Report European Islamophobia EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA …

2018

EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA

REPORT

ENES BAYRAKLI • FARID HAFEZ (Eds)

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B y gathering 39 local scholars, experts, and civil society activists specialized in racism and human rights, the fourth edition of the European Islamophobia Report addresses a still timely and politically important issue. All 34 country

reports included in this book follow a unique structure that is convenient, first, for com-paring country reports and, second, for selected readings on a particular topic such as politics, employment, or education with regards to Islamophobia across Europe.

The present report investigates in detail the underlying dynamics that directly or indirectly support the rise of anti-Muslim racism in Europe. This extends from Islamophobic state-ments spread in national media to laws and policies that restrain the fundamental rights of European Muslim citizens. As a result, the European Islamophobia Report 2018 dis-cusses the impact of anti-Muslim discourse on human rights, multiculturalism, and the state of law in Europe.

This fourth edition of our report highlights how European societies are challenged by the rise of violent far-right groups that do not only preach hatred of Muslims but also partici-pate in the organization of bloody terror attacks. The rise of far-right terrorist groups such as AFO (Action of Operational Forces) in France or the network Hannibal in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland confirms EUROPOL’s alarming surveys on the growing danger of right-wing terrorism.

This year, SETA worked in cooperation with the Leopold Weiss Institute, an Austrian NGO based in Vienna dedicated to the research of Muslims in Europe. In addition, the Euro-pean Union has funded the European Islamophobia Report 2018 through the program “Civil Society Dialogue Between EU and Turkey (CSD-V)”.

About SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) is a non-profit research institute based in Turkey dedicated to innovative studies on national, regional and interna-tional issues. SETA is the leading think tank in Turkey and has offices in Ankara, Istanbul, Washington D.C. and Cairo. The objective of SETA is to produce up-to-date and accu-rate knowledge and analyses in the fields of politics, economy, and society, and inform policy makers and the public on changing political, economic, social, and cultural condi-tions. Through research reports, publications, brain storming sessions, conferences and policy recommendations, SETA seeks to guide leaders in government, civil society, and business, and contributes to informed decision making mechanisms.

ANKARA • ISTANBUL • WASHINGTON D.C. • CAIRO • BERLIN • BRUSSELS

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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA

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This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors of the national reports; and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union and and Ministry of

Foreign Affairs-Directorate for EU Affairs.

COPYRIGHT © 2019 by SETAAll rights reserved.No part of this publication may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, without permission in writing from the publishers.

ISBN: XX

First Published in 2019

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ABOUT EDITORS

Enes Bayraklı Enes Bayraklı earned his BA, MA and PhD from the Department of Political Science at the University of Vienna, and conducted research for his PhD thesis at the Uni-versity of Nottingham in Britain between 2009 and 2010. He was a deputy director at the Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Center in London in 2011-2013. Bayraklı also served as the founding director of the Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Centers in Con-stanta and Bucharest, Romania in August-December 2012. He has been a faculty member at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Turkish-German University since 2013. Currently he is also the coordinator of SETA Brussels office and director of European Studies at SETA Foundation. His fields of re-search include Islamophobia in Europe, far-right movements in Europe, the transfor-mation of Turkish foreign policy, foreign policy analysis, and German foreign policy.

Farid HafezFarid Hafez, PhD (Political Science, University of Vienna), is currently lecturer and researcher at the University of Salzburg, Department of Political Science and So-ciology and senior researcher at Georgetown University’s “The Bridge Initiative” at the School of Foreign Service. He defended his habilitation thesis on “Islam-Politics in the Second Republic of Austria” at the University of Salzburg. In 2017, he was a Fulbright visiting professor at the University of California, Berkeley and in 2014, he was a visiting scholar at Columbia University, New York. Since 2010 he has been the editor of Islamophobia Studies Yearbook, and since 2016 the co-editor of European Islamophobia Report. Hafez has received the Bruno Kreisky Award for the “Political Book of the Year” for his anthology Islamophobia in Austria (co-edited with John Bunzl). He has more than 80 publications in leading journals such as Politics and Religion, Patterns of Prejudice, and German Politics and Society. His latest publica-tions are Islamophobia in Muslim Majority Societies (Routledge, co-edited with Enes Bayrakli) and Feindbild Islam. Über die Salonfähigkeit von Rassismus (Böhlau).

For more information about the EIR:[email protected]

695islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR

ISLAMOPHOBIA IN ROMANIA

BOGDAN GHENEA

ISLAMOPHOBIA IN

ROMANIANATIONAL REPORT 2018

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The AuthorBogdan Ghenea is a research consultant specialising in human rights, migra-tion/asylum, employability, and labour markets. He holds a Master’s degree in Eu-ropean and Romanian Politics from the University of Bucharest. Since 2010, he has written multiple shadow reports on racism and discrimination for the European Network Against Racism (ENAR) and has collaborated with the Asylum Research Consultancy on writing country and thematic reports. He has provided research and expert advice on employability and labour markets for clients such as Airbus and Total. Email: [email protected]

Disclaimer: Statements of fact and opinion in the national reports of the European Islamophobia Report are those of the respective authors. They are not the expression of the editors or the funding institutions and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union and Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Directorate for EU Affairs.

To cite this report: Bogdan Ghenea: Islamophobia in Romania: National Report 2018, in: Enes Bayraklı & Farid Hafez, European Islamophobia Report 2018, Istanbul, SETA, 2019, pp. 695-714.

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Executive SummaryAlmost 65,000 Muslims live in Romania accounting for 0.34% of the total popu-lation. The presence and integration of Muslims in Romania remains, as with im-migration as a whole, a marginal issue on the political and public agenda. Although no significant incidents regarding Muslims and immigrants have been recorded in Romania during 2018, hostility and increasing anti-immigrant rhetoric in the public sphere has been present, especially in the context of the debate regarding the adop-tion of the UN Global Compact for Migration.

Romania’s initial endorsement of the UN Global Compact for Migration gen-erated criticism from politicians, sparked small protests organised by far-right move-ments, and increased the use of bombastic headlines, factual misrepresentations, and stereotypical depictions of immigrants and Muslims in media coverage.

During 2018, Islamophobic and anti-immigrant articles and campaigns were recorded, especially in nationalist and Christian Orthodox media outlets. Activities in cyberspace of anti-Islam activists and sympathisers of extremist political parties continued to spread hate speech directed at Muslims, although to a lesser extent than in previous years. In February 2018, the National Council for Combatting Dis-crimination ruled that the statements and actions of a professor from the University of Bucharest against persons who wear Islamic veils in public institutions (such as universities) amount to discrimination, limit the right to education, and infringe the right to dignity, and issued a fine for RON 2,000 (about EUR 430).1

Hate crimes and cases of incitement to hatred remain underreported. Few offi-cial complaints have been made compared to the large number of people reportedly experiencing incidents of racial/ethnic or religious discrimination. Still, there is no systemic data collection regarding hate crimes and other types of violence directed at immigrants or Muslims by the Romanian authorities.

