JOURNAL OF MULTI-CRITERIA DECISION ANALYSIS

J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. 8: 28–30 (1999)

Rejoinder

PAUL GOODWINa and GEORGE WRIGHTb,*a Department of Mathematical Sciences, University of the West of England, Frenchay, Bristol BS16 1QY, UKb Strathclyde Graduate Business School, 199 Cathedral Street, Glasgow G4 OGE, UK

ELICITING VALUES: A SYNTHESIS OFVIEWS

We are grateful to all of the discussants for theircomments on our paper. As might be expectedfrom a well-organized group process, we havegained new insights and greater clarity from theirdiscussion and suggestions.

The most frequent comment made by the dis-cussants is that the application of decision analy-sis should not follow a linear process—moving,without recursion, through a series of neat stages(Bana e Costa and Costa-Lobo, Beinat, Buchananet al., Fishburn, Phillips, Pearman). We have nohesitation in agreeing with this. Indeed in ourtextbook (Goodwin and Wright, 1998, p. 16) westate ‘Although we present (the analysis) as aseries of stages, the decision maker is always freeat any point to return to an earlier stage, or tochange the definition of the problem. Indeed, it islikely that this will happen as a deeper under-standing of the nature of the problem is gainedthrough the analysis’. It is unfortunate that ourdiagram created the impression that we were rec-ommending a linear process. Instead, it was in-tended to represent the broad phases that theanalysis might pass though, but it was certainlynot intended to preclude returns to earlier phasesat any time. We think that the view of a decisionas a complex web of influences with each elementinforming the others (e.g. alternatives informed byattributes and vice versa) (Saaty, Beinat,Tsoukias) is important. In the light of thisBuchanan et al.’s view that decision simulationshould sit among value elicitation and optioncreation rather than precede them is attractive—though of course one has to start somewhere.

Most discussants agree that, when used on theirown, conventional value elicitation methods donot enable decision makers to explore what it

would be like to experience the consequences ofparticular courses of action. There is also generalagreement that this problem, and the associatedproblem of goal discovery, is not confronted inmany MCDA applications and there is often arush to specify alternatives and criteria too early.Several discussants suggest other approaches, ei-ther as complements or alternatives, to our deci-sion simulation proposal. These include cognitivemapping (Bana e Costa and Costa-Lobo, Shoneret al.), soft systems methodology (Daellenbachand Nilakant, Schoner et al.), Rokeach’s valuesurvey (Schoner et al.) and metagame and hyper-game analysis (Schoner et al.). We would alsomention the ‘frame analysis worksheet’ of Russoand Schoemaker (1989) (see Goodwin andWright, 1998, pp. 349–351) for a summary of thisapproach to generating options). While we cer-tainly recognize the value of these methods andsee them playing an important role in helpingdecision makers, our emphasis is on trying toenable the decision maker to develop visions ofthe future as ‘living’ holistic experiences. We fearthat this may be lost if the process moves tooearly into the abstract representation of the prob-lem as a model or if the problem is decomposedtoo soon into separate elements. Atherton pointsout the cognitive problems that could be associ-ated with stimulating the imagination in a deci-sion simulation while Daellenbach and Nilakantdoubt whether decision simulation could be im-plemented in a given practical situation. Tsoukiasconsiders the approach to be too simple given thecomplexities of the decision task. While theseproblems may ultimately prove to be overwhelm-ing, we think that it is certainly worth exploringthe idea further at this stage. The purpose ofwriting our paper was to develop the skeleton of aresearch agenda for an underdeveloped aspect ofdecision aiding in multiattribute choice—that ofvalue formulation.

Phillips argues that the decision problem de-scribed in our preamble would have been tackledmore successfully if ‘the very different approach’or requisite decision modelling approach had been

* Correspondence to: Strathclyde Graduate BusinessSchool, 199 Cathedral Street, Glasgow G4 OGE, UK.E-mail: wright@sgbs.strath.ac.uk

CCC 1057–9214/99/010028-03$17.50Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Accepted 5 No6ember 1998

REJOINDER 29

adopted. We have always found the idea of requi-site decision modelling to be useful and we seedecision simulation as complementing, ratherthan acting as an alternative to, this approach.Our worry is that without decision simulation,developing and iteratively revising a decisionmodel on its own may yield insufficient insightswhen one is faced with a personal consequentialdecision. As a result, the unease of the decisionmaker for the model cannot be resolved and theconvergence to a requisite model cannot beachieved.

Phillips points out the presence of an indepen-dent and skilled decision analyst is required forrequisite decision modelling. We agree withAtherton and Bana e Costa and Costa-Lobo thatthe presence of such an individual would also behighly desirable if decision simulation is to beused effectively. Of course independent analystsare also a key element in therapy and counselling(indeed Fischhoff, 1980, has drawn analogies be-tween decision analysis and psychotherapy) andFishburn asks whether this approach would notbe preferable for stressful career decisions. Inter-estingly, the applied area that is most prolific inthe academic discussion of choice and values isthat of career counselling and vocational be-haviour research. For example, as we pointed outin our paper, Gati (1990) argues that feeling posi-tive about uncertainty is a necessary first step toimproved career choice since it will tend to en-courage the client to seek out new experiencesand, in the process, discover a desired goal. Deci-sion simulation may provide such experiences andit may be possible to implement it within a coun-selling framework.

