Refugees At Our Border...REFUGEES AT OUR BORDER THE U.S. RESPONSE TO ASYLUM SEEKERS "The U.S. screens people in south Texas and holds them in a detention center and repatriates them

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THE U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

ISSUE BRIEF SEPTEMBER 1989

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This report was written by Bill Frelick. It is based, in part, on a U.S. Committee for Refugees fact-finding tripby staff members Frelick and Hiram A. Ruiz to the Lower Rio Grande Valley, Texas (including Harlingen,Brownsville, Port Isabel, and Laredo) Matamoros, Mexico, and Miami, Florida in April 1989. It was edited byVirginia Hamilton and produced by Koula Papanicolas.

USCR is grateful for the important support it receives from The Ford Foundation, The Pew Charitable Trusts,The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The Joyce Mertz-Gilmore Foundation, The HermanGoldman Foundation, and The Sunflower Foundation. USCR is also grateful to many individual contributors.

Cover illustration: Christopher Bing

@ 1989 American Council for Nationalities Service

REFUGEES AT OUR BORDERTHE U.S. RESPONSE TO ASYLUM SEEKERS

"The U.S. screens people in south Texas and holdsthem in a detention center and repatriates them in oneday. They do the same to the people from Haiti on a boatoff the coast of Haiti. They pick them up, screen them onboard the boat, deny them refugee status, and then pushthem off Now why are the Vietnamese different?"Michael Hanson, Coordinator for Refugees, Hong Kong

Hong Kong has instituted a harsh detention policy andhas been widely criticized for threatening to forciblyrepatriate those Vietnamese boat people whom it deemsto be economic migrants. The U.S. government hasdeclared that it is "unalterably opposed to the forcedrepatriation of Vietnamese asylum seekers." Yet thequestion raised by a Hong Kong official to rationalizethat government's inhumane treatment of asylum seekerscontinues to haunt: "Why are the Vietnamese different?"

The United States, by its example, has been the leaderin establishing the world's standards for refugeeprotection. America's adherence to principles of dueprocess; its rescue of more than 800,000 Indochineserefugees in the past decade; its willingness to underwritefinancially the largest share of the costs incurred byintergovernmental agencies assisting refugees; itsreminders to both allies and foes that the rights ofrefugees need to be respected, all add up to an unrivaledleadership that has carried weight-political, economic,and moral-that the United States has brought to bear tosave lives and to see that justice was done.

However, a longstanding policy of interdicting andreturning Haitian boat people-as well as a policy morerecently instituted in south Texas of detention, quickasylum adjudication, and deportation for those thegovernment rejects-threatens to erode the moralauthority of the United States on behalf of refugeesworldwide. Faced with asylum seekers on our ownborder, our actions no longer match the ideals weespouse.

This report will examine the newest developments inU.S. asylum policy, as well as some of the continuingproblems, such as Haitian interdiction. We recommendthat readers looking for a fuller discussion of the historyand development of U.S. asylum policy refer to twoearlier U.S. Committee for Refugees publications:Despite a Generous Spirit: Denying Asylum in theUnited States (December 1986) and "The Back of theHand: Bias and Restrictionism Towards CentralAmerican Asylum Seekers in North America" (October1988).

BACKGROUND

A Change in Policy to Stem theInflux of Asylum Seekers

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)signalled a major shift in U.S. asylum policy inDecember 1988 by ordering the expedited adjudicationof asylum claims in the INS district in Harlingen, Texas,through which most Central American asylumapplicants had been passing upon entering the UnitedStates. The policy, in effect, made further travelimpossible by requiring that asylum applications beexamined at the office where they were first submitted.The essence of the plan was to make quickdeterminations of voluntary (the technical term is"affirmative") asylum claims on the same day as theywere filed. Extra INS examiners and support staff weresent to Harlingen for expedited examination of theapplications.

Before December 16, the INS office in Harlingen hadallowed asylum applicants filing there to travel onward,so that their cases could be adjudicated at other INSoffices, many of which are located in metropolitan areaswhere the applicants would have vastly improvedchances of finding legal assistance and support. Theprocedure, prior to the change in policy, had been forapplicants to affix their fingerprints to the 1-589 asylumapplications, attach the biographical data form(G-325A), and proceed to their destination within theUnited States. Fewer than one percent remained in theHarlingen area. More than half traveled to Florida, whileothers went to Los Angeles, San Francisco, Washington,D.C., Newark, Houston, and other cities, primarilyscattered along the eastern seaboard.

The reason given for the change was a dramaticincrease in the number of people, particularly CentralAmericans, applying for asylum in the United States.The Harlingen INS district office reported an average of2,000 asylum applicants per week in December,compared to 400 to 500 a week in June 1988. Thisincrease was attributed by some, at least in part, to anINS policy shift earlier in the year. Prior to the spring of1988, asylum applicants in the Harlingen area had beenrequired to remain "in the Valley" for the duration of thedetermination of their asylum claims. Since beingpermitted to move onward, from May 30 throughDecember 8, 1988, 27,122 asylum applications were

Refugees at Our Border 11Refuigees at Our Border

Border patrol officer processes young woman apprehendedin Brownsville. Hiram A. Ruiz

filed in the Harlingen district. Roughly half of thoseapplying were Nicaraguans, a quarter Salvadorans, 12percent Guatemalans, and 11 percent Hondurans.

An average of 1,000 asylum applications per weekwere being filed in Miami. The Miami INS districtoffice had a backlog of 50,000 applications, including35,000 Nicaraguans.

All told, 60,736 asylum applications were filed withINS district directors in FY 1988, as opposed to 26,107in FY 1987, and 18,889 in FY 1986.

But the number of those voluntarily coming forwardto apply for asylum with INS district directors tells onlypart of the story. Apprehensions by the Border Patrol areanother indication of the extent of the influx, andinclude asylum applicants not counted in the abovestatistics.

Apprehensions of Salvadorans in FY 1988 increased46 percent over the previous year. Apprehensions ofGuatemalans in FY 1988 increased 38 percent over FY1987. At the same time, however, apprehensions for allnationalities decreased by 18 percent, including a 32percent drop for Nicaraguans. The overwhelmingmajority of apprehensions (94 percent) continued to beof Mexicans.

Those who are apprehended by the Border Patrol donot have the option of applying for asylum before INSdistrict directors, but rather are able only to apply forasylum in the course of deportation or exclusionproceedings before immigration judges. Asylumapplications before immigration judges in deportation orexclusion proceedings include both those made byapprehended aliens who opt to apply, as well as byothers who have previously applied and been denied byan INS district director, who then renew their asylumapplications in the course of deportation or exclusionhearings. Immigration judges received 11,025 asylumcases in FY 1988. Salvadorans represented 4,385 of thisnumber; Hondurans, 361; Guatemalans, 756; andNicaraguans, 2,325. These statistics are limited to thenumber of immigration judges who report by computer.

Internal Policy Debate at INSand the Justice Department

The December policy shift had been brewing at leastsince the departure of former Attorney General EdwinMeese and his replacement by Dick Thornburgh.Officials in the INS and Justice were particularlyconcerned by the impact of a July 1987 memorandumfrom Meese which said that Nicaraguans with awell-founded fear of persecution would not be deported,and called for an expedited process for granting workauthorization to Nicaraguan asylum seekers. A series ofinternal INS memoranda in early December called forrecision or modification of the Meese directive. OnDecember 2, Associate Attorney General Francis A.Keating wrote a memo to INS Commissioner Nelsonentitled "Texas Border Situation." The memo expresseddeep concern at reports of large numbers of CentralAmericans, primarily Nicaraguans, crossing the bordernear Harlingen, and urged him to take immediate stepsto augment the Border Patrol presence to deter illegalentries, and to increase INS examination capability atHarlingen to make on-the-spot adjudication of asylumclaims.

Keating said that he would urge "a prompt recision ofthe August 1987 memorandum" establishing the specialNicaraguan program, which he called "a contributingfactor to the current situation."

A memo of December 5 from INS DeputyCommissioner James Buck directed INS staff to marshalarguments "which Keating may use to support theargument for recision of the Meese memo regardingNicaraguans."

The INS memorandum proposed a series of long- andshort-term measures to reduce the number of asylumapplicants. In addition to acting upon all asylumrequests in the jurisdictions where they are filed (the key

2 Refugees at Our BorderRefugees at Our Border2

policy change of mid-December), the short-termmeasures proposed included other changes: reviewingall asylum applications on a last-in, first-out basis;reviewing all asylum applications before granting workauthorization; and immediately communicating to INSfield offices that "the Meese memorandum of July 1,1987 [regarding Nicaraguans] does not requireautomatic granting of work authorization to asylumapplicants whose claims are frivolous."

Intermediate actions proposed in the memorandumincluded: using all possible detention capabilities;increasing border enforcement; requesting the JusticeDepartment to rescind its Nicaraguan deportation reviewpolicy; and pressuring the State Department to "securethe assistance of Mexico and Central Americancountries to slow down the flow of illegal aliens into theUnited States."

Suggested long-term actions included: charging feesfor asylum and work authorization requests; giving INSdistrict directors greater discretion in issuing workauthorization; identifying "carefully selected officeswhere asylum applications will be accepted"; andconsidering increased refugee processing in CentralAmerica. "Seek additional refugee numbers in this areaif needed," the memorandum suggests.

The December INS memo listed the expected resultsand benefits of these proposed changes, such as anoverall decline in work authorization, more expeditedasylum determination, and a reduction of caseload inMiami, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. Thememorandum stated, "The free ride which smugglersand their clients now have out of the Harlingen area willbe disrupted, if not stopped."

