SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 169292, April 13 : 2011]

SPOUSES FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, JR. AND AMPARO O. DE GUZMAN, PETITIONERS, VS. CESAR OCHOA AND SYLVIA A. OCHOA, REPRESENTED BY ARACELI S. AZORES, AS THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA,J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the August 11, 2005 Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals(CA), in CA-GR. SP No. 89329, filed by petitioners, Spouses Francisco De Guzman, Jr. and Amparo O. De Guzman (petitioners). In the assailed decision, the CA found no commission of grave abuse of discretion when the public respondent therein, Judge Amelia A. Fabros(Judge Fabros), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 160(RTC), denied petitioners' second motion to dismiss, in Civil Case No. 68896, an action for annulment of contract and damages.

The facts of the case have been succinctly summarized by the CA as follows:On March 25, 2002, respondent spouses Cesar Ochoa and Sylvia Ochoa, through respondent Araceli Azores, ostensibly acting as attorney-in-fact, commenced in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City an action seeking the annulment of contract of mortgage, foreclosure sale, certificate of sale and damages. The action, docketed as Civil Case No. 68896 and entitledCesar Ochoa and Sylvia A. Ochoa, etc. v. Josefa M. Guevarra, et al., was raffled to Branch 160, presided by the respondent RTC Judge.

On May 22, 2002, the petitioners, as defendants in Civil Case No. 68896, filed amotion to dismiss, alleging the sole ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action. The petitioners'motion to dismisswas formally opposed by the private respondents.

On December 16, 2002, the respondent RTC Judge denied petitioners'motion to dismissand at the same time set Civil Case No. 68896 for pre-trial conference, directing the parties to submit their respective pre-trial briefs.

On March 31, 2003, the petitioners filed a secondmotion to dismiss,alleging that the certification against forum shopping attached to thecomplaintwas not executed by the principal parties (plaintiffs) in violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7, 1997Rules of Civil Procedure, rendering the complaint fatally defective and thus dismissible.

The private respondents opposed the secondmotion to dismiss.

On February 12, 2004, the respondent RTC Judge issued her first assailed order, denying the secondmotion to dismiss, disposing thus:xxx

Inasmuch as the records show that the pending incident is the second motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, the same is hereby Denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

On May 25, 2004. the petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration, but the respondent RTC Judge denied the motion through her second assailed order dated December 29, 2004, to wit:Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order dated February 12, 2004, filed by the defendant Spouses Francisco and Amparo De Guzman, through counsel, on May 25, 2004, and after considering the grounds stated therein in support of their motion, and finding no cogent reason to warrant the reconsideration sought for, the motion is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[2]

Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the order of denial to the CA via a petition for certiorari contending that the RTC should have dismissed the complaintmotu propriosince it was fatally defective. They pointed out that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the complaint was not signed by Cesar Ochoa or Sylvia Ochoa but by Araceli S. Azores (Azores), who was acting as the attorney-in-fact of Cesar Ochoa only. They invited the attention of the RTC to the fact that the powers delegated to Azores did not include the authority to institute an action in court. Thus, according to the petitioners, the denial by the RTC of their motion to dismiss was capricious, whimsical and arbitrary, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and should be struck down as null and void.

On August 11, 2005, the CA denied the petition for lack' of merit. The CA, in its decision, agreed with the RTC that following the omnibus motion rule, the defects of the complaint pointed out by the petitioners were deemed waived when they failed to raise it in their first motion to dismiss.

Not in conformity, the petitioners filed this petition for review under Rule 45, anchored on this:GROUND

THE COURT A QUO DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT REFUSED TO DISMISS, THE COMPLAINT DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS INDUBITABLY SHOWN AND ESTABLISHED THAT THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT OF CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING PURSUANT TO SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF THE RULES OF COURT WAS NOT OBSERVED AND COMPLIED WITH SINCE THE SAME WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED PERSONALLY BY THE PURPORTED PLAINTIFFS THEREIN.

It is the position of the petitioners that the second motion to dismiss does not violate the Omnibus Motion Rule under Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court because the issue raised in the second motion was a question of jurisdiction. For said reason, the matter of the defective verification and certification cannot be considered to have been waived when it was not interposed at the first instance. Considering that the issue is jurisdictional, the RTC should have dismissed the complaintmotu proprio.

The Court disagrees with the petitioners.

An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates the case nor finally disposes of it, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.[3]

Therefore, an order denying a motion to dismiss may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed in such cases is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment.[4]

Only in exceptional cases where the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion that the Court allows the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. By "grave abuse of discretion," we mean such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal-to perform the duty enjoined by or to .act all in contemplation of law.[5]

In this case, the petitioners failed to convincingly substantiate its charge of arbitrariness on the part of Judge Fabros. Absent such showing of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or ill motive, the Court cannot but sustain the ruling of the CA.

Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court defines an omnibus motion as a motion attacking a pleading, judgment or proceeding. A motion to dismiss is an omnibus motion because it attacks a pleading, that is, the complaint. For this reason, a motion to dismiss, like any other omnibus motion, must raise and include all objections available at the time of the filing of the motion because under Section 8, "all objections not so included shall be deemed waived." As inferred from the provision, only the following defenses under Section 1, Rule 9, are excepted from its application: [a] lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; [b] there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause (litis pendentia); [c] the action is barred by prior judgment (res judicata); and [d] the action is barred by the statute of limitations or prescription.

In the case at bench, the petitioners raised the ground of defective verification and certification of forum shopping only when they filed their second motion to dismiss, despite the fact that this ground was existent and available to them at the time of the filing of their first motion to dismiss. Absent any justifiable reason to explain this fatal omission, the ground of defective verification and certification of forum shopping was deemed waived and could no longer be questioned by the petitioners in their second motion to dismiss.

Moreover, contrary to petitioners' assertion, the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, and non-compliance with which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. In fact, the court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.[6]

Similarly, the rule requiring the submission of such certification of non-forum shopping, although obligatory, is not jurisdictional.[7] The certification requirement is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shallnot be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in differentfora, as this Q practice is detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure.[8]

As to whether the trial court should have dismissed the complaintmotu proprio, the Court rules in the negative. Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court is clear that failure to comply with the requirements on the rule against forum shopping shall be cause for the dismissal of the case "upon motion and after hearing."

WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIED.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 185954 February 16, 2010OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,Petitioner,vs.MAXIMO D. SISON,Respondent.D E C I S I O NVELASCO, JR.,J.:The CaseBefore us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing and seeking to set aside the Resolution1dated December 18, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 96611, entitled Maximo D. Sison v. Fr. Noel Labendia for Himself and in Representation of Isog Han Samar Movement, Diocese of Calbayog, Catbalogan, Samar. The CA Resolution denied petitioner Office of the Ombudsmans Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration of the CAs June 26, 2008 Decision.2The FactsOn October 11, 2004, the Isog Han Samar Movement, represented by Fr. Noel Labendia of the Diocese of Calbayog, Catbalogan, Samar, filed a letter-complaint addressed to then Ombudsman, Hon. Simeon Marcelo, accusing Governor Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public officials3of the Province of Samar, including respondent Maximo D. Sison, of highly anomalous transactions entered into by them amounting to several millions of pesos. Sison was the Provincial Budget Officer.The letter-complaint stemmed from the audit investigation dated August 13, 2004 conducted by the Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO), Commission on Audit (COA), which found, among others, that various purchases totaling PhP 29.34 million went without proper bidding procedures and documentations; that calamity funds were expended without a State of Calamity having been declared by the President; and that purchases for rice, medicines, electric fans, and cement were substantially overpriced.The Special Audit Team, which was created under LAO Office Order No. 2003-059 dated July 7, 2003, summarized the corresponding COA audit findings and observations, to wit:1. Rules and regulations pertaining to procurement of supplies and materials were consciously and continually violated as disclosed in the verification of selected purchases of the Province. Below were the findings and observations:a. Purchases of various items, totaling at least PhP 29.34 million and allegedly procured through public bidding, were found highly irregular for lack of proper bidding procedures and documentation;b. At least PhP 28.165 million worth of purchases through repeat orders were made by the Province without observing the pertinent law, rules and regulations governing this mode of procurement; andc. Emergency purchases of medicines and assorted goods totaling PhP 14.67 million were found not complying with the requirements set forth under the Rules and Regulations on Supplies and Property Management in Local Governments (RRSPMLG). Moreover, the purchases were charged against the calamity fund, despite absence of any declaration from the President that Samar was under a state of calamity, in violation of Sec. 324(d) of R.A. 7160.2. Inconsistencies in the dates of supporting documents relating to the purchases discussed in finding No. 1 were so glaring that they raised doubts on the validity of the transactions per se;3. The use of the 5% budgetary reserves for calamity as funding source of emergency purchases was not legally established, there being no declaration from the Office of the President that Samar was under a state of calamity, as required under Sec. 324(d) of R.A. 7160;4. Splitting of requisitions and purchase orders was resorted to in violation of COA Circular No. 76-41 dated July 30, 1976;5. There was overpricing in the purchase of rice, medicines, electric fans and cement in the amount of PhP 580,000.00, PhP 322,760.00, PhP 341,040.00, and PhP 3.6 million, respectively. An overpayment was also committed in the payments of cement in the amount of PhP 96,364.09;6. Other observations gathered corollary to the purchases made are the following:a. Purchase Orders were not duly accomplished to include a complete description of the items to be purchased, the delivery date and the terms of payment, in violation of the provisions of Section 74 and other corollary provisions of RRSPMLG. Some were even acknowledged by suppliers;b. At least 36 vouchers/claims were not supported with an official receipt, in violation of the provisions of Section 4 of PD 1445 that all disbursements must be supported with complete documentation; andc. Advanced deliveries of medicines and assorted goods were made on some purchases even before the purchase orders were prepared and before the public biddings were conducted.7. The necessity and veracity of the distribution of t-shirts/caps, medicines, assorted goods and cement purchased by the Province of Samar could not be established due to rampant inconsistencies in dates, quantities, as well as the signatures of the alleged recipients in the Requisition and Issue Slip; and,8. Financial Assistance (FA)/Assistance to Individuals in Crisis Situation (AICS) totaling at least PhP 5.4 million in 2002 and PhP 2.78 million as of April 2003 were granted to various applicant-recipients without subjecting them to the guidelines set forth by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).4x x xOn January 24, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Director Jose T. De Jesus, Jr., found basis to proceed with the administrative case against the impleaded provincial officials of Samar, docketed as OMB-C-A-05-0051-B. The latter were then required to file their counter-affidavits and countervailing evidence against the complaint.In his counter-affidavit, Sison vehemently denied the accusations contained in the letter-complaint and claimed his innocence on the charges. He asserted that his function is limited to the issuance of a certification that an appropriation for the requisition exists, that the corresponding amount has been obligated, and that funds are available. He did not, in any way, vouch for the truthfulness of the certification issued by the requesting parties. In addition, he averred that he never participated in the alleged irregularities as shown in the minutes and attendance sheet of the bidding.Further, he alleged that not one of the documentary evidences so far attached in the letter-complaint bore his signature and that he was neither factually connected nor directly implicated in the complaint.On May 6, 2005, Sison submitted his Position Paper to the Office of the Ombudsman and reiterated that he had not participated in the alleged anomalous purchases and use of public funds by the Province of Samar.On August 22, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered a Decision, finding Sison and several other local officials of the Province of Samar guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissing him from service. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:VIEWED IN THE FOREGOING LIGHT, DECISION is hereby rendered as follows:1. Respondents ROLANDO B. MONTEJO, DAMIANO Z. CONDE, JR., ROMEO C. REALES,MAXIMO D. SISON, AURELIO A. BARDAJE and NUMERIANO C. LEGASPI are FOUND GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE, and are METED the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE, and shall carry with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service.Accordingly, Governor Milagrosa T. Tan and Executive Director Presentacion R. Montesa of the Bureau of Local Government Finance, Department of Finance, are respectfully directed to implement this Order upon receipt hereof and to forthwith inform the Office of compliance herewith.2. The administrative complaint against respondents MILAGROSA T. TAN, FE ORTEGA TAN ARCALES, SUSANO DIMAKILING SALURIO, BARTOLOME P. FIGUEROA, ANTONIO DE LEON BOLASTIG, III, ROSENAIDA A. ROSALES and BARTOLOME R. CASTILLO III is DISMISSED in view of their re-election in May 2004;3. The administrative complaint against ERNESTO CARCILLAR ARCALES, FELIX T. BABALCON, JR., JIMMY R. DY, JUAN COLINARES LATORRE, JR., MARIA LOURDES CORTEZ UY, BIENVENIDA P. REPOL and RAMON P. DEAN, JR., who are no longer public officials, is DISMISSED.4. For insufficiency of evidence, the administrative complaint against ANAMIE P. MANATAD-NUNEZ and ROSIE AMARO VILLACORTE is DISMISSED.5. The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Office is DIRECTED to conduct further fact-finding investigations on the following:a. On DV Nos. 221-2002-12-083 and 221-2002-11-065: (a) to DETERMINE the other public officials who may be held administratively liable; and (b) to FILE, if necessary, the corresponding Complaint;b. On Bid Nos. 079-2002, 442-2002, 554-2002, 861-2002, 937-2002, 947-2002, 1221-2002, 1375-2002, 1411-2002, 007-2003, 014-2003, 023-2003, 047-2003 and 082-2002: (a) to VERIFY whether actual public biddings took place relative to the transactions covered by these bids; (b) to CHECK the veracity of the documents relative to the repeat orders made; (c) to DETERMINE the other public officials who may appear to be administratively liable therefor; and (d) to FILE, if warranted, the corresponding Complaint; andc. On Bid Nos. 078-2002, 448-2002, 931-2002, 1230-2001, 411-2002, 944-2002, 1244-2002, 1407-2001, 198-2002, 316-2002 and 431-2002: (a) to DETERMINE whether actual public biddings were held relative to the above-mentioned transactions; (b) to CHECK the veracity of the documents relative to the repeat orders made; (c) to ASCERTAIN the