Rethinking Europe's conquest of North Africa and the Middle East: the opening of the Maghreb, 1660–1814

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Rethinking Europe'sconquest of North Africaand the Middle East: theopening of the Maghreb,1660–1814F. Robert Hunter aa Professor of History and Chairperson ofthe History Department , Indiana StateUniversityPublished online: 29 Mar 2007.

To cite this article: F. Robert Hunter (1999) Rethinking Europe's conquest ofNorth Africa and the Middle East: the opening of the Maghreb, 1660–1814, TheJournal of North African Studies, 4:4, 1-26, DOI: 10.1080/13629389908718377

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Rethinking Europe's Conquest of NorthAfrica and the Middle East:

The Opening of the Maghreb, 1660-1814

F. ROBERT HUNTER

In this article, the argument is made that during the second half of the seventeenthcentury, England and France began opening up the Maghreb to their economic andpolitical influence, and that this thrust led to the conquest of the southern and easternMediterranean, culminating in the nineteenth-century Age of Imperialism.

One of the most important evolutions in historical thinking about the MiddleEast and North Africa is the realisation that developments once believedparticular to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries occurred or started muchearlier.1 The movement of Islamic reform in modern times is nowunderstood to include the neo-orthodox revival, aimed at protecting Islamfrom excessive adaptations, which began in Arabia in the eighteenth centuryand which gave rise to groups in existence today.2 Political centralisation, adevelopment which led to the appearance of modern 'intrusive' states in thecontemporary epoch, was underway long before the nineteenth century inAlgeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and elsewhere. And in economic history,scholars have shed the view of the eighteenth century as a period of'decline', to be reversed by the take-off of Middle Eastern economies in thenineteenth century.3

This is also true of Europe's 'conquest' of Ottoman North Africa and theMiddle East.4 In the nineteenth century, France imposed direct control overAlgeria (from 1830) and Tunisia (1881) and England did the same overEgypt (1882). In concert with the other nation states of Europe, these twogreat powers also established indirect rule over Lebanon in 1861 throughforced economic arrangements (the Reglement et Protocole) and fiscalcontrols in Ottoman Turkey in 1881 (via an international debtadministration). Libya was occupied by Italy in 1911. The establishment ofcolonial control was the outcome of a long and complex process of

F. Robert Hunter is Professor of History and Chairperson of the History Department at IndianaState University.

The Journal of North African Studies, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1999) pp. 1-26PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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2 THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES

economic and political penetration. And it is complicated by the fact that italso led to economic transformations, social changes and cultural mutations.

This conquest was not strictly a nineteenth century phenomenon. Itderived from the opening of Ottoman lands to Western manufactures inexchange for raw materials, and the question of origination concerns the'moment' when this occurred. The crucial factor was the build-up ofEnglish and French power in the Mediterranean, and the resultant imbalancebetween the nation states of the north and the Muslim peoples of thesouthern and eastern rims. In the second half of the seventeenth century,Ottoman European trade began to be transformed under foreign pressure.5

Commerce moved away from transit commodities and luxury goods andtowards exchanges of raw materials (in demand in Europe) formanufactured goods and imported fabrics that competed with localproducts. England and France superseded Venice, Genoa and otherEuropean competitors to become Mediterranean powers par excellence. Bythe eighteenth century, they had achieved absolute predominance inOttoman European trade, with France outpacing England in Egypt and theLevant, and the two competing for influence in the Maghreb. If the marchof English and French power unfolded unevenly rather than advancing in aprogressive manner, it nonetheless marked the beginning of a conquest thatwould fundamentally alter the delicate balance of power in theMediterranean achieved by Spain and the Ottomans during the sixteenthcentury and culminate in the nineteenth century 'Age of Imperialism'.

Recent monographic studies have reinforced earlier research to producea fuller understanding of this early European penetration in the OttomanMiddle East (Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Anatolia). In a work onseventeenth century Izmir and its western Anatolian hinterland, Goffman hastraced the increase in trade with Europe, as reflected, for example, incustoms revenues, the search by European agents for markets in the interior,the growth of consular influence and the ascension of non-Muslim minorities(e.g. Greeks, Armenians, Jews).6 In a study of Izmir's foreign trade in theeighteenth century, Frangakis-Syrett has shown how, despite fluctuations, asteady growth in commercial ties with Europe occurred, and hasdemonstrated ways in which people in the interior sought to benefit from andshape it.7 In his work on eighteenth century Egypt, Raymond has revealedhow a semi-colonial economy was created through imports of manufacturedgoods (especially textiles) and the development of a quasi-European lifestyleamong the wealthy.8 And in a regional study of northern Palestine (theNablus district), Doumani has revealed the impact of European competitionupon agriculture and manufacturing during the eighteenth century, showinghow local merchants and peasants turned growing foreign demand to theiradvantage while tying the economy more closely to the world market.9

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THE OPENING OF THE MAGHREB, 1660-1814 3

Despite this, authors of Middle East textbooks and other works ofsynthesis ignore or minimise this early breakthrough in their treatment ofEuropean imperialism. Holt, Perry, Mansfield and Armajani/Ricks excludeall mention of it.10 Cleveland, Goldschmidt and Fisher give it briefestpossible acknowledgement." Lewis fails to perceive its significance or itsconnection with the larger conquest of the nineteenth century.12 Owen,however, acknowledges the 'significant shift' that occurred in the balanceof economic power between the Middle East and the nation states of Europeduring the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, manifested in competitionfrom foreign manufactures, difficulties in local textile production,stimulation of cash crops, the spread of European coins and the appearanceof European consumption habits.13 But Owen also minimises these twocenturies of Anglo-French penetration. Since foreign encroachment in theeastern Mediterranean was sporadic, uneven, and proceeded by fits andstarts, he postulates that 1800 is the appropriate date for Europe'sbreakthrough.14 For him, too, the Age of Imperialism remains centredsquarely on the nineteenth century.

Few authors have made the connection between the early eruption ofWestern influence in the Middle East and its simultaneous emergence in theMaghreb. This is due partly to the fact that the Middle East and the Maghrebtend to be studied separately, as if they existed in separate compartments.Historians writing about European expansion in the Middle East tend toignore its development in the Maghreb and vice versa. Early Westernpenetration of these areas, however, was integrally related. England andFrance could not advance their economic interests and develop politicalgoals in Egypt and the Levant without entering the Maghreb, which poseda strategic threat to their shipping lanes, and whose markets and maritimetrade were tempting objects of manipulation and control. Of the few MiddleEast histories that include the Maghreb, Aroian and Mitchell acknowledgean early European commercial expansion at both ends of the southernMediterranan, but they give short shrift to the Maghreb and centre theiranalysis of European imperialism almost entirely upon the nineteenthcentury.15 Hourani also recognises the early development of English andFrench influence throughout the Muslim Mediterranean, but sees the crucialmoment of change in power relations as occurring at the end of theeighteenth and start of the nineteenth century.16

Despite the existence of early monographic works, few authors ofgeneral Maghreb histories have appreciated the stunning breakthroughachieved by England and France during the late seventeenth century, anopening similar to but also quite different from that which occurred in theLevant. Charles-Andre Julien has traced this breakthrough in detail, but hisaccount is set within the context of the precolonial rather than modern

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epoch.17 Laroui barely mentions this early opening, considering it to bewithout long-term impact.18 Abun-Nasr focuses upon privateering ratherthan the new trade relationship, thus failing to make the connection with thenineteenth century.19 Valensi, though, recognises the importance of a priorbreakthrough in trade relations, perceiving that this would lead eventuallyto a confrontation between Europe and the Muslim peoples of the southMediterranean; but she dates this opening to the second half of theeighteenth century rather than to the seventeenth century.20

Europe's breakthrough in the Maghreb bears striking resemblance to thelater nineteenth century conquest. There was little that occurred during thegreat age of European expansionism which, mutatis mutandis, did not havean antecedent or precedent in seventeenth and eighteenth century Maghreb.The causes - European capitalism, technological innovation, more powerfulmilitary machines, willingness of home governments to use pressure andforce - were the same, as was the forced opening of markets. The OttomanCommercial Code of 1838 (obtained under strong English pressure andsubsequently forced upon Egypt), the 'free trade' treaties signed by Francewith Tunisia and with Libya in 1830 (the last obtained after the arrival of aFrench squadron and under threat of bombardment) and the abolition of taxfarming in Lebanon in 1861 following European intervention wereanticipated by the 'unequal' treaties imposed upon the rulers of Algiers,Tunis and Tripoli by England and France in the late seventeenth century.The process of foreign economic penetration contained many parallels. Inseventeenth- and eighteenth-century Maghreb, rulers gave Europeansconcessions to exploit resources; areas of the economy became reorientedto commercial agriculture; an institutional framework for trade with Europewas established; foreign merchants purchased crops from farmers inadvance of harvest; and foreign lending took place. As in the nineteenthcentury, trade went way beyond exchanges of manufactured goods for rawmaterials. European technology, technical experts and even ideas wereexported to the Maghreb. The indigenous response also showed broadsimilarities, from 'divide and rule' and other resistance strategies, topolitical centralisation and adaptation through acculturation. And as in thenineteenth century, foreign consuls in Maghreb ports issued warnings andthreats, created incidents and called in their fleets. Naval blockades,shellings of coastal sites, landings of expeditionary forces, wars andmilitary occupations (e.g. of Oran by Spain) took place.

