Religion and Politics in Inodnesia, Majelis Ulama Indonesia on the General Elections

8/20/2019 Religion and Politics in Inodnesia, Majelis Ulama Indonesia on the General Elections

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RELIGIO AD POLITICS I IDOESIA:

ATTITUDES AD IFLUECES OF THE IDOESIA COUCIL OF

ULAMA (MUI) O THE GEERAL ELECTIOS

By

Muhammad As’ad

Under the Supervision of

Prof. Kees van Dijk

MA thesis submitted to the Faculty of Humanities

for the degree of Master of Arts (MA)

in Islamic Studies

Leiden University9th February 2010


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ACKOWLEDGEMET

With the completion of this thesis, I would like to express my greatest gratitude to

people whose material and moral support have contributed to the fulfilment of this

writing. The first and the foremost, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Prof. Kees

van Dijk who has given me important and critical remarks regarding this research. Due to

his supervision, I have found many new ideas, especially in methods to develop a good

and precise writing. I also would like to thank Hilman Latief and Lusvita Fitri

Nuzuliyanti (Mbak Cici) whose suggestions and comments on my thesis draft have

helped me in finishing this thesis.

I am also grateful to the Indonesian Young Leaders Programme, especially to Dr.

N. J.G. Kaptein and Marise R. van Amersfoort M.Sc. who have given me the chance to

pursue a master degree in Leiden University. Their advice during my 18 months study

period is very valuable, particularly regarding my adjustment with the Netherlands

academic milieu. I would also like to express my gratitude to several Leiden University

lectures, i.e. Prof. L.P.M.H. Buskens, Prof. M.S. Berger, Prof. Nasr Abu Zayd and Dr. N.

J.G. Kaptein who have inspired me with invaluable knowledge.In addition, I would also like to thank fellow Indonesian Young Leaders

programme Batch III, i.e Novelia Musda, Tholib Rohmatillah, Munirul Ikhwan, Ali

Tantowi, Reza Indria, Nuril Huda, Laily Hafidzah, Istiqomah, Noblana Adib and Hijrotul

Magfiroh. In particular, I would like to thank my roommate Hilaly Basya who has been

my good friend in discussions related to my thesis and other intellectual subjects.

Discussing with him is always a nice experience and often ends with a good piece of

writing. I am also grateful to the staffs of the KITLV especially Mrs. Josephine and Mrs.

Rini who have provided me with valuable sources in the library. The KITLV has been my

“office” for the last 6 months and I am intellectually delighted with its collections.

Finally, I must acknowledge that the successful completion of my thesis and MA

program at Leiden University is largely due to the strong encouragement I have received

from my family and relatives. First of all, I would to express my gratitude to my father,

Maksum Ahmad, and my mother, Salamah, who gave me the permission to continue my

study at Leiden University. Without their agreement, I would not have tasted the


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academic milieu in the Western world. I would also thank my older brothers, Ali Bashori,

Masduki, Ahmad Maimun, and my sister, Nailatul Mufidah, who always support me in

realizing my dreams. The last but not the least, I am very grateful to my beloved wife,

Lilik Mulyani, whose support and love have incessantly inspired me to do the best in

finishing this MA degree. Her patient makes me strong and her love always helps me feel

at home. However, none of the aforementioned names is responsible for any of the

inadequacies of this study. Rather, the responsibility is in my hands.

Leiden, 8th

February 2010

Muhammad As’ad


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TABLE OF COTETS

Acknowledgement ......................................................................................... iTable of Contents........................................................................................... ii

Introduction ................................................................................................... 1

Chapter I: THE MUI AND THE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN THE NEW ORDERERA

A.

The Establishment.................................................................... 9B. The Relations Between the MUI and the New Order regime..... 17

C. MUI’s Attitudes in the General Elections during the New Order

era........................................................................................... 24

Chapter II: THE MUI AND THE 1999 GENERAL ELECTIONS

A. Islam and Politics in the Late New Order Era.......................... 35

B. The MUI and the Reformation Era........................................ 43C. The MUI and the 1999 General Elections................................ 48

Chapter III: MUI’S ATTITUDES IN THE 2004 AND 2009 GENERAL ELECTIONS

A. MUI’s Attitude in Post-Soeharto Era........................................ 58B. The MUI and the 2004 General Elections................................. 69

C. The MUI and the 2009 General Elections................................. 75

Conclusion..................................................................................................... 83Bibliography................................................................................................... 86


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ITRODUCTIO

General Description

The Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) is a semi-governmental organization in

Indonesia one of whose aims is to give advice and fatwas regarding religious problems in

particular, and the nation’s problem in general, to the government and society. In addition,

the MUI is also expected to promote unity among Muslims, and to act as a mediator

between the government and the ulama.1 Since its establishment on 26 July 1975, the

MUI has played its role in the society as an interpreter and guide for the religious

teachings of Islam. According to Hasan Basri, the third general chairman, the MUI

should function as a watchdog ensuring that no law that is passed in Indonesia is

contradictory to the teachings of Islam.2 In performing this function, the MUI has certain

tools for giving guidance to the society. There are at least two kinds of media which are

used by the MUI regarding its function of giving guidance to society. These media are a

fatwa discourses and non- fatwa discourses. The non- fatwa discourses consist of

Recommendation (Tausiyah), Admonition (Tadzkirah), Instruction/Mandate (Amanah),

Position Statement (Pernyataan Sikap), Appeal (Himbauan), and Thought Contribution

(Sumbangan Pemikiran).3

Among others, fatwas have definitely played a significant role in the society. As

stated by Wael Hallaq, fatwas played a considerable role in the growth and gradual

change of Islamic substantive law.4 In terms of religious authority, fatwas are also

important because through this media ulama can express their ideas and opinions

concerning Islamic law.5 By using fatwas produced by ulama, people may know what is

1 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 15 Tahun Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Jakarta, Sekretariat Majelis Ulama

Indonesia, 1990), p. 101.2 Atho Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama : A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in

Indonesia 1975-1988 (Jakarta: INIS, 1993), p 54.3 Nur Ichwan, “Ulama State and Politics: MUI after Suharto”, Islamic Law and Society, 12.1 (2005),

p. 51.4 See Wael B. Hallaq, From Fatwas to Furu: Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive Law, Islamic

Law and Society, 1 (1994), pp. 29–65.5 Nico Kaptein, “The Voice of the Ulama: Fatwas and Religious Authority in Indonesia”, Arch. de

Sc. soc. des Rel., 2004, 125 , (janvier-mars 2004), p. 116.


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forbidden for them and what is not. In this sense, fatwas function as evidence that ulama

(or the religious authority) have the ability to give people directions.6

However, even though fatwas play an important role, this does not mean that the

other media do not play a pivotal role. In terms of MUI’s position, the other media such

as Tausiyah, Tadzkirah, Amanah, Pernyataan Sikap and others played an important

function, especially in expressing MUI’s opinion on political matters. These attitudes can

be seen in several statements and recommendations issued by the MUI in to express its

support for the government. These statements were usually given before the election

during the New Order era. Most of them were in favour of Suharto to become the next

Indonesian president or to support the New Order government.7

The fact that the MUI supported the government was probably caused by pressure

from the government. We can see this from the objective of the government to establish

the MUI. From the time it was established, the New Order regime wanted the MUI to be

the interpreter, to bridge the gap between the government programmes and the

Indonesian people. In order to keep this objective, Suharto, the President of Indonesia at

the time, restricted MUI activities different from other Islamic organisations as well as

forbade the MUI from getting involved in political matters.8 For that reason it makes

sense that the MUI was in favour of Suharto maintaining his presidency during the New

Order era. This idea is supported by several scholars such as Atho Mudzhar,9 M.B.

Hooker,10 Nur Ichwan11 and Kees van Dijk,12 who argue that the MUI was mostly under

government control in the New Order era.

6 Ibid, p. 116.7 For instance, in 1982 after the MUI national Meeting, the MUI issued a statement which advised

the members of the House of Representatives (DPR) to vote for Suharto in the presidential elections. See Keputusan Rapat Kerja asional Majelis Ulama se-Indonesia, Mimbar Ulama, no. 57, April 1982, pp. 25-

31. This kind of statements was repeated each time Indonesia prepared for elections, such as in 1987(Seruan Bersama Berkenaan dengan Pemilu, Mimbar Ulama, no. 115, Maret 1987), 1992 ( Keputusan

Rapat Kerja asional Majelis Ulama Indonesia Tahun 1413/1992, Mimbar Ulama, no. 178, December

1992) and 1997 (Tausyiah Majelis Ulama Indonesia Hasil Rakernas Tahun 1997, Mimbar Ulama, no. 224,

April 1997).8 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Jakarta, Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia,

1976), pp. 15-19.9 Atho Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama : A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in

Indonesia 1975-1988 (Jakarta: INIS, 1993).10 M. B. Hooker, “Islam and Medical Science: Evidence from Malaysian and Indonesian Fatwas”,

Studia Islamika, Vol 4, No 4 (1997), pp. 1-31.11 Nur Ichwan, “Ulama State and Politics: MUI after Suharto”, Islamic Law and Society, 12.1 (2005),

45–72.


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Moreover, after the fall of Suharto in 1998, it seemed that the MUI shifted its

attitudes. It can be said that the MUI was no longer in support of the government. This is

evident from the 1999 general elections, when the MUI began to distance itself from the

government and speak out in the interests of Islamic parties. At that moment, the MUI

issued three taushiah which clearly endorsed Islamic parties by stating that Muslims

should vote for Muslim candidates. 13

Atho Mudzhar noted that in the post-New Order era

“the MUI touched on political issues of high sensitivity and, therefore triggered

controversies.”14

What stimulated this choice were probably the decrease of state pressure

and the increased power of civil society. On the other hand, as the New Order regime

ended, the MUI intended to revise its position and change the stigma of being a supporterof the New Order policies.

15

The MUI kept this attitude in the 2004 general elections when they issued a

taushiah regarding the elections. Compared to the previous taushiah in 1999, this

taushiah was not as strong as the previous one because it did not endorse Islamic parties.

However, at one point it mentioned that people should vote for the candidates who are

faithful, display good behaviour and are committed.16

This taushiah indicated the

preference of the MUI for Islamic parties as it was during the 1999 general elections.

Furthermore, in 2009 the MUI issued a controversial fatwa regarding vote

abstention. This fatwa was issued in January, three months before the general elections

which were held on 9 April 2009. This fatwa was considered to be controversial because

until this time, the MUI never issued a fatwa regarding the general elections. The MUI

issued mostly statements (Pernyataan Sikap) and (taushiah) recommendations. In

12 Kees van Dijk, “Religious Authority, Politics, and Fatwas”, in R. Michael Feener & Mark E.

Cammack, Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia, Ideas and Institutions (Cambridge, HarvardUniversity Press, 2007), pp. 44-65.

13 Mimbar Ulama, No.250, June 1999, p. 27.14 Atho Mudzhar, “the Ulama, the Government, and Society in Modern Indonesia; the Council of

Indonesian Ulama Revisited”, in Johan Meuleman (Editor), Islam in the Era of Globalization; Muslim

Attitudes towards Modernity and Identity, (Jakarta: INIS, 2001), pp.315-326. A fact also mentioned by Van

Dijk was that after the New Order regime collapsed, the MUI entered the field of “practical politics”, and

became an active player in the political game. Kees van Dijk, “Religious Authority, Politics, and Fatwas, p.

52.15 There were several actions of the MUI which represented this image such as the issuance of

eleven fatwas in 2009, among others a fatwa regarding the Ahmadiah sect in Indonesia and a fatwa

forbidding pluralism, liberalism and secularism. See Piers Gillespie, “Current Issues in Indonesian Islam:

Analysing the 2005 Council of Indonesian Ulama Fatwā no. 7 Opposing Pluralism, Liberalism and

Secularism”, Journal of Islamic Studies, 18:2 (2007) pp. 202–240.16 Mimbar Ulama, No. 310, June 2004, p. 31.


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addition, some national figures such as the vice-president at the time Jusuf Kalla

criticised this fatwa by saying that this fatwa was unnecessary because it would mean

most of the Indonesian people will go to hell.17 Besides that, it is also questionable

whether this fatwa was officially issued by the MUI or not. The reason for this doubt is

that the fatwa cannot be accessed on the MUI website, as well as the existence of the

statement of the vice-chairman of the MUI, Din Syamsuddin, who stated that the fatwa

was cancelled.

Based on these facts, it is important to look at the development of the MUI over

time. What was MUI’s position in the New Order era and its transformation during the

post-New Order era? Several scholars who previously studied the MUI used MUI fatwas to determine relations between the MUI and the government, but none of them looked at

the MUI attitudes during the general elections. Therefore, this thesis will analyse the

MUI stances in the general elections from the New Order era until recent days.

Research Questions

1. What are the attitudes of the MUI regarding the general elections during the New

Order era and how does my analysis differ from the theses made by scholars who

previously studied the MUI?

2. What are the differences between the MUI attitudes in the New Order era and in

the post-New Order era? Why did these differences emerge?

3. What were the reactions of Indonesian Muslims to these attitudes? Were they

effective in influencing Indonesian Muslims or did they stimulate pro and contra

discourses within society?

Methods of Analysis

This research consists mainly of library research; I analysed data about the MUI

both in the Leiden University library and the library of the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-,

Land- en Volkenkunde (KITLV). To capture the attitude of the MUI in the Indonesian

general elections, I analysed the official magazine of the MUI, Mimbar Ulama. This

17 Bahtiar Effendy, “MUI Fatwa is neither Necessary nor a Priority”, The Jakarta Post, 06 February

2009.


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magazine is used by the MUI in disseminating every decision made by its board, both

fatwas and non- fatwa discourses. The magazine also gives information regarding the

background of the fatwa or taushiah. This information is valuable to determine the

conditions surrounding the fatwa, especially related to the general elections.

To analyse the data, this thesis will use the comparative approach, specifically

when searching for the difference in attitude of the MUI in the New Order era and the

MUI post-New Order. This method is necessary to discover the reason why the MUI took

a particular stance at one period and changed it in another.18

The second analysis is the

theory of religion and political behaviour. This theory explains that membership of a

religious group helps create an identity, which differentiates it from other groups sincesuch involvement can provide members with particular norms and values that form a

particular group culture.19

In particular, this theory refers to the role of religious organisations such as the

MUI in the political sphere. It is clear that fatwas, taushiah, statements and others cover

several issues such as rituals, charity, pilgrimage, economy and also politics. According

to Nadirsyah Hosen, the stances of Islamic organisations in the political arena,

particularly on the issue of politics and government policies in Indonesia, can be found

since 1926.20

More specifically, the implementation of religion and politics in this thesis

is related to the official ulama (the MUI), which provided a certain religious legitimacy

either to the government or other stakeholders in society. This framework comes from

Abdullah Saeed who thinks that ulama as a group provide religious legitimacy for many

Muslims today. The meaning of ulama here is the official ulama that often have been

dependent on, and sought their legitimacy from, the rulers.21

18 Peter Burke, History and Social Theory (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2005), p. 21.19 Endang Turmudi, “Religion and Politics: A Study on Political Attitudes of Devout Muslims and

the Role of the Kyai in Contemporary Java, Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, 23:2 (1995), p. 18.20 See Nadirsyah Hosen, “ Fatwa and Politics in Indonesia”, in Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra,

Shari’a and Politics in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 168-180.21 Abdullah Saeed, “The Official Ulema and Religious Legitimacy of the Modern Nation State”, in

Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed, Islam and Political Legitimacy (New York, RoutledgeCurzon,

2003), p. 2.


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Previous Studies

There are several studies which discuss the MUI. The first study is from Atho

Mudzhar entitled Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal

Thought in Indonesia 1975-1988. This is his dissertation written at Columbia University

and published by INIS in 1993. The study is an analysis of the fatwas issued by the MUI

from 1975 to 1988 (Mudzhar: 1993).

The second study was written by M.B. Hooker in Studia Islamika, a journal of

Islamic Studies published by the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) Syarif

Hidayatullah. In this particular article Hooker analyses the fatwas issued in Indonesia and

Malaysia related to the issue of modern medical science. Even though this study does notsolely focus on MUI fatwas, it provides some discussions about the reaction of the MUI

to this issue. In his conclusion Hooker states that “in the period from 1975 to the early

1990s it is quite clear that the main function of the MUI is to support and, in some cases,

to justify government policy on government programs.”22

The third study was written by Nadirsyah Hosen in 2004. It is an article published

by the Journal of Islamic Studies, entitled Behind the Scenes: Fatwās of Majelis Ulama

Indonesia (1975–1998). The objective of this writing is to analyse the method of issuing

fatwas, the sources of fatwas, and the relationship between fatwas at national and local

levels. In this article Hosen argues that most of the fatwas used the method of collective

ijtihad , and that since 1975 the MUI’s position in terms of its social and political function

was to be a ‘bridge’ between Islamic organisations, ordinary Muslims and the

government.23

The fourth study is written by Nur Ichwan in 2005. His study can be seen as

further research continuing from Mudzhar and Hooker. Both of them focused their

research on MUI’s role in the New Order era, while Nur Ichwan focused his research on

MUI’s position after the Reformation era, especially during B.J. Habibie and

Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidencies. One central point of his article is the taushiah in the

1999’s general elections. His remarkable finding is that the attitudes of the MUI in the

22 See M. B. Hooker, “Islam and Medical Science: Evidence from Malaysian and Indonesian

Fatwas”, Studia Islamika, Vol 4, No 4 (1997), pp. 1-31.23 Nadirsyah Hosen, “Behind the Scenes: Fatwas of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (1975–1998)”,

Journal of Islamic Studies, 15:2 (2004) pp. 147–179.


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New Order era cannot be determined only from MUI fatwas but also from its silence

toward the governmental policies.24

The fifth study is Piers Gilespie’s article from 2007. His article mainly discusses

and analyzes MUI fatwas regarding pluralism, liberalism and secularism. His arguments

are mainly about the changing role of the MUI after the Reformation era; he states that

after the New Order era, the MUI sought to reposition itself as intrinsic to the wider

movement for change to avoid the stigma of being seen simply as a New Order

supporter.25

The sixth is an article written by Kees van Dijk entitled Religious Authority,

Politics and Fatwa in Contemporary Southeast Asia. In this article, Van Dijk scrutinizesthe role of the MUI in the political arena from the New Order era to the Reformation era.

Van Dijk states that since the time it was established, the MUI cannot be separated from

political interest. He mentions that the government’s subordination of the MUI can be

seen from the mechanism of MUI fatwa issuance: most of them were results of

governmental requests.26

The Organisation of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter focuses on the position

of the MUI during the New Order era. Thus, it will discuss the establishment of the MUI

and its social and political background. It is important to discuss the relation between the

MUI and the government. Another important focus is the attitudes of the MUI regarding

the general elections under the New Order regime. If many scholars define the MUI as

controlled by the government based on its fatwas, how about the general elections? Is it

the same or different?

The second chapter is devoted to an analysis of MUI’s role in the 1999 general

elections. Before analysing these elections, I will first discuss the position of Islam in

general and the MUI in particular during the late New Order era. This theme needs to be

24 Nur Ichwan, “Ulama State and Politics: MUI after Suharto”, Islamic Law and Society, 12.1 (2005),

45–72.25 See Piers Gillespie, “Current Issues in Indonesian Islam: Analysing the 2005 Council of

Indonesian Ulama Fatwā no. 7 Opposing Pluralism, Liberalism and Secularism”, Journal of Islamic Studies

18:2 (2007), p. 211.26 Kees van Dijk, “Religious Authority, Politics, and Fatwas”, pp. 44-65.


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discussed in order to understand the socio-political landscape of Indonesia in the late

New Order era and how the situation affected the political position of the MUI. Apart

from that, it is also important to look at the position of the MUI after the fall of Suharto

and how MUI shifted its attitudes during the Reformation era.

The third chapter will discuss the general elections of 2004 and 2009. Similar to

the previous chapter, the third chapter will discuss first the political landscape in the post

New Order era, particularly the position of Muslim politics. This situation needs to be

explained in further detail to find the map of political Islam and how it influences the

position of the MUI. The chapter then continues with a discussion regarding the MUI

attitudes in the 2004 and 2009 general elections and how they differ from MUI’s attitudesin the previous elections. All evidence in these three chapters will be summed up in the

conclusion.


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CHAPTER OE

THE MUI AD THE GEERAL ELECTIOS I THE EW ORDER ERA

This chapter will discuss the attitudes of the MUI toward the general elections in

the New Order era, particularly the attempts of the MUI to issue fatwas or non- fatwa

discourses regarding these events. After exploring both discourses, we will scrutinize

whether the MUI gave strong support to the government in every election or not.

Before analysing the positions of the MUI toward the general elections in the

New Order era, it is worth giving a historical account of the MUI, the background of its

establishment, and the process leading up to the decision of its establishment. In addition,it is also important to look at the relations between the MUI and the government,

especially with the New Order regime, through the eyes of scholars who previously

studied the MUI. By knowing its establishment process and its function in the New Order

era, we can determine its role in society, especially vis-à-vis the government.

A. The Establishment

The idea of the establishment of the Indonesian Council of Ulama first emerged at a

conference of ulama in Jakarta held from 30 September to 4 October 1970. The

conference was called Musyawarah Alim Ulama se-Indonesia or the Congress of all

Indonesian Ulama, and it was held by Pusat Dakwah Islam Indonesia (the Centre for

Islamic Preaching).1 It was really conspicuous that the idea of such a meeting came from

the government.2 The presence of K.H Muhammad Dahlan, the Minister of Religious

Affairs at the time, confirmed the theories of governmental influence. In addition, he

gave a speech on behalf of the government. In that speech he stated that the establishment

of a council of ulama was very important in order to give explanations about what was

1 Pusat Dakwah Islam Indonesia (the Centre for Islamic Preaching) was created by Minister of

Religious Affairs in 1969. Departemen Penerangan RI, 10 Tahun Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Jakarta, 1985),

p. 15.2 Atho Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in

Indonesia 1975-1988 (Jakarta: INIS, 1993), p. 46.


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wrong with deviant sects in Indonesia. He also argued that the state had a good reason to

create a partnership with the ulama, not to control them but to be their equal partners.3

In particular, the idea of a fatwa institution was proposed by Ibrahim Hosen, one of

the speakers at the conference. In his paper he mentioned that a fatwa institution was

needed to maintain the unity of Indonesian Muslims. Hosen also emphasized that in

Indonesia, this kind of institution was the best choice instead of one grand mufti

appointed by the government. Similar to what the Minister mentioned, Ibrahim Hosen

stated that one of the functions of the ulama in that council was to have good relations

with the government.4

However, this proposal was rejected by Hamka. In his paper, which was also presented at the conference, Hamka gave several reasons for his refusal. The first reason

was that the establishment of a fatwa institution would be counterproductive; his

argumentation was based on the existence of similar institutions such as Muhammadiyah,

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and Persatuan Islam (Persis). In his opinion, building another

institution would only create confusion and conflict. The second reason for refusal was

considered to be political; he said that this fatwa institution would only be used for

political interests. If the council would be established, it would be influenced by one

Islamic party which was controlling the Ministry of Religious Affairs at the time. Surely

this political party would use the institution merely for the interests of the party, not for

all Muslims.5

The political party mentioned by Hamka was Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). During the Old

Order era and until the first period of the New Order era, NU dominated the appointment

of the Minister of Religious Affairs, and for this reason this ministry became an NU-

bastion. Not only had the ministry become the centre for spreading NU’s traditionalist

ideas, but also for giving NU many benefits to dispense in the form of employment and

3 K.H M. Dahlan, “Amanat/Sumbangan Fikiran Menteri Agama RI K.H.M. Dahlan Pada

Musjawarah Alim Ulama se-Indonesia”, in Materi Musjawarah Alim Ulama se-Indonesia, Sekretariat

Panitya Musyawarah Alim Ulama se-Indonesia, pp. 19-33.4 Prof. K.H Ibrahim Hosen, “Pembentukan Lembaga Fatwa, in Materi Musjawarah Alim Ulama se-

Indonesia, Sekretariat Panitya Musyawarah Alim Ulama se-Indonesia, pp. 110-128.5 Different from Hosen, who preferred a council of ulama over a grand mufti, Hamka suggested that

the government appoint one ulama who has the task to give the government recommendations regarding

religious issues. He did not agree with establishing such an institution as was proposed by Ibrahim Hosen.

See Hamka, “Lembaga Fatwa, Bandingan atas Prasaran Prof. Ibrahim Hosen”, in Materi Musjawarah Alim

Ulama se-Indonesia, Sekretariat Panitya Musyawarah Alim Ulama se-Indonesia, pp. 129-133.