INS POLICY IN OPERATION

December 1988: The ImmediateImpact on South Texas

The immediate impact of the change of policy on theLower Rio Grande Valley was that the CentralAmericans, who previously continued to move out ofthe area, were now stuck with no place to live. The INSpolicy did not provide for a means to feed or shelterthose who would be forced to wait near Harlingen whiletheir asylum applications were pending. Soon after thepolicy took effect, the numbers of Central Americanasylum seekers in Harlingen-an economicallydepressed area on the southernmost tip of Texas-grew.Hundreds were staying in makeshift camps in fields,occupying abandoned buildings, and overwhelmingchurch shelters. Their living conditions becameincreasingly cramped, uncomfortable, and unsanitary.

Robert A. Wooten, Patrol Agent-in-Charge of theBrownsville Border Patrol sector, who supports thecurrent detention and deportation policy, recalled thesituation:

We were detaining no one. One hundred percent of theOTMs [Other Than Mexicans] were being put on the street.It was depressing to be a law enforcement agent, to see theresults of our work walk out the front door. How do weknow we weren't releasing criminal elements? It was anunhealthy situation for this country. People were camped invacant lots and in an abandoned, fenced-off motel. I wasn'tproud of what we were doing.

On January 9, the INS policy was stopped by atemporary restraining order issued by U.S. DistrictJudge Filemon Vela. That order freed hundreds ofCentral Americans to file their asylum applications inHarlingen and move onward to final destinations in theUnited States, where their claims would be adjudicated.

Judge Vela's order also presented a window ofopportunity for Central American asylum seekers;during the period of the temporary restraining order(with the cloud of a stricter enforcement policyoverhead), thousands of people rushed forward to applyfor asylum. Crowding at the INS office in downtownHarlingen became so bad that city officials responded byevicting the INS from its downtown office, citingviolations of health and fire codes. A state district judge,Robert Garza, prohibited the INS from reopeningfacilities in Harlingen "in such manner as to constitute anuisance and threat to public health and safety."

The way asylum applications were being filed had theappearance of a feeding frenzy. At the time, there was nocontrol over frivolous applications, and the systemclearly was open to abuse. Many of the applicationsfiled at that time were inaccurate or lacking ininformation upon which an asylum claim could bebased; some were even identical, filled out byunscrupulous middlemen. Taxi drivers taking people tothe INS office frequently filled out the asylumapplication forms.

The Central Americans themselves often had no ideathat they were applying for asylum. They often thoughtthe I-589s simply represented "permiso" to work andtravel. It is likely that among those who filed badapplications were genuine refugees who were not awareof what they were doing and who were never askedquestions relating to potential refugee status.

An immigration attorney in Washington, D.C. whoagreed to represent a group of Guatemalans fromHarlingen discovered after meeting his clients that theinformation on the I-589s was "identical and totallyfabricated." Now, said the attorney, "I need to tell theimmigration judge that the whole story is fabricated andexplain why my clients signed false asylum applications.It raises a serious credibility question." He said that the

Refugees at Our Border 3


judge is bound to ask why he should believe their storiesnow, when they already are on record as havingsubmitted false ones. Lawyers in Los Angeles said muchthe same thing.

Regardless of the abuses of the asylum system thatdid occur, at least the people who applied for asylum inJanuary and February were able to move on to Miami,Los Angeles, and other places where they would bemore likely to find work, have the support of family andfriends, and the assistance of legal counsel.

Miami-Melting Pot on the BoilWith the January 9 Temporary Restraining Order, the

cork that had created the bottleneck in Texas waspopped, and suddenly its contents-mostlyNicaraguans-poured into Miami, setting off a panicreaction in the local community.

Within a 48-hour period, several hundredNicaraguans arrived in Miami aboard Greyhound buses.The actual average rate of arrival of Nicaraguans andother Central Americans coming into Miami in Januarywas probably not much greater than it had been duringthe last six months of 1988. But it was more visible, andwas seen as a dramatic harbinger of things to come.Officials in Miami, with an estimated 100,000 to150,000 Nicaraguan exiles (as well as more than600,000 Cuban exiles and Cuban-Americans), werepredicting the arrival of an additional 100,000Nicaraguans in 1989.

The Miami Herald, which in a December 17 editorialhad declared INS's new get-tough measures (includingincreased apprehension and deportation of Nicaraguansand other Central Americans) an "immoral policy," onJanuary 13, ran a lead editorial, "The Crisis Upon Us,"which opened:

Within the next 48 hours, the droplets of Nicaraguansarriving in Miami will become a rivulet. Within days, thatrivulet probably will become a torrent. It has the potentialof swelling into a tidal wave that would engulf GreaterMiami, causing social and economic destruction moresevere than any American city anywhere has everexperienced.

In the wake of this widespread alarm over theimpending flood of Nicaraguan refugees, the shooting ofan unarmed young black man by a Hispanic policeofficer sparked rioting in Miami's black neighborhoods.The riots represented the boiling over of a host oftensions and grievances, but they were attributed, inpart, to resentment in some sectors of the blackcommunity to the Nicaraguan influx, and to thereception of the Nicaraguans by the City government.

The shooting and subsequent riots were reminiscentof events in 1980, when the shooting of another blackman during a chase (also in the wake of an influx of

Hispanic refugees, on that occasion the Mariel boatlift),led to rioting that left 18 dead and 400 injured. Whilepoor relations between the black community and thepolice force, particularly Hispanic officers, were onceagain cited among the causes of the rioting, the arrivalof the Nicaraguans (during the same week as a boat withHaitian refugees was interdicted and the Haitiansonboard returned to Haiti), the assistance offered to theNicaraguans, and the predictions of a further massiveinflux were also noted as triggers for the violence.

Exacerbating blacks'resentment of help given toHispanic refugees is their anger that Haitian refugees donot receive the same treatment. 'This community hasnot dealt fairly with black Americans and Haitians,"Dade County Commissioner Barbara M. Carey, co-chairof the Immigration Advisory Committee for DadeCounty, the County's only black Commissioner, told theUSCR team visiting Miami. "I'm not saying that's thecause of the riots, but it contributes to the frustration."

She said, "The black and Haitian communities see thetreatment of Haitians as totally unfair and unjust. Thereare very strained relations between ethnic communitiesright now. We feel that our govemment hasn't dealtfairly with black Americans or people from blackcountries."

The much-publicized arrival of the Nicaraguans onGreyhound buses also precipitated conflict not onlybetween local ethnic groups, but between localgovernments, as well. The City of Miami, with aCuban-born mayor and a much higher percentage ofHispanic residents than the county, welcomed theNicaraguan refugees and sought ways to assist them.The county, however, believed that the City was onlyencouraging more Nicaraguans to come. CountyCommissioner Carey said that while the county had noobjection to private efforts to help the refugees, shedidn't think that the City should take actions that wouldencourage Nicaraguans to think that they would be takencare of if they arrived in Miami. Both county and cityofficials were united, however, in pressing the federalgovemment for financial assistance to deal with theinflux.

Carey expressed her anger at the differentialtreatment of Haitians and Nicaraguans by federalauthorities. She said that the immigration law needs tobe applied fairly and equitably to all groups. "Don'tmake artificial distinctions." In Washington, she arguedthat if Haitians trying to enter the country are beingdetained, why aren't they detaining Nicaraguans? "Ourfirst objective is that they [Haitians and Nicaraguans] allbe released to families while a determination on theircase is made," said Carey. But, she added, if one groupis to be detained, then all groups should be equallydetained.

4 Refugees at Our Border


That, in fact, is just what INS is now doing.

Temporary Restraining Order LiftedJudge Vela's Temporary Restraining Order was lifted

on February 20. On that day, Nelson announced a newprocedure for detention and deportation ofundocumented aliens arriving in south Texas. Nelsonsaid, "We intend to send a strong signal to those peoplewho have the mistaken idea that by merely filing afrivolous asylum claim, they may stay in the UnitedStates. This willful manipulation of America'sgenerosity must stop." Nelson announced that theprocessing time for an asylum application in theHarlingen district would be reduced to a single day.

The plan unveiled on February 20 called for:

* increased Border Patrol activity, boosted by an increaseof 269 Border Patrol personnel;

* expeditious processing of asylum applications at the portof entry, marked by an increase of 74 INS adjudicatorsand support staff in south Texas plus a detail of about141 additional INS, State Department, and ExecutiveOffice of Immigration Review staff;

* issuance of OSCs [Order to Show Cause-contains thefactual allegations and the charges against the alien andinitiates the deportation process for denied asylumclaims; in it, the alien is required to show why he or sheshould not be deported], and, where applicable, WAs[Warrant of Arrest-written authorization to take anindividual into custody];

* the detention of undocumented aliens arrested in theLower Rio Grande Valley pending a determination oftheir asylum claims and completion of deportationproceedings, to be detained in INS facilities, or held incustody in other facilities in conjunction with otherfederal agencies;

* prompt hearings before immigration judges for the aliensto respond to the OSCs and to be given the opportunityto apply for or renew their applications for asylum, andto seek redetermination of the amount of bonds, as wellas conditions for release on bond.

* deportation for those found ineligible for asylum or otherforms of relief.

* making available additional detention space in INSfacilities in south Texas.

