Reservation for OBCs Hardly an Abrupt Decision

REPORTS

Reservation for OBCs: Hardly An Abrupt Decision Kameshwar Choudhary

The policy of reservation may be a 'reform measure' adopted by the ruling class to maintain the existing inegalitarian system, but opposing it at the moment would be a retrograde step.

THE decision of the central government to introduce 27 per cent reservation for

the socially and educationally backward classes (also called other backward classes) in the central government services and public sector undertakings as per the recommendations of the Backward Classes Commission (1980) headed by B P Mandal has spurred vehement criticisms and agita-tions in different parts of the country.

It is argued that this measure has been taken in haste, that it is an abrupt deci-sion. But this is not the case. In fact, this argument only shows the myopic vision of the critics. The Constitution of India made a special provision of making reser-vation for socially and educationally backward classes (SEBCs) about 40 years back in 1950. This provision was made in the section on the 'fundamental rights' of the citizens and not under the 'directive principles' of state policy. Hence, the state had to act immediately and not delay this step for long. As a consequence the first Backward Classes Commission was ap-pointed in 1953 under the chairmanship of Kakasaheb Kalelkar. The commission submitted its report in 1955. According to its recommendations, in all government and local body services the reservation for SEBCs was to be 25 per cent in Class I, 33 ) per cent in Class II and 40 per cent in Class 111 and IV services (p 205). But the recommendations remained unimple-mented. When the Janata Party came to power the second commission on the SEBCs was appointed under the chair-manship of B P Mandal. This commis-sion submitted its report in 1980 and made several recommendations including 27 per cent reservation of jobs for the SEBCs in the central government services and public sector undertakings. Again the Congress government at the centre did not imple-ment the recommendations. However, in the last Lok Sabha elections in 1989 the National Front made a commitment to implement the recommendations of the Mandal Commission, As a result, only recently the National Front government at the centre took a decision to implement the same.

Hence, making reservation for SEBCs

is not an abrupt decision. It was long over-due as a constitutional obligation. It does not matter much as to what impact the exit of Devi Lai had on this issue. It could have been delayed only by months and years and not by decades. The MPs and MLAs belonging to the OBCs constitute a sizeable section of the legislators. They wanted to implement this measure. So, it had to be done. Thus, it is good that an important constitutional goal has been achieved in the direction of promoting social justice.

CASTE BASIS

The Mandal Commission is criticised on the ground that it has recommended reservation to be made on the basis of caste which is a communal criterion whereas a secular one would have been preferable in a democratic and secular country like India. It is true that caste has been adopted as one of the criteria by, the commission but it is not the sole criterion for identifying the SEBCs for which the provision of reservation is made in the constitution. In fact, the commission adopted a 'multiple approach' for the identification of the SEBCs/OBCs (that is other than SCs and STs) for the pur-pose of reservation. The main sources used by the commission for preparation of the list of the OBCs are:

(i) Socio-educational field survey; (ii) Census Report of 1961 (for the

identification of backward tribes); (iii) Personal knowledge gained through

extensive touring of the country and receipt of voluminous public eviden-ces from members of the general public, voluntary organisations, social workers, politicians, legislators, etc; and

(iv) List of OBCs notified by various state governments (p 54),

Moreover, the commission applied some other tests like stigma of low occupation, criminality, nomadism, beggary, untoucha-bility and inadequate representation in public services.

In the socio-educational field survey, the indicators for determining social and

educational backwardness are grouped under three heads in part first of the report, i e, social, educational and economic:

(A) Social (4 x 3 = 12 points) (i) Castes/Classes considered as socially

backward by others. (ii) Castes/Classes which mainly depend

on manual labour for their livelihood. (iii) Castes/Classes where at least 23 per

cent females and 10 per cent males above the state average get married at an age below 17 years in rural areas and at least 10 per cent females and 5 per cent males do so in urban areas.

(iv) Castes/Classes where participation of females in work is at least 25 per cent above the state average.

(B) Educational ( 3 x 2 = 6 points) (v) Castes/Classes where the number of

children in the age-group of 5-15 years who never attended school is at least 25 per cent above the state average.