The early encounter between the Ottoman Maghreb and Europe is thusmore than an interesting case study revealing peculiarities of time and place.It provides the argument for an essential continuity or link with thenineteenth century. It is a precursor of what would later befall the entireregion, and it can shed light upon important questions about origination, the

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distinctiveness of the nineteenth century and the nature of the moderncolonial experience itself. Before these questions can be addressed, thisearly encounter must be examined more closely.

Early Encounters

Beginning in the 1660s, England and France embarked upon militarycampaigns in the Mediterranean aimed at obtaining freedom of commercefor their nationals and control of the sea lanes. Ever since the sixteenthcentury, a state of war had existed between the European states and theMaghreb, whose corsair fleets had shown themselves capable of inflictinggreat harm upon European seaborne trade. By the seventeenth century,Europe had entered the age of militant mercantilism, driven by commercialcapital and fired by advances in military technology. England and Francewere competing for control of the sea and their rivalry became a causalforce, propelling them to secure the greatest possible advantages for theircommerce and shipping. The lesser European states with trading interests inthe Mediterranean (Spain, Sweden, Sardinia, Genoa, Venice and Holland)became subordinated, but were by no means removed from contention. Todevelop trade with the Levant, England and France would have to curbNorth African privateering. To exploit Maghreb markets, they would haveto open the region to their merchants and commercial enterprise. 'Peace'would have to be imposed upon Ottoman Barbary.

Naval attacks were launched by England and France against Tripoli,Tunis and coastal Algeria.21 Raids and coastal bombardments had occurredbefore 1660, but these had had little effect upon well-defended and heavilyfortified port cities. These new attacks, however, proved devastating. Owingto a revolution in European naval technology, North African fleets could nolonger compete with the heavier ships, massed firepower and advancedartillery of English and French squadrons. In the early 1660s, the Englishbombarded Algiers and toward the end of the decade launched furiousassaults at Bougie and other ports, taking a heavy toll of Algerian ships. In1675-76, an English squadron carried out attacks against Tripoli harbour.French squadrons appeared in Algiers harbour, and attacks were launchedagainst Tripoli and Tunis. Bombardments of Maghreb ports continuedthrough the 1680s.

Warfare compelled Maghreb rulers to accept treaties that restrictedprivateering and contained important commercial clauses.22 England's 1662treaty with Algiers exempted its vessels from corsair attacks upon theproduction of passes (a privilege later extended to France). Rules were setfor the regularisation and repurchase of European captives. Privateering,though greatly reduced, was not eliminated. For Europe, the right to trade

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freely was as important as securing freedom of the seas.23 French andEnglish subjects in Tunisia received reductions in import duties, from tenper cent to three per cent ad valorem; their ships were assessed loweranchorage fees than those paid by other European nations. In Algiers,English ship captains could buy products at market rates. In Tripoli, the1685 treaty imposed by France accorded advantages to its merchants whowere free to export all manner of merchandise. A later treaty (1751)between Tripoli and England granted its consul the right to protect thecommercial activities of merchants from other countries who requestedEnglish patronage.24

A new trade pattern, characterised by exchanges of raw materials forimported products, gradually took hold. To foster commerce, institutionalmechanisms were developed. During the sixteenth century, consulates hadbeen set up in Maghreb capitals to supervise foreign residents, but after1680 these offices became stabilised and were extended. In Tripoli, the1685 treaty established a French consulate on a regular basis.25 To protectMarseille shipping interests, French vice-consuls were set up in Derna andBenghazi. England and France established official despatch boats tofacilitate communications with their representatives in Algeria. InTunisia, France acquired a chancellery in Bizerte and a vice-consul inSousse who supervised trade in a vast region from Monastir to the islandof Jerba. The English vice-consul of Oran became deeply involved in thecommerce of western Algeria. Consuls also worked to extendjurisdictional control and build networks of local allies. They protestedagainst treaty violations; intervened on behalf of nationals to securefavourable settlements of disputes; sent 'memoirs' to their governmentsexposing 'abuses' by local authorities; and pressured Maghreb rulers bystriking their colours and threatening to call in their fleets. Like theirnineteenth century counterparts, these European diplomaticrepresentatives also provided valuable information and rendered otherassistance to local rulers and their governments. If consular powerincreased generally throughout the Maghreb, consular posts nonethelessremained subject to many vagaries.

Foreign commercial houses became more firmly rooted. Manymerchants had ties with companies for whom they worked asrepresentatives or intermediaries. Most French traders represented theinterests of Marseille, whose Chamber of Commerce issued residencepermits to merchants in Tunisia.26 Privileged by low customs duties andother treaty advantages, English and French merchants could anticipateconsiderable profits. But commerce was not a stable or guaranteed activity,and upsets, occasioning huge losses, occurred frequently. The number oftraders and foreign residents remained low. In 1760, only nine French

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merchants were residing in Tunis (out of about 30 Frenchmen); in 1796, thisfigure had risen to 35, and in 1814 to 107.27

The establishment of an export trade was the most important result ofthis opening. Grain (e.g. wheat) was needed to provision chronic deficitoryregions, especially in southern France, and to supply English soldiers andships at Mediterranean bases in Minorca, Gibraltar, Malta and elsewhere.28

Dates, wool, raw hides and sponges were also highly prized. In Tunisia,Italian merchants tried to extract salt; in Libya, the French consul Lemaire- the first Frenchman to penetrate the country's interior - sent 'memoirs' toParis on ways of exploiting the Saharan transit trade in gold, ivory andslaves. But exports were overwhelmingly trade in grain: Europe's 'strategiccommodity'.

European merchants obtained agricultural resources by purchasingproducts as they arrived in the port cities or, less commonly, through agentsin the interior regions. Resources could also be acquired by control overland areas. During its long occupation of Oran (1509-1708, 1728-91),Spain obtained agro-pastoral products from nearby markets or by raidingneighbouring tribes. Control of the port of Mars al-Kabir permitted it to shipproducts home directly. In Tunisia, a few Europeans engaged in directproduction by acquiring land on which they planted wheat and olives; someothers endeavoured to set up a manufacturing plant (in Sousse) to producesoap and olive oil.29

The most important means of exploiting the surplus was the concession.Concessions were domains granted by rulers to Europeans and foreigncompanies as reserved markets. Located mostly near port cities, theseenclaves contained warehouses and other buildings to receive and processexport crops. Concessions had been granted during the sixteenth century,but after 1690 they increased in number and became more regularised, if notstabilised.30 The largest concessions were located in the grain-producingregions of eastern Algeria and north-west Tunisia (Tabarca, Cape Negre).From Tabarca, the Genoese extracted and exported wool, olive oil, hidesand beef. From Cape Negre, a French company shipped huge quantities ofwheat and other grains. Located near the Tunisian frontier, the Bastion ofFrance concession facilitated the exploitation of the rich grain-producingarea of eastern Algeria. The English acquired concessions in Tunisia, andreceived the right to operate a factory in Oran (during the period of Algeriancontrol from 1708 to 1728) through which they transferred 7,000-8,000tons of wheat annually to men and ships in the Mediterranean. In return foran agreement (1791) to evacuate Oran, Spain received a 'bastion' of its ownin the port of Mars al-Kabir.

