REGIONAL CENTRE IN CAIRO

REGIONAL BUREAU OF ARAB STATES

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

RE-THINKING APPROACHES TO LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMMING IN CONFLICT AFFECTED COUNTRIES IN THE ARAB REGION

AN EXPLORATORY STUDY

May 2010

Regional Centre in Cairo

Discussion Paper # 1

Regional Bureau of Arab States

Authors: Heba El-Kholy and Necla Tschirgi Editors: Noha El-Mikawy and Shaima Hussein

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For further information please contact:Noha El-Mikawy, Governance Practice LeaderUnited Nations Development ProgrammeRegional Centre in Cairo1191 Corniche El-Nil, Boulac P.O. Box 98211599 CairoEgypt

www.undp.org/arabstates

Acknowledgements

This discussion paper is being published by the Regional Centre in Cairo (RCC) in order to promote knowledge sharing and support thinking for effective programming. Special thanks are due all of those who have contributed to writing and reviewing this discussion paper, including the authors Drs. Heba El-Kholy and Necla Tschirgi, UNDP country office staff in the Arab States region, and the Oslo Governance Centre.

Copyright ©2010 by the United Nations Development Programme. All rights reserved.

Disclaimer: The analysis and policy recommendations of this Paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Development Programme, its Executive Board Members or the UN Member States. The paper is the work of an independent team of authors sponsored by the Regional Centre in Cairo, UNDP.

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY……………………………………………………………. ....1

INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………..3

I. THE VARIABLE ECOLOGY OF CONFLICT IN THE ARAB

REGIO….7

II. APPROACHES TO GOVERNANCE IN CONFLICT CONTEXTS ….…

10

III. OVERVIEW OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMMING: KEY

FEATURES AND OBSERVATIONS………………………………….…….

……..12

IV. KEY TENSIONS IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMMING:

TOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK…………………………………

23

V. RECOMMENDATIONS:………………………………………………………….30

ANNEX 1: APPROACHES TO GOVERNANCE IN CONFLICT-

AFFECTED AND FRAGILE STATES…………………………………………….…

33

ANNEX 2: THE LINKS BETWEEN STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO

GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE…………………………….

…..36

ANNEX 3: MODELS OF DECENTRALISATION: KEY

CONCEPTS…...38

ANNEX 4: POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS…………………………….…

39

ANNEX 5: CONFLICT SENSITIVE PROGRAMMING:

…………………….41

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………….……43

Abbreviations

BCPR Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Recovery

CCA Common Country Assessment

CO Country Office

COCA Central Organization for Control and Auditing, Yemen

DFID UK Department for International Development

DGD Decentralized Governance for Development

DGTTF Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund

DLDSP Decentralization and Local Development Support Project

EU European Union

GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit

IDEA International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

LA Local Authorities

LDP Local Development Programme

LG Local Governance

LGUs Local Government’s Units

MASS Palestinian Policy and Research Institute

MoLG Ministry of Local Governments

NDC NGO Development Center

NDS National Development Strategy

NGOs Non-governmental organization

ODA Official Development Assistance

OECD –DAC Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development

Assistance Committee

OGC Oslo Governance Centre

oPt Occupied Palestinian Territory

PA Palestinian Authority

PAPP Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People

PFMR Public Financial Management Reform

RCC Regional Centre in Cairo

RR Resident Representative

ROAR Results Oriented Annual Report

SF Social Fund

SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

SNAC Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption, Yemen

UN United Nations

UNCDF United Nations Capital Development Fund

UNCT United Nations Country Team

UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNDP-SURF AS United Nations Development Programme–Sub-Regional Facility Arab States

UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

US United States

USAID United States Agency for International Development

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The present regional discussion paper is informed by findings from four case studies (Iraq, Lebanon, the Occupied Palestinian Territory oPt, and Yemen) that investigated the challenges of local governance in conflict-affected contexts, focusing on UNDP supported programs. This exploratory study was jointly sponsored by the UNDP Regional Centre Cairo and the Oslo Governance Centre. Its aim was to stimulate comparative analysis across different conflict contexts and to extract key lessons for more effective local governance programming in the Arab region and globally.

Based on field missions, two of which were jointly planned with the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and supplemented by a review of the relevant literature, the four case studies examined the main characteristics and challenges of governance, and more specifically local governance, in conflict contexts. The purpose of this regional discussion paper is to:

a) Identify how current approaches to local governance are affected by and, in turn, affect the broader objectives of state and peace building in the four cases within the Arab region;

b) Provoke a critical examination of the approaches to local governance programming in conflict contexts;

c) Contribute to the development of an analytical framework to better understand and respond to local governance challenges in conflict-affected context; and

d) Offer strategic recommendations for future programming.

The paper draws provisional conclusions based on comparative experiences while offering an analytical framework for local governance interventions grounded in the empirical findings as well as the literature on governance support to conflict-affected contexts. Because of the limited scope and timeframe of the case studies, this discussion paper should be considered an exploratory effort to trigger further reflection and debate.

The paper comprises four sections. The first section provides a general overview of the ecology of conflict in the four Arab cases in order to better situate the challenges of governance programming. The second section presents the various approaches to governance programming in conflict contexts and their implications for local governance. The third section presents the four critical tensions (or dilemmas) that were identified through the case studies and that - this regional discussion paper argues - underpin some of the more salient and persistent challenges to programming. The final section offers overall recommendations that specifically relate to understanding and managing these tensions.

Because this discussion paper is intended for UNDP development programming purposes, it largely focuses on the internal dynamics of conflict in all four cases, leaving aside regional and international aspects of conflict, important as these latter aspects may be. In summary, the discussion paper argues that the four Arab cases under study are struggling with a diverse range of conflicts. Nonetheless, these examined cases share several features that have repercussions for local

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governance programming as well as for broader governance goals of state-building, nation building, democracy building, and peacebuilding. These are: (1) having to grapple with the slow pace of the implementation of governance, especially local governance, reforms; (2) tending to focus on the technical elements of decentralization (as one option for local governance reform); (3) struggling to produce a coherent governance and especially local governance approach; (4) generally weakly developed ‘conflict sensitive’ approaches (see annex 5); (5) having to include a component of support for broad-based citizen participation as a feature of local governance programming; (6) as well as having to strengthen the gender lenses of programming; and finally (7) having to address the fragility of the accountability systems in conflict contexts.

Beyond these shared features, local governance programming in these conflict-affected cases confronts serious tensions that must be carefully managed but that are often difficult to reconcile. These can be grouped into four sets of tensions: (1) local legitimacy versus state legitimacy, (2) technical versus political approach to programming, (3) efficiency versus legitimacy, and (4) local governance versus local government. Moreover, the broad governance models in which local governance programming is explicitly or implicitly embedded (state building, nation-building, democracy building, and peacebuilding) display tensions as they often entail contradictory and competing imperatives and impulses. Inadequate understanding of these tensions at different levels, as well as the inability to address them effectively in programme design, pose serious risks of failure to achieve the stated goals of local governance programs in conflict contexts. These findings raise important questions about the relevance and effectiveness of programming strategies and conventional planning processes. However, they also offer an opportunity to improve programming by focusing on better managing critical tensions and building contingent scenarios in order to enhance programme impacts.

Based on this analysis, the present paper’s main recommendations are structured around five main themes: policy dialogue; programming; research and analysis; capacity building; and knowledge management and learning. They include:

Better articulating and addressing conflict issues, including, as they impact local governance in very specific ways, in policy dialogue with governments;

Incorporating conflict issues into local governance programme planning, country strategies and evaluations;

Linking political economy analysis (see annex 4) to programming and supporting targeted policy oriented research;

Building capacity for local and international development practitioners in political economy and conflict analysis;

Supporting regional and cross regional exchanges on local governance within conflict affected contexts.

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INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION

WHAT IS BEING STUDIED AND WHY?WHAT IS BEING STUDIED AND WHY?

There is broad agreement on the importance of promoting democratic governance to enhance development outcomes.1 Democratic governance is also considered an essential element for conflict management in fragile states or conflict-affected countries and there is a growing body of literature on governance interventions in such contexts.2 Local governance, a key component of governance programming, has steadily gained support from governments and donors.

It is important to understand what local governance is in the midst of other relevant but different concepts. Local governance is distinct from decentralization, although the two terms are at times used interchangeably. Decentralization is a national level political process that can involve changes in political, legal, administrative and fiscal systems. Local governance covers the broad spectrum of issues and actors that influence local political, economic and overall human development planning and decision-making. Some of the elements shaping local governance include political patterns, institutional arrangements, accountability mechanisms, the degree of civil society empowerment and capacities for generating local resources. Local government generally denotes government institutions at the local level, comprising representative bodies, administrative organs and the local branches of the central government. Municipalities and local or district councils are common terms used to refer to local government. Local economic development describes collective efforts by various local actors to plan and manage sustainable and equitable local human development. MDG localization involves adjusting local development strategies around achieving the global goals, including through locally adapted MDG targets. Local development encompasses all of these concepts. It refers to the interactions of local stakeholders to promote human development, in the context of national frameworks and policies that may include varying degrees of decentralization. Local development as an outcome comprises access to quality basic services, achievement of the MDGs and local economic development.

Beyond supporting local level development, it is assumed that strengthening local governance can also help address conflict-related issues through, for example, strengthening the legitimacy of the state by integrating different groups and regions into larger political and development processes or

1In 2007, DAC countries spent US$11.6 billion in assistance to the “government and civil society sector”— an increase of 43% over 2006 http://stats.oecd.org?Index.aspx?DatasetCode=ODA_SECTOR 2For key policy and programming documents on the links between governance and conflict, see, UNDP, BCPR, GTZ, etc. For the centrality of governance in post-conflict reconstruction, also see the thematic section on governance in www.peacebuildinginitiative.com. For a recent review of key issues, see Louise Anten, Strengthening Governance in Post-Conflict Fragile States: Issues Paper (Clingendael Institute, June 2009).

What is Being Studied and Why?Study Methodology and LimitationsMain Study Findings

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enabling citizen participation, including women, in decision making processes. However, these assumptions remain to be empirically demonstrated.3

In 2009, Governance Programs in the Arab States Region delivered more than two thirds of the total expenditures to support the conflict-affected countries and territories, namely Lebanon, Iraq, oPt, Somalia, and Yemen (UNDP Result Oriented Annual Report 2009 - ROAR)). Local governance is an important entry point to support wider peace building and conflict prevention processes in conflict affected contexts. This is seen in the dominance of UNDP Country Offices’ Assistance Programs in conflict-affected contexts, which support local governance and link assistance at the local level with national level reforms. The DGTTF supported projects also illustrate this tendency: Between 2002 and 2009, local governance projects ranked highest among all democratic governance areas of support, as reflected in the pie chart shown below:

STUDY METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONSSTUDY METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

In line with the growing international commitment to enhance the development assistance provided to countries affected by conflict, the Regional Centre in Cairo (RCC)4 and the Oslo Governance Centre (OGC) co-sponsored a set of exploratory studies to investigate the challenges to UNDP programming within the Arab region. In light of the special importance of local governance in all projects supported by DGTTF (an indicative fact), the studies were conducted with a special focus on local governance. Covering Iraq, Lebanon, the Occupied Palestinian Territory (oPt), and Yemen, the case studies

3The literature on local government in post conflict environments is fairly recent in nature. For an early review of literature, see the commissioned paper by Paul Jackson and Zoe Scott “Local Government in Post-Conflict Environments” for UNDP Oslo Governance Centre meeting in Oslo 28-29 November 2007.4The RCC, through its support, ensures that evidence-based knowledge from country-specific and regional contexts contributes to the global practice; it also ensures that the relevance and impact of UNDP’s work is well attuned to country-specific and development challenges in the Arab States. Therefore, the RCC Democratic Governance Practice started an initiative to support exploratory reflective studies that distill comparative lessons learnt from the current development efforts at the country level and, eventually, to distill lessons learnt for strategic policy and technical support to governance programming regionally.

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examined local governance programming in these different contexts and generated empirically-grounded findings to stimulate comparative analysis and to identify key lessons. Each case study was based on a field mission, supplemented by a review of relevant literature, and sought to address several key questions:5

What are the main characteristics and challenges of governance, specifically local governance, in conflict-affected contexts?

Under what conditions do local governance reforms contribute to or undermine broader governance approaches such as state building, peacebuilding, democracy building, and nation building?

What are the main inherent tensions of local governance programming?

What are local governance assistance initiatives telling us and how can these stories be better understood in order to strengthen local governance assistance in conflict-affected contexts?

The purpose of this consolidated exploratory discussion paper is to:

Provoke critical examination of the approaches to local governance programming in conflict affected contexts;

Contribute to the development of an analytical framework to better understand and respond to local governance challenges in conflict-affected cases; and

Offer strategic recommendations for future programming.

This discussion paper is divided into four sections. The first section provides a general overview of the ecology of conflict in the four Arab cases in order to better situate the challenges of governance programming. The second section presents the various approaches to governance programming in conflict contexts and their implications for designing more effective local governance initiatives. The third section presents the four critical tensions (or dilemmas) that were identified through the case studies and that the authors argue underpin some of the more obvious challenges to programming. The final section offers overall recommendations, which specifically relate to the understanding and managing of these tensions.

In that light, the findings from the four case studies from the Arab region offer a valuable foundation upon which to attempt an inductively-based analytical framework to examine local governance programming in conflict contexts. Due to the short timeframe and limited scope of this study, this discussion paper should be considered an exploratory rather than a definitive study. Furthermore, this paper limits its analysis largely to issues related to internal conflicts that affect local governance programming, noting that internal conflicts also interface with regional and international conflicts at different times and places. Thus, the provisional findings in this paper merit validation through further empirical investigation, cross-regional comparisons, and methodological tools such as dilemma analysis. Nonetheless, as the first attempt by UNDP to analyze current practices in conflict affected contexts in the Arab region, they provide food for thought. 5Two of the case studies (Yemen and Lebanon) were carried out by the authors of this regional paper and two others (Iraq and Lebanon) were conducted by Noha El-Mikawy and Claudia Melim McLeod. The Sudan Study was focused on local governance projects supporter by DGTTF in Southern Sudan as an illustration of challenges in this complex country context

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MAIN STUDY FINDINGSMAIN STUDY FINDINGS

As this discussion paper demonstrates, the four Arab cases are struggling with a diverse range of conflicts. Nonetheless, they share several features that have repercussions for local governance programming as well as for broader governance goals of state-building, nation building, democracy building and peacebuilding. In conflict contexts, local governance programming in particular confronts serious tensions that must be carefully managed but are sometimes difficult to reconcile. These can be grouped into four sets of tensions that are discussed in detail in section IV. These are:

1. local legitimacy versus state legitimacy;

2. technical versus political approach to programming and policy dialogue;

3. efficiency versus legitimacy;

4. local governance versus local government.

Moreover, the broad governance models within which local governance programming is explicitly or implicitly embedded (namely, state building, nation-building, democracy building and peace building as discussed in section II) show tensions themselves, as they often entail contradictory and competing imperatives and impulses. Inadequate understanding of these tensions at different levels, as well as the inability to address them effectively in programme design, pose serious risks of failure to achieve the stated goals6 of local governance programs. These findings raise important questions about the relevance and effectiveness of current programming strategies and conventional planning processes. However, they also offer an opportunity to improve programming by focusing on better managing critical tensions in order to enhance programme impacts.

The “tension analysis” employed in this paper is a methodological tool that is designed to draw attention to the difficulties inherent in working in contexts where strategic, policy and operational choices do not necessarily fit together and might even work at cross-purposes. Also called “dilemma analysis”, the tool allows planners and practitioners to make difficult choices based on a more realistic assessment of what is possible in particular contexts while balancing competing imperatives and managing expectations.7

6UNDP considers the building blocks of good local governance to include: citizen participation, partnerships among key actors, capacity of local actors, multiple flows of information, institutions of accountability, and pro-poor orientation7For further discussion and application of ‘dilemma analysis’ see, Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk eds, “The Dilemmas of State-building: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations” (London: Routledge, 2009)

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I.I. THE VARIABLE ECOLOGY OF CONFLICT IN THE ARAB REGIONTHE VARIABLE ECOLOGY OF CONFLICT IN THE ARAB REGION

All four conflict affected cases informing this exploratory discussion paper are developing countries, albeit with varying levels of socio-economic progress, and their violent internal conflicts have deep socio-cultural, economic, and political roots.8 However, in each case, internal conflicts have been intertwined with broader regional/global dynamics over which the countries have little control. Situated in a critical geo-strategic region, all four have been deeply influenced by regional neighbors, global powers and other international actors. Specifically, their domestic political development has been shaped by broader political trends and cleavages in the Arab region and beyond.

As presented earlier, the focus of this paper is on internal conflicts, while acknowledging that internal conflicts intersect and interface with regional and international dynamics. It is important to note that internal conflicts are of different types that are not mutually exclusive: latent conflicts 9, protracted conflicts10 and violent conflicts. Whereas the term latent conflict could be applied to various situations such as the general context of Yemen, such conflict can turn into protracted and/or violent in certain locations within the same state, as the case of Sa’ada in northern Yemen or the sectarian violence in several governorates that was provoked in Iraq during 2006-2007.

While Iraq, Lebanon, the oPt, and Yemen have been affected by different types of violent conflicts, there are common elements across them. In all four cases, violent conflict has continued in one form or another since their independence (or in the course to achieve independence, in the case of the oPt), punctuated by periods of relative stability or latent conflict. In each case, the conflicts have mutated over time—but without a final resolution. However, there is a recent qualitative difference in the scale and scope of internal conflicts in all four cases.

Each case exhibits high political instability related to unfinished state formation. Thus, oPt is still without a state; the Yemeni state is contested and lacks authority over some of its territory; Iraq is

8Their differences in socio-economic development are significant; however, it is equally significant that poverty levels in all four countries have increased as a result of violent conflict. 9A problematic notion because it refers to situations where reasons for conflict simmer beneath the surface while actual conflict (especially violent manifestations thereof) may not have broken out. Most problematic is the measurement of thresholds.10The term was used in 1959 by Robert Strausz-Hupe, founder of Foreign Policy Research Institute and several times US Ambassador, in a book titled Protracted Conflict.

Cases studied in the Arab Region:IraqLebanonOccupied Palestinian Territories Yemen

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creating a new state following the overthrow of the previous Saddam regime by the US-led invasion, and the Lebanese state, formed upon a consociational system, remains highly fragile.11

In the oPt, Israeli occupation and its consequences (including expanded illegal settlements and the Separation Wall) remain crucial factors affecting the state building and peace building efforts. Moreover, several recent developments have seriously exacerbated the situation and created unprecedented challenges. The most urgent challenge is the schism between the two dominant Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah since 2007. The rift at the political level is replicated at the societal level with the Palestinian society deeply divided and unable to unite around a common vision. Since the Hamas electoral victory of 2006, relations between Israel and the Palestinians have continued to deteriorate, culminating in the devastating Israeli invasion of Gaza in December 2008-January 2009. The invasion has deepened the geographic, ideological, political, and economic chasm between the West Bank and Gaza while exposing the bankruptcy of the peace process.12 The changing internal dynamics within the oPt and the virtual collapse of the peace process with Israel have adversely affected international engagement in the oPt—further complicating tensions on the ground. Governance programming in the oPt needs to be viewed within this fluid, unpredictable, and perilous context.

Yemen’s problems are different. Since unification in 1990, the Yemeni state has been grappling with establishing viable central authority and creating a pluralistic political system to accommodate diverse regional, political, and economic interests within the framework of a unified nation-state. Overlaying a modern state upon Yemen’s traditional governance system has proved difficult, and both state formation and nation-building remain works-in-progress. Meanwhile, to ensure its survival, the government has created informal political alliances with traditional sheiks , religious leaders, and powerful interest groups through extensive patronage networks outside the formal state structures—which has given rise to the so-called “parallel state”.13 The fragility of the Yemeni state has been exposed and heightened by the country’s entrenched socio-economic and security problems. Currently, Yemen is facing multiple conflicts and security threats with growing linkages between them. There is open armed conflict in Sa’ada, involving neighboring Saudi Arabia; simmering secessionist conflict in the South; sporadic acts of terrorism within Yemen and by Yemeni nationals abroad, which has drawn the Yemeni state into becoming an active front on the war on terror; economically-rooted civil unrest, and open as well as latent inter and intra-tribal conflicts throughout the country. These conflicts adversely affect the government’s ability to exercise effective authority in large parts of the country and feed into growing distrust between the central state and local authorities.

11From a conflict-analysis perspective, the antecedents of each country’s current instability and insecurity are very important. However, given this report’s primary interest in present and future local governance programming, the following analysis focuses on each country’s current conflict and security situation as these affect the country’s present-day governance challenges. 12Internal political developments in Israel have also adversely affected relations with Palestinians as key members of the Israeli government express reservations about the two-state solution. 13For an in-depth discussion of the evolution of the Yemeni state and its relations with society, see Sheila Carapico, Civil Society in Yemen: The political economic of activism in modern Arabia, Cambridge University Press, 1998. Also see, Sarah Phillips, Yemen’s Democratic Experiment in Regional Perspective: Patronage and Pluralized Authoritarianism, New York: MacMillan, 2008

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Lebanon’s domestic conflicts are intertwined with regional dynamics. The Taif Reconciliation Accord that ended the fifteen year civil war in 1989 provided for “a democratic parliamentary republic founded on respect for public liberties”. It also reinforced the country’s intricate confessional system that distributes power among 17 religious sects. However, various domestic factions continued to have strong external connections that were brought into sharp relief in February 2005 when Prime Minister Hariri was assassinated and in the summer of 2006 when the Israeli invasion of Lebanon led to 1,200 civilian deaths and 5,000 injuries. While these events led to the withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces respectively, the armed clashes in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in May 2007 demonstrated Lebanon’s continued vulnerability. The country, which hosts some 422,000 UNRWA-registered Palestinian refugees, remains perilously fragile. Political instability has been exacerbated by the presence of armed groups alongside the Lebanese army. The Doha agreement of May 2008 helped to break the political deadlock over the election of the President while governmental instability persisted until a new unity government was formed in November 2009. Meanwhile, political instability at the national level is replicated at local levels, with villages and regions divided across confessional and political lines thereby complicating the decentralization efforts.

In Iraq, the legacy of devastating wars with neighbors, international sanctions, and the repressive Ba’athist regime under Saddam Hussein has been compounded by continuing US occupation as well as the challenges of establishing a new political order. The constitution of 2005, American gradual turn-over of security affairs to the Iraqi government, the continuing reduction of foreign troops, municipal elections and recent national elections in March 2010 are promising signs, albeit with heightened risk of conflict over the latest elections and other lingering issues of power and wealth sharing. Continuing tensions and violence underscore the country’s fragility. In order to preserve national unity, the devolution of power to local levels has not been given priority due to fears that increased autonomy can exacerbate separatist tendencies and increase violence. Ending the violence, establishing political stability and national and local reconciliation, and reaching consensus around wealth and power sharing in the different regions of the country remain key challenges.

As the brief review above demonstrates, despite their differences, all four cases are grappling with ending political violence, creating a viable and stable national authority, establishing an effective central government, and achieving reconciliation among political factions and cohesion among social groups. These relate directly to grave governance deficits in each case. All four cases, accordingly, have been receiving governance technical assistance. It should, however, be added that all four cases have also been receiving extensive external diplomatic and political, assistance and, in some cases, military assistance from multiple sources. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the interests and agendas of different external actors. External political, security, and economic agendas have consistently been influential in all four cases, not least in shaping development assistance strategies.14

14In an attempt to respond to this, donor governments and international institutions have increasingly adopted “3D” or “whole of government” strategies to harmonize sectoral policies with varying results.

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II. APPROACHES TO GOVERNANCE IN CONFLICT CONTEXTSII. APPROACHES TO GOVERNANCE IN CONFLICT CONTEXTS

Governance is a relatively new area of development assistance that is evolving steadily in light of cross-country experiences and cumulative learning. According to the UNDP, governance is “the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences.” 15

This definition does not apply easily to conflict contexts where conflict is marked by the absence or breakdown of a legitimate, credible, or capable national authority and where one of the key challenges of building peace is the establishment or restoration of national authority. There has been increased recognition of the need to use different lenses in viewing governance in countries where the very foundations of governance are in question.