Schoner et al. ask why Keeney’s techniques forvalue generation failed in the career choice prob-lem. There are, we think, two possible reasons forthis. First, we feel that for personal consequentialdecisions, the techniques proposed by Keeney aresomewhat underdeveloped. Simply asking your-self ‘what you would like to achieve in this situa-tion’ or ‘if you had no limitations at all whatwould your objectives be’ are really little morethan exhortations to think hard. The second rea-son is, of course, March’s idea that we discoverour values by doing and experiencing. Indeed, wewere interested in David’s point that Priestleymade his decision to say ‘yes’ only after havingexperienced what it was like to say ‘no’. Theremay be other ways of encouraging the decision

maker to focus intensely on the consequences of adecision. One approach suggested by Jungermann(1997) for decision makers with two options in-volves the simple device of tossing a coin. One ofthe options is associated with the outcome ofobtaining a head and the other with a tail. Amental commitment is then made to follow what-ever option the outcome indicates. The idea hereis that, when faced with the prospect of beingforced to choose a particular option one’s mind isconfronted with the reality of this prospect and aclear perception of one’s preferences emerges.Point-of-death experiences may also induce clarityof values. Almost invariably they evoke an en-hanced valuation of human relationships and ademotion of professional and material ambitions(Loewenstein, 1998).

Several discussants point out that the choice ofmodelling method is an important, but often ne-glected, element of MCDA (Schoner et al.) andthat the use of the SMART approach in thecareer choice problem may have been inappropri-ate (Saaty, Pearman). While we agree with thefirst point and have some sympathy with thesecond we doubt whether this was the crux of theproblem here. As we indicated above we believethat the key problems arose in the pre-modellingphase, or to be more accurate, in the neglect ofthis phase. Pearman argues that SMART is ‘es-sentially a tool for choosing at a sub-strategiclevel . . . where the score/weight uncertainty is nota key concern.’ So, is SMART simply appropriatefor choice amongst options that have little conse-quential impact to the decision maker? We thinknot. Theoretically, SMART is equally applicableto personal consequential decisions. However,Fishburn argues that, in such cases, values are‘more or less immutable’ (i.e. are already formedand crystallized). Academic studies (e.g. Jensenand Bergin, 1988; Singh, 1989; Somerman, 1993)also support the notion that basic values arefixed—or at least only evolve slowly during thecourse of a lifetime. Perhaps three types of valuesare implicated in personal choice:

(i) values associated with relatively inconsequen-tial choices (e.g. choice of a personalcomputer);

(ii) values associated with consequential choicesthat evoke fixed basic values (e.g. the choiceof whether to risk one’s own life for that ofone’s child);

Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. 8: 28–30 (1999)

REJOINDER30

(iii) values associated with other consequentialchoices such as the career choice problemdiscussed in our paper.

Finally, we have no problem agreeing with anumber of other sensible suggestions that thediscussants make such as the possibility of usingother people’s experiences to form an idea of whatthe consequences of a particular choice will belike (Bana e Costa and Costa-Lobo, Atherton)and the desirability of developing contingencyplans in case the wrong choice is made (Pearman).

Overall, we hope that our paper and the viewsof our discussants will prompt others to analyseand develop the application of multiattribute deci-sion analysis to personal consequential decisionproblems so that a latter-day Joseph Priestleywould be better supported in his career choice.

REFERENCES

Fischhoff, B., ‘Decision analysis: clinical art of clinicalscience?’, in Sjoberg, L., Tyszka, T. and Wise, J.

(eds), Human Decision Making, Bosafers: Doxa,1980.

Gati, I., ‘Why, when and how to take into account theuncertainty involved in career decisions’, J. Couns.Psychol., 37, 277–280 (1990).

Goodwin, P. and Wright, G., Decision Analysis forManagement Judgment, 2nd edition, Chichester: Wi-ley, 1998.

Jensen, J.P. and Bergin, A.E., ‘Mental health values ofprofessional therapists: a national survey’, Prof. Psy-chol.: Res. Pract., 19, 290–297 (1988).

Jungermann, H., ‘When a coin is in the air’, WorkingPaper, Department of Psychology, Technical Univer-sity, Berlin, Germany, 1997.

Loewenstein, G., ‘Because it is there: the challenge ofmountaineering for utility theory’, Working Paper,Department of Social and Decision Sciences,Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA (1998).

Russo, J.E. and Schoemaker, P.J.H., Confident DecisionMaking, London: Piatkus, 1989.

Singh, B.R., ‘Neutrality and commitment in teachingmoral and social issues in multi-cultural society’,Educ. Re6., 41, 227–242 (1989).

Somerman, F.B., ‘Value, attitude and belief determi-nants of willingness to accept a facility for the home-less’, J. Soc. Distress Homeless, 2, 177–192 (1993).

Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. 8: 28–30 (1999)