Reification and the Sociological Critique of Consciousness

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Wesleyan University

Reification and the Sociological Critique of ConsciousnessAuthor(s): Peter Berger and Stanley PullbergReviewed work(s):Source: History and Theory, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1965), pp. 196-211

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REIFICATIONAND THE SOCIOLOGICALCRITIQUEOFCONSCIOUSNESS

PETER BERGER and STANLEY PULLBERG

Sociologicaltheoriesmay be groupedaround two poles. The firstpresentsus with a view of societyas a networkof human meaningsas embodimentsof humanactivity. The second,on the otherhand, presentsus with societyconceivedof as a thing-like facticity, standing over against its individualmemberswith coercivecontrolsandmoldingthemin its socializingprocesses.In otherwords,the firstview presentsus with manas thesocial beingand withsociety as being made by him, whereasthe second view sets society as anentity over and against man, and shows him being made by it. It would bemisleading o describe hese two viewsas, respectively,"individualistic" nd"collectivistic".The differencebetweenthem is rather that between seeingsocietyas the incarnationof human actionsand seeingit as a realitywhichhumanactivityhas to takeas given.'If, for example,we pursuetwo classicalformulationsof these two typesof sociological heorizing,namely hoseof Weberand of Durkheim,t becomesclearthat whatis requireds a comprehensiveerspectivewhichencompassesbothby showing heir nterrelatedness.Certainly ociologydeals with realitiesthat aretaken as given- withdata,in the literalsenseof the word. It is thisaspect of sociologicalunderstandingwhich Durkheim's ormulationbringsout. However,sociologywill only accomplishts task if it studiesnot merelysuchgivenessbut the variousprocessesof becominggiveness.The confronta-tion of the Weberianand Durkheimian ormulations annotbe resolved byconstructinga highly abstractedifice which can seeminglyhouse both, butat thepriceof losingtheproblematics utof whichthetwoformulations rose.The point is not to prove pre-establishedharmoniesbetween all possiblesociologicalformulations. Rather one must take seriouslythe objectivityof socialexistence n its relatednesso humansubjectivity.Thisposesa funda-mentalproblemof sociological heorizing:Howis it possiblethat subjectively1 Weberand Durkheimmaybe taken astypicalof thesetwo poles of sociological theorizing.The polarity, however, s not simplybetween these two. The sociologicaltheoriesof Simmeland Mannheim, or instance,maybe placedclose to the "Weberian" ole, those of structural-functionalism n Anglo-Saxon "culturalanthropology"and sociology close to the "Durk-heimian"pole.

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REIFICATION AND SOCIOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 197intended meanings become objective facticities? Or, to use terms appropriateto the aforementioned theoretical positions, how is it possible that humanactivity (Handeln) should produce a world of things chasess)? This problem,however, is difficult to deal with in either Weberian or Durkheimian termsonly, because these always refer to one or the other pole of what is a cpmpre-hensive process involving both poles in an inextricable interrelatedness. Ifwe understand this process as involving both subjective productivity andobjective product, men producing society and in turn being produced by it,then our theorizing will be propelled towards formulations of this dialecticin its totality. Indeed, it will become necessary to understand society as adialectical process.2

It is as a result of such considerations that we believe in the usefulness forsociological theory of certain Marxian categories as well as of insights derivedfrom the phenomenological analysis of social life. This does not imply anydoctrinaire commitment. It is important, rather, to show how sociologicaltheory can be enriched by streams of thought coming from outside the socio-logical tradition in the narrower sense. We are especially interested in thisin terms of a sociology of knowledge understood as a centrally importantsegment of sociological theory dealing with the relation between consciousnessand society. Furthermore,we would like to show how dialectical and phenom-enological perspectives can be usefully combined in an understandingof humansociality.

We shall use the Marxian concept of reification (Verdinglichung)for anexercise in the sociology of knowledge understood in these terms. We are notconcerned with an exegesis of Marx or with a history-of-ideas treatment ofthe later development of the concept. However, while our concern is system-atic rather than historical, we feel obliged to give at least a brief outlineof the history of the concept of reification. After this, we shall proceed to ourown theorizing, hopefully freed from the burden of historical gratitude. Thereader who is familiar with this conceptual development and with the relevanttechnical terms may decide to skip the historical section immediately following.As we have implied in our introductory emarks, he concept of reificationmakessense only withina dialecticalperspective. Hegel madeit clear that the dialectic spreciselythe experience hat consciousnessmakes with itself. The Hegelian notionof experience,as developed n The Phenomenology f Spirit,encompassesnot onlythe dialecticalmovement hat consciousnessmakes in its knowledge,but also in itspraxis. It is this "all-encompassingness"hat makes of the Hegelianphilosophythemost ample philosophical otalization hat we know of. In the HegelianphilosophySpirit objectivates tself, alienates itself and recovers itself without respite. Thedialecticalmovementthat consciousnessundergoes n itself, as much in its knowl-edge as in its object, is preciselywhat is termedexperience.Therefore, he dialecticis, for Hegel, the mannerof thinking hat is designed o overcomeall forms of rigidly2 An analogousformulationmay be found in Jean-PaulSartre,Critiquede la raisondialec-tique(Paris, 1960),107.