In a nutshell, there are four strategic approaches in the literature that describe the salient governance challenges in conflict contexts from different vantage points and offer corresponding strategies and entry points (see annex 1). The four models of relevance to the Arab world are: state-building, nation-building, peace-building, and democracy-building.

These are not mutually-exclusive and are often employed simultaneously or sequentially. However, in conflict contexts, they are based on different assumptions and lead to strategic dilemmas and differing programming priorities. Governance assistance is rarely a coherent whole with different elements of governance programming (e.g. elections, parliamentary support, decentralization, civil society or media development, public sector reform, etc.) fitting neatly into an overall strategy. In conflict contexts, restoring stability, peace and security generally trumps other considerations. Increasingly, establishing state authority is seen as key to achieving stability and peace. Thus, there is growing support for privileging state-building as the overriding governance strategy in conflict contexts. This is reflected in the steady production of new policy statements and donor programs on state-building that are designed to strengthen the institutions, capacities, and credibility of the state.16

The evidence from the four case studies reveals that local governance programming is likewise, explicitly or implicitly, largely embedded in a mainly state-building framework. The findings from our

15See UNDP. “Good Governance and Sustainable Human Development”, UNDP Policy Document, available online at http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/policy/chapter1.htm 16See Paris & Sisk 2009, op. cit. 6; See also Charles T. Call & Vanessa Wyeth (Eds.). Building States to Build Peace, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2008.; OECD Statistics website.

The four models of relevance to the Arab world are: state-buildingnation-buildingpeace-buildingdemocracy-building

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study, however, suggest that too much of a focus on a narrowly defined state-building model may not be the most effective approach to addressing the multiple peace and development challenges in the Arab region. 17 As outlined above, Iraq, Lebanon, oPt, and Yemen are concurrently grappling with a complex mix of domestic challenges, not to mention the external ones. These include violent internal conflict; neo-patrimonial political systems; identity-based social fragmentation; weak social capital and external interventions that reflect complex geopolitical interests. Domestic challenges are manifestations of deep (and even deepening) governance problems that need to be addressed beyond restoration of and building the state authority, just as externally located challenges manifest deep global governance problems.

International donors have found it difficult to incorporate elements from peace-building or nation-building models into a more conventional and narrowly defined state-building model, within which local governance programming is embedded. In all four cases, strong external support for state-building has aimed at ensuring efficient delivery of services or state security/stability that does not always sit smoothly with demands for more accountable, inclusive, participatory, democratic governance at the local level. In some cases, this is exacerbated by occupation, which equally reduces responsiveness to such demands. This contrasts with the mounting evidence of the complex linkages between development, peace, governance and security issues in the four cases.

17For a discussion of the inherent dilemmas of state-building approaches, see Paris & Sisk 2009, op. cit. 6. See also Lakhdar Brahimi, “State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Contexts. 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government Conference Paper, Vienna, 2007.

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III. OVERVIEW OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMMING: III. OVERVIEW OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMMING: KEY FEATURES AND OBSERVATIONSKEY FEATURES AND OBSERVATIONS1818

The tensions mentioned in section II have implications for local governance programming (annex 2). Decisions made regarding the entry points to local governance programming can generate additional tensions and dilemmas for broader governance approaches. The difficulty starts with understanding the nature and history of local governance relations, structures authority, and capacity to deliver services. For example, not all local governance relations can be called customary or traditional, implying that they are deep-rooted in history and are unchanging. In several instances worldwide, including in the Arab region, local governance relations and structures are enmeshed with colonial history as opposed to being simply traditional, customary, old, and unchanging19. In some, like the oPt, local authorities have had a long and turbulent history, dating back to Ottoman rule (1516-1916); many local authorities preceded the set up of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 and played key political, service delivery and recovery roles throughout the past century.20

18This paper uses decentralization and local governance interchangeably, although clearly they are not the same, yet implicitly or explicitly are lumped together in the case of UNDP programming, and that of key donors. This tension, identified and flagged through this study, is discussed later on in section VI. 19IDS “An Upside Down View of Governance” IDS 2010, p. 11.20While local authorities were influenced by different ruling regimes, it was during the British mandate (1916-48) that the current form of Local Councils or Local Government Units (LGUs) took shape, the first local elections carried out, and the seeds of patronage relations were sown into LG structures. With the set up of the PA in 1994, the Ministry of Local Government (MOLG) was established to oversee Local Authorities and the first PA law regulating LA was enacted in 1997.? However, since the PA was granted only limited civilian and security control over much of the West Bank and Gaza, many LGUs continued to play a role in Palestinian self-governance. There are currently 453 LGUs in the oPt. The majority of the Territories currently does not fall under any local authority. For more on local governance in the oPt, see country study by Heba El-Kholy and Necla Tchirgi, commissioned by UNDP, 2010.

Key features observed: The implementation of reforms has been slow, Local governance assistance has largely focused on the technical elements

of decentralization The piece-meal approach to reforms and the lack of a coherent approach The slow and only recent shift to conflict sensitive local governance

programming Support for broad-based citizen participation has been generally tepid Gender considerations in programs are consistently weak The fragility of accountability systems

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Furthermore, the emphasis on local governance reform via decentralization needs to be carefully understood. The histories of local governance and decentralization (which is a more recent institutional reform fashion) vary considerably between the four cases. Devoid of a state, Palestinians have one of the most decentralized systems in the region. On the other hand, Iraq’s experience with decentralization since independence has been minimal, with the exception of the autonomous regime in the North through the Kurdistan Regional Government. It was only in 2004 that Iraq adopted a decentralized political system, which was enshrined in the new 2005 constitution and gave Governorates nearly full responsibility for service delivery (Iraq CCA).21 In Lebanon, formal provisions for restructuring administrative divisions and introducing administrative decentralization were embodied in the Taef agreement in 1989 which ended the long civil war. Municipal elections were resumed in 1998 and have been held again in 2004 and are scheduled for the summer of 201022. In Yemen, decentralization became a priority policy for the government after the country’s short but violent civil war in 1994. The Ministry of Local Administration was created in 1995 and the first Law on Local Administration was enacted in February 2000 following six years of public debate. It provides Yemen’s first legal framework for decentralization and contains important provisions for local elections, which took place in 2001 and 2006.

In effect, the implementation of full decentralization (political, administrative and fiscal) is still in its infancy in the Arab region. In the four cases, administrative deconcentration, as opposed to decentralization, is the most prevalent form of reform. Fiscal decentralization is practically nonexistent in any of the cases23, whereas Iraq arguably has the strongest form of political decentralization. All four cases have held recent municipal elections as part of the decentralization process, which is an important step forward for the legitimacy of local governments. The credibility, predictability, and potentially divisive elements of such elections in some cases remain in question.24

Surveying programming trends in all four contexts, the four cases display several common features that underlie the tensions discussed in the next section. Seven key features in relation to both programming and the political context shaping local governance reforms have been identified: (1) having to grapple with the slow pace of implementation of reforms; (2) tending to focus on the technical elements of decentralization; (3) struggling to produce a coherent approach; (4) having

21Since 2003, the Republic of Iraq adopted a decentralized system made up of (a) a Kurdistan Regional Government that is comprised of three governorates, and (b) 15 governorates, including the capital Bagdad, comprising 251municipalities. The Iraqi National Development Strategy (NDS) of 2007-2010, enshrines the responsibility of Governorates for rehabilitation and service delivery especially with regard to critical services such as health, education, water and energy supply. The last provincial elections were during 2009. 22The Lebanese model combines aspects of deconcentration at the level of the eight mohafazat (governorates) and 25 (districts), with administrative decentralization at the municipality levels. In 2001, the Council of Ministries approved a law granting municipalities more powers, and in 2003, a new decentralization draft law was formulated. It is still unclear if it will be adopted by parliament.23The absence of provisions in the legislation of some countries, and specific systems that enable local revenue collection and ensure equitable and predictable transfer of resources from central to the local levels is a serious barrier for the sustainability and autonomous decision making of local governments.24Elections in oPt, which were scheduled for 2009 have been indefinitely postponed, stripping LGUs of their elected legitimacy, and scheduled municipal elections in both Lebanon and Yemen have been delayed several times.

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programme designs that are informed by ‘conflict sensitive’ approaches25 (see annex 5); (5) having to include a component of support for broad-based citizen participation as a feature of local governance programming; (6) as well as having to strengthen gender lenses of programming; and finally (7) having to address the fragility of accountability systems in conflict contexts.

I.I. The implementation of reforms has been slowThe implementation of reforms has been slow

In all four cases, local governance reform and particular attempts at decentralization (as one example of reforming relations and structures at the local level) have been part of complex trajectories of national politics and been influenced by weak or hesitant political will, resulting in the implementation of announced reform initiatives at a slow pace. In the oPt, for instance, the 2004 -2005 local elections in the West Bank and Gaza represented the first attempt by the Palestinian Authority (PA) to address the democratic representation role of local governing units, moving beyond their service delivery role. However, the overwhelming victory of Hamas showed that the Fatah dominated PA had a serious ‘legitimacy crisis’. The polarization between Hamas and Fatah and increased tensions were reflected in local governance structures—both within government and with civil society. In Lebanon, although administrative reform has been a recurring theme of government policy statements and donor support over the past decade, overall, improvements have been modest and not in line with the size of the problems. The decentralization law drafted seven years ago is still under debate and it is unclear at the time of writing if it will be approved by the parliament. In Yemen, the National Decentralization Strategy, drafted with UNDP support, has not been fully endorsed by the President, let alone implemented, and remains a subject of debate. The decentralization process in Yemen, while delivering some outcomes in terms of capacity building for local government and delivery of services to some districts, has been largely stalled (Country study, DCF, 2007).

II.II. LLocal governance assistance (donor supported as well as many of UNDP’socal governance assistance (donor supported as well as many of UNDP’s programs and policy support) has largely focused on the technical elements ofprograms and policy support) has largely focused on the technical elements of decentralizationdecentralization

This technocratic approach has resulted in a menu of narrowly defined interventions. These include the provision of services and infrastructure, drafting of legislation and land planning codes, institutional capacity assessments, and capacity building. Although it could be argued that there is nothing technically wrong with strictly technical assistance to local government units,

25There are different definitions of conflict sensitivity. In a nutshell, this approach often emphasizes the need to make sure that governance assistance and development interventions do no harm by making sure that no conflict is inadvertently created or perpetuated. This approach could also entail ensuring the understanding of conflict dynamics wherein development and governance assistance promotes peace. Conflict analysis is a necessary prerequisite of conflict sensitivity as it provides an understanding of the local, national, regional and international roles, motivations, dynamics and capacities of actors and all of that helps ensure sensitivity to conflict and an understanding of the impact of development interventions. See the annex on what conflict sensitivity is; furthermore, see www.undp.org/oslocentre for guide to measuring fragility and http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/resource_pack/chapter_2__266.pdf which provides a good guide to conflict sensitivity and conflict analysis. See also http://berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/dialogue4_barbolet_etal.pdf

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linking state building with nation and peace building make it imperative that addressing local governance feeds positively into legitimacy, accountability, inclusiveness and participation alongside provision of services (Evaluation Report, 2008, mission interviews).

In Iraq, a needs assessment of the capacity of local authorities to deliver services to the local population was implemented by a technical organization, the Iraqi Engineers Union and finalized in August 2007.26 It covered the technical areas of planning, quality assurance, project implementation, environmental management, information and communication. It is noteworthy that the needs assessment and the final report did not adequately address issues relating to the nature of the relationship between the central line ministries responsible for social service delivery and the local governance units, or the connection between civil service reform and accountability.

In all cases, training initiatives are largely technical, focusing on subjects such as financial management, budgeting, planning, monitoring, and information technology.27 With UNDP support, several country offices, in particular Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq, have also engaged in strategy development and policy dialogue with the government. These, however, have similarly focused mainly on technical issues.28 The more ‘strategic’ and ‘political’ elements of local governance in a conflict context, including the critical need for developing an inclusive national and sub national vision, is generally less emphasized. Without understanding and addressing the intersecting circles of authority, legitimacy, and loyalty or without addressing value chains of resources and service provision or incentive structures of national and local elites, the facilitation of training for capacity development or of dialogue to arrive at national and sub national visions may be a quick win but not a transforming one.

