uring World War II the RedArmy, like all armies, pro-

duced a series of tactical and organi-zational manuals. Published in1944, Combat Regulations for Tanksand Mechanized Troops of the RedArmy, Part II (Battalion, Regiment,Brigade), incorporated the lessonslearned in three years of combatexperience with the Wehrmacht.The manual was comprehensive,dealing with all aspects of armoredwarfare. For this article, we willfocus on the opening section of the“THE OFFENSIVE.”

General Offensive Principles

During a combined-arms attack, thetank’s main duty was to supportinfantry or cavalry formationsthrough fire and maneuver. Tankssuppressed enemy weapons,destroyed infantry, tanks, andinfantry obstacles. (Enemy tankswere fourth on the target list. By1944, with the preponderance ofGerman armor in the west awaitingD-Day, a set piece Soviet offensiveusually faced German infantry inprepared positions.)

Terrain and enemy defenses deter-mined how tanks were committed.If the terrain was favorable and theenemy weak, the tanks conducted a

battle of maneuver. In bad terrain,or when enemy defenses werestrong, tanks were employed in com-bination with infantry and artillery.An extensively fortified enemy wasleft to direct infantry assault in com-bination with heavy tanks, supportedby indirect artillery and air attack.Medium tanks covered the flanks ofthe assault force and were directlycommitted, along lanes cleared ofobstacles, only after the fortificationwas breached.

During the attack the tank brigadesubordinated to the infantry divisionit was attached to. When attacking atactical objective, tank battalionssubordinated to the attackinginfantry regiment. When the objec-tive was taken, the tank battalionreverted back to the tank brigadecommander who directed the pursuitor defended against counterattack.In marshy or mountainous terrain, orif the objective was a single village,tanks were doled out in company-strength and subordinated to thelocal infantry commander.According to the book, tanks neverfought individually or unsupported.In other words, no “penny packets.”Tanks always worked closely withinfantry and other available support-ing arms.

The Motorized Infantry Battalion

No matter how the tank brigade’sassets were parceled out, the tankbrigade’s motorized infantry battal-ion always remained a brigade com-ponent. In a combined arms assault,the motorized rifle battalion formedthe brigade reserve force. If the tankbrigade was committed separately,the rifle battalion attacked togetherwith the tanks, either riding trucks ordismounted. The motorized riflebattalion’s principal duties were con-solidating ground won, covering thebrigade’s flanks, and securing thebrigade’s assembly and departureareas. The motorized rifle battalionwas a security force trained andequipped to provide close-in protec-tion for the brigade tanks. (Thesetroops were not tank riding shocktroops commonly called “tankmarines.” In fact, the issue of troopsriding tanks into combat is notaddressed in the entire manual,either as a “do” or “don’t.” By1944, it appears this tactic was longabandoned.)

Cooperation with Artillery

It was the job of the artillery to placeits fire directly ahead of the advanc-ing tanks. The desired effect of the

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DRed Army Offensive Doctrine: 1944

barrage was two-fold:a. blind enemy observation postsb. prevent opposing artillery andanti-tank batteries from suddenlyappearing in front or on the flank ofthe attack.Once the leading attack echelonsneared the extreme range of the sup-porting artillery, a portion of the bat-teries ceased fire and advanced topreviously staked positions. Oncethe advanced gun section com-menced fire, the rest of the batteryfollowed up. Thus, a continuousbarrage was maintained ahead of theattack. Towed infantry and anti-tankguns advanced with the leadinginfantry elements, assault guns andself-propelled artillery followedbehind the tank brigade.

The brigade’s tank commanders,down to company-level, knew theartillery targets and barrage timeta-bles for their attack lanes. The bat-talion commander coordinated theartillery support. He kept the

artillery batteries abreast of the bat-talion’s position and gave the signalsto shift or cease artillery fire.

To facilitate communication with theartillery, the tank brigade establisheda forward observation post equippedwith radios, encoded maps, and notegrids. This post was static. (Therewas no mention of dedicatedartillery observation tanks equippedwith extra radios and dummy guns, astandard T/O&E item of everyGerman and Allied tank battalion)

Cooperation with Engineers

Engineers were corps assets. A tankcommander accessed his needs andrequested these specialized troops.Corps staff doled out men and mate-rial. Although the engineers workedin close cooperation with local com-manders, their mission orders camefrom corps.

Prior to the attack, engineers pre-

pared the assembly areas and recon-noitered enemy tank obstacles.During the attack, engineers accom-panied the leading infantry elements,principally clearing mines and gen-erating smoke. At the point ofattack, engineers generated smokeonly on orders from the senior tanktroop commander. Smoke grenadesissued to tankers, were used to maskthe recovery of disabled vehicles.

Preparation for the Attack

Tank assembly areas were locatedten to fifteen kilometers in front ofthe enemy’s main defensive line.Moving into the assembly area wasdone under the cover of night. If thebrigade moved during the day, thebrigade commander made a formalrequested for air cover, in writing,and passed the brigade march routeto the local air commander. Withthe brigade in place, the brigadecommander detailed a security forceconsisting of a motorized infantryplatoon and tank company to protectthe assembly area. Once the brigadewas in the assembly area, specialattention was given to camouflage,cover and concealment.

