NIGERIAN EXPELLEES IN TOGO 187

Response in Togo to the impact of expulsions from Nigeria

Charles Kelly

3225 Oliver Street N.W. Washington D.C. 20015 U.S.A.

Among the many natural and man-made events which come under the heading of disaster are mass migrations,often the result of events such as drought, civil disturbance or political upheaval, rather than a physical catastrophe. Nonetheless in this kind of disaster it is normally the same institii tions which respond to more commonly recognized disasters that also play a major role in providing assistance to the migrants. Through a review of specific mass migration events, data can be acquired on response methods and mechanisms, institutional and organizational systems and the material assistance used. Analysis may provide specific information for use in similar events and help to formulate generalizations on disaster response patterns.

This report documents and reviews the response of Togo, a small West African nation between Benin and Ghana, to the migration of people expelled from Nigeria in January 1983. Although only a small number of the expellees actually returned to Togo, the country (like neighboring Benin) was forced to deal with rapidly increasing numbers of expellees on its eastern border, for all intents and purpow closed to the majority of the expellees as the Togo- Ghana border, destination of most of the migrants, was also closed. The rapid onset of the migration and the limited resources available in Togo provide the circumstances for a useful case study through- which to evaluate specific responws and identify broader generalizations on the operation of disaster response.

On 17th January 1983 the Nigerian Minister for Internal Securitk, Ali Baba, announced that all foreigners working or living in Nigeria without proper visas would have to leave the country by 1st February 1983. As a result of this announcement an exodus of an estimated 2 million people to Benin, Niger, Chad and the Cameroons began by air, land and sea. Although the exact number of expellees has not been established, over 1 million alone were estimated to be Ghanaian. The remainder originally came from Benin, Togo, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad, the Cameroons and countries as far away as the Sudan. Many of the expellees were young men who had travelled to Nigeria to work temporarily as unskilled laborers in the construction and service 4ectors of the economy. Others, particularly from

English-speaking countries, worked as skilled tradesmen and professionals and resided in Nigeria more or less pcrniancntly.

In the week following the expulsion order Benin, on Nigeria’s western border, attempted to control the flow of cxpellccs into the country. This was intended to ensure that those in transit through Benin would actually reach their destinations and prevent the creation of a resident expellee population in Benin. The most severely affected group was nationals of Ghana, as Ghana’s border with Togo was closed and Togo was unwilling to permit the passage of these people into Togo. The controls at the Nigeria-Benin border resulted in a major bottleneck in the flow out of Nigeria but did not prevent the infiltration of expellees through the unpatrolled segments of the border.

By 30th January, 14 days after the expulsion order, expellees had begun arriving at the Benin-Togo border. The border point, at a place named Hila Condji, is on a low sandy bar between a lagoon and the ocean. Because of the physically isolated nature of the crossing authorities in Togo were able to enforce the policy that only those expellees crossing Togo for Upper Volta or originally from Togo were to be allowed through the border point. This policy was intended to prevent a build-up of expellees at the Togo- Ghana border, which lies on the western side of Lome, Togo’s capital.

By Monday, 31st January, an estimated 7,000 persons had congregated on the Benin side of the Hila Condji crossing and normal traffic through the crossing began to be severely congested. By early Tuesday, 1st February, the number of persons halted at Hila Condji increased to an estimated 25,000 and the passage across the border was increasingly difficult. Wednesday, 2nd February, saw the number of expellees at Hila Condji increase to an estimated 70,000 with an additional 50,OOO persons nearby on the road to Nigeria. Although the mostly young, male expellees generally behaved calmly, the lack of water and food, together with poor sanitation and general crowding - effectively closing the border - began to create severe difficulties.

On the 1st February, several private or voluntary organizations (PVOs) in Togo began providing food and medical assistance informally through the Togo side of the border. Access from Benin to the Hila Condji crossing was almost impossible due to the backup of vehicles and persons on the road leading to the border.

By the Wednesday an informal working group of PVOs providing relief had developed. The Togo Baptist Mission and Caritas (supported by Catholic Relief Services) provided food through a soup kitchen for children and mothers and general distribution of bread to those crowded on the Benin side of the border. The Togolese Red Cross established a First Aid Post at Hila Condji and provided assistance to those who could make it to the post. This assistance pattern, aided by local officials in Togo and Benin, continued during Thursday and Friday ( 6 5 t h February). On Friday the informal group met and, aided by the fortuitous presence of a League of Red Cross Societies representative, formulated plans for continued assistance to the expellees for periods of 1 week to 1 month.

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188 NIGERIAN EXPELLEES IN TOGO

These preparations were not needed since through international consultations between Togo, Benin, Ghana and Nigeria, a decision was made to open the Togo-Ghana border at LoniS (Afalo) on Saturday 5th February. A t I I a .m. on Saturday the authorities in Togo began to permit the expellees to cross into Togo on.foot and in vehicles. This movement continued without hitch and with few formalities through the following week until, by 10th February, travel through Hila Condji was without delay or incident.

