Remedial Law Review 2 Midterms Cases

8/11/2019 Remedial Law Review 2 Midterms Cases

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REMREV2 MIDTERMS CASES

G.R. No. 180843 Ap ril 17,

2013APOLONIO GARCIA, and CRISTINA

SALAMA T vs. DOMINGA ROBLES VDA.

DE CAPARAS,

Under the Dead Man's Statute Rule, "if oneparty to the alleged transaction is precluded

from testifying by death, insanity, or other

mental disabilities, the other party is not

entitled to the undue advantage of giving his

own uncontradicted and unexplained

account of the transaction."1Thus, the

alleged admission of the deceased Pedro

Caparas (Pedro) that he entered into a

sharing of leasehold rights with the

petitioners cannot be used as evidenceagainst the herein respondent as the latter

would be unable to contradict or disprove

the same.

Facts: Flora Makapugay is the owner of a

2.5-hectare farm in Barangay Lugam,

Malolos, Bulacan (the land) covered by

Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) RT-

65932 (T-25198)6and being tilled by

Eugenio Caparas as agricultural lessee

under a leasehold agreement. Makapugay

passed away and was succeeded by her

nephews and niece, namely Amanda dela

Paz-Perlas, Justo dela Paz and Augusto

dela Paz. On the other hand, Eugenioschildren Modesta Garcia , CristinaSalamat and Pedrosucceeded him.

Before she passed away, Makapugay

appointed Amanda as her attorney-in-fact.

After Eugenio died, or in 1974, Amanda and

Pedro entered into an agreement entitled

"Kasunduan sa Buwisan",7followed by an

April 19, 1979 Agricultural Leasehold

Contract,8covering the land. In said

agreements, Pedro was installed and

recognized as the lone agricultural lessee

and cultivator of the land.

Pedro passed away in 1984, and his wife,

herein respondent Dominga Robles Vda. de

Caparas, took over as agricultural lessee.

On July 10, 1996, the landowners Amanda,

Justo and Augusto, on the one hand, and

Pedros sisters Garcia and Salamat on theother, entered into a "Kasunduan sa

Buwisan ng Lupa"9whereby Garcia andSalamat were acknowledged as Pedros co-lessees.

On October 24, 1996, herein petitioners

Garcia and Salamat filed a Complaint10

for

nullification of leasehold and restoration of

rights as agricultural lessees against

Pedros heirs, represented by his survivingspouse and herein respondent Dominga.

Before the office of the Provincial Agrarian

Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Bulacan,

the case was docketed as Department of

Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board

(DARAB) Case No. R-03-02-3520-96.

Our Ruling: The Petition is denied.

DARAB Case No. R-03-02-3520-96, which

was filed in 1996 or long after Pedros death

in 1984, has no leg to stand on other than

Amandas declaration in her July 10, 1996Affidavit that Pedro falsely represented to

Makapugay and to her that he is the actual

cultivator of the land, and that when she

confronted him about this and the alleged

alternate farming scheme between him and

petitioners, Pedro allegedly told her that "he

and his two sisters had an understanding

about it and he did not have the intention of

depriving them of their cultivatory

rights."28

Petitioners have no other

evidence, other than such verbal

declaration, which proves the existence of

such arrangement. No written memorandum

of such agreement exists, nor have they

shown that they actually cultivated the land

even if only for one cropping. No receiptevidencing payment to the landowners of

the latters share, or any other documentaryevidence, has been put forward.

What the PARAD, DARAB and CA failed to

consider and realize is that Amandasdeclaration in her Affidavit covering Pedrosalleged admission and recognition of the

alternate farming scheme is inadmissible for

being a violation of the Dead MansStatute,

29which provides that "[i]f one party

to the alleged transaction is precluded from

testifying by death, insanity, or other mental

disabilities, the other party is not entitled to

the undue advantage of giving his own

uncontradicted and unexplained account of

the transaction."30

Thus, since Pedro is

deceased, and Amandas declaration whichpertains to the leasehold agreement affects

the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa"
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which she as assignor entered into with

petitioners, and which is now the subject

matter of the present case and claim

against Pedros surviving spouse and lawfulsuccessor-in-interest Dominga, such

declaration cannot be admitted and used

against the latter, who is placed in an unfair

situation by reason of her being unable to

contradict or disprove such declaration as a

result of her husband-declarant Pedrosprior death.

Section 9. Agricultural Leasehold RelationNot Extinguished by Death or Incapacity of

the Parties - In case of death or permanent

incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work

his landholding, the leasehold shall continue

between the agricultural lessor and the

person who can cultivate the landholding

personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor

within one month from such death or

permanent incapacity, from among the

following: (a) the surviving spouse; (b) the

eldest direct descendant by consanguinity;

or (c) the next eldest descendant or

descendants in the order of their age:

Provided, That in case the death orpermanent incapacity of the agricultural

lessee occurs during the agricultural year,

such choice shall be exercised at the end of

that agricultural year: Provided, further, That

in the event the agricultural lessor fails to

exercise his choice within the periods herein

provided, the priority shall be in accordance

with the order herein established.

In case of death or permanent incapacity of

the agricultural lessor, the leasehold shall

bind his legal heirs.

Amanda may not claim ignorance of the

above provision, as ignorance of the law

excuses no one from compliance

therewith.31Thus, when she executed the1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract with

Pedro, she is deemed to have chosen the

latter as Eugenios successor, and ispresumed to have diligently performed her

duties, as Makapugays representative, inconducting an inquiry prior to making the

choice.

With the above pronouncements, there is no

other logical conclusion than that the 1996"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" between

Amanda and petitioners, which is grounded

on Pedros inadmissible verbal admission,and which agreement was entered into

without obtaining Domingas consent,constitutes an undue infringement of

Domingas rights as Pedros successor-in-interest under Section 9, and operates to

deprive her of such rights and dispossessher of the leasehold against her will. Under

Section 732of RA 3844, Dominga is entitled

to security of tenure; and under Section

16,33

any modification of the lease

agreement must be done with the consent

of both parties and without prejudicing

Dominga's security of tenure.

