RCSS Policy Studies 6 The Politics of Violence and ... Policy...A stark reality of South Asian politics and civil society, is that it is characterized by an increasing level of violence

RCSS Policy Studies 6

The Politics of Violence and Development in South Asia

Ajay Dharshan Behera

Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: Violence and Development: Towards an Analytical Framework

Chapter 3: Nature and Political Economy of South Asian States

Chapter 4: Conflict Patterns and Violent Manifestations

Chapter 5: Underlying Causes and Conditions

Chapter 6: Overwhelming Consequences and Wanting Responses

Chapter 7: Conclusion

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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

A stark reality of South Asian politics and civil society, is that it is characterized by an increasing level of violence. In the fifty years of post-colonial existence there has been a weakening of social and political cohesion and the societies are progressively moving towards a violent socio-political order. The relationship between the State and civil society is exemplified by violence, exhibiting a lack of faith in the normative mode of political bargaining. Increasingly, ethnic groups and social classes are negotiating with the State in the idiom of violence as a means of articulating their demands. The rise of this phenomena is largely an outcome of the socio-political and economic processes.

Violent Political Action under Colonial Rule

Ironically, colonial rule in the subcontinent was not subjected to so much of violence as is the case today with the post-colonial states. Though colonial history in the subcontinent was marked by uprisings, rebellions and mutinies, they were a localized and short-lived phenomenon or a response to specific issues. Probably the 1857 mutiny, often characterized as the first national war of independence, had a wider dimension and included various ‘nationalist’ forces in an armed uprising against the colonial power. India’s subsequent history of freedom struggle is replete with sporadic acts of violence with the intent of terrorizing the colonial rulers to relinquish power.1

However, these events were largely limited to geographical regions like Punjab and Bengal. Although the nationalist leaders who believed that the colonial powers could be forced to give up power were very popular, they failed to build a mass base. Since there was no common programme of action, attempts to coordinate activities of various revolutionary nationalists also did not succeed. Moreover, this belief was subsumed under a much more dominant ideology of non-violence and pacifism propounded by Mahatma Gandhi.

Notwithstanding these uprisings, the British were able to consolidate their political and military hold by the latter part of the 19th century. However, after the Second World War, they could no longer sustain this control and transferred political power to the indigenous bureaucratic and bourgeois class. Thus in South Asia, India and Pakistan (with a common pre-independence history) and Sri Lanka gained independence without any militant or armed struggle, unlike certain other Asian and African countries. In fact, Sri Lanka was granted independence without even a semblance of a national movement.

Background and Objectives

The indigenous rulers were not able to exercise the same political and military control as the British did. Soon after independence, most South Asian states were faced with various kinds of domestic conflicts. Some conflicts were resolved and some lost momentum, but some took the shape of insurgent movements, which predominantly made use of violence to articulate their demands. Sporadic outbursts of violence by peasants, tribesmen, religious groups or guerrilla

movements took place. Communist-led peasant insurgency was initiated shortly before and after independence in North Bengal known as the Tebhaga uprising, and in Telengana, in the former princely state of Hyderabad, during the uncertainties of the transition of power. These were, however, localized actions, confined largely to particular tribal or low caste groups or to a narrow range of peasant classes. Over the years, violence arising from ethnicity and sub-nationalism have become the main challenge to the creation of a national identity in these states and has dominated the political space. Post-colonial history is replete with violent movements arising from the demands of secession by the Bengalis, Baluchis, Nagas, Mizos, Assamese, Sikhs, Kashmiris and Tamils. Peasant insurgencies charged by ideological fervour have been far more infrequent and of lesser intensity.

Violence as a subject of political inquiry has been a complex issue. The treatment has been mainly normative. Even within the realm of politics, analysts invariably take recourse to socio-psychological, cultural and anthropological explanations to understand the phenomena.2 This problem is much more pertinent in the case of South Asia. Despite the increasing use of violence, whether in the assertion of an identity or for the purposes of structural change, as a dominant mode of political action in the subcontinent, enough attention does not seem to have been given to this problem.

The purpose of this study is to give salience to political and socio-economic explanations in understanding the causes and nature of violent political action. While it cannot be denied that psycho-cultural primordialist explanations do add to our understanding of violence, such explanations cannot delve into the roots of political violence as it exonerates the material bases which nurture such action. In this study an attempt is made to analyze whether the roots of such actions can be located in the nature of the state structures and political economies.

Being post-colonial States, South Asian States are still trying to adjust to new political institutions and socio-economic structures. In a situation of scarce resources the State becomes the principal means of access to and control of resources. In such societies politicized social groups arrive at the view that their everyday struggles for livelihood have to be fought not only in the market and within civil society but also in the arena of the control of the state. The state and its resources thus become objects of considerable political attention. Its only when the politicized social groups fail to manoeuvre, negotiate and bargain within the political space that they resort to violence.

Thus, the process of identity formation and assertion are enmeshed in secular economic interests. The demands for political autonomy to fulfil developmental aspirations are, therefore, being articulated in the language of ethnicity. While most separatist violence in South Asia is based on the assertion of a distinctive identity, the question that needs to be addressed is whether the underlying causes were economic exploitation, economic neglect, and relative deprivation. The objectives of this study is to establish linkages between the developmental processes and political violence. How uneven development and underdevelopment have resulted in the increasing use of violence in the articulation of demands?

While the development process has engendered violence, in a paradoxical way violence in turn tends to be dysfunctional in the development process and retard the pace of economic growth.

This happens in two ways. Firstly, by a deliberate strategy of economic disruption followed by the insurgents. This strategy involves damaging State and private property, disrupting the public sector economy, and disorganizing public transport and other essential services and militarily targeting development projects which might erode the support base of the insurgents. Secondly, the State is compelled to divert limited resources to counter the challenge posed by the insurgents. The environment created due to the use of violence on the other hand acts as a major constraint on the growth of the economy to enlarge the economic cake for further sharing and redistribution. This process further retards socio-economic development. Thus in a cyclical way one process generates the other.

Scope of the Study

The empirical focus of the present study is only on the four post-colonial States of South Asia — India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The Himalayan Kingdoms — Nepal and Bhutan — were not a part of the colonial experience and have not inherited the colonial state apparatus. Even though they are also undergoing the processes of development and modernization, they still retain many characteristics of traditional societies. However, the apparent tranquility in these two Himalayan kingdoms is already shattered — much earlier in Nepal3 andmore recently in Bhutan.4 The modernization processes have already caught up with these societies and they are also confronting their share of violence. The minuscule Maldives in the Indian ocean is excluded, simply because it has hardly any experience of organized violence arising from the socio-political process. This atoll State has received considerable attention for the number of coups that have been attempted in that country but they have been more of a personalized affair and some of them have been generated externally.5

The reason for attempting to study the four South Asian states within a single framework is that the constituent States of this region have shared historical, cultural and economic features. Not only are India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka located in the same geographical region but their pre-colonial cultural and political heritage stems from common, though quite variegated, ancient and medieval roots. Moreover, they owe their origins to the processes of change and transformation — uneven but interconnected — wrought by the same colonial power. The nationalist elites who took over power at the time of British withdrawal envisaged modernization and development as essential components of their respective nation-building projects.

Even within the four post-colonial South Asian States, studying political violence is not without its complexities. The range of manifestations of political violence in South Asia can be wide-ranging and at times perplexing.6 Therefore, the scope of this study has been deliberately confined to only manifestations of political violence which have had or have the potential to seriously effect the State structure, either by a structural transformation of the State itself or decapacitating the territoriality of the State. The concern here is with violence that is directed against the State and central power. It does not take into consideration violence against local actors with the intention of having a localized impact. Most of the empirical cases taken into consideration in this study, have taken the form of insurgencies or are close approximations of insurgencies.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. However, one must take note of the Ghadar revolt around the First World War, which was fairly organized. According to this plan, the Indian immigrants abroad were to return to India and wait for a signal for a general uprising. Arms and ammunition were to be mobilized from Germany. Indian troops in the British imperial army, outside and inside India, were to revolt against the British. It was hoped that these plans in conjunction with the First World War would paralyze the British administration and free India. See, Saleem Qureshi, “Political Violence in the South Asian Subcontinent,” in Yonah Alexander, International Terrorism: National, Regional and Global Perspectives (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), pp.160-163.

2. For an interesting interpretation of Sikh militancy see, Veena Das, “Time, Self, and Community: Features of the Sikh Militant Discourse,” in Veena Das, Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.118-36; Veena Das and Ashis Nandy, “Violence, Victimhood, and the Language of Silence,” in Veena Das (ed.), The Word and the World: Fantasy, Symbol and Record (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1986), pp.177-95; On communal violence, see, Sudhir Kakar, The Colours of Violence (New Delhi: Viking, 1995); On various aspects of violence, including the ethnic violence in Sri Lanka, see, Sasanka Perera, Living with Torturers and Other Essays of Intervention: Sri Lankan Society, Culture and Politics in Perspective (Colombo: International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 1995).

3. Nepal was also faced with a Naxalite movement in the early seventies. See, Tribhuvan Nath, The Nepalese Dilemma 1960-1974 (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1975). More recently, a Maoist guerrilla group called the United People’s Front has been waging a self-declared “people’s war” in the poorer parts of the country, from the mountainous districts of Rolpa, Rukom and Jajarkot, about 475 km west of Kathmandu. See, “Maoist Guerrillas killed,” Hindu, 13 August 1996; and Return of the Maoists: Midnight Knocks and Extrajudicial Killings in Nepal, Occasional Publication Series (New Delhi: South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, n.d.). For an analysis of conflict between the high caste Hindus and ethnic minorities in Nepal see, Thomas Cox, “Land Rights and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal,”Economic and Political Weekly, vol.25, no.21, 16 June 1990.

4. For the simmering ethnic conflict and violence in Bhutan see, James Clad, “Bhutan: Nepali Influx Threatens the Hermit Kingdom,”Far Eastern Economic Review, vol.150, no.51, 20 December 1990; S.D. Muni, “Bhutan in the Throes of Ethnic Conflict,” India International Centre Quarterly, vol.18, no.1, Spring 1991; Parmanand, “India-Bhutan Friendship and Bhutan’s Problem of National Integration,”Strategic Analysis, vol.13, no.12, March 1991; Brian C. Shaw, “Bhutan in 1991: `Refugees’ and `Ngolops’,” Asian Survey, vol.32, no.2, February 1992; Farzana Hossein, “Bhutan’s Ethnic Problem: A Case of a Fragile Ethnic Mosaic in South Asia,” BIISS Journal, vol.14, no.1, January 1993; Sarbari Majumdar, “Bhutan: The Divide Deepens,” India Today, 30 June 1993; Kalyan Chaudhuri, “Bhutan in Ferment: With a Growing Pro-Democracy Movement,” Frontline, 27 August 1993; Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist: Tales of War and Peace from India’s Northeast (New Delhi: Viking Publishers, 1994).

5. The last coup attempt that took place in November 1988 was engineered by an exiled businessman, who had hired Sri Lankan Tamil mercenaries to execute it.

6. For a representative sample one may refer these studies: Veena Das (ed.), Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990); Dennis Austin and Anirudha Gupta, “The Politics of Violence in India and South Asia: Is Democracy an Endangered Species,” Conflict Studies, no.233, July-August 1990; Dennis Austin, Democracy and Violence in India and Sri Lanka (New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995); K.S. Subramaniam, “Political Violence, Social Movements and the State in India,” Institute of Development Studies Discussion Paper (Sussex), no.308, August 1992; Ajit Roy, “The Changing Role of Violence in Indian Politics,” in T.V. Sathyamurthy (ed.), Class Formation and Political Transformation in Post-Colonial India, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996); Sumanta Banerjee, “The Politics of Violence in the Indian State and Society,” in Kumar Rupesinghe and Khawar Mumtaz (eds.), Internal Conflicts in South Asia (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1996); Uma Singh, “Internal Violence in Pakistan,” International Studies (New Delhi), vol.32, no.2, April-June 1995; Imran Ahmed, “Political Violence and Developing Nations,” Strategic Studies(Islamabad), vol.12, no.2, Winter, 1988, pp.16-37; B.K. Jahangir, Violence and Consent in a Peasant Society and Other Essays (Dhaka: Centre for Social Studies, 1990); Monirul Islam Khan, “Violence in Bangladesh Society: Fallout on Democratic Transition,” in Iftekharuzzaman and A.K.M Abdus Sabur (eds.), Bangladesh: Society, Polity and Economy (Dhaka: Progoti Prakashani, 1993).

Violence and Development: Towards an Analytical Framework

There is an intrinsic linkage between political violence and development. The propensity to violence is inherent in the process of development itself. Since the principal political contest in every society involves a polarization of social groups around distributional issues, the process of development invariably results in the continuous disturbance of the prevailing social balance, in the emergence of new social classes that threaten the existing distribution of power. The pace, content and dynamics of development, therefore, acquire a pervasive character of instability, disequilibrium and conflict. This often results in the use of force and violence as one of the available modes of political action in the pursuit of promoting socio-economic and political change or for reducing instability, establishing order, and suppressing conflict. Sometimes violence is also adopted as one of the necessary instruments directed at the radical transformation of the system.

The Connotations of Development

Development is a normative concept eluding a single accepted definition. It is a multidimensional process which may be interpreted as change from a less to a more desirable state. Accordingly, the concerns with development were essentially a concern with a programme of social, political and economic transformation. But the question still remains whether development should be relative to time, place and circumstance or may be reduced to one universally applicable formula?

The project of development was inspired by a naive image of a successful transition — institutional and ideological — from tradition to modernity, eventually mirroring the western experience. The early stages of theory-building associated with development was unduly optimistic about the prospects for spreading capitalism and western democracy.1 The agenda of the project was the creation of stable pro-western political systems in the new states of the third world or developing societies. This was replaced in the mid-sixties, due to a tense international situation and challenges to the state even in the west, by a more pessimistic account, which turned from a concern with constitutional democracy to a concern with order and stability. Therefore, it was not surprising that Samuel P. Huntington’s classicPolitical Order in Changing Societies had expressed a normative preference for order and stability.

The connotations attributed to development can be extensive and diverse. Even within the discipline of political science there has been a tendency to take an all-encompassing view of political development. Lucian Pye has elaborated on atleast ten ways in which political development can be understood. These are: (i) Political Development as the Political Requisite of Economic Development; (ii) Political Development as the Politics Typical of Industrial Societies; (iii) Political Development as Political Modernization; (iv) Political Development as the Operation of a Nation-State; (v) Political Development as Administrative and Legal Development; (vi) Political Development as Mass Mobilization and Participation; (vii) Political Development as the Building of Democracy; (viii) Political Development as Stability and Orderly Change; (ix) Political Development as Mobilization and Power, and (x) Political

Development as one Aspect of Multi-Dimensional Process of Social Change.2

Pye’s elaborations are so wide-ranging that they, in fact, demarcate the boundaries of the concept of development itself. And if one were look for the connotations of development then one has to go no further but look into Pye’s elaborations which encompass social, economic and political development in onego. But it also points to the difficulties in conceptualizing the concept of development. The essence of the concept of development revolves around political modernization, economic development and social change but the normative priorities of the concept seem to stress stability.

Development involves change in the structure of society and in its capacity to respond effectively to stress imposed upon the system. The central thesis of the concept of development is that social and political change occurs according to a pre-established pattern, the logic and direction of which are known.3 It is a unilinear movement from the traditional to the modern. It involves the shift from a predominantly rural, agricultural society to an increasingly urban industrial society, characterized by a cash and market economy, economic growth, high literacy, greater social and occupational differentiation and mobility. The ascription determination of status by birth is supposed to give way to achievement orientations. The direction of development, it is assumed, is away from the primordial (biological criteria of affinity) towards attachment to the larger territory, the form of development is away from weak, non-intrusive centres to active, dominant centres, the substance of development is towards a civil society marked by modern values and procedures.4 Participation in the political process increases with demands by new groups seeking access to the political system. Thus, along with the development-promoting potential, development also has a change-inducing role.

Development and Change

Development viewed the process of change in the new states as problematic from the beginning — it was overwhelmingly concerned with the dislocations it produced. The dynamics of change creates serious disruptions in the process of development and by its very nature breeds instability.5 The character and direction of change is a product of a dialectical interaction between tradition and modernity, each transforming the other.6 The relationship between tradition and modernity — the degree to which tradition is accommodated in the process of change, the way it responds to the challenge of modernization — is a critical determinant of stability and development. In the increasing conflict between the traditional and the modern elements in society, primordial loyalties and proximate identities come to the forefront.

The political consequences of change often involve higher levels of disruption, conflict and violence. And therefore, one of the primary goals of development has been political stability. There are two important elements in political stability — order and continuity. Order involves relative absence of violence, force, coercion and disruption from the political system. Continuity means a relative absence of change in the critical components of the political system, a lack of discontinuity in political evolution, the absence from the society of significant social forces and political movements that wish to bring about fundamental changes in the political system. The evidence of political stability is infrequent changes in political institutions and political actors

and a relative lack of, or significantly low levels of political violence.

Nature of Conflicts

The development process results in not only dislocations and disorder but also various kinds of conflicts. Most of these conflicts occur over the distribution of scarce resources, most notably power. Inequality remains the ultimate source of conflicts. There are various perspectives on conflict — the functional and the dialectical perspective. Both the functional and dialectical perspective on conflict point to the significance of violence. Within the functional perspective, Lewis Coser’s definition remains one of the most comprehensive. Conflicts arise when the deprived members of a system withdraw legitimacy from the system. He regards conflicts as a struggle over values, entailing behaviour that is initiated with the intent of inflicting harm, damage or injury on the other party.7 However, the functional theorists focussed on less severe and violent conflicts and their consequences for promoting integration within and between the conflicting parties and for increasing overall system adaptability and flexibility.

The dialectical theory of conflict emerged out of a concern to end capitalism and change society. The dynamics of change was explained by Marx’s concept of dialectics — the inherent contradictions in social relations generate their transformation. These contradictions make conflict inevitable and the economic organization of the society and consequent class formation resulting from ownership and non-ownership of property leads to a revolutionary class conflict. Dialectical conflict or class conflict, envisaged severe and violent conflicts causing redistribution of resources into a new pattern of inequality which, in turn, will cause a new wave of conflict and resource distribution.

This conception of conflict was not only narrow but also teleological as it essentially arose from Marx’s desire to not only interpret the social world but also how to change it. However, conflicts are rarely bipolarized across an entire society as the process of class formation has not taken the course that Marx had predicted. Also, class conflict was supposed to have been more acute in capitalist societies in which the major classes are much more clearly differentiated. On the contrary, in transitional societies polarization has taken place across a whole range of primordial identities resulting in multiple levels of conflict. They are plagued by ethnic, religious, communal, tribal as well as class conflicts.

Though Marxism visualized the need for conflict to change the world, it saw violence in instrumental terms. However, after the second world war the communist world had largely bifurcated with regard to the theoretical need for violence to achieve goals. While the Soviet contention was that there are many roads to socialism, the Chinese still felt the necessity for violence. Thus, immediately after the second world war, communists in most new states in Asia, influenced by Maoism enunciated the doctrine of wars of liberation and sought to gain power through armed insurrections.8 This conflict between the Marxist-Leninist and Maoist ideology and liberal democracy became a concern for development theorists.

Nation-building and State-formation

Decolonization in the wake of the second world war, had led to the emergence of a large number

of states in the global system. These states were faced with the problems of nation-building and state-formation. The structural transformation of these societies was conflict-ridden. These conflicts concern the long-term processes of nation-building and state-formation.

Most of these developing states are of a multi-ethnic character, consisting of several nations. Their national boundaries were drawn by the departing colonial power, without any regard to the ethno-linguistic or cultural composition of the population. The state had to take the initiative in nation-building. Deriving from the European nation-building experience, even elites in these developing societies felt that the nation and state should be congruent.9 This resulted in the attempt to bring about cultural homogenization. This process of nation-building10 was a major factor in the emergence of conflicts based on ethnicity.

Ethnicity as a category in conflicts not only exists at the level of consciousness, but it is also a reflection in consciousness of very real, concrete and material circumstances. Some view ethnic conflict as inherent in the capitalist model of development as it is competitive. The capitalist form of development is uneven and accentuates exploitation as some ethnic groups benefit disproportionately and others lose disproportionately.11

The way ethnic conflict or ethnic movements relate to development is highly complex. One of the outcomes of the development process has been an expression of ethnic violence. In all ethnic conflict there is an economic factor of varying importance but there is no uniform economic cause. The range of economic factors that may influence ethnic relations can be diverse — struggle for scarce resources, regional imbalances, infrastructural investments with a great impact on the local economic systems, labour market conflict, distributional conflicts, etc. Conflict over natural resources can be exemplified by the way in which forest wealth is used by jungle tribes on the one hand, and urban middle class populations on the other. For the former the forest represents a way of life, for the latter it means building materials or paper for the newspaper industry. Thus, growth and modernization can go against what is known as ethnodevelopment — a development process appropriate for a particular ethnic group.12

Due to the multi-ethnic character of the developing societies, the regime in power invariably lacks the support of some significant component of the population. The process of nation-building renders many ethnic groups devoid of power or influence. The relationship between the core community or the dominant ethnic group and the peripheral communities in a state is quite often characterized by exploitation. This is in some senses structural. The core community acquires an advantage over the outlying communities in the period of state-building or during the early periods of modernization, and then uses political and economic power to maintain and enhance its superior position. Despite the formal withdrawal of the colonial power, forms of oppression which could be described as colonial, have continued in these countries. In this relationship between the centre and the periphery, ethnic conflict is an outcome of real or a perceived sense of internal colonialism.13 Long years of nation-building have not resolved some of these conflicts. In some cases, modernization and development have only resulted in the intensification of conflicts and an increasing use of violence in the articulation of demands.

Political Violence

Political violence, in contradistinction to other forms of violence in general, is not random. It is the use of force for the resolution of conflicts in society that mainly originate from sociopolitical, economic, ethnic, and cultural causes and that find expression in various forms of collective action. Political violence as opposed to other forms of violence is a group phenomenon and that it must be carried out with the intent of having an impact on the political system. The expression of political violence need not always be overt physical armed violence. Violence may be inbuilt into the structure — characterized as structural violence — violence that is implicit in the structures of domination and inequality in a society. This violence is exerted by situations, institutions, social, political and economic structures. These structures are legitimized by the prevailing juridical order, and sociopolitical and economic institutions.14

One of the most comprehensive definitions of political violence has been provided by H.L. Nieburg. According to him, political violence is “acts of disruption, destruction, injury whose purpose, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and/or effects have political significance, that is, tend to modify the behaviour of others in a bargaining situation, that has consequences for the social system”.15 Ted Robert Gurr provides a more precise definition that political violence is “the use or threat of violence by any party or institution to attain ends within or outside the political order”.16

Political violence emerges within a certain socio-political and economic context. Though political violence is disorderly but it is designated for a reordering purpose, i.e., to overthrow a tyrannical regime, to redefine and realize justice and equity, to achieve independence or territorial autonomy, to impose one’s religious and doctrinal beliefs.17 Under certain circumstances it can become self-legitimizing, specifically when it is an expression of the natural desire for freedom and liberty when directed against autocracies. But in democratic societies, political violence suggests institutional weaknesses, or normative insufficiencies, injustices or inequities. In this context David Apter has said that “political violence, although a fluctuating phenomenon within democracy, has at every step accompanied its evolution, and with... the whole improving results. Which is why we have argued that in some respects democracy is violence-driven.”18

Nation-State Building and Violence

Political violence in the context of the third world is largely an outcome of the nation-state building process. Therefore, conflicts and instability in developing societies can be interpreted as signs of an ongoing process of development.19 The developing societies are fragmented with too many ethnic, religious and linguistic differences. Due to the extended period of colonial rule political, economic and social structures are weak, divisive and often inflexible. However, in contrast to the industrialization of the older advanced western states, even in the developing world, development is expected to take place before the unity of the nation is really underway. European States took several centuries for the completion of the state-making enterprise, whereas the post-colonial states are expected to replicate the same process within a short time-frame. Along with this, the demand for political participation, welfare and a more equitable distribution of economic resources by the general populace complicates the process of state-making in the post-colonial societies, leading to conflicts. The degree of violence is probably explained by the task of achieving the nation-state building in a drastically curtailed time

frame.20

Charles Tilly also adheres to the view that state-building is a violent process. Violence in new states is a process of primitive accumulation of power.21 However, the process of development and state-formation need not necessarily and permanently be of a violent nature. The relationship between violence and development can thus be characterized as curvilinear, violence will decrease only once a certain level of development has been reached. It is not yet clear, however, what this level is or whether economic (in the form of more equity) and political development (in the form of more democracy) are sufficient in themselves to prevent conflict and violence.22

Manifestations of Political Violence

Political violence can manifest itself in various forms like civil war, guerilla warfare, insurrection, revolution, terrorism and also state violence. Fred R. Von Der Mehden creates a typology of five basic types of political violence. These are: (i) Primordial (such as religious or racial); (ii) Separatist or secessionist; (ii) Revolutionary and counter-revolutionary; (iv) Coup oriented, and (v) Political issues or personality oriented.23

These categories may not be totally comprehensive and do in fact overlap. Primordial encompasses acts of violence related to cultural — primarily racial, ethnic or religious conflict. Often it is difficult to separate the political element in these events from personal or group antagonisms. Separatist conflict is a particular form of primordial violence related to efforts by groups to achieve independence or autonomy. Such events are usually tied to religious and ethnic divisions. They differ from events associated with what is called primordial violence, however, in that they are aimed at removing the aggrieved group from the sphere of influence of the group that dominates the central government. Primordial violence refers to situations in which a group attempts to improve its situation by changing or altering conditions or even taking control of the central government, whereas the term secessionist violence refers to a situation in which a primordial fission runs so deep that efforts are directed at seceding from the sociopolitical context rather than at altering it. Revolutionary violence takes place during the effort to overthrow a regime and to establish a state molded upon a significantly different economic and political model. Coup violence is attendant to efforts by organized groups to overthrow the regime in power without intending to establish fundamentally different economic and political systems. Most coups and coup attempts result in comparatively low levels of violence as either the military moves in quickly to take power or the effort is nipped in the bud. The last category is primarily oriented towards a particular issue or set of issues, individuals or groups. Some of the violence may be student violence, strikes for government reforms, land reforms, etc.24

In systemic terms, political violence can be categorized into anti-systemic and extra-systemic. The objective of anti-systemic violence is a revolutionary transformation in the social and political order. Extra-systemic violence is unleashed by secessionist insurgencies by ethnic, religious or ethno-religious minorities which affirm their right of self-determination and question the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state.