The most significant development affecting Muslims during the reporting peri-od was the rejection by the Chamber of Deputies of the legislative proposal to ban face covering with any material that prevents physiognomic recognition in educa-tional institutions. At the time of writing this report, the proposal was up for review in the Senate.

1. “Press Release on the Decisions Taken by the CNCD College of Directors in the Meeting of 22.02.2018”, (Co-municat de presă referitor la hotărârile adoptate de Colegiul director al CNCD în şedinţa din data de 22.02.2018), NCCD, 22 February 2018, http://cncd.org.ro/2018-02-22-comunicat-de-presa-referitor-la-hotararile-adoptate-de-colegiul-director-al-cncd-in-edin-a-din-data-de-22-02-2018, (Access date: 4 September 2019).



SumarAproape 65.000 de musulmani trăiesc în România, reprezentând 0,34% din totalul populației. Prezența și integrarea musulmanilor în România rămâne, ca și în cazul imigrației în ansamblu, o problemă marginală pe agenda politică și publică. Deși în anul 2018 în România nu s-au înregistrat incidente semnificative cu privire la musulmani și imigranți, în sfera publică a fost totuși prezentă ostilitatea și retorica anti-imigrație, în special în contextul dezbaterii privind adoptarea Pactului Global ONU pentru o migraţie sigură, ordonată și reglementată.

Susținerea inițială acordată de România Pactului Global ONU pentru o mi-grație sigură, ordonată și reglementată, a generat critici din partea politicienilor, a declanșat mici proteste organizate de mișcări de extremă dreaptă și a sporit folosirea în mass-media a titlurilor bombastice, a denaturării faptelor și reprezentările stereo-tipice ale imigranților și musulmanilor.

În decursul anului 2018 au fost sesizate articole și campanii islamofobe și an-ti-imigrație, în special în mass-media naționalistă și creștin ortodoxă. În spațiul ciber-netic, activiștii anti-Islam și simpatizanții partidelor politice extremiste au continuat să răspândească discursul instigator la ură față de musulmani, desi într-o maniera redusă comparativ cu anii anteriori.

Infracţiunile motivate de ură și cazurile de incitare la ură rămân insuficient ra-portate. Au fost făcute puține plângeri oficiale în comparație cu numărul mare de persoane care susțin că se confruntă cu incidente de discriminare rasială / etnică sau religioasă. În plus, la nivelul autoritatilor nu există un sistem unitar de colectare a datelor privind infracţiunile motivate de ură și alte tipuri de violență îndreptate îm-potriva imigranților sau musulmanilor. În februarie 2018, Consiliul Național pentru Combaterea Discriminării (CNCD) a hotărât că afirmatiile unui profesor de la Uni-versitatea din București împotriva persoanelor care poartă vălul islamic în instituţii publice, precum universităţile, reprezintă discriminare, limitează dreptul la educație și încalcă dreptul la demnitate. CNCD a aplicat o amendă contraventionala in valoa-re de 2000 RON (aproximativ 430 EUR).

Cel mai important eveniment care a afectat musulmanii în perioada de rapor-tare, a fost respingerea de către Camera Deputaților a propunerii legislative de a in-terzice acoperirea feței cu orice material care împiedică recunoașterea fizionomică în instituțiile de învățământ. La momentul redactării acestui raport, propunerea a fost înaintată la Senat pentru dezbatere.

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Country Profile0Country: RomaniaType of Regime: Democratic RepublicForm of Government: Semi-Presidential SystemRuling Parties: Partidul Social Democrat - PSD (Social-Democrat); Alianta Liber-alilor si Democratilor – ALDE (Liberal)Opposition Parties: Partidul National Liberal – PNL (Liberal); Uniunea Salvati Ro-mania – USR (Centre-Right); Partidul Miscarea Populara – PMP (Centre-Right)Last Elections: 2014 Presidential Election (Klaus Iohannis of PNL – National Lib-eral Party won with 54.4% of votes against Victor Ponta of PSD – Social Democrat Party 45.6%); 2016 Legislative Election (PSD: 221 [Centre-Left], PNL: 99 [Cen-tre-Right], USR: 43 [Centre-Right], UDMR: 30 [Centre-Right], ALDE: 29 [Cen-tre-Right], PMP: 20 [Centre-Right], Minorities: 17)Total Population: 20,121,641 (2011 census)Major Languages: Romanian (official) 85.4%, Hungarian 6.3%, Romani 1.2%, Other 1%, Unspecified 6.1% (2011 est.)Official Religion: No official religion (secularism)Statistics on Islamophobia: No statistics availableStatistics on Racism and Discrimination: There are no designated procedures for recording hate crimes by the Romanian police. Consequently, criminal offenses com-mitted with a bias motivation cannot be identified through the system. According to the National Council for Combatting Discrimination (NCCD), in 2017, there were 652 petitions registered, out of which the largest number of petitions received were on the grounds of belonging to a social category (114) and the smallest numbers were on the grounds of race (2). There were 18 petitions submitted on the grounds of religion. The NCCD found discrimination in 117 cases. Major Religions (% of Population): Eastern Orthodox (86.45%), Roman Catholic (4.6%), Reformed Protestants (3.19%)Muslim Population (% of Population): 0.34%Main Muslim Community Organisations: Romanian Muftiyat, Diyanet FoundationMain NGOs Combating Islamophobia: Centrul Cultural Islamic “Islamul azi” (The Islamic Cultural Centre “Islam Today”), Liga Islamica si Culturala din Romania (The Islamic and Cultural League in Romania), The Coalition for the Rights of Migrants and Refugees (CDMiR), ActiveWatch. Far-Right Parties: The New Right Party – PND (Partidul Noua Dreaptă), United Romania Party - PRU (Partidul Romania Unita), Greater Romania Party – PRM (Partidul Romania Mare)Far-Right Movements: N/AFar-Right Terrorist Organisations: N/A



Limitations to Islamic PracticesHijab Ban: In December 2017, a legislative proposal for banning face coverage with any material that prevents the recognition of physiognomy in educational institutions was launched by 26 MPs. The proposal was overwhelmingly rejected by the Chamber of Deputies in April 2018 and further submitted to the Senate for deliberation. − Halal Slaughter Ban: No− Minaret Ban: No − Circumcision Ban: No− Burka Ban: No− Prayer Ban: No

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IntroductionRomania features mostly as a country of emigration, registering a population de-crease of 6% since 2007, the third highest decrease in the European Union.2 As such, the presence and integration of immigrants in Romanian society remains marginal in the political and public debates.