Building an inclusive vision based on the concept of citizenship is particularly important for local governance in conflict contexts. In such a context, issues of representation of diverse (and sometimes opposing) voices and equal access to and distribution of resources among different local communities become of paramount importance for both development and managing conflicts. In a conflict context, the challenge goes beyond ‘managing diversity’. Without a national vision developed through a participatory and inclusive process, local governance can lead to fragmentation, territorial secession, and heightened conflicts, rather than contributing to national unity or effective state-building.

III.III. The piece-meal approach to reforms and the lack of a coherent approachThe piece-meal approach to reforms and the lack of a coherent approach

26This project was supported by the DGTTF27Capacity building interventions (which are largely training programs) have resulted in the development of a plethora of methodologies and tools by donors. The team is not aware of there being any assessment to date of the quality of these tools or impact of training programs for LG at either the Country level or regionally. Our overall impression is that in some of the countries, much of this training is uncoordinated, repetitive, unsustainable, and not demand driven.28For example, the National Strategy in Yemen does adequately take into account the more political challenges of decentralization in a state with limited central authority, where patronage and informal power structures prevail, and other non Western donors, such as Saudi Arabia play a key role. See the country report.

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This reflects not so much a failure of programming, but of the political constraints within which programs operate, thus limiting, in some cases quite substantially, their effectiveness. In all four cases, there is little coherence or consensus on local governance in terms of an overall national vision, strategy or guiding legal framework. Local governance initiatives in the four cases, with the oPt arguably representing the most extreme case, appear to be a ‘bittersweet cocktail’ of objectives, strategies, legal codes, overlapping functions and structures29. Legislation is internally inconsistent and, in the case of Yemen, also inconsistent with the constitution. In the oPt, the current legal framework is a combination of sometimes contradictory codes derived from Ottoman, British, Jordanian and Egyptian Laws. In Iraq, while the law stipulates that local councils at all levels have a responsibility for monitoring and oversight of line ministry services, no enforcement mechanisms are defined. Local councils thus have no managerial controls over service provision. While they can thus identify problems, they depend on others to take action to address the constraints identified. The lines of demarcation of the roles and responsibilities between elected and appointed officials are unclear, and delegated responsibilities to local authorities are not matched by a delegation of resources (nor in the case of Yemen and Lebanon, legal provisions for local revenue generation).

In all four cases, linkages with broader governance and socio-economic reforms for state, nation and peace building remain programmatically challenging. To varying degrees, initiatives appear to be focused on supporting local governance as a separate sector while operational links to broader governance reforms, such as elections, support for the parliament, the judiciary, political party development, anti-corruption initiatives, or security sector reform are not yet well articulated.30

However, one of the key conclusions from successful local governance reforms globally is explicitly situating local governance reforms within broader political and institutional reforms.31

There are some recent promising attempts, however, by several COs to move to a more holistic approach to programming. In Yemen, the newly formulated project on local governance explicitly makes linkages with other UNDP supported governance reforms such as support to the parliament. The project will also work closely with the EU/UNDP electoral support project to ensure that the electoral changes that will be proposed by the Supreme Committee for elections and Referendum will be in line with objectives of decentralization. Links with the Civil Reform Programme of the World Bank project on Public Financial Management Reforms (PFMR) will also be forged to make sure that the public expenditure management model that was introduced at the district levels will contribute to the PFMR and will be scaled up and used at the national level. 32 In the oPt, UNDP/PAPP has recently formulated a new governance strategy that will strengthen these linkages. UNDP’s close involvement in the drafting of Iraq’s new constitution 29The term “bitter sweet cocktail” comes from one of our interviews in oPt, and it seems appropriate to describe the state of affairs in the other countries as well.30The role of local governance in bringing about security and tackling crime is an important dimension that is often overlooked. Given the limited timeframe of this study, this issue was also not investigated but it remains an important and not sufficiently researched area. 31See UNDP, November 2007. Paul Jackson and Zoe Scott. Local Government in Post Conflict Environments. Commissioned Paper for workshop on Local Governance in Post Conflict Situations. Oslo, Norway; See also GTZ: Decentralization and conflicts: A guide line, 2008, P. Collier, Breaking the Conflict Trap—Civil War and Development Policy, World Bank, Washington, 2003.

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has possibly provided the Iraq office with a privileged entry point to engage in a political dialogue with the government and to embed its support for local governance within the context of broader governance reforms. Similarly, there are attempts in Lebanon by UNDP and donors to scale up local recovery and poverty reduction efforts in such a way that may enhance local governance relations and operations (new generation of ARTGOLD).

IV.IV. The slow and only recent shift to conflict sensitive local governanceThe slow and only recent shift to conflict sensitive local governance programmingprogramming

The majority of interventions appear similar to those implemented in countries that are not affected by the kinds of deep internal schisms and external conflicts described in the previous sections. Local governance programming is not guided by explicit (or sometimes even implicit) assumptions regarding conflict prevention/or conflict resolution. This study found conflict analysis in UNDP programme documents, policy papers, PRSP or evaluations, too weak or nonexistent in a manner that would ensure that programs do not exacerbate existing conflicts, or play a pro-active role in addressing them. It is not clear as to how much of this weak conflict analysis is due to duly exercised deference to public discourse inside countries and how much of that, if it exists, is indeed hindering effective programming (design, implementation, and M & E).

In Yemen, the programme document on decentralization (2003-2009) does not integrate conflict into the analysis or programme design. The initial study on which the programme was developed in 2003 was also not grounded in a conflict or political economy analysis (see annex 4). 33 Similarly, the project evaluation conducted in 2008 did not consider conflict dynamics in its assessment, analysis, lessons learned or recommendations. This is even more striking as by 2008 the simmering internal conflicts of the early 2000s had blossomed into a full-fledged war in the North and a vocal protest movement in the South. There are a total of five lines in the evaluation document making reference to conflict. For example, the evaluation acknowledges that the project created a tangible gap between the pilot and non-pilot districts in terms of capacity to develop local plans and budgets. However, it provides no follow up information or analysis as to what impact this may have had in inadvertently creating conflicts or how this was mitigated.

With a more conflict sensitive approach, good practice can be identified, analyzed, replicated, or scaled up. In the same evaluation document, it appears that “one of the lessons learned is that the establishment of Community teams with representations of local councils, non elected bodies and community groups has created a good working environment and helps avoid the kinds of conflicts that used to arise between these actors and which still blights the non pilot districts.” (UNDP evaluation, 2008). This is a critical point. If taken into account in other programme designs, it could

32Linkages with other key national governance institutions such as the anti-corruption initiatives of SNAC and COCA are yet to be developed.33This may partly be because the conflict in the North and the separatist demands in South were still in a simmering stage at this time and had not reached the intense levels, or publicity, that they have reached today. According to the RR in Yemen in 2003, conflict issues, particularly in the South, were “not on the radar screen of the UN at this time”.

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serve to avoid conflict neutral approaches, and strengthen differentiated strategies that are designed to respond to the highly diverse internal political conflicts in Yemen.

In the oPt, for example, a comprehensive diagnostic on Local governance, commissioned by UNDP in 2002 and updated in 2009, (LG diagnostic, 2009) makes no explicit reference to the impact of the internal conflict34. In terms of programming, the team did not see specific evidence of a differentiated strategy to deal with municipalities in the West Bank and Gaza. This is crucial given the divergent capacities, needs and trajectories of municipalities, all of which were exacerbated by the violent split in 2007 between Hamas and Fatah and the devastating invasion of Gaza by Israel. In contrast, the analysis provided by the Iraq and Lebanon Country Offices in the CCA and other documents shows more sensitivity to conflict issues.

Conflict sensitive analysis can strengthen local governance programming. Institutional and community measures and platforms for peace-building, local dialogue or conflict management (which have been employed in other conflict contexts as key elements of local governance programs) have not adequately been employed in the Arab context; their systematic integration in local governance in country programs would be necessary. In both the oPt and Lebanon35, for example, innovative small-scale initiatives supporting local dialogue have been initiated. The youth groups established in Lebanon are particularly potent opportunities for upscaling youth engagement as an integral component to promote reconciliation at the local level. To date, UNDP has supported 65 youth groups that cover sixteen areas in the North and another 49 in the South of Lebanon and established three Youth Municipal Offices in Beirut Southern Suburbs (in 2009). In Yemen, following a recent initiative to engage in a comprehensive Conflict Analysis exercise jointly with key donors, the UNDP office is considering similar initiatives for mainstreaming conflict into programming based on the results of this exercise36. It is noteworthy that Iraq introduced “crisis management and local governance” as a specific and key area of training for civil servants. The training is conducted in the five regional training centers for local governance that were supported by UNDP. These are all positive steps demonstrating UNDP’s ability to push the boundaries of standard programs and to go beyond a ‘business as usual approach’.

V.V. Support for broad-based citizen participation as a feature of local governanceSupport for broad-based citizen participation as a feature of local governance programming has been generally tepidprogramming has been generally tepid

In a recent IDS study that advocates the rethinking of governance, it is argued that supply-side governance (where focus is on state capacity to govern) and demand-side governance (where focus

34The update of the diagnostic in 2009 does make reference to the impact of Israel’s building of the Separation Wall on local governance in the oPt, which is a welcome addition to an otherwise largely conflict neutral document. See Horizon for Sustainable Development, Update of diagnostic Report on the Local Governance System in the OPt and the Action (Implementation) Plan, Ramallah, 2009 [hereinafter Local Governance Study 2009]. 35The pilot initiative on local reconciliation with Inter-peace at the grassroots level and the initiative with the Carter Center and the Arab Thought Forum at the level of political parties in the oPt, are very promising examples.36UNDP Yemen has recently enhanced its staff capacities with specific skills in conflict analysis through hiring a conflict advisor and a gender and conflict advisor, as well as a consultant to review the UNDAF from a conflict perspective.

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is on civil society to participate) are both ill guided. The IDS study argues for a better focus on state-society relations37. The field missions that informed our reflections in this paper have detected a similar difficulty. Links to community based groups and NGOs, including women’s groups, are limited while donors support civil society and UNDP often supports local state capacity to plan and deliver.

Their concurrent support appears to be operating on separate tracks, with community development initiatives undertaken by NGOs not necessarily linked to UNDP work with municipalities or with local councils on local development plans. Initiatives to strategically link support to NGOs with support for local councils are not common, and structures to facilitate community participation in local government decisions or ensure citizen access to information, budgets, and decisions of local councils are rare (mission interviews in oPt).38 The few studies that exist on better understanding the relationships between local councils and communities in the oPt argue that the links are quite weak39. In the case of the oPt, our interviews suggest that, in some cases, there may also be some competition for donor funds between local governments and NGOs (NDC mission interview).

Current reviews of participatory approaches in local governance strike cautionary notes about the context in which community participation is advocated and pursued. In some instances, community level participation ends up captured and manipulated by local elites. In many instances, the local governance legal, political and administrative framework needs to allow for and institutionalize community participation from planning to budgeting, delivery and monitoring. In Iraq, for instance, there is a need to create better mechanisms to enable communities and citizens to play an active role in local governance. One of the shortcomings identified in the 2004 decentralization law and the Provisional Powers Act enacted in March 2008 is the lack of reference to inclusion and participatory mechanisms of community groups. One of the problems undermining decentralization and local governance in Iraq is the interference from sectarian powers (both religious and tribal) in setting local priorities that meet their own narrow constituencies, rather than those of the broader community. Independent and non-sectarian civil society groups are yet to emerge as a force to enforce more regulation and accountability.