Analyzing the Causes of Violence: Some Theoretical Propositions

Most analyses of political violence explain the causes of violence as a product of repression and unresponsive governments. The reality, however, is that political violence is attendant even in those states which are not repressive. And therefore, instead of making a normative treatment of violence it will be instructive to seek explanations in the socio-political and material bases of society.

Various theories have tried to explain the causes of political violence. Samuel P. Huntington has given primacy to political and institutional factors and emphasized disequilibrium within the political sector as the primary cause for violence. He argues that if a country’s institutional procedures for political participation are inadequate in comparison to the people’s expectations for participation, this could lead to unrest and anti-regime activity. As a result of mobilization, new social forces enter the political arena, but the political structure does not provide channels for their participation in politics, thereby leading to civil strife.25 Violence and instability were “in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions,” and the primary problem of politics was “the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change.”26

Amongst other theories on violence, the relative deprivation theory and the resource mobilization theory are the most influential. Ted Gurr is most influential within the relative deprivation school of thought. According to him, when people perceive a discrepancy between their value expectations or what they believe they are entitled to and value capabilities or what they are able to get and keep, then this leads to alienation, deprivation and disillusionment. If members of a collectivity experience this relative deprivation simultaneously, the potential for political violence increases.27 The feeling of relative deprivation may be conditioned by an increase in expectations or a decline in the rewards. Violence is likely when aspirations and capabilities are changing and when the gap between them is increasing. This is precisely what takes place during the process of socioeconomic modernization. Socioeconomic modernization also has effects on the forms of political violence and instability. In traditional societies such violence is likely to involve a limited number of actors with limited goals. As modernization proceeds, however, more groups, become socially mobilized and participant in politics. As a result the forms of violence and instability diversify and become broader in scope. This opposition to the government turning violent would depend on “the scope and intensity of the disposition among members of collectivity to take violent action against others”.28 The attacks against the political regime may take the form of guerrilla wars, coup d’etat, rebellion and riots.29

Collective discontent tends to be politicized and then expressed in violent action against political objects and actors. Collective violence usually has a political object in mind. Political violence is in the greatest magnitude if both a regime and those who oppose it exercise approximately the same degrees of political control and command similar high levels of institutional support in society. Applying Gurr’s notion of similar degrees of political control and levels of institutional support in society to separatist struggles, it can be asserted that in a situation where a separatist movement is well-equipped militarily, enjoys some amount of popular support and can also employ political clout regionally and internationally, it will be able to mount and sustain a separatist challenge against the state more forcefully. The modern state is normally well equipped to crush internal challenges but rather ineffective in controlling external sources of

support to such movements.

This theory, however, provides only a partial explanation. It does not explain why in similar socio?economic and political conditions, some groups resort to violence while others do not. Relative deprivation may, in fact, exist and yet the situation may not turn explosive. Sometimes groups which are economically worse off do not revolt. To make up for this gap in the understanding of political violence it may be supplemented by the resource mobilization theory.

The resource mobilizationschool is based on theories of collective action and it emphasizes organizations and mobilization. Conflict and violence is a product of a leader’s capability to manipulate resources of power, to organize, to recruit members by providing incentives or coercion that motivates participation.30 Charles Tilly argued that if a conflict arose between a regime and its opponents, whether that conflict would become violent depends on who fares better in terms of comparison over available options/abilities.

The outcome between the government and contenders of power and the probability of a popular protest occurring would depend on how the resources available to the latter compares to that of the incumbents. The ability of groups to achieve power would be determined by the extent to which they are in control of: (a) normative resources by which Tilly meant, commitment of members to the group itself and its ideals; (b) coercive resources or means of inflicting punishment on opponents, and (c) utilitarian resources which basically meant rewards.31

If the group was to be effective in collective action against its contenders, acquiring these resources was necessary. This collective action led to violence when members of one group mobilized to attack its opponent’s resources, which would further lead to violence — groups which had lost their resources, responded to reclaim them.32 According to Tilly, only mobilized sections of the population were involved in this violence. Thus, conflict and violence is more a consequence of organized activity unlike the view of the relative deprivation school where it arises from feelings of anomie.

Gurr, subsequently, has tried to incorporate his relative deprivation theory with Tilly’s resource mobilization theory. The basic premise of this theory is that political action is motivated by people’s deep-seated grievances, in combination with the capability of the group leaders to articulate these grievances. If grievances regarding differential treatment and a sense of group identity are strong, then it can be organized and articulated by group leaders.33

The role of the regime and the nature of state in fostering violence have been critical factors in the expression of political violence. Centralization of administration, especially where it threatens regional and cultural autonomy, can intensify the discontent of an aggrieved group and deepen the conflict. Further, when ends are moderate (for greater autonomy) and means non?violent, the regime may not deal with the problem. This often leads to the exacerbation of the crisis and soon the movement may turn violent.34 In the process of state building, sometimes, rapid social change leads to dislocation and demands the repudiation of the old and the forging of new institutions and relationships. When a ruling class resists fundamental reforms (which means reduction, if not liquidation of its power and privileges), a confrontation between the new

political forces and those who wish to retain status quo becomes inevitable and violent.35

The Mutuality of Violence and Development

The uprooting nature of the development process, results in the emergence of conflicts in developing societies. Violent conflict can further be highly disruptive for development prospects. The costs in human potential, social and productive capital and physical infrastructure can be very high, and tremendous amount of development effort can be lost. This obviously has very serious destabilizing effects. Peace and political stability are thus preconditions for development. Violence can be a major factor in distracting the state from the developmental agenda.

Violence is, therefore, considered to be dysfunctional in the development processes of the civil society. But if it is against the structural inequalities inherent in the existing socio-political and economic framework, in which a certain group has continued to be disadvantaged, then should it be viewed as mobilization efforts on the part of such groups for distributive justice and thereby functional in the developmental process? Our normative concerns do not allow us to accept that even in democratic states, ethnic and social groups should resort to violence to extract concessions from the ruling classes. However, the reality seems to be that ruling classes do in fact succumb to such pressures, even while suppressing violent conflicts.

If developmental prospects improve will there be a decline in the degree of political violence? The inability to create a bottomline on developmental needs, as referred to earlier, would suggest that even if developmental prospects improve political violence will not necessarily subside. But what one can be sure of is that if developmental growth produces negative consequences, it is virtually certain that political violence will endure and probably escalate. A much better sensitivity to peoples’s need — social, cultural and economic — by the ruling classes, may probably ensure lesser levels of violence. But it will be no guarantee against violence as long as violence can be justified ideologically.


1. This is reflected in the early works of Gabriel Almond. See G. Almond, “Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics,” in G. Almond and J. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1960); and G. Almond and G.B. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little Brown, 1966). Also see, Paul Cammack, Capitalism and Democracy in the Third World: The Doctrine for Political Development (London: Leicester University Press, 1997).

2. Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (New Delhi: Amerind Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1972), pp.33-45.

3. Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Dilemmas of Development Discourse: The Crisis of Developmentalism and the Comparative Method,”Development and Change, vol.22, no.1, January 1991, p.6.

4. Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State Society Relations and State

Capabilities in the Third World (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp.10-41.

5. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968)

6. Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p.3.

7. Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1956).

8. Development theorists had noted that the problem of insurgency was closely related to the transitional societies, and that the highly complex industrial societies had relative immunity to them. See Pye, Op. Cit., p.136.

9. Theory of nationalism proposed by Ernest Gellner states that industrialization has the inbuilt logic of bringing nation and state into congruence. See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1983).

10. Actually called nation-destroying by Walker Connor. See, Walker Connor, “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?” World Politics, vol.24, April 1972, pp.319-55.

11. See Asghar Ali Engineer, “Capitalist Development and Ethnic and Communal Conflict,” in Ghanshyam Shah (ed.), Capitalist Development: Critical Essays (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1990), pp.370-73.

12. This development strategy is suggested by Rodolfo Stavenhagen. As opposed to the conventional notion of development which is state-centric, ethnodevelopment follows principles that bring out the potential of different ethnic groups rather than bringing them into conflict. See Bjorn Hettne, Development Theory and the Three Worlds (Essex: Longman Scientific and Technical, 1990), pp.190-2.

13. Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), pp.8-9. The operation of the concept of internal colonialism is brought out powerfully by Rajni Kothari in this passage:

Emphasis on economic development through the historicist model of industrial growth and urbanization produces an elite (economic, bureaucratic, and technocratic) that is intimately tied to the metropolitan areas of the world and treats the vast rural hinterlands in its own country as colonies that provide cheap food, raw materials and surplus labour (and markets for inferior industrial products). It, no doubt, produces impressive increases in the national GNPs (and hence also in the aggregate per capita incomes) without really benefiting anyone except a small fragment of the large humanity huddled in the ‘countryside’.

Quoted from Rajni Kothari, State Against Democracy: In Search of Humane Governance (New Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1988), p.121.

14. The reduction of structural violence should also be addressed as a very important part of development. For this view see Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization (London: Sage Publications, 1996), p.157.

15. H.L. Nieburg, Political Violence: The Behavioural Process (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1969), p. 13.

16. Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), p.4.

17. David E. Apter, “Political Violence in Analytical Perspective,” in David E. Apter (ed), The Legitimization of Violence(London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997), p.5.

18. ibid., p.26.

19. For this view see, Mohammad Ayoob, “The Security Predicament of the Third World State: Reflections on State-Making in a Comparative Perspective,” in Brian L. Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992).

20. ibid., p.69.

21. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990).

22. “Introduction to the Themes,” in Luc Van de Goor, Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (eds.), Between Development and Destruction: An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), p.10.

23. Fred Von Der Mehden, Comparative Political Violence (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1973), p.7.

24. ibid., pp.7-17.

25. Huntington, Op. Cit., pp.274-75.

26. ibid., pp.4-5.

27. See, Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp.24-30.

28. ibid., p.29.

29. ibid., pp.3-4.

30. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: Random House, 1978), pp.69-70.

31. ibid., pp.69-70.

32. ibid., pp.216-19.

33. See, Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1993), pp.123-124.

34. Invariably, there is a pattern to the use of political violence. On a continuous scale, the intensity of violence moves from a conflict with no violence or force, to stages in which minor or major violence is used by atleast one party. This in turn leads to retaliatory violence and escalation in the levels of violence.

35. Thomas H. Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1974), p.115.

Nature and Political Economy of South Asian States

The nationalist elites of the South Asian states who inherited power at the time of independence enjoyed enormous prestige and a certain sense of purpose and were committed to economic growth and social transformation. The ruling elite looked at institution-building as a part of the developmental process that would enable the society to govern itself effectively, facilitate mass participation in the political process that would provide legitimacy of the system, and ensure political stability to achieve economic growth and social justice.

The optimism of the ruling elite was based inter alia on an assumption that rapid economic development, diffused through all levels of society, would inevitably reduce the potential for violent conflict. The processes of economic development, urbanization, social mobilization and politicization were expected to break down and erode proximate identities and fissiparous tendencies. The first decade or so of post-colonial history, seemed to bear out this theory. Beginning in the late 1960s, however rising ethnic and class tensions in most of the South Asian states cast doubts on this optimistic scenario. This virtually brought to centre stage the reality that development and conflicts were inter-linked. The nature of development itself, both in terms of institution-building and economic progress, had sowed the seeds of discontent and conflict.1 Since the state is pivotal in the developmental process in post-colonial societies, it is essential to examine the nature and the role of the state and the relationship between state and society to understand the roots and causes of violent conflicts.

Historical Context of South Asian States

The antecedents of the territorial boundaries of contemporary South Asian states are of recent origin. Prior to the advent of colonialism, the subcontinent was characterized by tribal and feudal social formations and encompassed a multitude of principalities and kingdoms. The colonial power devised certain strategies to deal with nationalist aspirations and prolong its rule. The strategy of coping with multi-ethnic India was to divide and rule. In the context of Sri Lanka, it was co-option of the ruling elites of both the Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic groups. By the time of the withdrawal of the British ethno-religious difference became the basis of state creation culminating in the creation of India and Pakistan as two separate states.2 The proponents of the two-nation theory had hoped that such religious nationalist sentiments would override all other types of ethnic divisions in the newly established state.3 Jinnah had thought that “the diversities and particularisms of regions, castes, communities and sects would all be swept away in the future state of Pakistan if certain forms of state apparatus were built speedily and methodically.”4 But this soon gave way to another principle of nationalism — the assertion of ethno-linguistic identity by the Bengalis inhabiting East Pakistan, which culminated in the creation of the state of Bangladesh.

Structure of Ethnic Group Relations

The states that were to emerge out of the British colonial system were heterogenous states comprising of various ethnic groups. Only Bangladesh that emerged independent later in 1971

could claim to be largely, but not entirely, homogeneous. The structure ofethnic group relations or the position of an ethnic group in the socio-economic stratification can be understood by Donald Horowitz’s schema of the centralized and dispersed ethnic systems. Urmila Phadnis uses this schema to characterize India as an ethnically dispersed system as there is no preeminence of any ethnic group. The rest of South Asia she describes as ethnically centralized systems.5 However, both centralized and dispersed systems among South Asian states, have been prone to ethnic violence of various hues and intensity.

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Nature of the South Asian States

The paradox of the nation-state building enterprise was that it was rooted in the European tradition, and unlike the largely homogeneous nation-states of Europe, the heterogeneous post-colonial state-nations of South Asia in the process of the management of a national identity imparted to their states, a hegemonic role over their multi-ethnic societies.6 Certain continuities with the pre-colonial state structure could also be discerned. The historical context and developmental processes of South Asian states also evolved in such a manner as to lead to divergent types of regimes.

The hegemonic role of the state was not only due to the imperatives of nation-building but also because it has taken upon itself, for historical reasons, the role as a provider for its citizens. Consequently, there has been increasing state penetration into the civic society as well as centralization of initiatives and resources on the one hand, and the rising expectation of the people from the state on the other. Although the state has relative autonomy in relation to society, in several respects it embodies and reflects the values of the dominant social classes.

In the case of India, the concern for law and order in the immediacy of partition and the desire to build a strong, welfare oriented state, laid the foundations for the centralization of powers in the state. However, the dilemma of building a nation-state in a complex plural society was circumvented by creating a secular, “non-ethnic state”.7 The political arrangement envisaged in the Indian Union constituted several provincial states organized on the principle of quasi-federalism. Subsequently, the re-organization of states in 1956 on the basis of language accommodated the ethno-linguistic aspirations of a number of groups.

There were two factors that contributed to the strengthening of democracy in post-independence India. The first was Nehru’s vision and influence. Under him elected institutions enjoyed preeminence over non-elected institutions. Secondly, the Congress party played the role of an intermediary between state and society. However, all this was to be undermined later. Since the 1970s two seemingly contradictory processes appear to be at work in India. One is the sharp tendency towards centralization in the running of the state and in the management of power. The other is a gradual decline in the authority of those in positions of power and a loosening grip on the national situation by the leadership.8 Consequently, there is both an increase in the repressive character of the state and the vulnerability of the state apparatus.

This process has largely to do with the deinstitutionalization of the Congress party and state

structures done by Mrs. Indira Gandhi. The autonomy and professionalism of the state institutions — independence, professional standards, and procedural norms of the parliament, courts, police, civil service and federal system — were eroded. Erosion of the state’s capacity to mediate effectively between contending interests and manage conflict was also due to increased political mobilization of highly fragmented social forces that threatened governability. Mrs. Gandhi’s response to the crisis of governability was by centralizing power in her own person and secretariat.9 Mrs. Gandhi increasingly became intolerant of opposition and those opposition groups who felt that they had lost decisively developed a tendency to take political issues outside the political process itself for settlement and thus was the origin of assorted militancies in various regions.10

In Pakistan, the death of Jinnah, soon after independence, weakened the Muslim League profoundly and was to leave a lasting impression on the development of political institutions. For almost nine years after independence the state was to pass through political uncertainty, even finding it hard to put a legitimate government in place. Soon, the military assumed a pre-eminence in the power structure, dominating and controlling the political system.

Developmental theorists in the sixties acclaimed military regimes as agents of modernization in the developing world. Democracy resting on the mobilization of masses was believed to be detrimental to both political stability and economic growth. On the other hand, it was perceived that the military institution with its hierarchical structure, established chains of command and rigid discipline seemed well equipped to provide political stability and ensure efficient economic management.

There are some theoretical explanations for the nature of the Pakistani state as it emerged. According to Hamza Alavi, the post-colonial state is relatively overdeveloped in relation to society owing to its origins in the colonial system. Post-colonial society, along with the bourgeoisie and the landowners are also less developed than the state. Consequently, the state has to mediate the competing and conflicting interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the land-owning class. The state is, therefore, not simply an instrument of any particular class. Rather it is relatively autonomous vis-a-vis the three dominant classes. Alavi’s analysis of the Pakistani state as an overdeveloped state argues that a predominantly Punjabi military bureaucratic oligarchy dominates Pakistan. This oligarchy is linked to the powerful landowning class and the bourgeoisie.11 The Pakistani state has also been described as a “Praetorian state” — a society without effective institutions and in which corruption is rampant among those who are entrusted with guarding it.12 There is one explanation which de-emphasizes the role of the military and gives more importance to the bureaucracy in the process of state formation. According to this argument the Pakistani state is a “bureaucratic polity” which has sought economic development and modernization through its “involuted paternalism”. That is a belief that the masses cannot represent themselves so they must be represented. And due to a detestation of non-bureaucratic institutions, the argument goes that, the masses must be represented by the bureaucracy.13

The composition of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy has been changing over the years. Initially, urdu-speaking Muslims or Muhajirs, were over-represented in the Civil Services of Pakistan. Their influence declined with the assassination of Pakistan’s first Prime Minister

Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, and the hold over the state was strengthened by the Punjabi bureaucrats. With the rise to power of Gen. Ayub Khan in 1958, a Punjabi-Pakhtun Military Bureaucratic oligarchy was on the ascendancy. After Gen. Zia-ul-Haq came to power in 1977, the predominantly Punjabi army eclipsed the bureaucracy. Even now substantial representation of Muhajirs still remains in the bureaucracy. In terms of the class composition of the military and bureaucracy, there has also been changes. Since the late sixties, there are more recruits to the officer core from the middle classes in the urban and rural areas as against the land-owning background of the earlier officer corps.14

In Bangladesh, the coming to power of the Awami League after independence signified the assumption of state power by an alliance of intermediate classes, which was the support base of the Awami League. But the Awami League’s compulsions to dispense patronage to its support base — the intermediate classes — resulted in a rift between the ruling classes and the masses. This resulted in a crisis of legitimacy for the ruling classes and undermined the Awami League and strengthened the Military Bureaucratic oligarchy.15 Moreover, a strategy of capitalist development through foreign aid further entrenched the bureaucrats in the power structure. External dependence of the state has resulted in a lack of accountability which has diverted politics and development towards the enrichment of a narrow class of beneficiaries. Governments are less accountable to people and more dependent on donors for securing their patronage in order to retain state power.16

Centralization of state power was inherent in Mujib’s conception of a unitary system for Bangladesh from its inception. Mujib refused to recognize the Chakmas as a distinct ethnic group and grant them provincial autonomy when a group of Chakma leaders met him in 1973. Soon thereafter, the massive mandate that Mujibur Rahman received in the elections held in March 1973 was to result in a kind of democratic autocracy.17 Without any effective opposition, for that matter any opposition at all, parliament became endangered, if not obsolete.18 Mujib was faced with a grave political-economic crises by the mid-seventies which he tried to cope through a constitutional coup. The multi-party parliamentary system was replaced by a one party presidential form of government. All political parties were banned and were cajoled to join a newly formed party called the Bangladesh Krishak Shramik Awami League (BAKSAL Bangladesh Peasants and labourers National Front). Firstly, Mujib tried to undermine the opposition through constitutional means, and secondly, appropriated for himself the role of the Presidentwith overarching powers. This has been a legacy unabashedly appropriated by his military successors. The decision of the military to intervene in the political process was an effort to mediate between the power blocs and alter the nature of the state itself in which the military bureaucratic oligarchy had dominance in the exercise of state power.19

Although the struggle against Pakistan was expressed in terms of linguistic nationalism, but nation-building in the relatively homogeneous Bangladesh has contained an underlying religious dimension. Gen. Ziaur Rahman asserted the Islamic cultural identity of the state. The principle of secularism was replaced under a constitutional amendment in 1977 and a drift towards greater conformity to Islamic symbols and values has taken place. Fifteen years of military rule has weakened political institutions and the civil society. Even the most modern of the state apparatuses, the military suffers from weaknesses as it is not a centralized hierarchical structure

but is constituted by several groupings and factions.

The multi-ethnic character of Sri Lanka became a central issue in defining the state structures as it moved towards independence. Initially, the Sinhalese political elite stood for some composite Sinhalese-Tamil nation. However, the emergence of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism as a dominant political force, particularly since the elections of 1956 which led to the formation of a government with a hegemonic Sinhala Buddhist ideology, was to result in the erosion of safeguards for the minorities. It is a highly centralized state because there is no devolution of power to the local bodies. Consequently, it is the majority Sinhala community that enjoys state power in Sri Lanka. After 1956, Sinhala Buddhist nationalism became the dominant ideology of the ruling class. The governments that havecome to power have been populist in order to sustain their support base in society and build up a system of patronage and reward. Such an approach has inevitably undermined the autonomy of the state.20

Majority domination on one hand, and the increasing authoritarian character of the state on the other have played a significant role in promoting the divide between the Sinhala and Tamils.21 Right from the Citizenship Act of 1948 disenfranchising one million Tamils, to the Sinhala Only Act of 1956, to the 1972 republican constitution granting Buddhism the foremost place it has been perpetuating the divide between the Tamils and the Sinhalas. This divide between the Sinhala and Tamils and also within the Sinhalas was furthered by some strong measures taken by the Jayewardene regime since 1977. His tough measures like the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979 and the Sixth Amendment (4th August 1983) only invited defiance from the Tamil youth. Preponing of Presidential elections in 1982 and the referendum of 1983 for the extension of the UNP regime resulted in the increasing erosion of the competitive party system and ensured the continuance of the UNP till 1989.22 It was since Jayewardene’s regime that the modes of protest and dissent have increasingly taken recourse to extra-constitutional means with the worst manifestation of this being in the ethnic realm.

The nature and character of the South Asian states, therefore are more immediately rooted in the legacies of the colonial period. These post-colonial states tried to pursue modernization and development within a capitalist framework with a view to generating more wealth, consolidating the nation and making the state strong against internal and external threats.23 But they have not been able to ensure political stability and promote loyalty to the state from all sections and groups within their societies.

The Development Processes

Most states in the post-colonial world had laid emphasis on planning for development in the initial years. With the dawn of decolonization the state’s role in development came to pervade the theory and practice of development economics. Development was to be overseen by the centralizing state which had two primary tasks — one was to ensure economic growth and the other was to level the multitude of diversities rooted in developing societies. By planning for development and monitoring the production and distribution of economic resources in society, the centralized state was expected to expedite the processes of national integration.

The capacity of the state to engage in redistributive reforms is intricately dependent on the

support of atleast a fraction of the dominant social classes or relatively autonomous from the dominant social classes. The ideological leanings of those exercising power within the state apparatus bear upon development policies adopted by the ruling coalitions. An analysis of the state-class relationship in the different phases of the post-independence history of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka would help us in understanding their relative capacities in addressing and redressing the longstanding problems of economic disparities and social injustices. The absence of significant restructuring of prevailing relationships of dominance and privilege in civil society have since the late sixties served to intensify competition and conflict in expanding political arenas and increased the transactional costs of governance, forcing greater reliance on the state’s coercive apparatus, irrespective of its formally democratic or authoritarian facade.

Although the countries of South Asia have had diverse regime patterns, they basically have followed the same economic system, that of a mixed economy. Mixed economymay be described as an eclectic system, based on a mechanism of interaction between the private (market) and public (state) sectors. The system of a mixed economy was adopted in stages since independence through planning. The choice of a mixed economy emerged from the underdeveloped nature of the South Asian societies and thus the entire planning process was geared to overcome underdevelopment in the region. This strategy of economic development had come under attack from Left critics as vacillating between capitalism and socialism and reflecting lack of a coherent plan, purpose and direction.24 Economic planning was concentrated in the hands of the national bourgeoisie and foreign capital which resulted in retarded social and economic development.