other public officials who may be held administratively liable therefor; and (d) to FILE the corresponding Complaint, if warranted.Accordingly, let a copy of this Memorandum be furnished the Fact- Finding and Intelligence Office for its appropriate action.SO ORDERED.5(Emphasis supplied.)Aggrieved, Sison appealed to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 96611.On June 26, 2008, the CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman against Sison. The fallo of the CA decision reads:WHEREFORE, the decision of the Ombudsman dated 22 August 2006 in OMB-C-A-05-0051-B in so far as it finds the herein petitioner MAXIMO D. SISON administratively liable for grave misconduct, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence. Accordingly, he is absolved from administrative liability as charged.SO ORDERED.6In ruling thus, the CA held that the Office of the Ombudsman failed to adduce substantial evidence in order to convict Sison. Moreover, it reasoned that Sisons responsibility as Provincial Budget Officer was to ensure that appropriations exist in relation to the emergency purchase being made and that he had no hand or discretion in characterizing a particular purchase as emergency in nature. Hence, he cannot be held administratively liable for simply attesting to the existence of appropriations for a certain purpose, save if such certification is proved to be false.On July 22, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA in its assailed resolution of December 18, 2008.Hence, we have this petition.The IssuesIWhether the [CA] gravely erred in denying petitioners right to intervene in the proceedings, considering that (a) the Office of the Ombudsman has sufficient legal interest warranting its intervention in the proceedings before the [CA] since it rendered the subject decision pursuant to its administrative authority over public officials and employees; and (b) contrary to the appellate court a quos ruling, petitioner Office of the Ombudsman filed its Omnibus Motion to Intervene and to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration on a patently erroneous decision of the [CA] which has not yet attained finality.IIWhether the [CA] erred in ruling that the finding of the Office of the Ombudsman was not supported by substantial evidence.IIIWhether the [CA] erred in giving due course to respondents petition for review when this was prematurely filed as it disregarded the well-entrenched jurisprudential doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.Our RulingThe appeal lacks merit.Intervention Is Discretionary upon the CourtThe pivotal issue in this case is whether the Office of the Ombudsman may be allowed to intervene and seek reconsideration of the adverse decision rendered by the CA.In its Decision, the CA did not allow the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene, because (1) the Office of the Ombudsman is not a third party who has a legal interest in the administrative case against petitioner; (2) the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed after the CA rendered its Decision; and (3) the Office of the Ombudsman was the quasi-judicial body which rendered the impugned decision.In its Petition, however, the Office of the Ombudsman asserts that it has sufficient legal interest to warrant its intervention in the proceedings, since it rendered the subject decision pursuant to its administrative authority over public officials and employees. Further, it contends that the Omnibus Motion to Intervene was timely filed, since, at the time of its filing, the decision of the CA had not yet attained finality.We are not persuaded.It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion to Intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.7The permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the intervention,8thus:SECTION 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.9(Emphasis supplied.)Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not originally parties to the suit but claiming an interest in the subject matter, come into the case in order to protect their right or interpose their claim.10Its main purpose is to settle in one action and by a single judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among, the persons involved.11To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.12In support of its argument that it has legal interest, the Office of the Ombudsman cites Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr. (Garcia).13In the said case, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) imposed upon its employee, Garcia, the penalty of forced resignation for gross neglect of duty. On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) exonerated Garcia from the administrative charges against him. In accordance with the ruling in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,14this Court affirmed the standing of the PNB to appeal to the CA the CSC resolution exonerating Garcia. After all, PNB was the aggrieved party which complained of Garcias acts of dishonesty. Should Garcia be finally exonerated, it might then be incumbent upon PNB to take him back into its fold. PNB should, therefore, be allowed to appeal a decision that, in its view, hampered its right to select honest and trustworthy employees, so that it can protect and preserve its name as a premier banking institution in the country.1avvphi1Based on the facts above, the Office of the Ombudsman cannot use Garcia to support its intervention in the appellate court for the following reasons:First, Sison was not exonerated from the administrative charges against him, and was, in fact, dismissed for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service by the Office of the Ombudsman in the administrative case, OMB-C-A-05-0051-B. Thus, it was Sison who appealed to the CA being, unquestionably, the party aggrieved by the judgment on appeal.Second, the issue here is the right of the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene in the appeal of its decision, not its right to appeal.And third, Garcia should be read along with Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals15and National Appellate Board of the National Police Commission v. Mamauag (Mamauag),16in which this Court qualified and clarified the exercise of the right of a government agency to actively participate in the appeal of decisions in administrative cases. In Mamauag, this Court ruled:RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of the disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize either party to appeal in the instances that the law allows appeal. One party is the PNP member-respondent when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The other party is the government when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but the government believes that dismissal from the service is the proper penalty.However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party appealing must be the one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent. Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy, the Court declared:To be sure when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought to the Court of Appeals, the Civil Service Commission was included only as a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service Commission can be likened to a judge who should "detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review."In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated function is to "hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices and agencies," not to litigate.Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to intervene in the instant case. It must remain partial and detached. More importantly, it must be mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not an advocate.It is an established doctrine that judges should detach themselves from cases where their decisions are appealed to a higher court for review. The raison detre for such a doctrine is the fact that judges are not active combatants in such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate court to decide the issues without the judges active participation.17When judges actively participate in the appeal of their judgment, they, in a way, cease to be judicial and have become adversarial instead.18In Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG),19the Court applied this doctrine when it held that the CA erred in granting the Motion to Intervene filed by the Office of the Ombudsman, to wit:The court or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and impartial, not only when hearing and resolving the case before it, but even when its judgment is brought on appeal before a higher court. The judge of a court or the officer of a quasi-judicial agency must keep in mind that he is an adjudicator who must settle the controversies between parties in accordance with the evidence and applicable laws, regulations and/or jurisprudence. His judgment should already clearly and completely state his findings of fact and law. There must be no more need for him to justify further his judgment when it is appealed before appellate courts. When the court judge or the quasi-judicial officer intervenes as a party in the appealed case, he inevitably forsakes his detachment and impartiality, and his interest in the case becomes personal since his objective