Lebanon seems to offer more promise in this regard, as civil society appears to have played a critical role in advocating for independent municipal elections. The Electoral Law reform has been coordinated with the CSOs with special focus on the voter education component; many of these organizations conducted outreach activities to various regions; similarly media campaigns were coordinated by these CSOs. This is a crucial issue as robust, non-partisan civil society interaction with

37IDS “An Upside Down View of Governance” IDS 2010, p. 10. 38While key actors, like UNDP and USAID have played a role in supporting linkages between community organizations and municipalities in the development of local strategic plans in the oPt, (LG report, 2009), there is no evidence that multi-stakeholder participatory planning at the local level is systematically part of LG interventions, nor that it links to national planning and policy processes. 39Gabriel Mohammed, Al Hokm Al Mahaly & Al Mosharka Al Mogtamaeya. Unpublished Paper, Palestinian Center for the Dissemination of Democracy and Community Development, Jerusalem, 2009

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local government is highlighted in the literature as a determinant for success, partly to ensure mutual accountability and to prevent democratic consensus from unraveling.40

VI.VI. Gender considerations in programs are consistently weakGender considerations in programs are consistently weak

The prevalent assumption that local government increases women’s participation in decision-making is not easy to verify in any of the countries. In the oPt, female representation at the local level is higher than at the national level, with about 17 percent of elected local council members in municipal elections in 2005/2006 being women. (UNDP/PAPP strategic framework, 2008). In the other countries, the numbers of female elected officials at the local level are much lower. The situation is also not any better on the national level. In Iraq, the election law aims to achieve a 25% representation of women in the parliament41.

Beyond formal electoral representation, however, team impressions from interviews and visits to several municipalities in the four countries suggest that women’s de facto participation in local council decision making is not significant, and there is no explicit strategy, or particular mechanisms in any of the four countries to address gender issues in local governance. A 2008 evaluation of the Local governance programme in Yemen clearly points to this shortcoming (UNDP evaluation document, 2008), which the Yemen country office plans to address in the new local governance project. Our interviews, however, suggest that gender is a divisive and polarizing issue in all four countries. At the local levels, even more so in a conflict context, gender roles and relations are in flux; it is often more difficult, not easier, to put in place gender differentiated strategies that can empower women.42 This calls for some more serious reflection regarding programming to implement the 8-point agenda in different conflict contexts especially that Southern Sudan seems to represent a positive case. In Sudan, the DGTTF supported project for a Strategy for Mainstreaming Gender Empowerment in Local Government in Southern Sudan was a component of the broader Local Governance Recovery Program that supported Gender Equality by training State and County government officials in gender awareness, sensitivity and mainstreaming. An assessment conducted by the Oslo Governance Centre in 2010 determined that:

40A forthcoming study by the independent Palestinian Policy and Research Institute (MASS) on donor support to NGOs may shed more light on these linkages in the case of the oPt. Similar policy studies on these linkages in other countries would be an important research area for the future as this issue relates to a key tension identified by this study and discussed later in the paper relating to the tension between support for decentralization versus support for local governance. 41See UNDP Parliamentary Development Initiative in the Arab Region, available online at http://www.arabparliaments.org/countries 42Addressing the differentiated and shifting roles and relationships between men and women in conflict contexts, needs much more attention at all governance programming and addressing this issue will require concerted commitment, effort and ‘thinking out of the box’. See Marcia E. Greenberg and Elaine Zuckerman, The Gender Dimensions of Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Challenges in Development Aid, Tony Addison and Tilman Brück, eds. Making Peace Work: The Challenges of Social and Economic Recontsruction (Palgrave MacMillan, UNU-WIDER, 2009) for a discussion of gender in conflict in general, and Nadje Al-Ali and Nicola Pratt (eds) Zed Press. Women and War in the Middle East London and New York 2009 for a discussion related in particular to the Arab world.

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The project managed to build databases, train specific and general Local Government staff members, develop policy guidelines, and successfully introduce gender issues into planning and budgeting of Local Government throughout Southern Sudan.

A network of 20 Gender Focal Points was created and based at the Ministry of Local Government in each of the 10 Southern States. The role of the Focal Points was to initiate and coordinate gender activities with communities in an attempt to increase participation of women in community decision-making.

VII.VII. The fragility of accountability systems The fragility of accountability systems

Lessons learned globally show that decentralization (particularly in a context of conflict) is a major instrument for creating opportunities of corruption at the local levels if not supported by enhanced accountability mechanisms. Moreover, in light of the prevalent relations of patronage, neo-patrimony, and local conflicts (sectarian, ideological or identity based, depending on the country), concerns in the literature regarding ‘local elite’ capture (of both development benefits and local elections) and local despotism could be aggravated43 particularly in the absence of effective accountability measures.

Given this context, UNDP programming sometimes notices popular, and sometimes vocal, concerns with issues of participation and integrity at the local levels in several of the countries. For example, in the oPt, a comprehensive analysis by Deneoux (Middle East Policy Review, June 2005) of a series of polls on perceptions of corruption between 2004-2005 reveals that corruption/integrity was the single most important issue in the selection of candidates in the municipal elections of 2004/2005 in the West Bank and Gaza. Integrity was deemed more important than religiosity, family relations, and level of education or political affiliation. The majority of respondents in both WB and Gaza (93%) expected the elected council members to fight previous corrupt practices, and most felt that fighting corruption should be a top priority. Polls also showed very high expectation by Palestinians on local government to deliver on that priority issue. 44 UNDP in the oPt, funded by the Democratic Governance Trust Fund (DGTTF), conducted a project that resulted in the production of the first local integrity tool kit for use by local councils. The toolkit is currently being tested in several municipalities and the office plans to apply it to all 132 municipalities in the West Bank and Gaza over the next few years. This project represents an innovative initiative and has generated several key lessons, which if taken on board, has the potential for both up-scaling in the oPt as well as adaption to other countries in the region.45

43See Paul Jackson & Zoe Scott, “Local Government in Post Conflict Environments”, UNDP Local Governance in Post Conflict Situations Workshop Paper, Oslo, 2007. Also Eva Shrottshammer & Uwe Kievelitz. “Decentralization and Conflicts: A Guideline”, German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (GZT) Commissioned Paper, Eschborn, 2006..44As of June 2005, 80% believed that the PA is corrupt and that ‘wasta’ (or connections) is what secure jobs. Almost 70% saw government performance on tackling corruption as weak, weaker than performance in other areas, with those accused of corruption avoiding being charged (Denoux, 2005). 45For an assessment of this project, see the report by Heba El-Kholy and Necla Tschirgi, January, 2010

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In Iraq, where development planning has been made the responsibility of locally elected bodies, a poll published in 2008 showed a slight majority having no confidence in their local community leaders. This suggests that building new relationships between local councils and local stakeholders to ensure the trust, transparency, and accountability that underpin their local mandate is still a work in progress46. It is, therefore, one major area of governance reform as per the national priorities of the government of Iraq and also reflected in UNDP governance assistance programs.

46Prime Minister Maliki’s provision of funds to local governors outside the budget and that were not subject to clear accountability procedures is an example (see the country report).

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IV. KEY TENSIONS IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMMING:IV. KEY TENSIONS IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMMING: TOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKTOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Local governance programming in situations of conflict is presumed to support peace and inclusive national development partly through forging both ‘vertical social capital’, i.e. better linking citizens to their national government and state building processes, as well as ‘bridging social capital’, i.e. connecting different groups in the localities, across social, political, religious or ethnic lines. Given the above observations, however, it would be safe to assume that local governance initiatives are still far from reaching their maximum potential of forging either ‘bridging’ or ‘vertical’ social capital. Enabling local governance to do that requires a radical rethinking of current approaches. An approach that is more grounded in the political economy (annex 4) and ‘messy’ context of conflict in a country stands better chances of making a transformational difference in this field. A ‘tension analysis’, focusing on tensions and identifying what is realistic to achieve in specific contexts, through balancing and prioritizing competing imperatives and managing expectations, may be a more effective way forward, rather than a conventional linear planning process that emphasizes sequencing.

This final section presents four key ‘tensions’ identified through an analysis of the characteristics, achievements, and limitations of current approaches to local governance. These are: (1) tensions between ‘local’ and ‘national’ legitimacy; (2) tensions between the technical and political approaches to local governance programming; (3) tensions between efficiency and legitimacy; and (4) tensions between local government versus local governance.

I. The tension between ‘local’ versus ‘national’ legitimacy:The tension between ‘local’ versus ‘national’ legitimacy: “the tribe behaves like a state and the state behaves like a tribe”47

As mentioned in section III, there is an apparent lack of political consensus on the overall vision, approach and specific objectives of local governance reforms. This is a result of the tension inherent in efforts to strike the right balance between building local versus national legitimacy. This tension is critical and it puts to the fore the key question regarding ways in which it is possible to strengthen state legitimacy in a conflict context where other local actors, organizations, and institutions (both formal and in some cases informal) either compete with the state for legitimacy, or, may have an even stronger basis for legitimacy.

47This quote is from our interviewees in Yemen. While it relates to the tribal context of Yemen, its spirit nonetheless captures, in a local idiom, a common dilemma of local/center legitimacy in all countries.

Key tensions between:

‘Local’ versus ‘national’ legitimacy, ‘Technical’ and ‘political’ approaches to programming‘Efficiency’ and ‘Building Legitimacy’‘Local Government’ and ‘Local Governance’

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As discussed earlier, all four cases are experiencing different forms and degrees of ethnic, religious, or identity based divisions, as well as political fragmentation, heterogeneous political elites, and highly fluid political alliances. Building national consensus around the specifics of reform in such a context is clearly complicated. Decentralization is a case in point. While decentralization is seen by certain groups as a way of improving service delivery and building trust between localities and the national government, a full-fledged decentralization process can also run counter to the perceived interests of various groups. Central/local tensions, however, play out differently given the diverse conflict ecology of each case.

In the oPt, tensions between local and central authorities, related to the perceived legitimacy of local governance units have played out in different ways throughout the past century, with various regimes playing a conscious role in fragmenting local interests and local legitimacy. These tensions, however, have recently intensified partly due to an escalating internal conflict around competing visions and objectives regarding the nature of the State and Palestinian identity, as well as autonomy, accountability, capacity and responsibility in political and fiscal decision making arenas.48

The resistance by central ministries in both Lebanon and Iraq to increased decision-making authority at the local level is due to fear of reducing their level of control, as well as the implications of what is essentially a fundamental rethinking of the role of central government institutions. In Iraq, moreover, the divides that have plagued the country since the invasion in turn fuels the fears that increased autonomy and legitimacy will exacerbate separatist tendencies and threaten national unity. This tension explains why devolution of power has not been tackled as a priority.

In Yemen, this tension is played out in an often dramatic manner between informal tribal authorities and the regime in Sana’a. Since in large areas in the North, tribal authorities de facto provide many core state functions, including justice and community security, decentralization is seen not only as threatening the power of some line ministries, but is feared by some as threatening to the very stability of the country. Current debates in Yemen about the legitimacy of local versus national (and formal versus informal) authority and the transition from one to the other is at the very heart of Yemen’s democratic development and viability as a nation-state. 49

In all four cases, intensive debates in parliament and the media on decentralization has significantly raised expectations and enthusiasm among the public that decentralization in its three elements - the political, administrative, and fiscal - will result in better delivery of services, more equally distributed development outcomes and the start of a real democratization process.

48These tensions occur in a particular context where the legitimacy of LGUs in sometimes stronger than that of the PA (many LGUs preceded the PA or the MOLG), where the national legitimacy of the Fatah dominated PA has been challenged (including at the local level), where there are two de facto governments, but no sovereign state, and where LGUs cover only 70% of the oPt.49State resources which are no longer sufficient to maintain political stability based on patronage and cooptation-- the basis for state survival since unification--thus exacerbating these inherent tensions. Deep mistrust between the South and Sanaa has also reached an all time high as discussed in section I.

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It is possible that decentralization reforms will proceed in a manner that will enable local government to become a mechanism for more equitable allocation of resources and services from the national government to underprivileged areas, in turn contributing to both peace and development and building the legitimacy of the national state. However, indications to date and mission interviews suggest that governments are more interested in administrative decentralization, not devolution of power, or fiscal decentralization (annex 3). Further developments in decentralization are unlikely to include more space for local decision-making. Rather, it will most likely result in more state control over local affairs. If this is accepted by local communities, and does not result in further conflicts, it could still lead to improved services and stronger nation-states. There is, however, the strong likelihood that it could also exacerbate local conflicts.