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198 PETER BERGER AND STANLEY PULLBERGoppositionalthinking- it is the attempt to think being and thinkingtogether. Al-though Hegel never uses the specific term reification(Verdinglichung),t is quiteclear that reification akes placeat everystage in the historyof consciousnessas thatform of immediacywherein he object s experienced s an "in itself" over andagainsta subject. The historyof Spirit s the historyof Gestalten f consciousness,wherebynaturalconsciousnessmakes the experienceof the inadequacyof its reificationalthinking,and is drivenon to evernew andhigher evelsof thoughtformson the roadtowardthat typeof absolutethinkingwhereby he completedialecticality f thinkingand being is made fully manifest n their completeunity. Therefore, or HegelSpiritrealizesitself throughand as its own properhistory: Man exteriorizeshimselfandloses himself in the things- in the loss the thingsare positedas "in-itself-others"onlyto bereturnedo himself n thought. All alienation,anditsattendant eificationalthinking, s surmountedn the absoluteknowledgeof the philosopherwhereinSpiritis fully transparento itself and knows itself in its othernesswhile remainingwithitself.3The protest of Marxagainst the Hegeliansystem,out of whichthe conceptof reifi-cationused in this articlearose,takestwo forms, the firstan existentialprotest,andthe seconda protestagainstHegel'sallegedconfusionof objectivation nd alienation.In the Economic-PhilosophicanuscriptsMarxcriticizesHegel for havingmade ofthe actual and concreteways to be of man "momentsof motion". Thus, our an-guishes, our suffering, he contradictionswhich make for our real and existentialalienationbecome in the Hegeliansystem dialecticmomentswhich are posited inorderto be transcended "moments, xistencesandmodes to be of man, whichhaveno valuetaken in isolationor apart, whichdissolveand engenderone another. Mo-mentsof movement".4Thus, Marxstates, in theirreal existencethe mobileessenceof manand his products s hidden; this only appears n thought,in philosophy. Aslived-through, he human and its objectivationsare, in the Hegelian perspective,reifications,and this is why Marx accuses Hegel of confusing objectivationwithalienation, and confusingreificationwith objectivityas such. From this point ofview the Hegeliantranscendentaldealismbecomesa mystificationn that the onlymannerof de-reifications thought, in that the dialecticis only truly realizedasknowledge.5Just as much as Marx will denouncethe absorptionof man into thoughtforms,sotoo he will denounce he alienationof man in an objectivistic cientismwhichexpli-catesmanby natureandthereby oses sightof the fact that, one, there s not a naturewithouthumansignification,and two, that scienceitself is a humanproduct.6In asocietyof commodityproduction,which results n the quantification f the concretequalitiesanddeterminationsf theobjects,manproducesanaturewhich s a miathemat-ically expressiblemanifold. This is a reificationwhich finds its expression n anautonomousscience,namely politicaleconomy. The social realityexpressed n thispoliticaleconomyis a realitywhereinman is relatedto his fellowmenonly via themediationof the commodity. The latter is an externalthing whichseparatesmen

The expositiongivenhere constitutesan extremedistillationof whatis a difficultandrichargumentpresented n The Phenomenology f Spirit. For furtherelucidationcf. AlexandreKoj6ve,Introduction la lecturede Hegel (Paris, 1947);Jean Hyppolite,EtudessurMarx etHegel (Paris, 1955); Carlos Astrada, Hegel y la dialectica(Buenos Aires, 1956).4 Karl Marx,Die FruehschriftenStuttgart,1953),279. Our translation.5 Cf. Marx,op. cit., 248 ff.6 This formulationmay also be found in Hyppolite, op. cit., 112.



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REIFICATION AND SOCIOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 199as at thesame time it artificially nitesthemas functionsof theautonomous conomicsystem. Labor, for example,becomes not the world-producing ealizationof thehumanacultiesof man,but a thing,a powerto be boughtandsoldon a quantitativelyevaluatingmarket. This is theessenceof Marx'sconceptof thefetishismof commod-ities. It is very important hat this is not misinterpreted s a rigid economic deter-minism. As a matter of fact, the Marxiantexts point to economic determinism shaving its roots precisely n the fetishismof commodities.7It follows that there are two aspectsof reification n Marx'sthought. Thefirstis theautonomizationof objectivity n unconnectednesswith the humanactivity by whichit has been produced. The second is the autonomizationof the economic whichmakesthing-relations f the humanrelationsof production. Both these aspectshavebeen developedin later Marxistthinking.8 However,we think it is importanttounderstand hat the autonomizationof the economic is paradigmatic f the auton-omizationof the whole rangeof social relations. This is clearly brought out in theanalysesof both GydrgyLukacsand Lucien Goldmann. In otherwords,therearenot only fetishized ommodities,but there s also fetishizedpower, etishized exuality,fetishized tatus. Justas the fetishismof commodities indsits theoretical xpressionin a reifiedpoliticaleconomy (or, to use a morecontemporaryerm for this science,in reifiedeconomics), o the other speciesof fetishizationare theoreticallyormulatedand therebymystified n reifiedpolitical science,reifiedsociology,reifiedpsychologyandevenscientisticphilosophy. As we shall showin moredetail later,these theoret-ical reifications epresentourknowledgeof ourselvespreciselyas reified,andtherebyexhibit the tendencyto perpetuateand legitimatethe pre-theoretical lienationandreification.How can the concept of reification be used in a general sociological critiqueof consciousness, without the polemic and utopian trappings that have oftenaccompanied it? We shall now proceed to give our own tentative answer tothis question. First of all, however, it will be necessary to clarify some keyterms in our argument, namely the following - objectivation, objectification,alienation and reification. This is especially important in view of the polemicuse often made of the latter two.