PEOPLE vs. NOEL ENOJAS y HINGPIT,

GR# 204894 March 2014

PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. testified that at

around 10:30 in the evening of August 29,

2006, he and P02 Francisco Pangilinan

were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota

Alabang and SM Southmall when they

spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked

in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop near

the intersection of BF Almanza and

Alabang-Zapote Roads. The officers

approached the taxi and asked the driver,

later identified as accused Enojas, for his

documents. The latter complied but, having

entertained doubts regarding the veracity of

documents shown them, they asked him to

come with them to the police station in their

mobile car for further questioning.2

Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the

police officers and left his taxi behind. On

reaching the 7-11 convenience store on the

Zapote-Alabang Road, however, they

stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down to

relieve himself there. As he approached the

stores door, however, he came upon twosuspected robbers and shot it out with them.

PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and

hit the other who still managed to escape.But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan

causing his death.

On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came

around and fired at an armed man whom he

saw running towards Pilar Village. He saw

another man, who came from the Jollibbee

outlet, run towards Alabang-Zapote Road

while firing his gun at PO2 Gregorio. The

latter returned fire but the men were able to
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take a taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio

radioed for help and for an ambulance. On

returning to his mobile car, he realized that

accused Enojas, the taxi driver they had

with them had fled.

P/Insp. Ferjen Torred, the Chief of

Investigation Division of the Las PiasPolice, testified that he and PO2 Teoson

Rosarito immediately responded to PO2

Gregorios urgent call. Suspecting thataccused Enojas, the taxi driver who fled,

was involved in the attempted robbery, they

searched the abandoned taxi and found a

mobile phone that Enojas apparently left

behind. P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Joel

Cambi to monitor its incoming messages.3

PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that

they monitored the messages in accused

Enojas mobile phone and, posing asEnojas, communicated with the other

accused. The police then conducted an

entrapment operation that resulted in the

arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni.

Subsequently, the police were also able to

capture accused Enojas and Gomez. Theprosecution presented the transcripts of the

mobile phone text messages between

Enojas and some of his co-accused.5

Manifesting in open court that they did not

want to adduce any evidence or testify in

the case,7the accused opted to instead file

a trial memorandum on March 10, 2008 for

their defense. They pointed out that they

were entitled to an acquittal since they wereall illegally arrested and since the evidence

of the text messages were inadmissible, not

having been properly identified.

The defense points out that the prosecution

failed to present direct evidence that the

accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or

Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2

Pangilinan dead.11This may be true but theprosecution could prove their liability by

circumstantial evidence that meets the

evidentiary standard of proof beyond

reasonable doubt. It has been held that

circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if: 1) there is more than one

circumstance; 2) the facts from which the

inferences are derived are proven; and 3)

the combination of all the circumstances is

such as to produce a conviction beyond

reasonable doubt.12

Here the totality of the circumstantial

evidence the prosecution presented

sufficiently provides basis for the conviction

of all the accused. Thus:

PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused

Enojas as the driver of the taxicab

suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila

Auto Glass shop. The officers were bringing

him with them to the police station because

of the questionable documents he showed

upon query. Subsequent inspection of the

taxicab yielded Enojas mobile phone thatcontained messages which led to the

entrapment and capture of the other

accused who were also taxicab drivers.

Enojas fled during the commotion rather

than remain in the cab to go to the police

station where he was about to be taken for

questioning, tending to show that he had

something to hide. He certainly did not go to

the police afterwards to clear up the matter

and claim his taxi.

PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused

Gomez as one of the men he saw running

away from the scene of the shooting.

The text messages identified "Kua Justin"

as one of those who engaged PO2

Pangilinan in the shootout; the messages

also referred to "Kua Justin" as the one who

was hit in such shootout and later died in a

hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These messageslinked the other accused.

During the follow-up operations, the police

investigators succeeded in entrapping

accused Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and

Gomez, who were all named in the text

messages.

The text messages sent to the phone

recovered from the taxi driven by Enojasclearly made references to the 7-11

shootout and to the wounding of "Kua

Justin," one of the gunmen, and his

subsequent death.

The context of the messages showed that

the accused were members of an organized

group of taxicab drivers engaged in illegal

activities.
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Upon the arrest of the accused, they were

found in possession of mobile phones with

call numbers that corresponded to the

senders of the messages received on the

mobile phone that accused Enojas left in his

taxicab.13

As to the admissibility of the textmessages, the RTC admitted them in

conformity with the Courts earlier

Resolution applying the Rules on

Electronic Evidence to criminal

actions.15Text messages are to be

proved by the testimony of a person who

was a party to the same or has personal

knowledge of them.16Here, PO3 Cambi,

posing as the accused Enojas,

exchanged text messages with the other

accused in order to identify and entrap

them. As the recipient of those

messages sent from and to the mobile

phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had

personal knowledge of such messages

and was competent to testify on them.

G.R. No. 131805. Septem ber 7, 2001

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, v s. GREGORIO HERMOSA

and GABRIEL ABEL INDE

That sometime on January 11, 1995, at

about 1:00 oclock in (the) morning more orless, at Barangay Gahit, Municipality of

Caitingan, Province of Masbate, Philippines,

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable

Court, the above-named accused, with

intent to kill, conspiring and confederatingand mutually helping one another, with

evident premeditation, use of superior

strength and noctornity as cover,

treachery,did then and there

willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the

use of sharp and pointed bolo, assault,

attack, hack and stab a woman named

ELEONOR CONDE MALIPOTthereby

hitting the latter at the different parts of her

body which was the direct and logical

(cause) of her instantaneous death.

The records show that in the early morning

of January 11, 1995, the residents of Sitio

Mayabas found the lifeless body of Eleanor

Conde Malipot[3]

near a creek, a few meters

behind her house in Sitio Mayabas,

Cataingan, Masbate. She was 43 years

old. A widow, the deceased was survived

by four (4) children, namely: Elizalde, 15

years old, Marither, 12 years old,

Macuibelle, 8 years old, and Dexter, 4 years

old.

