Raskolnikov: Dostoevsky's Hegelian Agent

Fyodor Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment was written in 1866, but it continues to

impress readers worldwide nearly 150 years later. It is the story about Rodion Raskolnikov, a

man who murders a pawnbroker in St. Petersburg and the mental anguish that tortures him as he

comes to terms with his crime. The sophisticated tale evokes the mystique of a murder mystery,

even though the reader knows the identity of the killer from the beginning; Raskolnikov tries to

discover his true motivation and Dostoevsky reveals key pieces of Raskolnikov's psyche and

history as the plot unfolds. Like most of Dostoevsky's work, this novel evokes an underlying

moral message and reveals facets of the author's own psyche and history. This paper intends to

explore one of those facets: Georg Hegel's influence on Dostoevsky's novel, Crime and

Punishment, from a philosophical and historical context.

Dostoevsky first began exploring progressive philosophy, including Hegelianism, due to

his acute interest in romanticism. After publishing his story Poor Folk in 1846 to critical

acclaim, Dostoevsky was invited to numerous Left Hegelian meetings. Shortly thereafter, in

1849, the Russian government strictly enforced its stance on potentially terrorist groups and

Dostoevsky was incarcerated. Ultimately, as a result of association with these groups and his

experience in a Siberian prison, Dostoevsky came to sympathize less with progressivism and to

rely more on a Christian moral foundation. Crime and Punishment was both Dostoevsky's way

of responding to Hegelian sentiments of the 1840s and warning the radicals of the 1860s about

the possible negative influences of their ethics. As a result, Raskolnikov is largely an agent of

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Left Hegelianism, constructed especially from Hegel's section on “World Historical Individuals”

from Philosophy of History, utilized by Dostoevsky to illustrate a philosophy that the author

opposed. As there has been considerable debate regarding how much Dostoevsky actually

connected with Hegelian philosophy, this argument will be revealed in several steps. First, it will

illustrate the historical context of Dostoevsky's work in connection with Hegelian philosophy, so

that the reason for Dostoevsky's critique may be more fully understood. It will then juxtapose

Hegel's philosophy with the key sections of Crime and Punishment that parallel Hegelianism, so

that the reader may clearly see the correlations. Finally, it will end with an examination of those

views opposing the idea that Crime and Punishment represents a reaction to Hegelianism,

offering a case for why these views, while understandable, are inaccurate.

Dostoevsky's encounters with Hegelian social groups in the 1840s allowed him to explore

his fascination with German Romanticism, but he found Christianity, not Progressivism, most

engaging following his incarceration in Siberia from 1849 to 1854. Before inclusion into the

social circle of Vissarion Belinsky, a well-known critic of Russian literature at that time,

“Dostoevsky exhibits a horrified fascination with the theme of man's sacrilegious aspiration to

dethrone God and substitute himself in God's place” (Frank, 103, Seeds). But Dostoevsky

quickly found the Left Hegelian ethics of Belinsky troubling because he felt that they encouraged

anti-Christian sentiments, which Dostoevsky opposed. In fact, notable Dostoevsky scholar

Joseph Frank wrote that, “Dostoevsky had been deeply disturbed - indeed, on the point of tears -

when, during a conversation in 1847, Belinsky had attacked and denigrated Christ with the new

Left Hegelian arguments” (Frank, 161, Years). It is worth noting that Belinsky explored many

different philosophical ideas throughout his life, but Belinsky’s enthusiastic Left Hegelian stage

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most greatly affected Dostoevsky. Dostoevsky disliked Belinsky's philosophy; however, he

disliked Mikhail Petrashevsky's form of Left Hegelian atheism even more.

Belinsky impressed Dostoevsky, who viewed the man's negative outbursts as genuine

concern for Russian people, but Petrashevsky's cold sarcasm and scorn contributed to

Dostoevsky's move away from ideologies such as Hegelianism to an aggressively Christian

moral code. Initially, Dostoevsky held several reasons to shift from Belinsky's social circle to

Petrashevsky's group. The stifling egoism from Belinsky's circle, Belinsky’s lack of

endorsement for Dostoevsky’s works following Poor Folk, and Dostoevsky's desire for a group

with more open communication of ideas inspired Dostoevsky's decision to distance himself from

Belinsky in 1847. During this time, Dostoevsky became more familiar with the arguments of

Left Hegelianism, but “there is no evidence . . . that he ever gave way to [the sentiments]

entirely” (Frank, 117, Years). Moreover, Petrashevsky's strong emphasis on atheism and scorn

for literature discomfited Dostoevsky even more than Belinsky's ocassional anti-Christian

outbursts. But the move to the Petrashevsky circle ultimately facilitated Dostoevsky's decision

to oppose Russian progressivism, especially Left Hegelianism, for another reason. Association

with the Petrashevsky group resulted in incarceration in Siberia two years later, after the

government executed a raid versus radical groups in 1849. It was during Dostoevsky's time in

Siberia that his Christian faith rejuvenated and empowered the author.

