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USAID Evaluation Special Study No. 76

Rebuilding Postwar Rwanda

The Role of theInternational Community

by

Krishna Kumar, team leader

Center for Development Information and Evaluation

U.S. Agency for International Development

David Tardif–Douglin

Development Alternatives, Inc.

with

Carolyn Knapp, Kim Maynard, Peter Manikas, and Annette Sheckler*

Center for Development Information and Evaluation

U.S. Agency for International Development

July 1996

*Respectively, staff, Development Alternatives, Inc.; independent consultant; fellow, International Human Rights LawInstitute, DePaul University; senior analyst, Refugee Policy Group.

Table of ContentsPage

Summary v

Introduction xii

Glossary xv

1. Political and Economic Background1Economic Context 1Ethnic Composition and Relations 2Political History 2Genocide and Killings of Moderate

Hutu3

Migration of Refugees 4Composition of the New Government 5

2. An Overview of Assistance toRwanda

6

Prewar Development Assistance toRwanda

6

Postwar Humanitarian Assistance 7Problems and Prospects 9

3. Promoting Human Rights andBuilding a Fair Judicial System

11

International Interventions 12Problems and Prospects 21

4. Support to the Economic Sector 23Macroeconomic and Public Management 23Assistance to Agriculture 25Problems and Prospects 27

Page

5. Rehabilitating Health and Education

30

International Intervention in Healthand Sanitation

30

International Interventions in Education 31Problems and Prospects 33

6. Assistance to Vulnerable Groupsand Initiatives for Healing

35

International Interventions for Vulner-able Groups

35

Problems and Prospects 39

7. Return of Refugees and InternallyDisplaced Persons

42

Old-Caseload Refugees 42New Caseload Refugees 43Internally Displaced Persons 48Problems and Prospects 49

8. Crosscutting Issues and a Vision for the Future

53

Consequences of Genocide 53Relationship Between NGOS and the

Government54

Unrealistic Expectations for Repatriation 55Long-Term Development of Rwanda 56

9. Recommendations and LessonsLearned

58

Recommendations for Rwanda 58Lessons Learned for Future Complex

Emergencies 61

Rebuilding Postwar Rwanda iii

Summary

5WANDA IS A SMALL, mountainous,densely populated country in Cen-

tral Africa whose history has been markedby ethnic violence. The economy is basedon the largely rain-fed agricultural produc-tion of small, semisubsistence, and increas-ingly fragmented farms. The ethnic makeupof Rwanda before the recent civil war was90 percent Hutu, 8 percent Tutsi and lessthan 1 percent Twa (an aboriginal group).For 500 years the traditionally cattle-herd-ing Tutsi dominated the agriculturalist Hutuand hunter–potter Twa.

In 1962 the Hutu revolted against theirincreasing marginalization on ethnicgrounds. The revolt succeeded, largely be-cause Belgian administrators shifted theirsupport from the Tutsi aristocracy to theHutu majority in response to the democraticfervor sweeping across Africa. The recentlyexiled regime, which came to power bycoup in 1973, appeared to make importanteconomic and social gains. But the apparenttranquillity and progress concealed unre-solved social and political tensions as wellas structural weaknesses within the econ-omy.

This was the context when, in October1990, the Tutsi-led Rwanda Patriotic Front(RPF) launched from Uganda an offensivethat had been in preparation for years. Con-certed peace negotiations led ultimately tothe August 1993 signing of the Arusha(Tanzania) peace accords. It was during

continued negotiations, in August 1994,that unknown forces shot down the planecarrying the Rwandan president as he wasreturning from Arusha. Relative to the forceit could have brought to bear on the situ-ation, the international community stood bysilently and watched in horror as Rwandaerupted into a grim civil war: the RPF ad-vancing to stop annihilation of Tutsi; theHutu extremist-controlled army and militiabent singlemindedly on exterminating theirenemy.

In May 1995 a team from the Center forDevelopment Information and Evaluation(CDIE) of the U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) visited Rwanda fora firsthand assessment of international as-sistance to that country in the wake of thecivil war. This report synthesizes the team’sfindings.

Assistance to Rwanda

Helping the people of a war-torn nationrehabilitate and reconstruct their society is apolitically delicate process requiring sub-stantial financial commitment and program-matic coherence from the internationalcommunity. With Rwanda, the challengehas been especially daunting because of thegenocide, which resulted in the deaths of600,000–800,000 people and the sub-sequent exodus of 2 million. From April1994 through the end of the year, the inter-national community directed efforts largely

Rebuilding Postwar Rwanda v

at saving lives by providing food, shelter,and medical and sanitary services to refu-gees and internally displaced persons.Emergency food aid was and continues tobe massive. It has prevented large-scalestarvation and malnutrition.

Attention began to shift toward reha-bilitation and reconstruction in September1994, when the international communitygrasped the enormity of the devastation. Asthe year progressed, the level of pledgedassistance grew to slightly more than $1billion. The United States, largely throughUSAID, has been a major provider of fundsand other resources.

Disbursing financial assistance to thenew Tutsi-led government raises a range ofproblems, such as absorptive capacity andissues of legitimacy and accountability. Inlight of potential social, political, and eco-nomic costs of delays, financial support fornational recovery has been painfully slow.According to the UN Development Pro-gram, by September 1995, nine monthsfrom the initial pledging conference, aboutone third (US$245 million) of the initialfunds pledged had been disbursed. Byyear’s end, roughly half the funds initiallypledged had been disbursed.

Of the more than US$2 billion spent onthe Rwandan crisis since April 1994, thevastly larger share has gone to maintenanceof refugees in Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi.Although such a disproportionate allocationis understandable—refugees must be sup-ported—it appears to Rwandans who havelived through the horror of genocide that theinternational community is more concernedabout the refugees than the survivors.

Promoting Human Rights andBuidling a Fair Judicial System

USAID and other donors have sup-ported human rights initiatives in three keyareas to promote national rebuilding: 1) es-tablishment of the International Tribunal forRwanda, 2) reconstruction of the justicesystem, and 3) assistance to the UN HumanRights Field Operation. By May 1995, sixmonths from its establishment, the tribunalhad made only limited progress. From theoutset, it had been facing problems of logis-tics, funding, and staffing, causing long de-lays. With staffing changes in October1995, the pace of investigations stepped up.Thirteen months from its establishment, thetribunal issued its first indictments of sus-pected war criminals, four alleged leaders ofthe genocide. Despite recent progress, de-lays in establishing the tribunal and makingit operational have postponed reconcili-ation, which can hardly be expected to oc-cur in the absence of justice.

If Rwanda is to establish a legal systemthat helps ensure the rights of all citizens, itmust construct a justice system that substan-tially improves on that which previouslyexisted. Several assistance initiatives areunder way. But these programs do not ap-proach the level of assistance that wasbroadly recognized as being required to re-start the justice system. The real challenge,however, is not so much one of marshalingsufficient human and technical resources asof putting into place a new political culturein which differences are settled through dis-cussion and accommodation and notthrough violence and bloodshed.

The UN commissioner for humanrights and the Government of Rwandaagreed to deployment of 147 human rights

vi USAID Special Study No. 76

field officers, one for each of the country’scommunes. The Human Rights Field Op-eration for Rwanda aims to investigate thegenocide, monitor the human rights situ-ation, help reestablish confidence, and pro-vide technical assistance in administrationof justice. Informed observers feel thehuman rights operation has failed to accom-plish its stated mission. Its impact inpreventing human rights violations and pro-moting human rights has been minimal. Itshould, however, be recognized that manyfactors, some of which were beyond thecontrol of the field operation, have contrib-uted to its poor performance. Clearly theentire blame for failure cannot be laid on theleadership of the field operation and its par-ent organization, the UN Center for HumanRights. In October 1995, a new chief as-sumed leadership of the field operation. In-itial reports indicate he is reexamining theentire operation to make it more relevantand effective. It is too early to tell the out-come of his efforts.

Support for the Economic Sector

In consultation with the WorldBank and the International MonetaryFund, the government has taken meas-ures—demonetization and reduction inmoney supply, devaluation and reliance onmarket determination of exchange rates—confirming its seriousness about economicreform. The United States has been one ofthe principal donors in covering the govern-ment’s arrears to unblock World Bank fundsand in reequipping ministries. The govern-ment and international financial institutionsface two major challenges. They are 1)maintaining macroeconomic policy in favor

of growth and development 2) and keepingpublic recurrent expenditure under control.

USAID and others have been largelyresponsible for funding agriculture rehabili-tation programs. The most notable of thesehave been providing seeds and tools to farmhouseholds, multiplying local varieties ofmajor crops, and assisting the Ministry ofAgriculture. In particular, over two seasons,each household received a “package” ofbean, maize, sorghum, and vegetable seedsand one or two hoes. Fifty percent of farm-ers were reached in the first season, 80 per-cent in the second. But some relief person-nel fear such aid has begun to inducedependency of some recipients. Many farm-ers who have received material assistancefor agriculture are squatters on land vacatedby people who were killed or who fled dur-ing the war. An unanticipated effect of seedsand tools distribution may be to entrenchand appear to validate their hold on the land.