The victims 8-year old daughter,Macuibelle, partially witnessed the tragic

incident. She testified that at about 1

oclock in the morning of January 11, 1995,she was roused by the victimsscream. She peeped through a hole in the

wall of their room and saw the victim at the

main door of their house, near the

stairs.[6]The victim had a lamp in one hand,

and a bolo in the other. Macuibelle also

saw the two accused: Gregorio Hermosa

was standing in front of the victim while

Gabriel Abelinde was at the front yard,

clubbing the victims carabao that was tied

some four (4) meters away from the

house.[8]Suddenly, Hermosa stabbed the

victim. Thereafter, Hermosa and Abelinde

forcibly took the victim from the house and

dragged her towards the nearby

creek. Macuibelle shouted for help. No one

responded. Her only companion then was

her 4-year old brother, Dexter. Afraid, she

went back to sleep.[9]

Issue: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN

GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO

THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION

WITNESS MACUIBELLE MALIPOT.

We give full faith and credit to her

testimony. She was young and unschooled,

but her narration of the incident was honestand sincere. It cannot be suspected as a

concocted story, impressed upon her by

other people.

We should not take Macuibelles testimonylightly simply because she was a mere child

when she witnessed the incident and when

she gave her testimony in court. There is

no showing that her mental maturity

rendered her incapable of testifying and of

relating the incident truthfully. Indeed, the

time when we degrade a child witness

testimony is now pass. In the new Child

Witness Rule,[26]every child is presumed

qualified to be a witness. To rebut this

presumption, the burden of proof lies on the

party challenging the childscompetence. Only when substantial doubt

exists regarding the ability of the child toperceive, remember, communicate,
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distinguish truth from falsehood, or

appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court

will the court, motu proprioor on motion of a

party, conduct a competency examination of

a child.[27]

The alleged delay in identifying the

appellants is more apparent than real. It isclear from the records that the appellants

were identified by Macuibelle as the

persons responsible for the death of the

victim. She failed to mention their names

when the police first arrived at the scene,

but a few hours later, she told the police that

the appellants were the assailants. In fact,

the appellants were immediately arrested

shortly after the discovery of the crime.[28]

Failure to immediately reveal the identity of

the perpetrator of a felony will not

necessarily impair the credibility of a

witness.[29]

Even adult witnesses sometimes

would not reveal at once the killers of their

loved ones for one reason or

another.[30]

Fear of the criminal is one such

reason.[31]

We stress that the identity of the appellants

was well established. Macuibelle positively

identified them. The victim was then at the

main door of their house when the

appellants forcibly dragged her. She saw

them from a distance of about six (6)

meters. The lamp held by the victim

provided the light that gave Macuibelle the

chance to recognize the appellants.[32]

She

was also familiar with them because theywere neighbors. The possibility that she

was mistaken as to their identity is nil. Her

lack of ill motive bolsters her credibility.

Macuibelle was only eight (8) years old

when she witnessed the shocking

incident. Despite her plea, no one came to

help them when the appellants attacked the

victim and dragged her from theirhouse. She was helpless and afraid. She

knew her brother Zaldy and sister Marither

were not around to protect her. After the

traumatic incident, it is difficult to fault her

when she chose to go back to sleep and

wait for her siblings to arrive the next

day. Her behavior is not irrational.[34]

The exact location of the victims wounds

does not destroy Macuibelles testimonythat appellant Hermosa was the one who

stabbed the victim and, with Abelindeshelp, dragged her to the nearby creek

where they finally finished her off. The

misdescription of where appellant Hermosa

stabbed the victim does not mean the

witness perjured herself. The violent

incident happened fast. Macuibelle just

woke up and witnessed the bloodyassault. It was a traumatic experience for

the eight-year old girl. She cannot be

expected to have a perfect memory of an

event she may even want to forget.

The appellants defense of denial and alibicannot prevail over their positive

identification. Alibi is the weakest defense

as it is easy to concoct. For alibi to prosper,

an accused must not only prove that he wasabsent at the crime scene at the time of its

commission, but also, that it was physically

impossible for him to be so situated at said

distance.[35]

G.R. No. 204637 Ap ril 16, 2013

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO,

vs.HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ELMER E.PANOTES,

In the May 10, 2010 elections, Chato and

Panotes both ran for the congressional seat

to represent the Second District of

Camarines Norte. On May 12, 2010,

Panotes was proclaimed as the winner for

having garnered 51,704 votes. The votes

cast for Chato totalled 47,822.

On May 24, 2010, Chato filed an electoral

protest claiming that in four of the seven

municipalities4comprising the Second

District of Camarines Norte, where

irregularities occurred. Chato, on the other

hand, was not able to present sufficient

evidence to prove that the integrity of the

CF cards was not preserved.

The settled rule in election contests is thatthe ballots themselves constitute the best

evidence of the will of the voters, but the

ballots lose this character and give way to

the acceptance of the election returns when

it has been shown that they have been the

subject of tampering, either by substituting

them with other official or fake ballots, or by

substantially altering or changing their

contents.
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Consequently, the votes determined after

the revision in the foregoing 69 CPs in

Basud and Daet, which yielded a reversal of

votes, cannot be relied upon, as they do not

reflect the true will of the electorate. Hence,

the Tribunal has to rely on what is reflected

in the election returns and/or statement of

votes by precinct[,] the same being the best

evidence of the results of the election in

said precincts in lieu of the altered ballots.

Central to the resolution of the instant

petition are the issues of whether or not the

HRET committed grave abuse of discretion

when it:

a) resorted to the PIBs, regarded them as

the equivalent of the paper ballots, andthereafter ruled that the integrity of the latter

was doubtful;

b) held that Chato had failed to prove by

substantial evidence that the CF cards used

in the May 10, 2010 elections were not

preserved.

There is no meri t in the instant pet i t ion.

It bears stressing that the HRETs Orderdated April 10, 2012 was issued to resolve

Panotes motion to suspend thecontinuance of the revision proceedings in

75% of the contested CPs. The HRETsfindings then anent the integrity of the ballot

boxes were at the most, preliminary in

nature. The HRET was in no way estopped

from subsequently holding otherwise after it

had the opportunity to exhaustively observe

and examine in the course of the entire

revision proceedings the conditions of all

the ballot boxes and their contents,

including the ballots themselves, the MOV,

SOVs and ERs.

Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369 defines

"official ballot" where AES (AutomatedElection System) is utilized as the "paper

ballot, whether printed or generated by

the technology applied, that faithfully

captures or represents the votes cast by

a voter recorded or to be recorded in

electronic form."