What impact did European penetration have upon economies andpopulations? Much research has yet to be done, but some information exists for

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Tunisia.31 In the late seventeenth century, a few French merchants extendedtheir fields of activity to Qayrawan and the Jarid, in the deep south. They builtup clientels, formed alliances with local officials and developed contacts withTunisian producers. In one case, peasants received monetary advances for thepurchase of crops one year in advance of harvest, a practice common in thenineteenth century. In north-west Tunisia, a vast cereal region was incorporatedinto mercantilist circuits. Agents of the French company holding the CapeNegre concession made loans to tribal chiefs and offered them otherinducements to persuade their tribesmen to sell wheat to it preferentially.Company representatives paid subsidies to tribes to facilitate (or at least not toobstruct) the transport of grain from the interior to Cape Negre, and evenarbitrated tribal disputes. Some tribesmen settled down to become farmers,some went into debt to the company, others were transformed into merchants.Monetarisation spread, and tribal populations became differentiated, as a resultof exposure to the market. One must beware of over-generalisation: in hisdiscussion of foreign penetration of Tunisia in the late seventeenth century,Boubaker cites the names of six European merchants who traded in the interiorregions; foreign penetration thus remained limited.

The Tunisian Sahel was also being developed. In the sixteenth century,the Sahel had been a mere sliver of land - a coastal fringe along the easternshores of the Mediterranean. However, a growing demand for olive oil bythe Marseille soap industry spurred its cultivation.32 The Sahel graduallycame to encompass more of the sedentary countryside, and ports like Soussegrew. How far did this go? Did Tunisia pass from a cycle of wheat to a cycleof oil in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries? Chater haspresented evidence indicating that while the European demand for oilincreased greatly, wheat held its value and remained the country's primaryexport crop through 1814.

The new trade relationship led to the entry into the Maghreb of a vastarray of materials which went way beyond luxury products and so-called'colonial' goods (e.g. sugar and coffee).33 As in the nineteenth century, localrulers and other groups derived benefits from commerce, but they alsobecame ever more dependent upon Europe. Tunisia relied upon Europe formoney, metals, arms, naval construction supplies and industrial materials.Its sheshia (red bonnets) industry depended entirely upon imported wooland dyeing materials from Spain. Its rulers availed themselves of peoplewho had learned modern European techniques. Husayn Bin Ali (1705-40)and Hammuda Pasha (1782-1814) were influenced by mercantilist ideas:Hammuda even had the French civil code explained to him. Trade indeedhad become the 'Trojan Horse' of Europe's advance.34

Concessions granted by the rulers brought regular cash payments to hostgovernments. Dues from the Bastion of France helped defray salaries of the

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Janissaries in Algiers. Payments by the French concessionaire in north-westTunisia were five times larger than the Bastion's. Local governments alsoacquired cash by extracting in taxes the coin put into circulation by foreigngrain purchases. The Cape Negre company even lent money to the Tunisrulers.35

Treaties signed with smaller European states brought in cash and goods.In the sixteenth century, privateering had provided North Africa with vastquantities of material and money (e.g. through the repurchase of captivesand by sales of looted goods). Though curtailed, corsair raids continued.England and France had the power to enforce their will, but the otherEuropean states felt compelled to purchase security for their seaborne tradeby concluding treaties guaranteeing immunity from corsair attacks. Thisbrought Maghreb regimes cash in subsidy payments as well as a bounty ofmilitary, naval and other supplies. In the late seventeenth century, Hollandwas provisioning Algiers with cannons, muskets, bullets, powder, masts,cables and sails; and in the late eighteenth, the US, Portugal, Sweden,Norway, Denmark and the Kingdom of Naples joined Holland in providingtribute to the government of the Dey, ruler of Algiers.36 To secure safeconduct for their shipping, Denmark, Sweden and Holland paid annualsubsidies to the ruler of Tripoli and made gifts of timber, canvas, cordageand pitch. When treaty lapses or violations occurred, negotiations tookplace that entailed additional payments in cash or kind. To renew its treaty,Spain gave the Pasha of Tripoli a ship, $20,000 in cash and 18 skilledartisans for his naval dockyards.

European merchants in the port cities provided ruling classes throughoutthe Maghreb with luxury products. Imported food products (e.g. jams, driedfruits), textiles (e.g. silver and dyed cloth) and tobacco became staples in thecourts of rulers and homes of the well-to-do. Clocks, rings and mirrors wereshipped to Algiers; writing paper, silver and gold bars found their way toTripoli.37 The external market, however, was not yet providing products ofgeneral consumption. European luxury goods were limited to a minority ofthe population.

As suggested above, technical expertise was also provided by Europe.Foreign technical experts could be found in port cities throughout theMaghreb. These men were recruited through agents in the Mediterranean,obtained from foreign governments or 'discovered' after having arrived inthe country. Many technicians were 'renegades', men who had left theirnative lands to escape punishment or poverty, or simply to seek greateropportunity, and who had converted to Islam. These Early Moderntechnocrats brought new techniques (e.g. of naval construction) andprovided essential skills that proved valuable to the rulers. Husayn Bin AHof Tunis employed a French master builder to construct a large ship at Porto

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Farino; Hammuda Pasha acquired French artisans to build a cannon foundryand artillerymen to train his soldiers in secret.38 At the end of theseventeenth century, and in hopes of gaining Algerian support againstEngland, the French government sent engineers to help clear sand fromAlgiers harbour. European renegade engineers with knowledge of minesand explosives were instrumental in Algiers' conquest of Oran from Spainin 1708. Europeans also found employment in Tripoli. Yusuf Pasha(1795-1832) recruited experts from Malta and imported foreign techniciansto instruct his subjects in the cultivation of cotton seed. Some of theseEuropeans rose to high positions. Renegades became naval commandersand even Janissary officers.39 Murad Rais, ne Peter Leslie, a Scotsman,became Admiral of the Navy and Chief Adviser to Yusuf Pasha.

The intensification of relations between Europe and the Maghreb alsofacilitated political centralisation, a process underway long before thenineteenth century. Centralisation grew originally out of internal evolutionsand political struggles inside the Ottoman military corps. In Tunis andTripoli, ambitious officers succeeded in achieving greater independence ofthe Turkish militia by basing themselves upon groups (e.g. merchants,artisans) in local society and wresting control of key resources.40 Powerbecame concentrated in powerful personalities rather than oligarchies, adevelopment reflected in the growth of court life and the delegation ofauthority to the ruler's trusted aides and blood relations. Such'monarchisation' provided a way of concentrating revenues, hithertodispersed, and helped facilitate the extension of state power into hinterlandareas.

Europe abetted centralisation in two ways. First, declining income fromprivateering and the establishment of an export trade impelled governmentsto seek greater control over internal resources. Secondly, Europeantechnology gave rulers a big advantage over rebellious subjects. Modernartillery proved decisive in contests between governments and tribes.Without superior weaponry, Yusuf Pasha might not have been able tosubdue and annex Cyrenaica to his 'Libyan' kingdom.41

In Algeria, Europe had a more directly causal role.42 Centralisation wascomplicated by the division of the country into three beyliks (provinces),subordinated in theory to the supreme authority, the Dey of Algiers, whowas a member of the Ottoman militia. Moreover, unlike Tunis, Algiers hadfew resources within easy reach that could be exploited, and, in contrastwith Tripoli, it did not have the advantage of a flourishing transit trade withsub-Saharan Africa. Algiers suffered far more than its neighbours from therelative loss of privateering income. Plunged into severe and recurrentcrises following European naval attacks in the late seventeenth century, itsrulers had had little choice but to press tribesmen for more tribute and to

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develop what agricultural potential existed. In Constantine province (Beylikof the East), the new emphasis upon internal revenues led to theconsolidation of the power of the governor, or Bey - linked to control of thegrain trade.43 Beylical family dynasties, adapted to society, arose. In Algiers,the Dey appointed loyalists from the military corps to key ministries, anddeveloped bureaucratic controls which enabled him to monopolise revenuesand concentrate power in his own hands. But centralisation proceeded muchfurther in Tunisia and Libya, where powerful dynastic states emerged underthe Husaynids (1705-1956) and Qaramanlis (1711-1835), respectively.