An INS document, "Enhancement Plan for theSouthern Border," on February 16, outlined "objectives"and "tactics" of the plan that would be unveiled laterthat week. The INS was aware of the public relationsside of the effort. The plan stated, "Mount an aggressive,proactive information campaign for the media, generalpublic, and Congress, both before and during enhancedoperations in south Texas. Make a clear case againstentry without inspection, even when followed by a claimfor asylum." The deterrent aspects of the INS plan hadto be weighed against possible negative public reactions."Maintain detention sites which are secure, yet sensitiveto harsh public scrutiny."

There was another component of the plan, however,that the INS had no intention of making public-the use

I.

ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN HARLINGENJune 1988-June 1989

8,000 -

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June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. March April

Note: Only afew asylum applications were actually filed in Harlingen between June and December 1988--an average of38 per month. The statistics inthis graph for that period represent the number of people who entered at Harlingen and picked up asylum applications, but who were allowed to filethem at other INS offices in the United States. Starting in January 1989, the statistics in this graph reflect the number who actually filed their asylumapplications in the Harlingen district. The drop in affirmative applications in March reflects the renewal of the detention and deportation policy, whenapplications had to be filed at the Port Isabel detention facility.

Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service

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May June


of asylum applicants as a source of intelligence on homecountry conditions. The document said, "A team ofdebriefers composed of special agents from theHarlingen District, Intelligence Officers, IntelligenceAnalyst(s) and clerical support will be on site at theprocessing locations. These personnel will developinformation on routes, availability of exit visas, theapplicants' perspectives on conditions in sourcecountries, major factors influencing their decisions toleave, socio-economic conditions, etc." The documentsaid that information collected by the INS would beshared particularly with the CIA, the DefenseIntelligence Agency, and the Department of State. Nothought was expressed in the memo to the possiblerepercussions for the asylum seekers of the INS givingto U.S. intelligence agencies information asylum seekersprovide in confidence to establish their refugee claims,nor on the chilling effect the knowledge of suchinformation sharing could have on their willingness tospeak forthrightly about their experiences and fears.

The Asylum Adjudication ProcessA month after the INS plan had been in effect, U.S.

Committee for Refugees staff traveled to south Texas tosurvey a cross-section of facilities that detain or shelterCentral Americans in INS proceedings in order to learnabout the process Central American asylum seekersundergo and to assess conditions of detention and theimpact of the INS policy on asylum adjudication. USCRinterviewed both those responsible for running each ofthe facilities visited, as well as the Central Americans inthem. USCR also observed deportation hearings at PortIsabel and Harlingen.

On paper, the asylum adjudication process set up bythe Harlingen INS district office to determineaffirmative asylum claims appears to be both quick andthorough. The reality, however, does not extend farbeyond the appearance because almost no one in southTexas is voluntarily applying for asylum.

Aliens stepping forward to apply for asylumaffirmatively dropped from 450 to 500 a day in Januaryto less than 10 per day in May. The day prior to theUSCR visit to the INS office in Harlingen, only 2applications had been received. Between February 21,when the program started, and August 1, a total of 886Central Americans had applied voluntarily for asylum,two-thirds of whom were Nicaraguans. Nicaraguanasylum applications were approved at a rate of 18.6percent. Approval rates for the other Central Americannationalities continued to lag, with the percentage ofapprovals for Salvadorans, Hondurans, and Guatemalansstanding at 3.6, 1.4, and 0 respectively. These statisticsapply only to affirmative asylum applications filed in theHarlingen district since the lifting of the temporary

restraining order; they do not include applications filedwith immigration judges in the course of deportationproceedings.

Affirmative applications are now examined on thegrounds of the remote Port Isabel Service ProcessingCenter, a compound that houses a large detentionfacility, and courtrooms for hearings before immigrationjudges. It is also the place for the filing of affirmativeclaims with the INS. Any person wanting to apply forasylum must now find his or her way to thisout-of-the-way location, about 25 miles from Harlingen.More daunting is that the person going to apply forasylum must present himself at a compound that, to allappearances, is a prison. Although the INS adjudicationsoffice - consisting of a trailer, a tent, and a temporary-looking building-is just outside the actual prisonfences, it is clearly on the same grounds. Whenapproaching the facility, one first sees two parallelchain-link fences topped by barbed wire, and patrolledby guards circling the periphery on motorcycles.

During the USCR visit, none of the INS examinerswas engaged in asylum adjudications. A large tent readyto accommodate the affirmative applicants stood nearby,almost empty.

The pace is much different just yards away, whereimmigration judges from the Executive Office ofImmigration Review (EOIR) have their offices andconduct deportation hearings of twenty or more CentralAmericans at a time. Immigration judges conductdeportation proceedings, and can consider asylumrequests in the course of those hearings.

USCR observed one group of 22 Central Americans-Hondurans, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans, but noNicaraguans-in their first and, as it turned out, onlyhearing prior to deportation.

Crammed into a small cinder-block room, thedetainees in their bright orange prison uniforms watchedas the judge, in black robes, leafed through files andspoke into a tape recorder. None of the detainees wasrepresented by legal counsel. The judge asked, "If it isnecessary for me to order you deported, to whichcountry would you wish to be sent?" Each person stoodas his name was called and named his country. Thejudge asked each, "Is there any reason why you cannotbe returned to .. . ," and then he again sorted throughfiles trying to match the name of the country with thename of the individual. Each answered, "No".

After explaining the option of voluntary departure,the judge asked, "Is the reason you do not apply becauseyou do not have enough money to return home?" Eachperson answered, "Yes".

The judge then ordered them all deported. He toldthem that they had the right to appeal to a higher court ifthey thought his decision was unjust. "Do you all waive


your right to appeal?" he asked. One man said, "I don'tunderstand." The judge repeated that "you have the rightto appeal to a higher court." The man fell silent as thegroup in unison waived their right to appeal.

Afterwards, the judge told USCR that this was theonly hearing for these aliens. He said that he had notadvised them of their right to apply for asylum becauseeach had named his home country as his preferredcountry of deportation, proving that none of them had afear of persecution.

Hearings in downtown Harlingen contrasteddramatically with those in Port Isabel. The Harlingenhearings, involving family groups from the Red Crossshelter in Brownsville, were individualized, not rushed,and the judges clearly tried to ask open-ended questionsabout fears of persecution.

For example, a Nicaraguan woman and her 5-year-oldson came before one of the judges in deportationproceedings. He asked, "Are you afraid?" She answered,"Yes, I am afraid for my young son." "Why for yourchild?" he asked. "Because they pursue little boys, takethem in the military. They say they will take him by theage of 10."

Even though he said that the articulated fear appearedto be at least five years off, the judge said to the woman,"If you apply for asylum, I will assist you in every way."

He directed the court clerk to give her an 1-589asylum application form and gave her a continuance oftwo weeks to fill it out and seek legal counsel.

Although none of the Central Americans we observedin downtown Harlingen was represented by legalcounsel, the several judges operating there all attemptedto communicate fully and clearly with them about theirrights and options. None of these aliens named theirhome country as the country to which they would bedeported; none waived any of their rights.

DETENTION

Prisons Versus Shelters

The single factor that determines whether a person isincarcerated at Port Isabel or taken to the Red CrossShelter is whether or not the person is traveling with hisor her children. Single people, or spouses withoutchildren, are detained at Port Isabel.

The Red Cross shelter in Brownsville has a relaxed,even a cheerful atmosphere. (A new shelter opened inSan Benito shortly after our visit, and another was beingcontemplated to open later in Hidalgo County.) Peoplewear street clothes and are free to wander aboutBrownsville during the day. Children play. Red Crossvolunteers from around the country lend an atmosphere

of welcome and camaraderie. Although theaccommodations were simple, and had a temporary feel,no one was complaining.

The contrast with Port Isabel is striking. One is aprison; the other a shelter. Port Isabel is surrounded bydouble rows of high fences topped by barbed wire;detainees are marched in lines from place to place; theywear bright orange prison uniforms. Even more striking,however, is the critical difference that placement in oneor the other facility has on legal access and, ultimately,on deportation. While INS staff at Port Isabel said at thetime of the USCR visit that up to 120 people per daywere being deported from there, the Red Cross staff inBrownsville said that they were not aware of a singleperson from their shelter having been deported. AJustice Department official with the CommunityRelations Service in Brownsville confirmed that was thecase.

A trailer with private attorneys and paralegals offeringfree legal aid sits on the grounds of the Red Crossshelter. At Port Isabel, it is a struggle for the detainees tolocate legal counsel, and even for attorneys and

Prisons versus shelters: Port Isabel is surrounded bydouble rows of high fences topped by barbed wire;detainees are marched in line from place to place; theywear bright orange prison uniforms. Hiram A. Ruiz



Shelters versus prisons: A Central American family in the comparatively relaxed atmosphere of the Red Cross shelter inBrownsville, where people wear street clothes and are able to visit the city during the day. Hiram A. Ruiz

paralegals to see the clients who have managed tocontact them.

The staff of Proyecto Libertad-the only organizationin the area that gives free legal assistance to aliens inINS proceedings and that has been involved in litigationagainst INS practices-said that they frequently travelthe long distance to Port Isabel, present a list of 10names to the authorities, and wait for hours. Sometimes,a few people are located; sometimes, none.

The director of the Port Isabel facility, Cecilio Ruiz,said, "We have done all we can to accommodate theattorneys." However, he said, "I will protect [thedetainees] against attorneys who want to take theirmoney and give them wrong information."

Of the detainees, Ruiz said, "They are allundocumented aliens. They all violated the law. Theyentered the U.S. illegally, period." He said, "Myexperience has been, in the files I have read, they arecoming here for economic reasons."