Rehabilitating Health and Education

By mid-July 1994, Rwanda’s entirehealth delivery system had collapsed. Morethan 80 percent of its health professionalshad been killed or had fled the country.Private voluntary organizations (PVOs),UN agencies, the International Committeeof the Red Cross, and bilateral donors ar-rived with trained health professionals,medicines, supplies, and equipment. Theyreestablished basic curative services andhelped restore damaged water systems.

On balance, the impact of internationalassistance for public health has been posi-tive. Health delivery systems have largelybeen brought back to prewar levels. Ham-

Rebuilding Postwar Rwanda vii

pering interventions, however, have beenweak initial needs assessments, absence ofprogram strategy development, and ineffec-tual program monitoring and evaluation bysome agencies. Inability or unwillingness ofsome PVOs to formally engage the Ministryof Health in project assessment, design, andapproval has further diminished successesin public health.

International assistance for rehabilita-tion of education, initially directed at theprimary level, has played a limited but valu-able role. It has emphasized emergency sup-plies of material, rehabilitation of struc-tures, and food-aid salary supplements toteachers. The largest and most visible inter-vention was the UN Teacher EmergencyPackage Program. A self-contained mobile“classroom” for 80 students and a teacher,TEP was provided to most of the primaryschools that opened in September 1994.Despite these interventions, internationalassistance in education has been largelycharacterized by ad hoc emergency inter-ventions with limited impact.

Assistance to VulnerableGroups and Initiatives for Healing

Genocide and war altered the country’sdemographic composition so radically thatwomen and girls now represent between 60and 70 percent of the population. By someestimates, between a third and a half of allwomen in the most hard-hit areas are wid-ows. Further, several thousand women wereraped. During the initial stages of emer-gency assistance, women were not givenspecial treatment as a group. Rather, it wasassumed that they would benefit from theassistance provided to various sectors.

Under Rwandan law, property passesthrough male members of the household. Asa result, widows and orphaned daughtersrisk losing their property to male relatives ofthe deceased husband or father. Thus anurgent need exists to change judicial guide-lines and legal interpretations of laws per-taining to property, land, and women’srights. But one year after the genocide, nonational programs of family support for sur-vivors had been set up. Over time, PVOsworking in the community began to recog-nize the distinctive needs of women—wid-ows, victims of violence, and heads ofhouseholds. These organizations developedad hoc initiatives to support communities incaring for the most vulnerable.

Estimates of the number of unaccom-panied children in the region vary between95,000 and 150,000. A wide array of PVOsand Rwandan nongovernmental organiza-tions are carrying out mostly ad hoc pro-grams for unaccompanied children. Mainareas of intervention are in registration,tracing, and reunification; provision of fos-ter care; and capacity-building. By the thirdquarter of 1995, 11,500 children in Rwandaand the camps had been reunited with theirfamilies. Some PVOs rushed into the coun-try opening up new orphanages and centersfor unaccompanied children without anylong-term planning and without the guid-ance and direction of a strong coordinatingbody. Collaboration with and support of na-tional organizations was lacking.

Little attention has been paid to psycho-social healing. Donor efforts have concen-trated on trauma counseling for children.Some organizations, mostly those religiousin nature, have tried to confront the ethnicanimosity directly through reconciliationworkshops and community healing initia-

viii USAID Special Study No. 76

tives, and indirectly within the context oftheir other programs. What few programsthere have been for psychosocial healinghave tended to overlook the needs ofwomen. Also, the international communitymay be misapplying its experience withposttraumatic stress disorder. Missed op-portunities in exploring indigenous con-cepts of mental health and methods of heal-ing conceivably stem from initial lack ofunderstanding of Rwandan society, psyche,and culture. Language skills, so vital to con-fidential communication, also are lacking.

Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

After the victory of Rwanda PatrioticFront forces in July 1994, the so-called old-caseload refugees, primarily Tutsi who hadleft Rwanda beginning in 1959, began re-turning in large numbers. The governmentestimates that more than 700,000 have re-turned. Old-caseload returnees have bene-fited from international assistance throughdirect aid to families, rehabilitation of com-mune structures and services, and assistanceto the Ministry of Rehabilitation. But theslow disbursement of money pledged forrepatriation and reintegration hampers thegovernment’s rehabilitation efforts.

Further, despite efforts of the interna-tional community, little has been accom-plished in the repatriation of 2 million new-caseload refugees who fled to Burundi,Tanzania, and Zaire in 1994. Most of theserefugees were intimidated or terrified intoflight through an orchestrated attempt byhard-line elements of the fleeing govern-ment to maintain leverage and a claim tolegitimacy. The many accounts (both trueand false) of violent reprisals and arbitrary

arrests and detentions of Hutu in Rwandahave also discouraged repatriation. Only asmall number of new-caseload refugeeshave returned thus far, no more than200,000 in 1994 and fewer than 100,000 in1995.

Although the pace of repatriation canbe accelerated, the international communityshould prepare itself for the eventuality thata substantial portion of the refugee popula-tion is still unlikely to repatriate soon, forthree reasons. First, between 10 and 15 per-cent of the refugees in the camps are allegedto have participated directly in mass killing.These refugees and their families would un-derstandably be reluctant to return. Second,transmigration of people has been commonin the Great Lakes region in the past. Refu-gees are not in totally foreign milieus; bondsof language and history help mitigate refu-gees’ nostalgia. Finally, the experience ofpast complex emergencies—man-made cri-ses—shows that it usually takes years, evendecades, before significant voluntary repa-triation takes place. Given these circum-stances, the international community mustdemonstrate more realism in planning itsinitiatives for the refugees than it has doneso far. It must consider a wider range ofsolutions to the crisis.

As for facilitating the return of inter-nally displaced persons, the record of theinternational community is mixed. Thecamps posed a potentially explosive threatto national security and prolonged the tran-sition from emergency to rehabilitation andreconstruction. The international commu-nity agreed to the need for closures but wasunprepared for the aggressive tactics em-ployed by the government. The events at theKibeho camp, in which thousands of dis-placed Hutu were killed by forces of the

Rebuilding Postwar Rwanda ix

Rwanda Patriotic Front, epitomized the gulfbetween government exigencies and reliefagencies’ moral stance and mandates. Theyalso underscored the tragic consequences oflack of communication.

Recommendations and Lessons Learned

USAID is only one of the major inter-national actors in Rwanda. It cannot accom-plish much alone. But it can make a criticaldifference in the performance and impact ofassistance by working closely with otherdonors and taking the lead in various activi-ties. Toward this end, the CDIE team madethe following recommendations:

• Continue assistance to the Governmentof Rwanda for building institutional ca-pacity. Without restoration of institu-tional capacity, it is unrealistic to expectgreater accountability and transpar-ency. USAID should lead donors insupporting 1) training of officials, 2)purchase of office equipment, and 3)rehabilitation of educational and train-ing facilities.

• Continue support for the UN HumanRights Field Operation. Though the op-eration initially proved to be ineffec-tive, a recent shakeup in the leadershipcould change that. The Agency shouldprovide six months of secure fundingfor the field operation. Further fundingshould be conditioned on results in thefield.

• Push countries in which suspectedRwandan war criminals have taken asy-lum to cooperate fully with the investi-gations of the international tribunal’sprosecutor. The Agency should also

make support to reconstruction of thejustice system a top priority.

• In cooperation with other donors, de-velop and implement short-term eco-nomic rehabilitation programs forwomen who have lost their husbandsand other male family members. TheAgency should also support removal oflegal barriers to women’s ownership ofland and other property.

• Push for prompt repatriation and reset-tlement of refugees. USAID and otherdonors can add impetus to this effort bysuch measures as pressuring the UNHigh Commission on Refugees to re-duce social services in refugee campsand inducing the government to formpeace committees in each commune tomonitor and protect the security of refu-gees.

The evaluation team drew these princi-pal lessons applicable to future complexemergencies:

1. The international community failedto comprehend the consequences of thegenocide. The systematic attempt by someHutu to exterminate the Tutsi transformedthe social, political, and economic land-scape of Rwanda. Above all, it underminedthe social trust that binds people together.The international community has largelyfailed to incorporate the implications ofgenocide in the design and implementationof assistance programs in Rwanda, treatingthe crisis like any other civil war. The cul-tural insensitivity of the international com-munity has at times devalued the tragic so-cial and human dimensions of the genocideas perceived by the Rwandans. Most lamen-table has been the rush to promote reconcili-

x USAID Special Study No. 76

ation over the understandable resistance ofthose who suffered immensely.

2. New mechanisms are needed forrapid delivery of rehabilitation assistance.During the initial response phase, donorsexpeditiously delivered massive humanitar-ian assistance to Rwanda and camps inneighboring countries. Postemergency pro-gramming, however, reverted to establishedprocedures, which usually take one to twoyears. The delay means that much neededresources are not available for meeting ur-gent rehabilitation needs.

3. Self-regulation by PVOs would im-prove impact. Some PVOs lacked essentialexperience and expertise to function effec-tively in developing societies. Others failedto coordinate their operations with fellowPVOs and relief agencies. Still others luredexperienced staff from the government by

offering higher salaries and benefits. Hadthe PVO community followed a well-formulated code of conduct for its opera-tions, the organizations would have usedtheir resources more efficiently and hadgreater impact.