By objectivationwe mean that process wherebyhumansubjectivity embodiesitself in products that are available to oneself and one's fellow men as elementsof a common world. This process, we must emphasize from the beginning, isanthropologically necessary. It has its roots in the fact that human subjectivityis not a closed sphere of interiority, but is always intentionality in movement.That is, human subjectivity must continuously objectivate itself. Or, in otherwords, man is a world-producing being.

This is developedmost fully in the first volume of Das Kapital.8 The most importantrecent developmentof the concept of reification s that by GybrgyLukacs n his GeschichteundKlassenbewuisstsein(Berlin,1923). Since the Germanedition iscurrentlydifficult to obtain, see the French translationby Kostas Axelos and JacquelineBois, Histoire et conscience de classe (Paris, 1960). See also Lucien Goldmann, Recherchesdialectiques (Paris, 1959), 64 ff; Sartre, op. cit., passim; Joseph Gabel, La fausse conscience(Paris, 1962). The last work is particularly mportantfor the psychologicaland psychiatricramificationsof the concept, but is beyond our presentscope.



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200 PETER BERGER AND STANLEY PULLBERGBy objectificationwe mean the moment in theprocess of objectivation n which

man establishes distance from his producing and its product, such that he cantake cognizance of it and make of it an object of his consciousness. Objectivation,then, is a broaderconcept,applicable o all humanproducts,materialas wellas non-material. Objectifications a narrowerepistemologicalconcept, re-ferringto the way in which the worldproducedby man is apprehended yhim. Thus, or instance,manproducesmaterial ools intheprocessof objectiva-tion which he then objectifiesby means of language,givingthem "a name"that is "known" o himfrom then on and thathe cancommunicateo others.In the same way, of course,non-materialproductsbecome part of human"knowledge".The fact that objectification lso appliesto those segmentsofreality namely,"nature") hatmanhasnot himselfproducedneednot interestus in this argument.

By alienation we mean the process by which the unity of the producing andtheproduct s broken.The productnow appears o the produceras an alienfacticityand power standing n itself and over againsthim, no longerrecog-nizableas a product. In otherwords, alienation s the processby whichmanforgets hattheworldhe livesin has beenproducedby himself. It is especiallyimportant o insist on this definitionbecauseof the conceptual haosbroughtabout by a psychologisticmisunderstandingf alienation. To say that manis alienated s not the same as saying that he is "anomic"or that he feelspsychologicallyestranged. On the contrary,some of the most importantexamplesof alienatedconsciousness an be takenfromthe magnificent omoiof humanhistory,such as the religious nterpretations f the human worldas merelya reflectionof a divineworld, the mythologicalmicrocosmthatprovideda near-perfectprotection to its inhabitantsagainstanomie- butdoing so, of course,in a processof alienation. Nor is it necessaryor evenlikely that an alienatedconsciousnesss subjectively xperiencedas psycho-logical conflict, anxiety or lostness. Psychological"health" s a function ofthe social situation. If the latter s defined n alienated erms,then only thosewho share this definitionwill be psychologically"healthy". For instance, na society that understandsts institutionsas an interactionbetweendivineand demonicforces,an understandingf these institutions n othertermsislikely to be alliedwith a psychologically"unhealthy" ondition or will leadthere f heldon to stubbornlyn the face of the sociallyacceptable xplanationsof the world.

By reification we mean the moment in the process of alienation in which thecharacteristicof thing-hood becomes the standard of objective reality. That is,nothingcan be conceivedof as real that does not have the character f a thing.This can also be put in differentwords: reificationis objectification n an alien-atedmode. If reification s thus linkedto alienation, t becomesclear that itis applicableonly to humanrealityand its products. It is applicable o theworldas a total meaningstructureand to all momentswithin it. The world,



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REIFICATION AND SOCIOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 201insofar as it is a human world, is always socio-historical in character. There-fore, any social or historical phenomenon may be reified. It need not be, how-ever. This points up an important difference between the first two and thesecond two of our four key concepts. Objectivation and objectification areanthropologically necessary. A priori, human existence cannot be conceivedwithout them. Alienation and reification, however, are defacto characteristicsof the human condition. They are not necessary to it a priori. While this mayseem a fine distinction, its importance will, we hope, become clearer a littlefurther on in our argument.Having thus explicated our key concepts, we can ask quite simply: Whatdoesit mean that man produces a world?

Man is always directed towards that which is other than himself. That is,he is object-directed. That is, again, he is an acting being. To act means tomodify the figure of the given in such a way that a field is structuredwhich,to the actor, constitutes a meaningful totality. This totality is the presupposi-tion for any particular meaningful action within it. In other words, the totalityis broken up into finite provinces of meaning, each of which is the scene ofparticular types of action. While man, as an acting being, is constantly engagedin structuring the world as meaningful totality (since otherwise he could notmeaningfully act within it), this process is never completed. Totality, then,is neverafait accompli, but is always in the process of being constructed. There-fore, the term totalization can be applied to this meaning-building process.9The world, then, is the result of action, of man totalizing his experience ashe engages in action.

Now, the human enterprise of producing a world is not comprehensibleas an individual project. Rather, it is a social process: men together engagein constructing a world, which then becomes their common dwelling. Indeed,since sociality is a necessary element of human being, the process of worldproduction is necessarily a social one. Man the world-builder and man thename-giver are possible only as manifestations of man the social being. Everyhuman society can thus be understood as a world-building enterprise, that is,as world-building human activity.