The post-colonial Indian state enjoyed relative autonomy from the dominant social classes. The state was not the instrument of any particular class but was balanced between, what Pranab Bardhan calls, the dominant proprietary classes — the industrial capitalist class, the rich farmers and the professionals both civilian and military including white collar workers.25 The proprietary classes are not homogeneous and none is more powerful then the other class. This is partly due to the retarded growth of capitalism in India. The industrial capitalist class has not yet been strong to undermine the economic interest of the rich farmers, neither has it succeeded in taming the professional classes to pursue its goals.

This heterogeneity and class balance while determining resource distribution assured the stability of the Indian state and helped preserve a liberal democratic tradition. The interest of the proprietary classes in the maintenance of a democratic process could be attributed to the need for a system which could provide the best medium for bargaining in the coalition.26 However, this democratic tradition co-existed with authoritarian strains due to the institutional structures inherited from the colonial period.27

The earlier Congress leadership, especially Nehru, avoided conflict with the dominant social classes and made measured and subtle uses of state coercion. Nehru succeeded in the abolition of Zamindari or the feudal landlord classes. Abolition of intermediary landholdings reduced tenancy from 60 to 25 per cent and increased proportion of owner cultivators from 40 to 75. About 20 million tenants became owners and about 14 million acres were acquired and distributed.28 This transformed agrarian relations by shifting the locus of power from feudal landlords to medium and rich farmers — a class which was diverse socially ranging from high

caste Rajputs to low-caste Hindus. However, proposals initiated in 1959 to lower ceilings on landholdings — to redistribute surplus land to tenants and landless labourers failed terribly due to faulty legislation. Implementation couldn’t take place except in Kerala and West Bengal, which were anyway ruled by Marxist governments.29

The fourth five year plan instead of initiating redistributive programmes for the rural poor, went for a technological package aimed at inducing the medium and rich farmers to enhance production. Increased use of fertilizers and high-yielding varieties of seeds were supposed to usher in a green revolution. But since land-reforms in the early 50s had barely grazed the agrarian power structure, the technological innovations in Indian agriculture at best produced regionally disparate results. Parts of north-western India with better irrigation facilities, Punjab and Haryana in particular, saw rapid growth in agricultural output. Rural India was simply bypassed by the Green Revolution of the late 1960s. India as a whole was able to shore up its food grain production, but in the process accentuated existing inequalities in the distribution of rural power and resources, and created greater disparities in the development of the different regional economies.

In regard to industrialization also, even though it strengthened the national economy, but it was at the cost of intensifying regional inequalities. Industrial dominance was in the Northern and Western regions bypassing the eastern and the north-eastern states.30 The contemporary articulation of regional identities in India is a product of inequalities created and perpetuated by the operation of capitalism in the last four decades. Capitalist development has intensified both class and regional inequalities and intensified anger against “a modernist elite”.31

The present sense of alienation on the part of a large segment of India’s diverse population is linked to a large number of factors, but more pertinently to democracy and distribution. The centralized state apparatus has thwarted many of the substantive political goals of democracy and the inability of India’s democratic system to bring about redistributive reforms and an even pattern of regional economic development has resulted in what one may call in V.S. Naipaul’s term “a million mutinies.”

Pakistan’s economy has been conditioned by the socio-economic structure inherited at the time of partition. After independence, Pakistan had almost no industrial infrastructure. Its economy was basically a feudal dominated agrarian economy. The leadership of the Muslim League party which headed the Pakistan movement was dominated by a feudalistic aristocracy and a group of professionals and rich merchants.32 Over a period of time the trading classes, were able to gain control of industries with the support and patronage of the bureaucracy.

Since Pakistan did not have an industrial capitalist class at the time of independence, the state followed a deliberate policy of creating one even at the cost of creating inequalities of income and wealth in the commercial and industrial sectors. This policy was followed because of a perception that such a class was very essential for the economic development of the country.33 This resulted in the expansion of the private sector but concentrated wealth in some families or groups of merchant capitalists belonging to certain ethnic communities. A study of distribution of industrial assets in 1959 showed that there were twenty-four industrial houses owning 45.9 per cent of private industrial assets and 31.9 per cent of sales in the corporate

sector.34

The planning process not only helped the rise of the industrial bourgeoisie in the urban areas but strengthened the feudal landlords in the countryside. The trading class, which developed into an industrial bourgeoisie, was unable to challenge the landlords. On the other hand, the feudal classes controlled state power either directly or through their links with the military-bureaucratic oligarchy. This led to the co-existence of semi-feudal and capitalist relations — which gave rise to an uneven pattern of development.35

In the agricultural sector, serious land reforms could never take place till the mid-1960s. Land reforms had only a nominal effect on land distribution. As early as 1952-3 Punjab’s bigger landlords subverted an attempt by the more progressive wing of the Muslim League to initiate redistributive reforms by refusing to bring their produce to the market and precipitating a man-made famine in that province. This pattern continued during the late fifties and the sixtieswhen Ayub’s military regime attempted to bring about a land reformfavouring the medium range landlords. Special care however, was taken not to unduly ruffle the bigger landlords. Ayub’s land reforms announced in 1959 fixed the ceiling on landownership at 500 acres of irrigated and 1,000 acres of unirrigated land. But as in the Indian case of land reforms of the early fifties, the ceilings were on individual rather than family holdings. This allowed most of the larger landlords, concentrated in the Punjab and Sindh where the agrarian structure is far more skewed than in Pakistan’s other provinces, to retain land well in excess of the ceilings. Land reform measures under Ayub Khan in 1959, had touched only about 1.6 percent of the cultivated land.36

Much radical rhetoric adorned Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s land reform of 1972. As in 1959, the drafters of the legislation were more concerned about winning popular legitimacy than delivering substantial benefits to the poor. Again, the ceilings were on individual rather then on family ownership. An individual landowner could hold upto 150 acres of irrigated and 300 acres of unirrigated land. These reforms made no impact on the power of the larger landlords. Only a mere one per cent of the landless tenants and small peasant holders directly benefitted from the reforms.37

Thirty per cent of all farm area is still owned by this landlord class. Landholding sizes are more than 150 acres and this class constitutes less than one percent of total landowners. Since these landed elites dominate major political parties they are a major stumbling block in building democratic institutions. Only proper land reforms can shift the power base of the feudal landlords and their hold over the state apparatus.38

The economic programmes also increased disparities between economic classes as well as among regional and ethnic groups. In Pakistan, the disproportionate representation of Punjabis in the military and civil bureaucracy and concentration of enormous powers in their hands resulted in its structural domination of the economies of East Pakistan, Sindh, Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province.39 The Punjab and the Sindh provinces, which had relatively more developed infrastructures, attracted a larger proportion of industrial investment than the other provinces. In Sind however, the growth of income was mainly in Karachi and Hyderabad. Thus the economic disparities widened not only between East and West pakistan, but also between the other provinces. During the 60s the factor which accelerated the growth of regional income

disparities within what is today Pakistan was the differential impact of agricultural growth associated with the so-called green revolution. Since the yield increase associated with the adoption of high yield varieties of foodgrains required irrigation, and since the Punjab and the Sindh had a relatively larger proportion of their area under irrigation they experienced much faster growth in their incomes, compared to Baluchistan and NWFP.40 Regional disparities worsened and sharpened the polarized nature of development and growth.41

Extended periods of military rule in Pakistan have also distorted its political economy. Due to its convoluted origins Pakistan has been devoting a disproportionate share of its resources to security since its creation. The defence budget coupled with the costs of administration, expenditure on para-military forces as well as interest payments on military debt accumulated over the years has greatly limited Pakistan’s policy options in regards to its development programme. Given the centralized nature of the state structure, Pakistan’s political economy has been portrayed as defence-oriented than development-oriented, i.e., a large part of resources go to non-productive expenditure. So it is the entrenched interests of the non-elected institutions, the military in particular, within the state structure which has resulted instead of development into a political economy of defence.42 Pakistan’s political economy has seriously frustrated the state’s development agenda, particularly with its scarce economic resources.

The Pakistani military has been able to translate its dominance over the state structure to become deeply entrenched in the political economy. This dominance over the state structure has provided the opportunities for legal and extra-legal priveleges. The military-bureaucratic oligarchy has been able to use government jobs as ladders to making private fortunes. The military owns some of the richest foundations and some of the best health and educational facilities in the country.43

In the newly independent Bangladesh, there was a lack of a big landlord class and an indigenous Bengali capitalist class — the emergence of which had been blocked under the Pakistani regimes. There were some medium range producers who advanced to constitute the capitalist class after independence. The emerging capitalist class had the support of the state and the Military Bureaucratic Oligarchy. By 1975, the Bangladesh state was pushed towards authoritarianism as effective support of the state became necessary for the further growth of this class and capitalist development.

But what concerns many is the role aid plays in the economy of Bangladesh. Rehman Sobhan calls it an aid driven market economy.44 This particular pattern of dependent development has contributed little to eradicate poverty. Rather it has accentuated concentration in the ownership of wealth, and inequality in the distribution of income without leading to significant expansion of the productive forces within the economy. Aid dependence has in fact been self-perpetuating as it has overthe years served to reinforce a system which has been inimical to the mobilization of domestic resources and the effective use of productive capacities.45

Praetorianism is probably more rampant in Bangladesh. The privatization of the state has been for the benefit of the ruling classes who have used the state to make wealth. “What passes for the government of Bangladesh has degenerated into an aggregation of a large number of individuals and groups moved by their own private agendas rather than the direction of an omnipresent

state.”46

Sri Lanka had a self-sufficient peasant economy before it was colonized. This was destroyed with the introduction of a plantation economy, organized on modern commercial lines, by the colonial rulers.47 Even after independence, the indigenous rulers continued with this classical export economy. The ruling elite was economically and socially a product of British colonialism and came from the land-owning propertied classes who had commercial interests in the plantation sector. The continuation of, more or less, the colonial economy suited the interests of the ruling class, but became dependent on the export of certain primary agricultural products only.

A favourable balance of payments position immediately after independence allowed the Sri Lankan government to introduce social welfare measures like subsidies on food, education and health. Successive governments financed these measures with the help of foreign capital and loans. Although these measures improved the quality of life in Sri Lanka, they were not in tune with hard economic realities. The excessive emphasis on welfare was at the cost of development. There was an imbalance between expenditure on ‘human investment’ and investment in capital goods to increase production and employment.48

The continuation of the plantation economy and immigrant labour adversely affected employment opportunities for the Sri Lankan peasant. As a result, the peasants or their descendants were rendered landless due to the gradual development of capitalism in the countryside and demographic and economic pressures on the land. The increasing pressure of population had created an adverseman-land ratio and the number of people dependent on the same acre of land grew because of acutefragmentation of land. Within a generation or two, a class of landless and semi?landless grew in the rural areas. In the 1960s, 30 per cent of the peasantry was landless and working as share croppers.49

In 1958, the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) government had passed aminimal landreforms act — the Paddy Lands Act.This was meant to guarantee certain tenurial safeguards to the tenants and a provision for reduced rents.But it was never implemented properly due to severe opposition from the members of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), who considered some of its provisions as inimical to their interests. The act was passed only after making favourable changes, which diluted some of its substantive content.50

In the absence of any meaningful agrarian reforms, thegovernments failed to resolve problems of indebtedness, landlessness and poverty of the peasantry.At the same timeexternal borrowings were being used to finance import of consumer goods and for building costly public works. By the next decade, Sri Lanka was in the throes of a serious economic crisis. This was compounded by a steep rise in population, domesticunemployment and an extremely high literacy rate.

Militarization of State and Civil Society

The contradiction of the South Asian region is that it sustains high levels of militarization though it is one of the poorest regions of the world. While a large majority lives in abject poverty in South Asia, a large part of the productive resources are consumed by the militaries.51 The poor

basic social indicators are inversely matched by the affluence of the weapons system some of the states of the region possess.

Traditional rivals like India and Pakistan, who have gone to war thrice, justify their high levels of defence expenditures due to external threats to their security from within the region or outside the region. Small states like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka who have no tangible external threat also have disproportionate resources devoted to maintain a military machine, which is predominantly used in resolving domestic conflicts. The monopolization of scarce resources by the military negatively impinges on resources which could otherwise have been diverted for social and economic development.

The disproportionate resources allocated to defence is also linked to the institutionalization of the military in the state structure. The peculiarities of the state-formation process in Pakistan had militarized the state since its inception. The reasons for Pakistan’s high defence expenditures in its initial years has been explained by the inheritance of a debilitated defence structure arising out of division of assets between India and Pakistan as a consequence of the partition.52

Conflict with India and long periods of military rule in Pakistan contributed to the high levels of militarization in the South Asian region. Military regimes in both Pakistan and Bangladesh, in the absence of popular support, militarized the state structures. However, the level of militarization which took place under Gen. Zia in Pakistan was unprecedented and fundamentally different in character. In the absence of domestic popular support, he sought political, economic and military support from the United States. He was more than willing to make Pakistan a ‘frontline state’ in the US’s Afghan war.

While the benefits to the military in shoring itself up with some of the state-of-the-art weapons against a formidable adversary was a major consideration, but the indirect fallout of being a conduit in America’s proxy war has been too severe not only on Pakistani society but on the region as a whole.53 Between 1977 and 1987, a large proportion of weapons meant for the Afghan guerrillas filtered into the illegal arms market. A steady flow of Afghan refugees contributed to the large illegal arms market and a burgeoning heroin trade injected both weapons and syndicate organizations into the social life of the major urban centres in Pakistan.54

During Gen. Zia’s regime, with political parties banned and all venues for protest through legal means closed, polarization within civil society had intensified.55 A lack of public confidence in the ability of the state to provide security of life to its citizens motivated more and more people to seek alternative support mechanisms in their communities to obtain security against physical threat. It was not difficult for such groups to acquire a high degree of firepower from the illegal arms market.56

However, the Afghan war was not the only reason for the diffusion of small arms in the South Asian societies. Indigenous production in small cottage industries have been carrying on for years in places like Darra Adam khel in NWFP and Bihar. Even in Bangladesh a large number of weapons are in private hands. Some estimates put the number of weapons in private hands at the time of liberation as 1,00,000,57 most of which have not been recovered so far. Where the pilfered arms meant for Afghan Mujahedin made a significant difference was in its firepower

capabilities. Overnight the lethal capabilities of the firearms dramatically increased.

In plural and multiethnic societies, the predominance of a single ethnic group in the military establishment militates against nation-building. For whatever structural reasons, the predominance of the Punjabis and the Sinhalas in their respective military establishments have been detrimental to their nation-building process and heightened the levels of conflict. In the case of Sri Lanka the ethnic divide has been reinforced by their secular armed forces acquiring a strong Sinhala-Buddhist orientation. The present army is for all purposes an ethnic Sinhala army subjected to the ideology of Sinhala-Buddhism.58

South Asian states have made no less contributions to militarization of civil society of their neighbouring states. This is due to their competing strategies of nation-building aligned with their strategic and security interests.

Appraisal of South Asian States Systems

Despite diverse regime patterns, certain general trends can be discerned in the states system of South Asia. With the growing momentum of modernization, the historical legacies of peripheral capitalism and uneven development have been compounded by increasing centralization of power and scarce resources. Initially, there has been an expansion of state-sponsored and state initiated activities for development, equity and justice by the post-colonial leadership. Besides, a strong centre was necessitated to cope with the issues of identity and territoriality. Military regimes by their very nature do not provide much scope for decentralization which has been the bane of Pakistan and Bangladesh in varying periods. However, even in non-military regimes like India and Sri Lanka, the centralizing tendencies have loomed large, weakening in the process the centre by eroding the intermediate institutions which often act as a cushion for dissent and protest.

The states role in the development process has been significant. The capitalist class was extended ample help with finance and infrastructure. While India possessed a relatively strong indigenous bourgeoisie, Pakistan didn’t have a bourgeoisie of its own. It had to be fostered by the state. In Sri Lanka most of the central political elites belonged to a class of rich commercial plantations owners. But none of the South Asian states and the bourgeoisie except for India in the early years, were able to push rapid industrialization. This was largely due to the relative autonomy of the state from the dominant classes. The position of the other dominant classes on such transformation had to be taken into account. Soon after independence except for Pakistan where big landowners constituted a powerful political factor, in India and Sri Lanka where the elites adopted social democratic ideology, the traditional landlord system was abolished. Under the so-called Green revolution strategy adopted by India and Pakistan agricultural modernization promoted by the state encouraged commercial farming. And at a later stage a broad section of medium range capitalist farmers, not only survived but were assisted to consolidate and expand through the so-called Green revolution strategy. To these landowning classes, concessions had to be made since they exercised considerable political clout at the local level and therefore important for electoral purposes as well as the general maintenance of control. Thus modernization was sought in alliance with rural property owning classes.Thus substantial benefits accrued from industrialization, based on the import substitution strategy and agriculture

modernization to the propertied classes.

On the other hand, the impact of modernization and development on the poor was much more complicated. Initially, a part of the poor peasantry released from agricultural activity was absorbed by the nascent industrial sector. Some from the disadvantaged sections from both the rural and the urban areas could experience upward mobility due to the benefits of state-sponsored education.

The impressive achievements in higher education during the 1960s produced a large number of college and University degree holders, mostly in the field of humanities. For them employment opportunities grew only slightly, so unemployed young men were to be found in large numbers during the late 1960s and early 1970s. These recently arrived members of the intelligentsia, often of peasant and lower middle class origins, were not willing to return to their humble surroundings. By that time the disruption of the subsistence economy had proceeded in some depth and the restoration of the old order was wellnigh impossible. The state was therefore compelled to continue expanding its instrumentalist role as the main solver of the societal social crisis, but it failed to meet the increasing volume of demands due to a weak economic base. Unemployment therefore rose sharply. In Pakistan the economy firstly expanded rapidly between 1959-60 and 1964-65, then slowed down and declined sharply in 1969-70.59 Unemployment, especially among young educated men was also an acute problem in Sri Lanka in the late 60s and early 70s. In 1969, there were 14,000 university graduates and 112,000 young adults with the general certificate of education, ordinary level qualification without employment.60 The incapacity of the states to maintain a congruence between social capital formation and physical capital formation was to result in a crisis of the state by the 1980s — when a volatile educated but unemployed youth was readily available in large numbers for political mobilization.


1. Rajni Kothari, Rethinking Development: In Search of Humane Alternatives (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1988), pp. 214-19.

2. Although the appeal of a Muslim homeland in the subcontinent played a crucial part in the emergence of Pakistan, it is probably true that the concerns of many who migrated from the more developed areas of British India had some material basis as well. The Muslims, particularly from the urban areas of North India, feared Hindu domination of government and commerce in a country in which they, because of their small number, would have been marginalized. On the other hand, an independent Muslim state offered attractive opportunities and less competition. That religion was not the only motivating factor explains why a large number of Muslims still remained behind in India after partition. See, Shahid Javed Burki and Robert LaPorte, Jr., “The Political and Social Environment for Development,” p.5; and Shahid Javed Burki, “A Historical Perspective on Development,” p.31 in Shahid Javed Burki and Robert LaPorte, Jr. (eds.), Pakistan’s Development Priorities: Choices for the Future (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1986); and G.H. Jensen, Militant Islam (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p.135.

3. The concept of the ‘Muslim Nation’ had been strongly contested even prior to independence by Baluch leaders. While after independence in West Pakistan there were four nationalities —

Punjabi, Sindhi, Baluch and Pashtun, this has been further complicated by the assertion of new ethnic identities by the Siraikis, Hazaras and the Mohajirs.

4. In this regard, Jinnah seems to have largely stressed on economic development. See, Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), p.25.

5. Urmila Phadnis, Ethnicity and Nation-Building in South Asia (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1990), pp.45-49.

6. ibid., p.32.

7. D.L. Sheth, “State, Nation and Ethnicity,” Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay), vol.25, no.12, 25 March 1989, p.624.

8. Atul Kohli, “Centralization and Powerlessness: India’s Democracy in a Comparative Perspective,” in Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (eds.), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp.89-106.

9. Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Governability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and also see, Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp.6-7.

10. Sudipto Kaviraj, “Democracy and Development in India,” in Amiya Kumar Bagchi (ed.), Democracy and Development (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p.111.

11. Hamza Alavi, “The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh,” in Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma (eds.),Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), pp.145-95.

12. See some of the contributions in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (eds.), Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship, The Political Economy of A Praetorian State (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983).

13. Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994), pp.150-60.

14. Shahid Kardar, “The Political Economy of Contemporary Pakistan,” Unpublished Paper, pp.11-12.

15. Ali Riaz, State, Class and Military Rule: The Political Economy of Martial Law in Bangladesh (Dhaka: Nadi New Press, 1994).

16. Rehman Sobhan, The Crisis of External Dependence: The Political Economy of Foreign

Aidto Bangladesh (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1982).

17. Awami League won 282 out of 289 seats.

18. Rehman Sobhan, Bangladesh: Problems of Governance (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1993), pp.12-28.

19. Riaz, Op.Cit.

20. James Jupp, Sri Lanka: Third World Democracy (London: Frank Cass, 1978), see Chapter 8.

21. Sumantra Bose, States, Nations, Sovereignty: Sri Lanka, India and the Tamil Eelam Movement (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994).

22. W.A. Wiswa Warnapala and L. Dias Hewagama, Recent Politics in Sri Lanka: The Presidential Election and Referendum of 1982 (Delhi: Navrang, 1983).

23. Ishtiaq Ahmed, State, Nation andEthnicity in Contemporary South Asia (London: Pinter, 1996), pp.42-3.

24. See, A.K. Bagchi, The Political Economy of Underdevelopment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Also see, Paul Baran,The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957).

25. Pranab Bardhan, The Political Economy of Development in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.40-53.

26. Pranab Bardhan, “Dominant Proprietary Classes and India’s Democracy,” in Atul Kohli (ed.), India’s Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1991), pp.214-24

27. For detailed argument of this view see, Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.134.

28. Rudolph and Rudolph, Op.Cit., p.315.

29. Even thirty-six years after independence less than 0.6 per cent of total cultivated area had actually been distributed among the landless. See, Bardhan, The Political Economy of Development in India, Op.Cit., p.59.

30. For an argument that the north-eastern states (provinces) served as sub-colonies for the Indian state, see, Gough and Sharma (eds.), Op.Cit., pp.8-9.

31. “The nation-state as it emerged through the Nehruvian design of the fifties can survive only if it allows its dominant imagination to admit amendments, and strive to achieve greater equity

between classes and regions, and try to surmount and heal the great cleavage of dispossession by the processes of the cognitively arrogant, socially uncaring, brutal form of modernity.” Quoted from, Sudipto Kaviraj, “Crisis of the Nation-State in India,” in John Dunn (ed.), Contemporary Crisis of the Nation-State? (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), p.128.

32. Jamil Rashid and Hasan Gardezi, “Independent Pakistan: Its Political Economy,” in Gardezi and Rashid (eds.), Op.Cit., pp.4-5. According to Hamza Alavi, the trading classes were not significant amongst the class of people who were behind the Pakistan movement. He calls the class which was behind the Pakistan movement as the salariat class. This class emerges in colonized societies, comes from urban educated classes who qualify for employment in the colonial state along with the professionals who emerged in the context of the colonial transformation of Indian society. These were the lawyers, journalist, urban intellectuals, etc. See, Hamza Alavi, “Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology,” in Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi (eds.), State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan(London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1988), pp.65-7.

33. Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), p.48.

34. Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan’s Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp.67-68; also see, Rashid Amjad, “Industrial Concentration and Economic Power,” in Gardezi and Rashid (eds.), Op.Cit., pp.230-31. However, the position of the monopoly industrial houses was drastically affected by the separation of East pakistan and the nationalization of some industries and the banking and insurance sectors by the Bhutto regime.

35. Omar Asghar Khan, “Political and Economic Aspects of Islamization,” in Asghar Khan (ed.), Islam, Politics and the State: The Pakistan Experience (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1985), pp.158-160.

36. Hamza Alavi, “Class and State,” in Gardezi and Rashid (eds.), Op.Cit., p.60.

37. Akmal Hussain, “Land Reforms in Pakistan: A Reconsideration,” in Iqbal Khan (ed), Fresh Perspectives on India and Pakistan (Lahore: Book Traders, 1987).

38. Akmal Hussain, “Land to the Tiller: First Steps towards Democracy,” News on Friday (Lahore), 8 December 1995.

39. B.M. Bhatia, “Economic Disparities in Pakistan,” in Urmila Phadnis, S.D. Muni and Kalim Bahadur (eds.), Domestic Conflicts in South Asia, Vol. II (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1986), pp.61-81.

40. Naved Hamid and Akmal Hussain, “Regional Inequalities and Capitalist Development: Pakistan’s Experience,” in S. Akbar Zaidi (ed.), Regional Imbalances and the National Question in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 1992)

41. Shahid Kardar, “Notes on National Unity and Regional Imbalances,” in Iqbal Khan (ed.), Op.Cit., p.226.

42. Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origin’s of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1991).

