Representations on Final Decision Review Redact

8/18/2019 Representations on Final Decision Review Redact

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Local Government OmbudsmanPO Box 4771CoventryCV4 0EH

Xxxxx YyyyyGrimsby

North East LincolnshireXX00 0YY

12 April 2016Ref: 15 016 673

Dear Mr Hobley

Representations on final decision review

1. The complaint to the LGO concerned first and foremost the council’s mishandling of the

complaint, by which I mean the matters raised were not investigated properly. Irrelevancies

were focused on which had the overall affect of leaving the salient points unaddressed.

2. Leaving that aside, there are several matters which can be separated from those relating to the

commencement of court proceedings, notably the Council engineering default by

misallocating payment to a previous year’s account which was clearly intended to reduce the

current year’s liability. The delay and sometimes complete failure in responding to queries

amounts to maladministration and has been a common theme highlighted throughout the

complaint.

Is a part of the complaint separable from the matter which has been litigated?

3. LGO Guidance 1 suggests that an investigator with delegated authority to make decisions

would be required to identify “aspects of complaint which are separable” from appeal matters,

and those that can, be will be within jurisdiction even when a complainant has resorted to

court proceedings.

4. I am aware from a report on an investigation into Newham Borough Council (ref 08 019 113)

that the ombudsman retains ‘jurisdiction to investigate administrative actions prior to the issue

1 Guidance on jurisdiction – June 2015


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of court proceedings’. That would tie in with the LGO Guidance where it deals with the

commencement of proceedings under Schedule 5 of the Local Government Act 1974 (the

‘1974 Act ’) and the claim made that the LGO has ‘found fault with councils obtaining

Liability Orders from the courts for unpaid Council Tax where they should not have done’.

Furthermore, listed among the matters that are IN jurisdiction under the same heading is ‘the

process leading up to the council’s decision to commence proceedings’.

R v The Commissioner for Local Administration ex parte PH [1999] EWCA Civ 916

5. Specifically regarding the above case, the matter upon which Turner J based his judgment

appears to have been on the grounds that the complainant had no entitlement to seek

compensation via the Ombudsman because the applicant had resorted to a remedy in court and

the matter settled by way of a consent order in the applicant’s favour. In my case, although a

remedy has been exercised, none has been reached, nor has there been a ruling on the matter

appealed, which if there had been, would if the proceedings were on the same point, put the

complaint out of the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.

6. I understand in circumstances similar to my case the Ombudsman follows counsel opinion

with regards exercising discretion. This means that the Ombudsman does not exercise her

discretion once a complainant has made an application to the court ‘irrespective of what then

happens’. Though this would apply ‘even if the application is rejected or withdrawn before the

hearing’, I would question whether as a blanket approach, the courts would accept this

argument. It is conceivable that in a case similar to mine where the application has neither

been rejected nor withdrawn that a court would deem there a greater reason for discretion

being used because the Magistrates’ court, by ensuring the remedy resorted to is impossible to

reach, is causing additional injustice.

Note : The equivalent legislation 2 setting out the LGO’s powers (1974 Act) contains the same

provision (s26(6)(c) / Schedule 5 para 1) with regards seeking a remedy through the courts.

However, where the LGO interprets this as having no jurisdiction, merely on account of the

complainant commencing proceedings, the Welsh Ombudsman (and it seems the PHSO) only

2

The Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2005 “ Section 9(1)(c) / Schedule 2 para 2 ”. The ParliamentaryCommissioner Act 1967 “ Section 5(2)(b) / Schedule 3 para 6 ”. The Health Service Commissioners Act 1993“Section 4(1)(b) ”.


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considers this a jurisdiction barrier where a legal remedy has been sought and one obtained. It

therefore goes that an applicant who has been unable to obtain a remedy may have recourse to

the ombudsmen who may then be free to exercise discretion to investigate a complaint.

Possibility of joint working with Parliamentary Ombudsman (PHSO)

7. The final review summarises my complaint as follows, despite extensive representations

contesting this interpretation:

“Your complaint is, in summary, that the Council made a charge of £70 for the issue of acouncil tax summons. You disputed the level of the charge. You took legal actionagainst the court in the High Court by way of case stated. You then issued judicialreview proceedings, which you later withdrew. You suggested the question costs shouldbe jointly investigated by the Local Government Ombudsman and the ParliamentaryOmbudsman.”