now is no longer only to settle the controversy between the original parties (which he had already accomplished by rendering his judgment), but more significantly, to refute the appellants assignment of errors, defend his judgment, and prevent it from being overturned on appeal.Likewise, the facts reveal that this case was elevated to the CA via a verified Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1-95 dated May 16, 1995, which govern appeals to the CA from judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies.Rule 43, as well as Administrative Circular No. 1-95, provides that the petition for review shall state the full names of the parties to the case without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents.20Thus, the only parties in such an appeal are the appellant as petitioner and appellee as respondent. The court or, in this case, the administrative agency that rendered the judgment appealed from, is not a party in the said appeal.Therefore, the Office of the Ombudsman does not have the legal interest to intervene. As the CA held correctly:The Office of the Ombudsman is not a third party who has a legal interest in the administrative case against the petitioner such that it would be directly affected by the judgment that this Court had rendered. It must be remembered that the legal interest required for an intervention must be direct and immediate in character. Lest it be forgotten, what was brought on appeal before this Court is the very Decision by the Office of the Ombudsman. Plainly, the Office of the Ombudsman, as an adjudicator, and not an advocate, has no legal interest at stake in the outcome of this Rule 43 Petition.21Motion for Intervention Was Not Filed on TimeFurthermore, the Rules provides explicitly that a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. In the instant case, the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed only on July 22, 2008, after the Decision of the CA was promulgated on June 26, 2008.In support of its position, petitioner cites Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego.22That case, however, is not applicable here, since the Office of the Ombudsman filed the motion for intervention during the pendency of the proceedings before the CA.It should be noted that the Office of the Ombudsman was aware of the appeal filed by Sison. The Rules of Court provides that the appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review with the CA, with proof of service of a copy on the court or agency a quo.23Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman had sufficient time within which to file a motion to intervene. As such, its failure to do so should not now be countenanced. The Office of the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," not merely a passive onlooker.24In this case, it cannot be denied that the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was belatedly filed. As we held in Rockland Construction Co., Inc. v. Singzon, Jr., no intervention is permitted after a decision has already been rendered.25In light of the foregoing considerations, all other issues raised in the petition are rendered moot and academic and no further discussion is necessary.WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIED. The CA Resolution dated December 18, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96611 is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 178221 December 1, 2010MAY D. AONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS and JOHN DESANTIS NERI,Petitioners,vs.INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, represented by BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI as Special Administrator,Respondent.D E C I S I O NPEREZ,J.:On appeal1is the Decision2dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576. In the said decision, the Court of Appeals nullified, on certiorari, the Orders3of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, of Negros Occidental (intestate court) allowing herein petitioners and their siblings4to intervene in the estate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.5The decretal portion of the decision of the appellate court reads:ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Orders dated July 2, 2004 and January 26, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. No. 338 are hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and a permanent injunction is hereby issued enjoining respondents [petitioners], their agents and anyone acting for and in their behalves, from enforcing the assailed Orders. No costs.6The antecedents are:Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20 December 1966.7He died without issue.8On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration9with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to commence the judicial settlement of the latters estate. The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 338 and is currently pending before the intestate court.10On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation11before the intestate court. In the Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia)who, in turn, was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one John Desantis.12The petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmotherIsabelwas, at the time of Rodolfos death, the legal spouse of the latter.13For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo.Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings pray that they be allowed to intervene on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.14As it was, by the time the Manifestation was filed, both Sylvia and Isabel have already passed away with the former predeceasing the latter.15To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings appended in their Manifestation, the following documents:a.) Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo;16b.) The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia;17andc.) Their respective proof of births.18It is the assertion of the petitioners and their siblings that the foregoing pieces of evidence sufficiently establish that Isabel was the spouse of Rodolfo, and that they are her lawful representatives.The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now represented by Bernardino as its Special Administrator, however, begged to differ. It opposed the intervention on the ground that the petitioners and their siblings have failed to establish the status of Isabel as an heir of Rodolfo. The very evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings showed that Isabel had a previous and subsisting marriage with John Desantis at the time she was purportedly married to Rodolfo.In its Comment to the Manifestation,19the respondent called attention to the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia, who was born on 14 February 1946.20As it turned out, the record of birth of Sylvia states that she was a "legitimate" child of Isabel and John Desantis.21The document also certifies the status of both Isabel and John Desantis as "married."22The respondent posits that the foregoing entries, having been made in an official registry, constitute prima facie proof of a prior marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.23According to the respondent, Isabels previous marriage, in the absence of any proof that it was dissolved, made her subsequent marriage with Rodolfo bigamous and void ab initio.24On 2 July 2004, the intestate court issued an order allowing the petitioners and their siblings to take part in the settlement proceedings.25The intestate court was convinced that the evidence at hand adequately establish Isabels status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo and, by that token, permitted the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the proceedings on her behalf.26The intestate court also held that the birth certificate of Sylvia was insufficient to prove that there was a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.27It ventured on the possibility that the entries in the birth record of Sylvia regarding her legitimacy and the status of her parents, may have been made only in order to save Isabel and her family from the social condemnation of having a child out of wedlock.28The respondent sought for reconsideration, but was denied by the intestate court in its order dated 26 January 2006.29Undeterred, the respondent hoisted a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.On 31 May 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and nullified the orders of the intestate court.30In coming to its conclusion, the Court of Appeals found that it was an error on the part of the intestate court to have disregarded the probative value of Sylvias birth certificate.31The appellate court, siding with the respondent, held that Sylvias birth certificate serves as prima facie evidence of the facts therein statedwhich includes the civil status of her parents.32Hence, the previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis should have been taken as established.The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer any other evidence proving that the marriage of Isabel with John Desantis had been dissolved by the time she was married to Rodolfo, it then follows that the latter marriagethe Isabel-Rodolfo unionis a nullity for being bigamous.33From that premise, Isabel cannot be considered as the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The petitioners and their siblings, therefore, failed to show that Isabel has any interest in the estate of Rodolfo.Hence, the instant appeal.34The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the orders of the intestate court allowing the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the settlement proceedings.The petitioners answer in the affirmative. They proffer the following arguments:One. The Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of review under a writ of certiorari.35In nullifying the intestate courts order, the appellate court did not confine itself to the issue of whether the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion.36Rather, it chose to re-assess the evidence and touch upon the issue pertaining to Isabels right to inherit from Rodolfo.37Had the appellate court limited itself to the issue of whether grave abuse of discretion exists, it would have found that the intestate court did not act whimsically or capriciously in issuing its assailed orders.38Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the intestate court is belied by the fact that the said orders may be supported by the two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo.39Second. Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the Court of Appeals was correct in addressing the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that Isabel has a right to inherit from Rodolfo, it nevertheless erred in finding that there was none.40A proper evaluation of the evidence at hand does not support the conclusion that Isabel had a previous marriage with John Desantis.41To begin with, the respondent was not able to produce any marriage certificate executed between Isabel and John Desantis.42The conspicuous absence of such certificate can, in turn, only lend credibility to the position that no such marriage ever took place.Moreover, the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia do not carry the necessary weight to be able to prove a marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.43In assessing the probative value of such entries, the Court of Appeals should have taken note of a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino couples who, in order to "save face" and "not to embarrass their families," concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate.44Since the alleged previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis was not satisfactorily proven, the Court of Appeals clearly erred in finding that her marriage with Rodolfo is bigamous.We are not impressed.First ArgumentThe first argument raised by the petitioners is specious at best. The question of whether the intestate court gravely abused its discretion is intricately linked with the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to establish Isabels status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo.A courts power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to intervene.45Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action or proceeding, to intervene therein.46Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person to intervene in a casethe mistake is not simply an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is made in excess of the courts jurisdiction and can only be the product of an exercise of discretion gravely abused. That kind of error may be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari.Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within the limits of review under a writ of certiorari, when it examined the evidence proving Isabels right to inherit from Rodolfo. The sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence determines whether the petitioners and their siblings have successfully established Isabels interest in Rodolfos estatewhich, as already mentioned, is an indispensable requisite to justify any intervention. Ultimately, the re-assessment of the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings will tell if the assailed orders of the intestate court were issued in excess of the latters jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.We now proceed to the second argument of the petitioners.Second ArgumentThe second argument of the petitioners is also without merit. We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negates their claim that Isabel has interest in Rodolfos estate.Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis was adequately established. This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate between Isabel and John Desantis exists on record.While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.47Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.48Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.49In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and (b) that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child.50In clear and categorical language, Sylvias birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.Pursuant to existing laws,51the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie weight. They are presumed to be true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the facts attested.52In the case at bench, the petitioners and their siblings offered no such rebuttal.The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in Sylvias birth certificate as untruthful statements made only in order to "save face."53They urge this Court to take note of a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. That, the Court cannot countenance.The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by any other evidence, do not diminish the probative value of the entries. This Court cannot, as the petitioners would like Us to do, simply take judicial notice of a supposed folkway and conclude therefrom that the usage was in fact followed. It certainly is odd that the petitioners would themselves argue that the document on which they based their interest in intervention contains untruthful statements in its vital entries.Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings themselves which, properly appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously married to John Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such marriage had been dissolved by the time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that Isabels prior marriage was dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest in the estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners and their siblings in the settlement proceedings cannot be justified. We affirm the Court of Appeals.WHEREFORE,the instant appeal isDENIED. Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED.Costs against the petitioners.SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 150611 June 10, 2003JACINTO SAGUID,petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE AND GINA S. REY, respondents.YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.1Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married,2but separatedde factofrom her husband, when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in July 1987.3After a brief courtship, the two decided to cohabit as husband and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacintos father.4Their cohabitation was not blessed with any children. Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing vessel "Saguid Brothers."5Gina, on the other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship with Jacintos relatives turned sour. Her periodic absence, however, did not ebb away the conflict with petitioners relatives. In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation.6On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque. She alleged that from her salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.Private respondent testified that she deposited part of her earnings in her savings account with First Allied Development Bank.7Her Pass Book shows that as of May 23, 1995, she had a balance of P21,046.08.8She further stated that she had a total of P35,465.009share in the joint account deposit which she and the petitioner maintained with the same bank.10Gina declared that said deposits were spent for the purchase of construction materials, appliances and other personal properties.11In his answer12to the complaint, petitioner claimed that the expenses for the construction of their house were defrayed solely from his income as a captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that private respondents meager income as fish dealer rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of said house. Besides, selling fish was a mere pastime to her; as such, she was contented with the small quantity of fish allotted to her from his fishing trips. Petitioner further contended that Gina did not work continuously in Japan from 1992 to 1994, but only for a 6-month duration each year. When their house was repaired and improved sometime in 1995-1996, private respondent did not share in the expenses because her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily needs and business of her parents. From his income in the fishing business, he claimed to have saved a total of P130,000.00, P75,000.00 of which was placed in a joint account deposit with private respondent. This savings, according to petitioner was spent in purchasing the disputed personal