A foreign 'interest' also emerged, composed of individuals and groupspartly or wholly assimilated to Europe through material ties or byinclination. This was expressed in a variety of ways, from the revolt of atribal chieftain linked by trade with French merchants in eastern Algeria,who blamed his government for closing the Bastion, to lobbying efforts byTunisian merchants in favour of foreign trade.44 The peace treaty signedbetween Tunisia and Holland in 1712, for example, represented an officialdecision to support the Tunis bourgeoisie, whose arguments prevailed overcorsair concerns. The appearance of a European interest (a phenomenon thatwould be greatly accelerated in the nineteenth century) derived not onlyfrom the new trade relationship but also from political necessity. Owing tothe new treaty arrangements, contacts between the north and southMediterranean multiplied. Maghreb rulers conducted extensivecorrespondence with the courts of Europe, sent gifts and presents to princesand kings, appointed permanent ambassadors abroad, and exchangedmissions. Trade and diplomacy led to the rise of new men, people who hadconnections with and an understanding of Europe. In Tripoli, the D'Ghiesfamily (whose members enjoyed financial and commercial contacts in Parisand Marseille and possessed deep knowledge of continental affairs)provided distinguished public figures who assisted Qaramanli rulers indifficult negotiations and represented them on missions abroad. Onemember of this family was ambassador plenipotentiary to the courts ofStockholm and Copenhagen. Far more important were the so-called'Livorne' [Leghorn] Jews, closely knit merchant families, originally fromSpain, who had settled in Leghorn. During the seventeenth century, somefamily members drifted south, installing themselves in Maghreb ports. Withtheir financial skills, commercial expertise and crucial contacts, they wereperfectly suited for employment by rulers who used them in dealings withLeghorn - a major commercial axis. In Tunisia, they exported leather andhides to Leghorn, bringing from it luxury goods destined for the ruler'scourt. In Algiers, the Dey relied on them to market goods and assist in theconduct of business in an increasingly centralised regime. Appreciatingtheir value, European consuls and merchants offered patronage and

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protection. The French had a Jewish ally in Tripoli who protected theirbusiness interests; a prominent French merchant in Tunis obtained supportof a Livorne Jewish courtier who helped develop trade in the south; theEnglish consul in Tunis took a Leghorn Jew as a trading partner; and theFrench consul obtained reductions in customs duties for Leghorn Jews. Butthese were isolated instances. In Algiers, the French resented Livornemerchants who monopolised trade with Leghorn and competed with themin other markets. Resisting foreign pressure for the most part, these Jewsretained their independence, rendering valuable services to Maghreb rulers.Their situation was comparable to that of the Greek Catholics in Egyptwhose ascension in the eighteenth century, as Thomas Philipp has shown,was connected less with foreign patronage and protection than with thebuild-up of centralised power. (After foreign control became established,this situation would change.) In Tunisia, some persons became protectorsof French interests, and a few displayed marked cultural attachments toEurope. Hammuda bin Abd al-Aziz - courtier, tax farmer and owner ofgrain-producing lands - defended trade with Europe against critics,equating it with 'progress'. Haj Muhammad al-Naqbi was characterised bythe French consul as protector of the Cape Negre concession and defenderof French interests in the Regency. Haj Yunis bin Yunis - supplier ofEuropean products to the Bey - sheltered money in Marseille. HusaynKhuja was also described as 'very useful to the French nation'. As early asthe mid-seventeenth century, some Turkish courtiers and officials weredeveloping European manners and tastes. Raised by European tutors (theirdomestic servants), they spoke foreign languages (often Italian) andmarried slaves of European origin. Was this the beginnings of culturalassimilation?

If rulers and other people cooperated with foreigners, wittingly orunwittingly facilitating Europe's advance, such behaviour for the most partdid not spring from true common interest. Whatever benefits trade mayhave conferred, the fact remains that unequal treaties deprived Maghrebstates of important revenues and imposed degrees of dependence upon itsrulers. Cooperation therefore must be understood as an effort to make themost out of a difficult situation. In any case, as we shall see, it wouldcompose only part of the Maghreb's reaction.

Jewish merchants excepted, European traders in the ports controlled allexchanges with the northern Mediterranean. Local rulers and merchants hadto buy and sell through them. Maghreb ships were denied access toEuropean ports. Merchant vessels bold enough to enter foreign harboursfound themselves placed under quarantine - an action designed to enforceEurope's shipping monopoly. Europeans also controlled much of theseaborne transport of people and merchandise between the Maghreb and the

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eastern Mediterranean. Foreign ship captains heading for Egypt and theLevant would pick up goods and passengers at coastal locations or whileanchored in Maghreb ports, and on return voyages bring eastern productsto workshops and government warehouses in Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers. Itis little wonder that local merchants lobbied for peace with Europe. Thesafety of their considerable trade with the Levant depended on foreignshippers.

Maghreb rulers resented the concessions, which deprived them of theright to exploit fully their own resources. Cash payments were no substitutefor this, and imposed reductions of customs duties for Europeans made itimpossible for governments to protect local markets. Moreover, foreignersintervened in local affairs. In Tunis, European merchants compelled Muslimtraders to give them, in return for primary materials, furnished productswhich they sent to the Levant - a classic if rare instance of merchantcapitalism seizing control over the production of other continents.45

Secretaries in the Bey's palace were in the pay of the French consul,providing him with sensitive information, including the content of the Bey'scorrespondence.46

Despite 'peace' treaties, Europe continued to press from without.England endeavoured to increase its influence by issuing illegal passes,causing difficulties for Maghreb states.47 Desiring to obtain compensationfor losses elsewhere, France pursued an aggressive policy, acquiring (alongwith smaller European states) a greater degree of control over NorthAfrica's intercoastal trade. Threats were made, and wars fought. Inpreparation for their naval demonstration of 1710, the French spread reportsin Tunis purporting to expose the Bey's violent and extortionate behavior.48

Such threats had the capacity to hurt the ruler by tying up valuable resources(in preparation for conflict), drawing down precious monetary reserves, andproviding opportunities for would-be rebels in the countryside. In 1769-70,France went to war against Tunisia. In 1775, Spain mounted a land and seainvasion of Algeria; the Spanish armada attacked Algiers in 1783 and againin 1784. Venice fought a war with Tripoli in the 1760s. The old belligerentrelationship, if subordinated, by no means had disappeared. These conflictswere manifestations of a struggle for control of resources, revealing anopposition of interests that made peaceful coexistence impossible.

If a new trade relationship was being constructed over the long term,Europe's opening of the Maghreb was by no means a linear development.Treaties with England and France signed by Maghreb rulers were violated,and had to be reimposed. In Tripoli, for example, the treaty imposed byFrance in 1685 was broken in 1692, and French concessions (bastions) werereclaimed.49 This led to a French naval bombardment in 1693, and theresigning of the original treaty. (In 1720, the 1685 treaty had to be renewed

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once again, with the inclusion of a provision providing for the establishmentof French missionaries.) England's treaty with Tripoli (signed in 1676) alsohad to be 'reconfirmed' following violations, a procedure entailingextensive diplomatic negotiations.

Maghreb Responses

In the eighteenth century, Maghreb rulers constructed a response toEuropean pressure that comprised three elements. The first was greatercontrol over the surplus that could be commercialised, which was achievedthrough monopolies, revenue farming and the imposition of new taxes.Interposing themselves between rural producers and the Mediterraneanmarket, rulers became sellers of grain and other products to Europe. Rulersbecame sole merchants: the parallel with Muhammad Ali in nineteenthcentury Egypt is obvious. A monopoly would be proclaimed over a product,which would then be farmed out to a high officeholder or local merchant(someone close to the ruler), who would sell it to a European exporter. Orthe ruler might establish direct control over a crop and himself market it toa favoured European (or Jewish) merchant. In Libya, Yusuf Pasha enjoyeda near-monopoly of trade with Malta, supplying cattle, sheep, horses andmules, and controlling exports of dates through an officially recognised taxfarmer who paid him a fixed annual sum.50 Tunisia's Husayn Bin Alibecame the country's main grain, wool and oil merchant. No one could sellto foreigners but the Bey or designated agents. He even put guards on theroads to the French and Genoese concession areas to prevent goods fromreaching them. In eastern Algeria, Husayn Bey Kilyan (1713-36) controlledsales of grain and other crops to the French concessionary company, whilein Algiers the Dey and his bureaucracy monopolised the sale of wool, hides,wheat and other commodities. Export licences called teskeras (sing.tadhkira) were developed. Sold to European merchants by local officials,these documents authorised delivery of a certain quantity of grain, oil andother products. Teskeras became a convenient way for rulers to obtainpartial or full payment for crops in advance of harvest or to acquire cash andother needed supplies. In Tunisia, the practice of mushtara (the advancepurchase of a crop by the government at a fixed price) became refined,anticipating developments in the nineteenth century.