Just prior to the attack, the tanksmoved from the assembly area todeparture positions located one tofour kilometers from the enemy’smain defensive line. Departureareas were used to form attack eche-lons and the final assault formations.Departure areas were selected inadvance by troop commanders. Ifthe enemy was in a hasty defense, orthe terrain was devoid of cover, thedeparture area was dispensed withand the tanks attacked directly fromthe assembly area. Ideally, the moveinto the departure area was done atnight. If done during the day, the

advance was masked with artilleryand smoke. Time spent in the depar-ture area was to be as short as possi-ble. If tanks moved into the depar-ture area during daylight, they had tomove out (attack) within an hour.

Attacking a Prepared Defense

On signal, the tanks exited thedeparture areas at high speed con-forming to the attack echelons estab-lished in the departure area. Thetanks advanced behind a creepingartillery barrage until within 150-200 meters of the enemy main lineof resistance. At this point the bar-rage lifted and the artillery com-menced suppression fire on previ-ously identified targets within theenemy defensive zone.

During the first part of the advance,the infantry followed the tanks, fir-ing from the hip. At first contact,the infantry moved ahead of thetanks and formed the leading attackechelon. Tanks followed theinfantry at a distance not exceeding

200-400 meters. If the infantryencountered a minefield they fell inbehind the tanks. As the depth ofthe enemy defenses was penetrated,the infantry and tanks advanced in aleapfrog manner, covering eachother with mutual supporting fire.

Penetrating the Depth of aPrepared Defense

Once into the depth of the enemydefense tanks defended againstcounterattacks, sought out anddestroyed enemy reserve concentra-tions, prevented the withdrawal ormovement of enemy artillery, assist-ed in mopping up by-passed pocketsof resistance, and pursued retreatingenemy units.

Areas screened with effective anti-tank defenses were bypassed and leftto artillery and air strikes.Entrenched infantry, or infantrydefending in woods, were sup-pressed by tank cannon and machinegun fire until supporting infantryworked in for a close assault.

When his tanks reached the enemy’sartillery positions, the brigade com-mander immediately called for hisown artillery support and air strikes.Ideally, enemy artillery positionswere taken from the flanks or rear,with the direct support of assaultguns. When attacking an artilleryposition, tanks firing on the moveengaged at the enemy battery long-range. During the advance the tanksmade full use of terrain undulationsfor cover. If the terrain was devoidof cover, the attack was masked bysmoke. As the range closed, a por-tion of the tanks halted and silencedthe enemy battery’s supporting ele-ments with aimed-fire. Remainingtanks continued to charge at highspeed, overrunning the guns in placeor on their limbers.

If the enemy counterattacked withunsupported infantry in open terrain,the tanks smashed directly into themat high speed, firing on the move. Ifthe counterattacking force was acombined arms assault, the tanks

defeated it in cooperation withassault guns, towed infantryguns, indirect artillery, and airstrikes. If tanks supported thecounterattack, the brigade com-mander called up his antitankreserve and deployed his tanksinto hull-down and concealedpositions. Once the enemytanks were destroyed and themomentum of the counterattackbroken, the tanks emerged fromtheir protected positions andattacked directly into the disor-ganized enemy.

If the enemy defenses provedweaker than expected or easilycracked, the tanks initiated a hotpursuit without waiting for the

foot infantry. In the case of hot pur-suit, infantry support is provided bymotorized troops.

Attacking Strongly FortifiedPositions and Fortified Areas

Cracking a strongly fortified defen-sive zone was accomplished throughthe successive elimination of enemystrong points by tank supportedinfantry. Heavy tanks were attachedto units of shock troops, which inturn were attached to regularinfantry battalions. If available,flame throwers and assault gunswere also attached to the infantry.The brigade’s motorized rifle battal-ion was retained as the brigade’sown combat reserve.

Systematic reconnaissance and aerialphotographs were used to determinethe location and extent of the anti-tank obstacles. Appropriateresources were then allocated tounits attacking these obstacles. Atleast two to three lanes had to becleared through antitank obstaclesfor each tank company. Due to theextensive amount of preparatorywork involved, at least three days

was requiredto organize anassault on anextensivelyfortified zone.At least oneday wasrequired toproperly briefthe battalioncommanders.

The mainmission ofmedium tankssupportingregularinfantry was

to destroy enemy troops defendinggaps between bunkers.

Once the assault groups accom-plished their missions, they returnedto the assembly point where thetanks reverted back to the control ofthe brigade commander.

Attacking a Hasty Defense

The main prerequisites for successwhen attackinga hasty defensewere speed,determinationand daring. Ifan immediateand vigorousreconnaissancewas conducted,the preparationtime for theattack was justtwo to threehours. Tankbrigadesattacked hastydefenses incooperationwith rifle divi-

sions or independently.

When assaulting hasty defenses,tanks, directly supported by towedguns, attacked in front of theinfantry. Other tanks supported atrailing echelon of assault guns, orwere assigned to protect the flanksagainst counterattack. A strongreserve force of tanks, infantry,assault guns, antitank weapons andengineers was retained to guardagainst a set back or to exploit abreakthrough.

After cracking the enemy defensethe tank brigade immediately target-ed enemy reserves, staff personnel,artillery batteries and supply troops.If the enemy started to withdraw, thetanks attacked with increase vigor.If the enemy escaped to a preparedsecondary line, the pursuit was bro-ken off and the tanks conformed to aconventional attack against a pre-pared defense.

by Edward Morris

German Prepared Defensive Positions, 205 ID, 1944

German Infantry Defensive Positions, 205 ID, 1944