(vi) Castes/Classes where the rate of stu-dent drop-out in the age-group of 5-15 years is at least 25 per cent above the state average.

(vii) Castes/Classes amongst whom the proportion of matriculates is at least 25 per cent below the state average.

(C) Economic ( 4 x 1 = 4 points) (viii) Castes/Classes where the average

value of family assets is at least 25 per cent below the state average.

(ix) Castes/Classes where the number of families living in kuccha houses is at least 25 per cent above the state average.

(x) Castes/Classes where the source of drinking water is beyond half a kilo-metre for more than 50 per cent of the households.

(xi) Castes/Classes where the number of households having taken consumption loan is at least 25 per cent above the state average (p 52).

Here, separate weigbtage was given Jo indicators of each group because these groups were considered to be not of equal importance in identifying "socially and educationally backward classes". All the social indicators were given a weightage of three points each, educational indi-cators a weightage of two points each and economic indicators a weightage of one point each. Moreover, only those castes/ classes which had a sco^e of SO per cent (i e, 11 points out of 22 in all) or aboue were listed as socially arid educationally backward and the rest were treated as 'advanced*.

Hence, not only social but educational and economic criteria were also included for the purpose of identifying OBCs in the

Economic and Political Weekly September 1-8, 1990 1929

socio-educational field survey. Moreover, position in the caste hierarchy was given only three points out of 12 points in the social criteria and 22 points in all. Con-siderations such as dependence on manual labour, age at marriage, female participa-tion in work, children's attendance at school, drop-out rate at school level, pro-portion of matriculates, value of family assets, residence in kuccha houses, access to the source of drinking water and amount of consumption loan cannot be said to be casteist by any stretch of imagi-nation. If socially, economically and educationally backward people also belong to the lower castes, this is not their fault. This is a consequence of their age-old deprivation, oppression and exploita-tion by the privileged castes/classes in the Indian society.

Further, the commission holds that the method of socio-educational field survey was 'objective' because the point system did not allow any subjective assessment. This method was found to be "highly dependable in practice" because as a result of its application most of the well known socially and educationally backward castes were identified as backward (p 53).

However, in some cases, the findings based on socio-educational field survey happened to be inconsistent with the liv-ing social reality. For example, the social status of Kasera caste in Bihar, Dhobi in Gujarat , Agasa in Karnataka, Kumbhar in Rajasthan, Badager in Tamil Nadu, etc, is known to be very low. Yet these castes scored below 11 points and, thus, qualified for ranking as forward. To rectify such aberrations, it was necessary to have the "intimate personal knowledge of local conditions and the use of massive public evidence" to which the commission took recourse. The result of the field survey was "carefully scrutinised and such aberra-tions rectified as far as possible" (p 55).

Further, for identifying OBCs in the central government services the commis-sion used two criteria for both Hindu and non-Hindu communities. In respect of employees belonging to the Hindu com-munities, the- following criteria were adopted: (i) an employee was deemed to be socially backward "if he does not belong to any of the three twice born (Dvij) Varnas' i e, he is neither a Brahmin, nor a Kshatriya nor a Vaishya"; and (ii) he was deemed to be educationally backward "if neither his father nor his grandfather had studied beyond the primary level". As regard the non-Hindu communities (i) an employee was deemed to be socially backward "if either (1) he is a convert from those Hindu communities which have been defined as socially backward as in case of the Hindu communities above, or (2) in case he is not such a convert, his parental income is below the poverty line, i e, Rs 71 per head per month"; (ii) he was deemed to be educationally backward "if

neither his father nor his grandfather had studied beyond the primary level" (Ap-pendix VII, p 91). Here, it must be noted that an employee is qualified for member-ship of OBCs only if, both socially and educationally he was found to be back-ward according to the above criteria. Educational backwardness was given equal importance to position in the varna-caste hierarchy.

Hence, the criticism that the Mandal Commission has recommended reserva-tion only on the basis of caste is not justified. In fact, it adopted a "multiple approach" for the identification of OBCs for the purpose of reservation. It took into consideration various criteria i e, non-caste social criteria as well as educational and economic while placing castes/classes in the category of OBCs. Caste criterion has been given only a meagre importance in the whole scheme.