The second element of the Maghrebian response may be described as'divide that ye may not be ruled'. Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli could takeadvantage of the rivalries and material needs of European states, playing theless powerful countries against France and England and, when possible, thetwo superpowers against each other. Privileges were granted to onegovernment in the hope of limiting or rolling back gains made by another.

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To prevent extension of French influence into western Algeria fromenclaves in the east, the Dey of Algiers granted England the right to foundestablishments in Oran.51 During the eighteenth century, France andEngland engaged in 'grain wars', endeavouring to deprive each other ofwheat, oil and other precious resources. Was it not to prevent grain exportsto France that England provided Algiers with naval and military stores?During their frequent military conflicts, the two superpowers sought theaid (or neutrality) of Barbary states. French and English representativesoffered gifts and made presents. Conflicts in Europe presented otheropportunities. In 1708, Algiers took advantage of a continental war toconquer Oran from Spain. 'To use Europe while resisting it' was thewatchword of Maghreb rulers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuriesjust as it would be for the governments of Egypt, Ottoman Turkey andother Middle Eastern lands in the nineteenth century, and ultimately withthe same tragic irony.

The third element was a cautious confrontation on the sea, for which nonineteenth century parallel exists. Privateering (tacitly supported by Franceand England so long as it was directed against imperial rivals) continued toprovide a supplemental replacement of things, but Maghreb rulers alsobelieved it important to demonstrate that threats, naval demonstrations andwarfare against them carried a price. Throughout the eighteenth century,corsair attacks were launched, though at a much lower level of activity thanpreviously. In 1728, the Bey of Tunis resumed raids along the Europeancoast, provoking complaints from French authorities. Ahmad PashaQaramanli (1711-45) carried out attacks in the Mediterranean. In 1713-14,the Dey of Algiers began building up his corsair fleet (this failed, however,to arrest its decline).52 Treaties continued to be violated in order to obtaindesperately needed funds and supplies, or when the moment seemedopportune. Having realised that his treaty with Austria deprived him ofprofits from raids on Sicilian and Neapolitan ships, Tunisia's Husayn BinAli broke the peace. Maghreb rulers also breached treaties by taxingEuropean goods beyond authorised limits. In 1733, Husayn Bin Ali askedEuropeans to pay ten per cent in customs fees on some imported goodsinstead of the three per cent fixed by treaties. Exit duties and 'gratuities'were demanded in Algiers. At propitious moments, military action wastaken and war declared. To gain control of the wheat trade, the Bey of Tunisdestroyed (in 1740^11) the European concessions at Cape Negre andTabarca (French naval power soon forced their restoration). In 1784,Hammuda Pasha went to war with Venice in a commercial dispute.Deliberately intransigent, he succeeded in imposing a good part of hisconditions. In Algeria, the Deys fought a long war with Spain for control ofOran, resolved only in 1791.

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The outbreak of the French Revolution and the onset of imperial warsbetween France and England enabled Maghreb rulers to assert themselvesto a degree not previously possible. Privateering was resurrected. Tunis andTripoli even gained control - albeit briefly - over their maritime trade.Faced with an increased foreign demand for grain, Tunisia's HammudaPasha pursued an explicitly mercantilist policy, forging an alliance with themerchant class, protecting industrial products (e.g. textiles of Sousse, Jerbaand the Jarid) that had suffered from European competition, and conductingexternal commerce himself.53 Tunisians purchased Spanish wool andvermilion (for the sheshia industry) directly, shipped some of it themselves,and controlled its distribution. Hammuda Pasha also built up his corsairfleet (97 vessels, carrying 1,052 cannons in 1798), launched new attacksagainst European ships, and raked in large sums through increased tributeand repurchases of confiscated cargoes and captives. Europe's hold overTunisia's external commerce thus became weakened, and the power of theBey and his dynasty strengthened. In Tripoli, Yusuf Pasha increased hisrevenues and built up central authority. After completing construction of anew navy, he called upon the smaller European nations to renew theirtreaties. When only two countries (Spain and Venice) agreed, he had attackslaunched against the other nations' ships. Lucrative captures were made.Large sums of money were acquired through repurchase payments and byannual subsidies that smaller European states were now compelled to make.The ruler also profited from increased import dues, new port charges and anexpanding trade with Malta. Tripoli became a maritime power once again,and extended its control over Fezzan and Cyrenaica provinces. Privateeringalso knew a revival in Algiers (the number of ships rose from eight to 30vessels, and captives from 800 to 1,642 persons), but on a much moremodest scale than in Tripoli and Tunis. Driven by famine in southernFrance, grain sales brought additional income. In 1793, Republican Franceeven borrowed money from the Dey! After 1798, a rupture in relations withFrance led to the seizure and plunder of its concessions in eastern Algeriaand to Algerian attacks against French (and Italian) ships; yet these gainswere short-lived. England's victory over France at Trafalgar (1805) led toincreased pressure from the new 'mistress' of the Mediterranean.Privateering was prohibited by declarations at the Congress of Vienna in1814. After this, the balance of power would shift even more against theMaghreb, with profound implications for the entire Muslim Mediterranean.

Between 1660 and 1814, then, and in the face of foreign encroachmentand military pressure, Maghreb states preserved their political autonomyand quasi-sovereignty within the Ottoman commonwealth. Possessingconsiderable freedom of manoeuvre, local rulers showed themselvescapable of taking the initiative and turning situations to their advantage.

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Most were military men, warriors, and some displayed qualities of greatpersonal merit - keenness of intellect, penetration of judgement,adaptability. Their resistance strategies helped limit external penetration.Government monopolies blunted the growth of French trade in Algiers;foreign consuls criticised monopolies as obstructions to the development of'free trade' in Tunisia.54 However, success can be attributed mostly to'structures' and to the epoch. Trade with Europe was not yet thepreponderant sector in Maghreb economies; internal exchanges and tradewith other Ottoman domains remained dominant; and in exchanges withEurope, Maghreb states often ran surpluses, not deficits. Europe dependedupon North African grain, and the manufactured goods it exported were notyet designed for general consumption. Foreign efforts to establish localfactories or engage in direct production through land purchases were rareoccurrences, and most failed miserably. Europe's primary objectives couldalso be achieved as readily by diplomacy and 'gifts' as by navaldemonstrations and war. Divisions among European nations, as we haveseen, also limited the foreign impact. Above all, Europe remainedprofoundly mercantilist. Control of coastal places was deemed preferable toconquest of land areas. Long-term occupations were exceptions, not therule.

Nonetheless, a fundamental change had occurred. The new mercantilistenvironment was no longer being resisted; it had become accepted by therulers of the Maghreb. For them, the primary question was how to derive themaximum possible benefit from the new situation while salvaging theirindependence, a question that would be posed by rulers in the nineteenthcentury. Europe had acquired a permanent advantage, an entering wedgethat would soon be widened.