The May 10, 2010 elections used a paper-

based technology that allowed voters to fill

out an official paper ballot by shading theoval opposite the names of their chosen

candidates. Each voter was then required to

personally feed his ballot into the Precinct

Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machine which

scanned both sides of the ballots

simultaneously, meaning, in just one pass.

As established during the required demo

tests, the system captured the images of the

ballots in encrypted format which, when

decrypted for verification, were found to be

digitized representations of the ballots cast.

As such, the printouts thereof PIBs are

the functional equivalent of the paper

ballots filled out by the voters and, thus,

may be used for purposes of revision of

votes in an electoral protest.

x x x The HRET found Chatos evidenceinsufficient. The testimonies of the

witnesses she presented were declared

irrelevant and immaterial as they did not

refer to the CF cards used in the 20

precincts in the Municipalities of Basud and

Daet with substantial variances x x x.

To substitute our own judgment to the

findings of the HRET will doubtlessconstitute an intrusion into its domain and a

curtailment of its power to act of its own

accord on its evaluation of the evidentiary

weight of testimonies presented before it.

Thus, for failure of Chato to discharge her

burden of proving that the integrity of the

questioned cards had not been preserved,

no further protestations to the use of the

picture images of the ballots as stored in the

CF cards should be entertained.

Chato attempts to convince us that the

integrity of the physical ballots was

preserved, while that of the CF cards

was not. As mentioned above, the

integrity of the CF cards is already a

settled matter. Anent that of the physical

ballots, this is a factual issue which calls for

a re-calibration of evidence. Generally, we

do not resolve factual questions unless the

decision, resolution or order brought to us

for review can be shown to have been

rendered or issued with grave abuse of

discretion. DISMISSED for lack of merit.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

DELILAH VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, COURT

OF A PPEALS, vs . CIELITO M. SA LUD,

CLERK IV, COURT OF A PPEALS, A.M.No. CA-05-20-P; Septemb er 9, 2005


7/43

Facts: Respondent is charged and held

liable for offenses on inefficiency and

incompetence of official duty; conduct

grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the

service; and directly and indirectly having

financial and material interest in an official

transaction considering his undue interest in

the service of the order of release and

actual release of Melchor Lagua.

Lagua was found guilty of homicide and was

then detained at the Bureau of Prisons

National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City.

Laguas petition for bond wasapproved in aResolution where the appellate court

directed the issuance of an order of release

in favor of Lagua. The resolution was

brought to the office of Atty. Madarang,

Division Clerk of Court, for promulgation.

Respondent served the resolution and order

of release of Lagua at the National

Penitentiary, where Lagua was detained for

homicide.

Meanwhile, Atty. Madarang received a call

from a certain Melissa Melchor, who

introduced herself as Laguas relative,asking how much more they had to give to

facilitate Laguas provisional liberty, and thatthey sought the help of a certain Rhodora

Valdez of RTC Pasig, but was told that they

still had a balance. When Atty.

Madarang was able to get the mobile

number of respondent, he represented

himself as Laguas relative and exchanged

text messages with said respondent for apossible pay-off for the Laguas provisional

liberty. Atty. Madarang later discovered that

the respondent did not properly serve the

copies of the Resolution and Order of

Release upon the accused-appellant and

his counsel. but gave them to a certain Art

Baluran, allegedly Laguas relative.

Later on, Complainant called therespondent to her office. When confronted,

the respondent denied extorting or receiving

money for Laguas release, or in any othercase. He, however, admitted serving the

copies of resolution and order of release

intended for Lagua and his counsel to Art

Baluran. Complainant then lodged the

complaint against the respondent in a Letter

dated November 14, 2003.

Issue: Whether or not the admission of text

messages as evidence constitutes a

violation of right to privacy of the accused?

Held: No. The respondents claim that theadmission of the text messages as evidence

against him constitutes a violation of his

right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages

have been classified as ephemeral

electronic communication under Section1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic

Evidence, and shall be proven by thetestimony of a person who was a party to

the same or has personal knowledge

thereof. Any question as to the admissibilityof such messages is now moot and

academic, as the respondent himself, as

well as his counsel, already admitted that he

was the sender of the first three messageson Atty. Madarangs cell phone.

This was also the ruling of the Court in the

recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-

Apao. In that case, the Court, in finding the

respondent therein guilty of dishonesty and

grave misconduct, considered text

messages addressed to the complainant

asking for a million pesos in exchange for a

favorable decision in a case pending before

the CA. The Court had the occasion to

state:

The text messages were properlyadmitted by the Committee since the same

are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of

the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which

provides:

Ephemeral electronic communicationrefers to telephone conversations, text

messages and other electronic forms ofcommunication the evidence of which is not

recorded or retained.

G.R. No. 170604 Septem ber 2, 2013

HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON

vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND

VALENTINA CLAVE, REPRESENTED BY

REV. MAXIMO ALVAREZ, JR.

The Best Evidence Rule applies only when

the terms of a written document are the

subject of the inquiry. In an action for

quieting of title based on the inexistence of

a deed of sale with right to repurchase that

purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a

property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule

does not apply, and the defendant is not


8/43

precluded from presenting evidence other

than the original document.

The Case: In their complaint for quieting of

title and damages against Margarita

Prodon,3the respondents averred as the

plaintiffs that their parents, the late spouses

Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and ValentinaClave, were the registered owners of that

parcel of land covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 84797 of the

Register of Deeds of Manila; that their

parents had been in possession of the

property during their lifetime; that upon their

parents deaths, they had continued thepossession of the property as heirs, paying

the real property taxes due thereon; that

they could not locate the owners duplicatecopy of TCT No. 84797, but the original

copy of TCT No. 84797 on file with the

Register of Deeds of Manila was intact; that

the original copy contained an entry stating

that the property had been sold to

defendant Prodon subject to the right of

repurchase; and that the entry had been

maliciously done by Prodon because the

deed of sale with right to repurchasecovering the property did not exist.

Consequently, they prayed that the entry be

cancelled, and that Prodon be adjudged

liable for damages.

During trial, the custodian of the records of

the property attested that the copy of the

deed of sale with right to repurchase could

not be found in the files of the Register of

Deeds of Manila.