4. Mechanisms for collecting, analyz-ing, and sharing background informationabout the crisis need to be institutionalized.Lack of in-depth knowledge of the histori-cal, political, social, and economic contextof the crisis undermined the effectiveness ofinternational interventions. For example, intheir ignorance of the extent of involvementof political leaders in the genocide, reliefagencies allowed former leaders to deliverassistance in refugee camps. This enabledthe very people who commanded the geno-cide to reestablish their command over therefugees.

Rebuilding Postwar Rwanda xi

Introduction

7HE CRISIS IN RWANDA has testedthe capacity of the international

humanitarian community to respond. Morethan half a million people were massacredin less than 10 weeks of genocide and civilwar. Unprecedented numbers of peoplewere then uprooted from their homes andfled to internal or external asylum. Hun-dreds of thousands of refugees suffered im-measurably or died en route to, or within,camps. The exceedingly brutal and wide-spread nature of killing in Rwanda makesthe crisis one of this century’s most pro-foundly tragic and least understood. Thedepth of destruction to the social and cul-tural institutions has been so great as to benearly complete.

Purpose and Scope

This report is based on a study conduc-ted in 1995 by the Center for DevelopmentInformation and Evaluation (CDIE) of theU.S. Agency for International Developmentfor a multidonor evaluation of emergencyassistance to Rwanda. Its primary objectiveis to examine the effectiveness, impact, andrelevance of international assistance on re-patriation, rehabilitation, reconstruction,and long-term development in Rwanda.Three points have been taken into accountin framing and answering the evaluationquestions. First, the evaluation examinesactivities of international donors and reliefand development agencies. Second, an

evaluation by definition concentrates oncompleted or ongoing activities. It is notmeant to be a needs assessment. Finally, thestudy seeks to draw lessons from the expe-rience of the international community inorder to formulate specific recommenda-tions for Rwanda and for future complexemergencies.

Methodology

The evaluation began with interviewswith aid agencies. From these and a compre-hensive literature review, a background pa-per was developed to provide an in-depthview of the changing situation in Rwandathat directly fed into the two field studies.The evaluation team conducted in-personand phone interviews with staff of interna-tional organizations involved in repatria-tion, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and de-velopment issues in Rwanda. Meetingswere held in the New York offices of the UNDepartments of Humanitarian Affairs, Po-litical Affairs, and Peace Keeping Opera-tions, and UN Development Program(UNDP), UN High Commission on Refu-gees (UNHCR), and UN Children’s Fund(UNICEF).

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)met with during this initial phase of researchincluded Save the Children/UK, Interna-tional Rescue Committee, the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross, Human RightsWatch/Africa, CARE, Catholic Relief Serv-

xii USAID Special Study No. 76

ices (CRS), InterAction, and the U.S. Com-mittee for Refugees. In addition, major bi-lateral and multilateral donors were inter-viewed about their funding forrehabilitation and reconstruction activities.They included the United States, Belgium,Germany, Holland, Japan, Canada, theEuropean Union, the World Bank, the Afri-can Development Bank, and the Interna-tional Monetary Fund. Phone interviewswith the home offices of non-U.S.-basedrelief agencies were also conducted includ-ing Trocaire, Action Nord–Sud, WorldCouncil of Churches, MSF/Belgium, andTear Fund.

Comprehensive literature review wasconducted to improve the formulation ofquestions for the Rwanda evaluation and toprovide a validity check for its findings andconclusions. The review concentrated onlessons from past disasters. The findingswere presented in a roundtable discussion,during which experts convened to share les-sons from Bosnia, Cambodia, CentralAmerica, Mozambique, Somalia, and otheremergency areas.

Subsequently, two field studies wereconducted. One examined the progress andprospects for repatriation and rehabilitationof refugees and displaced persons; the otherexplored questions about rehabilitation, re-construction and development, and cross-cutting issues. To gather the needed data andinformation, the field study teams 1) con-ducted key informant interviews withknowledgeable individuals in Rwanda andasylum countries, 2) visited many organiza-tions and governmental institutions at na-tional and local levels, and 3) interviewed asample of the affected population throughgroup meetings and informal surveys in the

countryside and in and around camps forrefugees and internally displaced persons.

The first field study, conducted by afive-member team, was carried out in Bu-rundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zairefrom April 21 to May 18, 1995. The teammet with UN, NGO, and church officials;current and former government repre-sentatives; soldiers; local civic associationleaders; and new- and old-caseload refugeesand returnees. Team members toured refu-gee camps, transit centers, open relief cen-ters, communes, and camps for internallydisplaced persons.

A five-member team visited Rwandafrom May 9 to June 3, 1995, to conduct thesecond field study. The team visited mar-kets, seed multiplication projects, farmercooperatives, food aid distribution centers,primary and secondary schools, rural healthclinics, hospitals, orphanages, and prisons.The team met with UN officials, donor rep-resentatives, Rwandan government officials(president’s office, prime minister’s office,Ministries of Rehabilitation, Planning,Health, Education, Agriculture, Justice, andWomen’s Affairs, and central bank offi-cials), NGOs, representatives of Rwandancivil society, farmers, small business peo-ple, and individual households.

From June to September a three-personsynthesis team, assisted at times by special-ists who had written subreports, prepared acomprehensive evaluation report. After re-ceiving comments from the steering com-mittee (made up of donors and UN, relief,and development agencies), the team madefurther revisions.

Rebuilding Postwar Rwanda xiii

Organization

The report is presented according tomajor topics. The next section provides apolitical and economic background ofRwanda. Following that is an overview ofthe major programs for rehabilitation andreconstruction. Next is an examination ofassistance to the national judicial admini-stration, of the record of human rights moni-tors, and of support for the international warcrimes tribunal. The next section assessesefforts to support macroeconomic policy re-forms and capacity building, provide a sta-ble monetary and fiscal foundation for re-covery, and rehabilitate agriculture and therural economy.

Interventions to rehabilitate two keysocial sectors (health and primary educa-tion) are covered in the subsequent section.The next section analyzes assistance given

to especially vulnerable populations (wid-ows, orphans, and unaccompanied children)and assesses programs for social and psy-chological healing and reconciliation. Next,international efforts to facilitate the returnand eventual resettlement of refugees andinternally displaced people are analyzed. Inthe following section issues that cut acrossall interventions (consequences of the geno-cide, relations between NGOs and the Gov-ernment of Rwanda, and prospects for thereturn of refugees) are discussed. This sec-tion also reviews issues related to longerterm development, highlighting the windowof opportunity afforded by rehabilitation as-sistance. The final section presents recom-mendations for continued assistance toRwanda as well as lessons learned from theRwanda experience for other complexemergencies.

xiv USAID Special Study No. 76

GlossaryCDIE Center for Development

Information and Evalu-ation (USAID)

CRS Catholic Relief Services

E.U. European Union

FAO Food and Agricultural Organization

HRFOR Human Rights Field Operation for Rwanda(UN)

IARCs International AgricultureResearch Centers

ICRC International Committeefor the Red Cross

LACU Legal Analysis and Coordination Unit

NGO nongovernmental organi-zation

PVO private voluntary organi-zation

RPA Rwanda Patriotic Army

RPF Rwanda Patriotic Front

TEP Teacher Emergency Packages

UNAMIR UN Assistance Mission toRwanda

UNDP UN Development Program

UNESCO UN Educational, Scientific, and CulturalOrganization

UNHCHR UN High Commission onHuman Rights

UNHCR UN High Commission onRefugees

UNICEF UN Children’s Fund

UNREO UN Rwanda EmergencyOffice

WFP World Food Program

Rebuilding Postwar Rwanda xv

1

Political and EconomicBackground

5ZDQGD� LV� D� VPDOO�� moun-tainous, landlocked, and densely

populated country in Central Africa whosehistory has been marked by ethnic violence.It is bordered on the south by Burundi,which shares a similarly troubled and vio-lent history. To the west, the Kivu region ofZaire has a large ethnic Rwandan popula-tion. To the north, Uganda also has a Kiny-warwanda-speaking population. On the eastis Tanzania, whose northwestern region hastraditionally been an area of Rwandan mi-gration. High, well-distributed rainfall, andgood soils, especially in the volcanic re-gions, have permitted the sustenance oflarge populations in Rwanda.

Economic Context

Before the 1990 civil war intensifiedand degenerated into genocide and massmigration (between April and July 1994),more than 9 in 10 of the Rwandan popula-tion of nearly 8 million lived on farms. TheRwandan economy is based on the largelyrain-fed agricultural production of thesesmall, semisubsistence, and increasinglyfragmented farms. It has few natural re-sources to exploit other than its ecotourismpotential, and it has a small, relatively un-

competitive industrial sector. Production ofcoffee and tea, however, is well suited to thesmall farms, steep slopes, and cool climatesof Rwanda and has ensured access to for-eign exchange over the years. Nonetheless,Rwanda is extremely poor and faces thestark prospect of an even poorer future be-cause of the juxtaposition of rapid popula-tion growth (despite the large number ofpeople killed) with continued reliance onsemisubsistence agriculture.