The prison atmosphere at Port Isabel was underscoredby some of Ruiz's other comments. For example, indistinguishing the treatment of family groups at theBrownsville Red Cross shelter from the detention ofadults at Port Isabel, Ruiz said, "I don't make war onchildren. I don't want children detained here. And Idon't like to detain women."

But Port Isabel does detain women, and Ruizmentioned that "some of the women are on the edge."Couples without children at Port Isabel have complainedthat it is difficult for spouses to see each other.

Access to telephones-essential for detainees to beable to contact lawyers-was limited. The Port Isabelauthorities said that efforts were being made to installadditional telephones-part of the requirement of theOrantes-Hernandez injunction, stemming from a classaction suit brought by Salvadorans in INS custody-butat the time of the USCR visit, we saw long lines at everytelephone accessible to the detainees. Other telephonesthat guards indicated were for detainee use appeared tobe inaccessible to them.

The Isolation of WebbCounty Detention Center

If legal access is difficult for Central Americandetainees in Port Isabel, it is well nigh impossible fordetainees in the Webb County Detention Facility. Laredobasically has two private attorneys-one of whommoved to Laredo in May-and one accredited paralegalwho are available to represent Central Americans andother asylum seekers. Their practices are limited almostexclusively to reducing bonds, which are among thehighest in the country. Bonds for Central Americans



generally are set at $7,500, and for South Americans,Haitians, Sri Lankan Tamils, or asylum seekers of othernationalities at $20,000.

Located in a remote area outside Laredo, the WebbCounty Detention Facility, like Port Isabel, is a prison.Surrounded by a barbed wire fence and guard towers,the detainees are normally given only one hour per dayof recreation time, five days a week, according to one ofthe guards. They are not given time in the recreationyard from noon on Friday until Monday morning. Thedetainees are further locked behind bars within thebarracks, with television as their only visible source ofrecreation. The detainees are locked away from thesingle telephone that stands in the center aisle of thebarracks. As the USCR team walked down the centeraisle of one of the barracks, detainees crowded againstthe bars on all sides pleading for help. While most of thepleas were for legal assistance, others asked fortoothpaste. It had been 25 days since they had had any.

A Salvadoran whom we interviewed at random, andwho is supposedly protected by the Orantes-Hernandezinjunction, told us that he had not had access to paper orpencils for the duration of his detention. He also saidthat there is little time for calls and that "the police cutoff the calls."

The Salvadoran said that there are long delaysbetween hearings before immigration judges. He saidthat many have been waiting for so long that they wantto be deported. He estimated that was true for about 40people in his barracks. Local service providers confirmthat no immigration judges are posted permanently inthe Laredo area, but that two judges come from San

23002200210020001900180017001600150014001300120011001000900800700600500400300200100

0

Antonio twice a month for about three days, resulting inlong delays for detainees who do seek legal remedies.

We asked the Salvadoran whether he had beennotified of his right to apply for political asylum. Hesaid, "They only asked me if I came with a smuggler."The Salvadoran then added, "When they gave thepapers, they said, 'Sign here, sign here, sign here.' Auniformed person asked how many kids I have, aboutmy wife, my work, birthdate, school, religion. He didnot ask me why I left. The only thing he explained wasthe list of attorneys."

Under the Orantes-Hernandez injunction, the INS isrequired to provide a list of free and low-cost legalservices. We were told by detainees and by localvolunteers and service providers that the problemeverywhere, but especially in Webb County, is that veryfew of the organizations listed actually help aliens indeportation proceedings. The list provided to detaineesin Webb County includes several agencies that do notaccept collect calls, including Texas Rural Legal Aid,which is prohibited by law from representingundocumented aliens. One service provider called thelist "a complete fraud."

The Salvadoran detainee said that he had been forcedinto the civil guard in El Salvador, but that "a few dayslater, they told me to disappear." We asked who "they"were. He said he had received an anonymous notetelling him not to do the service. This was in October1988. He fled shortly afterwards. He also said that hisdaughter had been kidnapped and held for ransom, buthe wasn't sure whether the kidnappers were politicallymotivated or not.

AVERAGE NUMBER OF ALIENS IN DETENTION PORT ISABEL SERVICE PROCESSING CENTERJanuary-July 1989

JAi.-iY6 FEB.-487 MARCH-2,251 APRIL-1,780 MAY-1,406 JUNE-1,350 JULY-1,100

Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service



Central American man detained at Port Isabel ponders anuncertain future. Hiram A. Ruiz

He was being held under a $5,000 bond. "The judgetold me I could be deported for free, otherwise I wouldhave to pay."

CCA Contract Facility in LaredoAt the time of our visit, Port Isabel was holding 2,184

detainees; the Red Cross Shelter, 925; and WebbCounty, an average of 350. The smaller CorrectionalCorporation of America (CCA) facility at Laredo washolding an average of 290 persons. Although contractedto the INS, the CCA facility operates somewhatdifferently from the INS facilities. Detainees wear streetclothes, rather than uniforms. They are still locked up,however, and we observed several detainees in solitaryconfinement. We observed one room holdingunaccompanied minors. None of the youths appeared tobe doing anything other than sitting. Detainees at theCCA complained about the food, and the recreationalfacilities were as bad or worse than Webb County. Thesmall recreation yard, which was not being used at thetime of the visit, was dirty, rocky, and dusty. It featured asingle basketball hoop, about 15-feet high. Two batteredballs sat on the ground.

Since our visit, unaccompanied minors have beentransferred out of the CCA facility.

Showcase Shelters forUnaccompanied Minors

In contrast to the treatment of children in the remoteCCA facility at the time of the USCR visit,unaccompanied minors who had the relative goodfortune of being apprehended in the Brownsville sectorwere being housed in shelters run by InternationalEducational Services (IES) under contract with theJustice Department's Community Relations Service.Although time did not permit a USCR tour of either ofthe IES facilities, local service personnel generally gavethose at Los Fresnos and Raymondville high marks. Anew, larger shelter for unaccompanied minors that hasstarted operation in Mission has been criticized for beingless equipped to handle its larger population ofunaccompanied youths than the two older, smallerfacilities. The Mission facility has a capacity for 80;Raymondville and Los Fresnos hold 48 and 35,respectively.

Proyecto Libertad on several occasions protestedtreatment of unaccompanied minors in deportationproceedings. Particular charges were leveled aboutrough treatment in the transport and holding of childrenfor appearances at immigration courts. These includedallegations of the use of shackles and handcuffs,infrequent meals, and temporary housing of minors inthe guards barracks of the Port Isabel facility. Afterprotests were lodged, improvements have come about.Minors are now generally taken to the Harlingenimmigration court-not Port Isabel-and see one judgewho is known for his sensitivity in dealing withchildren. The INS has been encouraging private effortsto find foster care alternatives to detention forunaccompanied minors.

Even with a sympathetic judge, however,unaccompanied alien children, like their adultcounterparts, are not considered to have a constitutionalright to court-appointed lawyers. In virtually every otherlegal context in the United States, children are appointedlegal representation. But when seeking asylum andfighting deportation, despite the potentially direconsequences of denial, alien children are left on theirown.

Orantes-Hernandez: A StopgapOrder to Prevent INS Abuses

Finding that "a substantial number of Salvadoranswho flee El Salvador possess a well-founded fear ofpersecution," a federal judge on April 28, 1988



concluded that they are eligible to apply for asylum, butthat "the vast majority of Salvadorans apprehended signvoluntary departure agreements which commence asummary removal process." The judge, David Kenyon,ordered a permanent injunction against the INS toprevent the agency from coercing Salvadorans toabandon their asylum claims.

The class action, Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, wasbrought on behalf of all Salvadorans in the United Stateswho have been or will be taken into custody by the INS.The widespread acceptance of voluntary departure, thecourt concluded, is due in large part to the coercivepractices of the INS combined with the unfamiliaritymost Salvadorans have of their rights under U.S.immigration laws. Those practices, the court found,include giving improper and incomplete legal adviceabout asylum, suggesting, among other things, thatSalvadoran applicants will face long detention, thatinformation from the asylum application will be sentback to El Salvador, and that if they apply, theirapplications will be denied anyway.

Judge Kenyon determined INS processing of detainedSalvadorans to be "inherently coercive and oftendeliberately intimidating." The court noted that as ageneral practice, "INS knowingly locates its majordetention facilities in communities with little or no legalrepresentation available to indigent detainees." Intransferring Salvadorans to remote and isolated areas,the court found that detainees "have been deprived offood and kept incommunicado for extended periods oftime."

Conditions of detention include total or partial banson writing materials, restrictions on telephone use, dailyannouncements of the availability of voluntary departure(without notifying detainees of other rights), limitingdaytime visiting hours with attorneys, distributinginaccurate legal services lists, and placing detainees insolitary confinement without a hearing under the guiseof administrative segregation.

The court found that the "INS engages in a persistentpattern and practice of misconduct which deprivesplaintiff class members of their constitutional right todue process and statutory right to apply for politicalasylum and withholding of deportation."

"INS agents used a variety of techniques to procurevoluntary departure," wrote Kenyon, "ranging fromsubtle persuasion to outright threats andmisrepresentations. Many class members wereintimidated or coerced to accept voluntary departureeven when they had unequivocally expressed a fear ofreturning to El Salvador."

After documenting a litany of coercive policies andpractices in every phase of INS dealing withSalvadorans in its custody, Judge Kenyon noted,

The record before this Court establishes that INS engagesin a pattern and practice of pressuring or intimidatingSalvadorans who remain detained after the issuance of anOSC to request voluntary departure or voluntarydeportation to El Salvador. . . This conduct is not the resultof isolated transgressions by a few overzealous officers,but, in fact, is a widespread and pervasive practice akin to apolicy. . . This pattern of misconduct flows directly fromthe attitudes and misconceptions of INS officers and theirsuperiors as to the merits of Salvadoran asylum claims andthe motives of class members who flee El Salvador andenter this country.

