabul. Bu as one civilian rep-

resenaive repored, he lack o suppor rom Kabul-based minisries increasingly

hampered he capaciy o respond o ciizens a he local level:

Yes No


Source: Authors’ survey of U.S. civilian representatives and Afghan government officials, conducted online and in Washington, D.C., from

May to July 2015. For more information, see Ariella Viehe, J asmine Afshar, and Tamana Heela, "Rethinking the Civilian Surge"(Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015).

FIGURE 7

Sustainability was lacking

"Do you believe that the PRTs/DSTs sustainably increased service delivery in the

provi nce/district after your tour? "

Number of

responses

8 33

20% 80%


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I was a misconcepion on he par o USAID and ISAF [he Inernaional

Securiy Assisance Force] ha we’ve go o each [Aghan officials] capaciy.

Tey know how o do i; wha hey don’ have is he money hey’re supposed o

be geting fom he cenral governmen. My fusraion was ha we were always

pushing he provinces o reach up o Kabul, bu here was no one pushing Kabul

o reach down o he provinces.101

Similar rusraions abou he lack o response rom Kabul were echoed by hose

who had some success locally bu hen hi a wall when looking o ranser o

Kabul-based minisries.

Tis lack o connecion beween levels o governmen was rooed in an assump-

ion behind U.S. policy: ha here naurally would be a cenral governmen wih

which o connec.102 Alhough rheorically boh he Aghan and U.S. governmens

promoed he need o develop local governmen, capable local officials eiher me

resisance or incompeence inside heir own governmen.103 A he naional level,oo, U.S. civilian represenaives did no have he same relaionship or access ha

hey had a he local level. Te Unied Saes and oher naions provided personnel

o advise several minisries, bu hey were ofen only a ew, appended o paricular

miniserial divisions. Unlike he civilian represenaives in he Ps, hose a he

miniserial level ofen sruggled o have influence due o shor ours and skepicism

among Aghan counerpars.104 As a resul, here was minimal opporuniy or U.S.

civilian represenaives o link beween he local and naional levels, leaving suc-

cessul work a he local level unsuppored by a larger, holisic governance sysem.

Lasly, he lack o ocus on such susainable governmen sysems may have

undermined Aghan percepion o U.S. policy and he civilian represenaives.

Aghan officials noed heir rusraion wih he curren lack o capaciy o he

local Aghan governmen. For several Aghans, he civilian represenaives did

no ocus enough on long-erm processes, such as educaion and job raining,105

or on large economic engines, such as acories and markes. Tese long-erm

developmens require complex economic, governance, regulaory, and securiy

sysems ha can communicae horizonallymeaning a he local levelor

vericallymeaning beween he local and naional levels. Tis rusraion,

coupled wih he reducion in posiive oulook menioned above, provides a worrying rend or even capable local Aghan officials. While civilian represen-

aives may have improved local capaciy, i is unclear o Aghans wheher ha

capaciy is susainable inside an Aghan governmen.


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Resources

Civilians had some, but not sufficient resources to build relationships

with the Afghan government

Many i no all o he civilian represenaives’ objecives resed on relaionships

wih Aghan counerpars, which included he governors, minisries, local councilmembers, and communiy or ribal leaders. In building hose relaionships, he

civilian represenaives and he Aghan inerviewees boh cied he need or more

o he resources ha civilian represenaives were able o provide, including “lead-

ership,” which his research defines using he six atribues discussed below.

• Daily interaction. Civilians indicaed proximiy o he governors and ranspora-

ion or he governors as he wo mos imporan acors in building a relaion-

ship o influence. (see Figure 8) When asked which acors mos conribued o

rusing relaionships wih Aghan counerpars, he mos common answer

repored by 40 percen o inervieweeswas he requency o ineracion.106 Tis need or requen ineracion was reinorced when several Ps moved

heir living and working quarers o he governor compound o ensure proxim-

iy.107 For one Aghan official, lack o proximiy was cied as a core problem: “[S]

ecuriy o saff was he main problem; he commue beween [Aghan officials]

and he P saff was very hard, so one o he disconnecions beween Ps

and [Aghan officials] was he disance.”108 Indeed, he survey o U.S. civilian

represenaives indicaes a srong correlaion beween he amoun o ime spen

wih he Aghan counerpar in decision-making and repored levels o rus.


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• Confidence building. Tis daily ineracion buil a rus and confidence or mak-

ing difficul bu imporan governing decisions. As one civilian highlighed, his

requen ineracion developed a relaionship ha allowed he Aghan governor

o have confidence when making difficul decisions ha ulimaely conribued

o U.S. securiy objecives: “Te governor’s growing confidence was paricularly

noiceable in 2009 and 2010, as he wen rom a airly new and weak governor

wih litle leadership experiencehe was an academico a more asserive

leader willing o make ough decisions and do regular oureach o consiuens.