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other facilities. That is why from 1953 to 1971 all Ministers of Religious Affairs were

prominent figures of the NU.6 As a result, Hamka rejected the establishment of the MUI

because he was afraid that the MUI would only be used for legitimating NU political

activism.7

After failing to reach a consensus at the Congress of all Indonesian Ulama

( Musyawarah Alim Ulama se-Indonesia) in 1970, the establishment of the MUI was

postponed. The idea came up again four years later, in 1974, when Pusat Dakwah Islam

Indonesia (the Centre for Islamic Preaching) organized a workshop on 26-29 November.

In this forum the idea of such an institution emerged once again. Moreover, unlike at the

first conference, the government was actively involved in the process and encouragedulama to support the idea. The meaning of actively involved in this situation was that

President Suharto was present at the conference and gave the opening speech. In his

speech, Suharto stressed the necessity of the council of ulama. One of the reasons was

that this body would represent Muslims for an inter-religious project designed by the

government. This project itself was initially started in 1967 when the government invited

the five recognized religions to meet in order to create a body for inter-religious

dialogue.8 Unfortunately, the Muslim representative rejected the idea. By creating a

council of Indonesian ulama, Suharto wanted to have an alternative way to persuade

Muslims to join the body.9 This time, the conference agreed that in order to participate in

the national development it was necessary to create the council of ulama, especially on a

6 For a more detailed account on the relation between Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and politics see Martin

van Bruinessen, “Indonesia's Ulama and Politics: Caught Between Legitimising the Status Quo and

Searching for Alternatives”, Prisma -The Indonesian Indicator (Jakarta), No. 49 (1990), pp. 52-69. 7 Nadirsyah Hosen, “Behind the Scenes: Fatwas of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (1975–1998)”, p. 150.8 According to Donald J.Porter, the establishment of the inter-religious body was very political. As

any other social organisation that was established during the New Order era, the purpose of thisorganisation was merely to incorporate the interests of the government. By creating such an institution, the

government would be able to control any movement from religions which can be defined as political or any

splinter groups and sects that threaten to disrupt economic development and cause instability. By

harmonising five recognized religions in Indonesia into one body, the government ensured that religions

would be not used for politics especially not for opposing the government, See Donald J.Porter, Managing

Politics and Islam in Indonesia (London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), p. 38.9 It looks like what Suharto wanted from this council succeeded when the MUI accepted the creation

of an inter-religious body in 1976, a year after the MUI was established. Even though in reality, the body of

inter-religious dialogue was not reached until 1980. See Atho Mudzhar, “the Council of Indonesia Ulama

on Muslims attendance at Christmas Celebrations”, in Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick and

David S. Powers (Eds), Islamic Legal Interpretation, Muftis and Their Fatwas (Cambridge, Harvard

University Press, 1996), p. 231.


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12

district and provincial level. The mechanism for such a creation in the provinces or

districts was based upon an agreement between each ulama and the government.10

The consensus was continued by President Suharto by instructing Amir Machmud,

the Minister for Internal Affairs at the time, to establish the council of ulama in several

provinces and districts.11 After successfully creating the council at district and provincial

levels, Suharto wished for further progress by instructing the Minister of Religious

Affairs to create a committee responsible for composing a council of ulama at the

national level. The committee consisted of several people, including H. Sudirman, a

retired Army general. This person was a representative of the government; therefore he

became the chairperson of the committee. The other people were ulama; Hamka, K.HAbdullah Syafi’i, and K.H Syukri Ghazali.

12

This committee decided to organize a conference which would be attended by each

district and provincial board of the council of ulama. The conference was held from 21 to

27 July 1975. Aside from the council of ulama from districts and provincial levels, it also

invited representatives from Islamic organisations at the national level and also the

representative of Muslim servicemen in the armed forces.13

At the end of the conference,

it was agreed upon by all participants that the first chairperson for this council would be

Hamka.

It is interesting to see how Hamka, who at first rejected the establishment of the MUI

when it was proposed in 1970, but finally changed his mind, accepted the idea and

became the first chairperson in 1975. In this situation, there are at least two possible

scenarios: the first is that the reason behind Hamka’s rejection of this council, as stated in

his paper in 1974, was based on his fear that if it were established in 1974, the council

would only be used for the benefits of the NU. It is known that the Minister of Religious

Affairs at the time, K.H M. Dahlan, belonged to the NU. It is known that Hamka

belonged to the Muhammadiyah and was one of the chairpersons on the national board.

Considering the contestation between these two organisations, it is understandable that

Hamka was against the establishment of the MUI.

10 Departemen Penerangan RI, 10 Tahun Majelis Ulama Indonesia, p. 15.11 See Nur Ichwan, “Ulama State and Politics: MUI after Suharto”, p. 48.12 Atho Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in

Indonesia 1975-1988, pp. 47-48.13 Ibid, p. 48.


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13

However, after Mukti Ali replaced K.H. M. Dahlan as the Minister of Religious

Affairs in 1971, it seemed that Hamka changed his mind. Mukti Ali can be seen as a

modernist thinker. Even though he was born in an NU family, in later periods he was

much closer to the Muhammadiyah.14

This replacement influenced Hamka’s stance and

he accepted the creation of the MUI. Not only did he accept the establishment of the MUI,

but he also accepted the appointment as the first chairman in 1975.15

He felt that because

Mukti Ali and Hamka belonged to the same organisation, the MUI could be relatively

free from political interest and focus more on the improvement of the relation between

the government and the Muslim population.16

Nevertheless, according to Atho Mudzhar, Hamka’s rejection was not the onlyreason for the postponement of the establishment of the MUI. The second scenario is

related to the political situation that Hamka and also many Muslims activists who

rejected the MUI in 1970 found themselves in. What Mudzhar means with this argument

is that after Suharto became president in 1967, there were many attempts to eliminate

prominent political stakeholders from the Old Order regime, especially politicians and

activists from Islamic parties. This policy was beyond the expectation of Islamic activists.

After being marginalized by Sukarno in his last term when he preferred to have close

relationship with the leftists, Muslims political activists presumed that the New Order

regime under Suharto would have another approach towards Muslims. One of them was

to restore political Islam to its rightful position in public life. 17 This aspiration was

expressed in their hopes to rehabilitate the Masyumi party which was banned by the Old

Order regime in 1960.

However, what was expected differed from reality. Suharto’s policy toward Islamic

political activism was not better than the Old Order regime’s policies. According to

14 For more detailed remarks about Mukti Ali see Ali Munhanif, “Islam and the Struggle for

Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: a Political Reading of the Religious Thought of Mukti Ali”, in Studia

Islamika, vol. 3 (1996), pp. 79-126.15 It is mentioned by Rusdi Hamka that before the conference from 21-27 July 1975, Hamka was

invited by Mukti Ali to talk about the establishment of the MUI. At that time Mukti Ali urged Hamka to

become the first chairperson of the MUI. See Rusydi Hamka, Pribadi dan Martabat Buya Prof. Dr. Hamka

(Jakarta, Pustaka Panjimas, 1981), p. 190.16 Nadirsyah Hosen, “Behind the Scenes: Fatwas of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (1975–1998)”, pp.

150-151.17 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (New Jersey,

Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 58.


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William Liddle, at the beginning of the New Order regime Suharto started to implement a

two-pronged Islamic policy; this means that on the one hand, Suharto approached and

accepted Muslims promotion of personal piety, but on the other hand he opposed to the

politicisation of religion. Liddle states that this political policy was adopted from the

Dutch colonial order.18

Expressions of this policy can be seen in the 1971 general elections. In these

elections, Islamic political activism and participation was accommodated and allowed in

more restricted forms. There were only four Islamic parties with highly supervised and

even controlled organisational and leadership compositions.19

They were Nahdlatul

Ulama, which had received 18.4 percent in the 1955 general elections; Parmusi, whichwas the inheritor of Masyumi; Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII); and Partai Tarbiyah

Islamiyah (Perti). Among the four Islamic parties only Nahdlatul Ulama was successful

and received 18.7 percent of the votes in the 1971 general elections.20

These political conditions were considered by Hamka and many other Islamic

leaders as being in the interest of the government instead of the Muslims. Therefore they

had to think twice before agreeing on the establishment of the MUI in 1970. In addition,

as mentioned earlier, the first general election under the New Order regime was held in

1971, and Hamka was afraid that this institution would only be used by the government

for political interests and not for the benefit of the Muslims. Many of them thought that if

it would be established in 1970, a year before the elections, the MUI would be used by

Suharto as a medium to win the votes of Muslims in the general elections of 1971.21

The worries of Muslim activists regarding the New Order regime controlling

political Islam proved to be true. In 1973, the New Order regime decided to amalgamate

the four Islamic parties that participated in the 1971 general elections to be one party. The

name of this fusion party was Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) or the United

18 For further explanations of Suharto’s policy toward Islam see R. William Liddle, “The Islamic

Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation’’, in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 55, o. 3 (Aug., 1996),

pp. 613-634; See also R. William Liddle, Islam and Politics in Late ew Order, Paper presented at the

conference on Islam and society in Southeast Asia, Jakarta, 29-31 May 2005, p. 7.19 Ibid, p. 621.20 For a complete analysis of the 1971 general elections see Donald Hindley, “Indonesia 1971:

Pantjasila Democracy and the Second Parliamentary Elections”, Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 1, A Survey of

Asia in 1971: Part I (Jan., 1972), pp. 56-68.21 Atho Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama, pp. 50-51.