The court's injunction required the INS "not toemploy threats, misrepresentation, subterfuge or otherforms of coercion, or in any other way attempt topersuade or dissuade class members when informingthem of the availability of voluntary departure."

During the USCR visit, INS personnel made frequentreferences to the Orantes injunction. Alfonso De Leon,assistant director for examinations at Port Isabel, said,"We knew we would be under a magnifying glass, andthat we could be challenged." In fact, at that very time,in Los Angeles, the INS was being challenged forviolating the Orantes injunction.

As a result of that challenge, Judge Kenyon issuedanother injunction against the INS requiring thatSalvadorans be advised of their rights before beingdeported. In taking this action, Kenyon determined thatthe INS had violated his previous order requiring thatSalvadorans be informed of their rights to be representedby an attorney and to apply for political asylum.

Judge Kenyon found that various Salvadoransrepresented in the class-action suit "indicated that theyhave not had access to telephones to contact an attorney,that they have not seen the videotape prepared bydefendants [the INS], and that they were neither givennor read the Orantes advisal."

Kenyon further found that,

... as an indication that detainees are not being informed oftheir rights in any meaningful manner, the Court haslearned that, out of a group of 67 Salvadorans deportedfrom Port Isabel Service Processing Center on April 20,1989, none were represented by counsel in their deportationhearings. The Court finds it difficult to believe that each ofthese individuals learned of and knowingly and effectivelywaived his or her right to counsel.

Judge Kenyon's preliminary injunction required theINS to arrange for group legal rights presentations to begiven immediately by attorneys and paralegals to allSalvadorans detained at the Port Isabel ServiceProcessing Center; restrained the INS from limiting thecontent of the presentations informing detainees of theirrights; and prohibited the INS from deporting or movingahead with deportation proceedings against Salvadorans"until they have been given the opportunity to receivelegal rights information through such orientations."

Refugees at Our Border 1111Refugees at Our Border

Haitians interdicted at sea by the Coast Guard. Since 1981,only 6 Haitians out of a total of 20,421 interdicted havebeen brought to U.S. shores to pursue their asylum claims.U.S. Coast Guard

INTERDICTION ANDDETENTION OF HAITIANS

Due Process CircumventedWhile litigation, such as Orantes-Hernandez, has

been brought to bear to protect Salvadorans, legalchallenges have not proven especially effective indefending Haitian boat people. This is becauseinterdiction takes place in international waters, outsidethe jurisdiction of U.S. courts.

A lawsuit challenging the interdiction program,Haitian Refugee Center v. Garcey, was dismissed inJanuary 1985 by U.S. District Judge Charles R. Richey,who said, "Because the interdiction program .. . occursoutside the jurisdiction of the United States, neither thestatutes nor the treaty upon which the plaintiffs rely canprovide any relief." In effect, Richey concluded, "theExecutive can avoid the obligations by interdicting the

Haitians on the high seas." He said, "Although theactions of the plaintiffs, and their representatives, arecommendable, and stem from the highest form ofhumanitarian concern, the Court cannot allow itssympathy for the plight of the Haitians to blind it fromthe law."

Although the south Texas detention policy garnered agreat deal of publicity, and the American public--evenoutside Texas and Florida-has a general awareness ofCentral American migration and some of the politicalbases for that movement, the flow of Haitians and theirinterdiction by the United States has remained largelyhidden. Those outside Florida who are aware of theinterdiction program generally think of it as a programof the early 1980s, associating it with the era of theMariel boatlift. Yet, the interdiction operation is moreactive than ever. Since the inception of the program in1981, the largest monthly totals of Haitians interdictedare now being recorded.

In March, 1,535 Haitians in 17 vessels wereinterdicted and returned to Haiti, the largest monthlytotal in the eight-year history of the interdictionprogram. On March 26, the largely unreportedinterdiction program broke briefly into the news as aresult of a dramatic stand-off between a group of 250Haitians on a 50-foot sailboat and five Coast Guardcutters. The stand-off continued for 30 hours until theHaitians, seeing their situation to be hopeless,surrendered. They were promptly returned to Haiti.

As of April 20, the number of Haitians interdicted in1989 was 2,373. An INS spokesman attributed the sharpincrease to "false rumors" in Haiti "that the Bushadministration would allow everyone to stay here whoarrived within a 90-day period." The INS spokesmansaid, "Obviously, someone confused the issues whenthere was so much publicity about the Nicaraguans"arriving in Miami via south Texas.

The increase in the flow of Haitian boat people hasled the Coast Guard to add a second cutter on permanentpatrol between Haiti and Cuba and to fly twosurveillance planes off the Florida coast as well.

Perry Rivkind, the Miami district director of the INS,told the Miami Herald that this was "the heaviestmovement of Haitians to the U.S. since I've been thedistrict director for the past six years." And, in a changefrom the INS refrain for years that all interdictedHaitians are economic migrants plain and simple,Rivkind connected the increase to political upheavals inHaiti as well as to the magnet attraction of the Haitiancommunity in Miami.

Although the increase in Haitians attempting to fleetheir homeland in the spring of 1989 has been especiallysharp, there has also been a steady annual increase inHaitians interdicted since the program began in 1981.


The total interdicted in 1988, 4,712, represented a 33percent increase over the 1987 number of 3,541.

Virtually all interdicted Haitians are returned directlyto Haiti following brief immigration hearings aboard theCoast Guard vessels. INS examiners aboard the vesselsinterview the Haitians to determine whether they have alegal basis-including a basis for an asylum claim-forentering the United States. Since 1981, only 6 Haitiansout of a total of the 20,421 interdicted have been broughtto U.S. shores to pursue their asylum claims.*

Those apprehended on the high seas are denied anyaccess to lawyers or any appeal of the INS officer'sdecision. The "interviews" have often been conductedwith groups, instead of confidentially with individuals.A representative of Haiti-by some reports, uniformedHaitian naval officers-is on board the Coast Guardvessels, keeping a watchful eye on the proceedings. Theinterdicted Haitians are often dehydrated, hungry, andexhausted. They have no idea about the purpose of thehearings, not even knowing what an asylum hearing is.Even assuming that they did understand the proceedings,they are not given an opportunity to document andexplain their asylum claims.

Testifying before a congressional hearing on Haitianinterdiction on June 8, Jocelyn Mc Calla, executivedirector of the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees,presented sworn affidavits from Haitians who had beeninterdicted and returned to Haiti. The affidavits showedpeople who had experienced past persecution and whohad clearly articulated fears of persecution in Haiti, yetwho were returned directly to Haiti without having beengiven an opportunity for a hearing of their asylumclaims on U.S. soil. One of those affidavits read:

Even though we did not organize many of thesedemonstrations, we took part in them. Thinking that wewere the leaders, the government often tried to bribe us,and regularly sent military envoys to threaten us and ourchildren with death . .. On December 8, 1986, the armyarrested me ... I spent two days in jail before they releasedme.. . But the troops would not let me live in peace. OnJuly 2, 1987, troops went into Raboteau and started firingwith little care for the lives of children, women, and theelderly ... They raided my house, and ransacked it. Inaddition, they raped my [common law] wife. On September9, 1987, the government again sent its troops to arrest us.We went into hiding ...

Finally, after all our struggle to change the country and theprospect that the authorities could murder us at any time,we decided to risk our lives at sea. I and many othersorganized a voyage on September 12, 1988, one day afterthe massacre perpetrated by the Namphy regime andparamilitary death squads in St. Jean Bosco church, inPort-au-Prince... However, the [U.S.] immigration

inspector who interviewed me declared that since there wasa new government, they will return me to Haiti. Theyrefused to admit that I had a good reason to leave Haiti andthat death threats were still hanging on my head.

The U.S. Coast Guard returned me and the others to Haiti.Since my return, I have been forced to move from house tohouse, never sleeping in the same place, in order to ensurethat the army never learns of my whereabouts and arrestsme.

Krome Detention CenterThe day of the USCR visit to the Krome Detention

Center, an INS facility located on the edge of the FloridaEverglades, was unusual in several respects. The daybefore the visit, a boatload of Haitians had landed on theMiami shore, so that Krome was seriously overcrowded(with 748 detainees in a facility with a capacity for 525;about 550 of the detainees were Haitians). On the day ofthe USCR visit, a major fire in the Everglades causedKrome to be evacuated.

It would be reasonable to infer that recreationalactivities were curtailed in preparation for theevacuation, and that detainees were being confined moreclosely than usual. During the visit, we found most ofthe detainees sitting on their cots doing nothing. Therewas no activity in the recreational yards. None of thedetainees in the barracks was seen to have anyeducational or recreational materials, except for onegroup of men who appeared to be playing a card game,and a group of women who were watching the televisionin their barracks. Ping pong tables and exerciseequipment stood unused. A bank of telephones in themen's barracks was blocked off by a chain-link fence,which was padlocked. Times for telephone use wereposted on the locked door of the fence. At the time of thevisit, shortly after 11:00 a.m., the schedule indicated thatthe phones should have been available. However, theywere locked and inaccessible to the detainees.

Krome Center Administrator Constance K. Weiss saidthat detainees usually spend most of the day in therecreation yard, and that Krome features classes andrecreational programs. She said that Krome detainsneither family groups nor minors, and that all of thedetainees are administrative, rather than criminal, cases.