In 2010, he surprised many o us when he ordered Aghan miliarywih U.S.

miliary supporo conduc an offensive.”109

• Transportation. Similarly, several civilian represenaives repored ha secure

ransporaionprovided by he U.S. miliarywas a criical componen o

convincing heir Aghan counerpar o visi a remoe village afer a securiy

inciden or naural disaser or as par o an elecion promoion sraegy. One

civilian recouned using ransporaion o enable he governor o ravel he

enire province o inspec reconsrucion projecs and atend local shuras ando allow he governor o bring firshand knowledge o negoiae wih Kabul or

increased unding or developmen.110

FIGURE 8

Daily interaction matters

Frequency of engagement compared with frequency of agreement on projects

“How many times a week did you ty pically engage with Afghan

counterparts (in any format)?”

“Every day”“Four to six days

a week”

“One to three

days a week”“Other” Tota

“How often do you

believe that your

Afghan counterpart

accepted and

followed PRT advice

for implementing

projects?”

“Never” 0 1 0 0 1

“A few projects” 1 1 4 1 7

“About half the

projects”3 9 2 1 15

“About three-quarters

of the projects”5 3 0 3 11

“All projects” 6 1 0 0 7

Total 15 15 6 5 41

Source: Authors’ survey of U.S. civilian representatives and Afghan government officials, conducted online and in Washington, D.C., from May to July 2015. For more information, see Ariella Vi

Jasmine Afshar, and Tamana Heela, “Rethinking the Civilian Surge” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015).


40/80


• Funding. Te presurge civilian represenaives repored a dearh o unding and

projecs, minimal flexibiliy o draw on reconsrucion resources, and general

logisics challenges behind reconsrucion, such as securiy or sies. Wih he

surge, however, civilian represenaives and heir miliary unis had increasing

access o unding hrough resources rom he deparmens o Deense and Sae.

Tis increase in resources was ofen jusified by is counerinsurgency meris,111

meaning ha he abiliy o provide goods and services opened a conversaion

wih Aghans. Tis jusificaion was suppored by he 10 Aghan inerviewees, 5

o whom were Aghan governmen employees. All 10 independenly cied und-

ing as he criical conribuion o he civilian represenaives.112 As described

urher below, in he “Civilians needed more appropriae resources” secion,

he ype o unding and approach o using i were increasingly imporan or is

effeciveness in changing securiy, poliical, or economic oucomes.

• Quality and length of tour matters to Afghans. Aghans repored ha one o

he key challenges in dealing wih civilians was heir requen roaions: 2 o he10 Aghans saed ha, over ime, hey had increasingly less rus in each succes-

sive civilian represenaive.113 Aghans repored high levels o rus wih he iniial

civilian represenaive, bu rus decreased wih subsequen U.S. civilian repre-

senaives as he civilians roaed poss. One o he Aghan officials in souhern

Aghanisan described he experiences as ollows: “rus was buil and hen wih

he new eams, new assessmens sared and hey were no much amiliar wih he

projec background, so ha caused disrupions.” Tis led he official o expend less

effor in building relaionships when he knew civilians were deparing.114

• Personality. Te personaliy and skills o he civilian represenaives also ma-

ered o Aghans. Tose represenaives who were given high marks or rais

such as “[local] language,” “engaged,” “accounable,” “ransparen and hones,”

“undersanding [Aghan] ineress,” “[par o a] unied U.S. posiion,” and “a

clear abiliy o bring rewards rom Kabul” had ar beter relaionships wih

Aghan counerpars and greaer abiliy o moivae hem o implemen projecs.

One P civilian described a successul projec engagemen under a dedicaed

saff judge advocae rom he U.S. miliary, who was “rying o push he [Aghan

officials] o do more and o be accounable. Tere was good cooperaion

beween he disric prosecuor and he police. Tey were conducing evidence- based operaions. Tey were properly pushing cases o he provincial capial.

Te Huqooq, he sor o radiional jusice acor in he disric, was resolving

cases in a prety reneic pace, like 10, 15 cases a day.” Ye once his personaliy

roaed and he Aghan officials los his engagemen, “we saw [ha] he rule o

law [acors] really sared engaging in prety significan corrupion.”115


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Even in insances where resources were more readily available, civilian represena-

ives and Aghans repored relaionships ha were more defined by he values and

experiences o each Aghan in an offi

Documents

Rethinking the Civilian Surge: Lessons from the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan