Religion and Control of Violence

Levent Tezcan

Abstract

Regarding current developments there is hardly no doubt about rela-tionship between religion and violence. Increasing amount of re-searches meantime covers solide reflections not only about religious causes of violence. There exists also the idea that religion genuinly offers effective tools to control violence. Following article draws an conceptual framework that brings together four analytical levels: To-pic is discussed in nthropological (sacrifice), ethical (regulation of affects), theological (legitimacy of violence), and governmental (in-tegration via religion) regards. Author want to show not only how religion performs control of violence but he calls the attention also to the question what consequences religious control of violence bear practically. Special focus is thereby laid upon a new trend in integra-tion policies and geopolitical strategy to meet the Islamic violence by joining the battle in religious field itself.

Introduction

If one wants to ask for what can be identified as the benchmark of the current talk over religion, the answer is not to be found difficult. Without violence the religion never would have gained public atten-tion which it enjoys indubitable in our present time. The relationship between religion and violence is undeniable; this experience trig-gered an avalange of researches that are revolving around the ques-tion: Does the religion cause violence? If the sacred (as the core of religion) wouldn't have born any substantial relation to violence it never would have raised the fateful power which religion has been ever though in human history. My concern in this context will be to

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ask in what sense can be reflected upon the relation between religion and violence with specific regard to the forms of control of violence. My starting point shall be dialectical idea that release/cause and control of violence belong together; both modes are mutually dependent.Here four analytical levels are to be identified:

1. Anthropological Level: Intimate Relationship of Sacred to Vio-lence - inner-communal harmony at stake;

2. Individual Level and the Regime of Conduct of Life - affect regu-lation at stake.

3. Armed Conflicts: War and Terrorism - theological legitimacy at stake.

4. Religion and Governability - Accountability at stake: a) National Level: Religion as Agent of Integration; b) Global Level

1. Anthropological Level: Intimate Relationship of Sacred to Violence - inner-communal harmony at stake

The very basic relation between religion and violence is located on the anthropological level; this is sacrifice as the basic religious operation. Sacrifice was, due to its unneglectiable connection to vio-lence, almost excluded from scholars work for some time ago, (Negel 2005). It won't be wrong to assume that the regained up-to-datedness of sacrifice as research object could be traced back to the utterly rhetorical use of the terms of martyrdom and holy war by re-ligious militants.Generally spoken, sacrifice means the cultic act of offering a gift that can be performed bloody (human and animal sacrifice) or bloodless (cereals) (Krech 2004). To the latter the ascetism as a technique of affect modulation belongs too. Among several ap-proaches I want to refer here to two French Scholars who focused

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their works to the topic of sacrifice. One of these substantial theories was laid down by the French philosophers Georges Bataille (1997). His theory of religion (following Durkheim's sociology of religion) operates on a level which lies before any historical particular form of religion. Specific for human being is the consciousness of being separated from others in the instrumental world of labour. Men act religiously insofar as they take the attempt to get re-connected to a state of being in which this conscience of being separated from the whole is to be annulated. Sacred, as Bataille discerns the core of reli-gion from manifold empirical dresses, means exactly this experience of mergence and wasting oneself (in some sort of ecstasy) which is usually staged in sacrifice, festival, and Eros. In that sense sacrifice is to be understood as a controlled ritual stage to leave the world of causality and utility. The community makes experience of being ho-mogenized (timelly and not totally). We can conclude on behalf of Bataille that sacrifice in that cultic form works without canalizing the violence towards outside. It is first the warrior society (for Ba-taille the early Islam), which transforms sacrifice from its wasting and innercommunal form into an instrument of power accumulation by canalizing towards outside. Sacrifice seems to forfeit partially its immanence in favour of a transcendent instance. Analytical potential of this approach is still almost unfolded in current studies on religion and violence. Current debates on sacrifice refer rather to the anthro-pology of René Girard than the philosophy of Bataille (a recent ex-ception Megel 2005).

In a similar way but with totally different consequences, Girard fo-cuses also on the intrinsic connexion between Sacred and Violence. Short outlined, mimetically rivalry (for Girard a basic social opera-tion) is triggered by human desire, mainly by envy. Desire which we feel for concrete objects is getting rash to lose its fixation on these specific objects and is being transformed in to a kind of abstract de-sire. Now we desire because the others desire the same object too. Especially in periods of social crises this mechanism brings forth de-structive results; the unity of community is endangered by such brewing violence. In order to provide for communal harmony, the violence (resulted from mimetic desire) now is to be canalized on to a victim. Community vents its fury with an unleashed violence in

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this very original moment. Sacrifice as ritual repeats and recalls in a covered way this primary act of rebuilding the communal harmony that succeeded by destroying someone else. Phenomenon of scapegoat has its origin herein.According Girard, „Religion has had always a goal: It aims to pre-vent backslide to mimetic violence" (Girard 1987: 86). Especially along the example of the biblical Genesis story Girard wants to show that the very constitutive moment of social life (in the anthropologi-cal regard) is based upon the prohibition of revenge on Cain who murdered his brother. Monotheistic religions have their common roots in the ban of human sacrifice in this archetypical sense. They differ rather with regard to strategies replacing the sacrifice. Judaism and Islam know animal sacrifice. Judaism however hasn’t practiced animal sacrifice since the destruction of temple of Jerusalem 70 (A.D.). Christianity performed the supreme form of sacrifice, Sacri-fice of God’ Son by God in order to redeem the men - though Girard doesn't aggree with this theological interpretation (1983: 187). Islam is the only monotheistic religion that keeps still performing animal sacrifice. One of two most important holy festivities in Islam is called “Festival of Sacrifice”. On this day all believers are expected to abandon their animosity, hatred, enmity and to visit relatives and neighbours; the sacrifice animal enjoys the status of a sacred figure.