If, on the other hand, decentralization proceeds beyond administrative decentralization to include both fiscal decentralization as well as devolving more power to local authorities, the scenarios may vary. Some local leaders might use that as a base to further strengthen their traditional power. This could result in a weaker state and stronger communities, if these local voices do speak on behalf of their communities. Alternatively, it could lead to further aggravating intra-tribal conflicts in the case of Yemen, or sectarian conflicts in the case of Iraq.

Decentralization policies are just one example. Comprehensive local governance reforms are thus clearly complex. They may aggravate conflicts and fragmentation and weaken the prospects for inclusive development and peace if the transition is not designed and managed in a manner that can balance the tensions between local and regional legitimacy, reducing regional inequalities as well as competition and acrimony over power.50

II.II. The tensions between ‘technical’ and ‘political’ approaches to programming: The tensions between ‘technical’ and ‘political’ approaches to programming:

As discussed in section III, local governance programming should not have to adopt a technocratic, piecemeal approach; rather, it has to be based on a participatory national vision and consensus regarding the shape and type of the desired nation-state (and nation-state building process) in each country. As discussed earlier, developing an inclusive national vision is a pre-requisite for ensuring that local governance in a context of conflict does not lead to further conflicts or fragmentation. The example of limitations in forging a vision around decentralization reforms does not reflect a failure of programming as much as it reflects how far local governance programming can go - given the particular political realities. The limitations of reforms are largely a reflection of competing perspectives and diverging interests in a country, combined with the absence of adequate national processes through which a multi-stakeholder vision for the country’s future can be articulated. Societal fragmentation in the four cases and the unresolved tensions related to power sharing (and,

50A key lesson from the literature on conflict and decentralization is that local governance works best in a win-win situation; it does not work well in an atmosphere characterized by acrimony over power sharing. See See John Mary Kauzya, “Decentralization: Prospects for Peace, Democracy and Development”, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs – Division of Public Administration and Development Management Policy Paper , New York, 2005. See also David Nassar. “Evolving Democracy in Yemen: No Surprise After All”. Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. July/August 1998. and Stephen Day. “Bariers to Federal Democracy in Iraq: Lessons from Yemen.’ Middle East Poliy. Volume 13. Issue 3. pp 121-139. Published online September 13, 2006.

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in some of the cases, wealth sharing as well) have exacerbated this divergence in moving towards an inclusive national vision, including the role of local governance structures within it.

The technocratic approach runs in the face of well acknowledged wisdom in international development assistance that local governance is highly political and that a focus on both the strategic and political elements, not only the technical and operational, is key for success. The challenge, however, does not appear to be due to the lack of available political and conflict analysis per se. For example, Yemen is one of the best-studied cases in this respect and there is a range of excellent, although mostly foreign-generated, analysis. There is also general agreement regarding the underlying factors contributing to underdevelopment and conflict in Yemen. Also in Lebanon and the oPt, there is strong local research and analytical capacity and a resultant plethora of political economy analysis (annex 4). 51

The challenge is linking this analysis to programme design and making it useful to programming. This is where a set of tensions arise between the ‘technical’ versus the ‘political’ approach to programming. Better understanding and managing these tensions could contribute to stronger linkages and ultimately more effective programming. What we should aim for is indeed a ‘developmental’ approach that combines the relevant elements of the political approach (that development actors can have some control over) and elements of the technical approach that is clearly also essential to any change process. One of the problems is precisely that development approaches to governance have been reduced to technical ones. 52

A recent analysis of the gap between political analysis and development responses provides an excellent understanding of why making these links is neither straightforward nor simple, and why political analysis is not changing development models in a fundamental manner.53 There are important institutional and conceptual barriers that serve to reinforce the status quo. On the international development assistance side, these include the inflexibility of programming timelines and instruments, institutional obstacles, fast rotation of staff resulting in little institutional memory and local knowledge accumulation, and competing strategic and programmatic imperatives. Other key barriers include the reluctance to be seen or perceived as challenging central government on issues that are considered sensitive, even if it is acknowledged that these are critical for the success or failure of technical development programs. In a context of conflict, concerns by development practitioners that such discussions may affect critical issues of ‘humanitarian access’ to certain communities adds to their reluctance. Governments are also often resistant to discuss with development actors issues that are considered “political” and outside the traditional field of development actors. An additional reason for the gap between research and programmatic responses is the lack of adequate locally generated political economy or conflict analysis. As a result, much of the analysis is 51The Lebanon CCA 2007, for example, acknowledges that the slow pace of the reform is intimately linked with the confessional structure of government in the country and the way power is shared between the various groups (country report). 52Thomas Carothers in his excellent analysis of Democracy Assistance in specific draws a distinction between what he terms the ‘political’ versus Developmental approaches (Carothers, 2009). While this resonates closely with our analysis, we prefer in the case of LG programming to draw the distinction between the ‘technical’ versus ‘political’. 53See Sue Unsworth, “What's Politics Got To Do With It?: Why Donors Find It So Hard to Come to Terms With Politics, and Why This Matters”, Journal of International Development 21(6), 2009

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generated by foreign researchers or donors and is largely in English. The policy analyses also generally remain at the macro level, rather than exploring differentiated regional/local dynamics. This makes it much more difficult for policy makers or local policy centers and civil society to access it or use it as a basis for debate and dialogue.

III.III. The tensions between ‘Efficiency’ and ‘Building Legitimacy’:The tensions between ‘Efficiency’ and ‘Building Legitimacy’:

Equitable delivery of basic services is an urgent need in all four cases, although the need varies significantly from one case to the other. Better service delivery and local development outcomes remain among the key drivers of decentralization (as an example of local governance reform) in all cases.54 One of the key tensions is between the need for short term, efficient delivery of urgently needed schools, clinics and other basic services and the longer term and more complex need to build state legitimacy and the capacity of local authority institutions. Basic services projects, depending on their approach and modality of delivery, may undermine state legitimacy, through creating parallel projectized aid. Lebanon, however, offers a good example of how early recovery at the local level after the Israeli war of 2008 took place in close partnership with the municipalities and not parallel to them.

Donors try to tackle this issue in different ways, among them the establishment of social funds. The ‘Social Fund’ approach is meant to improve livelihoods and provide for basic services.55 However, the Social Fund modality is often criticized for creating parallel structures to the central state, as well as detracting from decentralization reforms attempting to build the capacity of local authorities at the district levels (mission interviews). It is true that parallel structures such as the Social Fund, rather than line ministries or local authorities, may not be the best way to cement a highly fragile social contract. However, the slow pace of local governance reform and decentralization poses serious challenges to address increasing poverty and lack of basic services. This tension remains an important one and will require further collective reflection, monitoring, and new strategies to manage. A second phase programme by UNDP Lebanon, with Italian funding, which aims to both enhance local government as well as impact on local poverty reduction and job creation, may offer some lessons in this regards (ARTGOLD).

The tension between efficiency and legitimacy is also evident in Iraq. In an effort to jump start local recovery and development efforts, Prime Minister Maliki disbursed grants, outside the budget and not subject to normal accountability measures, to a number of Governors. While the delivery of services may have been faster due to access to these funds, this undermined the legitimacy of local authorities by creating a parallel modality of funding local efforts outside of normal channels of revenue transfer between the central and local levels. The results of a poll published in March 2008 56

54Decentralization is not a panacea for poor service delivery. In the absence of a well-formulated framework for decentralization with the devolution of resources alongside responsibilities and strong accountability frameworks, it can create greater opportunities for fraud and mismanagement.55For example, the Social Fund (SF) in Yemen was initiated with World Bank funding in 1997, prior to the enactment of the Local Authorities Law. An innovative, quasi-governmental body, it has national coverage and is generally considered efficient and transparent. To date, the SF has financed about 9,666 projects reaching nearly 20 million beneficiaries and creating more than 37 million temporary jobs, mainly in rural areas. The Social Fund annual report, mission interviews

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reflected a distrustful mood among Iraqis regarding local government. The results of the poll indicated lack of confidence in the government and the local leaders at the same time.

In some instances, the tension between efficiency and legitimacy is left unaddressed because of programming operations in country offices. For example, in some UNDP country offices, local governance and local development programs overlap and are operated by the same team (such as in Yemen). In other countries, such as Iraq and Lebanon, there are two different programs and teams where local governance is part of the poverty team and the policy dialogue on the national level (e.g. on legal framework for decentralization) is part of the governance team. In the latter case, the needed linkages between local development and decentralization programs could be strengthened with team cooperation/coordination.

IV.IV. The tensions between Local Government and Local Governance:The tensions between Local Government and Local Governance:

While not explicit, the analysis shows that, in effect, in the four cases, the main approach has been largely one of support to local government, rather than broader support to local governance.57 While local government and local governance are interlinked and complementary, they do not always go hand in hand. A local governance approach requires an explicit link to local governance actors such as business leaders, departments of the ministries, community groups and civil society groups. 58 It also entails targeting processes and structures that give meaning to an inclusive, equitable relationship between government units and local communities and citizens at large.

The tilt towards a narrower approach to strengthen local government versus a broader approach to building local governance structures and processes is not just an issue of sequencing. It is partly a reflection of the overall governance model adopted—which is often a narrowly defined state building model as discussed earlier. One of the inherent shortcomings of this model is that it “is still vague on how participation, voice and accountability can be fully fostered and how external assistance to critical state

56Survey conducted for ABC News, BBC, ARD, and NHK by D3 systems of Vienna, VA and KA Research Ltd. of Istanbul, Turkey. Interviews were conducted in person with 2,228 Iraqis over 18 years of age in Arabic and/or Kurdish from February 12 to 20 in 2008 and compared the findings to previous polls conducted on 2004, 2005, and 2007

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/14_03_08iraqpollmarch2008.pdf 57While in other countries, government discourse and documents use both terms, local governance and local government—Hokm mehally and Idara Mahalia, it is noteworthy that in the oPt, the PA Recovery and Development programme uses specifically the term local government, not the broader one of local governance. In Iraq the reference is to Local Governance, Lebanon considers Local Governance but practically with reference to administrative decentralization which is closer to the Arabic term of ‘Idara Mahalliya , while in Yemen the reference is to Local Administration through Local Committees. 58According to UNDP, decentralization refers to the restructuring of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility between institutions of governance at the central, regional, and local levels according to the principle of subsidiarity. Based on such a principle, functions (or tasks) are transferred to the lowest institutional or social level that is capable (or potentially capable) of completing them. Decentralization relates to the role of, and relationship between central and sub-national institutions, whether they are public, private, or civic. Local governance, on the other hand, comprises a set of institutions, mechanisms and processes, through which citizens and their groups can articulate their interests and needs, mediate their differences and exercise their rights and obligations. DGD Policies and Programmes in the Arab Region, UNDP/SURF-AS, 2003.

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capacities (especially the police and military as the sole legitimate source of coercive authority) can do more harm than good in the absence of democratic rights and systems for citizens to hold states accountable”59

In a conflict context, however, engaging civil society and business leaders as part of a local governance agenda is also not straightforward. Over and above the fact that community level engagement in local government varies from one political system to another, civil society leadership and infrastructure is often significantly weakened and fragmented during, or in the aftermath of a conflict. For example, unlike Lebanon and the oPt, highly centralized administration and the high level of control exerted by government on civil society in Iraq for decades has resulted in limited local initiatives by community-based groups or the private sector.

Moreover, in polarized conflict environments, many civil society organizations and community groups have narrow political, ethnic, or religious affiliations and interests, which may undermine the accountability and watchdog role that they could play at the local level. Given the sectarian or ideological inclination of some civil society organizations, working with certain groups could inadvertently exacerbate conflicts, or marginalize certain groups.60

Finally, some of the institutional obstacles discussed earlier under tensions between a political versus a technical approach to local governance programming are also relevant here. Governments are often unwelcoming of civil society initiatives and prefer to focus on strengthening the capacity and authority of local government officials. Thus, development assistance manifests this tension between support for local government versus support to local governance and may inadvertently explain/perpetuate the fragility of accountability structures in local governance programs as described in the earlier section.