Issues: (a) whether the pre-requisites for

the admission of secondary evidence had

been complied with; (b) whether the late

Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been physically

incapable of personally executing the deed

of sale with right to repurchase;and (c)

whether Prodons claim of ownership wasalready barred by laches.12

Ruling: The appeal has no merit.

1. Best Evidence Rule was not applicable

herein

Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court

embodies the Best Evidence

Rule, to wit:

Section 3. Original document must be

produced; exceptions. When the subjectof inquiry is the contents of a document, no

evidence shall be admissible other than the

original document itself, except in the

following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or

destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,

without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or

under control of the party against whom the

evidence is offered, and the latter fails to

produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous

accounts or other documents which cannot

be examined in court without great loss of

time and the fact sought to be established

from them is only the general result of the

whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in

the custody of a public officer or is recorded

in a public office.

The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that inproving the terms of a written document the

original of the document must be produced

in court. The rule excludes any evidence

other than the original writing to prove the

contents thereof, unless the offeror proves:

(a) the existence or due execution of the

original; (b) the loss and destruction of the

original, or the reason for its non-production

in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on

the part of the offeror to which theunavailability of the original can be

attributed.13

The primary purpose of the Best Evidence

Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of

a writing are brought before the

court,14

considering that (a) the precision in

presenting to the court the exact words of

the writing is of more than average

importance, particularly as respects

operative or dispositive instruments, such

as deeds, wills and contracts, because a

slight variation in words may mean a great

difference in rights; (b) there is a substantial

hazard of inaccuracy in the human process

of making a copy by handwriting or

typewriting; and (c) as respects oral

testimony purporting to give from memory

the terms of a writing, there is a special riskof error, greater than in the case of attempts
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9/43

at describing other situations

generally.15The rule further acts as an

insurance against fraud.16

Verily, if a party is

in the possession of the best evidence and

withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior

evidence in its place, the presumption

naturally arises that the better evidence is

withheld for fraudulent purposes that its

production would expose and

defeat.17Lastly, the rule protects against

misleading inferences resulting from the

intentional or unintentional introduction of

selected portions of a larger set of

writings.18

Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only

when the terms of a writing are in issue.

When the evidence sought to be introduced

concerns external facts, such as the

existence, execution or delivery of the

writing, without reference to its terms, the

Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked.19

In

such a case, secondary evidence may be

admitted even without accounting for the

original.

The action for quieting of title may be based

on the fact that a deed is invalid, ineffective,

voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the

writing may or may not be material to an

action for quieting of title, depending on the

ground alleged by the plaintiff. For instance,

when an action for quieting of title is based

on the unenforceability of a contract for not

complying with the Statute of Frauds, Article

1403 of the Civil Code specifically provides

that evidence of the agreement cannot be

received without the writing, or a secondary

evidence of its contents. There is then no

doubt that the Best Evidence Rule will come

into play.

It is not denied that this action does not

involve the terms or contents of the deed of

sale with right to repurchase. The principalissue raised by the respondents as the

plaintiffs, which Prodon challenged head on,

was whether or not the deed of sale with

right to repurchase, duly executed by the

late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed.

2. Prodon did not preponderantly establish

the existence and due execution of the deed

of sale with right to repurchase

The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial

tactics still required Prodon to establish and

explain the loss of the original of the deed of

sale with right to repurchase to establish the

genuineness and due execution of the

deed.26This was because the deed,

although a collateral document, was the

foundation of her defense in this action for

quieting of title.27

Her inability to produce the

original logically gave rise to the need for

her to prove its existence and due execution

by other means that could only be

secondary under the rules on evidence.

Towards that end, however, it was not

required to subject the proof of the loss of

the original to the same strict standard to

which it would be subjected had the loss or

unavailability been a precondition for

presenting secondary evidence to prove theterms of a writing.

The foregoing testimony could not be

credible for the purpose of proving the due

execution of the deed of sale with right to

repurchase for three reasons.

The first is that the respondents

preponderantly established that the late

Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been in and out ofthe hospital around the time that the deed of

sale with right to repurchase had been

supposedly executed on September 9,

1975. The records manifested that he had

been admitted to the Veterans Memorial

Hospital in Quezon City on several

occasions, and had then been diagnosed

with the serious ailments or conditions.

The second is that the annotation on TCTNo. 84797 of the deed of sale with right to

repurchase and the entry in the primary

entry book of the Register of Deeds did not

themselves establish the existence of the

deed. They proved at best that a document

purporting to be a deed of sale with right to

repurchase had been registered with the

Register of Deeds. Verily, the registration

alone of the deed was not conclusive proof

of its authenticity or its due execution by the

registered owner of the property, which was

precisely the issue in this case. The

explanation for this is that registration, being

a specie of notice, is simply a ministerial act

by which an instrument is inscribed in the

records of the Register of Deeds and

annotated on the dorsal side of the

certificate of title covering the land subject

of the instrument.35

It is relevant to mention
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10/43

that the law on land registration does not

require that only valid instruments be

registered, because the purpose of

registration is only to give notice.36

By the same token, the entry in the notarial

register of Notary Public Razon could only

be proof that a deed of sale with right torepurchase had been notarized by him, but

did not establish the due execution of the

deed.

The third is that the respondents remainingin the peaceful possession of the property

was further convincing evidence

demonstrating that the late Maximo Alvarez,

Sr. did not execute the deed of sale with

right to repurchase. Otherwise, Prodonwould have herself asserted and exercised

her right to take over the property, legally

and physically speaking, upon the expiration

in 1976 of the repurchase period stipulated

under the deed, including transferring the

TCT in her name and paying the real

property taxes due on the properly. Her

inaction was an index of the falsity of her

claim against the respondents.

The deed of sale with right to repurchase

executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr.

did not exist in fact.

G.R. No. 188881 April 21, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R.

TANTOCO, JR., DOMINADOR R.

SANTIAGO, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,

IMELDA MARCOS, BIENVENIDO R.

