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Real - tim e DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale

Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

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Page 1: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Real-time DDoS Defense:A collaborative Approach at

Internet Scale

Page 2: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Agenda

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale2

Problem & Goal

Overview

Challenges

Implementation

Evaluation

Conclusion

Insight

Discussion

Page 3: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Problem & Goal

Page 4: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Problem

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale4

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBBIqKeVdDo

Page 5: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Problem

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale5

network-traffic

Page 6: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Problem

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale6

mitigation and reaction

Page 7: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Goal

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale7 Source: https://www.gallaudet.edu/rsia/world_deaf_information_resource.html

Page 8: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Ingredients

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale8

Source: http://www.mitnatur.com/wp-content/uploads//2013/11/Kochen.jpg

InsightOverview

ChallengesImplementation

Evaluation

Page 9: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Insight

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale9

RQ1: Is real-time and automatic mitigation at ISP level performed and if yes, how?

Page 10: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Insight

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale10

May – July 2014

Online

52 4256 47

November – December 2012

Source: http://www.pieuvre.ca/v2/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/survey.jpg

Page 11: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Real-time and automatic mitigation

Europe93%

North America

2%

Asia5%

Origin

0,00%

5,00%

10,00%

15,00%

20,00%

25,00%

30,00%

35,00%

Market segment and frequency

16. February 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Give and Take - Mitigation and Response: A collaborative approach11

Page 12: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Real-time and automatic mitigation

• Process and involved third-parties

• ISPs and CSIRTs

• to aid NOC

• by email or telephone

16. February 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Give and Take - Mitigation and Response: A collaborative approach12

Page 13: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

16. February 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Give and Take - Mitigation and Response: A collaborative approach13

Real-time and automatic mitigation

Page 14: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Real-time and automatic mitigation

16. February 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Give and Take - Mitigation and Response: A collaborative approach14

Page 15: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Real-time and automatic mitigation

Yes37%

Unsure3% Agree

43%

Disagree17%

No60%

Use of automatic mitigation and response tools

16. February 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Give and Take - Mitigation and Response: A collaborative approach15

Yes37%

Unsure3%

6%

31%

17%

6%

No60%

Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools

Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it

No, we will not make use of it I am not aware of it

Page 16: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Real-time and automatic mitigation

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Rerouting traffic Change blocking/ filter

capabilities

Notification Rate limiting atingress

Exchange datawith trusted

partners

Quarantinemachines

Changing thetarget's IP

address

Other

Automatic actions of mitigation and response tools

Actions already performed Actions would like to use

16. February 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Give and Take - Mitigation and Response: A collaborative approach16

Page 17: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Real-time and automatic mitigation

Yes48%No

52%

IP traffic filtering

Blacklists53%

Whitelists29%

Greylists18%

IP traffic filtering

16. February 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Give and Take - Mitigation and Response: A collaborative approach17

Page 18: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Real-time and automatic mitigation

6

21

2 2

0

5

10

15

20

25

Netconf SNMP OpenFlow Other

Network configuration protocols

16. February 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Give and Take - Mitigation and Response: A collaborative approach18

Yes29%

9%

39%

13%10%

No71%

Current technical ability to use OpenFlow / Plan to make use of

OpenFlow in 3 years

Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it

No, we will not make use of it I am not aware of it

Page 19: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Real-time and automatic mitigation

10

13

6

0

4

6

17

7 7

3

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

None Various CERTs or CSIRTs Law enforcement orgovernmental entities

Industry peers Only receive data

Sharing threat indicators or security events / incidents

Threat indicators Security events/incidents

16. February 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Give and Take - Mitigation and Response: A collaborative approach19

Page 20: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Real-time and automatic mitigation

Strongly agree53%

Agree43%

Disagree4%

Collaboration improves mitigation and response capabilities

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

SCAP IDXP IDMEF IODEF x-arf

Exchange protocols / formats

Do or did use Know Heard of Unknown

16. February 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Give and Take - Mitigation and Response: A collaborative approach20

Page 21: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Ingredients

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale21

Source: http://www.mitnatur.com/wp-content/uploads//2013/11/Kochen.jpg

InsightOverview

ChallengesImplementation

Evaluation

Page 22: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Terminology

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale22

Format Protocol

vs.

Source: http://www.mifus.de/out/pictures/master/product/1/8000796013248_simba_sechs_sandformen.jpghttp://www.bluesource.at/2013/11/bluesource-enewsletter-november-2013/

Page 23: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Terminology

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale23

Page 24: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Security Event/Incident

Incident

Alert/Event

Alarm/

Warning

Terminology

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale24

Page 25: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Terminology

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale25

IncidentEvent

Chance Card

vs.

Source: http://www.hasbro.com/monopoly/de_DE/ Source: http://www.bitstorm.org/journaal/2005-6/grolsch.jpg

Page 26: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Application Domain

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale26

Source: http://makingsecuritymeasurable.mitre.org/about/index.html

Page 27: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Who is involved ?