Together, the four sets of tensions discussed above as well as the tensions within the broader governance models discussed earlier, provide the basis for developing a field-driven analytical framework to better understand the complex nature of local governance in a conflict context. Closer attention paid to these tensions and on how to manage them would enable the exploration of differentiated strategies that can better respond to the diverse conflict contexts in the Arab region. This could significantly strengthen local governance programming. In the absence of adequate theoretical frameworks to understand the dynamics of local governance and conflict in the Arab world, this represents an important first step for further reflection, validation, and development in the Arab region and possibly globally.

59Paris & Sisk 2009, op. cit. 660For example, the current split between Hamas and Fatah is reflected not just at the local government levels, but on many civil society organizations in the West Bank and Gaza as well, including at the community levels (mission interviews).

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V. RECOMMENDATIONS:V. RECOMMENDATIONS:

In line with the exploratory nature of this study, our recommendations attempt to push the boundaries of ‘business as usual’ programming. They focus on proposals that relate specifically to the tensions identified in this study and are clustered into five categories: Policy, Programming, Research and Analysis, Capacity Building, and Knowledge Management.

The recommendations as a whole suggest a rethinking of current approaches and a qualitatively different way to support local governance reforms. While focusing on the UNDP, we believe that these recommendations are relevant to the broader international community. We hope that this exploratory study and the respective recommendations that flow from it will thus form the basis for a serious debate among key practitioners, donors, and policy makers in the near future.

I.I. Policy Dialogue: Policy Dialogue:

Articulating and addressing conflict issues, including their impact on localArticulating and addressing conflict issues, including their impact on local governance, in policy dialogue with governments. governance, in policy dialogue with governments.

As this study demonstrates the linkages between local governance programming and broader governance approaches, as well as linkages between governance, conflict and security are complex. The linkages are not linear or easily amenable to traditional planning tools. Moreover, these linkages and their implications are often not addressed in policy dialogue with governments. The aim of a more open dialogue on these issues would be to ensure that the positive linkages are reinforced and the contradictory nature of the linkages leading to tensions in implementation of LG reforms are better managed, to the extent possible. Building partnerships within the international community, including with Arab donors who have investments/influence in a particular country, would enhance local governance effectiveness. A more explicit political economy analysis to inform local governance programming would enable local governance programming to go beyond the technicalities of reform

Recommendations are clustered into five categories:

Policy Dialogue: Articulating and addressing conflict issues, including their impact on local governance, in policy dialogue with governments

Programming: Incorporating conflict issues into local governance program planning, country strategies, and evaluations

Research and Analysis: Linking political economy analysis to programming and supporting targeted policy oriented research

Capacity Building: Building capacity both for local and international development practitioners in political economy and conflict analysis

Knowledge Management and Regional Learning: Supporting regional and cross regional exchanges on local governance in conflict affected countries

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(e.g. capacity trainings for local government officers) in order to combine programming to foster inclusive state society relations on the local level with programming to prevent or manage conflict and enhance human security. Such an approach would also enhance the potential of local governance programs to contribute positively to broader state-building, nation-building, and peace-building approaches.

II. Programming:II. Programming:

Incorporating conflict issues into local governance progrm planning, countryIncorporating conflict issues into local governance progrm planning, country strategies, and evaluations. strategies, and evaluations.

How this can be done is, of course, highly dependent on the particular context of each case. Some countries may choose to mainstream a conflict sensitive approach into specific local governance programs or into the country programme more broadly. Others may find it more effective and opportune to pilot ‘stand-alone’ conflict-resolution or peace building initiatives. The findings of this study point to some key thematic areas of local governance worthy of further exploration with a conflict sensitive lens including: programming for enhanced accountability and combating corruption as well as programming to enhance independent and non-sectarian civil society engagement.

III.III. Research and Analysis:Research and Analysis:

Linking political economy analysis to programming and supporting targeted policyLinking political economy analysis to programming and supporting targeted policy oriented research.oriented research.

In most contexts there is often good conflict analysis at the macro level, although it is often in English and does not delve into conflict dynamics at the sub national and micro levels, which directly affects local governance programming. In response, a number of recommendations are of relevance: (1) supporting more differentiated and disaggregated analysis of conflict dynamics at the sub national level; (2) A stronger and explicit focus on real-time analysis and learning in the course of programme implementation, for example by incorporating and resourcing an ‘action research’ component into new major initiatives; (3) supporting targeted policy research on certain ‘blind’ spots on which there is less data or significant debate. This will vary by country, but this study also suggests that there are region-wide issues that may merit such targeted research. These include, for example, gender issues in local governance programs, managing diversity and mutual accountability in the context of local governance, or the role of informal/traditional, customary local structures; and (4) identifying opportunities for incorporating issues of trust, social capital, and social cohesion into large scale socio economic datasets, such as household poverty surveys.

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IV.IV. Capacity Building:Capacity Building:

Building capacity both for local and international development practitioners inBuilding capacity both for local and international development practitioners in political economy and conflict analysis.political economy and conflict analysis.

In some countries local capacity in these areas is strong. In other countries, however, strengthening the capacity of national think tanks and university departments is a critical long-term strategy. UNDP could indeed spearhead and build strong partnerships towards this kind of long-term investment in political economy and conflict sensitive analysis and programming. Strengthening in-house capacity to use a political economy framework and mainstream conflict analysis into UNDP programming and that of the UNCT on a sustainable basis is also critical. The country offices need long-term staff with the right kinds of skill to spearhead and sustain this type of new approach to policy dialogue and programming. Joint training of staff in partnerships with key donors is a possible element in such a strategy.

V.V. Knowledge Management and Regional Learning:Knowledge Management and Regional Learning:

Supporting regional and cross regional exchanges on local governance in conflictSupporting regional and cross regional exchanges on local governance in conflict affected countries.affected countries.

One-third of the Country Offices and Assistance Programs in the UNDP RBAS are in countries and territories affected by conflicts. All are involved is supporting some type of local governance programme and are struggling with similar challenges. Several COs have begun to introduce pilot conflict sensitive initiatives into their recovery and governance programs. To date, however, there are few exchanges of lessons being learned or strategies regarding both direct and indirect approaches to addressing conflict in governance programs, including local governance. Supporting structured and targeted exchanges of both CO staff and counterparts can be highly productive. The RCC, with support from other departments within UNDP and the UN, is well poised to support such regional or cross-regional exchanges. It is also well positioned to put in place mechanisms for better knowledge management and organization wide learning on the still not fully explored links between conflict and local governance programs in the Arab region and globally.

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ANNEXES:ANNEXES:

ANNEX 1: APPROACHES TO GOVERNANCE IN CONFLICT-AFFECTEDANNEX 1: APPROACHES TO GOVERNANCE IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND FRAGILE STATESAND FRAGILE STATES

There are four key political governance models. They are often employed simultaneously or sequentially—although not without inherent tensions or dilemmas, which are briefly noted below.

State building:State building: State building is now arguably the most widely promoted approach by the international community. In its current usage, state building is distinct from transition to statehood. Although there are different perspectives, state building currently applies to strengthening juridical states that lack the critical (empirical) properties of state authority, legitimacy, and capacity. 61 This includes a large category of countries that are loosely called “fragile states.” The term “fragile” is highly contested and is often used interchangeably with “weak”, “failed”, “failing”, “collapsed”, and “at-risk” states. Most fragile states are also states in conflict. Since (excluding Somalia) there are no collapsed states, state building involves strengthening the authority, legitimacy, and capacities of a sovereign state. In other words, it is heavily involved in domestic governance. Given prevailing international norms, the current approaches to state building explicitly affirm the primacy of sovereignty and national ownership, although they differ with respect to the level and scope of external involvement in the domestic governance of fragile countries. Nonetheless, under the state building framework, external support for governance is no longer restricted to traditional areas such as public administration reform, political participation and dialogue, electoral systems and processes, civil society promotion, parliamentary development, local governance and decentralization, access to information and, more recently, anti-corruption. Instead, recognizing poor governance as both a cause and consequence of state fragility, donors have increasingly become engaged in buttressing the state through support to the security, political, social, and economic functions of the state, including politically sensitive sectors such as the military and the police. The main objective of the state building approach is to stabilize and strengthen the state in order to enhance its developmental and security roles. As a result, one of the major criticisms of the approach is its heavy focus on state institutions at the expense of the state’s vital (and dialectical) relations with society. Thus, critics point to the growing “sovereignty gap” whereby fragile states derive their support from external sponsors rather than their own populations, thereby undermining the social contract essential for state formation over the long haul.62

Peacebuilding:Peacebuilding: While there is no single accepted definition, peacebuilding goes beyond state-centered processes or institutions to address the underlying causes of conflict and to strengthen the institutions and capacities for peace.63 Since state failure and/or political or institutional breakdown contribute to conflict, governance is a central concern of peacebuilding. However, given the complex 61The academic and policy literature on state building has mushroomed in the last decade. For two useful reviews of the state building literature, see Zoe and CIGI. It is increasingly recognized that externally-supported state building is fraught with many dilemmas which are usefully examined in Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk (eds.) The Dilemmas of State building62For an interesting perspective, see Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States, A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World (Oxford University Press, 2008)

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nature of most contemporary intra-state conflicts and the growing focus on conflict prevention and human security, strategies for sustainable peacebuilding are generally multi-dimensional in nature and extend beyond state-centric approaches to address national dialogues, social reconciliation, conflict resolution, peacemaking, and peacekeeping at multiple societal and political levels. State building and peacebuilding objectives often overlap over the long haul although they might also lead to conflicting goals in the short-term.64 There is growing case-based evidence confirming that state building strategies designed to stabilize and strengthen a central state can adversely affect peacebuilding at the societal level.65

Nation building:Nation building: Like peacebuilding and state building, nation building is a fluid concept. In fact, the three concepts are sometimes used interchangeably. Nation-building, however, is far less used in the international community than peacebuilding and state building. It has recently been criticized in key UN and academic literature and strong calls are made to distinguish it from the more common state building framework.66 There is an important distinction between them that has direct implications for governance programming. State building focuses primarily on the hardware of a state while nation building deals with the invisible socio-cultural bonds that are important - though not necessary - ingredients for a state. Nation building can serve as the natural software for state building. However, the relationship between state building and nation building has varied considerably across time and geography. Although many contemporary states are called nation-states, they are not comprised of a unitary nation. Indeed, created within artificial colonial borders, many new states in turn had to create their “national” identity through socialization, public education, citizenship rights, and social policies. Thus, historically nation building has been a powerful approach to fostering social cohesion as well as a source for legitimate and inclusive governance. On the other hand, exclusivist nation building strategies in heterogeneous or divided societies (whether ethnic, linguistic, tribal or geographic) have often been the source of conflict, instability and fragility.67 More recently, nation building projects through military intervention in

63There is ongoing debate about the difference between conflict prevention and peacebuilding, which is largely based on political considerations. The dividing line relates more to the timing of the intervention rather than the instruments employed by both approaches. In the final analysis, both conflict prevention and peacebuilding aim to address conflict causes and to strengthen capacities for peace in order to avoid a lapse or relapse into conflict. 64For a practical comparison between state building and peacebuilding, see Charles T. Call and Elizabeth Cousens, “Ending Wars and Building Peace.” Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, New York: International Peace Academy, March 2007. For a conceptual as well as empirical analysis of the contradictions between them, see Charles T. Call & Vanessa Wyeth, op. cit. 1465Ibid. especially see Kenneth Menkhaus, Beyond the Conflict Trap in Somalia in Necla Tschirgi, et. al. Security and Development: Searching for Critical Connections, Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010. Also see Laurent Bonnefoy and Renaud Detalle, The Security Paradox in Unified Yemen, Tschirgi, et. al. op cit. 66see Lakhdar Brahimi. State building in crisis and Post Conflict contexts. 2007, 7h Global Forum on Reinventing Government Building Trust in Government

26-29 June 2007, Vienna, Austriaand EU report on state building in Yemen, 200967In this context, the role of diaspora groups in fostering nationalism also deserves attention and is one of the elements that is not adequately taken into account in state building frameworks.

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Afghanistan and Iraq have contributed to heightened reservations about externally-induced nation building.