According Girard Christianity as documented in the Gospel (despite of the empirical history of the Church) claims a programmatically rejection of mimetic mechanism. Different from all other religions that always have covered the mechanism of violent sacrifice, Chris-tianity rejects, so Girard, a unity to be reached at the expense of vic-tim. On this he refers to Peter and Paul who don’t anymore blame the victim but take over guilt instead. The Gospel, Girard says, stands up for victim and put an end to the sacrificial religion, and creates the cultural base for demystification of social relation (2002). On the other hand the following dynamics are becoming more appa-rently, but not only in form of being in favour of victim. In the de-mystifying act its inner threat has been contained too. As a result of rehabilitation of victim the mimetic rivalry now goes on in the end-less competition about who is the real victim, who suffers more and so on. Currently we live in a time of affirmative claim of victimizati-

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on, but this is according Rene Girard a perversion of the original message of the Gospel (2002). Different from Girard who speaks of rejection of sacrifice (victimization), Nietzsche interpreted that me-chanism of Christianity as a result of relocation of guilt into inside. According to Nietzsche the resulting self-blame brought fort a cul-ture of resentment which needs relentless those who don’t blame themselves, those who don’t know bad conscience in order to assure itself of its moral superiority (Nietzsche 1999, Vol. 1: 127; s. also Deleuze 1985: 167)

Jan Assmann, a famous scholar of The Egyptology, doesn’t agree with Girards reflections upon violence and religion. Assmann him-self wants to draw our attention to the relation between violence and monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) in a specif-ic sense. In order to explain this relation, he presents two kinds of monotheism: a) Exclusive monotheism is based on the idea of “There is no other God but God”; b) Inclusive Monotheism (a ma-tured stage of Polytheism) which rather prefers to say: “All Gods are the One.” Both forms of monotheism maintain relations to violence, but in different ways: For traditional, pagan religions the violence is a “matter of political authority; it is not related to the issue of God, not of truth.” (2007: 23). It is the exclusive monotheism that con-nects the violence with the subjects of God and truth.

“The overthrowing new of exclusive monotheism is that it can not only be considered as a matter of cult or general relation to the world. Monotheism aims to regulate / govern the whole conduct of life, festivity as well as the everyday, every nut, bolt and screw.” (2007: 46, translation mine)

It seems more clearly why (exclusive) monotheistic God behaves jealously (2007: 33; s. also Preuß 2002: 103pp.). Assmann's ap-proach helps to bridge the anthropological level with the level of conduct of life.

2. Individual Level and the Regime of Conduct of Life - affect regulation at stake

Preparing of individuals' behaviour has been always one of the pref-erential tasks of religions, especially of the monotheistic ones. In

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that sense moral commandments and ethical tools, practices serve to control and channel affects such as rage, hate, anger. Recent reflections upon terrorist attacks and outbreaks of religious violence pay increasing attention to emotions – specifically the hate.The topic can be in different ways approached. In connexion to the debate on monotheism as shortly outlined above, hate appears as the other side of truth claim that the believer of monotheistic religion feel against unbeliever. The presence of unbeliever at all can be in principle sufficient to provoke the believer because reversely the same totality of truth claims makes believer aware of possible doubts against his belief. Here is the font of seduction which results from practices and lifestyles that the believer is expected to avoid or damn. The temptation resulting from pure presence of difference in behaviour and lifestyle visualises the contingency of own belief and the doubts on owns belief that the believer doesn’t dare to admit.Claus Offe (2002) has delivered an interesting analysis of current violent expression of hate. He defines hate as "an emotion which de-mands an unconditionally damage on its object". Different from envy that always is defined by "what the object has", the hate is evoked by "what the object is". This distinguishes it from "rage" which generally refers to something that the counterpart has done to the acting person. Offe argues against approaches that are placing the cause of hate of Islamic fundamentalists mainly in the politics of USA. Here he comes very close to one another theoretical concept that is attracting increasing interest: Resentment.

Term is commonly deployed in the Weberian modification. Max Weber borrowed it from Nietzsche and used it in order to distinguish the Judaic redemption religiousness from others (e. g. Hindu pari-ahs). Embedded within Weber's sociological connexion between sal-vation concepts and social classes, resentment describes the mood of the “pariah' religion”; it is the hatred of those who are and feel so-cially deprived against the powerful (Weber 1985: 301; s. Stauth 1991). Some scholars have already made use of this version in order to understand the roots of the current Islamic violence (Eckert 2005; Schiffauer 2005; Schulze 2007).Different from Weber, Nietzsche conceptualised resentment as a productive cultural tool to hinder the (re-)action by directing it to-

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wards inside (Nietzsche 1999, KSA Vol. 5) Put in the historical con-text, according Nietzsche it was first the Judaic priesthood (after de-feat by the Roman) who was compensating the lost of power over its community by premising the revenge in future in the name of God. In the Christian version – so Nietzsche – the quilt isn’t anymore re-ferring to an outside, no more against a concrete enemy; the place of resentment is not in outside but the inside. No more: “You are guilty” but “I am guilty” is now motto. This second stage of resent-ment is based upon the bad conscience which is now expected to be felt against God, against Church. Suffering and self-blaming, the in-wardness has been established as a crucial cultural technique. With regard to Islam the concept of resentment seems me mostly to be de-ployed inappropriate. To put it tentatively, terrorist attacks seem, at least in Nietzschean sense, less to indicate the resentment (hindering the act) than rather its lack as a cultural tool. Terrorist act transfers revenge immediately into action. Possibly should be searched for roots of resentment in Islam elsewhere?

There are endless empirical findings, exemplas about how the con-temporary Islamic awakening intends to dominate the individual be-haviour and organisation of social space. It seems typical for this strong religious ethics (both in orthodox and more radically in fun-damentalist forms to ban the sinful behaviour by preventing all pos-sibilities in social space that would seduce believer. Of course, Is-lamic ethics in general doesn’t ignore the inner responsibility and discipline of individuals – especially mysticism makes strong stress on the inner dimension of responsibility. But control does take place mainly by controlling the environment, primarily by the mean of ex-ternalization of the instance.Due to its call for radical internalisation, Nietzsche accused the Christianity of having eradicated passions instead to cultivate them (Nietzsche 1999, KSA Vol. 6: 83). The principal of current Ortho-dox version of Islamic ethics reads in contraire (to compare it with biblical texts): In order to prevent that my right eye causes me to sin, you have to cover yourself, and man and women are not al-lowed coming together. Possible conflicts are to be prevented by an-nulating any possibility for their occurance beforehand. Here only one example, depicted randomly from a flood of empirical exem-

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plas. The great mufti of Australia Sheikh Taj el-Din al-Hilali stated that women who did not wear a headscarf attracted sexual assault:

"If you take out uncovered meat and place it outside... and the cats come and eat it... whose fault is it, the cats' or the uncovered meat?"(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacif ic/6090136.stm , cited 30.09.2007).

One might object against that this was a solitary case which shouldn't be generalized. Besides, the mufti was immediately (after reports and protests against him) suspended after that slip. Neverthe-less mirrors his statement exact the logic of Orthodox Islamic affect regulation. A penetrate mechanism of religious organisation of the outside (behavioural as well as spatial) externalises the task of con-trol to the environment. By doing so, individuals are kept save from seduction that can cause disharmony in the community. This is, I think, one of the most important reasons for current Muslim testiness – one is tempted to say, there is too much "blaming the other", and no piece of "blaming the oneself". In traditional societies this kind of regulation might have functioned without raising resentment. If we keep it in mind that the global world and its mass societies which are immensely connected to each other by production, transport and es-pecially telecommunication (being exposed to each other inevitably), the question becomes extremely relevant how and at what costs this regime of externalizing regulates violence in the so-ciety.

3. Armed Conflicts: War, Terrorism - theological legitimacy at stake

Armed violence such as “holy war” or religious terrorism has given enormous drive to scholar's current interest on religious violence. Question at stake is the theological legitimacy of action.

In his article Is Religion the Problem? (2004), Mark Juergensmeyer sum up existing approaches on religion and violence in two contraire positions: The first one, by focusing practically on Islam, highlights martyrdom ideology, rich award in paradise (at least for men), lack of separation between politics and religion as causes of a specific proximity of Islam to violence. He, however, doesn't want to ap-

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prove to this statement since he could observe deadly relation in al-most all so-called world religions (2004: 4). Neither he is willing to support the others, who “deny that religion is the problem”, when [they] talk about religion being ‘used’ for political purposes.” (2004: 2pp.). Juergensmeyer actually is slightly simplifying this position. There is another version of it possible without any reference to "used":

“We are far beyond ideology and politics now. No ideology, no cause -- not even the Is-lamic cause can account for the energy which fuels terror. (...) Terrorism, like viruses, is everywhere.”. (Baudrillard 2002: 9pp.)

Similarly, other authors (mainly journalistic contributions) consider current religious violence as an expression of nihilism that is desig-nated as the specific temper of our time independent on religion (Kermani 2002). On the other hand, those who insist still on the reli-gious nature of this violence deliver explanations that are featured much more differentiated than this dual model pretends. The as-sumption of crucial religious (here: Islamic) dimension of terrorist violence (Meddeb 2002; Kippenberg & Seidensticker 2004; for an overview see Schulze 2007) does not mean in reverse that Islam would have to lead automatically to terror and violence. Juergens-meyer himself doesn’t consider religion as the primary cause of vio-lence; he moreover pins his hope to some degree on religion to pre-vent violence. But he remarks however that religion “brings new as-pects to conflicts that were otherwise not a part of them” (ibid.). These new aspects in the reading of Juergensmeyer are:

a) Personalization of conflict (personal reward, religious merit, redemption, the promise of heavenly luxuries); b) Vehicles of social mobilization; c) Organizational network of local churches, mosques, temples and religious associations; d) Legitimacy of moral justification for political encounter and even more for violence against state’s monopoly on violence; e) Image of cosmic war, an all-encompassing world view, a fight against evil; f) Demonizing of opponents, satanization and vision of a total victory, eternal battle.

Many of these aspects as touched on above can, as Juergensmeyer himself admits, apply without serious frictions to some other move-ments, too. Two points seem to me stimulating:

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a) Martyrdom and satanizations as strategies of a cosmic war: Al-though the communist movements have had also a similar “cosmic” vision, the difference which Juergensmeyer points out is: „A satanic enemy cannot be transformed; it can only be destroyed“ (2001: 207). For the disturbing character of the enemy is its form of live which insults God, not just what it says. At that point the religious violence shows some proximity to racist ideology - except the enemy con-verts that is impossible in racism. Here one can take the concepts of resentment and nihilism into account because those exactly are char-acterized by the exorbitance this sort of violence expresses. The re-sentful man cannot react equitable because he loosed any measured relation between guilt and punish (Brusotti 1992, especially pp.98). This type oscillates between guilty conscience and endless blaming the others. In that sense there is indeed an obviously coincidence be-tween resentment and transfiguration of worldly conflicts into a cos-mic struggle, into a last battle between good and evil. Abstraction from concrete case that can be principally bargained under specific conditions generalizes practical conflicts into homogen images. Therein lies specific danger resulting from religious implemented conflicts.

b) Performance Violence: As another specific marker of religious violence and terrorism is its performance to be highlighted (Juer-gensmeyer 2007). Term of performance stresses the fact that the aim of an action isn't primarily rooted outside of itself. Rather it is the "immanence of act” (s. Schulze 2007) that counts. Reference to “im-manence” takes our attention to the point that violence is designated not just by the strategic dimensions of act which is normally per-formed in order to reach certain goals outside of acting itself (e.g. to free Muslim countries from Western domination as claimed by Is-lamic militants). Of course, it would be misleading if one would deny the strategic implications of religious violence as it is always the case for other sort of violence. It is much more appropriated to say that the meaning of violence cannot be absorbed fully in that strategic dimension.1 Act interprets itself performatively and not pri-

1 Long before religious terrorism had appeared in the screen, Michel Foucault stat-ed as result of his observations on Iranian revolution (which he accompanied for

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marily as mediated through any external goal. “Performance of act”, “Hermeneutics of act” (Schulze 2007), violent act as “worship serv-ice” (Kippenberg 2004; Preuß 2002: 124) or as a “symbolic counter-gift” (Baudrillard 2002) which only answers to the “system”, all these conceptual offers (with different consequences) can help to discern a crucial point to understand the current (religious) violent: This is its excessive part which cannot be captured by the classical concepts of political analysis that still orient themselves on strategic action. The question of performance violence comes into appearance between violent fundamentalist groups on the one hand and religious Establishment on the other hand which is interested in control of re-ligious authority by making it rationally bonded. Before I present this inner religious conflict, a last remark could be of use: If the per-formance of violent act should have contained a goal (or goals) this goal seems me to be sought in the desire for purity which cannot be perceived as a goal outside in the common sense. This term also al-lows connecting to the former levels of analysis with each other. Violence is expected to perform purity that brings it in the neigh-bourhood of worship. Firstly, sacrifice of warrior is supposed to abolish disharmony in the community; secondly the act purifies the individuals in a worshiplike act which is to be performed in a pure state of body (see the Manual of suicide attackers, Kippenberg 2004); finally, the violence destroys the enemy which had brought impurity in the world (in all that: a curing violence).

To take up the difference between religious Establishment and ter-rorists again: Violence puts namely the very question of the authori-ty on the agenda: Who is permitted to call for action? Who might be able to define what and who brings impurity in the community, in what case Moslems are obliged to care for purity and in which prop-er way? Such questions which affect immediately the authority structures are inevitable because “curing” violence threats simulta-neously the community by directing against some community mem-bers as well as other countries.

an Italian newspaper) that at this very historical moment a new understanding of revolution must be worked out. Not a party, not a strategic program is the very marker of this revolution but the act in itself as its aim. (s. Stauth 1991)

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Between Self-empowerment and Rationalization by Establishment

As it is the case in the Bible the Qur'an contains too several explicit references to violence. In case of warfare one finds contradicting commandments which, according Firestone (1999), can be classified as followed:

• Verses expressing nonmilitant means of propagating or defending the faith (e.g. 6:106; 15:94)

• Verses expressing restrictions on fighting (e.g. 2:190; 2:194)

• Verses expressing conlict between God’s command and the reac-tion o Muhammad’s followers (e.g. 2:216; 3:156)

• Verses strongly advocating war or God’s religion for detailed in-formation (e.g. 2:191; 2:193; for more information see Firestone 1999: 69pp.).

As a result of that variety each party (proponents as well as oppo-nents of violence in the mind of God) can fell to be equipped with proper ideological munitions. Is the analysis confined exclusively to the question whether the Qur'an (and the Islam) prescribes violence, one will find oneself immediately in the middle of a struggle.A proper alternative to better understand current religious violence was above presented with reference to Schulze (2007). The term of Self-empowerment draws the attention to changes ongoing in the “re-ligious field” for last 20 years in general, not confined to Islam. As Schulze (2007) pointed out, the self-empowerment causes heavy problems in the religious field because it immediately comes in quarrel with the institutional authority within Islam. Schulze contin-ues by directing the attention at two main traditions within Islam: a) a rather moralistic approach following the commandment to stand up against injustice, to provide the justice immediately by active behav-iour; b) the other position rather preferred by lawyers to better bear the injustice than to cause disharmony in the community. Here we can build a bridge from the debate on religious violence to the broader debate on fundamentalism. Modern fundamentalism (Marty 1991; Riesebrodt 2000; for a case study on Turkey: Tezcan 2003)

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actually is distinguished by its moralistic drive (with regard to content) and immediate access to the scripture (with regard to method). It skims over the instances of traditional authority. In issues such as suicide attacks and jihad dissent becomes much more relevant.Although it was due to apparent sympathy among Muslim popula-tions a very risky affair, large parts of religious Establishment could finally push for a decision to condemn terrorist suicide attacks com-mitted by Muslims in the name of Islam. Arguments expressed in fatwas of leading religious authorities against religious violence re-volve around the questions: In what cases is the violence permitted by religion?; What forms of violence are to be considered as legiti-mized?; Who is authorized to decide for legitimacy of a violent act? Each one of these questions contains contradicting answers. Let me give shortly some exemplas randomly picked up.Saudi Arabia’s grand Mufti formulated the Islamic position to terror (31 January, 2004): “Jihad was made lawful not to shed blood or o take revenge but as a kind of worship of God and one of the reli-gious duties for defending the Islamic nation.” (www.IslamAgainstTerrorism.com). Let me dwell on this statement that is of paradigmatic relevance of the inner Islamic struggle.Lawful, as that argument elsewhere comes into play too, means, first of all, the war to be declared by a legitimated authority. Contraire position is that the jihad, resistance, in the moralistic version appears as a personal duty for each individual. Also the position to be men-tioned that the religious and political authorities have lost their legitimacy from several reasons (e.g. by allowing American soldiers on the holy soil of Islam).Lawful means also to not attack innocent civilians, non-combatants, women and children. Here too, counter-positions claim also legiti-macy in the name of God. Either by referring to other historical ex-emplas or verses from Qur’an or by classifying cases in a differenti-ated scheme. For latter for example, al-Karadawi, the international prominent Islamic scholar from Qatar considers the suicide attacks of Palestinians against Israeli civilian as lawful because these “are militarized”. But the general possibility of exceptions has been al-ready available in the verse of Qur’an most referred by all Muslim participants of the debate:

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“Whosoever killeth a human being for other than manslaughter or corruption in the earth, it shall be as if be had killed all mankind, and whoso saveth the life of one, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind.” (Al-Ma'idah 5:32)

Fighting as worship on God means to fight without the feel of re-venge that would vitiate the fight in the path of God. Here too, the opposite position was expressed either. The manual of suicide at-tackers does not only claim as a verbal statement but also in its very structure to perform worship in the path of God (see the articles in Kippenberg 2004; for the manual see also Nerial et al. 2005).

There is an accordance in the debate, never before did the notion of the martyr (be it in the Sunni sense or in the Shiite sense) designate an act of self murder. Of course, there is a powerful concept of mar-tyrdom and we cannot ignore its belowed usage among Muslims. Even those who do not agree with fundamentalist violence could ac-cept the idea in general. In the classical concept of the martyr, the warrior is expected to sacrifice his life courageously and without hesitation. A promise of a good place in heaven might deliver the compensation for paying the ultimate price in a deadly game. For all the preparation for death, the classical understanding lacks some-thing which is essential for modern suicide bombers. Classical mar-tyr went into battle with huge degree of uncertainty. He had to face death but he was not allowed to kill himself deliberately; that is the preserve of God. The whole economy of belief depends essentially upon this unpredictability. If the warrior survived the battle he could gain the honourable status of “veteran” (ghazi). The classical con-cept of the martyr makes no sense without this status of veteran, which indicates the radical randomness of human fate. Here the fear of hubris does play an enormous role. This is a mighty God who watches carefully over His competency for which no-one dares to compete. This is the reason why traditional scholars (clerics) were unwilling to unambiguously bless suicide bombings, even though it was for long time difficult also to give a clear condemnation due to the positive resonance among some parts of Muslim populations (es-pecially in case of Palestine in which suicide attacks rather could be considered as legitimatized). Not even the manual for suicide bomb-ers did ever adressed the suicidal nature of attackes (Nerial et al. 2005: 7).

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Suicide bomber, however, takes matters into his own hands. On his way to God he negates every possibility of contingency. With a radi-cal self-empowerment, if we may dare a highly speculative thesis; in an act from absolute trust in God he paradoxically trusts not even in God because God is incalculable. God never guarantees the death in the fight. The modernity of the suicide bomber is based on his desire for a certainty and security that would not have come easily in the so-called pre-modern world. The suicide bomber disposes of own body and fate in a sovereign gesture. Actually, in a certain way he mirrors exactly the sovereign gesture by which the superpower presents its power by transcending international arrangements and law. Suicide bombers deactivate even God, actually take over his place. This is why the religious Establishment in large parts damns the suicide bombing. Such a total self-empowerment not only endan-gers security of Muslim countries but also undermines the political and religious authority who is assigned with to watch over. Is here a parallel to Nietzsche’s thesis at the end of Genealogy of Moral that the resentment as a cultural tool of priest aims to prevent the second, the ultimate type of nihilism, that self destroying sort of it (Ni-etzsche 1999 [Vol. 5]: 411? Intellectual control not only of killing but also of dying is the source for power and legitimacy of priest, also for the Islamic clerics in the service of “State apparatus” that now has been challenged by a “nomadic war machine” to use a ter-minology of Deleuze and Guattari. Two questions seem me to be important: a) Who will be able to collect and convert the rage of young generations of increasing pour populations into action (Sloterdijk 2006)?; b) what does it mean for international politics as well as for integration politicies in European countries? Here I will deal only with the second question since the first one requires more empirical researches.

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4. Religion and Governability - Accountability at stake: a) National Level: Religion as Agent of Integration; b) Global Level

A. National Level: Religion as Agent of Integration in the Age of Multiculturalism: Integration at stake

Albeit with different weight depending upon each national integra-tion regime, multiculturalism generally has gained more or less a key position in political debates within national societies – security aspect always as a significant part ot them. Until religion did appear as the most important security risk, multicultural approaches on inte-gration hadn't pay any specific attention to religious actors. In ac-cordance with two processes, i.e. emerging significance of religion among migrant self-understanding and new security challenges due to religious violence, some European governments are heading on for sometime now to work out new programs that aim to include re-ligious actors as main partner of integration and security policies. Since I already conducted analyses elsewhere to come to term with this religious turn in integration and multicultural policies (Tezcan 2007) here I am not going into detail. Different from politics of re-pression regimes, the liberal power technologies identify existing power relations within a milieu, interference with them and perform impact to this milieu by leading the specific shape of community to a certain direction. Foucault called it security dispositif (2004) that fits well to our case because integration policies are becoming a sup-porting pillar of security politics. In current integration policies some European governments are going to perform this policy by governing via community (term coined by N. Rose 1996). By the fostering of responsible communities, the society will be vitalised and the social justice maximized.

"Individuals are to be governed through their freedom, but neither as isolated atoms of classical political economy, nor as citizens of society, but as members of heterogeneous communities of allegiance." (Rose 1996: 41)

Actually we have to do with a local translation of the global concept of clash (and dialog) of civilisations that wants to respond to ten-

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sions of multiethnic composition. Parallel to restrictive regulations a politics emerged to support religious identity in order to provide structures among Migrants from Muslim background which are ex-pected to become accountable. In this context Islamic identity is go-ing to be affiliated as a crucial tool in the integration policies and be-coming a common denominator for issues of Migrants of Muslim belief. Let me present outlines of this shift along two empirical cas-es:

A first and most apparently step seems to be taken by the British of-ficials. At the beginning of 2000s there were riots in several British cities (Bradford, Oldham and Burnley) and as cause was the lack of community coherence agreed (2001). After September 11 and finally Londoner terror attacks in 2005 the government coordinated in co-operation with mosque associations and other Muslim representa-tives of Britain an ambitious project, „Preventing Extremism To-gether. Working Groups“. Muslim partners express their claim for a shift in the integration policy very clear:

„The central question is where faith sits alongside other identities in the context of public policy. How and why is faith as important, or more important than race, when understand-ing and planning responses to needs of British Muslims. (...) It is important that sites where faith-based communities gather, including places of worship, have the capacity to function as a resource to the local community, including members of all faiths.” (PET - WG 2005: 47)

The aim of the project reads: “Locating community needs around mosques and encouraging them to function as community centres”. Parallel to the re-definition of community the problems have to be addressed either in a new dress. Classical social problems such as unemployment and education have been approached as social prob-lems of Muslims. Contents of problems don’t change significantly but they now are to be articulated in the discourse on religious iden-tity which is considered as both cause and and solution of security lack. Not race or class is expected any more to designate addresses of integration policy but faith - whereas to be asked whether it is bet-ter to say that faith (and culture) will stay henceforth for race.British Government took several measures to back and evaluate the program. Leadership Development Project for example aims at proper teaching of Imams; Womens's Voices is supposed to strength position of womens in local communities; Bradford Citizenship Ma-

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drassas Project's goal is “to develop a chitizenship curriculum to supplement traditional Qur'anic training for 8-13 yr olds, promoting British citizenship and acceptance of key shared values” (PVE . WHM 2007: 10). It is not needed here to present more exemplas. I prefer rather to draw the attention to the ways to further foster reli-gious identity among migrants which differs from classical types of prevention: 1) “To promote links between Muslim communities here and overseas to develop joint projects to support the promotion of shared values and to tackle violent extremism” (ibid.); 2) Among the title “Supporting and nurturing civic and theological leadership” government offices and local government are called to support “ac-tivities that promotes Islamic awareness amongst Muslim communi-ties and local communities widely” (PVE – PF 2007: 10). For politi-cians one of the reasons for security problems consists obviously of weak religious awareness of young people who could be attracted by extremism. At that point the government practically takes over the common position of conservativ religious groups (be it Muslim or not) that in the society outside and without religion criminality and moral decadence would dominate. Consequently the profound tool of figting against extremism is described, government should help religious instituions and organisations “(to) be able to connect to young people, address their needs and concerns”, as the expertise of Department for Communities and Local Governemnt formulates it (Choudruy 2007: 33).

Another example for governing through religion can be found in the experiment of German Ministry of Interior “The German Confer-ence on Islam” (GCI). The program started 2006 and will be ending presumably in 2009. Underlying idea is to work out arrangements in order to tackle better with problems triggered by demographic change, tendencies of ghetto building, religious radicalism. Similar to new strategies in Great Britain and Netherlands this political pro-gram aims also to shape the religious field in specific way – but not so much offensive as in the British case. Actually German govern-ment seizes on the longstanding interfaith dialogue between Chris-tian churces and Muslim organisations and wants to transpose this preform of inclusion of Islam into accountable relationship with op-erative results. As a matter-of-fact the interfaith dialogue has pre-

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pared the ground on which Muslim groups (even though groups known as fundamentalist) could become more socially acceptable. Interfaith dialog remained however for long time a marginal issue. Since the religion appeared as a public power partielly with violent dimensions, dialogue is now being considered as part of a general integration and security politics. Its most significant expression can be explained in the coalition aggreement whereby dialogue is placed there in chapter VII. Security of Citizens:

“We will conduct an intensive dialogue with the main Christian churches, Jews and Mus-lims. Interfaith and intercultural dialogue is not only an important part of politics of inte-gration and political education; it serves too to preventing racism, anti-semitism and ex-tremism. Especially dialogue with Islam plays an important role in that context. This dia-logue can only success if we integrate young Muslims socially and professionaly.” (Koali-tionsvertrag... 2005, 137)

There is no doubt that religious organisations naturally feel strong interest to sum individuals along their religious belonging. Their pri-mar interest within the GCI consists upon the desire to restrain de-bate (and work of gathering at all) to issues of institutional represen-tation that could be resolved by legal regulations. Government on the other hand insists of that integration of Islam cannot be dealt with as merely a juridical arrangement. The problem for the govern-ment turns out much more to cooperate with organisations about se-curity and integration which on the contraire are conceived as prob-lematic in their political and cultural orientation. Most apparently becomes this problem in the discussions circle within GCI “Islam-ism and Security” where Milli Görüs (IGMG) which regulary is ob-served by German Intelligence Service participates in. Government sought to master this ambivalence partially by organi-sational means. GIC covers three Working Groups: 1) German So-cial System and Value Consensus; 2) Religion in German Constitu-tion; 3) Economics and Medya as Bridges. Additionaly there is a lower leveled circle „Islamismus and Security“. Each Working Groups consists of four types of participants: First group covers rep-resentatives of Muslim organisations; second group contains mainly “individualists” who are popular migrants of Muslim background in different areas; thirdly are there scientific observer and finally (fourthly) representatives of government. The Category of individu-alists plays mainly the role to give a counter-weight to organisations.

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To support and curb the power of Muslim organisations, this seems momentally the core of strategy deployed within GCI. GCI is still under construction, finally too early to draw significant conclusions. Concrete work has been done actually on the local lev-el and such experiences have been by now picked up by GCI. To give an example, “Confidence Building Measures”, so called is an aggreement made 2005 between two Muslim Umbrella Organisa-tions (DITIB and ZMD) on the one hand and BKA (Federal Crimi-nal Police Office) and BfV (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) on the other hand. Mosque associations and security offices cooperate in order to build up an early warning system against extremist and violent tendencies among Muslim migrants. Federal Conference and police dialogue with Muslim organisations are not the only strategy Germany Government follows with regard to control of violence in long term. Several arrangements that have existed already (before focusing on religious violence) are going to be revalueted as part of control policy. Role ascribed to Imam gains in importance (Malik 2005). To conclude: German inclusion of reli-gion into the general integration policy oscillates between body (support) politics and fear of “parallel lives”; at last glance it oper-ates to some degree subdued in comparison to offensive community supports of British government. Common to both, however, is to ac-tively include Muslim groups and Muslim identity into the struggle against violenct extremism. Appearance of religion as risk fosters (seemengly) paradoxially the attraction of religion. Migrant turns out to be first and foremost Muslim. Social integration is getting to par-tially become an integration in the modus of religion what some crit-ics called “confessionalization of integration policy” (Malik 2007). Even organisations such as Turkish Community in Germany that never before had dealt activily with religious issues are meanwhile going to compete over resourses avaible in support programs on dia-logue with Islam. It happened further within the context of support-ing religion that the so-called group of “Secular Muslims” constitut-ed itself as stimulated by the Minister of Interior W. Schäuble.

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B) Global Level of Regulation: Geostrategy at stake

Genealogy of the very up-to-dated term “moderate Islam” doesnt go much far back. We have encountered it already impicitely within na-tional politics as described above. Effective support is naturally promised to “moderate Muslims”. Much more explicitely does this category appear on the geopolitical level. To define what “true” Is-lam is can be in principle only a matter of inner Islamic competition as well as islamic competence as officials keep stressing too. Never-theless, we could observe how governments feel obliged to intercede indirectly (by funding, including, education etc.) into the battles over how the “true” Islam is to be understood. To put it into the govern-mental language, the “true” Islam reads as the appropraited Islam, that is to say: “moderate Islam”. Current US-global strategy counts in large parts on this figure (e.g. USAID - Outreach 2004:). Its crite-ria have been defined in the report “Moderate and Radical Islam” submitted by RAND National Security Research Division (RAND – MRI 2005) as following:

“Their preferred forms of government (do they seek to establish an Islamic state or are they willing to accept secular forms of government?); their political and legal orientation (do they insist on the application of Islamic or sharia law, or do they accept other sources of law?); their attitudes toward the rights of women and religious minorities (do they deny women equal rights, including the right to political participation? Do they support the education and advancement of women? Would they allow freedom of worship?)“ (S. 2).

