Mediterranean Report #8

July 2015

Turkey after last general elections Domestic and external factors influencing the future of the country

Edited By Francesca AZZARÀ

MA in International Relations and Vice-CEO of

Mediterranean Affairs

(LUISS Guido Carli, University of Rome)

July 2015

Copyright© 2015 by Mediterranean Affairs

All right reserved except for brief quotations in a review. This Paper must not be reproduced in

any form without permission in writing form the publisher.

Mediterranean Affairs is a Think Tank aiming to provide analyses that cover the Mediterranean

area. By carrying out extensive researches, the staff studies various issues of international policy

focused on defense and security, regional stability, and transnational challenges such as economic

integration.

The main objective is to provide detailed information to the public through the website, writing

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interviews with the media.

July 2015

2 Turkey after last general elections. Domestic and external factors influencing the future of the Country

Introduction................................................................................................................ 3

Interview with Daniele Santoro ................................................................................... 5

Turkish diaspora and out of country voting ................................................................. 9

Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 13

Authors .................................................................................................................... 15

Summary

July 2015

3 Introduction

Introduction

The domestic and external politics of Turkey have been hit by a tornado of changes

consequently to some recent events coming from both inside and outside the country,

that is the Turkish general elections and the nuclear agreement between Iran and the

P5+1 group.

The elections, perceived as a motion of no confidence against Erdoğan, have forced

the country to revise its policy towards the Kurds, to revive the peace process and, as

a result, modified its stance towards the war in Syria and its neighborhood as a whole.

These issues added to the foregoing rivalries between the political factions inside

Turkey, making it difficult for it to come out with a coalition Government to avoid

plunging into a straightforward situation of instability.

The recent agreement

between the P5and1 marked the

official return of the Iranian

power to – at least – the regional

stage, thus forcing Turkey to

resettle its ambiguous policy

towards a historically

competitive neighbor.

Thus, this report will try to

unveil some particular aspects of

the above-mentioned issues.

First, an interview to Daniele Santoro will explain the effects of the “Kurdish victory”

at the last general elections on the AKP’s attitude towards the Kurds, the war in Syria

and, more in general, to Iran. This first part of the report is extremely important as it

demonstrates how internal and external issues as well as human rights protection,

domestic politics and external affairs are deeply connected and determine the future of

the country as a whole and in relation to its neighborhood.

Then, a piece from Stephanie Plante will try to uncover an aspect of the last general

elections most of people failed to notice, that is the relationship between Turkey and

its “expats”. In fact, despite Turkey has been lately depicted as an immigration country

because of the refugees flow from the Syrian border, it is and always be an emigration

one. Hence, the way Turkey deals with the so-called “Turkish Diaspora” is a yardstick

of the former’s democratic maturity.

Source: Wikipedia

July 2015

4 Turkey after last general elections. Domestic and external factors influencing the future of the Country

Together, these two contributions will try to provide a specific while encompassing

picture of the changes occurring inside out Turkey especially since ever the benchmark

of the recent elections.The domestic and external politics of Turkey have been hit by a

tornado of changes consequently to some recent events coming from both inside and

outside the country, that is the Turkish general elections and the nuclear agreement

between Iran and the P5+1 group.

Francesca Azzarà

Vice-CEO of Mediterranean Affairs

July 2015

5 Interview with Daniele Santoro

Interview with Daniele Santoro

By Francesca Azzarà

Can you tell us what do you think about “relative” victory of the HDP at the last general elections concerning its internal politics, which is to the peace process and to the guarantee of more rights to the Kurds? Do you think that the AKP will find an agreement with the HDP through Öcalan or, otherwise, will go to snap elections?

The 13% of shares obtained by the HDP at the last general elections marks an extraordinary result, which undoubtedly is likely to influence the “peace process” with the Kurds. In fact, we can probably explain Erdoğan’s decision to suspend the peace process in April as a way to stem the HDP’s possibility to overcome the fatidic 10% threshold and to respond to the anti-AKP electoral campaign conducted by Demirtaş. Since 5th April, the Ministry of Justice has not been replying to the demands of the Imrali Committee to visit the PKK leader Öcalan. Thus, one can claim that the HDP’s success has somehow complicated the solution process for two reasons.

First, because Demirtaş did not accept the idea of exchanging presidentialism for more autonomy to the Kurds, as negotiated by Erdoğan and Öcalan.

Second, The HDP’s access to the Parliament established, on the Kurdish side, a relationship between the civilians and the military similar to the one

before the reforms introduced by Erdoğan. In this respect, it will be interesting to see how much Öcalan and the other leaders of the PKK will influence Demirtaş’ moves. After the elections, the Union of the Kurd Communities released a public statement in which it resized the HDP’s role in the elections and owed this success to Öcalan and to his democratic project.