Nineteenth-Century Thrust

In the nineteenth century, England and France had to 'open up' the Maghrebonce again, in much the same way that they had done between 1660 and1685, though with more pronounced results.55 In April 1816, an Englishfleet commanded by Lord Exmouth bombarded Algiers, Tripoli and Tuniswith the aim of ending the reinvigorated corsair system. Privateering wasabolished in Tunis, but Algiers and Tripoli resisted. In August 1816, anEnglish naval force was sent against Algiers, leading to the signing of atreaty that ended Christian slavery. After 1816, English and French powergrew. France acquired new concessions in Algeria, fortified its factories atLa Calle and Bone with cannons, and brought pressure upon the Dey inorder to obtain favourable settlement of a financial dispute. Growingtensions culminated in 1830 with the sending of a French expeditionary

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force to Algiers. This marked the beginning of France's conquest of Algeria,one that would take decades to complete. In Tunisia, France resumed itstrade monopoly, ending the country's short-lived attempt at commercialindependence. French merchants developed olive oil exports, and by thelate 1820s had established control over this lucrative branch of commerce.In 1830, coinciding with its capture of Algiers, France imposed a treatystipulating the end of state monopolies and enforcement of the Capitulatorytreaties signed in the seventeenth century. In Libya, France and Englandcompeted for influence through their consuls, who became the real powersin the land. England's representative forced the Caramanli ruler to abolishhis monopoly of trade with Malta. Using threats of naval intervention,France obliged him to sign the 1830 treaty, which suppressed privateering.In 1832, an English naval squadron sailed into Tripoli harbour, forcing theruler to pay his debts to English creditors. Thus, between 1816 and 1832England and France triumphed in the Maghreb. The assumption of directcontrol over Libya by the Ottomans in 1835 may have spared it the fate ofAlgeria, but left it open to foreign economic penetration for the next threequarters of a century until its occupation by Italy in 1911.

What lay behind this new opening were forces generated by the FrenchRevolution, which produced more powerful military machines, especiallyland armies, and by the Industrial Revolution in England (and later, inFrance), which spurred a search for new markets. The war against piracyand slavery in the Maghreb was really aimed at opening new trade relationsand establishing security of commerce. As victor in its long war withFrance, England took the lead in pacifying the Mediterranean. No Muslimregime could confront directly the new foreign advance. The result was ahuge increase in trade not only with the Maghreb, but with the Muslim landsof the eastern Mediterranean. During the seventeenth and eighteenthcenturies, England and France (and the other European powers) had takenonly a small portion of the international trade of North Africa and theMiddle East. Almost overnight, the two great powers became the area'smost important trade partner. English manufactures, now designed forgeneral consumption, began flooding markets from Istanbul, to Cairo, toTunis in exchange for primary commodities.

This trade explosion led to huge imbalances that upset local economiesand communities in ways not possible during the seventeenth andeighteenth centuries. In the Maghreb, where English fabrics became theprincipal item of export, the balance shifted dramatically. In the lateeighteenth century, the value of goods imported by Algiers and Tunis hadbeen less than that of the products sent to Marseille, necessitating Frenchcash payments to these regencies.56 After 1815, as industrial importsincreased, local people were less able to pay for these products in cash.

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Furthermore, the development of olive oil production in Tunisia by Frenchmerchants affected prices and upset the Sahel region's social equilibrium,where farmers were placed at the mercy of foreign traders. In Libya, owingto the 1830 treaty (which compelled the ruler to pay debts owed to Englishcreditors), the Pasha was obliged to impose a heavy tax on tribes that hadbeen previously exempt from such levies, occasioning revolts andrebellions."

In the Middle East, people were likewise subjected to the increasing'assault' of English manufactured goods, particularly cottons. Englishexports to the Levant increased 150 per cent in value between 1816 and1818, producing an unfavourable trade balance.58 The willingness ofEuropean governments to apply pressure helped break local resistance andopened up markets in Anatolia and Egypt (through the Anglo-Turkishcommercial convention of 1838) to foreign mercantile activity. Anglo-French competition to exploit resources and acquire political influencegained amplitude. Foreign merchants penetrated into the deep interiordirectly or indirectly, through local intermediaries. Non-Muslim minoritieswere elevated. The number of foreign residents grew. European coinagebecame more widespread, helping cause depreciation of some localcurrencies. Local manufacturers, especially textiles, faced difficulties as aresult of growing foreign competition. Production of cash crops wasstimulated. This Middle Eastern 'pattern', observed also in nineteenthcentury Tunisia (which had many similarities with Egypt and OttomanTurkey) and Libya, was not, of course, new. As we have seen, it had beendeveloped and put into place in the Maghreb and the Levant during theseventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The difference now was one of scaleand effect.

The nineteenth century, then, is distinguished by the intensification andacceleration of Anglo-French influence. Trade with Europe became themost important economic sector, and France and England had greaterenforcement power than heretofore as well as the will to use it. The tradeeconomy instituted in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had notadversely affected the commercial balance, or prices, or the equilibrium ofsocieties and economies, but the new opening in the nineteenth century did.During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, farmers and tribesmenliving in or close to concession areas had become partially transformedthrough contact with the market, but this had not entailed upset of the largersociety or the economy. In the nineteenth century, the equilibrium of entireregions, even the deep interior, was affected. Anglo-French power wasunfolding more rapidly and developing at a much greater pace. In NorthAfrica and the Middle East, regions passed from a balanced situation to anunbalanced one.

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In what ways was the nineteenth century qualitatively different? Militaryoccupation was a novel development in the eastern Mediterranean lands,which had not experienced the invasions and occupations suffered by someMaghreb peoples during the preceding two centuries. Long-termoccupations of large land areas was new everywhere. But it would take timefor indigenous peoples to comprehend this. In 1830, for example, it waspossible to regard the French takeover of Algiers as 'reversible', notfundamentally different from previous invasions (e.g. by O'Reily in 1775)or limited occupations; not so, however, after mid century, when the entirecountry became 'absorbed'. Local responses to Anglo-French power tooknew forms. State institutions were recast, partly along European lines. Thisoccurred in the armies of Tunisia, Egypt and Ottoman Turkey and thenspread to areas of the administration. In Ottoman Turkey, the idea ofequality was proclaimed as a new basis for governance. Constitutions wereestablished in Tunisia (1861) and in Ottoman Turkey (1878). In the area ofthe economy, new cash crops (e.g. long-fiber cotton in Egypt) wereintroduced. Transport and communications became rapidly developed withthe use of imported technology (e.g. steamships, railways and telegraph).Foreign banking capital was imported and used to finance governments andto defray local development schemes, leading to the build-up of huge publicdebts in Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey that drained capital out of thesecountries. (Local surpluses were also drained away through tradeimbalances and the drawing down of precious currency reserves.) The landsof the Muslim Mediterranean also became dependent upon pricemovements in London and Paris (the end of the US Civil War collapsed thecotton market in Egypt). The distinctiveness of the nineteenth century, then,lay in (1) the acceleration of developments begun earlier, and (2) newdepartures in areas of government, economy and finance.

By exposing the common experiences of Muslim peoples in the southand eastern Mediterranean, a comparative approach across centuries canyield conclusions about this entire process. First, the Anglo-French advancedid not move in a straight line from the seventeenth through the nineteenthcenturies. Considerable variation existed both between regions (e.g. in theseventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Egypt and the Levant were spared theviolence that occurred in relations between Maghreb states and Europe) andwithin regions (e.g. the Maghreb resurgence of the late eighteenth century).Secondly, local groups were not merely acted upon, but were also actors inthis unfolding drama. As noted, rulers did not observe the treaties that hadbeen foisted upon them. They violated them whenever possible and soughtto turn them to their advantage, and their efforts to delay the foreignadvance by pitting one power against the other affected both its timing andsequence. Thirdly, the modern colonial encounter contains a supreme irony,

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embodied in the phrase: 'To use Europe in order to resist Europe.' Byseeking to benefit from the growing foreign presence, local ruling (andother) groups helped further entrench it. The best example is the decision bythe governments of Egypt, Tunisia and Ottoman Turkey in the nineteenthcentury to launch development projects that depended upon foreigntechnology and advisers, and were financed by European banking capital.This led to indebtedness, bankruptcy, imposition of foreign debtcommissions and loss of sovereignty. Even efforts to pit France againstEngland or vice versa were counterproductive in the long run, since thisonly intensified rivalry between the powers and drew them even moredeeply into local affairs. So the Anglo-French conquest was not an entirelyimposed one. Finally, this conquest was a limited, not total, victory, even inthe great age of expansion during the nineteenth century. Quataert hasshown how industries in Anatolia survived competition from foreignmanufactures through adaptation.59 Arcanli has demonstrated the way inwhich the Ottoman state preserved control over the agricultural surplus inAnatolia in spite of foreign pressure.60 In Egypt, the government was able tomaintain control of agricultural revenues through the build-up of largeprivate estates. In Tunisia, the sheshia industry survived the flood ofimported bonnets (largely from France), preserving itself and maintainingsome of its markets well into the twentieth century.61 And Tunisianmerchants in the olive oil ports of the Sahel survived intense competition ofFrench merchants (and the Tunisian government) by engaging in lesslucrative activities.62 With the possible exception of Algeria, Anglo-Frenchcontrol over the lands of the Muslim Mediterranean was a matter of degreerather than one of absolute subjugation.

There remains the question of origination. When did this conquestbegin? The answer depends on the source of the new imperium. Was this aEuropean conquest or an Anglo-French one? To be sure, Austrians,Germans, Spaniards, Italians and even Russians benefited from thedevelopment of trade with and the growing political and military weaknessof North Africa and the Middle East. Foreign colonies in Algiers,Constantine, Tunis, Tripoli, Alexandria, Cairo, Beirut, Izmir and Istanbulcontained people from all corners of continental Europe. Anglo-Frenchnaval demonstrations sometimes included Prussian, Russian and otherEuropean ships. Commissions set up in Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey toadminister revenues pledged to the payment of the public debts containedrepresentatives of the leading nations of Europe, not just English- andFrenchmen. The 1878 Berlin Conference, which paved the way for thepartition of Africa, was the triumph of Germany and its Chancellor, Ottovon Bismarck. To characterise this as a European conquest, however, raisesvexing questions. Can this melange of city states, kingdoms, monarchies

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and republics, all possessing different interests, all existing in rivalry andcompetition with one another, be regarded as single unit, with a will of itsown? How are the changes in these political units to be dealt with (e.g. Italyand Germany, before and after unification)? And what of the US, which wasalso developing commercial interests in the Mediterranean, and which evenfought a war with Tripoli early in the nineteenth century? Should we bespeaking of a conquest by the 'West'?

Conclusion

This study demonstrates that this was palpably an Anglo-French affair.English and French merchants were the ones who conquered markets in thesouthern and eastern Mediterranean; English and French merchant shipsand navies dominated the sea; English and French nationals built most ofthe railways, erected and maintained telegraph lines, and expanded portfacilities. Their bankers financed most of the development projects; theircitizens were majority stockholders in public utility companies, and in thepublic loans made to local governments; their representatives directed andcontrolled the 'international' commissions set up to supervise payment ofthe debts. A glance at a political map of the Muslim Mediterraneanfollowing the Ottoman collapse after World War I shows French and Britishflags flying everywhere except Libya (occupied by Italy) and Turkey (arepublic since 1922). The conquest of North Africa and the Middle East waspre-eminently the work of England and France. The rest of Europe playedonly an ancillary role.

When did it really begin? The struggle by England and France forcommercial and political advantage in the Mediterranean originated duringthe second half of the sixteenth century. At that time, the two ascendantpowers signed important trade agreements with the Ottomans which gavethem rights to establish consulates and awarded privileges to their nationalswho were trading in Ottoman domains. (The other European statessubsequently obtained these Capitulatory treaties.) Ally of the Ottomans inthe war against Hapsburg Spain, France received trade concessions in NorthAfrica, preparing the way - as Charles-Roux has noted - for its conquest ofAlgiers in 1830.63

Until the second half of the seventeenth century, England and Francemerely positioned themselves, establishing diplomatic offices, takingadvantage of favourable tariffs granted by the Capitulations, competingwith each other, and engaging in indecisive warfare with Barbary corsairs.The turning point came with the rise of powerful navies and the decision ofgovernments in London and Paris to foster commercial expansion throughwarfare. Forces that had been slowly building were unleashed. After 1660,

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the Mediterranean became the boulevard of Anglo-French (and to a lesserdegree, Dutch and other European) expansionism. A fundamental change inthe nature of trade took place. Colonisation was launched, but confinedmostly to areas along or near coastal regions.

The historic role of the nineteenth century was to complete the transferof power from the south and eastern Mediterranean to the states of the north.Owing to the Industrial and French revolutions, England and France (alongwith the secondary European powers) were able to exert greater pressurethan heretofore and to sustain it in ways previously not possible,overcoming local resistance. Deep interior regions were penetrated;economic dependency was established, albeit unevenly; controls wereimposed, and when these were threatened or broke down, vast land areaswere occupied; and frontier colonialism was replaced by terrrestrialimperialism. By the early twentieth century, practically the entire MuslimMediterranean had become incorporated into an economic and politicalorder dominated by England and France.

NOTES

1. I wish to acknowledge helpful comments made by colleagues at the Twentieth BiannualConference of the Southeast Regional Middle East and Islamic Studies Seminar (ValleCrucis NC: 10-12 Oct. 1997), and especially Palmira Brummett, who read a draft of thisarticle.

2. John O. Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World (Boulder CO: WestviewPress 1982) ch.3.

3. Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy 1800-1914 (London: Methuen 1981)pp. 1-23.

4. Morocco, which was not part of the Ottoman empire, is excluded from this study. However,a similar European economic and political penetration was occurring there.

5. Robert Mantran, 'The Transformation of Trade in the Ottoman Empire in the EighteenthCentury', in Thomas Naff and Roger Owen (eds.), Studies in Eighteenth Century IslamicHistory (Carbondale IL: Southern Illinois Press 1977) pp.217-35.

6. Daniel Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World 1550-1650 (Seattle: University ofWashington Press 1990).

7. Elena Franjakis-Syrett, The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century 1700—1820(Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies 1992).

8. Andre Raymond, 'L'impact de la penetration europeene sur l'economie de l'Egypte auXVIIIe siecle', Annales Islamologiques 18 (1982) pp.217-35.

9. Beshara Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine. Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus,1700-1900 (Berkeley CA: University of California Press 1995).

10. Peter M. Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516-1922 (Ithaca NY: Cornell UniversityPress 1966); Glen E. Perry, The Middle East, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River NJ: Prentice Hall1997); Peter Mansfield, A History of the Middle East (New York: Penguin 1991); YahyaArmajani and Thomas M. Ricks, Middle East, Past and Present, 2nd ed. (Englewood ClifffsNJ: Prentice Hall 1986).

11. William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder CO: Westview 1994);Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East, 2nd ed. (Boulder CO:

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Westview 1983); Sydney Nettleton Fisher, The Middle East; A History, 2nd ed. (New York:Knopf 1969).

12. Bernard Lewis, The Shaping of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press1994).

13. Owen (note 3) pp.8-10.14. Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy 1800-1914, 2nd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris

1993) pp.xxi-xxii.15. Lois A. Aroian and Richard P. Mitchell, The Modern Middle East and North Africa (New

York: Macmillan 1984).16. Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (New York: Warner Books 1991).17. Charles-Andre Julien, History of North Africa, trans. John Petrie (New York: Praeger, 1970).18. Abdallah Laroui, The History of the Maghreb (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press

1977).19. Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University

Press 1975).20. Lucette Valensi, On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa before the French Conquest, trans.

Kenneth Perkins (New York: Africana 1977).21. These wars and the treaties that followed are discussed in Sir Godfrey Fisher, Barbary

Legend. War, Trade, and Piracy in North Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1957) pp.229-87;Paul Masson, Histoire des etablissements et du commerce francais dans L'Afriquebarbaresque, 1560-1793 (Paris: Hachette 1903) pp.130-80, 239-62; Sadok Boubaker, LaRegence de Tunis au XVHe siecle: ses relations commerciales avec les ports de VEuropemediterraneene, Marseille et Livorne (Zaghouan: Centre d'Etudes et de RecherchesOttomanes et Morisco-Andalouses 1987) pp.93-101; John B. Wolf, The Barbary Coast.Algiers Under the Turks 1500 to 1830 (New York: W.W. Norton and Co. 1979) pp.223-87;F. Charles-Roux, France et Afrique du Nord avant 1830 (Paris: Felix Alcan 1932)pp. 140—86; and Jean Peter, Les Barbaresques sous Louis XIV. Le duel entre Alger et de marindu Roi, 1681-1698 (Paris: Economica 1997).

22. For the treaties themselves, see George Chalmers, Collection of Treaties between GreatBritain and other Powers, 2 vols. (London: J. Stockdale 1790); E. Rouet de Card, Traites dela France avec les pays de VAfrique du nord: Algerie, Tunisie, Tripolitaine, Maroc (Paris: A.Pedone 1906).

23. For this and what immediately follows, see M.H. Che'rif, Pouvoir et societe dans la Tunisiede Husayn Bin Ali 1705-1740, 2 vols. (Tunis: University of Tunis 1984) vol.1, p.161;Boubaker (note 21) p.66.