TANTOCO, SR., GLICERIA R. TANTOCO,

AND MARIA LOURDES TANTOCO-

PINEDA,

The Second Division of the graft court

denied admission of Exhibits "MMM" to

"AAAAAAA" in the Formal Offer of Evidence

filed by petitioner Republic.2

Twenty four years ago, the Republic,

through the Presidential Commission on

Good Government (PCGG), commenced a

complaint3for "reconveyance, reversion,

accounting, restitution and damages"

against Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. (Tantoco

), Dominador R. Santiago (Santiago),

Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda, R. Marcos,

Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R.Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-

Pineda. Instead of filing an Answer,

respondents Tantoco and Santiago filed a

"Motion To Strike Out Some Portions of the

Complaint and For Bill of Particulars," which

were both denied for lack of bases.

On 27 July 1989, Tantoco and Santiago

filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading

denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff." A

month later, they filed both an "Amended

Interrogatories to Plaintiff" and a Motion for

Production and Inspection of Documents.

This time, the Sandiganbayan admitted the

Amended Interrogatories and granted the

Motion for Production and Inspection of

Documents. When the PCGG elevated the

issue to the Supreme Court, this Court,

through then Justice Andres R. Narvasa,affirmed the Orders of the Sandiganbayan.

Tantoco and Santiago filed a "Motion under

Rule 29 of the Rules of Court," claiming that

the additional documents were never

produced at the discovery proceedings and

praying that petitioner be sanctioned for

contempt. The Sandiganbayan denied the

motion on 17 February 1997 (First

Resolution).8Trial proceeded; however,

new documents not shown at discovery

were still being marked. Tantoco and

Santiago again filed a "Motion to Ban

Plaintiff From Offering Exhibits Not Earlier

Marked During the Discovery Proceedings,"

which the graft court denied on 29 May

2002.9

Peti t ioner Republ ic now raises the sole

issue of whether or not the

Sandiganbayan comm it ted grave abuse

of discret ion in excluding the documents

due to petitioners own failure to

prod uce them at the pre-tr ial .

We deny the petition.

Petitioner conveniently disregards the

basic rule of evidence, namely, that the

issue of the admissibility of

documentary evidence arises only upon

formal offer thereof.This is why objection

to the documentary evidence must be made

at the time it is formally offered, and not

earlier.17

Accordingly, the Court ruled in

Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles as follows:

The identification of the document before it

is marked as an exhibit does not constitute

the formal offer of the document as
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evidence for the party presenting it.

Objection to the identification and marking

of the document is not equivalent to

objection to the document when it is

formally offered in evidence. What really

matters is the objection to the document at

the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.

It would have been so simple for the

defense to reiterate its former objection, this

time seasonably, when the formal offer of

exhibits was made. It is curious that it did

not, especially so since the objections to the

formal offer of exhibits was made in writing.

In fact, the defense filed no objection at all

not only to the photocopies but to all the

other exhibits of the prosecution.18

Seasonable objection to the subject

"Exhibits" can only be properly made upon

formal offer. The Sandiganbayan

acknowledged that Tantoco and Santiago

had been consistent in reiterating their

objections. The court even clarified in its

First Resolution that their "Motion Filed

Under Rule 29," was but in pursuance of

their continuing objection to the marking of

evidence not produced at discovery. Hence,

nothing in the said Resolution can be read

as a ruling on its admissibility. Its dispositive

portion clearly states: "Under all these

circumstances, there is no basis for the

Court to declare plaintiff in contempt of court

and it would be too much of a technicality to

bar it from introducing the additional exhibits

in evidence."19

The Second Resolution, while issued after

petitioner had submitted its Formal Offer of

Evidence, noted that all the documents

contained therein were photocopies.20

It

stated that a mere certification from the

Clerk of Court that they "appear to be the

original copy" would not suffice. The

Sandiganbayan still admitted them as

evidence, yet the only reason cited for doing

so was liberality, viz: "There is nothing in

the rules which categorically prohibits the

admission of additional documentary

evidence when called for as a case

progress [sic]. What is clear is that it is the

Courts discretion to allow or disallow itsreception."21Thus, the Sandiganbayan

fittingly corrected itself when once and forall, it excluded the photocopies in its latest

Resolution.

This Court discusses the contents and

implications of the two earlier Resolutions,

because petitioner simply has no other

argument supporting its claim to reverse the

Sandiganbayan. For those documents

introduced in evidence as proof of their

contents, the assailed Resolution stated thatpetitioner has not made any effort

whatsoever to explain why it submitted

mere photocopies. When the subject of

inquiry is the content of a document,

submission of a certified true copy is

justified only in clearly delineated instances

such as the following:

a) When the original has been lost or

destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,

without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

b) When the original is in the custody or

under the control of the party against whom

the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to

produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous

accounts or other documents which cannot

be examined in court without great loss of

time and the fact sought to be established

from them is only the general result of the

whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in

the custody of a public officer or is recordedin a public office.

22

Nothing on record shows, and petitioner

itself makes no claim, that the Exhibits fall

under any of the exceptions to the Best

Evidence rule. Secondary evidence of the

contents of writings is admitted on the

theory that the original cannot be produced

by the party who offers the evidence within

a reasonable time by the exercise ofreasonable diligence. Even then, the

general rule is that secondary evidence is

still not admissible until the non-production

of the primary evidence has been

sufficiently accounted for.23

As for the documentary evidence which are

purportedly transmittal letters, petitioner

remains unable to prove their due execution

and authenticity. We subscribe to the view
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forwarded by the Sandiganbayan in its

Second Resolution, which we quote below:

The fact that the documents were certified

as true copies of the original by the PCGG

does not enhance its admissibility. These

documents have remained private even if it

is in the custody of the PCGG. Whatbecame public are not the private

documents (themselves) but the recording

of it in the PCGG. For, "while public records

kept in the Philippines, of private writings

are also public documents...the public

writing is not the writing itself but the public

record thereof. Stated otherwise, if a private

writing itself is inserted officially into a public

record, its record, its recordation, or its

incorporation into the public record

becomes a public document, but that does

not make the private writing itself a public

document so as to make it admissible

without authentication."25

Aside from lack of authentication and failure

to present the originals of these documents,

what ultimately tipped the scales against

petitioner in the view of the graft court was

the formers lack of forthrightness incomplying with the Supreme Court directive.