8. There is little merit reiterating what has already been submitted in my representations but one

material inaccuracy concerning the suggestion of a joint investigation with the PHSO needs

highlighting. The summary above states that I suggested the costs should be jointly

investigated, though the question of costs, in reference to the PHSO’s involvement was not

the remedy I sought. Paragraph 2 in my complaint contained the following:

“It is therefore suggested that the main body of the complaint and the matter of theMagistrates’ court perverting the course of justice are jointly investigated in conjunctionwith the Parliamentary Ombudsman under powers granted by 2007 Regulatory Reformlegislation.”

9. The reference to ‘perverting the course of justice’ was not a reference to costs but to the

Magistrates’ Courts mismanagement of the application (case stated) that has resulted in the

failure to reach an outcome (see Annex A). This is clarified a number of times in the

representations on the Ombudsman’s draft decision. On every occasion (example below) the

reference is clearly to the Magistrates Court’s maladministration:

“It is in this matter that the supporting documents, if they had been considered, wouldhave highlighted the true extent of HMCTS’s maladministration that involved lying toprevent an outcome of the proceedings and why it was recommended to be jointlyinvestigated with the Parliamentary Ombudsman. Despite this; though I’m pursuing theavailable remedy, and have never withdrawn my appeal, it is reasonable that the


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Ombudsman would consider the matter out of my control, and for practical purposesdeem that resolve via the High Court is not a reasonable alternative to the Ombudsman’sinvolvement.”

10. The gross injustice caused by the combined maladministration of these two bodies could notin my mind be more suited to be jointly investigated by the LGO and PHSO.

Where the relevant legal proceedings have been instigated by the council

11. Schedule 5 of the 1974 Act is cited in the review to justify not investigating with regard to

the council taking the matter to court, i.e., para 1 (Sch 5) says the Ombudsman may not

investigate “the commencement or conduct of civil or criminal proceedings before any courtof law.” The relevant paragraph (the review) is quoted below:

“The issue of the summons with the costs was ‘commencement’ of proceedings and sothis is out of the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction and she cannot look at the costs or whathappened in court.”

12. The guidance however states that s26(6)(c) does not apply where the proceedings have been

instigated by the council, though ‘if the matter has been considered by the court it may be

appropriate not to investigate under s24A(6). In these circumstances the investigator must

consider the court’s decision and presumably would need to take into account ‘aspects of

complaint which are separable’ and ‘the process leading up to the council’s decision’ (see

above paras 1-4).

13. The guidance then advises that ‘where in the course of such proceedings the complainant

has made a counterclaim against the council in relation to the subject matter of his

complaint, s/he may be treated as having exercised an alternative remedy under s26(6)(c)’.

But to properly determining that the bar should apply would also require taking into account

‘aspects of complaint which are separable’ etc. etc., and the point (para 6 above) about

people who are denied the possibility of redress i.e., where the application has neither been

rejected nor withdrawn 3.

3 The review cites R (Scholarstica Umo) v Commissioner for Local Administration in England [2003] EWHC 3202

(Admin) to endorse its decision of having no jurisdiction, merely on account of the complainant commencingproceedings. However, in that case the claimant was refused permission to apply for judicial review and so does notrelate to a case where the application has neither been rejected nor withdrawn.


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14. Regarding ‘a counterclaim against the council’, the remedy sought, although summons costs

factored into representations, the questions of law on which the opinion of the High Court

was sought, did not centre on the ‘level of the charge’ (See Annex B).

15. Finally, it is underestimating the extent of the injustice caused by the maladministration to

say that it amounts to a mere £60 when clearly that is just the starting point and the knock-

on affects are potentially far more serious. I have been pursuing these issues with the

council over a protracted period and therefore it is necessary to examine events over the

whole period, so as to appreciate the full extent of the maladministration and injustice.

Yours sincerely

Y. Xxxx


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Annex A

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

CO Ref: CO/ /2014

BETWEEN:

XXXX YYYYY Appellant

and

NORTH EAST LINCOLNSHIRE COUNCIL

Respondent

CHRONOLOGY

19. The billing authority sent a Council Tax reminder dated 12.9.12 in respect of a missed

instalment which was due on 1.9.13. It warned that instalments would be withdrawn if the

account not brought up to date, and if following that the balance was not paid immediately,

a summons would be issued (incurring costs) without further notice.

20. Neither demand was met so on 17.10.12 a summons was served on the Appellant to appear

before the Magistrate’s Court on 2.11.12 to answer the said complaint. It was stated

alternatively that all further proceedings would be stopped if the amount outstanding

including summons costs was paid before the date of the hearing.