According to the 2011 Census there were 64,337 registered Muslims in Roma-nia that make up for under 1% of the total population. Most Muslims in Romania live in urban settlements (49,795) with the Turks and Tartars being the largest Is-lamic communities. A total of 20,561 Turks and 14,376 Tartars live in urban areas, whereas 6,342 Turks and 5,684 Tartars are registered in the villages of southern Ro-mania. Most Muslims are located in the county of Constanta (43,279) and Bucha-rest (9,037).

Islam is one of the 18 registered religious denominations specified in Romanian law.3 At the last census Muslims accounted for 0.34% of the population.4

Despite the small number of immigrants living in Romania hostility towards Muslims and anti-immigrant rhetoric were present in the public sphere during the year. The findings of a recent Pew Research study revealed that among Europeans, Romanians were among the least accepting of Muslims, with only 29% of surveyed Romanians being open to the idea of welcoming Muslims into their families or neighbourhoods.5

Discussion of Islamophobic Incidents and Discursive Events Physical and Verbal AttacksBased on the sources consulted, no information on racially motivated violence and incidents directed at Muslims could be found during the reporting period. There is no systemic data collection regarding hate crime and hate speech by the Romanian authorities. The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (EU-FRA) also

2. It is estimated that around 3.4 million Romanian citizens are living and working abroad. “How Romanians Be-came Second at Emigration. Causes and Consequences” (Cum au ajuns românii pe locul doi în lume la emigraţie, Motive şi Consecinţe), Adevarul, 16 August 2017, https://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/cum-ajuns-romanii-loc-ul-doiin-lume-emigratie-motive-consecinte-1_599473bc5ab6550cb80c2cdc/index.html, (Access date: 2 September 2019).

3. “Law 489/2006 on Religious Freedom and the General Status of Religions”, (Legea nr. 489/2006 - libertatea religioasă şi regimul general al cultelor), LegeAZ, https://legeaz.net/monitorul-oficial-201-2014/legea-489-2006-libertatea, (Access date: 1 September 2019).

4. “2011 Census – Religion” (2011 Recensământul despre Religie), National Institute for Statistics, October 2013, http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/publicatii/pliante%20statistice/08-Recensamintele%20despre%20religie_n.pdf, (Ac-cess date: 1 September 2019).

5. “Eastern and Western Europeans Differ on Importance of Religion, Views of Minorities, and Key Social Issues”, Pew Research Center, 29 October 2018, http://www.pewforum.org/2018/10/29/eastern-and-western-europeans-differ-on-importance-of-religion-views-of-minorities-and-key-social-issues/, (Access date: 2 September 2019).



noted that Romania’s law enforcement agencies have not recorded the bias moti-vations of hate crimes.6 The same source further pointed out that there is a lack of understanding among police officers regarding what a hate crime is and how to in-vestigate the bias motive of a crime. Representatives of NGOs mentioned that public authorities in Romania do not collect disaggregated data on hate crimes and other type of violence directed at Muslims. As such, hate crimes remained underreported.

The OSCE ODHIR’s reporting on hate crime in Romania also illustrates the shortage of data.7 No information is available for 2018 while the only incident re-corded against Muslims was the March 2016 assault on two young Muslim women in Bucharest for wearing the hijab.

Romania’s initial endorsement of the UN Global Compact for Migration in November 2018 sparked small protests in Bucharest. These protests were organised by small and obscure nationalistic and neo-fascists movements rallied around Noua Dreaptă (PND), a far-right movement that supports militant ultra-nationalism and strong Orthodox Christian religious convictions. The protests were organised under the title “Marș Împotriva colonizării României” (March against the colonisation of Romania) and were directed at immigrants in general; Muslims were mentioned as one of the ‘major threats’ to Romania that could result from the migration treaty.8

agencies have not recorded the bias motivations of hate crimes.6 The same source further

pointed out that there is a lack of understanding among police officers regarding what a hate

crime is and how to investigate the bias motive of a crime. Representatives of NGOs mentioned

that public authorities in Romania don’t collect disaggregated data on hate crimes and other

type of violence directed at Muslims. As such, hate crimes remained underreported.

The OSCE ODHIR’s reporting on hate crime in Romania also illustrates the shortage of data.7

No information is available for 2018 while the only incident recorded against Muslims was the

March 2016 assault on two young Muslim women in Bucharest for wearing the hijab.

Romania’s initial endorsement of the UN Global Compact for Migration in November 2018

sparked small protests in Bucharest. These protests were organised by small and obscure

nationalistic and neo-fascists movements rallied around Noua Dreaptă (PND), a far-right

movement that supports militant ultra-nationalism and strong Orthodox Christian religious

convictions. The protests were organised under the title “Marș Împotriva colonizării României”

(March against the colonisation of Romania) and were directed at immigrants in general;

Muslims were mentioned as one of the ‘major threats’ to Romania that could result from the

migration treaty.8

Figure 1: “Refugees not welcome in Romania”. “The Romanians Who Do Not Understand Anything about Migration, But Protest about the ‘Colonisation of the Country’” (Românii care nu înțeleg nimic din migrație, dar protestează față de ‘colonizarea țării”.9

6 ‘‘Hate crime recording and data collection practice across the EU’’, European Union Fundamental Rights Agency, 2018, http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-hate-crime-recording_en.pdf, p. 78. 7 Data on Romania’s hate crime reporting to the OSCE ODIHR is available at http://hatecrime.osce.org/romania, (Access date: 5 September 2019). 8 Vlad Popovici, Andree Pocotilă, “The Romanians Who Do Not Understand Anything about Migration, But Protest about the ‘Colonisation of the Country’” (Românii care nu înțeleg nimic din migrație, dar protestează față de ‘colonizarea țării”), Vice, 6 December 2018, https://www.vice.com/ro/article/nepqv8/romanii-care-protesteaza-fata-de-colonizarea-tarii, (Access date: 5 September 2019). 9 Ibid.

Figure 1: “Refugees not welcome in Romania”. “The Romanians Who Do Not Understand Anything about Migration, But Protest about the ‘Colonisation of the Country’” (Românii care nu înțeleg nimic din migrație, dar protestează față

de ‘colonizarea țării”.9

6. ‘‘Hate crime recording and data collection practice across the EU’’, European Union Fundamental Rights Agency, 2018, http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-hate-crime-recording_en.pdf, p. 78.

7. Data on Romania’s hate crime reporting to the OSCE ODIHR is available at http://hatecrime.osce.org/romania, (Access date: 5 September 2019).

8. Vlad Popovici, Andree Pocotilă, “The Romanians Who Do Not Understand Anything about Migration, But Protest about the ‘Colonisation of the Country’” (Românii care nu înțeleg nimic din migrație, dar protestează față de ‘colonizarea țării”), Vice, 6 December 2018, https://www.vice.com/ro/article/nepqv8/romanii-care-protesteaza-fa-ta-de-colonizarea-tarii, (Access date: 5 September 2019).