The reality of such a world is given neither in itself nor once and for all.It must be constructed and re-constructed over and over again. That is, theworld must be continuously realized, in the double sense of this word, asactualization and as recognition. To put this a little differently, the worldremains real, in the sense of subjective plausibility and consistency, only asit is confirmed and re-confirmed. This, again, takes place in a social process -the world must be confirmed and re-confirmed by others. Just as the worldcannot be constituted by the individual in isolation, so it is not inhabitableby the individual in isolation. Being in the world means, for man, being in the9 Thistermservesas the key conceptof Sartre's bove-quoted ork.



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202 PETER BERGER AND STANLEY PULLBERGworld with others. This follows inevitably from the insight that the world isproduced by means of a human enterprise that is social in character. As aproduct, this world possesses expressivity, that is, it manifests the intention-ality of those who produced it. Because of this, it is possible for others tounderstand this world, that is, to understand the intentionality of those engagedin building or having built this world.What does this mean for that part of the world we call social structure? Thisis not difficult to answer, on the basis of the above considerations. Socialstructure is a part of the objectivated, the produced world. Social structurationis part of the human enterprise of totalization. It follows, then, that socialstructure is nothing but the result of human enterprise. It has no reality excepta human one. It is not characterizable as being a thing able to stand on itsown, apart from the human activity that produced it. Any specific socialstructure exists only insofar and as long as human beings realize it as part oftheir world. In this capacity, however, social structure is essential to humanexistence. A priori, social structure can be understood as an expansion of thefield within which life makes sense to the individual - even more than that, asthe constitution of such a field, providing new modes of meaningful actionfor the individual. A priori, a social structure is an open horizon of possibilityfor all its members, a medium for the production of a world, while at the sametime it is itself a produced moment of that world. Clearly, the relationshipjust described is a dialectical one. That is, social structure is produced by manand in turn produces him. In sum, man produces himself as a social beingthrough social structure.

We would emphasize the a priori character of the propositions just made.We have tried to give a description of the essence of human objectivation asa social process on the level, so to speak, of pure possibility. Very differentpropositions emerge as we look at man's de facto situation in the world. Onthe level of pure possibility, social structure provides an open horizon forman's ongoing world- and self-realization. On the level of actual historicalexperience, social structure functions pretty much as the opposite of this,namely, as a narrowing of the horizons within which life is allowed to makesense. Social structureis encountered by the individual as an external facticity.It is there, impervious to his wishes, sovereignly other than himself, an alienthing opaque to his understanding. Furthermore, social structure is encoun-tered as a coercive instrumentality. A social fact can be recognized, as againsta purely individual fantasy, by the fact that it resists the individual. Societyconstrains, controls and may even destroy the individual.10 Through itsagencies of social control, society surrounds the individual at each turn. But10 We have intentionallyused almost verbatimDurkheimian formulationshere in orderto stress the point made in our opening remarks. These formulationsare developedmostfully in Les regles de la mithodesociologique.



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REIFICATION AND SOCIOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 203through its agencies of socialization, society also penetrates into the con-sciousness of the individual, molding the latter into a socially desired shape.Thus, for instance, society as law coerces the individual from without, societyas conscience coerces him from within. Finally, this pervasive regulativefunctionality of social structure takes on an almost automatic character. Ifsocialization has been successful even to a degree, the individual acts withinthe socially prescribed channels with a minimum of reflectiveness. Indeed,it is possible to argue that social structuremust provide these taken-for-grantedregulative channels unless it is to collapse into chaos, with social institutionsin their unreflected automaticity serving as a substitute for the biologicallygiven instincts in which man is relatively underprivileged."

The external, coercive and automatic character of social structure can bereadily seen by looking at any of its institutional complexes - say, the family,the economy or the state. But it can already be seen in the most fundamentalsocial objectivation of all, in language. Here even an ideologist, who willinterpret the aforementioned three institutional areas in terms of, say, a God-given natural law, will probably concede that language is nothing but a humanproduct - or, at the least, that any particular language is. Yet language isexperienced by the individual as an external facticity - things are that as whichthey are named. And language regulates the individual in near-automaticfashion, forcing itself upon him with a minimum of reflection on his part, itfurthermore coerces him in many ways (from the educational system thatteaches him "correct" language down to the ridicule imposed on "incorrect"language by his peers) in the event that he has not learned his lesson fully.

What we have just proposed are commonplaces of sociology and socialpsychology. However, under the perspective presented here, they have far-reaching consequences, for if one accepts these propositions, then the de factoinstitutionalization of human actions and the institutional world producedthereby - that is, social structure- are seen to be a movement whereby humanactions are alienated from the actor. In other words, alienation and sociationare de facto linked processes. In the course of sociation (simply understoodhere as the ongoing realization of social structure) horizons are narrowedand human possibilities become non-human or supra-human facticities.Founded on this process there emerges a world that is taken for granted andthat is lived through as a necessary fate.

Anthropologically, this process is a paradoxical one. For we are in a situa-tion in which we express our world-producing essence in producing a worldthat denies this. That is, we ourselves produce the world from which we arealienated. This is important to bear in mind: however much alienation maymodify the results of our world-producing, the fact remains that it is we our-selves who are continuing to produce this world.12 As will be explained a little

Cf. Arnold Gehlen, Urmenschund Spdtkultur Bonn, 1956), 7 ff.12 Cf. Sartre,op. cit., 63.