From the 1960s through the early1980s, a generally conservative approach toeconomic management, combined with fa-vorable terms of trade for Rwandan com-modities (primarily coffee and tea), led toslight positive trade balances and a stablecurrency and contributed to a congenial en-vironment for development projects. Agri-cultural production kept pace with and evenexceeded population growth rates. By themid- to late 1980s, however, the collapse ofworld coffee prices and continuing highpublic expenses led to an economic crisis.The crisis peaked in 1990, when the firstmeasures of a structural adjustment pro-gram were carried out. Although the pro-gram of structural adjustment was not fullyimplemented before the war, key measures

~

such as two large devaluations and the re-moval of official prices were enacted andhad powerful effects on civil servants andthe urban population. Juxtaposed againstthe developing rebel insurgency fromUganda, the hiring freezes and other cost-containment measures of structural adjust-ment contributed to the perception oflargely Hutu elites that their future wasbleak.

At the same time, agriculture, the main-stay of the economy, was undergoing a cri-sis. While population had grown at the highrate of 3 percent a year, agricultural technol-ogy had progressed very little. Conse-quently, per capita production of food hadbeen declining. Population density in 1994was 466 people per square kilometer of ar-able land. Farm sizes were declining and by1994 were on average smaller than one hec-tare. Near-continuous use of farmland withlittle use of fertilizer led to soil exhaustionand erosion. Outmigration, used frequentlyin the past as the solution of last resort, wasbecoming less tenable as populations (andresentment of immigrants) in neighboringcountries were growing. The realization thattoo many people were occupying too littleland facilitated (but did not cause) wide-spread participation in politically motivatedmassacres of ethnic minorities and moder-ate Hutu.

Ethnic Composition and Relations

According to the 1991 census, the eth-nic makeup of Rwanda before the war wasroughly 90 percent Hutu, 8 percent Tutsi,and less than 1 percent Twa. The postwarcomposition is unknown. The agricultural-ist Hutu are commonly believed to have

migrated into the region nearly a thousandyears ago. The cattle-herding Tutsi began toappear in the region 400 years later (15thcentury) and were assimilated by the Hutu.The Tutsi took on the language and tradi-tions of the Hutu and lived among them.Although there were clear ethnic distinc-tions, clan affiliation, which cut across eth-nic lines, seems to have been more impor-tant in precolonial times.

Gradually, Tutsi military rule and ad-ministration was established over the Hutuand Twa in Rwanda as in Burundi. Duringmuch of the colonial period, the Belgianadministrators, operating under a racialistmyth of Tutsi superiority, entrenched Tutsihegemony by removing Hutu chiefs, favor-ing Tutsi in education, and concentratingadministrative positions in the hands ofTutsi. Furthermore, Belgian policy rein-forced and stiffened ethnic identity, chang-ing what had been a more fluid ethnic andsocioeconomic classification. In 1959,however, with the support of Belgian colo-nial rulers, Hutu overthrew the Tutsi monar-chy to begin what turned out to be 35 yearsof political dominance in Rwanda.

Political History

The Hutu revolted against being in-creasingly marginalized from political lifeon ethnic grounds. Their revolt was success-ful largely because Belgian administratorsshifted their support from the Tutsi aristoc-racy to the Hutu majority in response to thedemocratic fervor sweeping Africa. Thefirst republic (1962–73) was markedthroughout by ethnic confrontations inwhich many Tutsi, especially chiefs andsubchiefs, were killed or forced to flee.There were cycles of raids by Tutsi exiles,

2 USAID Special Study No. 76

and repression and massacres of Tutsi by theHutu-dominated government and military.Finally, this period saw the end of all Tutsi-dominated political parties and overt Tutsiparticipation in politics.

The recently exiled regime came topower by coup in 1973 as the Second Re-public. Until the mid-1980s it was widelyregarded as relatively incorrupt, seriousabout development, and a good steward ofinternational assistance. Throughout thatperiod, Rwanda appeared to make impor-tant gains in the economic and socialspheres. Roads and other communicationsinfrastructure were built and maintained,access to social services was increased, andsoil conservation works were expanded.Ethnic tensions seemed to have declined;there were few incursions by Tutsi exilesduring most of the 20 years of the SecondRepublic (1973–94).

The apparent tranquillity and progressconcealed important unresolved social andpolitical tensions and structural weaknesseswithin the economy. Rwanda’s develop-ment policies and programs were increas-ingly characterized by lack of vision, in-creased regional and ethnic bias, andinadequate emphasis on development of hu-man resources. Large infusions of develop-ment assistance contributed significantly tobolstering a system of patronage, reinfor-cing the perception of the state as employerand provider of first resort and later ena-bling a massive military buildup.

This was the internal context when, inOctober 1990, the Tutsi-controlled RwandaPatriotic Front (RPF) launched an offensivefrom Uganda. It had been in preparation formany years. The Rwandan Army, withZairian, French, and Belgian military assis-

tance, repulsed the attack. This led to aprotracted period (1990 to mid-1992) of si-multaneous fighting and negotiating. Con-certed peace negotiations began in Arusha,Tanzania, in June 1992 and led ultimately tothe August 1993 signing of the Arushapeace accords.

Throughout this period of intense ne-gotiations, the government was seriouslyfractured. Earlier, under pressure from theinternational community, the president hadbeen obliged to allow formation of politicalparties to compete for power in a new mul-tiparty democracy. Some of these opposi-tion parties were included in the transitiongovernment; some were more closely alliedto the RPF than to the ruling party, theNational Movement for Democracy andDevelopment. Among the key negotiatorsin Arusha were members of opposition par-ties who shared the RPF’s distrust of theruling party. This led to the Hutu hard-linerperception that their interests were beingignored and fostered strong opposition toimplementation of the peace agreement. Assoon as the peace agreement was signed, theopposition parties began to split, largelyalong ethnic lines. It was during continuednegotiations on power sharing and the com-position of the new government of transi-tion that the president’s plane was shotdown upon his return on 6 April 1994 frommeetings in Arusha.

Genocide and Killings of Moderate Hutu

Immediately after the plane wasdowned, elimination of opposition leadersbegan. Ironically, what was ultimately tobecome an attempt to annihilate the Tutsibegan with the assassination of moderate

Rebuilding Postwar Rwanda 3

Hutu in the coalition government. Althoughthere is not yet any proof of who shot downthe presidential plane or who ordered itsdowning, circumstantial evidence—such asmotive and access—points to elementswithin the former president’s own entou-rage. Determining who killed the presidentis critical to interpreting the resultingevents. In the first few days, political andethnic killings and fighting between gov-ernment forces and RPF took place largelywithin Kigali. With the evacuation of expa-triates and the retrenchment of the UN As-sistance Mission to Rwanda peacekeepingtroops, and ultimately their reduction inforce, the hunt for Tutsi spread throughoutthe countryside. The advance of the RPFcontinued ostensibly to stem the genocide.

Compared with the force it could havebrought to bear on the situation, the interna-tional community stood by silently andwatched in horror as Rwanda was grippedby the grim race against time: the RPF ad-vancing to stop the annihilation of Tutsi,and the Hutu extremist-controlled army andmilitia determinedly set on the extermina-tion of their enemy. By the time the Hutuextremists had enacted as much of theirscorched-earth policy as possible and fledthe country under the pursuit of the RPF,more than 500,000 people (mostly Tutsi)had been killed, and more than 2 million(mostly Hutu) had been taken out of thecountry. As the enormity of what had hap-pened in Rwanda began to dawn on the restof the world, the response became massivebut also disproportionate. The vast majorityof resources went to maintain refugee popu-lations in asylum countries. Many of theserefugees were complicit in the genocide ofTutsi and the massive killing of moderateHutu.

Migration of Refugees

The migration of refugees began asearly as April 1994 with the flight of Tutsifortunate enough to have been living alongthe borders of Rwanda or to have had accessto vehicles and to have evaded the militia.This flight was dwarfed by the massive out-flows of Hutu ahead of the RPF advance,first into Tanzania and then into Zaire.

In just two days at the end of April1994, an estimated 250,000 people fled toTanzania. By the end of the month 1.3 mil-lion people had left their homes. As the RPFgradually secured control of the west, vastnumbers of Hutu took refuge in the newly


established French safe zone in the South-west, while others fled to Goma, Zaire, cre-ating the largest short-term human migra-tion in recorded history. By the time theRPF had unilaterally declared a cease-fire(18 July 1994) approximately 25 percent ofthe Rwandan population had fled the coun-try. The migrations into Zaire, especially,were characterized by premeditation, or-chestration, and leadership by hard-lineHutu government and community authori-ties. In an intensive propaganda campaign,they spread fear among the population ofreprisals by advancing troops of theRwanda Patriotic Army (RPA), the armedwing of the Rwanda Patriotic Front. Somewere forced to flee by threats of physicalviolence. In Goma, refugees camped on vol-canic rock offering virtually no water ortrees for firewood and building shelters. Ex-tremely poor sanitation contributed to theensuing cholera and dysentery epidemicsthat killed 50,000 people.1

Besides refugees, many people wereuprooted and displaced within the country.Initially, Tutsi and moderate Hutu fled theirhomes to churches, schools, stadiums, andother public places traditionally used forasylum. Many of those fleeing were killedin these places. Some survived and returnedto their homes; others settled away fromtheir homes for fear of their neighbors.Some camps for internally displaced per-sons, especially those established in theFrench Zone (“Zone Turquoise” ) became

havens for Hutu-extremist militia. As such,they were considered highly threatening tothe new government and were targeted forclosing. The process of closing the campsfor internally displaced persons culminatedin the deadly April 1995 confrontation atKibeho in which many thousands of peoplewere killed, largely by RPA troops.