ECONOMIC CRITERIA

The critics of the Mandal Commission have advocated the adoption of economic criteria at two levels. One stream of the critics opine that reservation should be made only on the basis of economic back-wardness irrespective of social and educa-tional backwardness. But this view is not in consonance with the provisions of the constitution. While imposing prohibition on discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth (Arti-cle 15), Article 15(4) declares that nothing shall prevent the state from making "special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens" (emphasis mine). Moreover, Article 16(4) of the constitution specifically empowers the state to make "any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the state, is not adequately represented in the services under the state (emphasis mine). In addition, Article 340 of the constitution authorises the presi-dent of India to "appoint a commis-sion. . . to investigate the conditions of socially and educationally backward classes and the difficulties under which they labour and to make recommenda-tions as to the steps that should be taken by the union or any state to remove such difficulties and to improve their condi-t i o n s . " (emphasis mine). Hence, it is very clear that the constitution provides for giving preferential treatment through special measures such as reservation in jobs by the state only on the basis of "social and educational backwardness'. The advocacy of reservation solely on the basis of economic criteria does not have constitutional sanction.

Another stream of opinion supports reservation for OBCs in principle but sug-gests that economic criteria should be ap-

plied within that category so that the well-off section amongst OBCs does not corner the benefits. This concern is genuine but understanding of the problem seems to be inadequate. In fact, application o f econo-mic criteria within OBCs for reservation will largely negate the provision of reser-vation and amount to opposing this measure in practice. Here, let us have a look at the figures regarding representa-tion of OBCs, SCs and STs in central government services.

From Tables 1 to 3 we find that though the proportion of the OBCs (including both Hindu and non-Hindu castes and communities) is 52 per cent of the total population; their representation in central government services is 4.69 per cent in Class I, 10.63 per cent in Class II and 24.40 per cent in Class III and IV. Their proportion is even lower than the SCs and STs who constitute 22.5 per cent of the population but whose representation is 5.68 per cent in Class I, 18.81 per cent in Class II and 24.40 per cent in Class 111 and IV. Whereas overall employment of SCs and STs in central government ser viccs is 18.71 per cent, it is merely 12.55 per cent for OBCs. Moreover, represen-tation of OBCs in some of the ministries, departments and public sector undertak ings has been found to be nil in Class I and II services (1980 Report, pp 93, 95) In contrast, the forward castes and com munitics who constitute about 25 per cent of the total population have monopolised about 90 per cent of Class I, 70 per cent of Class II and 50 per cent of Class 111 and IV jobs under the central government.

Further, it is suggested that economic criteria should be applied within the OBCs so that the benefits of reservation are not skimmed off by the well-off sec-tion of this category and the really backward section left out. However, if the economically well off and therefore educationally advanced section of the OBCs is excluded, only the poor and ill educated, underqualificd or uneducated section would remain to take advantage of the provisions of reservation which they, in practice, cannot take because of their educational backwardness. As a result, jobs reserved for the OBCs shall largely lie unfilled. The unfilled seats shall be dereserved after three years, as recom-

tAble i ; REPRESENTATION of OBCs, SCs ANd) STs IN Central GOVERNMENT SERVICES

Source-. Report of the Backward Classes Com-mission (1980), First Part, p 42.

1992 Economic and Political Weekly September 1-8, 1990

mended by the Manda l Commiss ion and consequently grabbed by the candidates belonging to the forward castes/classes. The net result would be a perpetuat ion of the overwhelming away o f the upper castes/classes over the services for a long time to come. Moreover, there will be less competition amongst the O B C candidates and relatively ill-educated and ill-equipped candidates will get into services. The criterion of merit which is so dear to the critics will be put at an unmanageable dis-count and efficiency of the administration severely eroded.