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204 PETER BERGER AND STANLEY PULLBERGlater, this fact already ndicatesat least the theoreticalpossibilityof reversingthe alienatingmovement.13Alienation,to repeat, is a rupturebetweenproducerand produced. Itpreventshis recognition f himself n a worldhe has created. This worldnowexists in estrangedexternalityand he himself exists in estrangedexternalityfrom himself. These existentialcircumstancesound a consciousness f bothworldandself wherein he two areperceived s atomisticallylosedand mutu-ally exclusive.Thus,in producingan alienatedworld,the human s devaluedand a humanity s produced hat is characterized y inert objectivity.Thisconsciousnesss reifyingconsciousnessand its objectsare reifications.

Aswenowproceed o look morecloselyatthesocialphenomenon f reification,it will be convenient o distinguish etween hree evelsof consciousness.First,there s directandpre-reflectiveresence o the world. Secondly, oundedonthe latter,there is reflectiveawareness f the worldand one'spresence o it.Thirdly, out of this second level of consciousness here may in turn arisevarious theoretical ormulationsof the situation. We may, then, distinguishbetween he pre-reflective,hereflective, nd the theoreticalevel of conscious-ness. Reificationmay occur on the last two levels. It is important o stress,however, hat thefoundations f theoretical eificationie in the pre-theoreticalreification f the world andof oneself.Social situations providethe occasions by which certain expressionsarealienatedfrom the expressive ntention of theirperformerand are changedinto reifications.For example,a person performsa gesture,an expressionofsomeparticularntentionof his own, whichgesture s namedas an "uncouthgesture" by the other participant n the situation. In this designation hegesture s alienated rom the activeprocessof producing t as well as fromthe particularntention of its producer. It becomes an "uncouthgesture"in and of itself. The gesture s thus fixed in an inertobjectivityavailable oall, with a significanceonceivedof as belonging o it intrinsicallyather hanasexpressive f something lse. Thegesturebecomesreified, hat is, it becomesa thing-like acticityseparatedrom its humansource. Thus, ab initio,reifica-tion entailsa de-humanizationf its object.Butevenin analienatedand reifiedworldmancontinues o reflectand oftento formulateheoreticallyheresultsof his reflection.This happens,of course,upon the basis of pre-theoreticallienation.There is consequentlyproduceda totalization hat is itself alienatedand alienating.Moreover, his alienated13 Within the alienated and reifiedworldthere is a double structureof inertness,or better,practico-inertness Sartre):On the one hand, the world is producedas an inert objectivitystandingover and againstman; on the other hand, man produceshimself as an inert "piece"of this world. Gabel,in the workcited,insists on the non-dialecticality f false consciousness.Yet, false consciousness s a secondaryphenomenon n that it is founded on an existentialalienatednesswhichprecedesall reflection. Howeverreified,manmust never be ontologicallyequatedwith a thing. Reificationratherinvolves living as a man the condition of a thing.



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REIFICATION AND SOCIOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 205consciousness, both of world and of self, may be designated as false con-sciousness - false in the sense that the actual process by which itself andits world have been produced is forgotten. If this false consciousness achievesa theoretical formulation, the latter functions as a mystification (or, if oneprefers, as an ideology - though we would prefer to avoid this term in thepresent context). For instance, following up the previous example, if onereflects about a gesture as a defined inertness, one thereby calls into being areifying apparatus by which any gesture is no longer a specific expression ofthe others' or one's own life, but rather becomes a quality that serves to char-acterize the other or oneself in a typical and anonymous manner. That is,the world is divided into "couth" and "uncouth" people, who are "couth"or "uncouth" in the same way as tables are brown or grey. In this way, thereoccurs a reversal of the actual process: no longer is the gesture an expressionof the person, but the person is defined as the embodiment of an abstractquality of which the gesture is the symbol. Following this reification, a theoryof manners may arise that legitimates the division of humanity into "couth"and "uncouth" people, and which ongoingly mystifies what actually occursin concrete situations. On a further level of theoretical complexity, but stillwithin the same movement of reifying mystification, there may develop ageneral psychology that defines persons as embodiments of abstract qualitiesor states.

With regard to the theoretical level, it would be a misunderstanding toconceive of this level as nothing but a passive reflection of "underlying" socialprocesses.14 The theoretical formulations, rather, themselves become realmoments of our pre-reflective existential situation. Founded upon the latter,they act back upon it. Theoretical reifications, expressive of pre-reflectiveandpre-theoretical reifying consciousness, can themselves become reified, harden-ing into dogmas and cutting off the possibilities of the world as an expressivefabric. In this way, the theoretical formulations may fixate even more firmlythe reifying character of pre-theoretical consciousness.

For instance, one reifies action by saying that it is performed because (or,one may say - because of course) the actor is an X-type person. That is, X-type14 This misunderstanding s exemplifiedby Lenin's concept of "reflection"(otrozhenie),which attained the level of philosophicaldogma in official "dialecticalmaterialism" n theSoviet Union. The non-dialecticalcharacter of this concept is described excellently byAstrada n the following passage: "Toconsider he dialecticalprocess of knowledgeas a merereflection,copy or photographof real processes, of the developments hat take place in thedomain of nature, s to surreptitiously eify (cosificar) he fluidityof the processes hemselves,and to forget the structuralunity of subject and object that is supposed by the dialectic"(op. cit., 87 - our translation). The same non-dialecticalcharacterof dogmaticMarxism sexpressed in the utopian vision of the future, which is reified as a "future-thing" avenir-chose); cf. Simone de Beauvoir, Pour une moraled'ambiguiti(Paris, 1947), 165; Gabel, op.cit., 25. We cannot here enter furtherinto the question of the dogmatization of Marxismand its concurrent metamorphosisinto a reified ideology. Cf. Leszek Kolakowski, DerMenschohne Alternative Munich, 1960),7 ff., for one of the most incisive critiquesof thisprocess coming from within the Marxistcamp itself.