43. Kardar, “The Political Economy of Contemporary Pakistan,” Op.Cit., pp.3-4.

44. Sobhan, Bangladesh: Problems of Governance, Op. Cit., p.275

45. Sobhan, The Crisis of External Dependence, Op.Cit., p.vii.

46. Sobhan, Bangladesh: Problems of Governance, Op.Cit., p.264.

47. The economic system which evolved under colonial rule has also been termed as a dual economy. The modern sector which centered around the plantation economy depended on foreign entrepreneurship, immigrant labour and foreigncapital. It was technologically advanced but at the same time highly land and labour intensive. On the other hand, the traditional sector centered around subsistence agriculture, handicrafts, petty trade and small scale commodity production for domestic consumption. There were no linkages between these two sectors and therefore, the traditional sector was underdeveloped. See, Donald R. Snodgrass, Ceylon: An Export Economy in Transition (Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966), pp.4-15.

48. Satchi Ponnambalam, Dependent Capitalism in Crisis: The Sri Lankan Economy, 1948-1980 (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1981), p.37.

49. Fred Halliday, “The Ceylonese Insurrection,” in Robin Blackburn (ed.), Explosion in a Subcontinent: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Ceylon (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), p.180.

50. Mick Moore, The State and Peasant Politics in Sri Lanka (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp.55-63; and Urmila Phadnis, “Sri Lanka: Crises of Legitimacy and Integration,” in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, Vol. 3 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), p.149.

51. For details refer to Mahbub ul Haq, “The Subcontinent of Sub-Saharan Asia,” pp.15-16; Mitu Varma, “Guns `n’ Rotis,” pp.18-20; Manik de Silva, “Ploughshares into Swords”, p.24; Beena Sarwar, “Skewed priorities in Pakistan,” pp.28-30 in Himal South Asia, vol.9, no.1, March 1996.

52. Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origin’s of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence, Op. Cit.

53. For details see, Chris Smith, The Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Pakistan and Northern India (London: Brassey’s, 1993).

54. Akmal Hussain, “The Crisis of State Power in Pakistan: Militarization and Dependence,” in Ponna Wignaraja and Akmal Hussain (eds.), The Challenge in South Asia: Development,

Democracy and Regional Cooperation (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1989), p.231.

55. Shireen M. Mazari, “Militarism and the Militarization of Pakistan’s Civil Society: 1977-1990,” in Kumar Rupesinghe and Khawar Mumtaz (eds.), Internal Conflicts in South Asia (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1996), pp.102-3

56. Akmal Hussain, “The Crisis of State Power in Pakistan: Militarization and Dependence,” in Wignaraja and Hussain (eds.), Op.Cit., p.231.

57. Sobhan, Bangladesh: Problems of Governance, Op.Cit., p.14.

58. The Sri Lankan army has been Sinhalized by various measures. The creation of a Sinha (Lion) regiment, Sinhala as official language and the use of the terms ‘Vam-Dak’ instead of Left-Right in marches, western band music replaced with Sinhalese folk music, the marginalization of Tamil officers all created a Sinhala atmosphere in the army. See, Newton Gunasinghe, “Community, Identity and Militarization in Sri Lanka: Social Origins of the Armed Forces and Tamil Militants, Sri Lankan Armed Forces,” in Wignaraja and Hussain (eds.), Op.Cit., pp.245-48.

59. Viqar Ahmed and Rashid Amjad, The Management of Pakistan’s Economy 1947-82 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp.77-90.

60. A.J. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka (London: Macmillan, 1974), p.62.

Conflict Patterns and Violent Manifestations

The South Asian subcontinent achieved independence from the colonial power without resorting to large-scale organized violence in their liberation struggles. The attainment of independent statehood was accompanied by the partition of the subcontinent, the consequences of which were violence perpetrated by Hindus and Muslims against each other. The violence that accompanied the birth of the two states of Pakistan and India, was to become a part of political life and civil society of all thestates in the subcontinent.

There was relative absence of violence for the first two decades after independence. Though there was instability, regional dissidence, communal riots, etc, all throughout, but these manifestations of certain grievances did not pose a serious threat to either the state structure or the ruling classes. By the late-sixties, however, it seemed as if the whole subcontinent was about to be engulfed by waves of violence, threatening both the states and the regimes.

The emergence of various conflicts and the incapacity of thestates to deal with them signified the failure of the nation-building project and the process of economic development. These two processes were not independent but converged and their effects led to the marginalization and alienation of certain ethnic groups. Further, under the process of modernization, the changing patterns of agrarian and production relations sharpened class inequalities and mobilized social groups like the peasantry and the petty-bourgeoisie. The marginalization of minority ethnic groups and other deprived social classes in the power structure and the uneven distribution of economic resources between groups and classes gave rise to protracted ethnic conflicts on one hand, and class conflicts on the other. Some conflicts were contained, some withered away and some intensified with an increasing use of violence in their articulation of demands.

Before going into an exploration into the causes of violence, it would be pertinent to lay out the patterns of conflict and the way violence has been manifested in them. In this study, we are taking into consideration only two categories of political violence in South Asia — ethnic/tribal or primordial violence and revolutionary or ideological violence.

Ethnic/Tribal or Primordial Violence

All the four states of South Asia under consideration in this study are confronted with ethnic and primordial violence. Ethnic/tribal and primordial violence can be further sub-divided into secessionist and separatist violence.

Ethnic/Tribal and Secessionist Violence

A high intensity of ethnic violence in South Asia is due to secessionist goals or movements. India, the largest state in the region is confronted with the largest number of secessionist movements.

North-East India

The north-eastern region of India was to be in ferment since the mid-sixties. The Nagas were the first to revolt followed by the Mizos in 1966, the Tripuris in 1978 and the Assamese in 1979. The genesis of ethnic violence in Tripura, a tribal majority territory, lies in the massive influx of settlers from East Pakistan and later Bangladesh as well as other parts of India, thus, upsetting the socio-economic pattern in the state and increasing pressure on land. Due to the demographic transition arising out of the partition of the subcontinent millions of Bengali Hindus migrated from East Pakistan to Tripura reducing the indigenous tribes to minorities. Migration allowed the Bengali Hindus socio-economic dominance. The influx of Bengalis from East Pakistan had been on such a large scale so as to turn Tripura, a tribal majority territory into one in which the tribal population had been reduced to a minority. This resulted in a sharp decline in the tribal population of the state and large areas of cultivable land were passed on to the refugees. The disturbance in the demographic equilibrium, land alienation supplemented by economic exploitation, and a strong tribal identity led to militancy in Tripura. The severe eruption of violence in 1980 was due to the resulting sense of deprivation, political and economic and the realization by tribals, as the years passed that no redress could be had for their deep-seated grievances by lawful means. The violence unleashed by the Tripuris primarily targeted the Bengali settlers and selective killings of non-tribals were designed to trigger off an exodus, a form of ethnic cleansing.

Even though Assam was faced with a similar set of grievances, secessionist demands took a long time to emerge. The initial problem in Assam revolved around a set of deeply perceived disadvantages. It was a concern that persisting underdevelopment was due to the intrusion of outsiders and the unresponsiveness of the central authority. The migrants who settled in Assam monopolized or dominated virtually all new opportunities for resource exploitation or for jobs in the modern sectors of the economy and in government service.1 The migrations were so large as to threaten to transform the indigenous Assamese Hindu population into a minority.2

These grievances were mobilized by the All Assam Students Union (AASU) and the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP). The AASU and the AGP also signed an accord known as the Assam accord with the central government in regard to deportation of refugees.3 It was the failure of the AGP and the central government to implement the Assam accord and revise the electoral rolls that resulted in the emergence of a group called the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) in 1979. The ULFA expressed its loss of faith in both the AGP and the central government by demanding secession from India and launching a violent movement to achieve its aim. By 1990, the ULFA was at the peak of its power and had a highly effective system of levying taxes and also organized community work, at times by coercing people.4 The Indian government’s military action was able to immobilize ULFA by early 1992. Simultaneously, a section of the leadership decided to hold talks with the government. This resulted in a split in the organization and while some of its cadres have been rehabilitated, its hardcore members have managed to take shelter in Bangladesh.

Punjab

The roots of the ethnic violence in Punjab can be traced to a moderate movement for greater

autonomy spearheaded by the Akali Dal under the Anandpur Sahib resolution of 1973. This resolution called for the devolution of power to the states and the implementation of a proper federal structure in which the power of the central government would be restricted to such items as defence, foreign policy, currency and communications. Later, the Akali Dal entered into an alliance with the Janata party and Communist Party of India (Marxist), and emerged as the dominant party in the 1977 assembly and general elections. The Congress used Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a militant and communally inclined Sikh leader to undermine the moderate Akali leadership. In 1978, an organization called the Dal Khalsa was formed under the leadership of Bhindranwale.5 The Dal Khalsa along with a student organization called the All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF), were believed to be behind large-scale violence against Hindus which started by the end of 1983. By this time, the Sikhs demand for autonomy had taken secessionist overtones and a violent form. The Anandpur Sahib resolution also talked of Sikh nationhood and this was interpreted by the armed militants and some Akali groups as justification for an independent state of Khalistan. Bhindranwale’s followers acquired sophisticated weapons from abroad and launched a violent campaign.

Finally in June 1984, the central government launched an assault on the Golden Temple where Sikh extremists had sought sanctuary. Anti-Sikh riots in different parts of the country following Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s assassination by her Sikh bodyguards in October 1984, further fuelled violence in Punjab. Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi signed an accord with Sant Longowal in 1985 to resolve some of the outstanding issues, but it failed to end violence in the state.6 The government managed to restore the political process in March 1992 and thereafter by strong counter-insurgency measures was able to contain violence by early 1993.

Kashmir

After Kashmir’s accession to India, it was given a special status under Article 370 of the Indian constitution. The determination of Sheikh Abdullah, the popular leader of the National Conference (NC), was instrumental in an understanding being reached on the issue of Kashmir’s accession to India despite existent aspirations for a separate state at that time. But his imprisonment in 1953 and later his demise in 1982 completely changed the political course in Kashmir.

Over the past five decades, New Delhi has progressively curtailed the powers and scope of Article 370 by extending most of the provisions of the Indian constitution to that state. Successive Congress governments in New Delhi, right from Jawaharlal Nehru to P.V. Narasimha Rao, have been inclined to go along with a diluted Article 370, as long as the state governments in Jammu and Kashmir were loyal to the Indian Union and did not question the legitimacy of its accession to India. Often the centre adopted both fair and foul methods to this end, including the rigging of elections, dismissal of duly elected governments and appointing state governors of its own choice, even against the wishes of the state government. These lapses on the part of the central leadership, along with corruption and dismal employment prospects for the Kashmiri youth, led to their growing alienation and disenchantment with the policies of New Delhi.

It was against this background, that Rajiv Gandhi and Farooq Abdullah had arrived at an electoral agreement in 1986, whereby an alliance of National Conference and Congress-I was

formed to fight the 1987 elections. This agreement was instrumental in discrediting Farooq Abdullah in the eyes of the Kashmiris. Further, allegations of rigging of the 1987 elections is believed to be the turning point because for the first time, a newly constituted Muslim United Front (MUF), an umbrella organization of several fundamentalist groups and parties, had made a serious bid to capture power through popular vote.7 The election was not only rigged before the eyes of the MUF polling agents, but they were even harassed and beaten.8 Having lost faith in the democratic political process, the disgruntled elements soon took to the path of militancy. Later, it was found by the intelligence agencies that quite a few militants were those young men who were guarding ballot boxes for the MUF candidates during the 1987 elections.9

Following the installation of the National Conference government, violent protests over the issue of unemployment and power shortages took place throughout 1988-89. Central government assistance for the development of the state had been misappropriated by the bureaucrats and political leaders. The failure of the state government to create employment opportunities severely affected the unemployed and the underemployed among the newly educated youth. Due to lack of satisfactory life chances and political opportunities to express their dissatisfactions, coupled with the corrupt behaviour of the state politicians, the Kashmiri youth took up arms.10

By end-1989 and early 1990, the militants were holding sway in the valley and the politicians were getting marginalized. The Kashmiri militants came into limelight through the kidnapping of Rubaiya Sayeed, daughter of the then Union Home Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, himself a Kashmiri Muslim, in December 1989 by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). Prime Minister V.P. Singh gave in to the JKLF’s demands for the release of five militants. The victory of the militants was widely celebrated in the valley. The National Front government sent Jagmohan as the Governor to bring the deteriorating situation under control. Farooq Abdullah resigned in protest and President’s rule was imposed. This unleashed a wave of militant violence in the valley and the government responded with strong retaliatory measures by deploying para-military forces.

East Pakistan

Even though the Bengalis of East Pakistan decided to go with Pakistan because of a common religion — Islam, the assertion of a separate Bengali identity started taking shape in February 1952 with the launching of an agitation for adoption of Bengali as a national language. By late 1960s, the demand for regional autonomy had taken strong roots and Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman, leader of the Awami League, presented a Six Point Demand in 1966 at an All-Party Convention in Lahore. A significant demand was for a truly federal form of government, wherein the central government should only control defence and foreign affairs, and separate currencies to be instituted for both wings. This was considered as being too radical by the ruling regime in Pakistan and as a threat to its nationhood. By March 1969, the Bengali agitation had gained momentum and in the national elections held on 7 December 1970, the Awami League won with an absolute majority. The Yahya Khan regime not only took measures to inhibit Mujib from forming a government but also launched a massive crackdown on the Bengali civilian population in March 1971. Soon an armed resistance built up that was jointly organized by the Bengali military, para-military and police personnel. On 4 April 1971, the Mukti Bahini, a guerrilla force, was set up in order to ensure more effective resistance to the Pakistan army and to mobilize

political support. The guerrilla resistance held on till 7 December 1971, when India intervened militarily and the defeat of Pakistan in the ensuing war culminated in the secession of East Pakistan from Pakistan.

Baluchistan

The Baluch tribes had revolted against the Pakistan state when they were forcibly incorporated on 27 March 1948.11 Though the movement in Baluchistan had died down after the initial armed revolt, however, resistance continued from significant pockets. Throughout the 1960s the Baluch mountains were the scene of considerable guerrilla activity. In 1967-68, Bugti guerrillas and the Pakistan army engaged in a series of bloody skirmishes. In May 1968, Nawab Akbar Bugti was sentenced to death under the Defence of Pakistan Rules. Although Bugti was later pardoned, around 200 Baluch leaders were kept imprisoned in Quetta, Kalat and Karachi on rebellion charges, between 1962 and 1969.

The Baluch tribal leaders were unable to forge unity to assert provincial autonomy for a fairly long period of time. Baluch nationalism, however, later found expression through the National Awami Party (NAP), formed in 1957 under the leadership of Wali Khan, and was pledged to the principle of provincial autonomy. In the elections of 1970, the NAP along with the Jamaat-Ulema-i-Islami (JUI) scored an impressive victory and formed a NAP-JUI coalition government with two Baluch nationalists, Mir Ghaus Bizenjo and Ataullah Khan Mengal being installed as Governor and Chief Minister respectively. The provincial government’s demand for a greater share in the national resources of the province and allocation of industries led to friction with the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)-dominated centre.12 Consequently, the provincial government was dissolved in 1973, the NAP leaders arrested and the party banned for anti-national activities.13

While the NAP was banned and its leadership in jail, the militant sections got an upperhand and led by the Baluch People’s Liberation Front (BPLF) and Baluch Students Organization (BSO) at a later stage, they carried out an insurgency for the next four years, from 1973-77. The BPLF, after its formation in 1976, declared liberation of all nationalities in Pakistan as its prime objective. Subsequently, it stressed on an independent Baluchistan and by 1980, it was demanding for a ‘Greater Baluchistan’, comprising the areas in Iran and Afghanistan inhabited by the Baluchis.14

Since the 1980s, Baluch separatism has tempered down to demands for greater provincial autonomy. This has also been partly due to a realization that success over a far superior Pakistan army through guerrilla struggle in Baluchistan seems a remote possibility. The tiny population of about five per cent of Pakistan is not large and well equipped to succeed against a huge modern army. The subdued nature of the Baluch movement is also due to certain external and internal developments. The Afghan crisis and the toppling of the Shah of Iran have enhanced the geo-political significance of Baluchistan. The refugee influx due to the Afghan crisis has also had a severe impact on Baluchistan. The province has the highest number of refugees mostly Pushtuns, which has altered the ethnic balance in the Province. During the 1990s, the support for an independent Baluchistan has been further eroded by the demands of Pathans settled there, for the division of Baluchistan along ethnic lines.

Ethnic Violence in Sri Lanka

The origins of ethnic violence in Sri Lanka may be traced to the historical perceptions of the Sinhala and Tamil communities vis-a-vis each other. The conflict got exacerbated after independence due to the state’s intransigence in accommodating Tamil aspirations. Government policies over the issues of language, land colonization, standardization policy leading to inadequate access for Tamils to university admissions and consequent shrinking in employment prospects, constitutional guarantees to Buddhism and preservation of the unitary constitution in 1972, created a feeling of alienation among the Tamils. By mid-1970s, the demands for affirmative discrimination and autonomy had taken the form of a demand for secession, due to the reluctance of the state to concede to the legitimate aspirations of the Tamils. While the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), a moderate Tamil party, was demanding a separate state and using parliamentary methods towards achieving this objective, the militant groups took up arms for this cause. It was the failure of the moderate Tamil leadership to get concessions from the Sinhala leadership and the clandestine support and backing they received from India in the initial years,15 due to which the Tamil militants have occupied the political space in the ethnic conflict since the late 1970s till today. Armed skirmishes between the militant groups and the security forces continued till 1983, when it flared up due to the killing of 13 soldiers in the north by the LTTE. This was followed by the ethnic riots of July 1983, which only strengthened the resolve of the militants.

The United National Party (UNP) did initiate some steps to evolve a consensus on a solution acceptable to all groups, but it did not make much headway. In 1984, at an All Parties Conference, a consensus on the principle of devolution emerged but there was no common understanding about the form and substance of devolution. By this time, the militants had started operating from Indian soil. With the help of India’s mediatory efforts, the government evolved a set of proposals for Provincial Councils in December 1986, which was rejected by the Tamil militants. The LTTE threatened to take over the civil administration in the north-east on 1 January 1987. Subsequently, Indian mediation between the militants and President Jayewardene’s government in Colombo resulted in the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord on 28 July 1987, which stipulated the acceptance of Provincial Councils and the Tamil militants laying down arms to an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). Though most of the militant groups laid down their arms, the LTTE was not willing to either give up their arms or their secessionist goal and soon rejected the accord. In October 1987, the LTTE and IPKF came into direct confrontation over the issue of capture of seventeen LTTE cadres by the Sri Lankan army and their subsequent death by committing suicide. The confrontation between the LTTE and the IPKF continued till March 1990, when the latter was withdrawn by the Indian government in response to President Premadasa’s demand. The LTTE and Premadasa government resumed negotiations but once again, it broke down.

There was renewed hope with the coming to power of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga in August 1994. She announced a devolution package in August 1995. Though the devolution package proposes a fair amount of autonomy to the Tamils, it has not been acceptable to the LTTE. Substantial discussions have not taken place on the proposals and the government in its counter-offensive have significantly weakened the LTTE militarily. It no longer retains control

over Jaffna and has shifted base to the Eastern provinces.

Ethnic/Tribal and Separatist Violence

The Muhajirs

The Muhajirs who had formed the backbone in the struggle for the creation of Pakistan had traditionally supported the Jamaat-i-islami after the decline of the Muslim League. The emergence of an organization to represent Muhajir interests came about in a leadership vacuum after the Jamaat had closely aligned with the ruling establishment dominated by Punjabis and Pathans during General Zia’s period.

The origins of the Muhajir Quami Mahaj (MQM) is traced to a student organization called the All Pakistan Muhajir Student Organization (APMSO) formed in June 1978 by some lower middle class Muhajir student activists. One of the main demands of the APMSO was for a revision of a federal quota which had seriously restricted the job prospects of urban Sindhis, i.e. primarily Muhajirs. In 1984, General Zia banned student organizations because of which the APMSO had to take a new appearance. Altaf Hussain founded the MQM out of this Muhajir student movement in March 1984.

The rise and growth of the MQM has taken place in an atmosphere of ethnic riots and violence. Organizationally the party remained small till severe ethnic rioting took place in 1985-86. The first Muhajir Pathan riot took place in May 1985 following a minivan accident in which a Muhajir girl was killed. In the second instance, in November-December 1986 Muhajirs were targeted by Pathans following a raid by the army on Sohrab Goth to smash a heroin processing and distribution centre allegedly run by the Pathans. The rioting which followed spread to Hyderabad as well. These incidents were instrumental in the rise of the popularity of the MQM.

In early 1987, Altaf Hussain issued a charter of resolutions. It is believed that it was here that Hussain introduced the idea that the Muhajirs be treated as a fifth nationality. The MQM first tested its electoral strength in the local body elections in 1987 in Karachi and Hyderabad and won majorities. In November 1988, in the general elections the MQM won 13 seats in the national assembly and 24 in the provincial out of 100, dominating all the Urban Sindh seats. Since then the MQM has followed a strategy of helping minority parties to form governments in return for concessions. After the 1988 elections, the MQM reached an agreement with the PPP to help it form the government and signed a declaration with it. This understanding was shortlived. In October 1989 the MQM abrogated the accord. Relations between the Sindhis and Muhajirs deteriorated and in 1990 hundreds of people were killed in clashes between the students wing of the MQM and the PPP. In the October 1990 general elections, the MQM came to an understanding with the IJI and following a seat sharing arrangement dominated the urban areas. In the provincial assembly it won 28 seats and in the national assembly 15. By 1991, the MQM had established a virtual monopoly over representation of the Urdu-speaking community in urban Sindh.

The understanding with the IJI also did not last long. In June 1992 the army launched what is known as a Operation Cleanup against dacoits and criminal elements in rural Sindh but

apparently the target was also the MQM.16 This led to a prolonged confrontation in which an urban guerrilla warfare was fought in the streets and lanes of Karachi. The military operation ended their parliamentary phase and the MQM parted ways with the IJI in June 1992. A split within the MQM was engineered in 1992 and another group claiming to be the real MQM came into existence called the MQM (Haqqiqi). Since then severe armed clashes have taken place between these two groups.

In 1993, the MQM boycotted the national elections but in the provincial assembly it won 26 seats. In the February 1997 elections it repeated its performance in urban Sindh, and won 12 seats in the national assembly and 28 seats in the provincial assembly, and reached a secret agreement with the PML (N) to form a coalition government.17

Chakmas

Bangladesh, one of the most homogeneous states in the region, is also confronted with ethnic violence and separatism. The Chakma’s, residing in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), demand for autonomy and subsequent resort to armed struggle was largely due to policies followed since the 1950s, when Bangladesh was still part of Pakistan, due to which the tribal people were affected by government initiated internal migration and development projects. The autonomy of the CHT region was eroded by the Pakistan government since 1955, and increasingly the administration of the region earlier managed by the tribals themselves came under the control of the non-tribals.18 In 1964, as a result of a constitutional amendment, the CHT also lost its status as an excluded area.

The alienation and disenchantment of the tribal people was further exacerbated after the emergence of Bangladesh as a new state. On 15 February 1972, a delegation led by Manabendra Narayan Larma, an independent Member of Parliament (MP) at that time, met Mujib to put forward four demands of the CHT people. These were: (1) autonomy of the CHT with its own legislature; (2) retention of the 1900 regulations in the Bangladesh constitution; (3) continuation of the Tribal Chiefs office, and (4) constitutional provisions restricting the amendment of the regulation and imposition of a ban on the influx of non-tribal people.

Sheikh Mujib agreed that the region was backward and needed development to bring it upto the level of the other areas of Bangladesh. But he refused to recognize the distinct ethnic identity of the CHT people and ruled out any form of provincial autonomy as that would run counter to his idea of a unitary political system for Bangladesh. In fact, he felt that these kinds of demands would encourage ethnic feelings. Mujib’s advocacy of Bengali nationalism and his cultural assimilationist policies were an alienating factor for the Chakmas. Though M.N Larma was only demanding that the CHT should be made an autonomous region, this was, however, interpreted as secessionist and challenging Bengali nationalism. Hence, the demands were not only outrightly rejected, but also massive military deployment took place in the CHT. A few days after M.N Larma met Mujib, the police and army attacked villages in the tribal areas and the Air Force using jet aircraft carried strafing raids on tribals.19

After the meeting with Sheikh Mujib in February 1972, M.N Larma and his younger brother Jyotindra Bodhipriya Larma20 established theParbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati

Samity (PCJSS - Chittagong Hill Tracts United People’s Party) as a broad-based mass organization. It also had an armed wing called the Shanti Bahini (SB). The SB was able to develop into a powerful guerrilla force without any initial foreign support. The first signs of an impending insurgency were to emerge soon after Bangladesh switched over to a one party presidential form of government in January 1975. M.N Larma who was an M.P at that time, went underground. After Sheikh Mujib’s assassination M.N Larma along with most of the top-ranking leaders shifted to India and launched sporadic attacks.