A few weeks ago Murat Karayılan, the PKK’s military leader, publicly criticized Demirtaş’ excessive antagonism towards the AKP and called on to change this attitude. In this context, what is sure is that the AKP lost 2 million votes to the HDP. It remains to assess the impact on the peace process of Erdoğan’s strategy to re-conquer the lost votes. A positive sign comes from the meeting of last 4th July between the Turkey’s President and the HDP Deputy Celal Doğan and the project of going back to elections on November with a 5-7% to reduce the occurrence of a “convenience vote” of the Kurds in favor to the HDP.

This possible rapprochement to the Kurds inside Turkey does not clash with the antagonism demonstrated towards the Kurds in Syria? I mean, there have been speculations about a possible military action in Syria lately aimed

July 2015

6 Turkey after last general elections. Domestic and external factors influencing the future of the Country

at impede the creation of a Kurdish state cross the Syrian border.

The relations with the Kurds deeply influence that with the PKK and the solution process and vice versa. Turkey sees the PyD as an extension of the PKK. For this reason, Erdoğan reads each success of the Syrian Kurds as a reinforcement of the PKK. For instance, the establishment of the Rojava cantons in 2014, the alliance between the U.S. and the PKK/PyD established in occasion of the ISIS’ siege of Kobani and the curd militias’ recent siege of Tel Abyad made it possible for the PKK to control more or less directly a significant portion of the Syrian territory and to become the more significant American ally there. This powerful position enabled the PKK to be advantaged in the negotiations with Turkey to lay down the arms. Thus, in this moment, Ankara cannot accept the creation of a kind of Kurdish entity in the north of Syria. As told playfully in the last few days, that would imply the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PKK that, instead, Erdoğan scheduled to dismantle in a few years because of the negotiations with Öcalan. Bearing in mind that Syria is now a confederation of terrorist organizations, it is comprehensible that Turkey is interested in establishing a lasting relationship with the Syrian Kurds. Similarly, to what the Turkish Government did with the Kurds in Iraq, Rojava is likely to become a Turkish satellite. A move like this, anyway, cannot be made without an agreement with the PKK on the arms deposition.

Furthermore, Turkey has got valid geopolitical reasons to oppose the creation of a Kurdish entity able to control the almost totality of the border with Syria, which would happen if the PyD will manage to extend its control over the area stretching from the canton of Kobani to Afrin. In such a scenario, Ankara should negotiate with the PKK the transferal of weapons to the Syrian rebels and possible military operations in Syria in accordance to the agreement between Erdoğan and the Saudi king Salman of the last 2nd March. Some factors seem to point out that Turkey is trying to develop a strategy aimed not to compromise the long-term advantages deriving from the cooperation with Syrian Kurds and, at the same time, coping with the immediate threats deriving from their territorial expansion. Considering that Turkey seems lacking of the necessary strength, especially in terms of aerial power, to create autonomously a “buffer zone” in the northern part of Syria, the war announcement probably is a bluff aimed at threatening the Syrian Kurds, on the one hand, and at reinforcing the Ankara’s negotiating position in the talks ongoing with Washington. According to the Turkish media, the Government would have

Source: Corriere della Sera

July 2015

7 Interview with Daniele Santoro

sent the HDP three requests: first, the return of Arabs and Turkmens to Tel Abyad; then, the removal of the Kurdish flag from the city and absence of any hierarchy in the local Government. Turkey sees this as a test to evaluate the seriousness of the Syrian Kurds and the feasibility any eventual form of future cooperation.

How can you explain the matching between the possible agreement with the Kurds and the ambiguous attitude towards the ISIS, as evidently in Kobani? Many claim that it is also due to the Erdoğan’s unveiled support to the latter that the AKP lost part of its Kurdish electorate.

Underestimating the importance that the fight for Kobani would have had on the public opinion, Erdoğan has undoubtedly committed a huge tactical mistake. The problem is that, as confirmed by a discussed title of Sabah, a journal of property of Erdoğan’s son in law, the Turkish President and the AKP consider the Islamic State a less dangerous actor than the Syrian Kurds. For one single reason. The Caliph is a temporary actor; the Syrian Kurds are there to stay.