The. severity of the situation at Hila Condji before the txrldcr opened is difficult to assess. The density of people c.t-ontled together, possibly as many as 150,000 within 400 meters of the Benin-Togo border, resulted in severe prcibleni~ in providing food, water and adequate sanitation. r \ l though only a few deaths were reported at the border, no \!\tenlatic jurvey of the health impact of the convergence of ~)cople at Hila Condji was carried out. I t is clear that adequate supplies of water and proper sanitation were tiia.jor problems, while the generally young, male comeo- \ i t ion of the expellees and the relatively short duration of their stay at Hila Condji may have mitigated the severe impact of the health and food problems.

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ities undertook to provide shelter, food and transportation until the final destination in Ghana was reached. During the week following the opening of the border the Togo Baptist Mission, Togolese Red Cross, Caritas, along with other humanitarian organizations in Togo, provided water, food and medical supplies to the facilities set up at Afalo to handle the migration.

Direct participation in the expellee problem by the Government of Togo was undertaken overtly by the Minktry of Health and Social Affairs who received and channelled materials to the PVOs working at the borders. Following a visit by the President of Togo to Hila Condji a directive was issued on 3rd February establishing a national committee to deal both with the transiting expellees and those actually returning to Togo (an estimated 70,000). From statements made to the press in Togo and elsewhere it was also evident that considerable diplomatic activity between the affected comtries resulted in the opening of the Togo-Ghana border, although the role of Togo in these discussions is unclear.

Despite the almost 2 weeks warning i t appears that both the government and the PVO\ in Togo were unprepared for either the number of people intending to cross Togo or the logi\tical and organizational demands required to provide

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NIGERIAN EXPELLEES IN TOGO 189

Photograph by Agyeman-Daa and Ken, World Vision Picture Library

Fig. 2. Voluntary agency workers distributing milk to expellees from Nigeria.

basic services to the expellees. The policy of Togo to prevent nationalc of Ghana passing from Benin to Togo confined people to a well defined location. The nature of the Hila Condji crossing resulted in close to 150,OOO persons living at a very high density. This concentration overwhelmed available water and sanitation facilities and exceeded the capacity of normal commercial sources of food.

The, nt first ad hoc, response of several PVOs in Togo appears to have been induced by humanitarian interests and based on informal reports on the severity of the problem. With minimum participation from the Govern- ment ot Togo the active PVOs established a working response to the problem and developed medium and long term response plans.

Even with the creation of an official committee to deal with the expulsion problem, the PVOs continued to furnish a larger part of the assistance provided at Hila Condji and Afalo. External assistance from the international commun- ity played no real role in the response in Togo as it began to arrive atter the opening of the Togo-Benin border and after evacuation of the expellees from Hila Condji.

The actual impact of the expulsion order on Togo may have been fairly minimal as only an estimated 70,000

persons returned to Togo. Most of these people were quickly absorbed into the family and village structure.

Based on the experiences of the private and public institutions in Togo which responded to the expulsion of foreigners from Nigeria a number of useful points can be drawn. Although the Nigeria expulsion order was announced 2 weeks before the deadline and some idea of the number of people affected was known, the government and PVOs were unwilling or unable to plan for the magnitude of the problem which developed. A similar statement seems justified with regards to the actions of Benin and Ghana.

As the crisis was developing at Hila Condji the first and most effective response came from a spontaneous reaction of agencies - Caritas, Red Cross, Baptist Mission, CRS - which have normal roles in providing humanitarian assistance. This self-organized response by PVOs is typical of quick onset disasters. For Togo it appears that normal government reaction to emergencies may require between 3 and 10 days. A similar pattern is probably applicable to other countries in West Africa.

It is also clear that, had the Togo-Ghana border not opened, the task of providing food, water and proper sanitation, housing and security for those at Hila Condji

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190 NIGERIAN EXPELLEES IN TOGO

Photograph by Agyeman-Dua and Kerr, World Vision Picture Library

Fig. 3. Expellees waiting for passage home.

u o u l t l have quickly grown beyond the capabilities of the l’VO\. I n such a situation the government would have been I’orced to play a major role in the relief operation. Given the immediate resources of the Togolese government and the neck or niore response time for international assistance, Iiad the borders not opened a major human disaster could have developed a t the Togo-Benin border.

Froni the brief summary of Togo’s response to the Nigeria cspulsion crisis presented in this report support for two trends i n disaster planning and management appear clear. As capabilities and limitations of private, governmental and interriat ional organizations differ, response plans should reinforce the known strengths of each party. The plans would encourage a greater effectiveness by promoting cooperation and coordination while not limiting response opt ions.

Recognizing the inevitable delay in disaster response

resulting from the bureaucratic decision process (locally, nationally and internationally) a high degree of selt reliancc in undertaking the first response to a disaster situation should be encouraged. This approach would ensure as rapid a response as possible, improve effectiveness by reducing confusion and provide for a rational use of the resource$ available to those who agree to participate.

While the 30th January - 1 l th February crisis caurcd 1)) the Nigeria expellees crossing Togo may have not reached disaster proportions, the lessons generated from the institutional and organizational response in Togo should prove useful in planning for similar events and provide general guidance on disaster responsc by organiiration\ similar to those found in Togo. Reviews of the responw 111

other affected countries would be useful to verity thc generalizations made in this report and to identify specific response patterns which were used.

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