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Development Party. The fusion of this Islamic party can be considered as a successful

step to weaken political Islam. Because it consisted of several parties that each had their

own ideology, much of its time was wasted in terms of conflict and rivalries, especially

between the traditional and modernist side.22

The interests of the New Order regime in trying to suppress Islamic political

activism and also the attempts use the MUI as a government tool to accomplish its

interests were the main reason why Hamka and many other Islamic activists rejected the

idea of the MUI in 1970. Furthermore, at the second attempt to establish it in 1975,

Hamka actually did not change his mind and refused to be the chairperson. Only because

Mukti Ali persuaded Hamka he was finally convinced that the MUI could be a goodinstitution for bridging the gap between the government and Muslim activists and also for

protecting Indonesia from communist ideas.23

Looking at this situation we can analyse the different objectives of the

establishment of the MUI. The first came from the government; the second was from the

Muslim activists. The government’s objective (or interest) in the MUI was visible in

Suharto’s speech at the first congress of ulama in 1975. He delivered a speech entitled

‘The role and function of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia; liaison between government and

ulama.’24

In his speech it was really obvious what the government wanted this institution

to be like in the future, what would be allowed and what not. It was stated that the

government wanted the MUI to be the interpreter of the governmental development

programs both nationally and regionally. For that reason, Suharto wanted the MUI to

restrict its activities; these should not be the same as those of other Islamic organisations

such as recruiting members etc. He also suggested that the MUI not create its own

madrasah (Islamic school) and mosque. What is really important about Suharto’s

statement is that he forbade the MUI to get involved in politics. He said that Islamic

22 See Martin van Bruinessen, “Islamic State or State Islam? Fifty Years of State-Islam Relations in

Indonesia, in C. van. Dijk and A. H. de Groot (eds.), State and Islam (Leiden, Research School CNWS,

1995), pp. 96-114.23 Rusydi Hamka, Pribadi dan Martabat Buya Prof. Dr. Hamka (Jakarta, Pustaka Panjimas, 1981),

pp. 189-191.24 See Amanat Presiden Soeharto, Fungsi dan Peranan Majelis Ulama, Penghubung Pemerintah

dan Ulama, Mimbar Ulama, No.1, Mei 1976, pp. 4-9.


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political activities were already facilitated by three political parties, the PPP (the

Development Unity Party), PDI (the Indonesian Democratic Party) and Golkar.25

In that speech it became really clear how the government saw the MUI. It seemed

that Suharto was afraid of potential political activism of the MUI. Therefore he reminded

the members of the MUI not to use the organisation to further political agendas. In the

next meeting of the MUI in August 1976, Suharto also presented a speech which

emphasized the importance of the 1977 general elections and expressed hope for the

participation of the Indonesian people in the development of the New Order regime.26

We

can see this speech as part of the pragmatic way of Suharto to use the MUI to approach

Muslims so that they would support every programme of the government.The other objective came from Islamic activists. At first, they had big expectations

that this institution would be an entry point for Muslims to get actively involved in

politics, or at least to develop good relations with the government. Muslim activists

assumed that the establishment of the MUI would create a different way of

communicating with the government. Some even thought that this institution could be

used as a media for Islamic political expression after Suharto’s policy to amalgamate the

Islamic political parties into one (the fusion).27

This objective can be seen in the MUI

statutes which mention that one of MUI’s objectives is to make and maintain good

relations between ulama and umara (government).28

Unfortunately, it looks like the

Muslim activists’ assumption about the establishment of the MUI overestimated its

benefits or can even be judged wrong. Between these two objectives it seems that only

the objective of the government was worked out. This situation can be seen as a result of

the political policy of Suharto, especially during the 1970s until the early 1990s when

Islamic political activism was restricted.

25 The speech also can be found in the book published by MUI. See Majelis Ulama Indonesia,

Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Jakarta, Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 1976), pp. 15-19.26 Amanat Presiden Soeharto di Depan Peserta Raker Majelis Ulama, Mimbar Ulama, No.3,

Agustus 1976, pp. 3-6.27 Atho Mudzhar, “the Ulama, the Government, and Society in Modern Indonesia; the Council of

Indonesian Ulama Revisited”, in Johan Meuleman (Editor), Islam in the Era of Globalization; Muslim

Attitudes towards Modernity and Identity (Jakarta: INIS, 2001), pp. 315-317.28 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 20 Tahun Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Jakarta, Majelis Ulama Indonesia,

1996), p. 38.


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B. The Relations Between the MUI and the ew Order Regime.

Before discussing the relations between the MUI and the New Order regime, let

us first go to the background of the relations between Islam and the New Order regime.

As one of several Islamic institutions, the MUI is treated in the same way as other

Islamic organisations in Indonesia especially regarding the New Order policies toward

Islamic political activism. Understanding the general policy of the New Order regime

concerning Islam means understanding the government policy toward the MUI.

In the Old Order era or early after the independence, it can be said that Islamic

political activism was mostly channelled through Masyumi, which was established by

four Islamic organisations (Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Perikatan Umat Islamand Persatuan Umat Islam).

29 This situation changed when Nahdlatul Ulama decided to

create its own party in April 1952 through its congress in Palembang. Surely, this

situation divided the Muslim votes in the 1955 general elections. In those elections, NU

received 18.4 percent of the votes and Masyumi 20.9 percent.30

The relation between Islam political activism and the State worsened when

Masyumi supported the PRRRI (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of

Indonesia) revolt in 1958-1959. Not only had Masyumi supported this rebellion, but

several of its leaders such as former Prime Minister Muhammad Natsir had joined the

revolt. Based on this fact, Sukarno banned and dismissed Masyumi as political party in

Indonesia in August 1960.31 The banning of Masyumi left Nahdlatul Ulama the biggest

Islamic party. However, with its traditional image NU cannot play a big enough role to

grasp all the Muslim votes, especially those of modernist Muslims as they are

represented in Muhammadiyah.

29 Masyumi was created from MIAI ( Madjlisul Islamil A’laa Indonesia) or the Supreme Indonesian

Council of Islam. This organisation was established in 1937. In November 1943, the organisation evolved

to be a political party named Masyumi ( Madjlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia). See B.J Boland, The Struggle

of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), pp. 10-12; Beside Masyumi there were

several small Islamic parties such as Perti and Partai Sarikat Islam Indoenesia, see Nasir Tamara, “Islam

Under the New Order: a Political History”, Prisma -The Indonesian Indicator (Jakarta), No. 49 (1990), pp.

6-30.30 With these votes, the NU and Masyumi are regarded as the big four together with PNI and PKI,

Ibid, pp. 6-30.31 See Allan Samson, Islam and Politics in Indonesia, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of

California, Berkeley, 1972, pp. 1-41; See also Allan A. Samson, “Islam in Indonesian Politics”, Asian

Survey, Vol. 8, No. 12 (Dec., 1968), pp. 1001-1017.