Erdoğan tried to manipulate the Islamic State to accomplish mainly three objectives. First, weakening the Syrian Government and the Shiite Government of Baghdad. Second, preventing the expansion of the Syrian Kurds. The result was not exactly positive. According to the Turkish media, in May Assad and the Islamic State would have achieved an agreement for a joint offensive against the rebel positions supported by Ankara in Aleppo. The status of American infantry provided to the Kurdish soldiers generated a mechanism implying that all the territories in the north of Syria risk to go under Kurdish control. What is more, the presence of the Islamic State in Iraq, allowed Iran to reinforce the Shiite militias. In the last few months, Erdoğan has very often displayed his intention to correct his strategy. In the event that Turkey starts to play a key role in the anti-Islamic state coalition, a problem may rise: who is going to control the territories subtracted to the Caliph in the north of Syria? According to Ankara, it would be a mistake to allow the Kurdish or the Assad’s regime to take over those territories.

Still concerning the war in Syria, do not you think that it will change Turkey’s “precious loneliness” within the neighborhood? What about Israel for example? Which are the future perspectives concerning the relationship with Iran, especially after the conclusion of the agreement on the nuclear?

Source: personal author archive

July 2015

8 Turkey after last general elections. Domestic and external factors influencing the future of the Country

The factor, which Turkey used to break its regional isolation, was the threat of a possible American-Iranian nuclear agreement, which eventually occurred. That helped Turkey restore its relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel. The Turkish Saudi and Israeli synergies in Syria are a consequence of this approach. A for Israel, the perspectives of cooperation with Turkey in the Syrian scenario were discussed on June 22nd in Rome by Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Undersecretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Dore Gold, General Director of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the previous months, several managers from both sides, such as the Turkish Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Bülent Arınç and the former General Director of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Alon Liel, tried to draft the content of a possible normalization of relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv. It is meaningful, in this respect, the fact that the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Justice did not ever approve the request of the tribunal in charge of the Mavi

Marmara dispute to prosecute those involved.

Furthermore, the economic and commercial relations with Israeli are going very well. In any case, it is out of question that Ankara could join a straightforward anti Iranian alliance. The same goes for the relations with Saudi Arabia and with the so-called Sunni front with Riyadh and Islamabad. Differently from Saudi Arabia and Israel, in fact, Turkey does not consider the return of Iran in the economic, financial and energetic circuits and its legitimization in the Middle East as an existential threat. Although Turkey considers Teheran its main competitor in the region, it does not want to come at odds with it and tries instead to reduce the former’s hegemony in the Siraq. Furthermore, Turkey does not want to lose the enormous economic, commercial, energetic, infrastructural pros deriving from the abolishment of sanctions and from a further deepening of the relations with Iran.

July 2015

9 Turkish diaspora and out of country voting

Turkish diaspora and out of country voting

By Stéphanie Plante

In the end, Turkey’s first foray into OCV proved underwhelming. On August 4, 2014, Deputy

Prime Minister Emrullah Isle announced that worldwide, only 232,000 overseas voters cast a ballot,

giving the OCV electorate a turnout rate of 8.5%. So while Turks abroad were galvanized by the

election, their participation levels did not match expectations.

The principle of universal suffrage is

rooted in a rich body of established

standards of international human rights

law. The right to political participation,

including the right to vote in elections,

is enshrined in Article 25 of the United

Nation’s International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),

which states:

Every citizen shall have the right

and the opportunity, without any of the

distinctions mentioned in Article 2

[race, color, sex, language, religion,

political or other opinion, national or

social origin, property, birth or other

status] and without unreasonable

restrictions: (a) To take part in the

conduct of public affairs, directly or

through freely chosen representatives, (b)

To vote and to be elected at genuine

periodic elections which shall be by

universal and equal suffrage and shall

1 OSCE and ODIHR (2003) Existing

commitments for democratic elections in OSCE

participating States. Cfr.

be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the

free will of the electors […]

Reaffirming this principle, the

Office for Democratic Institutions and

Human Rights (ODIHR) of the

Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which

monitors elections around the world,

has specified that “the absence of a

permanent residence should not

prevent an otherwise qualified person

from being registered as a voter”1. The

UN estimates that 175 to 250 million

persons currently reside outside of their

home countries of citizenship and must

therefore vote outside of their regular

electoral boundaries. Out of Country

Voting (OCV) has garnered a lot of

attention from political analysts and

electoral management bodies as citizens

become increasingly mobile and

politicians seek to balance the rights of

diasporas and the astronomical costs of

http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/13957?

download=true

July 2015

10 Turkey after last general elections. Domestic and external factors influencing the future of the Country

casting a ballot from abroad. To date,

there are 115 countries who allow for

OCV.