The Chakmas still maintained contact with the government and the two most important demands of the Chakmas among other demands, placed before Ziaur Rahman in 1976, was self-determination with a separate legislature and a total ban on further settlements, dismantling of existing ones, and transfer of land ownership to the tribal people. The government of Ziaur Rahman rejected the demand for a separate legislature which almost amounted to a demand for a separate state. However, it tried to win over the CHT people by accelerating the process of economic development in their areas and by reserving seats for tribal students in Universities and other educational institutions.21

Ziaur Rahman was willing to look into the developmental needs of the tribals, but at the same time he was not averse to the idea of using force. He also followed a policy of colonization which was called a mass rehabilitation programme. This policy encouraged the people from the overcrowded centre of Bangladesh from Comilla, Kaokhali and Mymensingh districts to move into the hill tracts areas granting them land and agricultural inputs.22 Such policies gave the feeling to the tribals that the government was deliberately inclined to marginalize them in their own land.

There were differences within the PCJSS on the goals and the course of action to be followed in the struggle. One faction wanted to declare independence and launch an all out attack on Bangladeshi forces. M.N Larma’s more limited goal was to force Dhaka into negotiations leading to a settlement that protected tribal interests. The PCJSS was thus divided along the lines of the autonomist-vs-secessionist.

The demands of the PCJSS have been modified which includes regional autonomy for the CHT with its own regional council guaranteed by the Bangladesh constitution, restoration of land rights of the ethnic hill people over the entire territorial area of the CHT, ban on settlement of people from the plains, withdrawal of all Bangladesh armed forces from the CHT, constitutional recognition of the hill people’s ethnic identity, and withdrawal of settlers of the plains land from the CHT since August 1947.23 The Chakma leadership has found it difficult to make the Bangladesh government listen to even these demands.

Various rounds of peace talks have been held so far since 1992, when a ceasefire was declared by the insurgents24 and which still holds till today, but the Bangladesh government has not yielded to any of the core demands. The negotiation process is still on with the Awami League government showing a greater willingness to talk with the insurgents. But there has been no let down in the violence and the Shanti Bahini still carries on with its guerrilla activities.

Revolutionary or Ideological Violence

The two major anti-systemic movements in South Asia — the Naxalites or the Maoists in India and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in Sri Lanka — apart from their ideological persuasions also had strong underlying economic causes. The Naxalite insurgency was a result of disadvantageous land tenure policies which had affected the peasantry seriously and due to land alienation among the tribals. The JVP insurgency in Sri Lanka can be explained in terms of relative deprivation — as a revolution of rising expectations. The sense of deprivation and grievances of the youth, unemployed and underemployed was mobilized against the Sri Lankan state.

Naxalites

In India, the Naxalite insurgency began in May 1967 with a peasant revolt in Naxalbari, West Bengal. The revolt was led by local Communist cadres, who subsequently broke away or were expelled from the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in 1969. These communists who came together to form the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar and Kanu Sanyal, were dissatisfied with the CPI(M). They believed that the CPI(M) had lost its revolutionary fervour and had aligned with bourgeois forces while adopting the line of parliamentary struggle.

Ideologically, the CPI(ML) believed that the Chinese model of guerrilla warfare and liberated zones would work in India as well. Their concept of armed struggle was primarily based on a premise that as soon as they organize and start an armed struggle, the people of India would rise up in revolt. This was to be done by the annihilation of the class enemy. The primary objective of the annihilation campaign was to smash the feudal authority in the villages and to replace it with the authority of the peasants.25

The tribals and students formed the backbone of the Naxalite cadres. The students from Calcutta, Andhra Pradesh and Delhi played an important role in the Naxalite movement in Bihar and Punjab. The annihilation strategy was applied in Calcutta in July 1970. But by adopting this tactic, the movement lost its support among the peasants and acted more like an urban terrorist movement by concentrating on annihilating police, moneylenders, businessmen and political enemies in the CPI(M).26

Subsequently, the annihilation theory raised a controversy within the organization on the question of the same tactics being applied to all parts of India. This debate led to a split in the organization in the summer of 1971. A break-away group, led by Ashim Chatterjee, favoured a return to mass struggles to distribute land and crops, and to fight police and paramilitary forces in the countryside. Though the Naxalbari uprising was crushed by mid-1969, groups of Naxalites were organized in at least eight Indian states.

But since Charu Mazumdar’s death in July 1972, the movement has faced a series of splits. At present, there are at least forty Naxalite factions. Among these, the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in Bihar and the People’s War Group (PWG) in Andhra Pradesh, formed in 1975 by Kondapalli Seetharamaih, still adhere to the concept of annihilation of class enemies though they

have combined armed struggle with mass front activities as well.27

The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna

The JVP as a movement emerged due to the socio-economic crisis of the 1960s and the political weakness of the established left parties.28 It originated as a result of a split in the pro-Chinese Communist party of Sri Lanka. As the established left parties were absorbed completely in the parliamentary process and power sharing, their appeal as revolutionary parties to the radical youth waned. The dissatisfaction with the traditional left was due to various reasons. The significant among them were - their support base was limited only to the urban working class and the peasantry was largely neglected by the left parties.29 Rohana Wijeweera, founder-leader of the JVP, was able to take a sizeable section of the youth with him when he left the Communist party.

In April 1971, in a swift attempt to takeover the state apparatus, it launched an insurrection. The government of Ms. Srimavo Bandaranaike was, however, able to suppress this attempt with considerable support from external sources including India. The JVP was proscribed and most of the insurgents incarcerated. With a change of government in 1977, the new President Jayewardene of the UNP offered amnesty to most of the insurgents including its chief Wijeweera. In 1977, Wijeweera gave an assurance to the President that they would function within the parliamentary framework. He also professed that theJVP would not use violence in its future course of actions. In 1983, following the anti-Tamil riots the JVP was again proscribed on trumped-up charges of complicity in the riots. Soon there were stray and sporadic acts of subversion. After the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord these were to become more widespread and organized. The strategy now seem to have changed from the earlier one and a protracted guerrilla warfare was waged for almost two years. With the capture and elimination of Wijeweera and some of the other leaders, the efforts of the JVP came to a standstill.

Integrating Violence into a Strategy

In the case of all the above mentioned conflicts, violence of a high degree has been employed as a part of a strategy at some point of time or at the initial stages itself. The use of violence, or the felt need to use violence, of course, has differed according to the objectives of the movements — the objectives being demands for autonomy or secession or capture of state power itself. While in the case of the Naxalites and the JVP, violence was integrated into their ideologies, the same has not been the case with the ethnic conflicts, most of which have evolved from autonomist to secessionist movements. Some autonomy movements like the Chakmas and the MQM have made a predominant use of violence as an essential ingredient of the bargaining process with their respective states.

But the question that needs to be addressed is to what extent have all these movements been able to integrate violence into their strategies? Because violence without a carefully thought out strategy cannot bring success in achieving any objectives. In order to be successful, violence has to be effectively and systematically integrated into a strategy. Surprisingly, few of the movements in South Asia have displayed any understanding of the effective use of violence in their strategy to either secede or capture the state by means of an armed struggle. Atleast, the

tactics of the autonomist movements, which have employed violence seem to have been more effective. All the secessionists movements seem to be based on a premise that once violence is introduced into a conflict situation and if the movement has the capacity to sustain and intensify the levels of violence, the states would inevitably capitulate. Ironically, the states seem to be also following this premise in wearing out most of the secessionist insurgencies and ruthlessly suppressing the anti-systemic insurgencies.

Therefore, most secessionist insurgencies in South Asia have not succeeded. All the secessionist insurgencies have relied predominantly on guerrilla warfare and use this method both in jungles and urban areas depending upon the terrain they are operating from. Generally, their strategy includes hit and run tactics with the intention of weakening the resolve of the administration. This is carried out by attacking security personnel and assassinating political leaders and high level government officials opposed to the movement. The hilly terrain in Baluchistan, Kashmir, the CHT and the jungles in north-eastern India and Sri Lanka provide ideal conditions for waging guerrilla warfare.

The insurgents in north-east India, because of its hilly and jungle terrain, have relied on classical guerrilla warfare methods. But since the induction of the army in 1956, it has not been very effective. However, reasons for its sustenance are inaccessibility of their jungle hideouts and the local support they enjoy. None of the insurgent groups have been able to create liberated zones. The ULFA, to certain extent, was able to challenge the administration by being able to levy and collect taxes. But strong counter-insurgency measures have undermined this network, even though there are some signs of revival.

The Sikh militants have been the weakest in terms of a strategy. First, they did not enjoy enough local support, as the population in Punjab is almost equally divided between Sikhs and Hindus. Therefore, they relied on subversion and planned acts of terrorism. By these methods, they were fairly successful in carrying out assassinations and sabotage and undermining the political process.30

The Kashmiri militants predominantly use urban guerrilla warfare because of the support they enjoy among the local population. This support not only provides them with operational flexibility but they have also used it tactically. There were some efforts to create liberated areas in the rural areas like Kupwara, Baramulla and Badgam. Perhaps their strategy was to draw the army out to larger areas where they might be vulnerable. However, all through out the insurgency, the security forces have continued to maintain a military edge over the militants in the valley.

The Shanti Bahini followed the essential principles of Maoist guerrilla warfare by conducting hit-and-run raids against the security forces, always choosing the ground of battle and avoiding confrontation if the time and terrain of the battle were unfavourable.31 Initially, the insurgent activities of the Shanti Bahini gained ground. The hills, valleys and dense vegetation of the tropical rainforests offer ideal terrain for low-to-medium intensity guerrilla warfare.The ability of the guerrillas to fight on the hilly, jungle terrain on their own terms was much higher than the security forces. Their ambushes were well planned and executed with a high level of efficiency. The guerrillas morale was also much higher than that of the security forces. And for a while it

was able to create a parallel administration in the district.32 Since January 1994 there has been a realization by the Shanti Bahini that an armed struggle with the Bangladesh government would prove futile.33

The most successful among the secessionist groups have been the Tamil militants in Sri Lanka. By using guerrilla warfare and terrorist acts they have posed a tough challenge to the Sri Lankan security forces. Since 1983, the Sri Lankan forces gradually lost control over the Jaffna peninsula and with the collapse of the civil administration, the militants were able to create liberated zones and run a parallel administration.34 By 1986, the LTTE controlled the entire Jaffna peninsula and parts of Vavuniya, Mullaitivu and Mannar districts. In order to contest the authority of the state and create a parallel administration, they also carried out certain symbolic acts such as recruiting police personnel to man traffic,35 open a bank,36 etc.

The strategy of the LTTE in its confrontation with the IPKF had two aspects. One was to wear down the IPKF militarily, psychologically and morally.37 It followed the principle of least resistance, withdrawing most of the time and trading space for time. By making innovative use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), it was able to inflict massive casualties on the IPKF. The nature of these explosives was a major factor in bringing down the morale of the soldiers. In urban warfare, like the Kashmiri militants, they used the civilians as a protective shield to fire at the IPKF and then, disappear into the crowds. By these methods, it was able to contain the IPKF militarily for about one and a half years. At the political level, its strategy was to prevent the restoration of the political and electoral process.38 Even after the elections had taken place, it tried hard to undermine the same both through military strikes, as well as by holding negotiations with President Premadasa.

Since 1989, the LTTE’s strategy had been to hold on to the Jaffna peninsula and run its own civil administration. It defended the peninsula by conventional means39 as well as guerrilla warfare. By effective use of landmines and boobytraps, the LTTE managed to keep the security forces confined to the camps. Occasionally, it made lightening attacks against the army camps and inflicted massive casualties, as in the case of the Pooneryn camp in the later part of 1993. At present, it is considerably weakened having lost control over the Jaffna peninsula since the end of 1995. It seems highly unlikely, inspite of the motivation and resolve, that the LTTE would be able to achieve its goal of a separate state by means of violence.

Secession of East Pakistan in 1971 was the only exception which came about due to a very different set of factors. The insurgency in East Pakistan was a combination of conventional military strategy and guerrilla warfare. In the early stages of the insurgency, conventional warfare failed and that is why in May 1971, the operational strategy was changed from regular to guerrilla warfare. However, the core of the guerrilla army still comprised professional military personnel, who were also responsible for raising a ‘people’s militia’ drawn from the peasantry. Besides the regular armed forces, many civilians, on their own initiative, organized guerrilla resistance groups. All such groups were based locally and on most occasions, acted in isolation, with little coordination with the Mukti Bahini. By hit and run operations, elimination of collaborators, destroying the enemy’s communication links, the insurgents succeeded in undermining the morale of the Pakistan army. Gradually, by June-July 1971, the guerrilla resistance was operating from four sectors. By this method, it forced the Pakistani troops to

deploy over a large area. Thus, when the Indian army intervened, it managed to override the Pakistan army in a short and swift action.40

While the anti-systemic insurgencies like the Naxalites and the JVP have failed, they were able to notionally develop a model of insurgent strategy. Strategically, the Naxalites followed the Chinese line on armed struggle, during the initial stages. It was to be based on the peasants establishing base areas in the countryside, promoting a country-wide guerrilla campaign and then using the countryside to encircle the cities. Where it significantly differed from Mao’s strategy was on its tactics of annihilation of the class enemy. While Mao had stressed mass mobilization before any guerrilla action, the Naxalite leaders believed that mass mobilization could follow once the feudal authority in the villages was smashed.41 The government machinery in these areas did not function and the peasants along with the CPI(ML) cadres ran the administration. They arbitrated in disputes and took over land and redistributed it among the poor landless peasants.42

The undoing of this strategy came about when it was extended to the urban areas in July 1970.43 While in the villages it was the annihilation of the feudal landlords, in the urban areas this campaign was to target policemen, military personnel, big capitalists and black marketeers. This did not create the power vacuum it was supposed to have done. After the collapse of the Srikakulum movement, the influence of the Naxalites remained only in Calcutta city. The party was in complete disarray and began splintering due to its tactical line.

The JVP was the only organization that had probably imaginatively and innovatively integrated violence in their strategy to capture power, It was convinced that power could not be captured without a successful armed revolution. The path a revolution takes place in a country under certain conditions was bound to differ from another country. Though Wijeweera said that violence is not essential, it was unavoidable in a revolution. Revolution could not be brought about by a democratic process or by peaceful means.44

The JVP developed a thesis that a swift and short armed insurrection, and not guerrillawarfare, was the appropriate form of revolutionary struggle in Sri Lanka in its formative stages. This developed partly from an analysis of thegeographical and demographic structure of the island — asmall densely populated area with a relatively weak security force.45 Therefore, in Sri Lanka, the revolution should start both in the city and villages simultaneously, aiming at the seizure of power through a sudden and very short sharp attack throughout the country. He was convinced that due to the small size of the island, it was possible to capture power in “a single blow”.46 Wijeweera’s plan was that at an opportune moment, the JVP would rise on the same day and at every place where it had a following. It was a plan to be executed with lightning speed, and all institutions of state power captured before the state could take effective counter?measures. In line with this strategy, in April 1971, in a swift attempt to takeover the state apparatus, it launched an insurrection. The government of Ms. Srimavo Bandaranaike was, however, able to suppress this attempt with considerable support from external sources.

In its second attempt to capture power, the strategy of the JVP seems to have been much more complex, probably taking into consideration the altered ground situation. The strategy adopted during the 1971 insurrection was a straight forward strategy of trying to capture the state in a

single blow. The strategy during the latter period was a protracted long drawn?out affair. In the short?term, the effort was to weaken the civil administration, cripple the economy and enforce hardship on the common man. This model may be conceptualized as a model of ‘sectoral paralysis’, whereby the economy and civil administration were paralyzed sector-wise, prior to the final takeover of state power. In the long term, it was hoped to generate sufficient public support, and as a result of the above factors, the people were expected to rise in a mass uprising against the state and bring about a systemic change. In this approach, the JVP had considered using a coalition of the parliamentary opposition as a popular front to ride to power.47 This projection, however, never worked out.


1. Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic conflict in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp.94-95.

2. Myron Weiner estimates that more than six and a half million migrants entered and settled in Assam. Refer, ibid., pp.80-81.

3. Under the terms of the accord, migrants who had come to the state between 1966 and 1971 were to be disenfranchised and those who had come after 1971 from Bangladesh were to be deported. For details see, P.S. Datta, Ethnic Peace Accords in India (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1995), pp.34-40.

4. The ULFA was successful in carrying out these activities because of its widespread support among villagers, the urban middle class and Assamese students. Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist: Tales of War and Peace from India’s Northeast (New Delhi: Viking Publishers, 1994), p.175.

5. For a detailed analysis about how Bhindranwale was promoted to keep the Akali Dal in check and also used in the internal rivalries within the Congress Party, see, Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991), pp.167-219.

6. For details of the accord see, Datta, Op. Cit., pp.190-193.

7. Within the valley, the Congress and the National Conference were totally discredited and in all probability, elections were rigged to prevent the MUF from demonstrating its strength. See, Paul Brass, The Politics of India Since Independence (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.221. On the other hand, it is suggested that notwithstanding its mobilization and consolidation in ranks, MUF could not win more than five seats and consequently it alleged mass rigging by the alliance. The allegations were so forceful that it managed to convince the public at large that the alliance had resorted to rigging. See, Riyaz Punjabi, “Kashmir: The Bruised Identity,” in Raju G.C. Thomas (ed.), Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p.148. But there is unanimous consensus of opinion that this election was the turning point in the rise of militancy in the valley. See, M.K. Tikku, “Kashmir: Genesis of the Problem”, Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 13 August 1991.

8. Anuradha Dutt, “Can Jagmohan Save Kashmir,” Illustrated Weekly of India (Bombay), 4-10 February 1990, p.15.

9. Shekhar Gupta, “Kashmir Valley: Militant Siege”, India Today, 31 January 1990, p.28. Some researchers have also confirmed this fact on the basis of their field studies. Ashutosh Varshney writes, “Some of those candidates (MUF candidates who were beaten up) crossed the ever porous Indo-Pak border and joined the extremist groups. The leadership of the insurgency two years later, would come from some of these contestants”. He adds that “Some have become area commanders of the various militant groups. Their names are widely known but for reasons of safety can not be revealed....” See his article, “Three Compromised Nationalisms: Why Kashmir Has Been a Problem,” in Raju Thomas, Op. Cit, pp.220, 233.

10. The former Governor of Kashmir, Jagmohan believes that it was due to these factors that “fundamentalists, pro-Pakistan elements and terrorists”, aided and abetted by Pakistan came to hold sway over the minds of Kashmiris. See, Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1991), pp. 13 and 112.

11. S. Mahmud Ali, The Fearful State: Power, People and Internal War in South Asia (London: Zed Books, 1993), p.137.

12. The insecurity engendered by theevents of 1971 that led to Pakistan’s dismemberment were at the heart of the events that followed. Ibid., p.143.

13. Satish Kumar, The New Pakistan (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1978), pp.157-215. Tensions between the Baluch government and the centre had exploded on 12 February 1973 over the discovery of a cache of arms from the residence of the Iraqi military attache in Islamabad that were allegedly meant for Baluch separatists. Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981), p.35.

14. Harrison, ibid., pp.72-87.

15.M.R. Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas, (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1984), pp.97, 174.

16. The operation lasted till November 1994.

17. For excerpts from the secret agreement see, Herald, March 1997, p.42. Some of the demands of the MQM are investigating into extra-judicial killings, compensations, withdrawal of the rangers, a census by December 1997, upward revision of urban Sindh’s federal quota from 7.5 to 11.5 per cent and repatriation of the stranded Biharis from Bangladesh.

18. The autonomy of the CHT was continued by the Pakistanis possibly to deny the Bengalis power at the centre. The special status of the CHT was continued both to delink the region from East Pakistan and at the same time to allow the Federal government a direct control over the province. See S. Gowher Rizvi, “Bangladesh: Insurgency in the Hills,” Roundtable, no.305,

January 1988, p.41.

19. Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist: Tales of War and Peace from India’s Northeast (New Delhi: Viking Publishers, 1994), p.278; also see Ali, Op. Cit., p.183.

20. Popularly known as Shantu Larma.

21. Talukder Maniruzzaman, “The Future of Bangladesh,” in A. Jeyaratnam Wilson and Dennis Dalton (eds.), The States of South Asia: Problems of National Integration (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1992), p.270

22. According to some news reports Ziaur Rahman had a plan to settle 20,000 families from each district on the fertile land along the Karnafuli river. The plan was sought to be put into effect in 1978. See, “Tribal Influx to Wreck Indo-Bangla Accord,” Times of India, 1 October 1981.

23. “Tribal Stir not Guided by India: Shantu Larma,” Public Opinion Trends (POT), vol.19, no.163, 20 July 1994, p.650.

24. Its not clear why the Shanti Bahini declared the unilateral ceasefire in 1992 and for what reasons it has continued for five years? While the PCJSS contends that it is essentially to prove its desire to negotiate, government and military officials believe it is a tactical move to reorganize. Personal interviews, Dhaka, December 1996.

25. Biplab Dasgupta, “Naxalite Armed Struggles and The Annihilation Campaign in Rural Areas,” in V. Grover (ed.), Political System in India: Politics of Influence, Violence and Pressure Groups (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1989), pp.233-238.

26. “Urban Guerrillas in Calcutta,” Economic and Political Weekly, vol.6, no.28, 10 July 1971, pp.1379-1382.

27. For details on PWG’s activities, see, R.J.R Prasad, “Naxalite Challenge: The Spreading Violence in Andhra Pradesh,” Frontline(Madras), 3 January 1992; B. Kesava Rao, “On Home Ground: Karimnagar District Run by Naxalites,” Frontline, 3 January 1992; Amarnath K. Menon, “People’s War Group: On the Warpath,” India Today (New Delhi), 28 February 1993; T. Lakshmipathi, “Fear Again: Naxalite Violence in Andhra Pradesh,” Frontline, 17 December 1993; R.J.R. Prasad, “End of the Run: The Arrest of Kondapalli Seetharamaih,” Frontline, 23 April 1993; and M.O. Farook, “Farewell to Arms,” Pioneer (New Delhi), 10 April 1994.

28. J. Uyangoda, “Socio-Economic Roots of Revolt”, Lanka Guardian, vol. 4, no. 3, 15 May 1981, p.17.

29. Politicus,”The April Revolt in Ceylon”, Asian Survey, vol. 12, no. 3, March 1972, p.265.

30. In this regard, one significant tactic of the Sikh insurgents may be noted. During the Legislative Assembly elections of 20 June 1991, the Sikh insurgents made serious attempts to eliminate at least one candidate from as many constituencies as possible. Thus, it was able to

ensure the postponement of elections in these constituencies. Before the elections, they were able to eliminate twenty-three candidates for the Vidhan Sabha. See, Paul Brass, Op., cit., p.197.

31. Subir Bhaumik, Insurgent Cross-Fire: North-East India (New Delhi: Lancer Publisher, 1996), p.275.

32. D. C. Burman, “Regionalism in Bangladesh: The Study of the Chittagong hill Tracts,” in Ramakant (ed.), Regionalism in South Asia(Jaipur: Aalekh Publishers, 1983), pp.125-127.

33. “Pact on Chakmas: Triumph for Bangla,” Telegraph, 25 January 1994.

34. S.H. Venkatramani, “Jaffna: Bearing the Blockade,” India Today, 15 February 1987, p.80-83.

35. The LTTE also opened a school to train motorists in traffic rules. Earlier, the EPRLF had issued postage stamps and postcards. See, Swamy, Op. Cit., pp.209, 225.

36. The LTTE, apparently, had set up a bank in Jaffna. See, “LTTE Opens Bank in Jaffna,” Pioneer, 31 May 1994.

37. S.C. Sardeshpande, Assignment Jaffna (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1992), p.31.

38. Shankar Bhaduri and Afsir Karim, The Sri Lankan Crisis (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1990), p.127.

39. While the LTTE’s strategy against the IPKF was predominantly guerrilla warfare, after the latter’s departure, the LTTE surprised the Sri Lankan forces by adopting conventional military tactics by defending itself with anti-aircraft guns during the course of the OperationBalavegaya. See, Rohan Gunasekera, “A Backward Glance at the Elephant Pass,” The Island (Colombo), 4 August 1991.

40. For details, see, Lawrence Lifschultz, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution (London: Zed Books, 1979), pp.31-88; Talukdar Maniruzzaman, Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath (Dhaka: Bangladesh Books International, 1980), pp.111-115; and K.M. Saifullah, Bangladesh at War (Dhaka: Academic Publishers, 1989).

41. Mohan Ram, Maoism in India (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1971), p.113.

42. ibid., p.117.

43. ibid., p.156. It is likely that the annihilation campaign was extended to the cities after they suffered setbacks in the countryside. By July 1970, the Naxalites in Srikakulum had been smashed. See, Robert Moss, Urban Guerrillas: The New Face of Political Violence (London: Temple Smith, 1972), p.139.

44. Swaroop Rani Dubey, One-Day Revolution in Sri Lanka: Anatomy of 1971

Insurrection (Jaipur: Aalekh Publishers, 1988), p.62.