Democracy building:Democracy building: Promoting democratic governance has increasingly become an end in itself as well as a means towards achieving development, peace, and security.68 Current approaches to state building and peacebuilding are generally accompanied by an explicit or implicit commitment to democracy building. The international peacebuilding agenda is in fact predicated on the liberal peace thesis that argues democratic societies avoid conflict. Similarly, one of the strongest rationales advanced for state building is to establish legitimate, accountable, and capable states to prevent state failure and conflict. The presumed causal linkages between democracy, peace, and conflict have led to considerable debate among academics as well as practitioners.69 Indeed, even when the merits of democracy building are recognized, it is argued that the process of democratization can be a conflict-inducing process and may actually undermine political consolidation and state stability. In fact, based on empirical evidence, one of the entry points that is not recommended as a first level intervention in local governance programming in conflict affected contexts, as is discussed in more detail in section III, is promoting local representational democracy.70 Nonetheless, democracy assistance or democratic governance is a growing area of donor investment, including in conflict-affected and fragile countries.

68Like the other concepts reviewed in this section, democracy building, or democratic governance assistance, has multiple and sometimes conflicting definitions. This partly derives from differing donor approaches in promoting democracy. The UNDP, for example, uses the term democratic governance, which has three broad goals: a) fostering inclusive participation; b) strengthening accountable and responsive governing institutions; c) grounding democratic governance in international principles. Other donors use a range of terms such as democratization, good governance, pluralist democracy, democratic governance, democracy promotion, and democracy building. For a comparative review of US and European approaches to democracy building, see Thomas Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: Political or Developmental?” in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 20, No. 1, January 2009.69For a useful review, see Peter Burnell (ed) “Evaluating Democracy Support: Methods and Experiences” by IDEA and SIDA, August 2009. 70See Vibeke Wang, Astri Suhrke & Elling N. Tjønneland. “Governance Interventions in Post War Situations: Lessons Learned”, Chr. Michelsen Institute Report R 2005:1, 2005

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ANNEX 2: THE LINKS BETWEEN STRATEGIC APPROACHES TOANNEX 2: THE LINKS BETWEEN STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL GOVERNANCEGOVERNANCE AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE

The table shown below seeks to illuminate the linkages between strategic governance approaches, key governance challenges, and entry points as well as the main local governance approaches and entry points.

Strategic Governance Approaches

Key governance challenges

Governance Approaches & indicative entry points

Local Governance approaches and indicative entry points

Peacebuilding -insecurity due to violent conflict

-poor governance as symptom, cause or consequence of conflict

-weak local capacity to manage conflict

-end violent conflict & establish stability and security

-strengthen national capacities to manage conflict at all levels

-address priority needs to reduce conflict risks and create confidence in government

-support platforms for local local dialogue (e.g.: the work that Interpeace is performing in Palestine

-identify opportunities for linking municipalities and local councils around issues of common concern

-support capacity building initiatives for reconciliation and conflict resolution (i.e. the work done by youth camps in villages in Lebanon)

Nation-Building -societal fragmentation or absence of a coherent identity

-threat of identity-based conflicts

-threat of political or territorial disintegration

- create national dialogues & platforms for national identity and social integration

-establish legal, and political, institutional mechanisms to facilitate integration

-mobilize political support through effective leaders

-provide incentives/eliminate disincentives to avoid conflict or disintegration

support multi-stakeholder local platforms to discus LG related issues

build capacity for managing diversity

incorporate LG as a part of broader regional planning frameworks to address perceived and actual inequalities

support local media

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State-building -weak state legitimacy, authority, or capacity

-weak/ineffective state institutions

-threat of conflict, instability, insecurity, disintegration

--build/ strengthen state authority, legitimacy, and capacity

-support national ownership and leadership

-reinforce state capacities across a wide range of sectors (RoL, SSR, anti-corruption, etc.)

-reinforce state-society relations

build local capacity for planning, management, and monitoring

support fiscal decentralization and financial management systems

enact legal LG frameworks and related legislation

Democracy building

-weak or ineffective institutions and capacities for inclusive, representative politics

-weak societal norms or demands for political participation

-lack of accountability and transparency

-establish inclusive and accountable governing institutions

-reinforce legal, constitutional, institutional bases of democratic governance

-broaden political participation, especially by minorities and marginalized groups

support local elections

build capacity for newly elected bodies

strengthen outreach between elected bodies and citizens

empower citizens’ ability to demand accountability—For example, local integrity kits in the oPt

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ANNEX 3: MODELS OF DECENTRALISATION: KEY CONCEPTSANNEX 3: MODELS OF DECENTRALISATION: KEY CONCEPTS

Box: Key ConceptsBox: Key Concepts7171

The term decentralisation is usually applied to refer to any shift away from the centre, whether administrative, political, or fiscal. There are three main models of decentralization:

Deconcentration – central government disperses responsibilities for certain services to its regional or local offices. This does not involve any transfer of authority to the lower levels of government.

Delegation – central government transfers decision-making responsibility and administration of public functions to local governments or semiautonomous organizations while retaining supervisory powers at the center. It can be described as a principal-agent relationship72, with the central government as the principal and the local government as the agent.

Devolution –central government transfers authority for decision-making, finance, and management to elected bodies with some degree of local autonomy. Local governments have legally recognized geographical boundaries over which they exercise authority and within which they perform public functions.

The shift in responsibility between tiers of government is underpinned by political, administrative, fiscal and market dimensions that define the extent to which intergovernmental relations are deconcentrated, delegated, or devolved.

Political decentralisation involves the transfer of political authority to the local level through the establishment of elected local government.

Administrative decentralization is the transfer of responsibility for planning, financing, and management of public functions from the center to subordinate units of government agencies, semi-autonomous public authorities, corporations, or regional authorities.

Fiscal decentralisation refers to resource reallocation from the central to local level. If local governments are to carry out decentralized functions effectively, they must have an adequate level of revenues as well as the authority to make decisions about expenditures.

Economic or market decentralisation relates to the transfer of public functions from government to voluntary, private or non-governmental institutions. This can be done through contracting out partial service provision or administrative functions, by deregulation or by full privatization.

71Source: UNDP. Democratic Governance Reader – A Reference for UNDP Practitioners. Oslo and New York, 2009. 72A ‘principal-agent relationship’ describes a relationship where a person or entity (called the agent) acts on behalf of another (called the principal). In this case, local governments act on behalf of a central government.

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ANNEX 4: POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSISANNEX 4: POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS 7373

There is no single conceptual framework for political economy analysis, but the following OECD-DAC definition is useful in capturing some of the main elements:

‘Political economy analysis is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time.’

It is concerned with understanding:

The interests and incentives facing different groups in society (and particularly political elites), and how these generate particular policy outcomes that may encourage or hinder development.

The role that formal institutions (e.g. rule of law, elections) and informal social, political, and cultural norms play in shaping human interaction and political and economic competition.

The impact of values and ideas, including political ideologies, religion, and cultural beliefs, on political behavior and public policy.

In fragile environments, political economy analysis can inform our work on state building and peace building by identifying entry points for promoting an inclusive and stable political settlement. This might include measures to promote political reform, strengthen the core functions of the state, or improve the delivery of services that build state legitimacy and respond to societal expectations. It can also identify how we might work outside the state to build progressive change coalitions across civil society, the private sector, and the media

How political economy analysis can inform country level work

Tasks Conventional analysis Insights from political economy analysis

A) Formulating country plans

Priorities determined based on PRSPs or technical advice on the impact of alternative investment choices on poverty and growth.

Priorities reflect a deeper understanding of what interventions are likely to work, given the prevailing interests and incentives and which interventions are likely to shift incentives in a pro-development direction.

B) Design of projects or programs

Political risks affecting project success are assumptions in the log frame.

Interests and incentives, especially those created informally, are explicitly addressed in programming. Interventions

C) Informing dialogue Political dialogue is formal Dialogue with partners is sensitive to the

73Source: DFID: Political Economy Analysis, How to Note, July 2009

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and engagement with partners

and focuses on governance and human rights standards, without reference to the deeper processes that underlie performance in these areas.

underlying causes of good and bad governance.

Issues D) Civil Service Reform Policy and institutional

reforms are typically prioritized based on efficiency/equity considerations without considering the distribution of power and influence between opponents and beneficiaries.

Analysis identifies which reforms are likely to have political traction, which may be completely blocked and what might shift the balance of forces in favor of the intended beneficiaries.

E) State building and Peace Building

State building seen as a largely technical task of (re)creating the capacity to perform conventional state functions by restoring formal organizations. Peace settlements and security assistance set countries on the road to avoiding recurrence of conflict and rebuilding their states.

Support for state-building takes account of the underlying power and wealth relationships. Tasks are carefully prioritized and sequenced, taking trade-offs into account. Peace building strategies based on understanding the root causes of conflict and promoting an inclusive political settlement, which goes beyond support to an initial peace agreement.

F) Service Delivery Poor service delivery outcomes are attributed to a range of technical, financial, capacity, and organizational weaknesses within the sector concerned.

Analysis identifies how and why different sectors are prioritized, and who the “winners” and “losers” might be. Action is informed by an understanding of these constraints, where the most appropriate entry points might be, and the medium-term strategies to help overcome obstacles.

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ANNEX 5: CONFLICT SENSITIVE PROGRAMMING:ANNEX 5: CONFLICT SENSITIVE PROGRAMMING:

Conflict sensitivityConflict sensitivity7474 is the capacity of an organization to: is the capacity of an organization to:

Understand the (conflict) context in which it operates;

Understand the interaction between operations and the (conflict) context; and

Act upon the understanding of this interaction in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts on the (conflict) context.

Note: the word ‘context’ is used rather than ‘conflict’ to make the point that all socio-economic and political tensions, root causes, and structural factors are relevant to conflict sensitivity because they all have the potential to become violent. ‘Conflict’ is sometimes erroneously confused with macro-political violence between two warring parties (as with a civil war between a national government and a non-state actor).

Conflict-sensitive programming for democratic governanceConflict-sensitive programming for democratic governance7575

For UNDP, the phrase ‘conflict-sensitive democratic governance programming’ refers to the strategies and programs that are based on:

An understanding of the possible harmful effects on building peace, and actively seeking to minimize these risks;

An understanding of their potential for contributing to conflict prevention and recovery, and actively seeking to maximize this opportunity.

Conflict analysis is the basis for conflict-sensitive democratic governance programming (see the below shown Box – Conflict analysis tools and approaches).

74Source: CONFLICT-SENSITIVE APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND PEACEBUILDING: A RESOURCE PACK - product of a two-year process by a consortium of partner organizations 2004 75Source: UNDP: Governance in Conflict Prevention and Recovery, Guidance Note September, 2009.

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Conflict analysis tools and approachesConflict analysis tools and approaches

Conflict analysis is the systematic study of the causes, actors, and dynamics of conflict. It helps development and humanitarian actors gain a better understanding of the context in which they operate and their role in that context, so that their interventions do not unintentionally reinforce conflict dynamics but rather, to the extent possible, address the causes of conflict and promote peace. Multiple tools and approaches for conflict analysis have been developed by international agencies. While these tools may differ in terms of focus, target audience, or process, most of them are built around similar elements. Tools can also be adapted, and possibly combined, to respond to specific needs and enhance effectiveness.

The Conflict-related Development Analysis (CDA) is the UNDP tool for conflict-sensitive development planning. Like many conflict analysis tools, the CDA is organized around three main stages:

Analysis of conflict, which allows for common understanding of the causes and consequences of violent conflict, examines the conflict factors (both proximate and structural); conflict actors; and capacities for peace. In order to identify a set of dynamics that are core to the conflict, it assesses the relative importance of the various issues and the way in which they interact with each other.

Analysis of responses, which looks at the interaction between conflict dynamics and past/ongoing interventions, to assess how they affect each other.

Identification of ways forward, which draws shared strategic and programmatic recommendations for development responses that address conflict and reinforce peace.

The CDA, like all conflict analysis tools, can provide overall guidance, but it is not a one-size-fits-all approach or a straightjacket. Rather, it should be flexibly tailored to each specific context.

Today, conflict analysis is integrated into a number of needs assessment tools that are used by the UN and other actors in post-crisis environments – for example, conflict analysis is an integral part of the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) framework.

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