Composition of the New Government

The government that took power withthe end of the war was in principle a coali-tion government of transition, made up ofrepresentatives of various political parties.It took the Arusha accords as its inspirationand claim to legitimacy. Accordingly, theposition of prime minister was given to theHutu president of the moderate wing of thefractured Democratic Republican Move-ment party. A Hutu RPF leader was namedpresident. In reality, however, the powerbehind the new government was Tutsi–RPF: the military leader of the victoriousRPF became vice president and minister ofdefense. The alliance between military andcivilian, RPF and other coalition members,and Hutu and Tutsi has been uneasy. Afterrepeated conflicts with RPF members of thegovernment over human rights abuses andother excesses of the RPA, the prime minis-ter resigned (or was fired), a little over oneyear from formation of the government. Atthe same time, four ministers were fired.


1“Public Health Impact of Rwandan Refugee Crisis: What Happened in Goma, Zaire, in July, 1994?” The Lancet(February 1995).

2

An Overview of Assistance to Rwanda

Prewar Development Assistance to Rwanda

5WANDA HAS over the years re-ceived large sums of foreign aid

relative to the size of its population andeconomy; average annual receipts from1985 through 1991 amounted to $238 mil-lion.2 In 1991, per capita official develop-ment assistance was nearly five times theaverage for all low-income countries (twicethe average, excluding China and India).3

From 1980 to 1992, per capita developmentassistance grew by 60 per cent.4 Develop-ment assistance grew to nearly one quarterof gross domestic production 1992, from 10percent in the 1980s and under 5 percent inthe 1970s.

Growth in development assistance inthe earlier period reflected a consensus thatRwanda had the right development priori-

ties and the ability to absorb the resourcesgranted or loaned to it. By the late 1980s andearly 1990s, however, the large amount ofassistance provided was to keep the Rwan-dan economy afloat, to counter the effects ofexternal shocks such as the decline in worldprices for its exports, and to help the gov-ernment get through a period of structuraladjustment.

Principal development partners ofRwanda traditionally have been Belgium,France, and Germany. The contribution ofUSAID, however, has grown over the years(see figure 2.1). The prewar goal ofUSAID’s program in Rwanda was to “ in-crease participatory economic growth bydecreasing the population growth rate, in-creasing real income in the private sector,and improving democratic governance.”5

USAID hoped to slow the growth in popu-lation through increased use of modern con-

~


2World Bank. 1994. “World Development Report 1994, World Development Indicators.” Oxford University Press.

3Ibid.

4The Economist Intelligence Unit. 1994. “Country Profile: Rwanda, Burundi, 1994–95.” London.

5“Rwanda Overview Profile.” 1993. USAID. Photocopy.

traceptive practices, increased accountabil-ity of the government in economic and so-cial policies, and increased commercial out-put by small- and medium-scale enterprisesand farms. The large increase in USAIDassistance to the government from 1989through 1993 was largely to facilitate struc-tural adjustments.

Postwar Humanitarian Assistance

From April 1994 through the end of theyear, the international community directedits efforts largely at saving lives by provid-ing food, shelter, and medical and sanitaryservices to refugees and internally displacedpeople. The vast majority of the assistancewas expended to maintain refugee popula-tions in Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi.Emergency food aid, provided mostly bythe United States and European Union, wasand continues to be massive. It has undoubt-edly prevented large-scale starvation andmalnutrition among the affected population.Because of varying financial-costing meth-ods employed, there is no consensus on the

total value of resources used in response tothe Rwanda crisis. Nonetheless, going bygrants or other assistance reported to the UNDepartment of Humanitarian Affairs, wellover $1 billion was expended during fiscalyear 1994 (see figure 2.2), and probablymore than $2 billion through 1995.

Attention began to shift toward reha-bilitation and reconstruction in late Septem-ber 1994, when the international commu-nity realized the severity of devastationbrought about by the civil war and geno-cide. Since then, UN and donor agencieshave supported a wide array of projects andprograms in different sectors and regionsthroughout the country. One year into thecrisis, about 130 nongovernmental organi-zations (NGOs) were represented inRwanda in May 1995. Relations betweenNGOs and the Rwandan government, how-ever, have been characterized by wariness,bordering on suspicion and hostility in somecases. In December 1995, 38 NGOs wereexpelled. An additional 18 had their activi-ties suspended pending further negotiations.Most NGOs, 102 in all, remained opera-tional.

The $200 million World Bank Emer-gency Recovery Program was among thefirst major initiatives specifically aimed atreconstruction. It included a $50 millionemergency recovery credit for private sectorneeds assessment and rehabilitation. By theend of 1995, direct funding to the govern-ment under this credit had not yet beendisbursed. Assistance to the private sectorhad been released, and the terms of thecredit allowed some reimbursement of ex-penses incurred back to November 1994. Inaddition, the UN Development Program(UNDP) designed the Rehabilitation andReintegration Program in Rwanda in late

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1994. Its purpose is to mobilize resourcesfor small-scale projects to build infrastruc-ture and generate income. The UN Assis-tance Mission to Rwanda also submitted acomprehensive normalization plan identify-ing priority areas in infrastructure, essentialservices, and vital socioeconomic needs. Inaddition to the Secretary General’s TrustFund for Rwanda, established in July 1994for emergency aid, a second trust fund wasestablished by UNDP at the request of do-nors in November 1994 to accelerate dis-bursement of funds for rehabilitation. Thesefunds have been used largely for providingadministrative support to the government,rehabilitating the judicial system, and refur-bishing the city of Kigali.

The UN Consolidated Inter-AgencyAppeal of January 1995 (referred to hereaf-ter as the Appeal), while still primarily aprogram of emergency assistance, had im-portant rehabilitation and reconstructioncomponents. In fact, most rehabilitationwork up through the middle of the year wasfunded through the Appeal. The agenciesmost closely associated with rehabilitationand reconstruction activities in the Appeal

have been the Food andAgricultural Organiza-tion, UNHCR, UNICEF,and the World Food Pro-gram.

The most criticalpostemergency event ininternational assistance toRwanda was the UNDP-sponsored January 1995Roundtable PledgingConference for RwandaReconstruction. A sharedframework, around whichrehabilitation and recon-

struction assistance has been organized (in-cluding programs explained above), wasformulated at the conference and recordedin a document referred to as the RwandaRecovery Program. Table 2.1 presents theamount of assistance requested by the gov-ernment in January 1995, the amountpledged (as revised in May), and amountscommitted and disbursed as of September1995. As the table demonstrates, pledges insupport of the Rwanda Recovery Programhave been substantial. As the year pro-gressed, the level of pledged assistancegrew to slightly more than $1 billion. TheUnited States, largely through USAID, hasbeen a major provider of funds and otherresources through the roundtable and theAppeal.

Problems and Prospects

Delayed Disbursement of Pledged Funds

Disbursement of emergency assistanceto Rwanda through initial UN agency andNGO appeals was relatively rapid. But do-

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nors have been slow to provide assistance tothe government for national recovery. Lessthan 10 percent of the pledged amount hadbeen disbursed nearly halfway through theyear. This situation began to improve sub-stantially toward the end of the year (seetable 2.1). Nine months from the initialpledging conference, about one third ($245million) of the pledged funds had been dis-bursed. By the end of the year roughly halfhad been disbursed.

Many factors account for the delay indisbursement of pledged funds. They in-clude

• Suspended donor direct assistance be-cause of opposition to excessive gov-ernment force used in closing camps,specifically in Kibeho

• Procedures that can take from one totwo years to design, assess, and approvedevelopment projects

• Implicit and explicit conditions by

some donors on assistance that haveinfluenced the pace at which funds arereleased

• Limited absorptive capacity (limitedtechnical and administrative staff) ofthe government and unwillingness toaccept foreign technical assistance

• Reasonable concerns about the politicallegitimacy and durability of the newgovernment that have made it difficultto disburse funds directly through it

Overall, regardless of the causes, de-lays in disbursement of funds are undermin-ing the government’s capability to pursuetimely initiatives for economic recoveryand political stability.