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale27

• US governments Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

• TERENA• IETF Incident Handling• Stuttgart University‘s CERT• IETF IDWG• MITRE• IETF MARF• Eco – Association of the German

Internet Industry

Source: http://m.crosstalkonline.org/media/cache/54/c8/54c83f7398d4ee4bece7c84e899c8a64.jpg

Page 28: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Timeline

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale28

1997CISL

DARPA

2001IODEF

TERENA

2002IODEF

IETF INCH

2003FINE

IETF INCH

2003IODEF

IETF INCH2002CAIF

University Stuttgart CERT

2003IDMEF

IETF IDWG

2009CEE

MITRE

2005ARF

MAAWG

2007ARF

IETF MARF

2012x-arf

Eco-Association of the German Internet Industry

2013x-xarf

Kohlrausch & Übelacker

2013Project DMTF Cloud Audit

or Project Lumberjack

Page 29: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Exchange formats

CISL IODEF CAIF IDMEF CEE ARF x-arf/x-xarf syslog

Language S-expressions XML XML XML XML, JSON MIME MIME Text/XML

Content Events, Attacks,Responses

Events,Incidents

Problem, Vulnerability, Exposure

Alerts, Alive messages

Events Spam Incidents, Attacks

Events

Producer Machine Human Human Machine Machine Machine Machine Machine

Consumer Machine Human Human Machine Human Machine/Human

Machine/Human Machine/Human

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale29

Page 30: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

IODEF vs. IDMEF

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale30

Page 31: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

ARF vs. x-xarf

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale31

Page 32: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Exchange formats and protocolsProtocol OSI layer Format Security

CIDF Transport CISL message SymmetricCryptography

RID Application IODEF TLS

XEP-0268 Application IODEF TLS

IDXP Application IDMEF TLS

CLT Transport CEE Provided by syslog(RFC 5425)

SMTP Application CAIFARFx-arf

NoneS/MIMEMultipart/SignedMultipart/Encrypted

Syslog (RFC 3164) Transport Syslog (RFC 3164) None

Syslog (RFC 5425) Transport Syslog (RFC 5424) TLS

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale32

Page 33: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Evaluation results

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale33

XML

MIME

Page 34: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Ingredients

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale34

Source: http://www.mitnatur.com/wp-content/uploads//2013/11/Kochen.jpg

InsightOverview

ChallengesImplementation

Evaluation

Page 35: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Challenges

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale35

„rogue ISPs“ Quantifying cost/benefit

FPRisk

Source: http://www.lowcarb-ernaehrung.info/

Source: http://whiteboard-ratgeber.de/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/digitales-whiteboard-vs-tafel.jpg

Page 36: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Ingredients

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale36

Source: http://www.mitnatur.com/wp-content/uploads//2013/11/Kochen.jpg

InsightOverview

ChallengesImplementation

Evaluation

Page 37: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Framework

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale37

Page 38: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Inference Engine (PHREAK)

Mitigation and Response System

Production Memory (rules)

Working Memory (facts)

Pattern Matcher Agenda

Event producer

sends consumes publishes

subscribes

delivers

Incident consumer

38

Page 39: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Pattern Matcher

Mitigation and Response System

Event Processing Response Selection

39

Reaction Execution

Knowledge Base

Page 40: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Event Processing

Mitigation and Response System

Normalization Aggregation / Correlation

40

Event Pattern Frequency of event in a time window

Geolocation IP Filtering Lists Confidence

Page 41: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Response Selection

Mitigation and Response System

Comparison Prioritation

41

Previous Reactions Potential damage

Benefit Risk CVSS Event profiles

Page 42: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Reaction Execution

Mitigation and Response System

Notification

42

Configuration Exchange formats

Email Pub/Sub Consumer

Page 43: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Flow-based Event Exchange Format (FLEX)

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale43

Page 44: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Ingredients

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale44

Source: http://www.mitnatur.com/wp-content/uploads//2013/11/Kochen.jpg

InsightOverview

ChallengesImplementation

Evaluation

Page 45: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Evaluation Methodology

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale45

Source: http://www.microgen.com/uk-en/products/microgen-aptitude/v4/microgen-aptitude-business-it-collaboration

Page 46: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Ingredients

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale46

Source: http://www.mitnatur.com/wp-content/uploads//2013/11/Kochen.jpg

InsightOverview

ChallengesImplementation

Evaluation

Page 47: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Conclusion

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale47

• insight into processes, structures and capabilities

• a hands-on for network operators

Page 48: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Conclusion

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale48

• FLEX

• framework

Page 49: Real-time DDoS Defense - University of Bonn...6% No 60% Plan of use of automatic mitigation and response tools Yes, we are planning to do it We are looking into it No, we will not

Discussion

3rd July 2015 Jessica Steinberger: Real-time DDoS Defense: A collaborative Approach at Internet Scale49

Source: http://www.prosperitycometh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/business_conference_1600_clr_3835.png


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