45. Fred Halliday, “The Ceylonese Insurrection”, New Left Review, no.69, September-October 1971, p.77.

46. James Jupp, Sri Lanka: Third World Democracy (London: Frank Cass, 1978), p.30.

47. For a detailed analysis of the strategy and tactics of the JVP, refer, Ajay Darshan Behera, Insurgency in South Asia: A Study of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) in Sri Lanka (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, School of International Studies,

Underlying Causes and Conditions

Underlying Causes and Conditions By the 1970s a large number of conflicts in South Asia had manifested in violence, and the conflicts that were to follow in the eighties were even bloodier. Though the underlying causes of all conflicts, starting right from the post-independence period, were a complex intermingling of political, economic, social and cultural factors, however, all conflicts did not end up in violence. In fact, some secessionist movements, like the Dravidian movement in India, which made a demand for a sovereign state, did not transform into a violent movement. It died down by the sixties. The Sindhi nationalist movement in Pakistan, with separatist aspirations, has also shown an incapacity to use violence on an organized scale, notwithstanding an upsurge in 1983. This leads us to a fundamental question — why have those movements which have become violent, did or could take recourse to violence? Where does the explanation lie? Some explanation may be found not only in an analyses of the underlying causes but also in an examination of the subjective and objective conditions of the actors involved in the movements. Thus in the following section we examine the reasons for violence in South Asiaby using some of the variables discussed earlier like internal colonization, relative deprivation and resource mobilization and also introduce some variables in the form of conditions which enhances the propensity for violence. Keeping in view the myriad expressions of violent conflict in South Asia, an effort is made here to understand them within certain conceptual categories and thus it is not possible to go into the specificities. The Operationalization Processes of Colonization

Even after the demise of colonialism certain processes of colonization are still in operation. The classical colonizers have been replaced by a new set of colonizers — not necessarily linked to the state. The reason why colonization evokes strong reaction is because of the feeling that the ‘other’ is developing at one’s expense and thus colonization is associated with underdevelopment or lack of development. Perception of being colonized by the state gets aggravated if the state is an ethnically centralized state. This then leads to defining one’s status in the states system and how much stakes one has in it. Alienation from the state then can lead to a redefinition or reassertion of a separate identity and demands for separation. The processes of colonization can operate in various ways.

Internal Colonization and State Suppression

Amongst all the conflicts in South Asia, probably it is least problematic to explain the violence in the liberation war in East Pakistan. The objective conditions played a significant role in motivating the Bengali Muslims to resort to an armed struggle. It was not a perception of deprivation but actual deprivation and exploitation of the Bengalis that led to the aggressive assertion of a separate identity. This was further strengthened by the denial of a legitimate share in political power.

There were two contradictions in the relationship between the East wing and West wing of Pakistan. First, it was a relationship of a colony and a colonizer. This process of exploitation could actually be felt by the economic indicators of both the wings despite substantial wealth being generated in the East wing. Even though East Pakistan had inherited some industrial base in comparison to the weak industrial base in West Pakistan as a consequence of the partition, it

was nevertheless the West wing that projected better growth rates from the beginning itself. Over the years this disparity kept on increasing. When Ayub Khan seized state power, per capita income in East Pakistan was only 30 per cent less than that of West Pakistan. By the time he stepped down from office in 1969 the differential was as much as 61 per cent.1 During the much vaunted decade of development, during Ayub’s period, the per capita gross domestic product of East Pakistan grew by only 17 per cent at 1959-60 constant prices compared to 42 per cent in West Pakistan.2

During the course of its twenty-four years of existence as part of Pakistan, the Eastern wing constituting about 55 per cent of the population, was under the complete political and economic dominance of West Pakistan. Various methods were employed for exploiting the Eastern wing for the benefit of the Western wing. For instance, with regard to the export income and resource allocation between 1958 and 1968, the West wing earned 41 per cent of total foreign exchange income of the country, but used up as much as 70 per cent, whereas the Eastern wing earned 59 per cent of total foreign exchange but was allocated only 30 per cent. It is estimated that during the twenty-four years, resources to the tune of 3,000 million British pounds were transferred from the East wing to the West wing.3 Moreover, the Bengalis share in the national elites was negligible. In 1955, their representation in the military elite was less than five per cent and in the civil bureaucracy about 30 per cent.4

The realization of being used as a colony, where resources generated in the East wing were being appropriated by the ruling classes in the West wing led to the perception of the West Pakistanis as colonizers. Secondly, this pattern of economic development did not lead to the growth of a bourgeoisie amongst the Bengalis. There was only the rise of a service class. Thus the deepening of the regional inequality was further augmented by class inequalities as well. Due to this fact the Awami League could create a class coalition of the intermediate classes with the peasantry to launch a combined struggle against the West Pakistani military-bureaucratic-industrial establishment so as to extricate themselves from the clutches of the ruling classes. The economic conditions “lent a material foundation to their otherwise vague ideological and political demands, and helped mobilize the support of the various strata of Bengali society behind their cause.”5 The ruling establishment only helped in pushing the Bengalis towards violence by starting a crackdown.

There is no other example of a similar experience in South Asia, though at times references are made to the north-east region in India, Baluchistan in Pakistan, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh as being internal colonies. This comparison is a little far-fetched, and the processes of colonization in operation in these regions has a different dynamics. Though there is no doubt that all the regions have been economically neglected by their respective states and economically exploited by outsiders — a problem to which the respective states have not shown much sensitivity.

Land Colonization and State Support

Unlike in the context of the north-east region of India or Baluchistan, the land colonization in the CHT is partly state-sponsored. Land colonization in the CHT is partly due to the land-hunger of the Bengali peasantry. The second objective seems to be to change the demographic profile in

the CHT by undertaking settlement programmes. These measures known as resettlement schemes had already started during the Pakistan era. The objective of these measures was to convert the CHT into a Bengali-Muslim majority area. Over four decades the tribal population has declined from 91 to 51 percent.6 Table I shows the progression of this decline:

TABLE I

RATIO BETWEEN TRIBAL AND NON-TRIBAL POPULATION IN THE CHT

YEARPERCENTAGE OF TRIBAL

POPULATIONPERCENTAGE OF NON-

TRIBAL POPULATION

1951919

19748812

19816238

199151.548.5

Source: Imtiaz Ahmed, “Refugees and Security: The Experience of Bangladesh,” in S. D. Muni and Lok Raj Baral (eds.), Refugees and Regional Security in South Asia (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1996), p.131.

Land is the main source of livelihood of the Chakmas and there has been a gradual appropriation of this resource through other processes as well. Inappropriate development projects have not only led to the loss of their land but opened the roads for their commercial exploitation. This process had started even before Bangladesh became independent. The construction of the Kaptai hydroelectric dam and the Karnafuli reservoir in 1962 submerged 54,000 acres of settled cultivable land affecting about 100,000 people, about ninety per cent of whom were Chakmas. The economic infrastructure and employment opportunities which came about due to the development project has not benefitted the tribals significantly.7 The development project in fact opened the CHT for commercial exploitation as cheap power and labour were available in plentiful. New navigational facilities expanded opportunities for exploitation of CHT’s forest and fishery resources. But all the schemes had no place for the tribals. All this was to benefit the settlers. In some ways, the construction of the Kaptai hydroelectric dam helped in the ‘resource appropriation’ from the CHT for the larger benefits of the growing industrial economy of the country.8

Even in Sri Lanka, the Tamils had been critical of the Sinhala leadership for pursuing a policy of land colonization. A large number of Sinhalese peasants have been resettled in the Tamil areas, through state-sponsored colonization schemes. The Tamils believe that this is a deliberate policy to undermine the contiguity of the Tamil majority districts of Jaffna, Mullaitivu, Mannar,

Vavuniya, Batticalao, and Trincomalee where they form the largest ethnic group. These measures were instrumental in altering the demographic composition of the districts of Amparai, Batticalao, Mannar, Trincomalee and Vavuniya. Though the Sinhalese constituted only 20.6 per cent of the population of Trincomalee in 1946. Over the years, it has been gradually increasing and by 1971 it was 28.8 per cent and in 1981 it was 33 per cent. In Amparai district, in only a decades time from 1971 to 1981, the increase in the Sinhalese population has been as high as 78 per cent.9 These policies, the Tamils believe and fear, have been progressively making them minorities in the land to which they make claims as their homeland.

Settler Colonization and State Incapacities

The complexities in the North-eastern region of India arose as a result of the colonial pattern of economic development introduced by the British after its annexation of Assam in 1826, which had led to an influx of immigrant labour, resulting in significant demographic changes. The partition of the subcontinent in 1947 resulted in migrations due to the restructuring of state boundaries. This process has continued with a massive influx during the Liberation war in East Pakistan. Subsequently, a large number of Bengali Muslims infiltrated Assam to escape economic hardships in Bangladesh. This uncontrolled migration particularly into Assam and Tripura, has marginalized the indigenous people.

The migrants who have settled in Assam have monopolized or dominated virtually all new opportunities for resource exploitation or for jobs in the modern sectors of the economy and in government service. Land alienation among the poor tribal peasantry and demographic changes has engendered a feeling among the indigenous people that the ‘outsiders’ have robbed them of their economic opportunities. The creation of the Assamese into a minority in their own state and their uneven share in the process of uneven national economic development and its consequently persisting underdevelopment has led to a perception that it is due to the intrusion of outsiders and the unresponsiveness of the central authority.

Therefore, initially the movement that emerged due to these grievances sought to control Assam’s resources and to make sure that the management of those resources remained with Assamese themselves. The demands also included sharing political and administrative control, revenues generated in the state, employment and other opportunities. State incapacities in responding to the problems of the Assamese, resulted in the emergence of the ULFA, eventually leading to the demand for independence.

From all the above instances one can see a pattern that the question of right over land has generated considerable amount of violence. Whether it is in the case of the Tamils in Sri Lanka or the Chakmas in Bangladesh or the Assamese Hindus in Assam or the tribals in North-east India. While the conflict is against the state, settlers have also become targets of violence. The primary reason behind it is that where the state shows an incapacity to intervene on behalf of the indigenous people, the only way to get back one’s land is by physical eviction of the settlers. Where settlement is supported by the state, such violent action can be justified much more easily.

The LTTE in Sri Lanka is known to have been attacking peasants in colonized lands. The

Chakmas have also attacked the state sponsored settlement schemes in the CHT. The AASU and the AGP have occasionally used violent tactics to expel the foreigners. The pattern of extensive mass violence witnessed in 1983 during the movement to detect and deport Bengali Muslim nationals of Bangladesh origin was due to attempts to foil the February 1983 election, which was being conducted without revising the rolls. This resulted in an unprecedented wave of violence and destruction.

Peripheral Societies and Lack of State Penetration

Peripheral societies are those societies where state penetration is weak — physically as well as institutionally. Physically it may be the outlying regions of the state which may not have been integrated strongly within the state apparatus. Institutionally, the idea of the state may not have captured the allegiance of the people inhabiting these areas. These people retain a certain independence and tactical mobility when it comes to their incorporation within the modern state.

In the context of South Asia, it is a colonial inheritance that institutional structures had not penetrated the outlying tribal dominated North-eastern area in India and the North-western area and Baluchistan in Pakistan. All these regions have a high potential for violence. In all these regions state penetration is weak — both physically as well as institutionally. Institutionally people from these regions identify weakly with the idea of the state and as such the resistance to being incorporated within the postcolonial state. Physically, their geographical location in the peripheries or the outlying regions of the state’s geographical boundaries creates the gulf between the centre and periphery. Lack of state penetration also leads to lack of development. these peripheral societies lag behind in their development achievements in comparison to the core societies. This gulf or the notion of distance and the lack of development is not helpful in attracting the allegiance of resistant groups to the central state apparatus. A perception of being out of the effective reach of the coercive apparatus of the state emboldens certain groups to resort to violence. The Baluch guerrillas could take on the might of the Pakistani army because of the above reasons. The same is the case with the numerous insurgencies carried out by the tribal people in the North-eastern region in India and the Chakmas in Bangladesh.

To a certain extent, even though the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Kashmiris and the Sikhs cannot be considered as peripheral societies, the fact that they come from outlying regions or border states, enhances their capacity for violence. These regions are peripheral only to the extent that the policing functions of the states are weak in these regions and they lack control over the borders through which move men and material for training and augmenting coercive resources. Thus, insurgent movements from these regions retain a tactical mobility in their confrontation with the state.

Class/Caste/Agrarian Violence

Our notions of peripheral societies invariably associate with outlying tribal regions — which is more of a physical association. Societies may be peripheral even if they are located physically in the heart of a state. One such region is in Central India where the borders of the four states of Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra meet. The authority of the state does not extend to these areas. The rural oligarchy in this region is engaged in a feudal mode of appropriation of

surplus value and perpetuates an exploitative production relations.10 The state machinery in some of these areas, particularly Bihar, comprises of a non-official apparatus of landlords and their private armies.11 Whatever maybe the reflection of class forces in the state, in these peripheral societies the landlords are the ruling classes. They are not independent of the state but only an extension of the state.12

To maintain existing patterns of agrarian relations the rural oligarchy is opposed to rural class struggle and is willing to use force towards that end. Resentment by the poor peasants, let alone revolt, brings in severe retribution not only against individuals but against members of an entire caste, at times even against entire villages. The violence unleashed by the landlords through their private armies has allowed the space for the mobilization of the peasants, low castes and the landless harijans by the Naxalites. The Naxalites are descendants of the parent Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) founded in 1969 with the aim of organizing the peasantry and seizing power through armed struggle. The Naxalite movement which was an ideological movement now finds space to mobilize on the basis of social oppression.

The Naxalites main demands and mobilization centres around tribal autonomy and land reform. The peasants and tribals have suffered loss of land, loss of access to forest resources. Landlords have made use of the judiciary in staying the land ceiling laws, thus enabling them to defeat its purpose through benami transfers. In their pursuit of a more equitable land redistribution the People’s War Group (PWG), in Andhra Pradesh has taken over land and distributed it among landless labourers of its choice through the judgements of its ‘people’s courts’.13 These land?grab campaigns have threatened the power structure in the rural areas and hence landlords have become increasingly repressive.

Relative Deprivation

A large number of violent movements in South Asia have been motivated by a feeling of relative deprivation. These groups have a perception that there is a mismatch between what they are capable of and what they actually get. They hold the system responsible for it. The desire to correct this imbalance has manifested in violence against the state. The JVP phenomena in Sri Lanka was a reflection of the feeling of relative deprivation amongst the youth and unemployed, which was successfully channelled into capturing state power itself. The transformation of movements from demands of autonomy to secession and the capacity and willingness of some of these movements to use violence is a simultaneous development with the rise of a petty-bourgeois class which due to the development policies of the state have also suffered from a feeling of relative deprivation. Such a class is identifiable in the case of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, amongst the Assamese, Sikhs and Kashmiris in India, amongst the Muhajirs and to a certain extent among the Baluchis in Pakistan.

The processes from which such a feeling arises is largely linked to the educational policies. Education has been an important channel for social mobility in traditional societies. However, the state’s incapacity to create a balance between human capital and physical capital,14 i.e., education and employment has resulted in a feeling of relative deprivation amongst the petty-bourgeoisie. State incapacities, unresponsiveness and ethnic discrimination has radicalized this social class which is willing to use violence in its mobilization strategies against the state in

which it does not have much stakes.

The rise of the JVP in the late 60s was largely due to the educational policies. In the context of Sri Lanka, it was not only the cultural values associated with education but also the failure of agricultural activity to generate livelihood, that compelled the younger generation of the peasantry to get educated. There was hope in the possibility that education would provide employment and consequently a better livelihood and social mobility. The youth who completed their education before 1971 expected to step into clerical or administrative posts because similar education had previously been a stepping stone to white?collar office employment. But when the number of educated youth soared dramatically in the1960s, education ceased to provide an assurance of secure and remunerative white?collar office employment. As a result, the educated rural youth were often compelled to return to their agricultural fields.15

The heightened aspirations and expectations engendered among youth by enhanced educational opportunities, and crushing of these aspirations under rising unemployment, produced a sense ofalienation, deprivation and disillusionment. For the employed too, the kind of jobs held by them fell far short of their aspirations and reasonable expectations. This, in turn, heightened the potential for political violence.16

The reemergence of the JVP around 1986 was largely due to the post-1977 economic policies. The economic policies adopted by the UNP since it took office in 1977 had a tremendous impact on the socio-economic development of the country. These market oriented policies were successful to some extent with regard to growth and employment generation, till the early years of 1980s. At a macro-level, however, they contributed to the worsening of conditions of inequality in terms of income distribution and regional development. Withdrawal of food subsidies and reduction in resource allocation on education resulted in a growing incidence of mal-nutrition and worsening levels of educational attainment among vulnerable sections of the society.17

Education, which was generally free till 1977 was opened up to the private sector and a decline in state funding reduced educational opportunities for the poor and lower middle classes. While the schools in the metropolitan areas managed to raise resources, those in remote rural areas were largely neglected. Consequently, those from the poor and lower middle classes who depended on education, which has traditionally been the primary avenue of social advancement, suffered.18

The contraction in the state sector also had a severe impact on employment opportunities. Educated youth from rural areas depended primarily on the state for various kinds of white collar employment which declined after 1977. Further, employment in private sector firms was restricted due to the lack of fluency in spoken english.19 While a student from a private school in Colombo with a GCE(A) level qualification could get a plush executive post in a private firm, the same was not available to the rural educated youth even with a university degree. The jobs that were mostly available were in the service sector which had expanded after 1977 while the production sectors had declined. These included jobs as bus conductors, lottery ticket sellers, tourist guides, housemaids and the like.20 Thus, the new economic regime placed serious limitations on opportunities for social upward mobility for educated rural youth.

The post-1977 economic changes did not alter the sense of deprivation and alienation which prevailed among the rural youth before 1971, but only compounded it further. There is no doubt that even in the late 1980s, alienation arising out of lack of educational opportunities, unemployment and the nature of employment was fairly widespread. This was brought out in the Report of the Presidential Commission on Youth, instituted on 19 October 1989 to enquire into youth unrest in the country. According to the Report:

There are some indications that the unrest of the Eighties also involved youth with relatively high educational attainment... If the profile of the insurgent is indeed identical or similar [to those who participated in the 1971 insurrection], then the findings will constitute a telling indictment of our social and economic system and, in particular, its failure to respond to the needs and aspirations of young men from predominantly rural areas, with access to at least secondary level education.21

Some of the figures presented in the Report are revealing. The rate of unemployment for GCE(O) level qualifiers was 37.5 per cent, GCE(A) level 44.1 per cent and 23.2 per cent for university degree holders.22 A vast majority of the 55.4per cent unemployed belonged to the age group of 20 to 29.23 Region wise, the percentage of unemployment was higher in 1981 as compared to 1971 in seven districts in the Sinhala heartland. This is reflected in Table II:

TABLE II

DISTRICT-WISE PERCENTAGE UNEMPLOYMENT IN SRI LANKA

District19711981

Kalutara26.227.7

Kandy18.019.4

Matale10.712.8

Galle26.227.4

Matara21.428.0

Hambantota16.220.2

Kurunegale14.215.2

Source: Sri Lanka, Report of the Presidential Commission on Youth, Sessional Paper No. 1, 1990 (Colombo, 1990), p.110.

The two districts of Matara and Hambantota, in particular, experienced a significant rise in unemployment. The levels of violence in these two districts was also very high due to JVP

activity.

The Tamils in Sri Lanka have had a better access to employment in the state sector due to historical reasons. Morever, they also dominated in enrollment in higher education, particularly in technical and science subjects. Over the years this was eroded by certain discriminatory policies of the Sri Lankan state. The Sinhala only legislation of 1956 had a serious economic impact on the Tamils as it required a knowledge of Sinhala as a necessary qualification for various jobs. The Tamils as such had to learn Sinhala within three years, failing which they were faced with the prospect of losing their jobs. This policy had the potential to shut out the Tamils from government employment.24

Further, in 1970, the state had introduced a standardization system of selection for admission to higher education according to which Tamils had to secure more marks than their Sinhalese counterparts in order to be admitted to higher seats of learning. In 1978 this system was scrapped but introduced with some modifications.25 The standardization method introduced in 1970 gradually saw the decline of the Tamils in University admissions. Due to this, they had a feeling that they were being systematically squeezed out of higher education. Between 1970 to 1975 there was a drastic drop in the number of Tamils entering University education. Table III illustrates this:

TABLE III

RELATIVE FIGURES OF UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS AMONG TAMILS

AND SINHALESE IN SRI LANKA BETWEEN 1970 AND 1975

TAMILSSINHALESE

YEARTOTAL

INTAKENO.PERCENTAGENO.PERCENTAGE

1969/7079231539.845757.7

1970/7195533735.357960.6

1971/72106938933.668063.6

1973117734729.579367.4

1974140329420.9105875.4

1975141126819.0110178.0

Source: V. Nithiyanandan, “An Analysis of Economic Factors Behind the Origin and Development of Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka,” in Charles Abeysekera and Newton

Gunasinghe (eds.), Facets of Ethnicity in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Social Scientists Association, 1987), p.127.

There was a rise in unemployment and a lack of commensurate employment amongst the Tamils as well. The major part of this unemployed group were the offspring of the Tamil lower-middle class, who unlike the higher strata of Tamilian society, did not have alternative means of securing suitable employment. Most of these unemployed and underemployed were channeled into the militant movement which had started emerging by the early seventies.

In the case of the Sikhs in India the sense of relative deprivation was not only felt by the youth but also by the rich farmers. The demand for more autonomy by the Akali Dal, representing farmers interest, was linked to this feeling and had hoped that more autonomy would correct the imbalance in the Sikh farmers capability to generate more wealth. The peculiar social division of capital in Punjab was instrumental in the feeling of insecurity amongst the Sikhs. In Punjab, Sikhs are concentrated more in the villages and rural settlements while Hindus predominate in the towns and the cities. Punjab was never considered good for setting up heavy industry. However, it had a sampling of agro-industry but most of these and the service sectors were owned and controlled by the Hindus. The green revolution was to result in the rise of a rich class of prosperous modern farmers. By 1978 the so-called Green revolution had reached a plateau. But when the Sikh farmer wanted to invest their surplus capital in the other sectors of the economy they found avenues for reinvestment blocked, as the Hindus controlled industry and the service sector.26

The Sikhs also realized that they also did not have any control over agricultural pricing and industialization policies, as these were determined by the central government at New Delhi. Excessive prosperity of the big landowners and capitalist landlords not only encouraged but necessitated greater political power,27 so that Sikh farmers could decide and direct economic policies and free the industrial sector from the Hindus. One of the peculiar economic demands in the Anandpur Sahib resolution was that all key industries should be brought under the public sector. This was in contradiction to the principles of state autonomy but ostensibly, these demands reflected the interest of the landowning upper crust of Sikh society.

While amongst the rich farmers it was this feeling of not being able to generate more wealth from surplus capital that had resulted in their feeling of relative deprivation, however, their moderate movement for more autonomy was hijacked by the rise of a petty-bourgeoisie.

Even in the case of the Kashmiris, although political grievances and Islamic revivalism predominate, but economic factors have also been an important dimension of the problem. There has been a dramatic improvement in the standard of living in the state of Jammu and Kashmir between 1977 and 1984. During 1977-78, 33.4 per cent of the population lived under the poverty line. By 1983-84 it had declined to a mere 16.3 per cent.28 There were only four states — Manipur, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Haryana in that order which had better poverty figures for the same period. The per capita income in the state in 1971-72 was Rs. 588 and by 1986-87 it had gone upto Rs. 3344, which was overall sixth highest in the country after Delhi, Goa, Punjab, Haryana, and Maharashtra during the same period.29

While average standards of living have gone up in Jammu and Kashmir, it has not benefitted the Muslims in real terms. Free education upto the level of the Universities introduced by Sheikh Abdullah resulted in a large number of the poor students who could aspire for social mobility to get educated. The pressures of educated unemployed youth was to soon strain the system. The number of unemployed matriculates rose from 6,875 in 1971 to 14,374 by 1981 and to 26,559 by 1986. The number of unemployed graduates rose from 1,228 in 1971 to 6,368 in 1981, while that of postgraduates increased from 409 in 1971 to 1,177 in 1981 to 2,866 in 1985. Number of unemployed engineering graduates increased from 166 in 1961 to 443 in 1988. It has been observed that the higher the educational qualification, the higher the growth and incidence of unemployment in that category.30

The main sources of employment for educated Kashmiri Muslims were the government services and public corporations. In the state government their representation in the non-gazetted and clerical services was fairly high but when it came to the gazetted posts representation of Hindus was far ahead of Muslims. In 1987, Hindus held 51 per cent gazetted posts in comparison to only 42 per cent amongst Muslims. However, in the central government jobs, Hindus monopolized almost 83 per cent of the gazetted posts while Muslims held only 7 per cent. And in the clerical non-gazetted central government jobs Hindus held ashigh as 79 per cent in comparison to only 13 per cent amongst Muslims.31 From 1986-87 to 1989 there was an increase of 200 per cent in unemployed educated youth from 100,000 to 300,000.32 Under these circumstances it was not difficult to mobilize the educated and underemployed youth. The processes of modernization had also produced a sizeable intelligentsia who could mobilize them.

In the case of the Muhajirs, in the initial years after independence, they along with the Punjabis were dominant in Pakistan’s state structure. By the end of the 1950s with the rising power of the military, an institution dominated by the Punjabis and the Pathans, the Muhajirs were marginalized. Muhajirs trace the origins of this marginalization to General Ayub’s decision to shift the capital from Karachi to Islamabad.