While Dostoevsky was imprisoned in Siberia, he strengthened his faith and began to

systematically examine philosophical texts. Many of Dostoevsky's experiences in Siberia may

be gleaned from House of the Dead, but one may also discover how Siberia influenced

Dostoevsky from his other books. Because of the environment and events in prison,

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Dostoevsky's relationship with Christianity evolved tremendously. Essentially he came to

believe that a Christian conscience served as a necessary “inner barrier against a . . . deadening

of the moral sensibility” (Frank, 150, Years). Joseph Frank argued that, before Siberia,

Dostoevsky had viewed Christ as the bearer of a general canon of social change, but that later

Christ became a deeply intertwined agent who soothed the author’s intellectual and ethical angst

(Frank, 150, Years). Dostoevsky became an enemy of the radicals of the 1860s because he

feared that their ethics would destroy this idea of defense. Along with reinforcing his Christian

foundation in Siberia, Dostoevsky also begged his brother to send him multiple books with

which to begin a philosophical survey.

During the early 1850s, Dostoevsky embarked on an intellectual journey to examine

some specific earlier philosophical movements, especially Hegelianism. While in prison,

Dostoevsky contacted his brother about acquiring some books. With regard to the types of texts,

Joseph Frank noted that Dostoevsky seemed “anxious to plunge back into the past in a very

serious and systematic fashion . . . [Dostoevsky wrote,] 'slip Hegel in without fail, especially

Hegel's History of Philosophy. My entire future is tied up with that'” (Frank, 169, Years).

Dostoevsky seems to have requested Hegel's text in order to reexamine the philosophy during

this time, assumedly without the immediate influence of Hegel's combative proponents, such as

Belinsky or Petrashevsky. Historical sources have failed to show whether or not Dostoevsky

actually secured History of Philosophy, but it is likely that he desired to research the means

through which to compose an argument against Left Hegelianism, considering how strongly

Christianity affected the author during this time. Although we do not know for certain if

Dostoevsky obtained the book, his negative heroes in later works indicate that he succeeded.

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Dostoevsky could not have constructed negative heroes like Radion Raskolnikov without an

intimate knowledge of Hegelianism, which historical sources have illustrated that he did not

achieve solely during association with earlier progressive circles.

Dostoevsky's experiences with Left Hegelianism in the 1840s alone could not have

supported the substantial paralellism between the vision of his negative heroes and Hegelian

views. On this subject, Frank even commented that, “if Dostoevsky had no effective answer to

Belinsky in 1845, he amply made up for it later by the creation of his negative heroes” (Frank,

198, Seeds). These subjects “engage in the impossible and self-destructive attempt to transcend

the human condition, and to incarcerate the Left Hegelian dream of replacing the God-man by

the Man-god” (Frank, 198, Seeds). Crime and Punishment illuminated the problems Dostoevsky

perceived in Left Hegelianism. Raskolnikov attempts to transcend humanity based upon his

theory of extraordinary individuals and by arguing that these gods or supermen among ordinary

citizens were capable of righteously committing negative acts. Deluded by his perception of

righteousness, Raskolnikov murders a pawn broker, leading him down a self-destructive path

that lasts merely seven days before its conclusion. Shadowing Dostoevsky's experiences,

Raskolnikov later finds redemption in suffering and Christianity while incarcerated, according to

Dostoevsky's own ethos. Echoing the Hegelian sentiments of men like Belinsky, Raskolnikov is

an effective negative hero, but not a Hero in the Hegelian sense.

Georg Hegel wrote in Philosophy of History that Heroes are great people who naturally

further the teleological, or progressive, world by contributing an idea that is simultaneously

uniquely their own and the best of their time. He called these figures both Heroes and “World

Historical Individuals,” and included men such as Julius Caesar, Napoleon Bonaparte, and

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Alexander the Great in their ranks (Hegel, 42). By defining these people, Hegel classified and

categorized two groups of historical agents with different roles. Essentially, there are notable

cases of Heroes and there are unremarkable cases of mundane individuals, being everyone else

accounted for within society.

Hegel wrote about several differences between Heroes and mundane people. A mundane

group of people seeks to establish and secure a community in order to facilitate its own ends,

which usually includes a focus on comfort. Furthermore, these people work toward building

harmony, establishing permanency, and generally upholding the rules given to them by their

predecessors. This is not the role of Heroes. According to Hegel, Heroes inspire and fulfill a

radical shift in society during the period with which they are associated (Hegel, 42). Often

largely unaware of their impact on society, they act according to their own benefit, like mundane

people, but toward different ends. Heroes are passionate agents who derive their vocation from

themselves and gather enough power to shape the world in the image of their own interests.

Ultimately, these individuals produce significant, changing conditions that reflect their personal

concerns (Hegel, 43). According to Hegel, they are thoughtful people whose enterprises

originate from an abstract source about a requirement of their age. Once they glean this

characteristic, all further aims are intended toward nothing else (Hegel, 43). This is one of the

central points of Hegel's argument because it contains both the reason why Heroes achieve

greatness and the unique property through which they succeed.