The term diaspora, in contrast to

migrants or displaced persons, applies

to expatriate populations abroad and

subsequent generations born abroad to

foreign parents who often retain dual

citizenship in the former and current

country of residence. The economic,

social and political clout of many

diaspora has reached significant levels

in recent years. Johnson and Sedaca

(2004) connects this to several key areas

such as poverty reduction, knowledge

transfer, political participation, business

creation, trade links, investments,

remittances, skills circulation, exchange

of experiences and even impacts on

social and cultural roles of men and

women in the home society 2 .

Enfranchising the diaspora during

elections, especially in an emerging

economy and democracy like Turkey, is

one of many approaches that can

ensure that Turks, in a symbolic and

concrete way, are not deprived of the

ownership of their contributions back

home.

2 Johnson, B., & Sedaca, S. (2004) Diasporas,

Emigrés and Development. Economic linkages and

programmatic responses [A special study of the

U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID) and Trade Enhancement for the

Services Sector (TESS) Project].

Translating general guarantees of

electoral participation to include out of

country voting, however, can be a

complex task which typically requires

addressing a range of issues and

obstacles – legal, administrative,

practical, and sometimes political – that

are specific to or exacerbated by

displaced and diaspora voters. It also

requires working with a broad array of

national and international actors,

including electoral authorities,

embassies, national legislators,

international agencies, and civil society.

Among the avenues through which

the diaspora can remain connected to

their country of origin, electoral

participation is perhaps the most

formalized 3 . Notwithstanding the

inherent challenges involved in

3 Grace, J., & Fischer, J. (2008) Seeking electoral

equality for IDP voters [Special issue of Forced

Migration Review: “Ten Years of the Guiding

Principles of Internal Displacement”].

Source: Daily Sabah

July 2015

11 Turkish diaspora and out of country voting

organizing an OCV program, those

conducted under a rules-based system,

requiring clear procedures and

regulations to protect both the integrity

of the electoral process as well as the

rights and the security of the voter, can

serve as a vital connection to the home

country. Turkey, with its four million

plus migrants around the world, in

2010, established the Office of Turks

Abroad whose mandate was dedicated

to “richer relations with the citizens and

kin communities abroad” as well as

“develops strategies […] and

coordinate related domestic activities”.

The OTA then lobbied for OCV on

behalf of Turkish expatriates and

Turkey then began enfranchising them

during the 2014 Presidential election

under the backdrop of the 2013 Gezi

Park protests and reports of social

media restrictions by Tayyip Erdoğan.

Despite this, and the new administrative

challenges of OCV voting, international

election monitors found the 2014

elections to be relatively free and fair.

There are several different ways in

which out of country voting plays out in

Turkish diaspora and out of country

voting parliaments or legislatures

around the world. The French model of

overseas constituencies, which works

out to eleven seats in their National

Assembly, was replicated by Italy,

Greece and newer democracies such as

Macedonia and Tunisia. For countries

such as Ukraine, Moldova, Austria and

Poland, votes from abroad go to the

total of proportional representation and

citizens only vote for registered political

parties. Swiss and Estonians can vote at

almost every level of Government and

in direct-democratic elections via

Internet voting. Mexico and the

Philippines, whose diasporas are two of

the biggest in the world, can vote by

mailing in their ballots, however this

model requires a complicated

Surce: Today Zaman

July 2015

12 Turkey after last general elections. Domestic and external factors influencing the future of the Country

registration process, which many

undocumented or illegal immigrants

find intimidating.

Turkey amended election

framework meant that 54 countries in

103 embassies or consulates were

turned into polling stations in the

summer of 2014 to help facilitate their

participation in the election process.

Previously, Turks abroad could vote,

but had to go back to Turkey and their

home ridings to do so. Polling stations

were open from 31st July to 3rd August

and overseas Turks had to call to

register using their national ID card

numbers, and were then allocated a four

hour window in which they could

present themselves to the embassy or

consulate to vote.

If the elector failed to show up in

that four-hour slot, they were denied

both the right to vote and to reschedule

their time-slot. For countries with a

large geographic territory, this proved

problematic for Turks living far from

diplomatic missions. Turkish

candidates also campaigned heavily

abroad, despite campaign finance

legislation forbidding them from doing

so.

In the end, Turkey’s first foray into

OCV proved underwhelming. On 4th

August 2014, Deputy Prime Minister

Emrullah İşler announced that

worldwide, only 232,000 overseas

voters cast a ballot, giving the OCV

electorate a turnout rate of 8.5%.

Therefore, while Turks abroad were

galvanized by the election, their

participation levels did not match

expectations. Renovations to their

electoral framework such as postal or

internet voting or simply less-stringent

voting hours, with more practical

registration deadlines and timetables

could mean Turkeys OCV efforts may

prove fruitful in elections in the future.