Weiss said that Haitians generally comprise about halfof the total population, the remainder made up mostly ofSouth and Central Americans. She said that only about 5percent of the personnel there speak Creole. Weiss saidthat the average length of stay is 3-to-4 weeks, with thequickest turn-around being one week and the longest

* Those who evade the Coast Guard and reach U.S. territory, or who arrive by air, have a better chance of applyingfor asylum, butstill only a very remote chance of actually being granted asylum. Of the 1,749 cases that have been decided by INS district directorsfrom June 1983 through September 1988, only 2 percent have been approved. Nevertheless, larger numbers than usual have managedrecently either to elude the Coast Guard and reach the Florida shores or enter the United States by air.


length of stay being 8 months. An average of 450detainees are housed at Krome at any one time.

But Krome remained overcrowded throughout Apriland May. As a consequence, tensions continued to rise,and, by May 11, Krome was in "lockdown," and a70-member riot squad was deployed to keep order.Detainees were segregated in eight separate areas of thefacility, and all telephones for detainee use were shutdown. One of the detainees filed an affidavit on May 18stating,

We must remain in our locked dorms most of the day. Atmeal times, the guards come to get us armed with clubs.We are made to run to the cafeteria, eat quickly, and runback to our dorms. We can go to the bathrooms only whenthe dorm doors are opened. We have had no access totelephones to call our families or anyone else sinceThursday afternoon, May 11, 1989.

On May 11, the INS began transferring 57 Haitianwomen from Krome to a rural jail in Cottonport,Louisiana. Shortly thereafter, Haitian men from Kromewere transferred to Oakdale, Louisiana and to the PortIsabel, Webb County, Laredo CCA, and El Pasofacilities in Texas. The Haitian Refugee Center in Miamisued the INS, charging that their transfer to a remotelocation deprived them of their rights to access to legalcounsel. The complaint stated, "There are no Creoleinterpreters and no experienced immigration lawyers orfamily to assist them at these locations." Under theterms of a settlement reached on June 30, the INS was

required to return the Haitians who had been transferredin May to Louisiana and Texas back to Miami.

REFLECTIONS ON U.S.ASYLUM POLICY

The Fallacy of Treating Asylumas an Immigration Problem

All too often, refugee status determination at or nearU.S. borders has little to do with a reasoned and carefulconsideration of the conditions people have fled and thesituations to which they would be returned, but ratherwith a host of factors peripheral to the essential questionof refugee determination-that of a person'swell-founded fear of persecution. Factors that relate toone's immigration status-whether or not the person hasvalid travel documents, for example-consistentlyoutweigh factors relating to refugee status in the INS'streatment of asylum seekers, and, ultimately, in thedetermination of their asylum claims. This happensdespite the Refugee Act of 1980, which states thatasylum claims will be considered "irrespective of suchalien's [immigration] status."

In drafting the Refugee Act, Congress recognized thatrefugees often have good reason for beingundocumented-because of fear of persecution at thehands of their own governments, many have fled

BORDER PATROL APPREHENSIONS BY NATIONALITYMcAllen Sector (Lower Rio Grande area of Texas, including Brownsville/Harlingen) January-July 1989

Number Apprehended

M M M

N

'N N.

N

S_ _

July


1,200

1,1001,000

900800700600

500400

300200100

Jan. Feb. March April May June

SSSS= Salvadorans NNNN= Nicaraguans GGGG= Guatemalans HHHH= Hondurans MMMM= Mexicans*

*Note: Scale changes, reflecting increments ofthousands, not hundredsSource: Immigration and Naturalization Service

M

Refugees at Our Border14

without the usual passports and visas. But the focus ofthe INS is not especially trained on the Refugee Act, orthe reasons for the Act's special treatment of asylumseekers. The INS is mandated to uphold all theimmigration laws of the United States, and theprotection of undocumented asylum seekers in theRefugee Act is truly an exception-a legitimate andhumanitarian one-to the general thrust of immigrationenforcement.

In seeing their role as the enforcers of our nation'simmigration laws, INS personnel consider their primarytask to be the prevention of unauthorized entry into theUnited States and the removal of persons not legallyentitled to be here. The entry of persons without validtravel documents, especially those who attempt to evadedetection and live and work in the United States withoutpermission, is seen as a direct challenge and threat to thepurposes of the agency. The deterrence of "illegalaliens" becomes all the more a priority to theimmigration service when there is a perception, widelyheld both inside and outside the INS, that the UnitedStates has "lost control" of its borders and has beenfaced with a "flood" of would-be illegal immigrants.

There is well-ensconsed and often-expressed beliefwithin the INS that would-be illegal immigrants will useany means available to circumvent or abuse orderlyimmigration procedures, and that applying for asylum isnothing but a shortcut to jump to the head of theimmigration queue. Former INS Commissioner Alan C.Nelson railed against "asylum abuse as a technique forfraudulent manipulation by those who would twist ourgenerosity into personal gain." The presumption evidentat every level of the INS-with some noteworthyindividual exceptions-is that asylum seekers fromcountries in our own hemisphere are overwhelminglyeconomic migrants and that their claims to refugeestatus are, with few exceptions, baseless.

In reality, the INS fulfills its own prophecy thatCentral Americans and Haitians are economic migrantsby not treating them as anything else, and by turning adeaf ear to those who might be able to tell their stories ifgiven a real opportunity to do so. More often than not,the actual merits of asylum seekers' claims becomerelegated to the bottom of the considerations U.S.immigration authorities use to determine their reception.Instead, a host of other factors usually come into playthat draw the energies of both the asylum seeker and thegovernment onto what are essentially immigration-notrefugee-status concerns. These include:

* the date the person entered the United States, and thepolicy in effect at that point in time;

* where-as in which INS region and district-the alienentered or attempted to enter;

* whether or not the person has valid travel documents;

* the alien's age-being older or younger than age 18;* whether or not the alien has money;* whether the person traveled alone or with children;* the alien's country of origin, and its relations with the

U.S. government (coming from Nicaragua rather than ElSalvador, or Cuba rather than Haiti);

* how the person traveled here-by boat, plane, oroverland;

* whether the alien has relatives or friends in this country;* whether the alien had access to legal help or received

correct legal information, or whether the person bases hisor her decisions on false or incomplete information; and

* whether the person was caught by the Border Patrol orvoluntarily applied for asylum.

While the disparities in the INS treatment of similarlysituated individuals is striking, the overall impression isthat few are treated well. The overwhelming majority ofaliens currently incarcerated by the INS and facingdeportation have no legal representation whatsoever.Among those interviewed by the USCR team, very fewshowed even a basic knowledge of their rights to applyfor asylum, and most seemed fatalistic and passive.Barriers to communication with legal representativeswere evident, and it was clear that many did not see thepoint in trying to overcome these obstacles, with theresult that the authorities frequently never heard theirstories.

Among the Nicaraguans, Hondurans, Guatemalans,and Salvadorans in INS detention in south Texas whomUSCR interviewed, we found people whom we wouldhave judged to be refugees, as well as others who didnot appear to meet the refugee standard. We do notsuggest that every Central American or Haitian whocomes to the United States is a refugee. Nor do weoppose asylum adjudication per se. We recognize thevalidity of immigration controls.

On the other hand, we came away convinced thatCentral Americans and Haitians face a presumption ofineligibility for refugee status by U.S. immigrationauthorities. This presumption leads to politicizedpractices that make it next to impossible for even themost deserving of asylum seekers to wend their waythrough the asylum process successfully. At a minimum,it appears that Central American and Haitian asylumseekers are being held to a higher standard fordetermining refugee status than the law requires. Ineffect, they are being required to establish proof of pastpersecution and a clear threat of future persecution ifreturned, rather than a "well-founded fear"-thesubjective fear of persecution a reasonable person wouldfeel based on objective conditions in his or herhomeland. As was noted by the U.S. Court of Appealsfor the Ninth Circuit in Matter of Arteaga, the Board ofImmigration Appeals-and by extension, theINS-might pay "lip service" to the "well-founded fear

Refugees at Our Border 1515Refugees at Our Border

of persecution" asylum standard affirmed by the U.S.Supreme Court in its Cardoza-Fonseca decision, but, inreality, the government's use of "boilerplate language"and "magic words" fails to apply the meaning of thosewords in deciding actual asylum claims.

For those entering the United States who may harborjust such legitimate fears, but who are not aware of theright to apply for asylum or of the very specific criteriaused in determining asylum claims, our governmentoffers little or no guidance about how to navigate thisarcane and complicated system. Most are left to theirown devices. During deportation proceedings, whetheror not they stumble on the magic words that will openup the avenue of relief from possible persecution seemsto rest on luck, sophistication, and personalresourcefulness. An unlucky, unsophisticated, orunresourceful person with a legitimate asylum claimstands little chance of being heard.

Persecution and Civil StrifeThe vagaries and personal biases of individual

immigration judges and INS examiners concerning thecrucial legal standard for asylum-what constitutes a"well-founded fear of persecution"-are unlikely ever tobe overcome completely. However, a separation offunctions within the Justice Department, so that a corpsof adjudicators could be developed outside the INS whowould be specially trained and who would focusexclusively on asylum would certainly be an importantstep towards a more objective approach.

