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Security Evaluation of PostQuantum Cryptography Recent Developments of PostQuantum Cryptography Tsuyoshi Takagi Kyushu University, Institute of Mathematics for Industry http://imi.kyushu-u.ac.jp/~takagi/en/ Workshop on Cyber Security between RHUL and Kyushu Univ. February 29, 2016.

Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

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Page 1: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

Recent Developments of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

Tsuyoshi Takagi

Kyushu University, Institute of Mathematics for Industry

http://imi.kyushu-u.ac.jp/~takagi/en/

Workshop on Cyber Security between RHUL and Kyushu Univ.February 29, 2016.

Page 2: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

Old Cryptography

Special technology used by limited purposes

Daily used technologyContemporary Cryptography

Cryptography is fundamental technology.

Cryptography in Modern Society

http://www.e-gov.go.jp/

Page 3: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s(1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer Quantum Experiments

× × × ×

research phase

widely used

History of Public‐Key Cryptography

1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 | | | | | |

Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) (code-based, lattice-based, multivariate polynomial based, etc)

RSA (widely used in such as SSL, integer factorization problem)

Elliptic Curve Cryptography (short keys, used in embedding devices)

long-term security, efficient implementation, fully homomorphic encryption, multi-linear maps

These cryptosystems are no longer secure in the era of quantum computer.  

~~

Page 4: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

• National Security Agency (NSA) announced preliminary plans for transitioning to quantum resistant algorithms in August 2015. https://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/

• Recent Workshops January 2015, DIMACS Workshop on The Mathematics of Post‐Quantum Cryptographyhttp://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Post‐QuantumApril 2015, NIST Workshop on Cybersecurity in a Post‐Quantum Worldhttp://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/ct/post‐quantum‐crypto‐workshop‐2015.cfmSeptember 2015, Dagstuhl Seminar ‐ Quantum Cryptanalysishttps://www.dagstuhl.de/en/program/calendar/semhp/?semnr=15371November 2015, ESTI Workshop on Quantum‐safe Cryptography February 2016, PQCrypto 2016: https://pqcrypto2016.jp/

• Big Research Projects Post‐quantum cryptography for long‐term security: http://pqcrypto.eu.org/CROSSING:  https://www.crossing.tu‐darmstadt.de/JST CREST CryptoMath: https://cryptomath‐crest.jp/

Trend in Post‐Quantum Cryptography

Page 5: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

PQCrypto 2016

• Winter School February 22‐23, 2016, Fukuoka, Japan.

• NIST announced a preliminary plan of quantum‐resistant algorithms for potential standardization.

Page 6: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

Theory of ComputationNumber 

Theory

Algebraic Geometry

Interaction: Crypto and MathHistorical Success

Advances of Mathematical Theory requiredfor Cryptography

Conventional Cryptography

Mathematical Modeling of

Multi‐Functional Next‐Generation Cryptography

using wide‐range Mathematical 

Theories

MathematicsModeling of theStrongest Possible

Attacks

Quantum Computation

Representation TheoryQuantum

Field TheoryMathematical 

Physics

Lattice TheoryMultivariate Polynomial Theory

Page 7: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

Security Evaluation Cycle

New Scheme

Security Evaluation

Practical Use Expiringkey size

Stress Test

New attack algorithm

How many bits are secure?

How about this attack?

Cycle of about 10 years

discussion in public conferences

Computer speed-up New cryptoanalyses

Page 8: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees in Japan

http://www.cryptrec.go.jp/

Page 9: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

Example of RSA public key

Page 10: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

Current record for factoring integers

• January 2010,  768 bits, 1500 CPU years, Aoki et al. 

• 1230186684530117755130494958384962720772853569595334792197322452151726400507263657518745202199786469389956474942774063845925192557326303453731548268507917026122142913461670429214311602221240479274737794080665351419597459856902143413= 33478071698956898786044169848212690817704794983713768568912431388982883793878002287614711652531743087737814467999489×36746043666799590428244633799627952632279158164343087642676032283815739666511279233373417143396810270092798736308917

Page 11: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

Estimation for Key Length of RSA

Computational cost for finishing the sieving step within one year (updated July 2015)

RSA 1024 bits

RSA 1536 bits

RSA 2048 bits

Tianhe‐2                    Titan                       

K                      Sequoia                      

RSA 768 bits

Page 12: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

Candidates of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

• Hash‐based signature schemes• Code‐based cryptosystems• Multivariate cryptosystems • Lattice‐based cryptosystems • etc

Page 13: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

Lattice‐based Cryptography

Page 14: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

A lattice  is the set of all integer combinations of  linearly independent vectors  . As   , , .

14

Shortest vector problem (SVP): find the shortest vectors in the lattice of given basis  , , . 

Page 15: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

Darmstadt Lattice Challengehttps://www.latticechallenge.org/• SVP Challenge / Lattice Challenge (since 2008) • Ideal Lattice Challenge (since 2013)

Page 16: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography16

Darmstadt Ideal Lattice Challenge

Instance:HNFofRandomLatticeTargetvector s.t. n det1/n. 

Cost Estimation by Simulator 

224.0 sec

220.7 sec

Our simulator gives a sharp estimation.

Page 17: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

Multivariate Public‐Key Cryptography(MPKC)

Page 18: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

MQ problem

mnji ni

mi

miji

mijnm

nji niiijiijn

nji niiijiijn

dcxbxxaxxf

dcxbxxaxxf

dcxbxxaxxf

,1 1

)()()(1

2,1 1

)2()2()2(12

1,1 1

)1()1()1(11

),...,(

),...,(

),...,(

MPKC are public key cryptosystems whose security depends on the difficulty in solving a system of multivariate quadratic polynomials with coefficients in a finite field  . 

MQ problem:  find a solution of the system of multivariate equations:

It is believed that it is difficult to solve (general) MQ problem. 

Page 19: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

MQ ChallengeStarting from April 2015https://www.mqchallenge.org/

Page 20: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

Current records• Type I ( )

m n time110 55 963.53

112 56 2254.21

114 57 5096.94

116 58 10391.10

118 59 18357.53

120 60 23536.88

122 61 80244.52unit: second

Page 21: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

Conclusion

• The attack technology is developing further. 

• We need to keep investigating the security of (post‐quantum) cryptosystems. 

• Challenge problems are used for estimating the computational over‐limit of expected attackers.

Page 22: Recent Developments of Post Quantum Cryptography · Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography Rabi Model Shor IBM’s NMR Haroche-Wineland’s (1944) Algorithm Quantum Computer

Security Evaluation of Post‐Quantum Cryptography

Thank you!Q&A