Turkish policy and lawmakers,

however, must be mindful that any

amendments or short cuts do not

endanger the overall security and

accountability of the electoral process

so as not to curtail the democratic rights

and responsibilities the Turkish

diaspora so richly deserve

July 2015

13 Conclusions

Conclusions

The contribution hereby presented was initially aimed at reporting on the results of

Turkish general elections and the perspectives ahead. Nonetheless, the issue of

Turkey’s domestic and international politics has evidently caught the interest of many

contributors and followers of Mediterranean Affairs. Thus, we decided to create

something quite similar to a mini-dossier. We did not use an academic approach.

Instead, we preferred to adopt a more flexible and variegated approach to attract the

attention of those who are interested in improving his knowledge of Turkish affairs.

Following to the last elections, the Kurdish issue has gained unprecedented

centrality and the ISIS has approached Erdoğan’s border. Thus, in this context it is very

important to understand properly Turkey’s domestic politics and forecast the future of

the relations between the AKP and the HDP1. The Turkish diaspora adds to and is

closely linked to the Kurdish issue.

Apparently, Turkey’s

international affairs are much

differentiated, and at first may

appear ambiguous. Actually, the

AKP’s external affairs are based

on realpolitik and aimed at

establishing long-term relations2.

In this contribution, we

provided two significant

examples of Turkey’s foreign

affairs, concerning the

relationships with Israel and Iran.

1 1 Which it is definitely a "Kurdish party" but that represents a part of the Kurds which is a world very fragmented and hard to understand in their own internal dynamics. For an overview of the complex are the relations between the various Kurdish political factions, see M. Ciola, Why arming Peshmerga Is not so useful, and maybe it will be dangerous, Mediterranean Affairs, October 17, 2014, Cfr. http://www.mediterraneanaffairs.com/en/events/why-arming-peshmerga-is-not-so-useful-and-maybe-it-will-be-dangerous.html. 2 Although, as always in politics, the attempt to build up alliances may increase instability. An example of this kind of attitude is the Syrian case.

Source: The Telegraph

July 2015

14 Turkey after last general elections. Domestic and external factors influencing the future of the Country

As for the latter, the conclusion of the well-known nuclear agreement resulted in

new opportunities and challenges for Turkey. According to the latest declarations, the

AKP is willing to invest in Iran and is committed to proposing itself again as an

energetic hub for Iranian strategic primary resources. In fact, that which would benefit

from further stability on the Turkish territory than on other Middle Eastern neighbors.

The renovated economic relations with Teheran will benefit Turkey’s economic

growth, which is one of the pillars of

the AKP’s program. On the other

side of the coin, there is another

factor influencing Erdoğan’s moves

towards Iran that is Neo-

Ottomanism. The abolition of

sanctions on Iran have paved the

way for its rise as regional power,

which Turkey aspires to be too. In

the past, the Ankara-Teheran axis

revealed fundamental for regional

stability and prosperity – especially on Ahmadinejad’s first mandate as President. Now

things have changed. First, because Neo-Ottomanism implies the strengthening of

relations with Sunni states. Consequently, in the Middle East Erdoğan prefers dealing

with Sunni Presidents than with laic ones like.At the same time, he prefers the latter

than the Shiites like Rouhani because of the contradiction that such a thing would

generate both in domestic and external politics.

A similar framework can be applied concerning the relationship with Israel. While

on the one side Erdoğan has been often condemning Israel’s crimes against humanity,

on the other he welcomes a partnership with the country at stake to stem the

affirmation of the Iranian and Shiite power in the region. The diplomatic relations

between Ankara and Tel Aviv have been recently challenged by the discovery of gas

fields off the costs of Cyprus. The problem is that Ankara claims the sovereignty on

the country and on the gas field that Tel Aviv wants to protect by means of, for

instance, the renovation of bilateral military agreements with Greece.

In conclusion, it is clear that Turkey, despite being one of the most stable countries

in the region, is very complex to study in terms of domestic and external politics. This

mini dossier is not aimed at clarifying all these issues, but just a little specific area of a

sea that we wish the reader to explore further.

Marcello Ciola

Vice CEO of Mediterranean Affairs

Source: Payvand

July 2015

15 Authors

Authors

Daniele Santoro, Master’s degree in International Relations at LUISS Guido Carli. He lives in Istanbul and collaborates with “Limes – Rivista Italiana di geopolitica”.

Stephanie Plante, MA at the University of Windsor and ProDoc in Public Administration at the University of Lausanne. She is research assistant at “FN Digital Democracy” and has been involved in elections in various capacities since 2005

Ed. Mediterranean Affairs®

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Cover image source: Reuters