In addit ion, the advocates of the appli-cation of economic criteria within the OBCs must s tand for adop t ion of a similar yardstick in case of the SCs and STs. Otherwise they are to be b lamed for pursuing a double s tandard. It is well known that as a result of the policy of reservation for the S C s / S R an elite section has emerged amongst them. This elite sec-tion is economically well-off and educa-tionally advanced and therefore grabbing all the benefi ts of reservation. The most backward section of the SCs/STs is left high and dry. Hence, we can think of applying economic criteria within the SCs/STs as well. But a d o p t i o n o{ economic criteria for exclusion of relative-ly advanced section of the OBCs and SCs/STfc is no t desirable a t the present stage of their progress. Because, in prac-tice, it will null ify the whole provision of reservation for them as a result of a large number of seats reserved for them remain-ing vacant. This is bo rne out by the fact that even now, when the economically well o f f section of SCs/STs is no t excluded a large number of jobs reserved for them re-main unfil led in Class I a n d Class II ser-vices. The M a n d a l Commiss ion found that the p ropor t ion of the SCs/STs in Class I and Class II s tood at 5.68 per cent and 18.81 per cent respectively despite extending an unqual i f ied reservation to them. Hence, there is no need of making any qualified reservation for the OBCs as in the case of the SCs/STC.

CASTE WAR

T h e critics of the policy of reservation have time and again raised the bogey of hea j t burning to those meritorious candi-dates whose entry into services would be barred. They argue that this heart burning leads to division of hearts, social tensions and caste wars. This argument has been noted by the Mandal Commiss ion . The commission holds that this reasoning is based on 'par t isan approach*. Here, the real motive of the ruling elite is to preserve its privileges (p 57).

Af te r all, it is only the students and people belonging to the upper castes who are involved in anti-reservation stir. Their real intent in their concern for preference to merit and efficiency of adminis t ra t ion is to perpetuate their tradit ional sway especially in the higher echelons of the ad-ministrat ion. In fact, they cannot be ex-pected to give up their privileged position without a fight.

We know tha t certain measures of the state, whether in economy, politics or ad-ministration are meant for sectional in-terests. In such cases we have to take sides and behave in a partisan manner. However, it is open to individual or group choice to take side of the poor o r the rich, the privileged or the underprivileged and for-ward castes/classes or backward castes/ classes. As regards the Manda l Commis-sion it is SEBCs who are going to benefit and forward castes and communi t ies to lose their dominance over administration. Here, the supremacy of the forward castes and communit ies is aimed to be challeng-ed and undermined. Hence, the critics call the Manda l Commiss ion casteist. Had there been no challenge to the dominance of forward castes/classes, they would not have talked of division o f heart and created social tensions or caste wars. As early as 1980, the Mandal Commission commented that the chorus of alarm being raised against reservation for OBCs on the plea that this causes heart burning was "sheer sophistry". It also observed that

" the furore against reservation is not aim-ed at the principle itself, but against the new class of beneficiaries, as they are now clamouring for a share of the oppor tu -nities which were all a long monopolised by the higher castes" (p 58).

It is also argued that reservation will not remove the dividing lines of caste but in-stitutionalise them by fu r the r codifying existing caste divisions and thus causing a 'civilisations! havoc* to the country. In fact, it does not matter much if castes are documented when it is made hereditary and norms and values associated with that system are actually practised in real life. T h e caste system has operated as a well-established social institution in India since ages a n d the lower caste people have suf-fered a lot under this unjus t system. Whoever has a historical unders tanding cannot blame the M a n d a l Commiss ion (1980) for codifying and institutionalising caste. It had been with us and it is still with us though the degree of its rigidity and severity has got reduced to some ex-tent. The most essential features of caste are still almost unaffected such as no^ms regarding marriage, dining and priest-hood. Hence, if some special provision is made for upl i f tment of backward classes of the popula t ion, caste has to be taken as one of the criteria of social backward-ness. This is recognition of a historical fact and that is exactly what the Mandal Commission has done.

The Manda l Commission is also criti-cised for taking a static and dogmatic view of the Hindu social order. T h e critics pre-sent the caste system as a dynamic scheme and adore it for providing avenue of social mobility to the lower castes through the process of Sanskri t isat ion. Under this traditional channel of social mobility the lower caste people Sanskrit ise their way of life through adopt ing upper caste norms and values and thus claim a higher caste status. But this t radi t ional route of social mobility provided very limited op-portunity in some regions to certain castes who were mobile economically or politi-

TABle 2: REPRESENTATION OF OBCs, SCs/STs IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES

Note: Figures in brackets represent percentages. Source: Report of the Backward Classes Commission (1980), First Part, Statement No I, Appendix VIII, p 92.