9. Ibid.

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EmploymentNo significant developments with regard to the employment of Muslims were reported during the period under investigation. In the last data available (for 2017) the NCCD registered 273 petitions about access to employment. Fines were issued in 18 cases, and a warning in 14. The data, however, is not disaggregated by ethnic origin or religion.

The main risks faced by foreign workers in Romania are related to exploitation and differential treatment. There have been reports of behaviour related to individual employment contracts (not having a contract, having fewer working hours registered in the contract or lower payment recorded in the contract, not being paid for over-time work or delays in receiving their salary) or cases of exploitation (for instance, having to work for longer than 12 hours per day with no weekly rest days). Job scar-city, low wages, lack of language proficiency, and lack of recognised academic degrees and other certifications often result in unemployment or employment without a legal contract and its related benefits and protections.

A 2016 study on discrimination of immigrants in Romania which interviewed 30 third-country nationals pointed out that some racist or xenophobic attitudes, especially towards individuals with a different skin colour or those coming from the Middle East, can result in limiting the immigrants’ access to certain professions.10 Also, interviewed persons who had or have small businesses (especially Arabs) complained about being a preferred target for controls by the Financial Guard.11 Given the low number of immi-grants interviewed and the lack of comprehensive data and studies on exploitation of migrant workers in Romania, we should be careful in drawing conclusions.

EducationThe education system in Romania guarantees a high degree of support for minority languages. In 2011, Romania adopted an education law which provides tuition for a minimum number of pupils in minority languages at various levels.12 The only educational institution for the training of imams in Romania is the Kemal Ataturk National College in Medgidia, where a theological profile class operates.13 Turkey offers scholarships for graduates of the college but due to the shrinking number of Muslims in Romania very few apply.14

10. Luciana Lazarescu (et al.), “Discrimination, Abuse and Exploitation: Immigrants’ Access to Civil Rights”, (Intre discriminare, abuz si exploatare. Accesul imigrantilor la drepturi civile), October 2015, http://sar.org.ro/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/DIM_Raport-cercetare_final_26_10_15.pdf, p. 52, (Access date: 1 September 2019).

11. Luciana Lazarescu (et. al.), The Impact of Immigration upon the Romanian Labour Market, (Impactul Imigra-tiei asupra Pietei Muncii din Romania)’’, (EMINET Raport, Bucharest: 2016), http://eminet.cdcdi.ro/sites/default/files/arps/EMINET_Raport%20Impactul%20migratiei%20pe%20piata%20muncii.pdf, p. 100, (Access date: 5 September 2019).

12. Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Second Report of the Committee of Experts in Respect to Romania, 21 December 2017, https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016807766d3#_ftn1, (Access date: 2 September 2019).

13. The State and the Religious Affairs, (Statul şi cultele religioase), (State Secretariat for Religious Affairs, Bucharest: 2018), http://culte.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/BookRO.pdf, p. 162.

14. Andrei Crăciun and Vlad Stoicescu, “Let There Be Light, Open Islam!” (Să fie Lumina, Islam deschide-te!), Să fie Lumina, 8 February 2018, https://safielumina.ro/islam-deschide-te/, (Access date: 4 September 2019).



Discrimination in educational institutions is rarely observed due to the small number of Muslims. However, incidents were recorded when certain university lecturers inappropriately commented on Islam-related matters. In October 2017, a professor of Political Science at the University of Bucharest was accused of discrim-ination after asking a Muslim student not to wear the Islamic veil during class. In February 2018, the NCCD ruled that the professor’s statements constitute discrim-ination, limit the right to education, and infringe the right to dignity, and issued a fine for RON 2000 (about EUR 430).15

PoliticsRomania’s decision in November 2018 to adopt the UN Global Compact for Migra-tion reignited the debate on migration which wasn’t present on the public and polit-ical agenda throughout the year. However, in the context of a variety of views among European Union Member States and as the 2018 President of the European Union Council, Romania considered it “important to maintain a balanced approach”. As such, the delegation abstained from the final vote.16 Earlier in the month, small protests against signing the treaty were organised by nationalistic, racist, and xeno-phobic organisations in Bucharest and other cities.17

In April 2017, the nationalistic parties United Romania Party (PRU), the Great-er Romania Party (PRM), and Noua Dreaptă (PND) formed an alliance, the Na-tional Identity Bloc in Europe (BINE), with the objective of participating in the upcoming elections for the European Parliament as well as presidential, local, and legislative elections that will take place during 2019 and 2020.18 All three parties made derogatory statements and encouraged negative attitudes towards immigrants and Muslims. In December 2018, Noua Dreaptă (PND) also sponsored street pro-tests against the adoption of the UN Global Compact for Migration considering that the pact would transform Romania into “a colony saturated with Muslims and Africans”.19 The protests were low in turnout and impact.

15. “Press Release on the Decisions Taken by the CNCD College of Directors in the Meeting of 22.02.2018”, (Co-municat de presă referitor la hotărârile adoptate de Colegiul director al CNCD în şedinţa din data de 22.02.2018), NCCD, 22 February 2018, http://cncd.org.ro/2018-02-22-comunicat-de-presa-referitor-la-hotararile-adoptate-de-colegiul-director-al-cncd-in-edin-a-din-data-de-22-02-2018, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

16. “Romania Abstained from the Final Vote on the UN Migration Pact”, (România s-a abţinut la votul de la ONU privind Pactul pentru migraţie), Digi24, 24 December 2018, https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/externe/mapamond/ro-mania-s-a-abtinut-la-votul-de-la-onu-privind-pactul-pentru-migratie-1054867, (Access date: 4 September 2019).

17. “The Romanians Who Do Not Understand Anything about Migration, But Protest about the ‘Colonization of the Country” (Românii care nu înțeleg nimic din migrație, dar protestează față de ‘colonizarea țării”), Vice.

18. Liviu Dadacus, “The PRU, PRM and PND Nationalistic Parties Will Form a Political Alliance Called in Short BINE”, (Partidele naţionaliste PRU, PRM şi PND vor constitui o alianţă politică, intitulată prescurtat BINE), Mediafax, 2 April 2017, https://www.mediafax.ro/politic/foto-partidele-nationaliste-pru-prm-si-pnd-vor-consti-tui-o-alianta-politica-intitulata-prescurtat-bine-16217815, (Access date: 6 September 2019).

19. “Nationalists, United as Never Before in the Year of the Centenary!”, (Naționaliștii, mai uniți ca niciodată în anul centenarului!), Noua Dreaptă, 24 December 2018, https://www.nouadreapta.org/noua-dreapta-actiuni.html, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

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The centre-right People’s Movement Party (PMP) founded by former President of Romania Traian Basescu received 4.30% of votes in the last parliamentary elec-tions and has been the main initiator of the legislative proposal to ban face covering in educational institutions.