The Sandiganbayan said:

Thereafter, it did not take long in the

process of the presentation of plaintiffsevidence before it became apparent that

plaintiffs exhibits consist mostly ofdocuments which have not been exhibited

during the discovery proceedings despitethe directive of this Court as confirmed by

the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs failure to offera plausible explanation for its concealment

of the main bulk of its exhibits even when it

was under a directive to produce them and

even as the defendants were consistently

objecting to the presentation of the

concealed documents gives rise to a

reasonable [inference] that the plaintiff, at

the very outset, had no intention whatsoever

of complying with the directive of this

Court.26

Petitioner failed to obey the mandate of

G.R. No. 90478, which remains an

important case on pre-trial and discovery

measures to this day; the rationale of these

rules, especially on the production of

documents, must be constantly kept in mind

by the bar:

The message is plain. It is the duty of each

contending party to lay before the court the

facts in issue-fully and fairly; i.e., to present

to the court all the material and relevant

facts known to him, suppressing or

concealing nothing, nor preventing another

party, by clever and adroit manipulation of

the technical rules of pleading and

evidence, from also presenting all the facts

within his knowledge.

The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may

be inquired into and learned by the parties

before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and

policy of the law that the parties - before the

trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial -

should discover or inform themselves of allthe facts relevant to the action, not only

those known to them individually, but also

those known to adversaries; in other words,

the desideratum is that civil trials should not

be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of

Court make this ideal possible through the

deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in

Rules 24 to 29.

After failing to submit the documentary

evidence during discovery, when it was

clearly ordered by both the Sandiganbayan

and the Supreme Court to do so, petitioner

also repeatedly failed to prove the due

execution and authenticity of the

documents. Having failed in its belated

attempts to assuage the Sandiganbayan

through the submission of secondary

evidence, petitioner may not use the

present forum to gain relief under the guise

of Rule 65. DENIED.

G. R. No. 171701 Febru ary 8, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs. MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS-

MANOTOC, FERDINAND "BONGBONG"

R. MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA.

ARANETA III, IRENE R. MARCOS-

ARANETA,

This case involves P200 billion of the

Marcoses alleged accumulated ill-gottenwealth. It also includes the alleged use of

the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and

RPN-9 for the Marcos familys personalbenefit; the alleged use of De Soleil Apparel

for dollar salting; and the alleged illegal

acquisition and operation of the buscompany Pantranco North Express, Inc.
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Thereafter, petitioner presented and

formally offered its evidence against herein

respondents. However, the latter objected to

the offer primarily on the ground that the

documents violated the best evidence rule

of the Rules of Court, as these documents

were unauthenticated; moreover, petitioner

had not provided any reason for its failure to

present the originals.

Moreover, the court held that the evidence,

in particular, exhibits

"P,"8"Q,"9"R,"10"S,"11and "T,"12were

considered hearsay, because their originals

were not presented in court, nor were they

authenticated by the persons who executed

them. Furthermore, the court pointed out

that petitioner failed to provide any valid

reason why it did not present the originals in

court. These exhibits were supposed to

show the interests of Imee Marcos-Manotok

in the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and

RPN-9, all three of which she had allegedly

acquired illegally. These exhibits also

sought to prove her alleged participation in

dollar salting through De Soleil Apparel.

In the matter of the spouses Irene Marcos

and Gregorio Araneta III, the court similarly

held that there was no testimonial or

documentary evidence that supported

petitioners allegations against the couple.Again, petitioner failed to present the

original documents that supposedly

supported the allegations against them.

Instead, it merely presented photocopies of

documents that sought to prove how the

Marcoses used the Potencianos13

as

dummies in acquiring and operating the bus

company Pantranco.

Petitioner raises the same issues it raised in

its Motion for Reconsideration filed before

the Sandiganbayan

There is some merit in petitioners

content ion.

The Courts Ruling: Petitioner failed to

observe the

best evidence rule.

It is petitioners burden to prove theallegations in its Complaint. For relief to be

granted, the operative act on how and in

what manner the Marcos siblings

participated in and/or benefitted from the

acts of the Marcos couple must be clearly

shown through a preponderance of

evidence. Should petitioner fail to discharge

this burden, the Court is constrained and is

left with no choice but to uphold the

Demurrer to Evidence filed by respondents.

First, petitioner does not deny that what

should be proved are the contents of the

documents themselves. It is imperative,

therefore, to submit the original documents

that could prove petitioners allegations.

Thus, the photocopied documents are in

violation Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the Rules of

Court, otherwise known as the best

evidence rule, which mandates that the

evidence must be the original documentitself. The origin of the best evidence rule

can be found and traced to as early as the

18th century in Omychund v.

Barker,34

wherein the Court of Chancery

said:

The judges and sages of the law have laid it

down that there is but one general rule of

evidence, the best that the nature o f thecase wil l admit.

The rule is, that if the writings have

subscribing witnesses to them, they

must be proved by those witnesses.

The first ground judges have gone upon in

departing from strict rules, is an absolute

strict necessity. Secondly, a presumed

necessity. In the case of writings,subscribed by witnesses, if all are dead, the

proof of one of their hands is sufficient to

establish the deed: where an original is lost,

a copy may be admitted; if no copy, then a

proof by witnesses who have heard the

deed, and yet it is a thing the law abhors to

admit the memory of man for evidence.

Petitioner did not even attempt to provide a

plausible reason why the originals were notpresented, or any compelling ground why

the court should admit these documents as

secondary evidence absent the testimony of

the witnesses who had executed them.

In particular, it may not insist that the

photocopies of the documents fall under

Sec. 7 of Rule 130, which states:

Evidence admissible when originaldocument is a public record. When the
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original of a document is in the custody of a

public officer or is recorded in a public

office, its contents may be proved be a

certified copy issued by the public officer in

custody thereof.

The fact that these documents were

collected by the PCGG in the course of itsinvestigations does not make them per se

public records referred to in the quoted rule.