During the 1960-80 period, the Muhajirs experienced a slow relative decline in their economic and political status. There was a perception of their eroding representation among the national elites — the civil bureaucracy, the military and the business elite.33 State policies after 1971, with the rise of Bhutto, a Sindhi, to power has hurt the interest of the Muhajirs. In 1972, Sindhi language was restored as the official language of the Sindh province. Muhajirs protested as they felt their interests in the provincial government were threatened. Bhutto had also introduced in 1971 a regional quota system for recruitment to the federal bureaucracy. The quota allocated 50 per cent to Punjabis, 11.5 per cent to the NWFP, 11.4 per cent to rural Sindh, 7.6 per cent to urban Sindh, and 3.5 per cent to Baluchistan and 10 per cent to be filled on the basis of merit at the national level.34 This quota system was designed to increase the representation of the Sindhis in the federal bureaucracy as the higher percentage intake from rural Sindh envisaged an increase in Sindhi recruitment.

Further, Bhutto’s policy of nationalization carried out from 1972-76, still shrunk the prospects of employment in the private sector as the public sector recruitment were regulated by the quota system. General Zia further curtailed prospects for employment in the state sector by introducing in 1982 a quota of 10 per cent in the federal secretariat for retired military personnel.35 Bhutto’s

and Zia’s policy put together eroded the Muhajir domination of Pakistan’s civil bureaucracy and public sector business elite, while increasing the representation of Punjabis and Sindhis.

Though there has not been an absolute decline in the Muhajir share of jobs and admissions, their share has dropped relative to that of the Punjabis, Pathans and Sindhis. It is the middle and lower middle class Muhajir youth who have felt the constraints of the quota system more. The Muhajir underclass (mostly Biharis from Bangladesh) is also faced with severe competition for scarce jobs with a large influx of Pathan immigrants to the city of Karachi in the 1980s. Thus, it is not surprising to see that the MQM’s leadership and support comes largely from the lower middle class and working class segments of the Muhajir population.

Social Bases of Violent Movements

In all the above cases of violent movements it was the emergence of an educated, lower middle class youth, in some instances also from the working class and peasant families that has pushed all the movements towards violence. In the South Asian context, except for the Naxalite movement in India, the onset of violence in all other movements has coincided with the rise of the petty-bourgeoisie. One may illustrate this by looking at the social bases of some of the movements.

The support base of the JVP was essentially among the petty bourgeoisie, including the youth and unemployed, and some sections of the low castes. Evidently, it had a limited social base for it to carry the people behind it. During the second attempt in 1987-89 period, the JVP’s support base was largely the same but it also seemed to enjoy the support of some professional classes.36

The shifts in the Tamil demands from regional autonomy to a federal system in the mid-50s to a separate state in the 70s has been accompanied by the rise of the petty-bourgeois to the Tamil leadership and a change in the form of the political struggle. The new leadership was less westernized than the earlier leadership and had a regional base in the northern and eastern provinces. The Tamil insurgents are mainly from non-propertied, lower middle class background in the age group of 18 to 35.37 In lot of respects they are a mirror image of the Sinhala petty-bourgeoisie which spearheaded the JVP movement in the south.38 The earlier leadership had been from the Tamil bourgeoisie.39

Among the Sikhs also, though the Akali agitation with separatist overtones emerged due to the feeling of relative deprivation of the rich Sikh farmers, it was however hijacked by the emergence of a petty-bourgeoisie. In fact, Bhindranwale was opposed to the upper class Sikh landed classes organized in the Akali Dal. His support base was the educated unemployed, subordinate non-agricultural castes, rural jats, youth from small peasant families, most of them with a few years of schooling.40

The social base of the MQM is also primarily among the lower middle class petty-bourgeoisie.41 Though the social base of the Baluch leaders was primarily within the traditional tribes. But the formation of the Baluch Students Organization in 1967 signified the emergence of an educated middle class, though very small. This class also did not find any share in the power

structure. Their representation in the army and bureaucracy is abysmally low.42

Increasingly, it is evident that this petty-bourgeois class can sustain high levels of violence. As a social group this class has weak material and social ties unlike the bourgeoisie or the peasantry. And due to the age group, it is also not strongly attached to family ties.

In most of the developing states, the economic base is underdeveloped and the superstructure is overdeveloped. This imbalance could be corrected by capturing the superstructure. The students and youth perceived that the only way their living conditions could be changed was by capturing the state apparatus. But the manifestations of this perception has been varied depending on the nature of mobilization. Thus, while on the one hand the JVP tries to capture state power, on the other the petty-bourgeoisie within the minority ethnic groups think in terms of secession and a new state. This is not to the say that entire ethnic groups are not supportive of independence movements. The difference is in just the methods. The petty-bourgeoisie would introduce and be capable of sustaining the violence.

Strategies of Mobilization

The petty bourgeoisie, when it comes to articulation of demands has never articulated narrow group interests. It has always asserted the interests of a distinctive cultural identity as it is the most effective means of mobilizing support across a wide range of social groups. At times cultural symbols are used in mobilizing. It may be, therefore, argued that ethnic demands do not emerge out of essentialist notions of inherent identities. That there are no inherent identities has nowhere been exemplified better than in South Asia. Social identities in South Asia have been forged and refashioned, largely as a response, reaction and resistance to state structures and political economies. State directed political and economic processes, rather than cultural diversity and ethnic plurality are the base of the expressions of violence. The manifestations of which in the superstructure are in the form of ethnic, class or caste violence.

How culture and a proximate identity can be a potent force in mobilization was demonstrated by the JVP in Sri Lanka. Though ideologically it stood for class struggle, nevertheless a Sinhala nationalist position dominated the Marxist elements in JVP’s doctrine even in 1971. It was fairly successful in carrying out a broad based mass mobilization over the issue of the presence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka by presenting itself as a patriotic movement uniting the Sinhalese masses and the BuddhistSangha in a common struggle against a corrupt puppet regime of India — the UNP and the cliques within this regime.43 The JVP succeeded in gaining popular sympathy by presenting itself as the only patriotic organization opposed to Indian intervention and the collaboration of a corrupt, illegitimate and anti-national government. Thus, it was able to cut across all divisions in Sinhala society to stand for the entire Sinhala population on the basis of its patriotism.44

In the case of the Sikh militants, a key mobilizing tenet was that the Sikh panth (religion) was in danger. Bhindranwale used religious revivalism and fundamentalism by selecting only the militant sikh tradition in the ultimate objective of Khalistan.45

Though the problem in Kashmir is a political and economic problem requiring a political

solution, a large number of militant groups particularly aligned to the Jamaat-e-Islami call their struggle a jihad, which is only a way of mobilizing not only Kashmiri muslims but also Indian muslims.46 Contrary to popular belief, religion is not the motivating factor for the Kashmiri militants. According to a psychoanalytical study of 400 captured militants, only 10 per cent said they were fighting for religion, 45 per cent admitted the reason was economic deprivation and alienation.47

In Pakistan it was first the Bengalis who asserted their Bengali identity before Islam. Now the Muhajirs are doing a similar thing. It is an example of a case of successful ethnic mobilization.48 The Muhajirs who were instrumental in the creation of Pakistan, had shunned a particularistic ethnicity in favour of a broader Islamic identity, when faced with competition for power and jobs from the Punjabis and Pakhtuns, now claim to constitute a fifth nationality in Pakistan. The MQM addressed the sense of relative deprivation of the Muhajirs effectively and has become successful in mobilization of their ethnic loyalties. It has also put forward demands for the creation of a Muhajir Suba including Karachi and Hyderabad.

Internal Violence and the External Dimension in Mobilization

A significant factor often used or does help in mobilizing in support of violence is the external dimension. It is fairly well known that all insurgent movements seek external support whether it be moral support, material aid or sanctuary for their effectiveness and sustenance. In the South Asian context, it has been observed that mobilization has been done on the assurance of forthcoming external support as in the case of the JVP during the 1971 insurrection. JVP cadres were made to believe that armed assistance from sympathetic foreign powers would arrive at the appropriate time.49 One does not know on what evidence these assumptions were based. Or if actually external assistance was available at the crucial time, would it have made a significant difference in the balance of forces? In all likelihood, the question of external support was used as a psychological ruse by the JVP leadership to boost mobilization.

In the case of the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka, it was only after the Indian government’s decision to train the Tamil militants, that there was a spurt in the recruitment to the various Tamil groups, when LTTE was just one of the groups.50 Though the Indian objective of training and arming the Tamil insurgents was to enhance their bargaining power and put pressure on Jayewardene to negotiate,51 but simultaneously this was used by the militant leaders to mobilize more and more youth.

In the case of the Kashmiri militants it was able to attract a large number of youth due to two external factors. First, some of the Kashmiri youth’s experience in fighting a jihad along with the Afghan Mujahideen’s against the erstwhile Soviet-backed Marxist government in Kabul. A lot of these youth came back with a ‘militant consciousness’ to challenge the Indian state.52 The second was a belief that Pakistan would actually intervene militarily on their behalf and therefore on this basis a large number of youth could be mobilized because they felt they had a chance of winning.53 The present frustration of a large number of militants is this incapacity or unwillingness of Pakistan to intervene directly on their behalf.

An Overview

The conceptualizations attempted above do give us some conceptual understanding of the causes of violence and some conditions in which they have manifested. It would be too ambitious to attempt a singular framework that can address the causes of violence in South Asia, as the manifestations of violence are too complex to be explained by any single framework. A singular approach also cannot suffice in explaining the unfolding of a process — some of which have taken decades under changing socio-economic conditions before maturing into a stage when violence has been introduced into conflict situations. But atleast from the above conceptualizations, one could arrive at a holistic view of the causes and the conditions in which mobilization in support of violence has been successful.

As stated earlier, the underlying causes of violence in South Asia is predominantly linked to development reasons where right over land and access to education and jobs are some of the important issues. The uneven development patterns in South Asia have resulted in unusual backwardness in some cases like that of East Pakistan, Baluchistan, Assam, parts of Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and relatively faster development as in the case of Punjab. Both conditions have offered the grounds for the growth of violent movements. The strongest impetus towards violence, however, is provided by a sense of relative deprivation, rather than deprivation itself.

Successful mobilization in support of violence has taken place in conditions where some of the variables discussed above have coalesced. Just as way of illustration, in the case of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the concept of relative deprivation may be one of the explanations, but this in conjunction with the processes of land colonization, the geographical location of the Tamils and the external support explains why high levels of violence have sustained in the ethnic conflict. Similarly, in all the other cases in South Asia the levels of violence can be explained by the conjunction of some of the variables discussed above.


1. Omar Noman, The Political Economy of Pakistan, 1947-85 (London: KPI, 1988), p.41.

2. Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), p.57.

3. See, K.P. Misra, “Intra-State Imperialism as a Factor in Conflicts Within and Between States,” International Studies (New Delhi), vol.14, no.1, January 1975, pp.45-52. For a detailed study on the discrepancies, see, Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration(Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1994).

4. Jahan, ibid., pp.24-25.

5. Quoted from Jahan, ibid., p.87.

6. Imtiaz Ahmed, “Refugees and Security: The Experience of Bangladesh,” in S. D. Muni and

Lok Raj Baral (eds.), Refugees and Regional Security in South Asia (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1996), p.131.

7. ibid.

8. M. Q. Zaman, “Crisis in CHT: Ethnicity and Integration,” Economic and Political Weekly, vol.17, no.3, 16 January 1982, p.77.

9. Cited in V. Suryanarayan, “Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka,” in Urmila Phadnis and others (eds.), Domestic conflicts in South Asia vol. II (New Delhi: South Asia Publishers, 1986), p.140.

10. Pradhan H. Prasad, “Agrarian Violence in Bihar,” in Pradhan H. Prasad, Lopsided Growth: Political Economy of Indian Development(Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.75.

11. Landlords have formed private armies mostly along caste lines and a few under individual leadership. Some of these are theBrahmarishi Sena, Sunlight Sena, Bhumi Sena, Lorik Sena, Satyendra Sena and the like. See, “Behind the Killings in Bihar: A Report on Patna, Gaya, and Singhbhum”, People’s Union for Democratic Rights, pp. 29, 45-47.

12. Dev Nathan, “Agricultural labour and the Poor Peasant Movement in Bihar,” in T.V. Sathyamurthy (ed.), Class Formation and Political Transformation in Post-Colonial India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.165.

13. Venu Menon, “Lure of the Lal Salaam”, Times of India, 15 December 1991.

14. Godfrey Gunatilleke, Neelan Tiruchelvam and Radhika Coomaraswamy, “Violence and Development in Sri Lanka: Conceptual Issues,” in Godfrey Gunatilleke and others (eds.), Ethical Dilemmas of Development in Asia (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1983), p.143.

15. W.H. Wriggins and C.H.S. Jayewardene, “Youth Protest in Sri Lanka,” in W. H. Wriggins and James Guyot (eds.), Population Politics and the Future of Southern Asia (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1973), p.331.

16. Robert Kearney, “Educational Expansion and Political Volatility in Sri Lanka: The 1971 Insurrection,” Asian Survey, vol.15, no.9, September 1975, p.741

17. W.D. Lakshman, “The Macro-Economic Framework and Its Policy Implications for Youth Unrest,” in S.T. Hettige (ed.), Unrest or Revolt: Some Aspects of Youth Unrest in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Goethe Institute, 1992), pp.93-94.

18. ibid., pp.95-96.

19. S. Hettige, “Fighting Youth Revolts,” Lanka Guardian, vol.16, no.19, 1 February 1994, p.16.

20. These were the underclass of the suburban areas who joined the JVP. The emergence of a lumpen social class after 1977 provided the JVP with its urban support and contributed

significantly to its violent nature. See, Victor Ivan, “The Political Legacy of Wijeweera,”The Island (Colombo), 4 February 1990.

21. Sri Lanka, Report of the Presidential Commission on Youth, Sessional Paper No. 1, 1990 (Colombo: Government Publication Bureau, 1990), p.31.

22. ibid., pp.30, 98.

23. ibid., p.109.

24. C. R. de Silva, “The Sinhalese-Tamil Rift in Sri Lanka,” in A.J. Wilson and Dennis Dalton (eds.), The States of South Asia: Problems of national Integration (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1982), p.165.

25. For details see Sunil Bastian, “University Admission and the National Question,” in Ethnicity and Social Change in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Social Scientists Association, 1984), pp.166-78.

26. Harish K. Puri, “The Akali Agitation: An Analysis of Socio-Economic Bases of Protest,” Economic and Political Weekly, vol.28, no.4, 22 January, 1983, pp.116-17.

27. Sikhs were aspiring for more power than is possible within Indian federalism. See Zoya Hasan, “Introduction: State and Identity in Modern India,” in Z. Hasan and others (eds.), The State, Political Processes, and Identity: Reflections on Modern India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1989), pp.22-23.

28. Statistical Outline of India, 1989-90, Bombay, Tata Services Limited, July 1989, p.27.

29. ibid., p.16.

30. All figures are from M. L. Mishri and M. S. Bhat, Poverty, Planning and Economic Change in Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1994), p.39.

31. See “Appendix III,” especially pp.263-66 in Asghar Ali Engineer (ed.), Secular Crown on Fire: The Kashmir Problem (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1991).

32. “Uprising in Indian-Held Jammu & Kashmir,” Spotlight on Regional Affairs, Institute of Regional Studies (Islamabad), vol.10, nos.3 & 4, March-April 1991, p.50.

33. By the early 1970s, a large number of initial bureaucrats retired. Presumably a large proportion of these were Muhajirs. After twenty-five years of Pakistan’s independence, the Muhajirs were feeling squeezed not only at the top but also at the bottom of state sector employment. I am thankful to Dr. Mubashir Hasan for making this point. Interview, Lahore, May 1997.

34. Charles H. Kennedy,Bureaucracy in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987),

pp.181-208.

35. ibid., pp.122-25.

36. For detailed studies of the JVP see, Gananath Obeyesekere, “Some Comments on the Social Background of the April 1971 Insurgency in Sri Lanka,” Journal of Asian Studies, vol.33, no.3, May 1974, pp.367-84; and Ajay Darshan Behera, “The Social Background of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in Sri Lanka,” in S. D. Muni (ed.), Understanding South Asia (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1994), pp.128-44.

37. Newton Gunasinghe, “Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Perceptions and Solutions,” in Charles Abeysekera and Newton Gunasinghe (eds.), Facets of Ethnicity in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Social Scientists Association, 1987), p.70.

38. Sunil Bastian, “Political Economy of Ethnic Violence in Sri Lanka,” in Veena Das (ed.), Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp.292-93.

39. V. Nithiyanandam, “An Analysis of Economic Factors Behind the Origin and Development of Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka,” in Abeyesekera and Gunasinghe (eds.), Op.Cit., p. 136.

40. Robin Jeffrey, What’s Happening to India: Punjab, Ethnic Conflict and the Test for Federalism (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1994), pp.175-79.

41. S. Akbar Zaidi, “Sindhi vs Muhajir: Contradiction, Conflict and Compromise,” in S. Akbar Zaidi (ed.), Regional Imbalances and the National Question in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 1992), p.340.

42. Tahir Amin, Ethno National Movements in Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors (Islamabad: Institute for Policy Studies, 1988).

43. In most cases, the ideology that has attracted mass following has been a combination of nationalism and Marxism. These types of struggles have occurred in China, Yugoslavia, Algeria and Vietnam. See, Lawrence Stone, “Theories of Revolution,” in Sam S. Sarkesian (ed.), Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago: Precedent Publishers, 1975), p.31.

44. See, S. Leelananda, “JVP Learning from Vietnam,” Lanka Guardian (Colombo), vol.18, no.19, 1 February 1990, pp.18-19.

45. Paul Wallace, “Religious and Ethnic Politics: Political Mobilization in Punjab,” in M.S.A. Rao and Francine R. Frankel (eds.),Dominance and State Power in Modern India: Decline of a Social Order, Vol.II (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.465-75.

46. Sultan Shahin, “Mindless Violence, Not Jihad,’ Hindustan Times, 15 March 1997.

47. Arjun Ray, Kashmir Diary: Psychology of Militancy (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 1987),

p.12.

48. Farhat Haq, “Rise of the MQM in Pakistan: Politics of Ethnic Mobilization,” Asian Survey, vol.35, no.11, November 1995, p.990.

49. A. J. Wilson, “Ceylon: The Peoples Liberation Front and the Revolution that Failed,” Pacific Community (Tokyo), vol.3, no.2, January 1972, p.367. After their capture, some of the JVP cadres said that they had been assured that help would be coming from China and North Korea. See, M. Van der Kroef, “The Sri Lanka Insurgency of April 1971: Its Development and Meaning,” Asia Quarterly (Brussels), no.2, 1973, p.125.

50. M. R. Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1994)

51. S.D. Muni, Pangs of Proximity: India and Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 1993), pp.168-169.

52. See “Kashmir: Training the Fighters,” Viewpoint, 10 October 1991, pp.23-24

53. Personal interviews, Srinagar, November 1995.

Overwhelming Consequences and Wanting Responses

Conclusion

It is a reality that over the years South Asian politics has been characterized by an increasing level of violence. The initial years after independence did see the emergence of some conflicts arising from the assertion of ethnic identities. However, it was only in the late 1960s that some of these conflicts intensified. And since then there has been an increasing use of violence in the articulation of demands, political bargaining and even attempts to capture state power. Increasingly, armed struggle has become a dominant mode of political action. As the South Asian states have grown and modernized, the societies have progressively moved towards a violent socio-political order. The politics of violence in South Asia can be linked to the contradictions generated by the development process underway in South Asia. The model of development that was adopted by the South Asian states was based on the urge to emulate and catch up with the developed countries. This was based on an erroneous assumption that rapid economic development would reduce the potential for violent conflict in the heterogeneous South Asian societies. It was believed that the processes of economic development would erode and break down proximate identities. In reality, however, the reverse process is underway with the assertion of various linguistic, religious and ethnic identities. The nature and the political economy of the state was instrumental in the emergence of most of these conflicts which have gradually became violent. The South Asian states are not neutral apparatuses but function in the interest of a coalition of classes and ethnic groups or a military-bureaucratic oligarchy. Those groups or classes exercising power within the state apparatus bear upon the development policies adopted by the state. Thus, the nature and political economy of the state in South Asia is an important component in the understanding of the problem of distribution of resources. In Pakistan, the dominance of the much larger nationalities of Punjabis and Pashtuns in the military bureaucratic oligarchy enabled them to corner a larger share of the resources and opportunities in comparison to the Baluchis and the Muhajirs. Bengali Muslim domination in Bangladesh and Sinhala majoritarianism in Sri Lanka also skewed the pattern of resource allocation against the Chakmas and the Tamils respectively. In the case of India, the nature of the state and its policies heightened conflicts in those cases where ethno-national or ethno-religious contradictions and rivalries historically persisted. The development process was to produce a structure of opportunities that was inequitable. The emphasis on capital accumulation for rapid industrialization, resulted in the uneven distribution of resources to the detriment of some regions and the poor classes. And this pattern was not only in regard to the resources that were at the disposal of the state but also of the resources that originally belonged to the people or to which they had free and easy access. Initially, it was thought that these inequalities and disparities — between classes and regions — were transitory, largely due to the inevitable lag between capital accumulation and redistribution, and would dissipate with further economic growth. The pace, content and dynamics of the uneven development patterns in South Asia, rather than so much the lack of development, that has been the predominant cause of violence in South Asia. The development process resulted in unusual backwardness in some cases and relatively faster development in some cases. Both conditions have offered the grounds for the growth of violent movements. The levels of violence among the groups that have been economically neglected has not been very high. The levels of violence amongst groups that have had a perception of relative deprivation have been very high. Thus, while the violence associated with the Chakmas in Bangladesh, the Baluch movement in Pakistan, the Naxalites and some insurgent groups in North-east India has not been very intense and enduring, but the violent movements of the Sikhs

and Kashmiris in India, Muhajirs in Pakistan and the Tamils and JVP in Sri Lanka has been very intense. The reasons why these groups have been able to sustain a high level of violence is either because of the rise of a young petty bourgeois class which has been successful in articulating their demands or because of a generational shift in the leadership which has brought forward a young petty bourgeois class to the forefront in some struggles. It is ironic that it was due to the welfare measures of the states that has resulted in the emergence of such a class. Most of the South Asian states are today subjected to so much of violence because of the incapacity of the states to fulfill the aspirations of this class. The successful mobilization in support of violence that some of these groups have made is due to their command over normative and coercive resources. Groups that have been able to sustain high levels of violence have been aided bysome variable conditions like geographical location and extent of external support. These have been strong determining factors in the capacity of these groups to continue their violent campaign and stand up to counter-violence. States have been finding it difficult to respond to violence and the contestation between state and opposition groups essentially seems to be a comparison between who has a better command over normative and coercive resources. So far, with the exception of the case of the Bengali Muslims of East Pakistan, South Asian states seem to have a better hold over normative and coercive resources. There is very little indication that the violent strategies of the insurgent groups would succeed in their goals, at best it would be able to make the state a little more responsive. The overall consequences or impact of violence on state and society is overwhelming. Violence as one of the available modes of political action in the pursuit of socio-economic and political change does result in some amount of redistribution of resources. This may be viewed as positive, even though it may be against our normative cognizance, in balancing out the structural inequalities inherent or created in societies. The experience in South Asia is that the ruling classes, do in fact, succumb to the idiom of violence even while devising means and methods to cope with violence. The positive aspect is that the South Asian states have shown the capacity to sustain democratic processes and preserve democratic institutions while coping with violence. As the levels of violence have increased, so also has there been a simultaneous strengthening of the coercive state apparatus. The negative trend and probably of much more serious concern has been the ability of most of the South Asian states to make use of intangible, unformalized, extra-constitutional and extra-legal agencies of state violence in their counter-violence strategies so that the questions of legality and accountability can be side-stepped. There is a mutuality in the interaction between the politics of development and the politics of violence. The uneven development process engenders violence, and in turn violence is highly disruptive in the developmental process. It is a major factor in distracting the state from the developmental agenda. Scarce resources are consumed and lost in the containment of violence. There is little doubt that tremendous amount of developmental potential is lost in the violence-ridden societies of South Asia. Resources lost in meeting the costs of violence can be saved and invested in the growing costs of modernization. Peace and stability are preconditions to bring what is known as peace-dividends in violence-ridden societies like South Asia’s. There is no doubt that rapid economic growth is necessary for development but it is not sufficient to promote economic equity. For that, it is important to devise a set of institutions and self-regulatory mechanisms that will ensure equitable distribution.