21. Payment was made on 17.10.12 which included the outstanding Council Tax liability and an

amount in respect of reasonable costs incurred (albeit a lesser sum than was stated on thesummons as the costs element). The authority was notified by letter under cover of an email

and sought whether it would proceed to obtain a court order to enable enforcement of the

element of costs which the council may have considered was unpaid.

22. On 17.10.12 the billing authority acknowledge receipt of the letter, and advised that it had

been forwarded to its Court Enforcement Officers to deal with. There was no further

response in relation to the issues raised so assumed it would proceed to obtain a liability

order.


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23. On 26.10.12 the Magistrates’ Court was notified that the liability had been settled and

advised that unless the application for a liability order was withdrawn the complaint would

be defended at the hearing of 2.11.12. A summary accompanied the letter to support several

documents asserting that the sum sought by the billing authority was an unreasonable claim

for costs.

24. On 28.10.12 an assessment of costs incurred in pursuance of the defence was submitted to

the Magistrates’ Court.

25. The complaint was heard in the Magistrates’ Court on 2.11.12 where the bench granted a

liability order in respect of the costs which the billing authority claimed were incurred.

26. On 5.11.12 the Magistrates’ Court was contacted by email expressing the wish to appeal the

court’s decision to grant a liability order and request to have details forwarded of the

relevant person to correspond with on the matter.

27. The court responded in a letter dated 6.11.12 advising that a Liability Order could only be

challenged by an appeal to the High Court by way of either a case stated on a point of law or

a judicial review and strongly suggested taking legal advice.

28. On 16.11.12 the court was contacted by email in regards appealing by way of a case stated

and to advise that seeking legal advice was not viable because of unemployment and havingno entitlement to benefit.

29. The court responded by email on 19.11.12 and clarified some points raised and advised that

in certain circumstances it is possible to apply for fee remission.

30. On 20.11.12 the court was contacted by email querying the relevant Criminal Procedure

Rules and again on the 21.11.12 to obtain particulars of the Liability Order hearing as were

required to complete the prescribed form to state a case.

31. The court responded in two separate emails on 21.11.12. The first advised it could not

provide assistance with the appeal and the second, advising that case references were not

allocated in Council Tax cases.

32. On 22.11.12 the application to state a case for an appeal to the high court was served on

both parties, that is, the billing authority and Magistrates' Court, within the time limits laid

out in the Criminal Procedure Rules.


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33. The Deputy Justices’ Clerk acknowledged receipt of the application in a letter dated

22.11.12 and advised that once the documentation had been considered further contact

would be made.

34. There was no communication and on 28.12.12 an attempt to contact the Deputy Justices’

Clerk was made by email, however, a 'delivery failure' notice was generated and returned.

An attempt was made under advice to contact the Justices' Clerk for Humber & South

Yorkshire for which there was no response. Further attempts to make contact on 10.1.13

were also unsuccessful in both cases.

35. The court made contact on 14.1.13 where it transpired that the Deputy Justices' Clerk who

had been dealing with the appeal had left HMCTS at the end of 2012. The Legal Team

Manager stated in his email that he would make enquiries into what was happening with theapplication and update as soon as possible.

36. The matter had been put in the hands of the Justices' Clerk for Humber & South Yorkshire,

who in a letter dated 24.1.13 advised that the Justices require recognizance to be entered

into in the sum of £500 and outlined the conditions of recognizance.

37. The Justices' Clerk was contacted on 6.2.13 by email with the billing authority and Grimsby

Magistrates Court’s Legal Team Manager copied in. An attached letter to the Justices’ Clerk

dated 5.2.13 highlighted that the recognizance should be set at a level which does not deny a

person access to justice and that the proposed sum effectively would. Alternative remedies

were suggested, which in the case of the court, was to set aside the liability order, and for

the billing authority, to apply for the order to be quashed.

38. On 8.2.13 the billing authority replied stating it was not prepared to apply to the Magistrates

Court to quash the liability order as it was correctly obtained. This was disputed in a letter

dated 14.2.13, on the grounds that the application should have ceased when the aggregate ofthe sum outstanding and an amount equal to the costs reasonably incurred by the authority

was paid.

39. The Justices' Clerk was contacted twice by email in February 2013, once on the 19th and

again on the 26th to prompt a response to the letter dated 5.2.13.

40. There was no communication from the Justices’ Clerk and on 23.3.13 the Administrative

Court Office was contacted by letter to make preliminary enquiries about a mandatory order

requiring the Justices to state a case for an appeal to the High Court.