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After Suharto became president in 1966 there was hope among former Masyumi

leaders that Suharto would rehabilitate Masyumi. However, based on military

objections to the rehabilitation of Masyumi, Suharto refused the request and preferred

the creation of a new Islamic party. This decision was followed by the creation of

Committee Seven, which was given the task to arrange a new Islamic party named

Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi).32

The committee achieved success in organising

a congress and elected former foreign Minister Muhammad Roem as the general

chairman. However, the government expressed its disapproval of this decision by saying

that no former Masyumi figures were allowed in the Parmusi. After several internal

conflicts, the government intervened and appointed State Minister M.S Mintaredja asthe general chairman. By eliminating many elements of the Masyumi and appointing a

leader who was loyal to the government, Suharto was successful in managing and

imposing its policy on Parmusi. Therefore, his government was free from any disruption

from opponents. This policy was proven in the 1971 general elections; Parmusi did not

get many votes, only 7.4 percent. This number was much lower than Masyumi, which

had received 20.9 percent in the 1955 general elections. The election itself was won by

Golkar with 62.8 percent of the votes. 33

During this period, from 1966 when Suharto became president until the 1971

general elections, Suharto consolidated his regime, surrounded himself with people who

were loyal to him and dissolved every unit which was defined as an enemy or a threat. It

can be said that there were many restrictions for someone who wanted to be active in

the political arena.34

We can see this from the establishment of Parmusi. By rejecting

any person related to Masyumi, the New Order regime did not have to worry that

Parmusi would disturb its power. Instead of opposing the government, Parmusi became

an instrument for the government to splitting the voice of Islamic activists. We can see

32 Muhammad Kamal B. Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to “ew Order” Modernization in

Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur, Dewan bahasa dan Pustaka, 1982), p 80.33 Donald Hindley, “Indonesia 1971: Pantjasila Democracy and the Second Parliamentary Elections”,

Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 1, A Survey of Asia in 1971: Part I (Jan., 1972), pp. 56-68.34 Those restrictions were: 1). they were not to include communist ideas, 2). they would not restore

Sukarno to prominence, 3). they would not lead to disruptions and debates that could undermine the basic

economic policy, 4). they would not threaten the dual function of the armed forces. See Donald Hindley,

“Indonesia 1970: The Workings of Pantjasila Democracy”, Asian Survey, Vol. 11, No. 2, A Survey of Asia

in 1970: Part II (Feb., 1971), pp. 111-120.


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this happening in the 1971 election campaign; Parmusi was allied with Golkar and the

Army against NU and PNI.35

According to Syamsuddin Haris, this process was

politically logical; from refusing Masyumi rehabilitation to accepting the idea of the

establishment of Parmusi. Suharto considered the New Order as a new era with a new

government. That is why he tried to eliminate any ideological rivalries from the Old

Order. Overall, in the early years of his administration, Suharto attempted to create a

stable government.36

Another step of the New Order regime to incorporate Islamic political activists

was to remove NU’s influence from the Ministry of Religious Affairs. As stated before,

the Ministry of Religious Affairs can be considered the centre of Nahdlatul Ulama forspreading its traditional ideas and politics. This can be concluded from the fact that

from 1953 to 1971 all Ministers of Religious Affairs were prominent figures of the

NU.37

Furthermore, after the ban of Masyumi, the NU became the biggest Islamic

political party and the biggest challenge to the government. Based on this situation, the

New Order regime decided that the NU must be controlled by eradicating its basis in the

Ministry of Religious Affairs. This effort started before the elections of 1971 when Ali

Murtopo, a military officer and a close counsellor to Suharto, persuaded the staff of this

ministry to become Golkar supporters. By doing so, he hoped to separate their loyalties

from the NU so they would leave the party. This policy was in line with the idea of

mono-loyalties of civil servants on the behalf of KORPRI to support the government.

However, this policy was rejected by K.H Muhammad Dahlan, the Minister of

Religious Affairs at the time, from the NU. This rejection led to a plan to remove

Muhammad Dahlan from his position. Some staff of the Ministry of Religious Affairs

who graduated in western countries went to Ali Murtopo and proposed this strategy.

Subsequently, Ali Murtopo agreed and chose Mukti Ali as the replacement of

Muhammad Dahlan for the post of Minister of Religious Affairs.38

35 Donald J.Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, p. 41.36 Syamsuddin Haris, “PPP and Politics under the New Order”, Prisma -The Indonesian Indicator

(Jakarta), No. 49 (1990), p. 35.37 Martin van Bruinessen, “Indonesia's Ulama and Politics: Caught Between Legitimising the Status

Quo and Searching for Alternatives”, Prisma -The Indonesian Indicator (Jakarta), No. 49 (1990), pp. 52-69.38 Donald J.Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, p. 54. Further reading of Mukti Ali

see Ali Munhanif, “Islam and the Struggle for Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: a Political Reading of the

Religious Thought of Mukti Ali”, in Studia Islamika, vol. 3 (1996), pp. 79-126.


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The next move of the government regarding Islamic political activism was to

simplify the number of parties into one party in 1973. Therefore, the four Islamic parties

(Nahdlatul Ulama, Parmusi, PSII and Perti) which participated in the 1971 general

elections amalgamated into PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) or United

Development Party. According to the government, the reason for this fusion was to

prevent political instability. With the experience of the multi-party system in the Old

Order era, the New Order regime wanted to make the system simpler without frequent

changes in the cabinet, political rupture, economic instability, protests and

demonstrations which caused trouble.39

At first, the establishment of the PPP was considered by Islamic activists to be agood sign for uniting Islamic politics. During the election campaign in 1977, there were

several Islamic leaders who conspicuously supported its programme such as

Muhammad Natsir and Nurcholish Majid. The result of the elections was surprising:

Golkar received less votes than in the 1971 elections with 62.1 percent, PDI gained 8.6

percent and PPP received 29.2 percent of the votes.40

This increase worried the

government, especially because of the possibility for a bigger increase in the future.

Furthermore, Suharto did not want the existence of an opposition which could disturb

legislation proposed by the government. Therefore, Suharto replaced Mintaredja with

Jealani Naro. This person was considered to be the government’s man. He was behind

the conflict with Parmusi which ended with the subjugation of Parmusi to the

government.41

After being assigned to the post, Naro excluded most of the NU members

who were considered to be critics of the government, specifically Yusuf Hasyim and

Saifuddin Zuhri. Not only had he excluded key members of the NU in the party, but he

also reallocated seats so that the NU no longer formed an absolute majority in the

parliament.42 All of these circumstances were a disappointment for the NU. In its 27th

39 Beside the PPP, the government also merged five parties such as PNI, IPKI, MURBA, Parkindo

and Partai Katolik into Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or Indonesian Democratic Party. See Dony S. Truna,

Islam and Politics under the ew Order Government in Indonesia 1966-1999, unpublished M.A Thesis,

Mcgill University, Montreal, 1995, p. 58.40 Nasir Tamara, “Islam under the New Order: a Political History”, pp. 13-19.41 Donald J.Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, p. 44.42 It was reported that NU which had the majority of the seats in the PPP, rejected the two decrees

which were proposed by the government. The first decree was to give religious status to mystical belief

systems (aliran kepercayaan). The other was to introduce Pancasila as moral instruction which was called

P4 (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila). This rejection convinced Suharto to intervene in


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congress in 1984, NU decided to withdraw from politics, especially regarding its

support for the PPP.43

The withdrawal of NU from politics worsened in 1983 when the MPR held its

session, and the New Order regime imposed Pancasila as the sole foundation for all

social and political organisations. To a certain extent this policy was directed to Islamic

organisations especially those related to Islamic political activism. Even though the

government rejected such a claim, it was really clear that this was a major blow for

Islamic political activism.44

Actually, this was not the first attempt of the government to

disallow any ideological principle besides Pancasila. With the establishment of the PPP,

the government had underlined that political parties must use Pancasila as their only principle. However, with the rejection of the PPP by many NU leaders, the government

accepted Islam as the basis for the PPP with the addition of Pancasila. Thus, PPP had

both Pancasila and Islam as its guiding principles. Inevitably, the imposition of

Pancasila as the sole foundation for political organisations had a big impact on political

Islam in general and the PPP in particular. Overall, the 1980s can be regarded as the

decade that the relations between the government and political Islam worsened. Van

Dijk mentions that in this decade, certain Muslim groups became enemies of the state.45

Even though Van Dijk’s writing was related to radical Muslims in particular, it showed

the government’s stance towards Muslims in general.