24. Kola Folayan, Tripoli During the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli (Ife Ife, Nigeria:University of Ife Press 1979) p.173.

25. For this and what follows, see Fisher (note 21) pp.279, 286; Boubaker (note 21) p.162;Masson (note 21) pp.171-2, 336. The most fruitful source for the development of foreignpolitical influence is the consular correspondence. For France, consult Eugene Plantet,Correspondance des deys d'Alger avec la cour de France, 1579—1833, 2 vols. (Paris: FelixAlcan 1889), and ibid. Correspondance des beys de Tunis et des consuls de France avec lacour, 1577-1830, 2 vols. (Paris: Felix Alcan 1893-94).

26. Khelifa Chater, Dependance et mutations precoloniales. La Regence de Tunis de 1815 a1857-1857 (Tunis: University of Tunis 1984) p. 170.

27. Ibid. 180.28. For this and the following, see Fisher (note 21) p.280; Masson (note 21) p. 177; Cherif (note

23) vol.2, p. 118.29. Cherif (note 23) vol.1, p.191; Boubaker (note 21) p.163. Boubaker could find only two

Europeans who exploited land directly in late seventeenth century Tunisia; the project toestablish a soap and olive oil factory in Sousse in 1712 never materialised.

30. For this and what follows, see Julien (note 17) pp.312-14, 331; Chater (note 26) p.170;Fisher (note 21) pp.286, 294; Wolf (note 21) p.307.

31. For what follows, see Boubaker (note 21) pp.162-4, 192^4; Cherif (note 23) vol.1, pp.59,346-7.

32. On the Sahel, see Boubaker (note 21) pp.162^4-; Chater (note 26) pp.192-5.

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33. For North Africa's trade in the Mediterranean, consult Ruggiero Romano, Commerce etprixdu ble a Marseille au XVIIIe siecle (Paris: A. Colin 1956); Yvan Debbash, La nationfrancaise en Tunisie 1577-1835 (Paris: Edition Sirey 1957).

34. Boubaker (note 21) p.217; Cherif (note 23) vol.1, pp.100, 171, 192, 199-200, 282; M.-H.Cherif, 'Hammuda Pacha bey et raffermissement de l'autonomie tunisienne' in Charles-Andre Julien (ed.), Les Africains (Paris: Editions j.a. 1977) vol.7, p.116. For the sheshiaindustry, see Lucette Valensi, 'Islam et capitalisme: production et commerce des chechias enTunisie et en France au XVIIIe et XIXe siecles', Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaineXVII (1969) pp.376-400. The reference to trade as Europe's Trojan Horse comes from thetitle of a chapter in Valensi, On the Eve of Colonialism.

35. Boubaker (note 21) p.195; Julien (note 17) pp.312, 314.36. For this and what follows, see Julien (note 17) p.327; Wolf (note 21) p.241; Folayan (note

24) pp.29-30.37. See Wolf (note 21) p.279; Masson (note 21) p.504, n.2; Boubaker (note 21) pp.131-4.38. Cherif (note 23) vol.1, p. 171; Cherif (note 34) p. 112. For what follows in this paragraph, see

Wolf (note 21) pp.273, 283; Folayan (note 24) pp.28, 57, 61-2.39. In seventeenth-century Tunisia, European renegades also discharged some important state

functions; see Boubaker (note 21) pp.168-9.40. On the centralisation process see, for Tunisia, Taoufik Bachrouch, Formation Sociale

Barbaresque et Pouvoir a Tunis au XVlle siecle (Tunis: University of Tunis 1977), andCherif (note 23); for Libya, see Ettore Rossi, Storia di Tripoli e Delia Tripolitania dallaconquista araba al 1911 (Rome: Istituto per L'Oriente 1968), chs.5-7, and Folayan (note 24).

41. Folayan, ibid. pp.53—4.42. For the centralisation process in Algeria, consult Pierre Boyer, 'Des Pachas triennaux a la

revolution d'Ali Khodja Dey, 1571-1817', Revue Historique 495 (1970) pp.99-124;'Introduction a une histoire interieure de la Regence d'Alger', Revue Historique 235 (1966)pp.297-316; and La vie quotidienne a Alger a la veille de Vintervention francaise (Paris:Hachette 1963). Other assessments can be found in Yves Lacoste, Andre Nouschi and AndrePrenant, L'Algerie. Passe et present. Le cadre et les etapes de la constitution de I'Algerieactuelle (Paris: editions sociales 1960); Jean-Claude Vatin, 'L'Algerie en 1830. Essaid'interpretation des donnees historiques sous Tangle de la science politique', Revuealgerienne des sciences juridiques, economiques, et politiques 4 (1970) pp.977-1058; andVatin, L'Algerie politique. Histoire et societe, new ed. (Paris: Presses de la fondationnationale des sciences politiques 1983) pp.82—111. Demonstrating the rise of Algiers as animportant capital city is Tal Shuval, La ville d'Alger vers la fin du XVIIIe siecle. Populationet cadre urbain (Paris: CNRS 1998).

43. Cherif (note 23) vol.2, p. 134.44. Julien (note 17) p.313; Cherif (note 23) vol.1, p.164. For what follows, see Cherif, vol.1,

pp.40-41, 168, 191-2, 206 and vol. 2, p.215, n.6; Folayan (note 24) pp.110-11; Boubaker(note 21) pp.68, 146, 153-4, 156, 163-5; Wolf (note 21) pp.294, 318; Masson (note 21)pp.605, 607; and Cherif (note 34) p.l 18. The reference to Thomas Philipp is The Syrians inEgypt 1725-1975 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH 1985) pp.23^, 27.

45. Cherif (note 23) vol.1, p.163.46. Ibid, p.168.47. For this and what follows on France, see Fisher (note 21) pp.288-90, 297.48. Cherif (note 23) vol.1, p.165.49. For this and what follows, see Rossi (note 40) pp.200-201, 206-7, 209, 231-2, 246.50. Folayan (note 24) pp.41, 63. For what follows, see ibid. 130-32; Cherif (note 23) vol.1,

pp.167, 199 and vol.2, pp.87-90, 119-22, 134; Wolf (note 21) pp.293^4; Julien (note 17)p.311.

51. Fisher (note 21) pp.285-6. For what follows, see ibid. 294; Wolf (note 21) p.282.52. Wolf (note 21) pp.286-7; Cherif (note 23) vol.2, pp.91-2; and Masson (note 21) p.335. For

what follows, see Cherif (note 23) vol.1, p.347 and vol.2, pp.93, 186; Julien (note 17) p.33O.53. On Tunisia, see Cherif (note 34) pp.117-19; Chater (note 26) pp.30-31, 34; Valensi, 'Islam

et Capitalisme' (note 34) p.390. For Libya, consult Folayan (note 24) pp.29-30, 47, 62-3.For Algeria, see Julien (note 17) pp.320, 327-8; Charles-Roux (note 21) pp.367-89, 393-7,

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425, 43SM0; and Fisher (note 21) pp.304-5.54. Julien (note 17) p.320; Cherif (note 23) vol.2, p.88.55. See Daniel Panzac, Les corsairs barbaresques. La fin d'une epopee, 1800-1820 (Paris:

CNRS Editions 1999).56. For this and what follows, see Valensi, Eve of Colonialism (note 34) pp.65, 67-9.57. Abun-Nasr (note 19) p.200.58. Owen (note 3) p.84.59. Donald Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of the Industrial Revolution

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993).60. Tosun Arcanli, 'Agrarian Relations in Turkey: A Historical Sketch' in Alan Richards (ed.),

Food, States and Peasants: Analyses of the Agrarian Question in the Middle East (Boulder,CO: Westview 1988) pp.23-67.

61. Sophie Ferchiou, Techniques et societes. Exemple de la fabrication des chechias en Tunisie(Paris: Institut d'Ethnologie 1971) pp.157-8.

62. Khelifa Chateur, 'Relations villes/campagnes dans la Tunisie du XIXe siecle' in Systemeurbain et developpement au Maghreb (Tunis: CERES Publications 1980) pp.67-82.

63. Charles-Roux (note 21) p.367.

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Documents

Rethinking Europe's conquest of North Africa and the Middle East: the opening of the Maghreb, 1660–1814