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41. The Justices' Clerk was again contacted by email on 27.3.13 to prompt a response to the

letter dated 5.2.13, but the concerns raised regarding the recognizance were never

addressed.

42. A Pre-Action letter dated 29.4.13 was sent to the Justices’ Clerk advising that it was

intended that an application would be made for permission to bring judicial review

proceedings for a mandatory order requiring the Justices to state a case.

43. The application for permission to bring judicial review proceedings was submitted on

31.5.13 as a consequence of there being no response from the Justices’ Clerk in relation to

the 5.2.13 and 29.4.13 letters. Similarly, there had been no response from the billing

authority to the 14.2.13 letter.

44. Sealed copies of the judicial review application (seal date 12.6.13) were received on

17.6.13, along with directions to proceed with the claim.

45. The Justices' Clerk was contacted by email on 18.6.13 to establish whether the court was

willing to accept service by email and if so, to specify the address to which it must be sent.

46. On 18.6.13, sealed copies of the judicial review claim forms and accompanying documents

were served on the defendant and interested parties in accordance with the relevant Civil

Procedure Rules. In the absence of confirmation from the Justices' Clerk, a hard copy wasposted in addition to that sent electronically in anticipation of the court accepting service by

e-mail.

47. Justices' Clerk contacted by email on 19.6.13 to confirm whether the Certificate of Service

should be lodged in respect of documents served at Grimsby Magistrates' court or those

served at Doncaster Magistrates' court (where the Justices’ Clerk for Humber & South

Yorkshire was based).

48. There was no confirmation from the Justices’ Clerk in regards the location, so on 19.6.13,

the Certificate of Service was lodged in the Administrative Court in respect of documents

served at Grimsby Magistrates' court.

49. Confirmation received on 16.7.13 that the Magistrates' Court had lodged the

Acknowledgement of Service (dated 8.7.13) with the Administrative Court, in regards the

claim for judicial review. The defendant Court gave an undertaking that it would serve the

draft case within fourteen days of the date of the acknowledgement of service.


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Note : It was not until this document was lodged that it was made known by the Clerk that‘the question of the appropriateness of the recognizance and/or the amount could have beenconsidered by the court ’ had an arrangement been made to appear before the defendantcourt to enter into a recognizance.

50. A letter sent by the billing authority dated 19.7.13 advised that the disputed court costs weresuspended, and dependent on the outcome of the proceedings, would either be withdrawn or

remain outstanding with the council.

51. The draft case, together with a statement of the delay for its production, both dated 22.7.13,

were received on 30.7.13. These were accompanied with a covering letter dated 24.7.13,

advising that any written representations upon its content, would, in accordance with rule

77(2) of the Magistrates' Courts Rules 1981, require submitting within 21 days from receipt

of the draft case.

52. On 19.8.13, representations upon the content of the draft case were served together with

letter advising that the Court had (from the latest day on which representations may be

made) 21 days to state and sign the case in accordance with rule 78 of the Magistrates'

Courts Rules 1981. At the same time, a copy was served on the billing authority.

53. The Justices' Clerk was contacted by email on 3.9.13 and a request made for a copy to be

sent of the liability order (as supporting document), stamped by the court, for the purposesof complying with the Civil Procedure Rules.

Note : Practice Direction 52E requires that within 10 days of the court serving the ‘CaseStated’ (anticipated on or before 10.9.13) the appellant's notice along with supportingdocuments require lodging with the appeal court.

54. An order from the High Court in the matter of the application for judicial review was

received on 6.9.13. The administrative court required updating with what had happened

after the defendant court undertook to serve a draft of a Case stated within 14 days of the

Acknowledgement of service. A reply was sent the same day and copies sent to the

interested parties stating that the draft Case had been served and representations made on

the draft case.

55. On 9.9.13, the billing authority as "interested party" to the judicial review claim submitted

representations expressing that it fully supported the defendant court’s submission.


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56. The administrative court wrote on 12.11.13 proposing that the judicial review claim be

withdrawn because there no longer appeared a need for further action on the part of the

High Court as the draft Case had been served.

57. On 20.11.13, the administrative court was notified of the wish to withdraw the judicial

review claim.

Note : The final signed Case anticipated on or before 10.9.13 had not been served. There hadbeen no acknowledgement of neither the written representations made upon the content ofthe draft case nor letter advising of the time limits stipulated in the relevant rules to servethe finalised Case.