During this period when Islamic political activism was gradually brought under

the government’s control, the MUI was established. In 1966, after Suharto was assigned

as president, he tried to develop his administration by stabilizing politics, without any

opposition, especially from political Islam. Consequently, he rejected the Masyumi

rehabilitation. Moreover, the approval of Parmusi as the successor of Masyumi was

really political. What really happened was that Parmusi was not similar to Masyumi at

the PPP board. See Sidney Jones, “The Contraction and Expansion of the "Umat" and the Role of the

Nahdatul Ulama in Indonesia”, Indonesia, Vol. 38 (Oct., 1984), pp. 1-20. Further reading regarding the

relation between Nahdlatul Ulama and PPP in the New Order era see C. van Dijk, "Ulama and Politics",

Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 152 (1996), no: 1, Leiden, pp. 109-110.43 Even though NU did not support one specific party; NU declared its members free to vote for any

political party: PPP, Golkar or PDI. See C. van Dijk, “Ulama and Politics”, p.110.44 Donald E. Weatherbee, “Indonesia in 1984: Pancasila, Politics, and Power”, Asian Survey, Vol.

25, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1984: Part II (Feb., 1985), pp. 187-197.45 C. van Dijk, Political Development, Stability and Democracy: Indonesia in the 1980’s (Centre for

South-East Asian Studies, 1989), pp. 19-24.


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all; instead it was backing up the New Order policy. In the words of Donald J. Porter, it

was Suharto’s policy to incorporate Islamic politics so that he could restrict its

movement and prevent any attempt to disturb his power.46 In an attempt to reduce the

Islamic influence in education, the New Order regime succeeded in changing the

position of NU in the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The replacement of Muhammad

Dahlan from the NU by Mukti Ali was proof that this policy was successful.47

The next attempt was to manage Islamic politics through a centralist and

controlled organisation. The MUI was a really good instrument to implement this

strategy. By cornering Muslim activist into this box, the government could easily

control any decision, as they were produced by the MUI. The guidelines from thegovernment were very clear that the MUI members were forbidden from getting

involved in political matters. Another pattern can be seen from the establishment of

another Islamic organisation such as the Indonesian Dakwah Council (MDI), which

affiliates with Golkar and the Indonesian Mosque Council (DMI). All these

organisations were established with the purpose that the government could interfere in

accordance with its own interests.48

The works of previous scholars on the MUI show how the MUI, overall, can be

judged as a central instrument of the government in conveying its policy to Indonesian

Muslims. If the MUI could be influenced so could the people. It meant the government

did not need more efforts or other instruments to subdue people’s refusal. The first is

the study of Atho Mudzar, who mainly argues that the position of the MUI during the

New Order era was very supportive of governmental policies.49

His conclusion was

based on twenty-two fatwas issued from 1975-1980. Another one is the work of M.B

46 Donald J.Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, pp, 75-82.47 As mentioned before, Muhammad Dahlan was affiliated to the NU. With the aim of the New

Order to eliminate any opposition, the government had the plan to put more loyal people in its ministries so

that its policies would be more successful. This was the background of the replacement of the Minister of

Religious Affairs, Muhammad Dahlan, by Mukti Ali. As a scholar who graduated from McGill University,

Canada, the government hoped that Mukti Ali could support the government’s design especially in

reducing the influence of political Islam. See Ali Munhanif, “Islam and the Struggle for Religious

Pluralism in Indonesia: a Political Reading of the Religious Thought of Mukti Ali”, in Studia Islamika, vol.

3 (1996), pp. 79-126.48 Ibid, p. 76.49 See Atho Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal

Thought in Indonesia 1975-1988 (Jakarta: INIS, 1993); See also Atho Mudzhar, “the Ulama, the

Government, and Society in Modern Indonesia; the Council of Indonesian Ulama Revisited”, p. 317.


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Hooker, who stated that the main function of the MUI – especially from 1975 to the

1990s – was to support and to justify governmental policies.50

Apart from the two opinions given by Hooker and Mudzhar, it is interesting to

read the argument of Nur Ichwan concerning MUI’s position during the New Order era.

If both Hooker and Mudzhar determine MUI’s position by looking at the fatwas issued by

the MUI, Ichwan’s analysis is not solely based on the MUI fatwas; Nur Ichwan assesses

the MUI position as follows:

“MUI’s relationship with the government was articulated not only through the fatwas it issued, but

also by its silence on certain state policies and programmes. Such silence often reflected the

powerlessness felt by many Muslims in relation to the state, as with the question of a government-

supported sport lottery and the Tanjung Priok massacre of 1984.”51

What can be concluded from Nur Ichwan’s statement is that in its political

expressions, the MUI can be regarded as suppressed by the New Order government. It is

a fact that on several occasions the MUI resisted the government’s policies, but overall

MUI’s positions, judged from its fatwas and its silence in accordance with the

governmental treatment of Muslims’ political expression, can be seen as oppressed by

the regime.

This opinion is strengthened by Kees van Dijk who said that since it was first

established, the MUI was used by the government to persuade Muslim activists of

giving their support to the government, especially those who rejected joining the

government’s party. Furthermore, the political position of the MUI at the end of the

New Order era in the 1990s, when the MUI along with other Islamic organisations

conspicuously supported the government to make an attempt for the sake of national

union and unity, illustrates how the MUI was really powerless and under the influence

of the government.52

These four opinions demonstrate the position of the MUI during the New Order

era when it was mostly suppressed by governmental control. From the early 1970s it is

50 M. B. Hooker, “Islam and Medical Science: Evidence from Malaysian and Indonesian Fatwas”,

Studia Islamika, Vol 4, No 4 (1997), pp. 1-31.51 Nur Ichwan, “Ulama State and Politics: MUI after Suharto”, Islamic Law and Society, 12.1 (2005),

45–72.52 C. van Dijk, “Religious Authority, Politics, and Fatwas”, pp 44-65.


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visible that the government intended to subdue political Islam. With the existence of

MUI, the government had an effective device to implement the idea of incorporating the

power of Islam for the benefit of the government.

C. MUI’s Attitudes in the General Elections in the ew Order era

It is mentioned before that the MUI under the New Order regime was generally

controlled by the government. This opinion is supported by several scholars who

previously studied the MUI. In this part I will discuss MUI’s attitudes toward the general

elections under the New Order regime. I will scrutinize whether these attitudes were the

same as other MUI fatwas. Was this also under governmental control or did the MUIhave a different idea concerning these events? The MUI was established in 1975, and the

elections which will be analysed are the ones from 1977 to 1997.

First to be analysed are the 1977 general elections. In these elections, the MUI

brought out a statement (pernyataan) regarding its position in the general elections. It

was published in Mimbar Ulama in April 1977, a month before the elections in May. The

statement was entitled Pernyataan Majelis Ulama Indonesia Menghadapi Pemilu (the

Statement of the Indonesian Council of Ulama concerning the General Elections). It

started with an introduction stating that after observing the explanations from the

government, two parties and Golkar, the MUI decided to issue a statement consisting of

five points. The first point was that the election was important for the success of national

development, and referred to the President’s speech in front of the ulama last year; it

emphasised the participation of the ulama in the elections. The second declared that every

member of the MUI who actively participated in the elections should not use the name of

the MUI. The third asserted that all parties and Golkar must campaign peacefully as was

mentioned in the law. The fourth point was to recommend people to choose the best

candidate for the House of Representatives, and to urge Muslims not to preach

provocatively which would hamper the elections. The statement ended with a call for

Muslims to pray for successful elections.53

53 Pernyataan Majelis Ulama Indonesia Menghadapi Pemilu, Mimbar Ulama, no. 09, April 1977, p.

70.


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This statement can be regarded as general. It can be seen from the content that it

did not give any specific endorsement either to the government or to the parties and

Golkar. It just gave a general preposition for Muslims as well as for the ulama to

participate in the general elections for the country’s development. The only political

statement was the necessity for the ulama not to speak of politics during their preaching

because it would endanger the coming elections.54

However, this statement was made after “pressure” coming from the government.