The project of building a large mosque in Bucharest initiated in 2015 after an agreement between the Romanian and Turkish governments was cancelled in 2018. The Romanian Muftiyat, which represents Muslims in the country, said they could not afford the overall costs of this investment. However, Turkey’s ambassador to Bu-charest told Romanian journalists that Ankara would not insist on concluding the project if it threatened bilateral relations with Bucharest.20 The project was criticised by a series of Romanian politicians in previous years and sparked some protests by small right-wing and anti-Islamic groups.

MediaThe media discourses in Romania overemphasised the “Islamic threat” by perpetuat-ing the idea of the imminent “Muslim invasion” and its “dangerous impact” on the European Union.

As immigration has been mainly a non-issue on the public agenda during the year, only a small number of nationalistic and Orthodox media outlets continued to report on immigration issues using stereotypes, bombastic headlines, and factual misrepresentations of Muslims for gaining online exposure. Several mainstream me-dia outlets also published depictions of Muslims using stereotypes, often taking facts out of context, or deliberately publishing fake news to manipulate public opinion. Below are a number of headlines that illustrate this kind of approach.

Figure 2: “The Silent Jihad. Alarming Discoveries about the Muslim Immigrants, in an Undercover Investigation. Radical Islam and Hatred towards Europeans” (Jihadul tăcut. Dezvăluiri alarmante despre imigranţii musulmani, într-o investigaţie sub acoperire. Islam radical şi dispreţ faţă de europeni)21.

Figure 3: “Germany Expels Europeans out of the Country and Muslim Refugees Are Paid to Stay.” (Germania expulzează europeni din ţară, iar refugiaţii musulmani sunt plătiţi să rămână)22, Napoca News, 23 September 2018, http://www.napocanews.ro/2018/09/germania-expulzeaza-europeni-din-tara-iar-refugiatii-musulmanii-sunt-platiti-sa-ramana.html, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

21 “The Silent Jihad. Alarming Discoveries about the Muslim Immigrants, in an Undercover Investigation. Radical Islam and Hatred towards Europeans”, (Jihadul tăcut. Dezvăluiri alarmante despre imigranţii musulmani, într-o investigaţie sub acoperire. Islam radical şi dispreţ faţă de europeni), Evenimentul Zilei, 25 February 2018, https://evz.ro/jihad-tacut-imigranti-musulmani.html, (Access date: 3 September 2019). 22 “Germany Expels Europeans out of the Country and Muslim Refugees Are Paid to Stay”, (Germania expulzează europeni din ţară, iar refugiaţii musulmani sunt plătiţi să rămână), Napoca News, 23 September 2018, http://www.napocanews.ro/2018/09/germania-expulzeaza-europeni-din-tara-iar-refugiatii-musulmanii-sunt-platiti-sa-ramana.html, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

Figure 2: “The Silent Jihad. Alarming Discoveries about the Muslim Immigrants, in an Undercover Investigation. Radical Islam and Hatred towards Europeans” (Jihadul tăcut. Dezvăluiri alarmante despre imigranţii musulmani,

într-o investigaţie sub acoperire. Islam radical şi dispreţ faţă de europeni)21.

20. Ana Maria Luca, “Romanian Muslims Cancel Grand Mosque Project”, Balkan Insight, 18 July 2018, Bal-kan Insight, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/romania-muslim-cult-tables-turkish-grand-mosque-project- 07-17-2018, (Access date: 4 September 2019).

21. “The Silent Jihad. Alarming Discoveries about the Muslim Immigrants, in an Undercover Investigation. Radical Islam and Hatred towards Europeans”, (Jihadul tăcut. Dezvăluiri alarmante despre imigranţii musulmani, într-o investigaţie sub acoperire. Islam radical şi dispreţ faţă de europeni), Evenimentul Zilei, 25 February 2018, https://evz.ro/jihad-tacut-imigranti-musulmani.html, (Access date: 3 September 2019).



Figure 2: “The Silent Jihad. Alarming Discoveries about the Muslim Immigrants, in an Undercover Investigation. Radical Islam and Hatred towards Europeans” (Jihadul tăcut. Dezvăluiri alarmante despre imigranţii musulmani, într-o investigaţie sub acoperire. Islam radical şi dispreţ faţă de europeni)21.

Figure 3: “Germany Expels Europeans out of the Country and Muslim Refugees Are Paid to Stay.” (Germania expulzează europeni din ţară, iar refugiaţii musulmani sunt plătiţi să rămână)22, Napoca News, 23 September 2018, http://www.napocanews.ro/2018/09/germania-expulzeaza-europeni-din-tara-iar-refugiatii-musulmanii-sunt-platiti-sa-ramana.html, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

21 “The Silent Jihad. Alarming Discoveries about the Muslim Immigrants, in an Undercover Investigation. Radical Islam and Hatred towards Europeans”, (Jihadul tăcut. Dezvăluiri alarmante despre imigranţii musulmani, într-o investigaţie sub acoperire. Islam radical şi dispreţ faţă de europeni), Evenimentul Zilei, 25 February 2018, https://evz.ro/jihad-tacut-imigranti-musulmani.html, (Access date: 3 September 2019). 22 “Germany Expels Europeans out of the Country and Muslim Refugees Are Paid to Stay”, (Germania expulzează europeni din ţară, iar refugiaţii musulmani sunt plătiţi să rămână), Napoca News, 23 September 2018, http://www.napocanews.ro/2018/09/germania-expulzeaza-europeni-din-tara-iar-refugiatii-musulmanii-sunt-platiti-sa-ramana.html, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

Figure 3: “Germany Expels Europeans out of the Country and Muslim Refugees Are Paid to Stay.” (Germania expulzează europeni din ţară, iar refugiaţii musulmani sunt plătiţi să rămână)22, Napoca News, 23 September 2018,

http://www.napocanews.ro/2018/09/germania-expulzeaza-europeni-din-tara-iar-refugiatii-musulmanii-sunt-platiti-sa-ramana.html, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

Figure 4: “PRO-ISLAM Manipulating Advertising Panels in Large Cities. Do the Authorities Notice to Take Them Down?”, (Panouri publicitare manipulatoare PRO-ISLAM în oraşele mari. Pe acestea nu se sesizează nimeni să le dea JOS?).23

Figure 5: “Liberty for Immigrants in Romania! Iohannis and Dancila Open Wide the Borders for Anyone.” (Liber pentru migranţi în România! Iohannis şi Dăncila deschid larg graniţele pentru oricine)24, Evenimentul Zilei, 29 November 2018, https://evz.ro/iohannis-dancila-migranti.html, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

23 “PRO-ISLAM Manipulating Advertising Panels in Large Cities. Do the Authorities Notice to Take Them Down?”, (Panouri publicitare manipulatoare PRO-ISLAM în oraşele mari. Pe acestea nu se sesizează nimeni să le dea JOS?), Ortodox Info, 28 September 2018, https://ortodoxinfo.ro/2018/09/28/panouri-publicitare-manipulatoare-pro-islam-in-orasele-mari-pe-acestea-nu-se-sesizeaza-nimeni-sa-le-dea-jos/, (Access date: 3 September 2019). 24 “Liberty for Immigrants in Romania! Iohannis and Dancila Open Wide the Borders for Anyone”, (Liber pentru migranţi în România! Iohannis şi Dăncila deschid larg graniţele pentru oricine), Evenimentul Zilei, 29 November 2018, https://evz.ro/iohannis-dancila-migranti.html, (Access date: 3 September 2019).