properties.On May 21, 1997, the trial court declared the petitioner as in default for failure to file a pre-trial brief as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89.13On May 26, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration14of the May 21, 1997 order, which was denied on June 2, 1997, and private respondent was allowed to present evidenceex parte.15Petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration but the same was also denied on October 8, 1997.On July 15, 1998, a decision16was rendered in favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Gina S. Rey against defendant Jacinto Saguid:a) Ordering the partition of the house identified as plaintiffs Exhibit C and D and directing the defendant to return and/or reimburse to the plaintiff the amount of seventy thousand pesos (P70,000,00) which the latter actually contributed to its construction and completion;b) Declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive owner of the personal properties listed on Exhibit M;c) Ordering the defendant, and/or anyone in possession of the aforesaid personal properties, to return and/or deliver the same to the plaintiff; andd) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) plus the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.17On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals; however, the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages was deleted for lack of basis.18The appellate court ruled that the propriety of the order which declared the petitioner as in default became moot and academic in view of the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It explained that the new rules now require the filing of a pre-trial brief and the defendants non-compliance therewith entitles the plaintiff to present evidenceex parte.Both parties filed motions for reconsideration which were denied; hence, petitioner filed the instant petition based on the following assigned errors:A.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING RETROACTIVELY THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE PRESENT CASE AND HOLDING THE FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR THEREIN MOOT AND ACADEMIC THUS, FAILED TO RULE ON THE PROPRIETY OF THE TRIAL COURTS REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF DEFAULT DUE TO MISTAKE AND/OR EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY PETITIONER.B.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RELYING ON THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH RECEIVED THE EVIDENCE OF HEREIN RESPONDENT ONLY EX PARTE.19The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not the trial court erred in allowing private respondent to present evidenceex parte; and (2) whether or not the trial courts decision is supported by evidence.Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial,i.e., the plaintiff may present his evidenceex parteand the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof.20The remedy of the defendant is to file a motion for reconsideration21showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect.22The motion need not really stress the fact that the defendant has a valid and meritorious defense because his answer which contains his defenses is already on record.23In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is justified because he was not represented by counsel. This justification is not, however, sufficient to set aside the order directing private respondent to present evidenceex parte,inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his own risk not to be represented by counsel. Even without the assistance of a lawyer, petitioner was able to file a motion for extension to file answer,24the required answer stating therein the special and affirmative defenses,25and several other motions.26If it were true that petitioner did not understand the import of the April 23, 1997 order directing him to file a pre-trial brief, he could have inquired from the court or filed a motion for extension of time to file the brief. Instead, he waited until May 26, 1997, or 14 days from his alleged receipt of the April 23, 1997 order before he filed a motion asking the court to excuse his failure to file a brief. Pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they should be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.27In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a persuasive reason to relax the application of the rules. There is nothing in the Constitution which mandates that a party in a non-criminal proceeding be represented by counsel and that the absence of such representation amounts to a denial of due process. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession is not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated.28However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically, Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, rendered moot and academic the issue of whether or not the plaintiff may be allowed to present evidenceex partefor failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief. While the rules may indeed be applied retroactively, the same is not called for in the case at bar. Even before the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on July 1, 1997, the filing of a pre-trial brief was required under Circular No. 1-89 which became effective on February 1, 1989. Pursuant to the said circular, "[f]ailure to file pre-trial briefs may be given the same effect as the failure to appear at the pre-trial," that is, the party may be declared non-suited or considered as in default.29Coming now to the substantive issue, it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 14830of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, "only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ..."31Proof of actual contribution is required.32In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987, which is before the date of the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.33Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.34In the cases ofAgapay v. Palang,35andTumlos v. Fernandez,36which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterous union is without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also inAdriano v. Court of Appeals,37we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense.38This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidenceex parte.The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.39Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.40In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are receipts41in her name for the purchase of construction materials on November 17, 1995 and December 23, 1995, in the total amount of P11,413.00.On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed personal properties came partly from their joint account with First Allied Development Bank. While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-half,i.e., P55,687.50 each.The Court of Appeals thus erred in affirming the decision of the trial court which granted the reliefs prayed for by private respondent. On the basis of the evidence established, the extent of private respondents co-ownership over the disputed house is only up to the amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution in the construction thereof. Anent the personal properties, her participation therein should be limited only to the amount of P55,687.50.As regards the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as moral damages, the Court of Appeals correctly deleted the same for lack of basis.WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64166 isAFFIRMEDwithMODIFICATION. Private respondent Gina S. Rey is declared co-owner of petitioner Jacinto Saguid in the controverted house to the extent of P11,413.00 and personal properties to the extent of P55,687.50. Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the amount of P67,100.50 to private respondent, failing which the house shall be sold at public auction to satisfy private respondents claim.SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 150611 June 10, 2003JACINTO SAGUID,petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE AND GINA S. REY, respondents.YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.1Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married,2but separatedde factofrom her husband, when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in July 1987.3After a brief courtship, the two decided to cohabit as husband and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacintos father.4Their cohabitation was not blessed with any children. Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing vessel "Saguid Brothers."5Gina, on the other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship with Jacintos relatives turned sour. Her periodic absence, however, did not ebb away the conflict with petitioners relatives. In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation.6On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque. She alleged that from her salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.Private respondent testified that she deposited part of her earnings in her savings account with First Allied Development Bank.7Her Pass Book shows that as of May 23, 1995, she had a balance of P21,046.08.8She further stated that she had a total of P35,465.009share in the joint account deposit which she and the petitioner maintained with the same bank.10Gina declared that said deposits were spent for the purchase of construction materials, appliances and other personal properties.11In his answer12to the complaint, petitioner claimed that the expenses for the construction of their house were defrayed solely from his income as a captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that private respondents meager income as fish dealer rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of said house. Besides, selling fish was a mere pastime to her; as such, she was contented with the small quantity of fish allotted to her from his fishing trips. Petitioner further contended that Gina did not work continuously in Japan from 1992 to 1994, but only for a 6-month duration each year. When their house was repaired and improved sometime in 1995-1996, private respondent did not share in the expenses because her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily needs and business of her parents. From his income in the fishing business, he claimed to have saved a total of P130,000.00, P75,000.00 of which was placed in a joint account deposit with private respondent. This savings, according to petitioner was spent in purchasing the disputed personal properties.On May 21, 1997, the trial court declared the petitioner as in default for failure to file a pre-trial brief as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89.13On May 26, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration14of the May 21, 1997 order, which was denied on June 2, 1997, and private respondent was allowed to present evidenceex parte.15Petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration but the same was also denied on October 8, 1997.On July 15, 1998, a decision16was rendered in favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Gina S. Rey against defendant Jacinto Saguid:a) Ordering the partition of the house identified as plaintiffs Exhibit C and D and directing the defendant to return and/or reimburse to the plaintiff the amount of seventy thousand pesos (P70,000,00) which the latter actually contributed to its construction and completion;b) Declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive owner of the personal properties listed on Exhibit M;c) Ordering the defendant, and/or anyone in possession of the aforesaid personal properties, to return and/or deliver the same to the plaintiff; andd) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) plus the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.17On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals; however, the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages was deleted for lack of basis.18The appellate court ruled that the propriety of the order which declared the petitioner as in default became moot and academic in view of the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It explained that the new rules now require the filing of a pre-trial brief and the defendants non-compliance therewith entitles the plaintiff to present evidenceex parte.Both parties filed motions for reconsideration which were denied; hence, petitioner filed the instant petition based on the following assigned errors:A.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING RETROACTIVELY THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE PRESENT CASE AND HOLDING THE FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR THEREIN MOOT AND ACADEMIC THUS, FAILED TO RULE ON THE PROPRIETY OF THE TRIAL COURTS REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF DEFAULT DUE TO MISTAKE AND/OR EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY PETITIONER.B.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RELYING ON THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH RECEIVED THE EVIDENCE OF HEREIN RESPONDENT ONLY EX PARTE.19The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not the trial court erred in allowing private respondent to present evidenceex parte; and (2) whether or not the trial courts decision is supported by evidence.Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial,i.e., the plaintiff may present his evidenceex parteand the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof.20The remedy of the defendant is to file a motion for reconsideration21showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect.22The motion need not really stress the fact that the defendant has a valid and meritorious defense because his answer which contains his defenses is already on record.23In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is justified because he was not represented by counsel. This justification is not, however, sufficient to set aside the order directing private respondent to present evidenceex parte,inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his own risk not to be represented by counsel. Even without the assistance of a lawyer, petitioner was able to file a motion for extension to file answer,24the required answer stating therein the special and affirmative defenses,25and several other motions.26If it were true that petitioner did not understand the import of the April 23, 1997 order directing him to file a pre-trial brief, he could have inquired from the court or filed a motion for extension of time to file the brief. Instead, he waited until May 26, 1997, or 14 days from his alleged receipt of the April 23, 1997 order before he filed a motion asking the court to excuse his failure to file a brief. Pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they should be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.27In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a persuasive reason to relax the application of the rules. There is nothing in the Constitution which mandates that a party in a non-criminal proceeding be represented by counsel and that the absence of such representation amounts to a denial of due process. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession is not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated.28However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically, Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, rendered moot and academic the issue of whether or not the plaintiff may be allowed to present evidenceex partefor failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief. While the rules may indeed be applied retroactively, the same is not called for in the case at bar. Even before the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on July 1, 1997, the filing of a pre-trial brief was required under Circular No. 1-89 which became effective on February 1, 1989. Pursuant to the said circular, "[f]ailure to file pre-trial briefs may be given the same effect as the failure to appear at the pre-trial," that is, the party may be declared non-suited or considered as in default.29Coming now to the substantive issue, it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 14830of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, "only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ..."31Proof of actual contribution is required.32In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987, which is before the date of the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.33Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.34In the cases ofAgapay v. Palang,35andTumlos v. Fernandez,36which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterous union is without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also inAdriano v. Court of Appeals,37we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense.38This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidenceex parte.The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.39Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.40In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are receipts41in her name for the purchase of construction materials on November 17, 1995 and December 23, 1995, in the total amount of P11,413.00.On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed personal properties came partly from their joint account with First Allied Development Bank. While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-half,i.e., P55,687.50 each.The Court of Appeals thus erred in affirming the decision of the trial court which granted the reliefs prayed for by private respondent. On the basis of the evidence established, the extent of private respondents co-ownership over the disputed house is only up to the amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution in the construction thereof. Anent the personal properties, her participation therein should be limited only to the amount of P55,687.50.As regards the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as moral damages, the Court of Appeals correctly deleted the same for lack of basis.WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64166 is AFFIRMEDwithMODIFICATION. Private respondent Gina S. Rey is declared co-owner of petitioner Jacinto Saguid in the controverted house to the extent of P11,413.00 and personal properties to the extent of P55,687.50. Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the amount of P67,100.50 to private respondent, failing which the house shall be sold at public auction to satisfy private respondents claim.SO ORDERED.