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206 PETER BERGER AND STANLEY PULLBERGpersonsperformsuch actions. Actions are perceivedas standingseparatelyfrom theirperformer.In other words,actions are conceivedof as roles andthe actor as an embodimentof roles. When one now reflectsabout theseperceptions, he world is seen as inhabitedby peoplewho not only performbut are embodimentsof roles. To put this a little facetiously,role-playingprecedes xistence or,evenbetter,replacest. If onenowgoeson to theorizeon the basis of this consciousness,one may develop a sociologythat regardsroles ratherthan people as the prime reality. Such a sociology effectivelymystifiesconcretesocial situations,but goes on to operateas a self-fulfillingprophecyby producingmore socialsituations n whichthis wholeprocessofreification an takeplace. It maythenevenhappenthat the worldconcoctedby this kind of theorizingbecomesthe taken-for-granted orld of everydaylife and even finds its expression n everyday anguage. No one exists anylonger,but roles interact n a sort of ectoplasmicexchange. The thief doesnot stealbut is playing herole of thief,thejudgedoes notjudgebutis playingthe role of judge,and(lastbutnot least)thecriminologist oes not understandeither he thief'sstealingor the judge's udgingbutis playing he roleof socialscientist. Such a world becomesthe trueworld as it is internalized s such.We thinkit probable, ncidentally, hat a few generationsof the teachingofthis kind of sociology maywell producesucha worldin certainmiddle-class,college-educatedtrata n America althoughat this pointreifyingpsychologyis morepopular n these circlesthan reifyingsociology).15Generallyspeaking,reificationoperates n society by bestowingontologicalstatus on social roles and institutions. Roles are reifiedby detaching hemfrom human intentionalityand expressivity,and transforming hem into aninevitabledestinyfor theirbearers. The latter may then act in the falsecon-sciousnessthat they "have no choice"- because hey are bearersof this orthatrole. Concreteactions thenbecomemere mimeticrepetitionsof the pro-totypicalactions embodiedin the roles. This reificationof roles may takeplace irrespectiveof the degreeof "civilization"of the society in question.The primitivewho sleepswith his wife mimes the prototypicalaction of thegodsin creating heuniverse "ultimately"t is not he but thegods who createlife. The executionerwho kills his victimmimestheprototypical ction of thegods,of abstract usticeorof the state n upholding ightandpunishingwrong"ultimately"t is not he but these abstractions hat engagein killing. Thebusinessmanwho operatesapart romhis personalconvictionsand sympathiesin his businessactivitiesmimesthe prototypicalactionsthat may be thoughtto dwellin some Platonic heavenof economic abstractions "ultimately"t15 It must not be thought that this criticismextendsto George H. Mead, the most importantfigure n the developmentof role theory. Mead effectivelyprotects himself against this sortof reificationwith his (we would argue) dialecticalunderstanding f the "I" and the "me".Cf. George H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago, 1934).



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REIFICATION AND SOCIOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 207is not he who is doing business but the economic system is conceived of asacting throughhim. The reificationof roles, on all possible levels of sophistica-tion, thus produces a quasi-sacramental world, in which human actions donot express human meanings but rather represent, in priestly fashion, varioussuper-human abstractions they are supposed to embody. Religious, ethicaland "scientific" theories are then called upon to legitimate and further mystifythe de-humanization that has occurred.16

Institutions are reified by mystifying their true character as human objec-tivations and by defining them, again, as supra-human facticities analogousto the facticities of nature. The family, for example, ceases to be a humanenterprise and becomes a re-enactment of prototypical actions founded, say,in the will of the gods, natural law, or human nature. The deviant from theseinstitutionally defined courses of action may thus be perceived, and therebytheoretically annihilated, as one who offends against the very "nature ofthings", against the "natural order" of the world or of his own being. Thushe who, in one society, denies the "natural" superiority of men over women,or, in another society, the "natural" superiority of women over men, is notonly a moral monster but a demented being who denies what is self-evidentto every "normal" person. The horror with which "sexual perversion" isstill regarded today may serve as a good illustration of the power of reification.The substitution of psychiatric categories of "mental illness" for the "unspeak-able crime" of English common law hardly mitigates the harshness of theo-retical annihilation. It cannot be our purpose here to supply a catalogue ofinstitutional reifications. Suffice it to point to such reifications as "the econ-omy", "the state", the nation", or "the revolutionary movement" to indicatethe very wide scope of the reification of institutions. Nor can we enter hereinto the question of the ultimate root of these processes, which we stronglysuspect to lie in some fundamental terrors of human existence, notably theterror of chaos - which is then assuaged by the fabrication of the sort of firmorder that only reifications can constitute. To follow these questions, however,would exceed the purpose of this argument.

The end result of the various reifications is that the dialectical process inits totality is lost, and is replaced by an experience and conception of mechan-ical causality. The relationship between human beings and society is under-stood as a collision between inert facticities. While in fact men produce societyas, at the same time, society produces men, what is now conceived of and actu-ally experienced is only a situation in which society produces men. For socio-logy, then, so-called sociologist represents reification on the level of theoreticalformulation. 716 Cf. Peter Berger, ThePrecarious Vision(Garden City, N.Y., 1961), for a discussionofthe ethical implicationsof this.17 Obviously, an intriguing ask would be the comparativeanalysis of different ociologicaltheories in terms of their proximity to or distance from this sort of sociologism. Equallyobviously, the compilation of such a catalogue is not possible here.