Figure 5: “Liberty for Immigrants in Romania! Iohannis and Dancila Open Wide the Borders for Anyone.” (Liber pentru migranţi în România! Iohannis şi Dăncila deschid larg graniţele pentru oricine)24, Evenimentul Zilei, 29 November 2018, https://evz.ro/iohannis-dancila-migranti.html, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

23 “PRO-ISLAM Manipulating Advertising Panels in Large Cities. Do the Authorities Notice to Take Them Down?”, (Panouri publicitare manipulatoare PRO-ISLAM în oraşele mari. Pe acestea nu se sesizează nimeni să le dea JOS?), Ortodox Info, 28 September 2018, https://ortodoxinfo.ro/2018/09/28/panouri-publicitare-manipulatoare-pro-islam-in-orasele-mari-pe-acestea-nu-se-sesizeaza-nimeni-sa-le-dea-jos/, (Access date: 3 September 2019). 24 “Liberty for Immigrants in Romania! Iohannis and Dancila Open Wide the Borders for Anyone”, (Liber pentru migranţi în România! Iohannis şi Dăncila deschid larg graniţele pentru oricine), Evenimentul Zilei, 29 November 2018, https://evz.ro/iohannis-dancila-migranti.html, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

Figure 5: “Liberty for Immigrants in Romania! Iohannis and Dancila Open Wide the Borders for Anyone.” (Liber pentru migranţi în România! Iohannis şi Dăncila deschid larg graniţele pentru oricine)24, Evenimentul Zilei, 29 November 2018,

https://evz.ro/iohannis-dancila-migranti.html, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

22. “Germany Expels Europeans out of the Country and Muslim Refugees Are Paid to Stay”, (Germania expulzează europeni din ţară, iar refugiaţii musulmani sunt plătiţi să rămână), Napoca News, 23 September 2018, http://www.napocanews.ro/2018/09/germania-expulzeaza-europeni-din-tara-iar-refugiatii-musulmanii-sunt-platiti-sa-ramana.html, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

23. “PRO-ISLAM Manipulating Advertising Panels in Large Cities. Do the Authorities Notice to Take Them Down?”, (Panouri publicitare manipulatoare PRO-ISLAM în oraşele mari. Pe acestea nu se sesizează nimeni să le dea JOS?), Ortodox Info, 28 September 2018, https://ortodoxinfo.ro/2018/09/28/panouri-publicitare-manipula-toare-pro-islam-in-orasele-mari-pe-acestea-nu-se-sesizeaza-nimeni-sa-le-dea-jos/, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

24. “Liberty for Immigrants in Romania! Iohannis and Dancila Open Wide the Borders for Anyone”, (Liber pentru migranţi în România! Iohannis şi Dăncila deschid larg graniţele pentru oricine), Evenimentul Zilei, 29 November 2018, https://evz.ro/iohannis-dancila-migranti.html, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

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Figure 6. “The Migration Pact or How Soros Threaded the Camel through the Needle” (Pactul pentru Migraţie sau cum Soros strecoară cămila prin urechile acului) 25 , România Liberă, 4 December 2018, https://romanialibera.ro/opinii/pactul-pentru-migratie-sau-cum-soros-strecoara-camila-prin-urechile-acului-763819 (Access date: 8 January 2019).

This type of reporting hasn’t been widespread, as most popular publications used a balanced

discourse in reporting issues regarding Muslims and immigrants, and no other major media

campaigns targeting Muslims were registered during the reporting period.

Justice System

The most significant legal development affecting the rights of Muslims that took place during

the year was the rejection of the draft bill proposing to prohibit covering the face in educational

institutions without providing for a religious exemption.

If the law passes, the burka, niqab, or other clothing used to cover the face for cultural (religious

or ethnic) or other reasons, except for medical purposes, will be banned in educational

institutions. Initiated in December 2017 by a group of 26 MPs from the three parliamentary

parties Popular Movement Party (PMP), Alliance of Liberals and Democrats Party (ALDE),

and the National Liberal Party (PNL), the bill received a negative advisory opinion from the

government and was overwhelmingly rejected by the Chamber of Deputies in April 2018. The

bill was further submitted for assessment to the Senate.26

25 “The Migration Pact or How Soros Threaded the Camel through the Needle”, (Pactul pentru Migraţie sau cum Soros strecoară cămila prin urechile acului), România Liberă, 4 December 2018, https://romanialibera.ro/opinii/pactul-pentru-migratie-sau-cum-soros-strecoara-camila-prin-urechile-acului-763819 (Access date: 3 September 2019). 26 At the time of writing this report, there weren’t any developments: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/proiecte/upl_pck2015.proiect?idp=16761.

Figure 6. “The Migration Pact or How Soros Threaded the Camel through the Needle” (Pactul pentru Migraţie sau cum Soros strecoară cămila prin urechile acului)25, România Liberă, 4 December 2018, https://romanialibera.ro/opinii/

pactul-pentru-migratie-sau-cum-soros-strecoara-camila-prin-urechile-acului-763819 (Access date: 8 January 2019).

This type of reporting hasn’t been widespread, as most popular publications used a balanced discourse in reporting issues regarding Muslims and immigrants, and no other major media campaigns targeting Muslims were registered during the reporting period.

Justice SystemThe most significant legal development affecting the rights of Muslims that took place during the year was the rejection of the draft bill proposing to prohibit cover-ing the face in educational institutions without providing for a religious exemption.

If the law passes, the burka, niqab, or other clothing used to cover the face for cultural (religious or ethnic) or other reasons, except for medical purposes, will be banned in educational institutions. Initiated in December 2017 by a group of 26 MPs from the three parliamentary parties Popular Movement Party (PMP), Alliance of Liberals and Democrats Party (ALDE), and the National Liberal Party (PNL), the bill received a negative advisory opinion from the government and was over-whelmingly rejected by the Chamber of Deputies in April 2018. The bill was further submitted for assessment to the Senate.26

Critics of the proposal have pointed out that there are very few women in Ro-mania who wear such coverings.27 Furthermore, the president of the national equal-

25. “The Migration Pact or How Soros Threaded the Camel through the Needle”, (Pactul pentru Migraţie sau cum Soros strecoară cămila prin urechile acului), România Liberă, 4 December 2018, https://romanialibera.ro/opinii/pactul-pentru-migratie-sau-cum-soros-strecoara-camila-prin-urechile-acului-763819 (Access date: 3 Septem-ber 2019).