BHARAT FORGE UMJTED Registered Office MUNDHWA, PUNE CANTONMENT PUNE 411 036


cally. The poor and powerless castes con-tinued to suffer from the grave injustices of the caste system. Moreover, the process of Sanskritisation did not pose a challenge to the hierarchical and inegalitarian struc-ture and ethos of the caste system. In fact, it perpetuated and reinforced the caste system through providing a safety valve for a proper channelisation of the anger and potential revolt of the lower castes. Socially mobile lower castes did not ques-tion the superiority and dominance of the upper caste but claimed only an upper berth for themselves. They followed the norms and values of the upper castes strictly and with utmost vigour so that their claim for a higher caste status was accepted by the dominant castes. Sans-kritisation operated as an avenue of social mobility but not at all as a factor for transforming the inegalitarian structure of the caste system.

Not content with the limited scope of social mobility through Sanskritisation, the lower castes have asserted their caste identity to claim their share in the fruits of development. With the adoption of land reform measures such as abolition of zamindari, tenancy reforms and increasing migration of landowning upper castes/ classes to urban areas, the economic con-dition of some of the OBCs has improved after independence. Moreover, under the new dispensation of parliamentary poli-tics, the OBCs have got opportunities to send their own caste people to the legis-lature both at the centre and state levels. Gradually, they have emerged as a major force in the political arena. Hence, it is in-evitable that they should be claiming their share in the control over administrative machinery to which is attached a high social status, handsome economic gains and political linkages. The recommenda-tions of the Mandal Commission are a logical reflection of this phenomenon.

NATURE OF REFORMS

Here, we must take note of the fact that under the given framework of a weak and developing bourgeois regime,' making reservation for the OBCs is a short-cut, soft and sly 'reform measure' to cater more to the psychological aspirations of that section of the population which con-stitutes the majority than trigger a pro-cess of radical structural change in society. The benefits of reservation will be mainly reaped by comparatively advanced section of the OBCs. The commission recognises the fact that besides material benefits ac-cruing to the family concerned which gets the jobs, the psychological spin off of this phenomenon would be tremendous as the entire community of that backward class candidates feel socially elevated the reason being that their own (caste) person would be sitting in the "corridors of power". Moreover, the commission believes that

"by increasing the representation of OBCs in government service^, we give them an immediate feeling of participation in the governance of the country" (p 57).

Further, we must notice the fact that the real aim and game of the ruling class in adopting the policy of reservation has been to develop or recognise and co-opt an elite stratum from amongst the back-ward castes/classes and rule the country with an alliance and coalition of the elites belonging to upper, middle and lower castes/classes in the interests of the bourgeois-landlord classes. The policy of reservation is a Reform measure* adopted by the ruling class to maintain the existing inegalitarian system with granting some concessions to the emerging assertive sec-tions of the backward castes/classes. In such a scheme of governance, the poor belonging to upper, middle and lower castes have to suffer. The policy does not aim at a fundamental restructuring of the systemthe task for which the left and progressive people and political forces in

the country have to organise the suffering people on class line for acquiring power irrespective of their caste origin. But at the moment an opposition to the provision of reservation for OBCs would be a retro-grade step because a section of the tradi-tionally deprived and backward section of the population is going to benefit from this. Whatever reforms are possible within the given bourgeois system have to be welcomed. But without getting misled about the real nature of such measures, the left and progressive people have to organise and fight for radical restructur-ing of the Indian society on egalitarian lin$s.