But whatever reforms are made in the adjudicationprocess, so long as the asylum standard remains thesame, the overwhelming majority of Central Americanand Haitian asylum seekers are still unlikely to begranted asylum. Denial is likely to result for any of threereasons. 1) Some applicants, most likely a relative few,will have attempted to abuse the asylum system withfrivolous claims. 2) At the other end of the spectrum,others might have true and legitimate fears ofpersecution, but will be denied because either a) theyfail to articulate and document adequately their claims,or b) U.S. asylum adjudicators apply the standard toonarrowly in their cases. 3) In the middle, stand themajority of the aliens to whom we spoke. This grouphad weak cases in terms of a strict application of thestandard of a fear of individualized persecution, but notfrivolous claims. The majority pointed to a mix ofpolitical and economic motives created by civil strifeand political violence as the reasons for having fled andfor fearing return. These upheavals and violence werenot necessarily directed against them as individuals,however.

But the "persecution" standard in U.S. refugee lawimplies individual targeting of the kind associated with

human rights abuses such as unfair trials, politicalimprisonment, and torture. As horrible as individualpersecution of this kind is, it does not tell the wholestory of the abuses that refugees in today's worldlegitimately fear.

Human rights abuses in those parts of the world fromwhich the overwhelming majority of the world'srefugees currently flee are frequently not the result oftargeting individuals for punishment. Often, humanrights abuses are wide and indiscriminate, intended tointimidate, or even destroy, whole classes or groups.These abuses tend to be extrajudicial in nature, throughanonymous threats or attacks by death squads, guerrillaforces, or other shadowy elements with or without linksto governments. In much of Central America, forexample, political imprisonment is not now the meansfor repressing dissent. Unfair trials are not an issue, forexample, if no trials are held at all. Rather, villages aredestroyed, indigenous populations are massacred, youngmen are forcibly conscripted en masse by government orinsurgent forces, and people broadly identified assubversives are "disappeared."

Articulating and documenting individual claims insuch circumstances is extremely difficult. And, even ifthe harm that the person has suffered or fears is genuine,is it persecution?

In Matter of Mogharrabi, setting forth thepost-Cardoza-Fonseca interpretation of a "well-foundedfear," the Board of Immigration Appeals said, "Aliensfearing retribution over purely personal matters, oraliens fleeing general conditions of violence andupheaval in their countries, would not qualify forasylum." The BIA has pointed to the legislative historyof the Refugee Act to show that Congress did not intendto include those fleeing civil war. The Senate version ofthe bill had included "any person who has beendisplaced by military or civil disturbance or uprootedbecause of arbitrary detention," but the conferencecommittee that resolved the differences between theHouse and Senate versions dropped this language fromthe Act.

A series of decisions in 1988 moved the BIA intoeven more narrow interpretations of "persecution" whenit occurs in the context of civil war. It has arrived at aparadoxical position that, in effect, favors asylumseekers from less violent and dangerous places, while,essentially, requiring a higher standard of persecutionfrom areas where political violence is now morewidespread. In a number of cases involving the BIA'sdenial of asylum to Salvadorans fleeing their civil war(see USCR's "Back of the Hand"), the Board has ruledthat "civil wars or revolutions have always containedstrong currents of violence, threats, destruction,intimidation, and indeed ruthlessness." But, said the BIA


M


in Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, "Individuals hanned bysuch violence or threats of harm in a civil war are notpersecuted 'on account of' the five categoriesenumerated in ... the Act [i.e., race, religion,nationality, membership in a particular social group, orpolitical opinion]."

While the BIA acknowledges that people can beharmed, presumably tortured and summarily killed, suchacts are not deemed to be persecution if they occur in thecontext of civil war or revolution.

In an earlier case, Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, theNinth Circuit Court of Appeals criticized this line ofreasoning, saying,

"The Board's conclusion that the threat against Bolanos'life was insufficient simply because it was representative ofthe general level of violence in El Salvador constitutes aclear error of law. We are mystified by the Board's abilityto turn logic on its head. While we have frequently heldthat general evidence of violence is insufficient to triggersection 243(h)'s prohibition against deportation, not oncehave we considered a specific threat against a petitionerinsufficient because it reflected a general level of violence... It should be obvious that the significance of a specificthreat to an individual's life or freedom is not lessened bythe fact that the individual resides in a country where thelives and freedom of a large number of persons arethreatened. If anything ... that fact may make the threatmore serious and credible."

The BIA has stated in another case, Matter ofFuentes, that it would not apply the Bolanos-Hernandezruling outside the Ninth Circuit. That is unfortunate. Thesituations so many of today's asylum seekers are fleeingrequire more, not less, attention to the nuances of thelaw that allow for a more generous application inborderline cases. This was certainly the intent of theSupreme Court in its landmark Cardoza-Fonsecadecision. For example, the Supreme Court pointed outthat the asylum eligibility determination turns "to someextent on the subjective mental state of the alien." Itfaulted the BIA for having paid insufficient attention tosubjective fears on the part of asylum seekers.

Since Cardoza-Fonseca, which affirmed a moresubjective standard than the BIA had been using on thequestion of "persecution," the BIA has been whittlingdown the objective grounds on which that fear can bebased. The law says that a refugee's fear of persecutionshould be "on account of' any of five objective factors.Although several, such as nationality, race, and religion,are more clearly immutable characteristics, the other twogrounds-"membership in a particular social group" and"political opinion"-do not lend themselves well to aconstruction as immutable characteristics (the positiontaken by the BIA). We can change our social groups andpolitical opinions, but are not any less likely to bepersecuted on account of them for that reason. The BIAhas declined to apply these two terms in any but the

most limited cases. The Board has said that it would notapply to cases arising in other federal circuits the NinthCircuit's ruling in Bolanos-Hernandez that "politicalopinion" includes political neutrality in civil war.Similarly, in a case involving a Haitian, Desir v. INS, theBIA characterized beatings, imprisonment, assault, andextortion at the hands of the Ton Ton Macoute asresulting from personal conflict, not political opinion. Inoverruling the BIA, the Ninth Circuit said,

"The Haitian government under Duvalier operated as a'kleptocracy', or government by thievery, from the highestto the lowest level. The Ton Ton Macoutes ... formed theheart of the system. .. Because the Macoutes are anorganization created for political purposes, they bringpolitics to the villages of Haiti. To challenge the extortionby which the Macoutes exist, is to challenge theunderpinnings of the political system."

When given the opportunity in Matter of Sanchez andEscobar to give a liberal reading of "social group" thatwould have included young, urban, working-class menof draft age in El Salvador, the BIA declined. Yet thehistory of the phrase from the drafting of the 1951Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, uponwhich the U.S. law is based, suggests that the UnitedStates is applying the term too narrowly. Atle Grahl-Madsen, the leading authority on the drafting of the1951 Convention, has noted that its drafters considered"social group" to be of broader application than ethmicor religious identifications, and intended it to fill a gapin protection not covered by the four other reasonsenumerated for persecution in the Convention. Inaddition, the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures andCriteria for Determining Refugee Status says thatmembership in a particular social group "normallycomprises people of similar background, habits, orsocial status" and suggests that such membership couldbe a ground for persecution when "there is noconfidence in the group's loyalty to the Government orbecause the political outlook, antecedents or economicactivity of its members, or the very existence of thesocial group as such, is held to be an obstacle to theGovernment's policies."

As these examples suggest, there is room within thelanguage of the Refugee Act for a more generousdetermination of asylum. But, even so, the Act does notadequately address the need for--or the means of-protecting persons displaced as a result of civil war andseeking temporary shelter in our country. Internationalhumanitarian law provides guidance for an approachthat extends the principle of nonrefoulement-thenonreturn of a refugee to a situation where his life orfreedom would be threatened-to persons displaced bywarfare. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 prohibit therepatriation of civilians into internal armed conflictswhere breaches of the Geneva Conventions are


Refuigees at Our Border 17

occurring. Also, the UNHCR Executive Committee's1985 Note on International Protection says that theprinciple of nonrefoulement extends beyond refugeesdefined by the 1951 Convention who fear persecution.According to the UNHCR, "persons who crossinternational boundaries to escape from severe internalupheavals and armed conflicts should not be returnedagainst their will to areas where they may be exposed todanger." While permanent asylum may not be mandatedby customary international law, the forced return of evena "displaced person" is prohibited. Many of the peoplenow being deported out of south Texas may not be"refugees" as classically defined in the 1951 Conventionand the Refugee Act. But many are, at the least,"displaced persons" facing real dangers in theirhomelands who should not be returned against their will.

CONCLUSIONS ANDRECOMMENDATIONS

1) SAFE HAVEN

CONCLUSION:

* The United States is deporting people seekingrefuge to countries where their safety cannot beguaranteed-and to which they are afraid to return.That is an unacceptable, inhumane practice.

As a nation, we must be able to control the flow ofwould-be immigrants. But we also have a responsibilityand commitment to provide safe-haven to those whocome here in fear for their lives.

Although there are deep and disturbing problems withthe implementation of our refugee law, a legal structureexists, at present, to provide asylum to those who canestablish a well-founded fear of persecution in theirhomeland. But most of the recent asylum seekers at ourborders cannot establish to the satisfaction of asylumadjudicators that they have been or are likely to beindividually targeted for persecution. They do,nevertheless, often have legitimate fears for their livesand safety based on the high levels of political violencein their homelands. They are no less vulnerable and noless in need of protection than those refugees who meetthe legal "persecution" standard. They should not betreated as just an immigration enforcement problem.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

A "safe haven" mechanism is urgently neededto prevent the deportation of persons who fearreturn to dangerous, violent conditions.