58. The Justices' Clerk was contacted by letter under cover of email on 10.1.14 enquiring into

why it was that the justices had not served the Case in accordance with the relevant rules.

Note : In accordance with rule 78 of the Magistrates' Courts Rules 1981, service of the finalsigned Case had overrun the 10.9.13 deadline by 4 months. There was no response.

59. The Justices' Clerk was contacted again by letter under cover of an email on 13.2.14 to

arrange a recognizance hearing in order that the appropriateness and/or the amount may be

considered and agreed.

Note : No response from the Clerk meant second guessing why the case had not beendelivered and assumed the reason may have been because the judicial review claim onlyprompted the court to give an undertaking to serve the draft case only and not deliver thefinal case until recognizance had been agreed.

60. There was no communication from the Justices’ Clerk in the matter of the recognizance so

on 3.3.14 contacted the Humber and South Yorkshire Magistrates Court by phone and spoke

to the Justices Clerk's assistant (Legal Admin Team Leader) where it was confirmed that a

message would be left for the Justices Clerk to make contact that day.

61. Telephoned the Court on the morning of 5.3.14 as there was still no contact and spoke to a

team member from the Judicial Support Unit who ensured a message would reach the

Justices’ Clerk who was due in later. A second call was made on the afternoon of 5.3.14

where a different member of the Judicial Support Unit took the call and confirmed that the

message had been passed on but the Clerk was again not at the premises so unavailable.

62. The Clerk to Justices made contact on 6.3.14, stating in an email that either that day or the

following (7.3.14) the position regarding the case (advising on the next steps) would be set

out and communicated in writing.


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Note : There was no communication from the Justices’ Clerk advising on the next stepswhich on top of the obstruction already encountered seemed to confirm that Humber andSouth Yorkshire Magistrates Court was a rogue unit.

63. Telephoned the court again on 19.3.14 (for the record) to be told again that the Clerk was

not at the premises.

Note : Similarly there was no communication in response to this call from the Justices’ Clerkadvising on the next steps.

64. Telephoned again on 28.3.14 (as a formality) to be advised that the Clerk was not available

but would be left a message.

Note : No response or any communication on this occasion.

65. The Justices' Clerk was contacted by letter under cover of an email on 22.4.14 requesting

the production of a Certificate of refusal to state a case under section 111(5) of the

Magistrates Court's Act 1980.

Note : There has neither been a Certificate of refusal to state a case provided nor any reply tothis communication to date.

66. The Justices' Clerk was contacted by email on 9.7.14 to enquire into whether Her Majesty’s

Courts and Tribunals Service had any arrangements in place to restrict the Appellant’s

contact with Humber and South Yorkshire, and if so in what way.

Note : There has been no reply to this communication to date.

67. On 2.9.14 a judicial complaint was submitted to the relevant Advisory Committee (the

“AC ”) with the grounds of complaint cited as perverting the course of justice. The events

outlined up to paras 48 in this Chronology were provided as evidence.

Note : There has been no reply to this communication to date. It is understood that theSecretary to the AC for the Humber – to whom the complaint was addressed, and againstwhom allegations were made – is also the Justices’ Clerk involved in the present case.

68. On 14.5.15 an enquiry was made with the Magistrates HR Team to establish why there had

not been acknowledgement regarding the complaint. The AC Secretary was not contacted as

it was deemed that eliciting a response would be unlikely. However, there was no advantage

gained, as the HR Team merely forwarded the email to the Committee Secretary.

Note : The Committee Secretary did not reply.

69. On 25.6.15 concerns were raised with the Head of the Judicial Conduct Investigations

Office (“ JCIO ”) who responded on 29.6.15 stating that she had contacted the Committee


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Secretary in the hope she would make contact directly. It was suggested complaining to the

Judicial Appointment and Conduct Ombudsman (“ JACO ”) if the handling of the complaint

remained unsatisfactory.

Note : The Committee Secretary did not reply.

70. JACO was contacted expressing the wish to escalate a complaint, first on 8.8.15 and again

on the 19.8.15 after receiving no acknowledgement.

Note : There has been no reply from the Ombudsman to date.

71. JACO eventually replied in a letter dated 14.12.15 in which an apology was given for the 4

month delay in responding. The Ombudsman’s remit was also set out, some of which

permitted him to consider the delay in investigating the AC complaint submitted more than

a year earlier on 2.9.14.