In an earlier RAND report (RAND - CDI 2003) Cheryl Benard at-tributed not only the modernist Muslims but also traditionalists (with some hesitation due to their overlapping with fundamentalism) who could help to create proper and authentic Islamic arguments against violent fundamentalism. Similar hints are contained in governments “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism” (NS – CT 2006) by the goal “Win the War of Ideas”.It is well-known that it is not the first time that USA does search for allies among Islamic groups. However, current politics of alliance with Islam differs to some degree substancially from the former politics of supporting the mudjahiddin and taliban during the Cold War Periode. Now much more stress is being done on theological is-sues (s. also Mahmood 2006: 331). Saba Mahmood mentions that this policy is mainly supporting modernist and secularist Muslims by opposing against traditionalists and fundamentalists. I would like

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to contest his thesis because support policies are now partially going to a further stage than Mahmood assumed. Not any more the modernists in the classical sense (represented by popular figures such as Persian Sorusch, Arab Hassan Hanefi or German-Arab Bassam Tibi) are the only or the key figures supposed to create changes in the Muslim culture. Rather orthodoxe traditionalists as well as new mixtures of sufism and orthodoxy seem to be held for appropraited allies for winning of hearts and minds in the battle against terrorism. To give two prominent exemplas from Turkish context, the Turkish premier Tayyip Erdogan and the at present US-resident Fethullah Gülen, sheik of a brotherhood, are figures of the so-called “moderate Islam” which is dealt with as the new model for theological and political re-configuration of Muslim world.2 Among many others support of a “think tank on moderate Islam (UK), “workshop for Islamic political activists” (Algeria), : Training of madrasah teachers” (Mali), “workshop for Islamic political activists; restoration of two ancient mosques (Egypt), „construction of three Islamic elementary schools; promotion of Islamic FM radio (Ugan-da), „inter-mosque sports tournament (Madagascar)“, „restoration of Hala Sultan Tekke, holiest site for local Muslims (Cyprus), „work-shop for Islamic political activists (Turkey)“, Restoration of 11th-century Abu Sakhyt Abul Khaira shrine (Turkmenistan)” etc. to be mentioned (David E. Kaplan 2005). Although such support raised by times some scepticism among officials since American constitution doesn't allow proactive religious policy, the battle for “moderate” Is-lam still continues. Discussion over implications stays out, though.

2„Fethullah Gulen puts forward a version of Islamic modernity that is strongly in-fluenced by Sufism and stresses diversity, tolerance, and nonviolence (...). His writings have inspired astrong multinational following and have proven attractive to young people.“ (RAND – CDI 2003: 38). Very recently the Economist on March 6th 2008 reported over Gülen as a key figure of moderate Islam. Gulen movement was also co-organisator and topic of an international conference hosted on the House of Lords (http://gulenconference.org.uk/).

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5. Conclusion

In my contribution I have draft an analytical concept to give an over-look about control of violence via religion. Hereby, not only out-standing are reflections upon systematic connection which should be assumed between these (four) levels of nexus between religion and violence. Consequences even from each level of analysis need still to be drawn in particular.

In what sense intercommunal regulation via sacrifice affects ethical techniques of self-control, that seems to stay an comlicated issue that needs to be dealt accurate with. Momentally relevance of this subject seems to extend to two directions: Sacrifice's meaning yields (with-out disapperaing) on the one hand to a competition for being the real victim. On the other hand can the question be asked whether as in form of suicide bombers the practice of human sacrifice comes back in a hidden way.

There is similar lack on reflections upon ways and concequences of self-regulation via religious ethics. Especially with regard to Islam – despite the huge amount of research – is this subject still waiting for due interest. Due to its relevance for control of violence is caution to be used because one has to do with an ambivalent issue. Ethical technique that operates by exernalizing the self-control mainly upon environmental mechanisms (by the means of covering the vomen, separating the space, and banning the unpermitted behaviour) fuels rage against those who can be the source for seduction and against practices that would delude believer. Shari'a in its both sense (juridi-cal law as well as way of life) is supposed to regulate in that way. At the same time therein lies a specific way of control of violence ei-ther. Religious class appaers an important powerful instant that can be appealed on. It seems to me, religious violence has paradoxially strenghted the position of religious class and organisations.

Exact this ability of religious clas let them come into consideration for governmental politics – both on the level of national integration policies and on the geopolitical level. As well as governmental poli-cies focus strengly upon the task to control violence and to prevent

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terrorism, religious identity of migrants becomes core of political at-tention and religious organisations as the most attractive partners. That is why dialogue could advance to the main pattern of communi-cation with migrants of Muslim background. Same does appear on the international level where finally the concept of Hungtington's concept of different civilisations interacting with each other serves as guideline.

Liberal politics in its multiculturalist version (Staut 1999) is based upon the assumption that everyone respects difference in the same way which means basically: by avoiding violence. The question is now how far or even whether liberal politics is able to problematize the consequences that result from cultural practices (Islamic as well as Christian) that indeed in a specific sense help to control violence whilst on the other hand cultural basis of liberal society is challenged by those practices.

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