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208 PETER BERGER AND STANLEY PULLBERGReification,on all levels of consciousness, onvertsthe concrete nto theabstract, then in turn concretizesthe abstract. Also, reificationconvertsquality nto quantity. And, as we haveseen,theseconversions re functional

for the effectiveoperationof an institutionalsystem. The functionalitysperhaps seen most clearlyin the highly bureaucratizednstitutionalsystemin whichweexist n contemporaryociety,especiallyn termsof the conversionof quality nto quantity. But the fundamental eification f the concrete ntotheabstracts a cross-culturalndhistoricallyecurrent henomenon.Despiteall socio-historicaldifferences, here is a structuralcontinuitybetweenthetwentieth enturypersonwho reifieshimselfas "a representativef the corpo-ration", he twelfthcenturypersonwho reifieshimselfas "a lord and gentle-man",and theprimitivenjust aboutanycenturywhoperforms ssentiallyhesamereificationby perceivinghimselfas, say, "a Baluba", mplying herebya Balubaworld-view,a Baluba self and a Balubabiographydown to theminutiaeof conduct. It is not difficult o see how such reificationsmakefora smoother-running orporative system, a more firmly establishedfeudalsystemand a viabletribalsociety. Reificationminimizesherangeof reflectionandchoice, automatizes onduct n the sociallyprescribed hannelsand fixatesthe taken-for-grantederceptionof the world. Reification n this way comesclose to beinga functional mperative.In its end result,reification onvertsaction into process, which is preciselythe core of its social functionality.Inasmuch s this definesaction without heactor,or praxiswithout ts author,reifiedsocial processesare intrinsically lienatingand de-humanizing.It will be clearnow that, while we must continueto insist that reification snot an anthropologicalnecessity (in the sense that human being = reifiedbeing), t is stillthecase that reification onstitutes hedefacto realityof mostsocio-historical ituations. Also, it would be a mistaketo regardreificationas a chronologicallyater perversionof some originalstate of non-reifiedexistence(as in the pseudo-theological onstructionsof paradise, all andredemptionof vulgar Marxism)or even as a rarephenomenon n specificsocio-historical ituations as Marxhimselfat least tendedto do in his con-ception of reification n terms of the specificallycapitalistic "fetishismofcommodities").As we have tried to show, just becauseof its social function-ality, reifications a cross-culturaland historicallyrecurrentphenomenon.Moreover, ethnologyhas providedsufficientevidenceto lead to the beliefthat the earliesthumansocietiesareparticularlymassive n theirreifications.18Similarly,child psychologymakes plausiblethe suppositionthat reification

18 Relevantto this point is the work of LUvy-Bruhl,which, however, s ratherdated in itsethnological materialsand is theoreticallydebatablein terms of its extreme formulationsabout "primitivementality". For a recent discussion of these problemscf. Claude LUvi-Strauss, La pensee savage (Paris, 1962).



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REIFICATION AND SOCIOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 209is at least a stage in the biographyof the individual,as it is in the historyofthe species.'9What are the instances of de-reification, even within the general reificationempirically present in human history? We could simply insist here on thetheoreticalpossibilityof suchde-reification nd eavethe matter o anempiricalsociologyof knowledge or furtherresearch. We are preparedo go beyondthis expedient o the extent of pointing o three socio-historicalonstellationsthat, it seems to us, are conducive o de-reification.The first is the overall disintegrationof social structures,necessarilyen-tailing a disintegrationof their taken-for-grantedworlds. History affordsa good many examplesof how naturalor man-caused atastrophes hook toits foundations a particularworld, including its hitherto well-functioningreifying apparatus,bringing forth doubt and scepticismconcerning everything that had previouslybeen taken for granted. In such situations,rolesaresuddenlyrevealedas humanactions and institutionsas humanlyproducedmontagesfor these actions. Examplesof such catastrophicdisenchantmentof the world neednot be limitedto modem westernhistory,but can be foundin the ancient societiesof Egypt, India and China. Such "timesof troubles"or ''axialtimes"can be very conducive o a rediscoveryof the worldas anopenhumanpossibility.20Secondly, situationsof culturecontact and the ensuing"cultureshock"can also produce a de-reifying mpulse,even if they are not followedby anoverall disintegrationof the socially constitutedworld. Culturecontact ofany intensitytends to lead to a crisis in "knowledge",as one is confrontedwith alternativeways of perceiving he worldand orderingone's life withinit. Whether he contacttakes the form of waror trade or migration, t bringsabouta clashof worlds, n ancienttimes expressedmost readilyas a clash ofgods. Evidently hereare differentpossibilitiesof developmentafter such aclash, ranging from promiscuoussyncretism o violent xenophobicretreat.In any case, however,culturecontactwill have weakened he reified ixednessof the old world. An importantexampleof this is affordedby the historicalpart played by urban centers n the mixingof peoples- and thereby n themixing, looseningand frequentlyhumanizingof these peoples'worlds.2'Thirdly,wewouldpointto thede-reifying roclivityof individuals r groupsexisting n a stateof socialmarginality. Suchmarginalitymay be chosenorinflicted,and it may take a large number of different ocial forms- ethnic19 Cf. the work of Piaget on the developmentof the world of the child.20 For a critiqueof these conceptsof Toynbee'sand Jasper'srespectively, f. EricVoegelin,Orderand History(Baton Rouge, 1957), II, 19 ff. In this work Voegelinemploys the verysuggestive erm "leap n being" to denote the radicaltransformation f the world to be foundat such moments of history.21 For a brief statement of the role of culture contact cf. Ruth Benedict,"The Growth ofCulture" n HarryShapiro, ed., Man, Culture,andSociety (New York, 1960), 187 ff.