Neither did petitioner present as witnesses

the affiants of these Affidavits or

Memoranda submitted to the court. Basic is

the rule that, while affidavits may be

considered as public documents if they are

acknowledged before a notary public, these

Affidavits are still classified as hearsayevidence. The reason for this rule is that

they are not generally prepared by the

affiant, but by another one who uses his or

her own language in writing the affiant's

statements, parts of which may thus be

either omitted or misunderstood by the one

writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is

deprived of the opportunity to cross-

examine the affiants. For this reason,

affidavits are generally rejected for being

hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are

placed on the witness stand to testify

thereon.36

As to the copy of the TSN of the

proceedings before the PCGG, while it may

be considered as a public document since it

was taken in the course of the PCGGs

exercise of its mandate, it was not attestedto by the legal custodian to be a correct

copy of the original. This omission falls short

of the requirement of Rule 132, Secs. 24

and 25 of the Rules of Court.37

Thus, absent any convincing evidence to

hold otherwise, it follows that petitioner

failed to prove that the Marcos siblings and

Gregorio Araneta III collaborated withformer President Marcos and Imelda R.

Marcos and participated in the first couplesalleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth

insofar as the specific allegations herein

were concerned. PARTIALLY GRANTED.

G.R. No. 205879 Apri l 23, 2014 SKUNAC

CORPORATION and ALFONSO F.

ENRIQUEZ,vs. ROBERTO S.

SYLIANTENG and CAESAR S.SYLIANTENG,

The facts: The civil cases before the

involved two (2) parcels of land identified as

Lot 1, with an area of 1,250 square meters

(Civil Case No. 63987) and Lot 2, with an

area of 990 square meters (Civil Case No.

63988), both found in Block 2 of the Pujalte

Subdivision situated along Wilson Street,

Greenhills, San Juan City which areportions of a parcel of land previously

registered in the name of Luis A. Pujalte on

October 29, 1945 and covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. (-78865) (-

2668) -93165 ("Mother Title") of the

Register of Deeds for the City of Manila.

Plaintiffs-appellants Roberto S. Sylianteng

and Caesar S. Sylianteng base their claim

of ownership over the subject lots a Deed of

Absolute Sale executed in their favor by

their mother, Emerenciana Sylianteng on

June 27, 1983. Appellants further allege that

Emerenciana acquired the lots from the late

Luis Pujalte through a Deed of Sale dated

June 20, 1958 as reflected in Entry No. P.E.

4023, annotated on the covering TCT, by

virtue of which she was issued TCT No.

42369. Then, when she sold the lots to

appellants, TCT No. 39488, covering the

same, was issued in their names.

Skunac Corporation and Alfonso F.

Enriquez on the other hand, claim that a

certain Romeo Pujalte who was declared by

the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151 in

Special Proceedings No. 3366 as the sole

heir of Luis Pujalte, caused the

reconstitution of the Mother Title resulting to

its cancellation and the issuance of TCT No.

5760-R in his favor. Romeo Pujalte then

allegedly sold the lots to Skunac and

Enriquez in 1992. Thus, from TCT No.

5760-R, TCT No. 5888-R, for Lot 1 was

issued in the name of Skunac, while TCT

No. 5889-R for Lot 2 was issued in the

name of Enriquez.

The petition lacks merit.

Coming to the merits of the case, the

abovementioned assignment of errors boils

down to two basic questions: (1) whether

or not respondents' predecessor-in-

interest, Emerenciana, validly acquired

the subject lots from Luis, and (2)

whether or not respondents, in turn,
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validly acquired the same lots from

Emerenciana.

The Court rules in the aff i rmative, but

takes exception to the CA's and RTC's

application of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.

Nonetheless, the Court agrees with thefindings and conclusion of the CA that

Emerenciana's acquisition of the subject

lots from Luis and her subsequent sale of

the same to respondents are valid and

lawful.

The best evidence rule is inapplicable to the

present case. The said rule applies only

when the content of such document is the

subject of the inquiry.

15

Where the issue isonly as to whether such document was

actually executed, or exists, or on the

circumstances relevant to or surrounding its

execution, the best evidence rule does not

apply and testimonial evidence is

admissible.16Any other substitutionary

evidence is likewise admissible without

need to account for the original.17In the

instant case, what is being questioned is the

authenticity and due execution of thesubject deed of sale. There is no real issue

as to its contents.

It is settled that a signed carbon copy or

duplicate of a document executed at the

same time as the original is known as a

duplicate original and maybe introduced in

evidence without accounting for the non-

production of the original.18

In the present case, petitioners failed to

present convincing evidence to prove that

the notarization of the subject deed was

irregular as to strip it of its public character.

On the contrary, a certified copy of page 26

of the notarial register of the notary public

who notarized the subject deed of sale,

which was issued by the Records

Management and Archives Office of Manila,

shows that the sale of the subject lots by

Luis to Emerenciana was indeed regularly

notarized.23

In this regard, the Court agrees with

respondents' contention that the

"instrument" being referred to in the

abovequoted provision is the deed or

contract which is notarized. It does not

pertain to the number of copies of such

deed or contract. Hence, one number is

assigned to a deed or contract regardless of

the number of copies prepared and

notarized. Each and every copy of such

contract is given the same document

number.

As to petitioners' contention that the copy of

the deed of sale presented by respondents

in evidence is of dubious origin because it

does not bear the stamp "RECEIVED" by

the Register of Deeds of Quezon City,

suffice it to state that the Court finds no

cogent reason to disagree with respondents'

contention that the duplicate original of the

subject deed of sale which they presented

as evidence in court could not have been

received by the Register of Deeds of

Quezon City because only the original copy,

and not the duplicate original, was

submitted to the Register of Deeds for

registration.

Petitioners also question the authenticity of

and the entries appearing on the copy of the

title covering the subject properties in thename of Luis. However, the Court finds no

cogent reason to doubt the authenticity of

the document as well as the entries

appearing therein, considering that the

parties stipulated25that the machine copy of

TCT No. 78865 in the name of Luis, marked

as Exhibit "DDD" for respondents, is a

faithful reproduction of the original copy of

the said title, including the memorandum of

encumbrances annotated therein. Included

in the memorandum of encumbrances is

Entry No. P.E. 4023.

In fact, as early as July 14, 1960, prior to

Romeo's appointment as administrator of

the estate of Luis, Paz L. Vda. de Pujalte

the mother of Luis, who was then appointed

administratrix of the estate of the latter, in

her Inventory and Appraisal29

which was

submitted to the estate court, already

excluded the subject properties among

those which comprise the estate of Luis.

Subsequently, in the Project of Partition30

of