Disproportionate Allotment of Assistance

Of the more than $2 billion spent on theRwanda crisis since April 1994, the vastly

Table 2.1 January 1995 Roundtable Conference: Financial Tracking (in millions of dollars)

RequestedaPledgedb

May 1995CommittedSept. 1995

DisbursedSept. 1995

Financial supportRepatriation and reintegrationRehabitation and reconstructionOutside roundtable process and unallocatedc

Total

189.6273.7300.9

0.0

764.2

186.265.6

314.2141.3

707.3

111.242.7

284.584.6

523.1

50.125.594.175.3

245.1

aRequested in January 1995 by the government through the Rwanda Recovery Program.bPledged amounts, as revised after the conference; committed and disbursed amounts as perUNDP/Rwanda Ministry of Plan document, “Donors Contributions for Rwanda Since GenevaRoundtable Conference,” facsimile copy received 26 September 1995.cFunds not matching Rwanda Recovery Program or unallocated within the subprograms.


larger share has gone to maintenance ofrefugees in asylum countries. The EuropeanUnion has estimated that as of May 1995, italone was spending $400,000 a day to main-tain the refugee camps.6

Figure 2.3 shows quarterly allocationof grants, or use of funds, for humanitarianassistance related to the crisis for the one-year period from April 1994 through March1995 from the eight largest bilateral donors7

and the European Union. As the figure sug-gests, roughly two thirds of all assistance,both emergency and rehabilitation aid, wasprovided outside Rwanda. Furthermore,only about 11 percent of the grants of thesesame nine donors during the one-year pe-riod was provided specifically for rehabili-tation and reconstruction.

Gross measures such as these cannotgive the full picture, but they do suggest adisproportionate response, especially inlight of the nature of Rwanda’s refugee cri-sis. Such a disproportionate allocation isunderstandable, though hardly justifiable.Despite attempts on the part of some majordonors to balance their assistance, it appearsto Rwandans who have lived through thehorror of genocide that the internationalcommunity is more concerned about therefugees than the surviving victims of thegenocide. Further, the refugee camps,which are totally dependent on internationalassistance, pose a serious security threat toRwanda because they have been heavilyarmed by shipments from abroad. More-over, increased rehabilitation and recon-struction expenditures to promote economic

growth and social rec-onciliation could pro-vide an inducement tosome refugees to returnhome. (The above dis-cussion is not intendedto convey the impres-sion that internationalassistance to Rwandaand refugees is a zero-sum game in which as-sistance to one comes atthe expense of theother.)

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6Interview with European Union delegation chief Achim Kratz, May 1995.

7The United States, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Belgium.

3

Promoting Human Rightsand Building a Fair

Judicial System

7HE LEGAL�infrastructure and law-enforcement system, which col-

lapsed in the aftermath of the civil war,remain a shambles. Court facilities had notbeen revived substantially nearly midwaythrough 1995; 3 of 11 courts of first instancedid not have a functioning prosecutor’s of-fice. Law enforcement duties continue to beperformed primarily by men and officers ofthe military, either in their capacity as RPAsoldiers or in their redeployed status as gen-darmes. There are almost no defense attor-neys, and of 800 people employed asmagistrates in the communal and prefecturetribunals before April 1994, only 40 remain.

Prisons continue to be severely over-crowded, the government having squeezed41,000 prisoners into a central prison sys-tem designed to house only 12,250 inmates.As of December 1995, an additional 15,000to 20,000 prisoners were housed in commu-nal prisons throughout the country, and ar-rests and detention continue. Since August1994, hundreds of prisoners have died ofasphyxiation and diarrhea, primarily ill-nesses tied directly or indirectly to sanitary

conditions created by overcrowding. InApril 1995 an average of 1,500 additionalpeople were being arrested each week. Thenumber declined to roughly 500 people perweek in September.

Constructing a viable judicial systemand ensuring protection of human rights inpresent-day Rwanda are critical for severalreasons. Refugees in neighboring countriesare reluctant to return unless they are as-sured of justice and security at home. Addi-tionally, conviction and punishment by le-gally constituted courts of those who wereinvolved in the massacres are likely to alle-viate the desire to exact revenge on suspectsand begin to address a culture of impunity.Moreover, the UN, as well as memberstates, has an obligation under the GenocideConvention to take action for the “preven-tion and suppression of acts of genocide.”But above all, an effective judicial systemthat guarantees basic human rights is a pre-requisite to political stability and evolutionof a democratic ethos in Rwanda.

USAID and other donors have support-ed human rights initiatives in three main

~


areas: establishment of the InternationalTribunal for Rwanda, reconstruction of thejustice system, and the UN Human RightsField Operation. The impetus for these in-itiatives was the findings of the UN specialrapporteur and a Commission of Experts,which looked into alleged human rights vio-lations.

International Interventions

The Special Rapporteur and the Commission of Experts

In May 1994, the UN Commission forHuman Rights authorized the appointmentof a special rapporteur to Rwanda to inves-tigate the human rights situation and gatherand compile information on possible viola-tions of human rights, including acts ofgenocide. The special rapporteur submittedhis first report to the commission in June1994 stating that gross violations of humanrights had occurred in Rwanda. Further, inJuly 1994 an impartial three-member Com-mission of Experts found that both the RPFand the former Rwandan government forceshad perpetrated serious breaches of interna-tional humanitarian law and crimes againsthumanity. Forces of the former Hutu-domi-nated government were also found to havecommitted acts of genocide. The commis-sion stated, however, that it had not un-covered any evidence that Tutsi elementshad perpetrated acts committed with the in-tent to destroy the Hutu ethnic group.

Both the special rapporteur and theCommission of Experts called for establish-ment of a war crimes tribunal. On the basisof the reports submitted by the special rap-porteur and the preliminary report issued bythe Commission of Experts, as well as re-ports of the UN secretary general and therequest of the Government of Rwanda, theSecurity Council on 8 November 1994, es-tablished the International Tribunal forRwanda, pursuant to its powers under chap-ter VII of the UN Charter.8 Although themandate for the Commission of Experts haslapsed, the special rapporteur for Rwandacontinues to perform several functions.They include following the progress of theHuman Rights Field Operation in Rwanda,investigating the genocide, and looking intorecent events such as the tragedy at the in-ternally displaced persons camp at Kibeho.9

International Tribunal for Rwanda

The International Tribunal for Rwanda,along with the International Criminal Tribu-nal for the Former Yugoslavia, is the firstattempt of the international community toprosecute violations of international hu-manitarian law since the close of the SecondWorld War. The tribunal consists of 11judges. Of these, five are shared with thetribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and sixare specific to the Rwanda tribunal. Arusha,Tanzania, was chosen as the seat for thetribunal, and the Security Council appointedthe prosecutor of the tribunal for Yugoslavia


8See UN document S/res/955/1994. The vote was 13 in favor of the resolution, one against (Rwanda), and oneabstention (China). It is generally believed Rwanda voted against the resolution because it precluded application ofthe death penalty.

9See UN document E/CN.4/1996/7 (28 June 1995), p. 1.

to serve also as prosecutor for the Rwandatribunal. A deputy prosecutor has been ap-pointed. A director of investigations washired with the collateral duty of establishinga prosecutor’s office in Kigali. The six trialjudges of the Rwanda tribunal were electedby the UN General Assembly after govern-ments submitted nominations to the Secu-rity Council. They were sworn in at TheHague in June 1995 and were beginningtheir work a year later.

High Rwandan officials have repeat-edly voiced dissatisfaction with the tribunal.At its creation in November 1994, theRwandan government strongly opposed theprovision of the Security Council resolutionthat prohibited imposition of the death pen-alty. Rwandan government officials alsourged that Kigali be named the seat of thetribunal, arguing that Rwandans were enti-tled to direct access to the proceedings. Fi-nally, the government pressed for temporaljurisdiction of the tribunal to begin as earlyas 1992, instead of January 1994. That wasso that planners, instigators, and organizersof massacres of Tutsis before commence-ment of the actual genocide in April 1994could be brought to justice. The officialswere, however, unable to convince the Se-curity Council on any of these points. Addi-tionally, and perhaps unrealistically, bothsurvivors and government officials believedthe tribunal would begin prosecutions be-fore the end of 1994. They were disap-pointed when it did not.

At the time of the May 1995 CDIE fieldvisit, the tribunal was facing problems oflogistics, funding, and staffing, all of whichcaused long delays. Although such delayswere not totally unexpected, the tribunalseemed unable to profit from prior relevantexperience and resources of other UN agen-

cies. For example, it failed to avoid the samefunding conundrums as those experiencedby the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.Staffing the prosecutor’s office and all thattask entails—recruitment, hiring, and de-ployment of personnel—encountered longdelays for unclear reasons. One year fromthe beginning of the crisis, only 5 prosecu-tors and investigators were serving the tri-bunal, although 31 investigators, secondedfrom the United States, the Netherlands, andother governments, were expected to sup-plement the investigative staff. The registrywas not yet operating, and judges of the trialchambers had just been nominated by theSecurity Council.

Hindered by an inadequate budget, theprosecutor was at first unable to establish avisible presence within Rwanda. Problemswith tribunal finances appear to be twofold.First, the funds given to the tribunal were, atfirst, inadequate. Second, control over useof the funds was not at first fully vested inthe tribunal, as would be necessary to ensurequick and efficient expenditures. The tribu-nal received $2.9 million to cover the periodJanuary through March 1995. In May 1995,an additional $7 million was pledged bydonor nations. Because of the tribunal’s lowbudget, restrictions were initially imposedlimiting personnel contracts to threemonths.