26. At the time of writing this report, there weren’t any developments: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/proiecte/upl_pck2015.proiect?idp=16761.

27. According to Islamic Studies expert Alina Isak Alak there are only a handful of women wearing the Islamic veil in Romanian educational institutions. Another expert, Fatma Yılmaz, has pointed out that according to data received from the Ministry of Internal Affairs no person wearing the Islamic veil has been registered while issuing ID docu-mentation. See: Florinela Iosip, “Antiburka Law in Romanian Schools: Measure of Security or Manifestation of Hate towards Islam? (Lege antiburka în şcolile din România: măsură pentru siguranţă sau o manifestare a urii faţă de is-lam?), Adevărul, 22 December 2017, http://adevarul.ro/educatie/scoala/lege-antiburka-scolile-romania-masura-sig-uranta-manifestare-urii-fata-islam--1_5a3bdf44d7af743f8d957e58/index.html, (Access date: 5 September 2019). There were no other figures on women wearing the Islamic veil in Romania in the sources consulted.



ity body has stated that “the association of the Islamic veil with terrorism is a proof of hate speech against a minority culture in Romania”.28

InternetRomania has its own radical groups that have been fuelled mostly by the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 and that still actively promote anti-Muslim sentiment - although with less frequency - in the context of migration in the European Union and the recent adoption of the UN pact on migration. Most anti-immigration, anti-Islamist activists have ties with nationalistic movements such as the New Right party (Noua Dreaptă).

An EU assessment of the removal of online hate speech by IT companies in the online environment published in January 2018 found that across the EU hate speech has been directed most commonly towards ethnic origin (17.1%), anti-Muslim hatred (16.4%), and xenophobia (16%). In Romania, 63 such cases of illegal online hate speech have been reported, with a rate of removal from the online platforms of 76.2%.29

The Facebook page “We don’t want a mega-mosque in Bucharest”,30 created to oppose the building of a grand mosque in Bucharest, although not as active as in the past years, has saluted the cancellation of the construction, considering it a victory and a consequence of the protests they organised against the project. The page still posts or shares anti-Muslim content frequently that receives moderate engagement, such as the racist photo shared on 30 November, 2018 that states, “Over 60% of refugees are Muslims. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait are all 99% Islamic countries and ZERO refugee intake. This PROVES they’re IN-VADERS – not REFUGEES” (Fig. 7).

Figure 7. “Over 60% of refugees are Muslims. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait are all 99% Islamic countries and ZERO refugee intake. This PROVES they’re INVADERS – not REFUGEES”.31

Central Figures in the Islamophobia Network The main actors that are promoting Islamophobia are small far-right movements and parties

that combine a nationalistic agenda, strong Orthodox Christian religious convictions, and

elements of the fascist ideology of the Legionary Movement (the Romanian fascist movement

during World War II). They are active in trying to gain public exposure and political support

by adopting a strong stance on immigration and xenophobic rhetoric.

Most of these movements are relatively obscure and group themselves around the more

established Noua Dreaptă (PND), which was registered as a political party in 2015. The PND

is known to have branches abroad, including the Republic of Moldova and according to some

sources it also maintains political relations with similar anti-European and anti-NATO groups

from different countries.32

31 The post can be consulted here: https://www.facebook.com/NuVremMegaMoscheeInBucuresti/posts/920071684849885, (Access date: 2 September 2019). 32 William Totok, “Small Glossary of Movements That Oppose Romania Signing the UN Migration Pact”, (Mic glosar al mişcărilor care se opun semnării de către România a Pactului ONU pentru Migrație), Radio Free Europe, 5 December 2018, https://www.europalibera.org/a/mic-glosar-al-mi%C5%9Fc%C4%83rilor-care-se-opun-semn%C4%83rii-de-c%C4%83tre-rom%C3%A2nia-a-pactului-pentru-migra%C8%9Bie/29639490.html, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

Figure 7. “Over 60% of refugees are Muslims. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait are all 99% Islamic countries and ZERO refugee intake. This PROVES they’re INVADERS – not REFUGEES”.31

28. Ibid.

29. “Results of Commission’s Last Round of Monitoring of the Code of Conduct against Online Hate Speech”, Eu-ropean Comission Directorate for Justice and Consumers, http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/document.cfm?doc_id=49286, (Access date: 4 September 2019).

30. The page can be consulted here: https://www.facebook.com/NuVremMegaMoscheeInBucuresti/, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

31. The post can be consulted here: https://www.facebook.com/NuVremMegaMoscheeInBucuresti/posts/92007 1684849885, (Access date: 2 September 2019).

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Central Figures in the Islamophobia NetworkThe main actors that are promoting Islamophobia are small far-right movements and parties that combine a nationalistic agenda, strong Orthodox Christian religious convictions, and elements of the fascist ideology of the Legionary Movement (the Romanian fascist movement during World War II). They are active in trying to gain public exposure and political support by adopting a strong stance on immigration and xenophobic rhetoric.

Most of these movements are relatively obscure and group themselves around the more established Noua Dreaptă (PND), which was registered as a political party in 2015. The PND is known to have branches abroad, including the Republic of Moldova and according to some sources it also maintains political relations with similar anti-European and anti-NATO groups from different countries.32

During the year, the PND and other lesser known movements33 have been at the forefront of organising the protests against the adoption of the UN Global Compact for Migration. Their exposure and impact, however, has been minimal.

The parliamentary party People’s Movement Party (PMP) has been the main initiator of the 2017 legislative proposal to ban face covering in educational institu-tions. (See Justice System section). PMP senator Vasile Cristian Lungu has advocated for the rejection of the UN Global Compact for Migration stating that most refugees originating from Syria and Iraq are “young, illiterate or semi-illiterate men, without papers, and this fact must be emphasised, overwhelmingly, of Muslim religion” and that in European cities the “violent crimes - especially rape, crimes and robberies, and terrorist attacks are committed in overwhelming numbers by Muslims”.34

Observed Civil Society and Political Assessment and InitiativesThe National Council for Combatting Discrimination has become increasingly effective in its work. It has received a growing number of petitions over the years

32. William Totok, “Small Glossary of Movements That Oppose Romania Signing the UN Migration Pact”, (Mic glosar al mişcărilor care se opun semnării de către România a Pactului ONU pentru Migrație), Radio Free Eu-rope, 5 December 2018, https://www.europalibera.org/a/mic-glosar-al-mi%C5%9Fc%C4%83rilor-care-se-opun-semn%C4%83rii-de-c%C4%83tre-rom%C3%A2nia-a-pactului-pentru-migra%C8%9Bie/29639490.html, (Ac-cess date: 3 September 2019).