The contradictions generated by the development process in South Asia has engendered violence. But in a mutually interacting fashion violence, on the other hand, is dysfunctional in the development process itself. Generally, the effect of violence is more noticeable on the economy but the impact of violence on political institutions and society can also have its own dynamism, in the sense in the way in which state and society react and cope with it. One of the primary concerns when one looks at state and violence is whether states have the capacity to sustain democratic institutions and processes while coping with conflict and violence. In the context of South Asia, states have been largely able to preserve the democratic order but have built mechanisms within the democratic space, or in some cases they have evolved themselves, to deal with violence. The consequences of violence are, in fact overwhelming, and states and societies have been wanting in their responses. On one side violence tends to make the state react and sensitizes it but on the other it also strengthens the coercive apparatus of the state. States can justify this strengthening on the basis of the need of the state to exercise control and dominance over society. Economic Costs of Violence The consequences of violence on development efforts is much more perceptible in its economic aspects. There is little doubt that violence retards the pace of economic growth. It can slow economic growth by destroying physical infrastructure; also by the loss of mandays, output and tax revenue; motivating talented individuals to migrate; scaring away foreign investments; extra expenditure due to managing the conflict and the rehabilitation of displaced persons. All the above consequences may not be operative simultaneously or at the same time as a consequence of violence. To what extent they would all become operative would depend on the nature and intensity of violence. A detailed and accurate estimation of economic losses suffered due to violence would be very difficult to make, it is possible to make a broad assessment on the basis of secondary sources data.1 But what is important is to know the ways in which violence can affect the economy. The violence in Kashmir has affected its development and people. It has particularly severely affected the main sector of the economy — the tourist industry. In 1988, 722,000 people visited Kashmir injecting $ 200 million into the local economy, in 1992 only 10,400 visited. Related to the tourism industry, the hotel industry has also suffered. Incomes derived from tourists by taxi-drivers, bus companies and the handicrafts trade have declined accordingly. A large number of houseboat owners have left to seek other forms of activity. The cottage industry has also been seriously effected, specifically the daily wage earners.2 In Sri Lanka, estimates of physical destruction in the north-east for the period from 1983 to July 1987 was about Rs. 23.5 billion (US $ 712 million). By 1987, the government had spent Rs. 586 million on rehabilitation of refugees. The loss from the tourism sector from 1983 to 1988 was about Rs. 17.3 billion (US $ 523 million). Foreign investments dropped from US $ 66 million in 1982 to $ 22 million in 1986.3 The Institute of Policy Studies report estimates that the total annual cost of the ethnic conflict is around US $ 2.2 billion, which is about 22 per cent of Sri Lanka’s GDP. The north east region which is rich in resources such as agriculture and fisheries, have not contributed to the economy since the outbreak of the conflict in 1983. And if the conflict continues and escalates, it may rise to 25 per cent.4 However, assessment by other experts put the loss in the violent conflict as five per cent of the GDP. If the violence can be contained, Sri Lanka could add three per cent to its GDP.5 Karachi, which is the hub of the Pakistani economy has been effected terribly by the violence. A major aspect of this is the flight of capital to other industrial centres in Punjab.6 A study

commissioned by the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) concluded that a working day lost by strike in Karachi costs Rs. 1.3 billion ($ 38 million) and in 1995 a total of 34 working days were lost as a result of strikes called by the MQM.7 Economy and Violent Strategies Economic growth and development are crucial for state support. And that is why militants and insurgents adopt a deliberate strategy of economic disruption. This strategy involves damaging state and private property, disrupting the public sector economy, and disorganizing public transport and other essential services and militarily targeting development projects which might erode the support base of the insurgents. The consequence of this is that affected states are compelled to divert their limited resources to counter the challenge posed by the insurgents. In South Asia probably no other group has successfully pursued this strategy than the JVP. In three days of rioting from 29 to 31 July 1987, as a reaction to the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord, the JVP attacked and burnt government offices and property. The government estimated the total property damage to be around Rs. 4 billion. The Ceylon Transport Board buses were the hardest hit, 453 of which were destroyed.8 The JVP’s strategy of hitting the key sectors in the economy badly hit the tea gardens in the Uva and Badulla areas and coconut and rubber estates in the south. Over 2,09,000 kilograms of tea were destroyed by the JVP in the central provinces. Tea exports is one of the main foreign exchange earners of the country, which earned Rs. 12.29 billion in 1988.9 Both the state?owned and private tea gardens were affected by the JVP. They were able to paralyze various sectors of the economy like transport, telecommunications, business, industry, banks, etc.10 By the extensive use of violence, the JVP destroyed public property worth Rs. 95,000 million.11 The Tamil militants, especially the LTTE, have also been selectively targeting physical infrastructure and hitting at key sectors which would hurt the Sri Lankan economy. By November 1985, due to several attacks the railways had lost Rs.90 million.12 In May 1986, an entire train was set on fire causing damages worth Rs.100 million.13 The state owned Air Lanka has lost two planes due to terrorist attacks by Tamil militants. More recently, the Central Bank and Oil tanks have been bombed by the LTTE causing enormous losses. The Shanti Bahini in Bangladesh, has also attempted a strategy of economic disruption, albeit at a low level.14 Its terrorist attacks were primarily targeted at developmental activity. It carried terrorist activities against the members of foreign oil companies15 or other developmental agencies working in the vicinity. This was primarily intended to discourage all kinds of developmental works in the region from which the government could reap benefits. As mentioned earlier, it also attacked government-sponsored settlements in the CHT. Security Expenditures It is very difficult to make categorical statements about how much states spend on internal security, in preserving order, in containing violence. Such expenditures are cleverly hidden under various heads. Even unofficial estimates that are available may not be very accurate and availability of data may be selective. But the idea here is only to get some estimates if not the actual costs so as to get a perspective on the impact of domestic violence. In the case of India and Pakistan, it is more difficult to come across data on internal security expenditures as they are subsumed under general defence expenditures. One cannot make a direct linkage between allocation for the defence budget and expenditures on internal security. Some assessments, nevertheless are available. In 1992, Punjab’s annual security budget had gone up from Rs. 150 million to Rs. 3 billion — an increase of almost 2000 per cent.16 By 1994, the government of India was spending about Rs. 2 crore everyday on the maintenance of security

forces in Kashmir.17 In Pakistan, the budget of the police and the paramilitary forces have been going up. In 1996, the budget of the police was Rs. 2,744 million and the Rangers Rs. 1,809 million. An expenditure of Rs. 20 million per day.18 In small countries like Sri Lanka, it is much more easy to link the rising defence expenditures and internal policing or war as one may view it. Between 1978 and 1982, there was a two fold increase in the military expenditure from Rs. 560 million to Rs. 1118 million but in the next five years there was a 700 per cent increase in the defence expenditure rising to Rs. 11.4 billion.19 As a share of the total expenditure, defence expenditure had risen from 3.5 per cent in 1978 to 15.5 per cent in 1987. The defence spending in Sri Lanka has been overshooting the budget in the last two years. In 1996 the budgeted figure of Rs. 38 billion ($ 701 million) was increased by Rs. 10 billion.20 A Sri Lankan minister disclosed in 1996 that the Sri Lankan government was spending Rs.110 million a day on containing violence in the north east.21 The Bangladesh government spends huge sums of money in the CHT in the deployment of security forces and in the effort to erode the support base of the insurgents. About Taka 1.5 crore is spent everyday in the CHT by the army.22 The defence budget for 1996 was Taka 20.7 billion ($ 503 million).23 Militarization of State and Civil Society The impact of violence on the state structure is that it increases militarization of both state and civil society. It forces the already strained states to build military and paramilitary forces at the expense of other sectors. Strong military forces then have the potential to threaten democratic institutions and civil society. South Asian states have abundant experience of this process. The security forces have time and again unquestioningly followed the decision of the political leaders to get involved in domestic peacekeeping. Its only recently that in India the army has publicly expressed some amount of resentment against its being used in essentially firefighting in internal conflict situations. The army gets deployed despite a massive expansion in the strength of the paramilitary forces and the creation of specialized units to tackle insurgency. The National Security Guards (NSG) patterned on the German GSG-9 and the Rashtriya (National) Rifles drawn from the army have been created specifically so as obviate the need for the regular army to be deployed in partisan disputes. The growth in the size of the paramilitary forces has been phenomenal. The Border Security Force (BSF) which had 25 battalions when it was set up in 1965, by 1994 had 140 battalions. At present it has 149 battalions. The Central Reserve police Force (CRPF) has grown from 80 battalions in 1986 to 119 in 1994.The growth in the CRPF between 1981-91 was 55 per cent. The BSF had a growth of 35 per cent between 1986 and 1991. The Assam rifles nearly doubled from 20 to 39 between 1986 and 1991. Between 1986 and 1994, the budget of the paramilitary forces had doubled to be around Rs. 30 billion per year.24 The growth in all these units can be correlated to the escalating levels of violence in Assam, Punjab and Kashmir. In Bangladesh, since 1976 there has been a massive increase in military personnel in the CHT district. Some 30,000 regulars as well as para military forces had been massed by 1980 and a naval unit had been established on the Kaptai lake. The number of police stations had more than doubled since 1976 from 12 to 28.25 Two-thirds troops of the Bangladesh army are believed to be in the CHT.26 In 1992 about 50,000 military personnel were deployed in the CHT, stationed in about 400 camps.27 According to some estimates — there is atleast one member of the security forces for every ten person.28 By the end of 1995, there were five brigades of the army deployed in the CHT besides the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) and the Ansars.29 In 1976, the government had formed a CHT Development Board (CHTDB) to implement

different multi-sectoral special development projects. The programmes of the CHTDB were implemented outside the normal annual development programmes. The Commissioner of the Chittagong Division was originally the Chairman of the Board and the District Commissioner of CHT its Vice-Chairman. In March 1982, when Martial Law was imposed in the country the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Chittagong division took over as the Chairman of the board. The situation has remained unchanged despite a civilian government being in power since 1991. The powers of the Chairman are quite extensive. He assigns tasks to the Board officials and is responsible for their appointments and promotions. He controls and allocates all development funds and appoints members of the consultative committee.30 From 1979 to May 1995, the government implemented 11 special projects at a cost of 1.49 billion Takas. The government also undertakes development programmes to alleviate grievances of the tribals. Under a special five year plan (1984-85 to 1990-91), the government spent 2.8 billion Takas to implement various development programmes including road communication, telecom service, electrification, water supply, infrastructure for Jhumia rehabilitation, etc. Since the rise in violence in the ethnic conflict in only eight years the strength of the Sri Lankan armed forces increased by 500 per cent. It went up from 16,000 to 82,000.31 At present it is about 115,000.32 Weaponization of Societies The proliferation or diffusion of small arms and light weapons in large parts of the developing societies is a post-cold war reality. The demise of the cold war and the mushrooming and intensification of domestic conflicts in developing societies has resulted in what one may call the “weaponization of societies.” It is a state where a large quantity of weapons, that too automatic weapons, is in the possession of private individuals and groups. It is not very difficult nowadays for insurgent groups to acquire sophisticated weapons from the private arms market. This is a dynamic process, but states can also be held responsible in the way they have contributed in weaponizing their own societies — by promoting and arming private groups in their counter-violence programmes. It is very difficult to assess how much of these weapons are in the possession of the insurgent groups. But one thing is clear they are increasing in numbers and becoming more sophisticated. During the Operation cleanup, the MQM said that the army believed there were 81,000 Kalashnikov series of rifles in Karachi alone, and not even 81 were recovered.33 However, authorities have said that about 12,948 weapons were recovered.34 Unofficial estimates of weapons in Karachi is around 2,00,000.35 The Sri Lankan army has also distributed weapons among the settlers in the north and the east. The Bangladesh government has also trained and armed settlers in the CHT. A core group of the settlers are believed to be made up of ex-servicemen and the rest given arms and training.36 In this way vigilante groups armed by the government were among the new settlers in the area.37 Further, divisions within the tribals have been created to weaken the Shanti Bahini. For instance, a tribal group called the `Hill Council for Resisting Terrorism’ has been floated to resist the Shanti Bahini,38 which probably has the government’s support. Armed Might, Hegemony and Lack of Political Alternatives It is not very difficult to visualize the linkages between armed might, hegemony and lack of political alternatives. Capacity of insurgent groups to sustain violence for a fairly long period, challenging the monopoly of the state over violence is reflective of hegemony in society, at times leading to a situation where there does not seem to be any other alternative to the resolution of a conflict. This is the situation that Sri Lanka seems to be facing today.

Earlier, it was the JVP that had been able to create this hegemony, even though for a very brief period of time, due to its armed might. This has been done both by the JVP and the LTTE in the course of their political action by unleashing violence not only against the state but also against political rivals. And by the use of violence, they did try to create a situation where there was no alternative to them. The assassination of Vijaya Kumaratunga, the popular leader of the Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya (SLMP), and the subsequent attacks on the SLMP leadership may be interpreted as the JVP’s tactics of eliminating any other force which was gaining support within their social base — the youth. The LTTE has been far more successful in liquidating individuals and organizations which it considered as its potential enemies in its insane drive for political hegemony. Both the TELO and PLOTE were wiped out because of their dominance in terms of arms and men.39 The Invisible and not so-Invisible Structures of the Coercive State Apparatus While the deployment of security forces in the maintenance of internal security is tangible, but what is fearful and a matter of serious concern is they have been “paralleled, supplemented and subsumed by a host of extra-constitutional and extra-legal organs of state power — death squads and vigilante groups.”40 A development of frightful intensity that was witnessed during the counter-violence against the JVP. While against the tangible agencies of state violence, these are the intangible “`un-formalized’ agencies of state violence throughwhich questions of legality, constitutionality and accountability of a variety of state practices can be circumvented.”41 These developments just go to prove that even democratic states can devise ways and means to put extra teeth to their repressive state apparatus without compromising on their democratic credentials. Even democratic states can manipulate processes and institutions to expand their capacity to use coercive power. For instance in the case of India, the vast coercive apparatus of the state has been built up by laws. As against these invisible structures, there are these not so-invisible structures about which the states are not in the least shy. The Pakistan army split the MQM and created the Haqiqi faction. That this faction has no popular support is evident from the fact that it has not won a single seat in Karachi even when the MQM has boycotted elections. A large number of deaths in Karachi city are reprisal killings or extra-judicial killings.42 No one seems to know who is behind these. However, there are a large number of pointing fingers. While some Pakistan Muslim League (N) members are accusing the MQM, the MQM is openly blaming the intelligence agencies for these.43 A large number of deaths result from the clashes between the Haqiqi faction and the MQM. In Kashmir, the not so-invisible structures are former militants, armed and supported by the army, BSF or the Rashtriya Rifles. They are in fact small armies of surrendered militants who are fighting against the Pakistan trained and supported militants.44 But the fear always remain that some of them may rejoin the militant outfits again.45 Social Consequences of Violence The social consequences of violence are much more severe and has a deeper impact than the economic and political consequences. While the economic consequences are temporary and transient, they can be built up and regenerated, but the same may not be the case with the impact on individual and mass psyche. It will take a considerable longer period of time to get out of a mental frame and change attitudes in regard to experiences of violence — both as a perpetrator and as a victim. The social consequences of violence can manifest both at the material as well as the psychological level. Human Costs

According to the SIPRI Yearbook till 1995, 37,000 people had been killed in only the Sikh and Kashmir conflict in India. In Bangladesh so far 3,000 to 3,500 men have lost their lives. And in Sri Lanka 32,000 men.46 The LTTE has said that since the outbreak of the violence it has lost 9,301 men including 94 of its Black Tigers. During 1996, it claimed that it had killed 3,651 government soldiers.47 Possibly more than 50,000 people have already been killed in the ensuing violent conflict. Social Acceptance of Violence Increasingly civil society is coming to terms with political violence as an acceptable mode of political behaviour whether by the state or anti-state forces. This mass legitimization of political violence is symptomatic of the present incapacity of the society to produce indigenous arguments for non-violence. One disturbing aspect of the social acceptance of political violence is that it dehumanizes society and prepares social space for long term processes of militarization at various levels. Militarization suggests more than the strengthening of militaristic institutions directly engaged in violent conflicts. It also means the social acceptance of militarism as the legitimate and correct form of political practice in cases of crises, in resolving conflicts. Social Harmony Once societies have undergone the experience of violence, it will be fundamentally difficult to restore the previous (pre-violent stage) social harmony. Violence introduces a certain discourse in political bargaining, that it becomes the easiest resort in case of any differences, tensions and conflicts. There is a certain process that individuals and social groups also have to undergo that is disturbing — for instance, the loss of innocence of simple hill tribes. There are certain other social consequences of violence like the criminalization of political movements. Criminal elements who take advantage of violent political conflicts are not desirous of social harmony and are interested in maintaining conflict situations. State Responses Though violence is an outcome of the nature of state structures and political economy, but states have a problem in accepting this argument. “Few governments can accept the view that it was their own policy deficiencies which drove people to violence. Governments more frequently prefer to picture insurrections as caused by misguided people lured on by some false prophet or evil conspiracy. Such a characterization has the virtue of making officials appear to be on the side of reason and their enemies essentially fools.”48 Because of such a perception, therefore, it is difficult to find a coherent response to violence. Invariably, though with certain exceptions, the attempt is to explain violence as not emanating from within one’s respective societies but something that is induced from outside by enemy states or neighbouring countries that wish them to be unstable. Even though this is not an honest analysis but nevertheless, not being entirely untrue has only strengthened the resolve of the states in their justification to use force and augment and strengthen their coercive resources. None of the South Asian states have had a policy framework to respond to violence. If there has been any policy framework at all, it has been of a reactive character. States have shown a remarkable incapacity in assessing conflict situations and intervening before the onset of violence. The interventions have generally followed agitations or insurgency situations. Very rarely has there been a policy which has contained or de-escalated the levels of violence by a political response. Sometimes, the problems have been compounded by administratively manipulated solutions which reduced the scope of negotiations. Like in Assam, Congress leaders used the immigrants support as a crucial vote bank for their electoral and mobilizational success. In India, the lack of

responsiveness in general at the centre after 1980 contributed to thedesperation of some of the insurgent groups. The role of personalities has also played an important part in the kind of interventions that the state has made in various situations. Indira Gandhi’s response to the Sikh agitation and J.R. Jayewardene’s response to Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka are examples of the way in which political leaders have displayed an insensitivity in adopting a hardline approach right from the beginning in responding to emerging militancy. Increasingly, there has been a realization that without addressing the development needs of the people or sharing power there cannot be a proper response to violence. In India the Mizo National Front (MNF) was weaned back to the parliamentary process by giving substantial concessions in terms of political power. The same was the case with the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) who also accepted a compromise instead of their demand for a ‘Free Tripura’. This approach was also employed in tackling the ULFA insurgency. While some leaders and cadres were weaned and rehabilitated,49 the hardcore have not relented. Similarly, in the case of the Baluch movement, the moderate leaders were weaned by President Zia-ul-Haq and he tried a more persuasive method to tackle the problem of underdevelopment by allocating massive funds for the development of Baluchistan. The fifth five year plan (1977-1982) increased expenditure in the province fivefold. A mix of persuasive and coercive methods have characterized the policy of the Bangladesh government towards the violence by the tribal people in the CHT. On one hand, it is continuing peace talks with the leaders of the Shanti Bahini to find a political solution. At various points of time, it has declared a general amnesty to encourage the tribal insurgents to surrender on the assurance that they would be helped in rehabilitating themselves. On the other hand, the government also persists with a sophisticated counter insurgency programme. NOTES AND REFERENCES 1. Some studies have tried to evolve a methodology to study the economic costs of violence. Specifically in regard to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, see, John M. Richardson, Jr and S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe, “Measuring the Economic Dimensions of Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict,” in S. W. R. D. Samarasinghe and Reed Coughlan, Economic Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: International Perspectives (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1991), pp.194-223. The Institute of Policy Studies, Colombo, is also conducting a study to measure the economic costs of the conflict. The report is as yet not finalized but one may refer to the preliminary draft of this report. See Saman Kelegama and others, The Economic Cost of the North-East Conflict in Sri Lanka, Institute of Policy Studies, Colombo, September 1995. Richardson and Samarasinghe’s study tries to break down the consequences into three categories — primary, secondary and tertiary. Primary costs are direct consequences like destruction of physical infrastructure, security expenditures due to containing the violence, resources spent in rehabilitation, etc. Secondary costs are indirect costs — the effects of which are known only in the long run. These are due to the loss of production, investment and capital flight, etc. Tertiary costs are the medium to long term economic impacts resulting from instability, uncertainty, etc. 2. Nils Bhinda, “The Kashmir Conflict (1990-),” in Michael Cranna (ed.), The True Cost of Conflict (New York: The New Press, 1994). 3. Richardson and Samarasinghe, Op. Cit., pp.199-203. 4. Saman Kelegama and others, Op. Cit. 5. Interview of Dr. Lal Jayewardene, Economic Adviser to the President of Sri Lanka, Colombo, February 1997. Also see, “An Economy Affected by War,” Tamil Times, 15 May 1996, p.7.

6. Azhar Abbas, “Trading Places,” Herald, July 1995, pp.45-46. 7. Cited from Moonis Ahmar, “Ethnicity and State Power in Pakistan: The Karachi Crisis,” Asian Survey, vol.36, no.10, October 1996, p.1035. 8. Since the announcement of the accord on 23 July 1987, there was general unrest and a campaign against the accord by certain nationalist forces and even opposition political parties. See Rohan Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP(Kandy: Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1990), pp.233?235. 9. Seema Guha, “No JVP Indication About Cease-fire,” Times of India, 25 September 1989. 10. Gamini Navaratne, “JVP’s Firm Hold over Sri Lanka,” Times of India, 1 August 1989. 11. Daily News (Colombo), 9 May 1991. 12. S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe, “Ethnic Conflict and Economic Development in Sri Lanka,” in Paul Groves (ed.), Economic Development and Social Change in Sri Lanka: A Spatial And Social Analysis (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1996), p.278. 13. ibid. 14. Public Opinion and Trends Analyses (POT), Bangladesh Series (New Delhi), vol.18, no.259, 16 November 1993, p.1427. 15. In January 1984, the Shanti Bahini kidnapped five Shell employees. Shell stuck a deal with the Shanti Bahini to release their employees but soon after, closed its operations in Bangladesh. 16. Paul Wallace,”Political Violence and Terrorism in India,” in Martha Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism in Context (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), p.403 17. P. S. Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1994), p.100. 18. Syed Sikander Mehdi, “Pakistan: Social Development as an Imperative of National Security,” National Development and Security(Rawalpindi), vol.5, no.2, November 1996, p.55. 19. Srikant Mohapatra, “Sri Lanka: Threat Perception and Defence Build-Up,” Strategic Analysis, vol.15, no.3, June 1992, p.254. 20. “War Burden Puts Lankan Economy in the Red,” Pioneer, 18 August 1996. 21. “Rs. 110 m Spent Daily on War,” Daily Observer (Colombo), 13 March 1996. 22. Personal interviews, Dhaka, December 1996. 23. Military Balance, 1996/97, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, p.158. 24. All the above figures on the paramilitary forces have been cited from Shekhar Gupta, “India Redefines its Role: An Analysis of India’s Changing Internal Dynamics and their Impact on Foreign Relations,” Adelphi Paper, no.293, pp.34-35. 25. The Chittagong Hill Tracts: Militarization, Oppression and the Hill Tribes, Anti-Slavery Society, Indigenous Peoples and Development Series, Report No.2, 1984, p.57. 26. Personal interviews, Dhaka, December 1996. 27. “Repatriation of Refugees: Centre asked to Persuade Dhaka,” Statesman, 3 October 1992. 28. See, Syed Anwar Hussain, “Ethnicity and Security of Bangladesh,” in Iftekharuzzam (ed.), South Asia’s Security: Primacy of Internal Dimension (Dhaka: Academic Publishers, 1994), p.183. 29. “Chakma Insurgency Costs Government Taka 4 billion Per Year,” POT, Bangladesh Series, vol.20, no.272, 9 December 1995, p.1138. 30. Amena Mohsin, The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, New Hall College, Cambridge, 1995, p.131 31. Mohapatra, Op.Cit., p.250.

32. Military Balance, 1996/97, Op.Cit., p.166. 33. What Next in Sindh? What the People Say, Report by the HRCP Fact-Finding Mission, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Lahore, June 1994, p.10. 34. ibid., p.46. 35. Personal interviews, Karachi, May 1997. 36. Partho Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1989), p.77. 37. Shelton U. Kodikara, “Bangladesh”, in Shelton U. Kodikara (ed.), External Compulsions of South Asian Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 1993), p.143. 38. “New Tribal Group to Oppose Shanti Bahini,” POT, Bangladesh Series, vol.19, no.81, 8 April 1994, p.323. 39. M.R. Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1994), pp. 143, 193. 40. Jayadeva Uyangoda, “Militarization, Violent State, Violent Society: Sri Lanka,” in Kumar Rupesinghe and Khawar Mumtaz (eds.),Internal Conflicts in South Asia (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1996), p.119. 41. ibid. 42. In the month of June 1997 there were 300 killings in Karachi alone and the authorities were not able to hold anyone responsible for it. See, Idrees Bakhtiar, “Return of the Death Squads,” Herald, July 1997, pp.25-31. 43. See interview of Farooq Sattar, Senior Minister from the MQM, “When We Say Agencies, We Mean the Federal Intelligence Agencies,” Herald, July 1997, pp.31-33. 44. See, Harinder Baweja, “Kashmir: Propping Up the Enemy’s Enemy,” India Today, 15 December 1995, pp.58-61; Harinder Baweja and Ramesh Vinayak, “Jammu and Kashmir: A Dangerous Liaision,” India Today, 15 March 1996, pp.76-79; “J&K Governor Defends Pro-Govt Militant Groups,” Telegraph (Calcutta), 5 September 1996. 45. “Pro-Govt Militants `Disappear’ in J&K: May have Rejoined Secessionist Ranks,” Pioneer, 3 November 1996. 46. SIPRI Yearbook, 1996, pp.26-27. 47. “LTTE Says it Lost 9,301 Men in Conflict,” Times of India, 4 January 1997. 48. Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (New Delhi: Amerind Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1972), p.139. 49. The government is believed to have spent Rs.1.10 billion to rehabilitate ULFA cadres. Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist: Tales of War and Peace from India’s Northeast (New Delhi: Viking Publishers, 1994), p.230.

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RCSS Policy Studies 6 The Politics of Violence and ... Policy...A stark reality of South Asian politics and civil society, is that it is characterized by an increasing level of violence