72. On 18.12.15 permission was given to JACO’s Office to disclose the complaint and

correspondence to the AC and confirmed that the AC had not responded to any

correspondence about the matter and the case still unresolved requesting therefore that the

Ombudsman consider the process by which the AC handled the matter so far. JACO’s

Office stated in an email sent on 22.12.15 that the complaint file would be requested from

the AC and an update given after it had been received and considered.

73. JACO made contact on 23.1.16 informing the Appellant that the complaint file had been

obtained from the AC and apologised for the delay that was down to the significant amount

of time obtaining it. It transpired that the AC had three letters on file that were sent to the

Appellant in response to his correspondence to them (AC), JCIO and JACO. Though the

Appellant had not received the letters when allegedly sent, he has had possession since

JACO attached copies (23.1.16).

74. The first letter dated 16.9.14 which is claimed to have been sent in response to the Judicial

complaint (2.9.14) had been a letter dismissing the complaint as it did not raise a question of

misconduct. It further stated that a certificate of refusal to state a case was not issued by the

Justices because they did state a case for the consideration of the Administrative Court and

the final case has been sent to the Appellant.


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Note : The Appellant received neither the letter nor the final case referred to in that letter.

Moreover, there was no copy of the case stated sent by JACO presumably because the

complaint file obtained from the AC did not contain the document.

75. The second and third letters claimed to have been sent were in connection with the JudicialOffice and then JCIO prompting a response from the AC and were dated 29.5.15 and 6.7.15

respectively. Both copies state: ‘ This matter was responded to by the Humber Advisory

Committee on 16 September 2014 and I enclose herewith a further copy of that reply ’.

Note : The Appellant received neither of these letters, consequently the 16.9.14 letter that

was never received was claimed to have been sent on three occasions.

76. On 25.2.16 the Appellant contacted the Justices' Clerk by email to advise her that he had notreceived and was unaware of the letters she claimed to have sent, dated 16.9.14, 29.5.15,

6.7.15 and the final case stated referred to in the 16.9.14 letter. She was also advised that

JACO had sent copies of the three letters, though not one of the case stated, and would

therefore like that sent in order that the Appellant may proceed with his application to the

High Court.

Note : The Justices' Clerk has never replied to or acknowledged this correspondence.


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Annex B

(Content of Skeleton Argument relevant to these representations)

SUBMISSIONS

Questions for the High Court

19. The questions of law on which the opinion of the High Court is sought were presented to the

Magistrates’ court on 22.11.12 in accordance with the relevant Criminal Procedure Rules, in

the following terms:

“The questions focus on two principle points of law with regards regulation 34 of theCouncil Tax regulations (SI 1992/613).

Those points being, whether

i) costs being disputed as unreasonable should have been awarded by thecourt without evidence from the council to support them.

ii) costs specifically incurred by the council for obtaining the liability ordershould have been charged at the summons issuing stage.”

20. In Nicolson v Tottenham Magistrates it was held unlawful for the court to award costs

without having sufficient relevant information from the billing authority to support them.

Consequently the first question of law in the present case appears to be resolved in the

judgment at paragraph 61 which states as follows:

“This application for judicial review of the decision taken by the Magistrates musttherefore succeed. I was told that since the hearing the order for costs against the

Claimant has been withdrawn, but that does not render the proceedings academic; as Ihave said, it raises issues of wider public importance. Had the order not beenwithdrawn, I would have quashed it. Since it has been withdrawn, I will declare thatthe order was unlawful, because:

i) the Magistrates did not have sufficient relevant information before them toreach a proper judicial determination of whether the costs claimedrepresented costs reasonably incurred by the Council in obtaining theliability order;

ii) the Magistrates erred in law by failing to make further inquiries into howthe £125 was computed and what elements it comprised; and


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iii) the Claimant was denied a fair opportunity to challenge the lawfulness ofthe order before it was made, by reason of the failure to answer his requestsfor the provision of information as to how the sum of £125 was arrived at.”

21. Put in context of the present case it is evident that the Council merely informed the

Magistrates' Court of the standard sum it had decided it would impose as costs and provided

no evidence as to how they were arrived at, and what costs they represented (see below

paras 45-46).

22. Though the court enquired into how the costs were justified at the hearing on 2.11.12, the

Council simply offered that it was not required to justify costs to the court and had never

submitted a breakdown. It was however stated generally that they covered Council Tax

collection and recovery, IT systems, employment of staff and HMCTS for the use of theirfacilities.

Documents

Representations on Final Decision Review Redact