The most immediate need is for the Attorney Generalto depoliticize the approach to granting temporary stays

of deportation and to exercise his discretion to grant"extended voluntary departure" (EVD) on humanitariangrounds. The continued failure of this and the previousadministration to do so forces those who seek ahumanitarian solution to work for enactment ofnationality-specific, safe haven legislation. EitherCongress must take the initiative by passing theMoakley/DeConcini bill (H.R. 45/S. 458), which callsfor a temporary suspension of deportation ofSalvadorans and Nicaraguans in the United States, or theAttorney General must exercise his discretion (as herecently has done for Chinese nationals in the UnitedStates) to "defer departure" of these (and other)endangered nationality groups.

Such an approach provides a necessary temporarysafety net for those who do not meet the high standardfor being granted asylum, but who nevertheless could beharmed if returned to their home countries. Under theHouse version of the legislative proposal, to be eligiblefor temporary safe haven, the Nicaraguan or Salvadoranwould have to have been in the United States beforeMarch 1, 1989 and would be required to register withthe INS, but in so doing would be granted workauthorization and protected from detention anddeportation for a three-year period. The person wouldnot be eligible for public assistance. Also, this would notprovide a right to remain permanently in the UnitedStates-as does the granting of asylum, which opens theway for adjustment of status and eventualcitizenship-but would protect a person pending areturn to safe conditions in the home country.

2) INTERDICTION

CONCLUSION:

* The interdiction of Haitian boat people on thehigh seas and their return to Haiti after superficialand perfunctory "hearings" aboard U.S. CoastGuard cutters is a travesty of justice in its own right,puts lives in danger, and shows discriminatorytreatment towards a particular nationality group.

It defies any reasonable explanation that out of themore than 20,000 Haitians who have been interdicted atsea since 1981, only six persons have been broughtashore to pursue asylum claims. This is stark testamentto prejudicial treatment by our government that is totallyunacceptable.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

* The interdiction program must be terminated.The Coast Guard should be used for genuinerescue-at-sea operations.

Haitians rescued at sea by the U.S. Coast Guardshould be brought to the United States for medical


Refugees at Our Border18

examination and be given the opportunity to apply forasylum should they fear persecution in their homeland.

* Haitians apprehended within U.S. territorialwaters should be treated the same as aliensapprehended on land.

Congress should abolish the legal fiction that Haitianswho enter U.S. territorial waters have not entered U.S.territory and therefore are placed in the moredisadvantageous "exclusion" proceedings as opposed to"deportation" proceedings. Haitians apprehended withinU.S. territorial waters should be considered to haveentered the United States and should be treated on anequal footing with any other aliens in deportationproceedings. Haitians rescued in international waters bythe Coast Guard should have the right to apply forasylum in the context of exclusion proceedings.

3) ACCESS TO COUNSEL

CONCLUSION:

* Undocumented aliens in detention in the UnitedStates are being denied access to legal counsel,resulting in the deportation or coerced departure ofpersons who, if they knew their rights and could beassisted, might apply for asylum or other forms oflegal relief to which they are entitled. As a result,persons in many cases are being returned todangerous conditions without ever having been givena meaningful opportunity to explain why they mightfear return.

The strongest and most lasting impression left fromour interviews with aliens in detention in south Texaswas of people who had little or no understanding ofwhat was happening to them. U.S. asylum policies andprocedures are complex and, especially during late 1988and early 1989, were shifting sharply and often.Whether there is a conscious intent to deny legal accessor not, the fact is that only a small fraction of thepersons detained in south Texas from therefugee-producing countries of Central America havebeen able to be represented or advised by legal counsel.Detained in remote facilities in areas with fewimmigration attorneys, most of the detainees are left ontheir own to navigate a complicated and confusingsystem.

The U.S. General Accounting Office in a June 1987report has shown that unrepresented applicants aredenied asylum more than twice as often as applicantsrepresented by attorneys in hearings before the INS, andthat unrepresented applicants in hearings beforeimmigration judges are denied three times more oftenthan those with an attorney. Our own observationssuggest that the GAO statistics represent the tip of theiceberg, since the overwhelming majority of

unrepresented aliens we encountered in detention didnot exercise their right to apply for asylum at all.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

* Attorneys and representatives of nonprofitagencies should have unimpeded access to INSdetention facilities to give group "know your rights"orientations and to provide individual counseling toasylum seekers and potential asylum seekers.

* To the extent detention of asylum seekersremains an option at all, INS facilities should belocated closer to urban centers where detainees willhave a better chance to be represented.

* Given the slapdash manner in which asylumapplications were filed in south Texas in the last halfof 1988 and the first half of 1989, aliens who receivechanges of venue with representation elsewhere inthe United States should have the opportunity tosubmit new asylum applications without prejudice.

Because the numbers of asylum seekers were solarge, the number of qualified legal representatives sosmall, and the level of confusion so high, the I-589sasylum applicants filled out in Texas at that time are,with some exceptions, worthless and do not reflect thetrue stories of the asylum claimants. The INS has takenthis as evidence of abusive and frivolous claims. It moreaccurately reflects that most of the Central Americansentering at the time were ignorant of the system. Manydid not know they were applying for asylum. It remainsto be seen whether their cases have merit. But thegeneral level of mayhem and confusion, to which ourown government contributed in no small part, should notnow be used against them.

4) DETERRENCE

CONCLUSION:

* Detention is used as a deterrent.The legal basis for detention of aliens in INS

proceedings is limited to those likely to abscond or whopose a threat to the community or the security of theUnited States. Yet, INS documents explicitlyacknowledge "the purpose of detention as deterrent"(INS Enhancement Plan for the Southern Border,2/16/89 p. 8). This is an illegal and illegitimate reasonfor detention. Judge David Kenyon observed inOrantes-Hernandez that detention is "inherentlycoercive and often deliberately intimidating." Weconcur. More broadly, he observed that INS misconduct"is not the result of isolated transgressions by a fewoverzealous officer," but rather that INS policies form "apattern and practice of illegal conduct which isapproved, authorized and/or ratified by INS personnel atall levels."

Refugees at Our Border 1919Refuigees at Our Border

RECOMMENDATIONS:

* The INS should obey the law and the orders ofU.S. courts.

The INS is a law enforcement agency. Yet, itswillingness to cut legal corners in pursuit of its deterrentgoals disregards the very notions of fairness and justiceour laws are intended to promote.

Time and time again, the INS drags its feet whencalled upon to ameliorate abusive conditions. Whetherconcerning the treatment of alien children in detention,work authorization for asylum seekers, access to legalcounsel, or a host of other deterrent measures, the INShas rarely acted on its own to correct coercive practices,and, indeed, as in the case of Orantes-Hernandez, hasbeen found to violate court injunctions.

Decent treatment of asylum seekers has been wroughtby costly and time-consuming litigation. Thisadversarial process has created mistrust and ill-willbetween the INS and immigration and refugee serviceproviders that is counterproductive to the interests of allparties.

Detention should be limited to aliens likely toabscond or who pose a threat to the community.

Given its coercive nature, which risks compellingrefugees to abandon their rights, detention should be theexception, not the rule.

5) CONDITIONS OF DETENTION

CONCLUSION:

* The United States treats undocumented asylumseekers like criminals. Such treatment is an affrontto their dignity and abusive of their rights.

Undocumented aliens are not criminals (although acriminal could also be undocumented). Althoughcrossing the border without authorization is illegal (likea traffic violation), it is not a criminal act (except inthose few instances when an alien who has previouslybeen deported is caught reentering the United Statesduring the subsequent five years). Yet, undocumentedaliens who seek political asylum in the United States arenow being locked up behind bars and barbed wirefences, guarded, dressed in prison uniforms andmarched from place to place, with limits imposed onrecreation, on seeing loved ones, even on personalhygiene.

The image of victims of human rights abuse seekingfreedom and protection in the United States beingthrown into prison by our government is a sad and ironicone. Yet, our government, in effect, punishes those whotry to avail themselves of our protection. For some, thevictims of torture and trauma in their home countries,incarceration in the United States represents the "secondblow"-an inhumane testing of their endurance through

the notion that those truly fearful will stick it out, whilethose with less fear will abandon their asylum claimsand return home. Testing asylum seekers' tolerance forincarceration is an irrational and inhumane method fordetermining the validity of refugee claims.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

* To the extent detention of asylum seekerscontinues as U.S. policy, it should be of the "soft"variety as, for example, at the Red Cross shelter inBrownsville (currently available only for familygroups), absent the alien presenting a danger to thecommunity or a likelihood of absconding.

Although required to be present for daily roll calls,those held at the Red Cross shelter are free to come andgo during the day, wear civilian clothes, pursuerecreational and educational objectives, and essentiallygovern their daily lives with minimal interference.

* Children should be spared detention except inthe most extraordinary circumstances.

Unaccompanied alien children should be released assoon as possible after apprehension to parents, legalguardians, other responsible adults, or licensed childwelfare agencies.

The U.S. policies of interdicting and returning Haitianboat people and detaining and deporting CentralAmericans have repercussions far beyond America'sborders. For better or worse, our country does set thestandard for refugee protection that will be followed bymany other countries. If the United States, with itshistoric adherence to due process and its wealth, cannotsee fit to offer minimal levels of protection to refugeeswho throw themselves on our mercy, the whole systemof refugee protection throughout the world runs the riskof unraveling. Lives truly hang in the balance, and notonly Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, and Haitian lives.Protecting refugees is not without costs, but these arecosts that it is absolutely necessary for our nation to bearif we hope to have a world safe for its most vulnerablemembers.


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20 Refuigees at Our Border

Documents

Refugees At Our Border...REFUGEES AT OUR BORDER THE U.S. RESPONSE TO ASYLUM SEEKERS "The U.S. screens people in south Texas and holds them in a detention center and repatriates them