33. The 13 signatories of the December 2018 “March against the colonisation of Romania” were Asociația Noua Dreaptă, Frăția Ortodoxă Sfântul Mare Mucenic Gheorghe, Asociația pentru Cultură, Educație și Valori Europene, Aso-ciația Bucovina Profundă, Asociația Calea Neamului, Asociația Gogu Puiu, Asociația Pro Consumatori, Asociația pentru Revigorarea Tradiției, Asociația Scut Botoșănean, Fundația Ion Gavrilă Ogoranu, Fundația Sfinții Martiri Brâncoveni şi Asociația pentru Toleranță în Spațiul Public.

34. Vasile- Christian Lungu, “Migration Global Pact or How to Cancel the Romanian Constitution” (Pactul Global pentru Migraţie sau cum să anulezi Constituţia României), Adevărul, 28 November 2018, https://adevarul.ro/news/societate/pactul-global-migratie-anulezi-constitutia-romaniei-1_5bfe55badf52022f75e26bc1/index.html, (Access date: 2 September 2019).



and has provided its expert opinion on judicial proceedings.35 The equality body’s activity has, however, been criticised by conservative politicians who view it as the “policeman of political correctness” and there are more and more calls in the public space targeting the NCCD. The vice-president of the National Liberal Par-ty (PNL) Ben Oni Ardelean and other politicians asked for the institution to be closed down. He specified that “the NCCD is a Gestapo-type institution which does nothing else but trying to oppress any form of freedom of expression as well as belief and religious freedom”.36

The NCCD partnered with 20 other organisations across seven European countries, including four national ministries, several regional public authorities, universities, and NGOs on an Erasmus project to combat radicalisation and pro-mote inclusion.37

The Coalition for the Rights of Migrants and Refugees (CDMiR), established in 2017 by a group of eleven Romanian NGOs active in the field of migration, human rights, and public policies, welcomed four more members in 2018, including the na-tional branches of two prestigious international organisations, Save the Children and Terre des Hommes. The CDMiR now has 20 NGO members, and four supporters (three academic institutions and the Romanian UNHCR Office) and strives to im-prove the perception of migrants and refugees in the public space, and advocates for the improvement of their access to basic rights and services. The coalition’s priorities going forward focus on education, citizenship, and access to the labour market.

The main NGOs committed to protecting and advancing the interests of Mus-lims in Romania are Centrul Cultural Islamic “Islamul Azi” (The Islamic Cultural Centre “Islam Today”) 38 and Liga Islamica si Culturala din Romania (The Islamic and Cultural League in Romania).39

ActiveWatch is a human rights organisation that advocates for free commu-nication for public interest. Among other activities, ActiveWatch strives to tackle racism and discrimination in the media and produces an annual report on hate speech in Romania.40

35. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Official Doc-uments System of the United Nations, 5 April 2018, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/084/74/PDF/G1808474.pdf?OpenElement, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

36. Marinela Angheluș, “Ben-Oni Ardelean Wants to Abolish the NCCD: It’s a Gestapo-Type Institution. It Stops Free Expression!”, (Ben-Oni Ardelean vrea desființarea CNCD-ului: E o instituție de tip Gestapo. Opresează expri-marea liberă!), PS News, 17 October 2018, https://psnews.ro/ben-oni-ardelean-vrea-desfiintarea-cncd-ului-e-o-in-stitutie-de-tip-gestapo-opreseaza-exprimarea-libera-exclusiv-236421/, (Access date: 2 September 2019).

37. IARS Press Release, €1.5m Youth-Led Project Funded by Erasmus to Tackle Radicalisation and Promote In-clusion, 1 March 2017, The IARS International Institute, http://api.components.ro/uploads/1d3a0bf8b95391b 825aa56853282d5da/2017/03/IARS_PR_YEIP_announcement_1.3.17.pdf, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

38. IslamulAzi, http://www.islamulazi.ro/.

39. IslamRomania, https://islamromania.ro/contact/.

40. ActiveWatch, https://activewatch.ro/ro/acasa/.

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Conclusion and Policy Recommendations The presence of Muslims in Romania remains a marginal issue on the political and public agenda. Although no major internal developments affecting Muslims have been registered during the reporting period, stereotypical portrayal of Muslims in the media and in populist speeches by politicians, have facilitated a growing trend of manifestations of intolerance and hate speech towards Muslims. The authorities’ lack of preparation, collaboration, and interest in tackling racism and discrimination, as well as the civil society’s insufficient resources to provide support are the main issues that need to be addressed.

• Authorities should adopt a strategy on preventing and combatting discrim-ination, and annual action plans for its implementation.

• Relevant authorities should develop and promote the harmonisation of data collection in areas of hate crime and racism, recognising anti-Muslim bias as a category.

• Including hate crime and speech as well as anti-discrimination legislation in the compulsory initial and continuous training of all law enforcement and legal professionals.

• Implementing a long-term monitoring mechanism to prevent ethnic and Islamophobic hatred in mass media and cyberspace.

• Initiating a collaboration between competent authorities in the field of im-migration, labour and institutions combating discrimination and NGOs in order to elaborate integrated public policies.

• NGOs should strengthen their relationship with the Muslim community and enhance their legal capacity to assist victims of discrimination and hate crime.

Chronology • 22.02.2018: A fine for discrimination, limiting the right to education, and

infringing on the right to dignity was issued by the NCCD for a professor of Political Science at the University of Bucharest who asked a Muslim stu-dent not to wear the Islamic veil during class.41

• 18.04.2018: The draft bill proposing to prohibit covering the face in edu-cational institutions without providing for a religious exemption was over-whelmingly rejected by the Chamber of Deputies. The bill was further sub-mitted for assessment to the Senate.42

41. “Press Release on the Decisions Taken by the CNCD College of Directors in the Meeting of 22.02.2018”, (Co-municat de presă referitor la hotărârile adoptate de Colegiul director al CNCD în şedinţa din data de 22.02.2018), NCCD, (Access date: 3 September 2019)

42. At the time of writing this report, there weren’t any developments: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/proiecte/upl_pck2015.proiect?idp=16761.



• 05.12.2018: A protest organised by nationalistic movements against the adoption of the UN Global Compact for Migration took place in Bucharest.43

43. “The Romanians Who Do Not Understand Anything about Migration, But Protest about the ‘Colonisation of the Country”, (Românii care nu înțeleg nimic din migrație, dar protestează față de ‘colonizarea țării”), Vice.

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