The Mandal Commission has suggested some additional measures for upliftment of OBCs besides reservation both in recruitment and promotion at all levels in services and public sector undertakings (pp 58-60). The provision of reservation also encompasses all universities and af-filiated colleges, nationalised banks and all private sector undertakings which have

TABLE 3: PERCENTAGe: DISTRIBUTION OF- INDIAN POPULATION BY CASTE AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS

15.05 07.51 22.56

11.19 (0.02)* 02.16 (0.44)* 01.67 (0.22)* 00.67 (0.03)* 00.47 16.16

05.52 03.90 02.21 01.00 01.88 01.07 02.00 17.58 56.30

43.70*

1992 Economic and Political Weekly September 1-8, 1990

received financial assistance from the government in one form or the other. As regard educational concessions, the com-mission emphasises the need for "fram-ing of integrated schemes for creating the proper environment and incentives for serious and purposeful studies" The* educational package includes launching of an intensive and time-bound programme for adult education in areas with high con-centration of OBC population, residential schools for backward class students, voca-tional training and 27 per cent reserva-tions of seats in all scientific, technical and professional institutions run by the centre as well as the state governments along with provision for special coaching facili-ties for OBC students. Regarding finan-cial assistance, the commission proposes the formation of separate financial in-stitutions and co-operative societies of occupational groups of OBCs. Moreover, the commission also advises the govern ment to set up backward classes develop-ment corporations and a separate ministry/ department both at central and state levels to serve the interests of OBCs. All these are 'reform measures' which the commis-sion thought essential.

Further, the commission has also stressed the necessity of structural changes. It observes:

It is the commission's firm conviction that a radical transformation of the existing pro-duction relations is the most important single step that can be taken for the welfare and upliftment of all other backward classes CP 60).

But the measures suggested by the com-mission for radical transformation of the production relations are half-hearted and dualistic. It believes that a change of struc-tural nature in the agricultural sector is both feasible and overdue. Therefore, it urges radical land reforms. The need for strict implementation of laws regarding abolition of zamindari, ceilings and distri-bution of land to landless is noted in this connection.

The commission asserts that the strangle-hold of the existing production relations has to be broken through radical land reforms. But half-heartedness and double standard of the commission becomes evi-dent because it rules out the-possibility of a radical transformation in the existing production relations in the industrial sector (p 60).

In fact, a fundamental change in the pattern of social relations is essential in agriculture as well as in industry and bureaucracy. This change has to be from the existing individualistic and inegali-tarian system of society to a collectivist and egalitarian system. Legal and formal democracy has to be transformed into a real and operational system in our every-day life so that the ideal principles of

liberty, equality and fraternity guide the behaviour of all the people in all spheres, e g, political, economic, social and organisational.

Besides introducing radical changes in agriculture, it is necessary that structural changes are made in industry as well at. the levels of management and ownerhsip. As a; first step, the individualistic and authoritarian management has to be democratised with adequate representa-tion of workers, both manual and mental. Moreover, the prevailing structure and culture of the bureaucracy has to be altered. Bureaucrats have to be made a real servant of the people and not master of the people as they are today. For this it is necessary that, in practice* they are made subordinate to the democratic bodies from the village level upwards. In addition, it has to be ensured that the poor, deprived, oppressed and exploited people who constitute the majority of the population are in majority in elected bodies at all levels i e f rom village to parliament level. This will enable the peo-ple's real representative to formulate and implement policies in favour of the masses and eradicate the scourge of poverty,

unemployment, inequality, oppression and exploitation. State policy has to give utmost priority to cater to the basic needs of the masses rather than being guided by the artificial needs of the privileged strata of society who are blindly imitating the consumerist culture of the west. Decision-making in bureaucracy has to be made more and more democratic by involving lower section of the employees in this pro-cess. In addition, wide disparity in salary and wages should go. All these measures will go a long way in fundamental restruc-turing of Our society on democratic and egalitarian lines. A really democratic func-tioning of society will finish the lure and lustre of bureaucracy. Therefore, the scramble for bureaucratic positions for acquiring high social status, power and money will also end.

But such a radical change is not possi-ble under the framework of bourgeois sponsored programme of social reform from above of which the recommenda-tions of the Mandal Commission are largely an example. The masses have to be involved in this gigantic task of social reconstruction. A movement of the masses is the precondition for this change.


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Reservation for OBCs Hardly an Abrupt Decision