By year’s end, the financial situationhad improved; $9.5 million of the pledgedamount of $9.9 had been disbursed, most ofit ($7 million) by the Netherlands. Furtherdelays and inconvenience have been causedbecause the prosecutor lacked authority tohire staff or travel out of the country withoutapproval of the UN’s Office of Legal Coun-sel in New York. These problems were com-pounded when the UN secretary general


froze all UN funds in September 1995. Untilnegotiations were completed exempting thetribunal from the generally imposed freeze,recruitment and travel at the tribunal ceased.Since October, when the tribunal installed anew director of investigations, the pace ofinvestigations has noticeably increased. OnDecember 12, the tribunal issued its firsteight indictments.

In establishing the tribunal, the Secu-rity Council stated that its aim was, in part,“ to contribute to the process of nationalreconciliation and to the restoration andmaintenance of peace.” Delays in estab-lishing the tribunal and making it opera-tional have postponed reconciliation; therecan be no reconciliation without justice. Theprosecutor has taken steps to address thetribunal’s deficiencies. Nonetheless, pro-gress remains to be made in addressing thetimeliness of investigations. There is needas well for progress in addressing the publicperception, inside and outside Rwanda, ofthe prosecutor’s lukewarm commitment tothe success of this tribunal. Should the tri-bunal succeed in these endeavors, it ishoped that trust in its work will grow.

Administration of Justice

The justice system of Rwanda was ma-nipulated by the former regime, despite con-stitutional provisions ensuring its inde-pendence. Human rights abuses relating toarrests, detention, trial without counsel, andwidespread corruption were frequent in thepast. If Rwanda is to establish a legal systemthat ensures the rights of all citizens, it mustconstruct a justice system that substantiallyimproves on what existed previously in thecountry.

There is a broad consensus in the inter-national community and the Rwandan gov-ernment that substantial short- and long-term assistance is needed. In December1994, UNDP and the government estimatedit would cost $66 million over two years torestart the justice system. In January 1995,donor nations pledged $44.6 million for hu-man rights and the administration of justice,not including funds being spent on prisonrehabilitation. Several assistance initiativesare under way (see box 3.1). These pro-grams, however, have not yet approachedthe level of assistance broadly recognized asrequired to restart the justice system. Nearlymidway through the year, projects beingexecuted totaled $5 million of the $44.6million pledged. By the end of the year, $28million had been pledged for administrationof justice programs alone (not including hu-man rights initiatives), of which $21 millionhad been committed, and $13 million dis-bursed, largely by the Netherlands.

More than 55,000 people were await-ing trial on genocide-related charges in Sep-tember 1995, but no trials had taken place.Interviews with several magistrates indi-cated prosecutions were not likely to goforward soon. During the first week of No-vember 1995, however, President Biz-imungu hosted a conference in Kigali:“Genocide, Impunity, and Accountability.”Participants discussed proposals to expeditedomestic trials of the detainees in Rwandanprisons. By the end of the conference, gov-ernment representatives indicated theywould be making decisions “ soon” con-cerning initiatives agreed to in large part byconference participants, including thosethat proposed realistic mechanisms for go-ing forward with the cases of the detained.In the interim, the role the RPA is playing in


the functioning judicial system is unclear.The departure to Belgium of the chief prose-cutor for Kigali, who alleged interferenceby the RPA, raises concern regarding therole of the army in the judicial system.Nonetheless, the September swearing-in ofthe Supreme Court’s president and five vicepresidents was an important step in the rightdirection. Official appointment of existingmagistrates is expected in the near future.

Obviously, it will take time before themodest programs initiated and supported bythe international community bear tangibleresults. More concerted efforts are neces-sary before the country’s judicial systemcan be revived, much less reorganized andreconstructed to meet minimum standardsfor human rights. The real challenge is notof marshaling sufficient human and techni-cal resources, but of institutionalizing a newpolitical culture in which differences aresettled through discussion, accommodation,and sound civil institutions, not throughviolence and bloodshed. The internationalcommunity can play a limited, though sig-nificant, role in helping the governmentmeet this challenge.

Human Rights Field Operation for Rwanda

The Human Rights Field Operation forRwanda (HRFOR) was the first field opera-tion to be undertaken under the auspices ofthe UN High Commission on Human Rights(UNHCHR) and to be administratively sup-ported by the UN’s Center for HumanRights in Geneva. In late August 1994, theUNHCHR reached an agreement withRwandan officials to deploy 147 humanrights field officers, one for each of thecountry’s communes.

The objectives of the field operationwere to

• Carry out investigations into violationsof human rights and humanitarian law

• Monitor the human rights situation and,through its presence, prevent future hu-man rights violations

• Cooperate with other internationalagencies in establishing confidence andthus aid the return of refugees and dis-

Box 3.1 Examples of InternationalAssistance for the Judicial System

• Training of magistrates and judicial po-lice by Citizens Network, a BelgiumNGO, funded largely by Belgium, theNetherlands, and Switzerland. By May1995, 150 judicial police inspectorshad been trained and 120 more inspec-tors and 30 army personnel had joinedthe program.

• Support for the salaries of Ministry ofJustice personnel by the European Un-ion, Belgium, Germany, the Nether-lands, and Canada.

• Establishment of a Legislation ReviewCommission, funded by Germany, toadapt Rwanda’s legal structure to theArusha accords.

• Support for recruiting foreign magis-trates to serve in Rwanda’s judicial sys-tem.

• Support for the revival of the lawschool in Butare by Citizen’s Network.

• Repair of court facilities by a projectfunded by Switzerland and Norway.

• Supplies and equipment worth $1 mil-lion, funded by the United States, forthe justice system.


placed people and the rebuilding ofcivic society

• Implement programs of technical coop-eration in human rights, particularly inadministration of justice.

To pursue these objectives, the fieldoperation established three units: the FieldCoordination Unit, the Technical Coopera-tion Unit (responsible for local training andeducation programs), and the Legal Analy-sis and Coordination Unit (responsible forspecial investigations). The UN Center forHuman Rights recruited and hired mostfield officers and has provided overall man-agement and logistical support for the op-eration. In October 1995, the original chiefof mission for HRFOR was succeeded by anew one.

At its outset in September 1994,HRFOR faced a dilemma. Governments,the United Nations, and nongovernmentalhuman rights organizations demanded thatthe high commissioner immediately deploya human rights monitoring mission, but theyfailed to provide adequate funding for eventhe minimal prerequisites. The high com-missioner complied with the request but hadminimal support. More resources wereavailable by December 1994, but recruit-ment and training of the personnel forHRFOR has been widely criticized.10 The

chief of mission was not involved in theoriginal selection of staff, and many of themonitors initially did not have relevantbackground and experience. Moreover, noofficial announcements of the openings forHRFOR appeared in relevant newspapersand periodicals, limiting the pool of quali-fied applicants. The high commissioner’soffice, in cooperation with the EuropeanCommission, appears to have institutedmore stringent recruitment standards, andthe sophistication of field monitors has pre-sumably increased.11 There is, however,still substantial room for improvement.

Field monitors arriving in Kigali re-ceived no orientation or training until atleast December 1994.12 At that time, asmall grant to the Center for Human Rightsprovided field officer training in Genevaand Kigali by the U.S. National Peace CorpsAssociation. At first, the training programaimed at preparing field officers to work ina foreign environment, with little emphasison operational aspects of their work. AsHRFOR further developed its training pro-gram over the year, it grew to include addi-tional topics such as the major human rightsinstruments. By April 1995, a total of 152HRFOR personnel, including 114 field offi-cers, had participated in at least some formof the training program. Nonetheless, it isunclear whether the content of the training


10For example, Amnesty International. 1995. “Rwanda and Burundi: A Call For Action By the InternationalCommunity,” September 1995, p. 11; and African Rights, 1995. “A Waste of Hope: The United Nations Human RightsField Operation,” pp. 48–49.

11Seven of 12 monitors surveyed were “ satisfied” with the selection process, at least with regard to the E.U. contingent.See Roel von Meijenfeldt, 1995. “At the Frontline for Human Rights: Final Report,” Appendix H, p. 4. No survey hasbeen conducted for non–E.U. monitors.

12From “Response of the High Commissioner on Human Rights to Recommendations Contained in ‘RebuildingPost-War Rwanda: Evaluating the Impact of International Assistance with Regard to Human Rights,’” p. 12.

program is still adequate. In fact, severalmonitors surveyed indicate that importantdeficiencies remain.13

At the January 1995 Roundtable Con-ference and in subsequent revisions early inthe year, donors committed approximately$9 million to human rights monitoring. Bythe end of the year, $14 million had beencommitted to the HRFOR, all of which hadbeen disbursed, largely by the EuropeanUnion and the United Kingdom.

Investigating Genocide

An eight-member team of experts ar-rived in Rwanda in late October 1994 tosupport the special rapporteur and the Com-mission of Experts, as part of the HRFORunit then called the Special InvestigationsUnit. After about a month, they were suc-ceeded by an American trial lawyer who, inturn, was replaced by a Swiss prosecutorand some forensic scientists at first fromSpain. From the very beginning the investi-gations unit lacked a well-defined purposeand direction. It was expected to investigateviolations of international humanitarianlaw, but, as one former member of the unitput it, “ for whom or for what purpose wasunclear.”