The meaning of pressure here is the presence of the government in several MUI activities

asking the MUI to participate in the general elections. The most conspicuous one was the

speech of President Suharto in front of the ulama during the training of ulama on 13December 1976 in Jakarta. The speech mainly covered the importance of the elections. It

asserted that because of its importance, everyone had the obligation to try to achieve

orderly, peaceful and secure elections. For that reason it was the duty of the ulama to

contribute to successful elections.55

From this fact, it can be seen that the MUI statement regarding the general

elections was a reaction to the government’s demand of the ulama to support the 1977

general elections. The speech of President Suharto during the training of the ulama

showed that Suharto tried to get the support of the ulama for his administration. His

words emphasizing orderly, peaceful and secure elections can be interpreted in terms of

the unwillingness of the government to accept any criticism from the opposition. Another

indication was the Mimbar Ulama magazine published in May which also included

Suharto’s speech at the House of Representatives in August 1976. In that speech, he said

he hoped that in the 1977 general elections there would be no clash of powers that would

endanger the recent stability.56

According to Liddle, in 1971 Suharto tried to create a system of politics

controlled by the bureaucracy. Ruling this system would be President Suharto and the

54 The statement is agar selama kegiatan kampanye dalam rangka pemilu, segala kegiatan-kegiatan

agama terutama pengajian-pengajian dan dakwah dapat berjalan terus, tidak terpengaruh dan

dipengaruhi oleh situasi pemilu, dan ummat Islam tetap menjaga dan memelihara isi pengajian dan

ceramah yang tidak merusak pemilu, Ibid, p. 70.55 Sambutan Presiden Soeharto Kepada para Peserta Pekan Orientasi Ulama/Khatib Seluruh

Indonesia tanggal 13 December 1976. Ibid, pp.67-69.56 Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden R.I di Depan Sidang DPR Tanggal 16 Agustus 1976 Mengenai

Pemilu. Ibid, pp. 65-67.


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armed forces. In order to achieve this objective, Suharto used Golkar to gather the

support of bureaucrats and civil servants. With this kind of policy, the government had

created a mono-loyalty for the bureaucracy to vote for Golkar. The 1977 general elections

were used by the government to strengthen the system.57

For that reason the government

needed a lot of support, especially from the ulama. However, as can be seen in the

statement, it does not look like the MUI gave a clear endorsement of the government,

instead giving a general statement saying that every person can choose any candidates

from any party including Golkar as long as they are good. The elections itself were won

by Golkar with 62.11% of the votes, the second was the PPP with 29.29% and third the

PDI with 10%.In 1977 MUI’s stance regarding support for the government can be considered

relatively neutral; if not contra. In 1982, MUI’s attitude in the general elections went

further. At that time, the MUI board had a new chairman after the resignation of Hamka

in 1981. His resignation was a reaction to the refusal of the government regarding the

MUI fatwa that prohibited Muslims from participating in Christmas celebrations. The

government had asked for its withdrawal, but Hamka refused to do so. Because of this

conflict, Hamka decided to resign on 19 May 1981. Two months later, on 24 July 1981,

Hamka died at the age of 75.58

Hamka was replaced by K.H Syukri Ghozali. Different from Hamka who

affiliated with Muhammadiyah, K.H Syukri Ghozali belonged to Nahdlatul Ulama. In

terms of the MUI policy concerning the general elections, the MUI under the leadership

of Syukri Ghozali was very different from Hamka’s time. As was explained, Hamka did

not give a strong indication the MUI would support the government. It just issued a

general statement urging Muslims to use their vote for the best candidate. In Syukri

57 See William Liddle, “Indonesia 1977: The New Order’s Second Parliamentary Election”, Asian

Survey, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Feb., 1978), pp. 175-185.58 Hamka can be considered an independent ulama. He did not want to be co-opted by the

government. That is why many of his decisions were against the government’s interests. He is the one who

rejected the idea of the MUI’s establishment in 1971 because he was afraid it would be used for the

government’s political interests. During his period as MUI chairman, the MUI never issued decisions

which were co-opted by the government. Most of them can be regarded as neutral or even against. The

MUI statements concerning the 1977 general election was a neutral one. The Christmas fatwa was against

and even though the government demanded its withdrawal, Hamka insisted on its effectuation. For further

reading regarding Hamka’s biography see Karel Seenbrink, “Hamka (1908-1981) and the integration of the

Islamic Ummah of Indonesia”, Studia Islamika, Vol.1, No.3, 1994, pp. 121-147.


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Ghozali’s time, the MUI gave a direct endorsement of Suharto for the next period. The

first endorsement can be seen in the statement of the MUI board after it held a board

meeting on 20 August 1981, which was continued by the MUI national meeting on 21-22

August in Jakarta. These two meetings enacted several programmes and

recommendations. One of the recommendations was to thank President Suharto and his

state apparatus for the development of Indonesia and to express hope that the President

would continue working and developing Indonesia. It was also to urge people to

participate in the next year’s elections.59

This recommendation was strengthened by another national meeting in March

1982, two months before the elections which were held in May 1982. Like the previousnational meeting, this meeting passed several recommendations, one of them regarding

the general elections. These recommendations were published in Mimbar Ulama as

Keputusan Rapat Kerja asional Majelis Ulama Indonesia (the decision of the national

meeting of the MUI). Regarding the elections, this decision had two items; the first

regarding kepemimpinan nasional (national leadership) and the second concerning the

1982 general elections.

In terms of its recommendation regarding the national leadership, MUI’s opinion

conspicuously supported Suharto as the next president. First, it announced that the MUI

expected the president to continue his leadership. Second, it advised the members of the

House of Representatives of the 1982 general elections to elect Suharto president of

Indonesia. His assignation would guarantee the stability of Indonesian development.

Third, the MUI prayed to God hoping he would give Suharto His blessing and protection.

In the item about the general elections, the MUI urged the people to participate on 4 May

1982 for the continuity of national development.60

These two recommendations show clearly that the MUI under K.H Syukri

Ghozali was really a supporter of the government. With many recommendations saying

that re-election of Suharto as the next president would be good for the stability of

national development, it shows that MUI was in the shadow of the government. The term

59 Hasil Rapat Pengurus Paripurna Lengkap dan Rapat Kerja asional Majelis Ulama Indonesia,

Mimbar Ulama, no. 51, April 1981, pp. 4-46.60 Keputusan Rapat Kerja asional Majelis Ulama se-Indonesia, Mimbar Ulama, no. 57, April 1982,

pp. 25-31.


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national development or pembangunan nasional itself was a really a term which was

created by the government. Using this term means the MUI was driven by the interests of

the regime.

Interestingly, this recommendation was not the only one that was composed by

ulama regarding the re-election of Suharto. Another one came from Nahdlatul Ulama.

However, this recommendation was the complete opposite of MUI’s recommendation. It

was issued at the national conference of Nahdlatul Ulama in 1981, stating that Nahdlatul

Ulama refused to endorse Suharto and did not support him becoming president for a third

time. This conference also disapproved of giving Suharto the title of Bapak

Pembangunan (Father of Development).61

It is probable that the results of the 1982elections were influenced by this constellation. The support of the MUI for Suharto and

his regime strengthened the solidity of Golkar, whereas the conflict within the PPP

(including the weakening by the government) and the refusal of NU to endorse Suharto

affected the PPP vote in the general elections. In these elections, Golkar won with 64% of

the votes, PPP finished second with 28% and PDI third with 8%.62

In the 1987 general elections, MUI’s attitude was different from 1977 and 1982.

What made it different was that the recommendation concerning the elections was not

issued by the MUI only, but also by other religious organisations such as Persekutuan

Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia or the Fellowship of Christian Churches in Indonesia (PGI),

Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia or the Bishop’s Conference in Indonesia (KWI),

Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia or the Hindu Council of Religious Affairs (PHDI),

and the Trusteeship of Indonesian Buddhists (WALUBI). All of these organisations

61 As is shown by many scholars, 1970 was the year when the government tried to reduce the power

of political Islam. This intention was discovered by NU activists in the PPP. That is why many ofgovernment policies were opposed by the NU faction in the PPP. One of the conspicuous ones was the

walk out of NU activists as a rejection of the government’s proposal concerning Pancasila education. The

New Order regime considered this act as endangering the national development. The replacement of H.M

Mintaredja by Jaelani Naro as the leader of the PPP was a sign of the government to eliminate NU’s

influence. The exclusion of NU members in the PPP national board was one of the decisions of Naro which

stimulated to the conflict and the withdrawal of NU from politics. This recommendation can be considered

to be NU’s reaction to all of those events. See Sidney Jones, “The Contraction and Expansion”, p.11.62 It looks like the political stability and national development programmes from the government

were working perfectly. In this year Suharto also received title of Father of Development from the People's

Consultative Assembly (MPR) in March 1983. See Gordon R. Hein, “Indonesia in 1982: Electoral Victory

and Economic Adjustment for the New Order”, Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1982:

Part II (Feb., 1983), pp. 178-190.


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signed a statement entitled Seruan Bersama Berkenaan Dengan Pemilu (Joint Statement

Regarding the General Elections).

This join

Documents

Religion and Politics in Inodnesia, Majelis Ulama Indonesia on the General Elections