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 91486 September 10, 2003ALBERTO G. PINLAC, ATTY. ERIBERTO H. DECENA, RODOLFO F. REYES, FELIPE BRIONES, JUANITO METILLA, JR., FELIPE A. FLORES, HERMINIO ELEVADO, NARCISO S. SIMEROS,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. CORAZON A. MERRERA, ATTY. JEAN MAKASIAR-PUNO, SERGIO ACABAN, represented by Atty. Ramon Gerona, ATTY. ROGELIO VELASCO, MARTINA S. NONA, OVIDEO MEJICA, ALFREDO ITALIA, MARIANO GUEVARRA, JESUS YUJUICO, DOMINADOR RIVERA, SATURNINA SALES, represented by Atty. Consolacion Sales-Demontano, FRED CHUA, SONIA SY CHUA, LAWRENCE CHUA, CAROLINA C. RUBIO, represented by Tessie Sebastian, GEORGE G. GUERRERO, BEATRIZ TANTOCO, represented by Filomena Cervantes, ATTY. MARCELA CELESTINO-GARCIA, FEDERICO GARCIA, ILDEFONSO MORALES, LEONCIA VELASCO, OCRAVIO F. LINA, ANA MARIA JARAMILLO, ESTRELLA BASA, JOSE ESTEVA, JR., CIRILO GONZALES, VILLY TOBIAS, MIGUEL DELA PAZ, RUBEN GUILLERMO, FAUSTO YADAO, represented by Jeremias Panlilio, RICARDO YAP, ROSAURO/PATRICK MARQUEZ, represented by Emmanuel Marquez, MODESTA FABRIG and MAXIMINO SALCEDA, MELIA LATOMBO, TERESITA PANGILINAN-RIVERO, ARCH. DANILO C. DE CASTRO, JOSE S. LEDESMA, JAIME P. ANG, VEICENTE P. ANG, MAURO U. GABRIEL, ATTY. VIRGINIA GOMEZ, GIL S. BONILLA, LOURDES BLANCO, represented by Catalina Blanco, JOSEFA SANCHEZ and ROSALINA VILLEGAS, represented by Heidi Bobis, SHIRLEY BUCAG, QUIRINA O. TUVERA, represented by Wilfredo Orejuros, GREGORIO AVENTINO, represented by Enrico Aventino, LEONARDO L. NICOLAS, NICOMEDES PENARANDA, FRANCISCA MEDRANO, OFELIA IGNACIO, ROSENDO ABUBO, represented by Santos Chavez, SOLEDAD BAUTISTA DE COLUMNA, represented by Zenaida Valle, MARQUITA/ SEBASTIAN LOPEZ, represented by Emmanuel Marquez, DELIA DORION, GERARDO L. SANTIAGO, FIDEL PANGANIBAN, represented by Manuel dela Roca, MATEO and OFELIA INOVEJAS, REMEDIOS C. DOVAS, represented by Josefa Capistrano, DOMINGO ALTAMIRANO and SPOUSES ROLANDO ALTAMIRANO and MINERVA FETALVERO, BEATRIZ RINGPIS, ROSARIO DE MATA, RUFINA CRUZ, represented by JOSEFA MANABAT, SPOUSES ANITA SALONGA-CAPAGCUAN and MAYNARD CAPAGCUAN, DISCORA YATCO, represented by VICTORINA Y. FIRME, and CONSUELO YATCO, GENEROSA MEDINA VDA. DE NOGUERA, represented by ATTY. RAYMUNDO M. NOGUERA, BEATRIZ SALANDANAN and LOURDES ALONTE-VASQUEZ, PEDRO COSIO and VICTORINA CARINO, RUTH C. ZARATE, PRECIOSISIMA V. YAPCHULAY, BASILISA B. YAPCHULAY, OFELIA B. YAPCHULAY, FELISA B. YAPCHULAY, FE B. YAPCHULAY, WILMA B. YAPCHULAY, FELIX B. YAPCHULAY, MARIANO B. YAPCHULAY, GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and other registered OWNERS OF VILAR-MALOLES (VILMA) SUBDIVISION,respondents.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,intervenor.WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,intervenor.RESOLUTIONYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:This resolves the Petition-In-Intervention1filed by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Registration Authority and the Motion for Clarification2filed by respondents.The facts may be briefly restated as follows: The controversy stemmed from a Petition for Quieting of Title filed by petitioners over 3 vast parcels of land known as Lot Nos. 1, 2 & 3. Lot No. 1 is covered by TCT No. 5690, while Lot Nos. 2 and 3 were originally covered by OCT No. 614 and OCT No. 333, respectively. On March 21, 1988, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision3in favor of petitioners and against the defendants who were declared in default, including respondent owners of Vilmar-Maloles (Vilma) Subdivision whose properties were within Lot No. 2. The dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and against the defaulted respondents:1) Declaring petitioners through the principal petitioners hereof, to wit: Alberto G. Pinlac, Atty. Eriberto H. Decena, Rodolfo T. Reyes, Felipe Briones and Juanito S. Metilla as absolute owners in fee simple title of the aforesaid Lots 1, 2 & 3 hereof by virtue of extra-ordinary prescription, with the exception of the lands covered by the respective transfer certificate of title belonging to the non-defaulted respondents;2) Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 614, TCT No. 5690 and TCT No. 3548 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, and the subsequent TCTs issued therefrom, with the exception of those titles belonging to the non-defaulted respondents, as null and void ab initio;3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel OCT No. 614, TCT No. 5690 and TCT No. 3548 as well as the subsequent TCTs issued and emanating therefrom, with the exception of those titles belonging to the non-defaulted respondents, from its record;4) Declaring the area of TCT No. 333 in excess of its true and actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, as well as the TCTs subsequently issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, covering the area in excess of said actual area, with the exception of those belonging to non-defaulted respondents, as null and void ab initio;5) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel all TCTs subsequently issued based on OCT No. 333 in excess of the actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, with the exception of those titles belonging to the non-defaulted respondents;6) Declaring the writ of preliminary injunction dated August 7, 1985, in so far as those areas covered by the cancelled OCTs and TCTs hereof are concerned, as permanent;7) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to issue herein petitioners the corresponding individual transfer certificate of titles upon proper application made thereof.SO ORDERED.On May 17, 1989, the defaulted title owners of Vilma filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition to Annul the Partial Decision of the trial court, which was granted in a decision4dated November 15, 1989. The appellate court ruled that the courta quodid not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondents because of defective service of summons by publication. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said decision was denied; hence, they filed this petition forcertiorari.On January 19, 2001, we rendered a Decision denying the petition and affirming the Judgment of the Court of Appeals. The dispositive portion thereof reads:WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 17596 is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.5Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration6contending,inter alia, that the disposition of the trial court with respect to Lot No. 3, should not have been annulled by the Court of Appeals because the petition for annulment of judgment filed by the respondents concerned only Lot No. 2. They prayed that the January 19, 2001 decision of the Court which affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals be reconsidered insofar as Lot No. 3 is concerned.On November 20, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution partially granting petitioners motion for reconsideration by reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the dipositive portion of the trial courts Partial Decision pertaining to Lot No. 3, thus WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED and our Decision promulgated on January 19, 2001 is MODIFIED as follows:(1) reinstating paragraph (4) and (5) of the Partial Decision of the courta quo; and(2) affirming the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 17596 in all other respects.SO ORDERED.7On July 22, 2002, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for intervention and a Petition-In-Intervention praying that judgment be rendered declaring:1) That OCT No. 333 is a valid and existing title in line with the decisions this Honorable Court had already rendered;2) That OCT No. 333 was never expanded from its original area of 52,949,737 square meters;3) That the land occupied by petitioners is not forest land and is covered by OCT No. 333;4) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. Q-35673 with respect to OCT No. 333 are null and void; and5) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. Q-35672 is null and void, no notice of the hearings/proceedings having been sent to the Republic and other interested parties.The Republic likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable under the circumstances.8The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure is intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof.9Indeed, in exceptional cases, the Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the trial court. In one case, intervention was allowed even when the petition for review of the assailed judgment was already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court.10InMago v. Court of Appeals,11intervention was granted even after the decision became final and executory, thus The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the same. But needless to say, this discretion should be exercised judiciously and only after consideration of all the circumstances obtaining in the case.But it is apparent that the courts a quo only considered the technicalities of the rules on intervention and of the petition for relief from judgment. The denial of their motion to intervene arising from the strict application of the rule was an injustice to petitioners whose substantial interest in the subject property cannot be disputed. It must be stressed that the trial court granted private respondent's petition for prohibition with injunction without petitioners being impleaded, in total disregard of their right to be heard, when on the face of the resolution of the Community Relations and Information Office (CRIO) sought to be enjoined, petitioners were the ones directly to be affected. We need not belabor the point that petitioners are indeed indispensable parties with such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made in their absence without affecting, nay injuring, such interest.In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals where the motions for intervention were filed when the case had already reached this Court, it was declared:It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial had already been concluded x x x and on appeal x x x the same was affirmed by the Court of Appe