In December 1994, the tribunal’sprosecutor met with HRFOR in Kigali torequest essentially that all investigationsaimed at collecting evidence of those to betried by the tribunal be henceforth con-ducted by tribunal staff only.14 Further, he

requested that evidence collected to date byHRFOR be organized and turned over to thetribunal. At that time, therefore, the SpecialInvestigations Unit was left with a mandateto work for the special rapporteur and theCommission of Experts, to the extent theirwork did not touch on prosecutions withinthe mandate of the tribunal.

Before the December meeting betweenthe prosecutor and HRFOR, the investiga-tions unit had encountered several problemsfulfilling its own understanding of its man-date. It was to work in support of the Com-mission of Experts and special rapporteurbut report to the Center for Human Rights inGeneva and the HRFOR mission chief inRwanda. Because neither the center nor themission chief in Kigali was supervising in-vestigations, no one could offer any signifi-cant direction; nor, apparently, did anyoneassume responsibility for addressing, in anymanner, the multifaceted problems encoun-tered by the unit.

Furthermore, the unit lacked sufficientmanpower and the necessary technical ex-pertise and equipment to conduct a thor-ough and competent investigation of geno-cide. The performance of the unit wasfurther hampered by uncertainty overwhether it had the authority to request offi-cial records from government officialswithin and outside Rwanda. Without accessto government officials and documents, col-lection of critical evidence for prosecutionswas all but impossible.


13See Roel von Meijenfeldt, 1995. “At the Frontline for Human Rights: Final Report” Appendix H, pp. 5–6.

14Additionally, there was discussion between the prosecutor and HRFOR concerning preservation for the tribunal of themassacre sites for its own expert staff.

Within this context, the members of theSpecial Investigations Unit directed theirinvestigative work at collecting witnesses’statements and physical evidence at 25 mas-sacre sites. Collection of this informationwas relevant, but insufficient for the inves-tigative process envisioned by members ofthe unit. The leadership of HRFOR at thetime seemed unable to resolve the resource–expertise–personnel problems or problemsassociated with access to official records,even those located in Rwanda.

Although the high commissioner forhuman rights communicated in one letter tothe United States the need for more expertpersonnel and adequate resources, neitherthis effort nor any effort on the part of theHRFOR mission chief brought significantlymore resources. The usefulness of the Spe-cial Investigations Unit was, by most ac-counts, very limited.15 Nonetheless, thehigh commissioner’s office reports thatwhen he handed over most of the HRFOR-collected evidence to the deputy prosecutorof the International Tribunal for Rwanda inMarch 1995, the deputy termed them “mostvaluable.”16

In April 1995, after a visit of the specialrapporteur, the Special Investigations Unitbecame the Legal Analysis and Coordina-tion Unit (LACU), and its mandate wasmodified. However, HRFOR, primarily

through its field officers, became involvedin documenting the genocide through a va-riety of activities carried out by the FieldCoordination Unit of HRFOR coordinatingwith LACU and the newly appointed coor-dinator for the special rapporteur.

Monitoring Human Rights

Since the beginning of 1995, the focusof field operations has shifted from investi-gating violations of international humani-tarian law to monitoring the ongoing humanrights situation and cooperating with otherinternational agencies in reestablishing con-fidence in Rwanda. Field officers hear com-plaints about human rights violations, in-vestigate them, then file their reports, whichare aggregated at the level of the prefectureand forwarded to the Field CoordinationUnit. The unit writes a report based on asummary of the information contained inthese reports. The mission chief peri-odically sends this summary to the highcommissioner.

Until October 1995, HRFOR leader-ship had developed no discernible strategyfor using these reports. According to thehigh commissioner’s office, the reportswere made available by him, “as appropri-ate,” to the secretary general, governments,UN agencies, and intergovernmental and


15

See, for example, Human Rights Watch. 1995. “Human Rights in Rwanda—1995,” p. 8; Adam Stapleton, “AmateursPosing As Professionals,” in Human Rights Tribune, June–July 1995, pp. 13–15; African Rights, 1995. “A Waste ofHope: The United Nations Human Rights Field Operation,” pp. 7–10.

16

From “Response of the High Commissioner on Human Rights to Recommendations Contained in ‘RebuildingPost-War Rwanda: Evaluating the Impact of International Assistance with Regard to Human Rights,’” p. 4.

17

See African Rights. 1995. “A Waste of Hope: The United Nations Human Rights Field Operation,” pp. 14–28.

nongovernmental organizations.18 Amnes-ty International has criticized this “as ap-propriate” distribution as ineffective for en-hancing accountability for human rightsviolations in present-day Rwanda, butHRFOR failed either to adopt or articulate apolicy concerning the reasons for its dis-tribution policy. Consequently, it is not clearif these reports formed the basis for anyactions or decisions.

In addition to the controversy over re-port distribution, the reliability of informa-tion contained in the reports was ques-tioned—at first privately, later publicly.19

HRFOR was unable to defend against suchcriticisms because it had not developed acomprehensive methodology for collectinginformation.20 Additionally, HRFOR didnot develop centralized policies, strategies,or guidelines for its field officers or unitleaders in Kigali for interaction with local ornational officials during investigation andfollow-up of alleged human rights viola-tions. Because there was no agreement ormissionwide understanding on these pointswithin HRFOR, different officers in thefield acted in different ways.

As of October 1995, the new missionchief undertook to review and overhaul thestructure and substantive work of HRFOR

in the field and at its center. Establishingeffective working relationships with minis-terial-level officials appears to be a priority.Such relationships are essential to exchang-ing vital information and ensuring immedi-ate action on allegations of current humanrights violations.

A problem in monitoring current hu-man rights violations is that the Rwandangovernment considers reporting partisanand unfair. Leaders feel the government isbeing subjected to critical scrutiny, whereasthe perpetrators of genocide are being fedby the international community. One expla-nation for this criticism is that HRFOR hasfailed to adequately publicize its assistanceto the judicial system and information it hascollected about the genocide.21 Another ex-planation is that the Human Rights FieldOperation may have directed its attentiontoward current violations with little regardfor the desperate need to take a leading roleon justice issues as they relate to perpetra-tors of genocide.22 A welcomed change re-cently began with HRFOR’s efforts to worksystematically with Rwandan officials onarrest and detention procedures.


18From “Response of the High Commissioner on Human Rights to Recommendations Contained in ‘RebuildingPost-War Rwanda: Evaluating the Impact of International Assistance with Regard to Human Rights,’” p. 7. However,the high commissioner’s office fails to note whether these reports were regularly provided to the Government ofRwanda for comment, and if so, whether and when its response was distributed.

19See African Rights. 1995. “A Waste of Hope: The United Nations Human Rights Field Operation,” pp. 14–28.

20In April 1995, HRFOR hired a senior officer to head the Field Coordination Unit and address that weakness.

21 Amnesty International. 1995. “Rwanda and Burundi: A Call For Action by the International Community.” AI Index:AFR 02/24/95, p. 12.

22 Africa Rights. 1995. “A Waste of Hope: The United Nations Human Rights Field Operation.”

A Special Note on HRFOR

Monitoring the return of refugees toRwanda and monitoring detention centersin that country are two tasks that deservespecial consideration. Until April 1995,HRFOR’s monitoring of returnees fromneighboring countries was characterized bythe same local variability as its other moni-toring activities. Effectiveness depended onthe persistence and talent of individual fieldofficers. When Zaire expelled 15,000Rwandans in August 1995, HRFOR tried toimplement a coherent monitoring strategy.Field officers initially played a supportingrole to UNHCR teams with regard to thelogistics of moving and tracking returneesto all relevant locations, especially prisons.Later, field officers traveled to communesand worked with local authorities to assist inthe reentry process. They monitored allegedkillings, property disputes, numbers of indi-viduals detained, and living conditions inthe communes. At the national level, theField Coordination Units contacted the rele-vant ministries to coordinate activities.

HRFOR has also been monitoring con-ditions for inmates in central, communal,and military prisons. Field monitors havereported serious maltreatment in both com-munal and central prisons and, at times,have been able to persuade local authoritiesof their duty to investigate and discipline.They have also raised with local authoritiesthe issue of illegal detention of people ac-cused of crimes not related to genocide.Coordination between HRFOR and the In-ternational Committee of the Red Cross in

prison monitoring has been problematicsince the inception of the mission. Therewere several reasons for it, one of which isthe special, independent mandate that theRed Cross must follow. Nonetheless, onlyrecently did HRFOR create written report-ing procedures to be used by HRFOR andprovide them to the Red Cross for bettercoordination.

Technical Cooperation Program

The Technical Cooperation Unit ofHRFOR has become increasingly impor-tant. It has attempted to coordinate foreignassistance for rebuilding Rwanda’s judicialsystem. By March 1995, the Technical Co-operation Unit had completed a nationwidesurvey (conducted in cooperation withUNDP and the Ministry of Justice) of short-and long-term material and personnel needsfor rehabilitating the judicial system. Thenfield officers dist

Documents

Rebuilding Postwar Rwanda - OECDand hunter–potter Twa. In 1962 the Hutu revolted against their increasing marginalization on ethnic grounds. The revolt succeeded, largely be-cause