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210 PETER BERGER AND STANLEY PULLBERG(e.g., "guestpeoples"),religious e.g., hermitsand asceticswithdrawingromsociety),moral e.g., the marginalworldscreatedbycrimeand vice) or political(e.g., politicalelites). It would not be difficult o develop the theme of de-reification y analyzinghe viewsof worldandsociety to staywith theabovecases, of EuropeanJews as expressed n their contributions o intellectual"debunking"movements, ndianreligiousasceticismn its radicaldevaluationof the world of everydayife as illusion,criminalsandprostitutesof differentsocio-historical ituations n their clear-eyedperceptionof the social dramain which they are often close to the sardonicMachiavellianperspectiveofthose located at the levers of powerin the society. These few examplesmayalso makeclearthat such marginalitymay actuallybe soughtby individualswith precisely hemotiveof penetratinghe false consciousness f their societythat mayhave becomerevealed o themas a resultof one or anotherbiograph-ical accident.22The sociologyof knowledge s a discipline hat has existedon the marginsof bothsociologyandphilosophy,as is well illustratedby the work of Schelerand Mannheim.On the one hand, the critiqueof consciousnesshas beentheprovinceof philosophy,while on the otherhand,the empirical nalysisof thesociallocation of consciousnesshas been the provinceof sociology and othersocial sciences. However,the comprehensiveperspective hat we spoke ofin our introductoryremarksdemandsthe cooperationbetween sociologyandphilosophy.This is not a matterof eclecticism,but follows withnecessityfrom the problematicsof the two disciplines hemselves.Philosophyhas the propensity or solitude, systematicseclusionand dis-passionate elf-contemplation.This opposesit at the outset to the verywarpand woof of the ongoingworldin whichhumanrealityfinds itself. In thisway, philosophybecomesalienatedactivity,estrangedbothfrom manand hisworld. As such alienated activity, philosophyis "unpopular",pompouslypouring forth unintelligible ncantations. But philosophersare men andphilosophy s itself a humanproduct. As men, philosophers hemselvesaresociallylocated. Philosophyby its own true essencedoes not standoutsidethe world, but does so only as alienatedactivity. Philosophy s estrangedfrom itself in the very measureas man, whose expressionphilosophy s, isestrangedfrom himself. Philosophy,then, is super-structure hose roots,sub-or infra-structure,re in actual, concrete, iving,human ntersubjectivity.Therefore, hilosophyasrise de consciencef humanityHusserl)mustconcernitself with the dialoguebetweenman and world. Philosophy hus conceivednecessarilynvolvescritiqueof everydayife. AlfredSchutzand HenriLefebvrehave shownhow this philosophical ask can proceed n a phenomenological22 Twowell-knownexamplesof sociologicalanalysesof this sort of marginality re Simmel'swork on the strangerand Veblen'swork on the intellectualrole of the Jews.



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REIFICATION AND SOCIOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 211and a Marxian manner, respectively.23 An interesting task for the future isthe synthesizing of these two manners of philosophizing.

Sociology has the tendency either to be a narrow empiricism oblivious ofits own theoretical foundations or to build highly abstract theoretical systemsemptied of empirical content.24 Both these directions take sociology awayfrom that everyday life which is supposed to be the subject matter of thediscipline. Sociology too is super-structure,in the sense just explicated withregard to philosophy. That is, sociology is grounded in the pulsating intersub-jectivity of the real world of men. The de-humanization of sociology in eitherof the above-mentioned directions not only results in a pomposity as abstruseas anything the philosophers might conceivably produce, but marks the pointat which sociology has lost its own subject. A sociology which retains itsgrasp of itself and its subject matter must be an continuing clarification ofeveryday life. The fulfilling of this task entails a critique of consciousness,which is the very stuff of everyday life.

Therefore, the sociology of knowledge is not an optional entertainmentfor either philosophy or sociology. Rather, the sociology of knowledge re-presents an essential meeting place for the sociologist and the philosopher aseach is engaged in his own proper task, which is the illumination of the humanworld. A sojourn in this meeting place will protect both the philosopher andthe sociologist against that alienation from the human world which congealsboth their disciplines in an inhuman petrification. The analysis of reificationmade here may serve as an illustration of the possible sense of the meetingof the two disciplines in the sociology of knowledge.25New Schoolfor Social Research,New York(Berger)Ecole Pratique des HautesEtudes (Pullberg)

23 Cf. Alfred Schutz, CollectedPapers, I and II (The Hague, 1962-1964);Henri Lefebvre,Critiquede la vie quotidienneParis,1958-1961).24 Cf. C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination New York, 1959).25 The present writers, n collaborationwith three colleagues in sociology and philosophy,are currentlyengagedin the preparationof a systematictreatise n the sociology of knowl-edge, whichwill seek to move towardsthe theoretical ntegration ndicatedhere. The writerswould like to expresstheir gratitudeespeciallyto Thomas Luckmannand HansfriedKellner,colleagues in this project and partnersin a continuing conversationabout the problemstouchedupon in this article.

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Reification and the Sociological Critique of Consciousness