Although Heroes are interested in private gain, they derive their larger success from an

unconscious impulse that Hegel called geist, or Spirit. Unfortunately, this central characteristic

of Hegel's argument is also fairly elusive. One may define geist as an Idea, or historical medium,

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transmitted through the process of Nature to the Spirit within a Hero that interprets the message

(Stillman, 13). Essentially, Spirit is the term used to describe the impetus for historical events.

But to understand how this idea connects with Crime and Punishment, one must understand the

relationship between Hegel's terms: Idea, Nature, and Spirit. Chenxi Tang, a German

Romanticism scholar, explained this relationship by articulating that it is “treated first as a

structure of thought” (Tang, 237). This structure of thought is the Idea, or historical medium,

which originates from an abstract force. The historical medium, Tang wrote, “informs nature and

comes to realize itself through nature” (Tang, 237). Nature, for Hegel, was the inevitable or

teleological progression from one stage of existence to another.

In a historical context, the ultimate goal of Nature is the progression of Spirit, which

results in civilization, laws, and modernity. But Nature does not evolve naturally; it progresses

through the foundation of Idea, and eventually “[comes] to the fore in subjective consciousness”

(Tang, 237). This consciousness may take several forms, according to Romanticism, but Hegel

notably argued that Heroes realize the Idea subconsciously through an agent within themselves:

Spirit. In essence, it is from this that Heroes derive their master passion, which leads them to

will and accomplish great things (Hegel, 44). Spirit signifies that connection between Heroes

and the will of the historical medium. Using Spirit, Hegel justified how Heroes may commit

monstrous acts, such as mass murder. In Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov closely echoes

this theory of “World Historical Individuals.”

In Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov writes an essay that describes the status of

ordinary and extraordinary people in the world. Magistrate Porfiry Petrovitch is the first

character to reveal it in the novel, saying that, “Ordinary men have to live in submission, have no

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right to transgress the law, because, don’t you see, they are ordinary. But extraordinary men have

a right to commit any crime and to transgress the law in any way just because they are

extraordinary” (Dostoevsky, 263). Petrovitch immediately takes the theory to an extreme level,

for which Raskolnikov corrects him by replying that “extraordinary people are not always bound

to commit breaches of morals” (Dostoevsky, 264)

Raskolnikov argues that an extraordinary person has the right to commit certain crimes,

based upon “his own conscience,” when fulfilling his or her idea, theory, or, as Hegel would term

it, Spirit. He continues this thought by stating, “Newton would have had the right, would indeed

have been in duty bound . . . to eliminate a dozen or a hundred men for the sake of making his

discoveries known to the whole of humanity” (Dostoevsky, 264). He furthers his reasoning in a

manner similar to Hegel, commenting that Newton would not have had a right to murder people

whenever and if he desired or to regularly steal; it was only for the sake of fulfilling his Spirit

that Newton had the right. Raskolnikov further commits himself to the position as a Hegelian

agent by introducing his example of Napoleon.

Raskolnikov comments that extraordinary people may commit some criminal acts justly.

He begins by commenting that all world leaders are criminals because they depose old,

sometimes sacred laws for their new ones and, in some cases, even commit bloodshed.

Raskolnikov argues that Heroes such as Napoleon “must from their very nature be criminals . . .

otherwise it’s hard for them to get out of the common rut; and to remain in the common rut is

what they can’t submit to . . . and to my mind they ought not, indeed, to submit to it”

(Dostoevsky, 264). Parallel with Hegel's argument, Raskolnikov argues for a position of

individuals who transcend common moral actions based upon the greater quality of their actions,

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which Hegel addressed in Philosophy of History.

Hegel argued from the position of good will, which holds that criminal acts may or may

not be justifiable. Hegel wrote that nothing can inform an individual about what is right except

for one's own conscience (Houlgate, 193). It is an individual's responsibility to examine the

conscience and determine what is right or good. Therefore, murdering for the sake of murder,

for personal gain, or for sadistic pleasure are wrong actions because they are not intended to be

good. But murder for the purpose of relieving or preventing suffering, or to save an innocent life

can be good if the conscience deems that it is so (Houlgate, 194). Stephen Houlgate in his book

on Hegel stated this simply, “What ultimately makes me a moral individual, for Hegel, is the

knowledge that I cannot go wrong as long as I will what my conscience tells me is good”

(Houlgate, 194). This position allows Heroes like Napoleon to murder freely and openly. Since

they are Heroes, they are driven by the Spirit, and so their acts are justified by the conscience,

which understands the acts to be good and inviolable. This particular theory served as a strong

base from which the character of Raskolnikov from Crime and Punishment was created.

However, Raskolnikov argues that a crime is still punishable regardless of what class of

individual committed the act.

Raskolnikov states that an individual who commits a crime is subject to punishment. He

reveals this position during the initial conversation regarding his theory. Raskolnikov says that

everyone who commits criminal acts suffers, even those who have the right to do so. He argues

that, if they are an ordinary individual then, “they castigate themselves, for they are very

conscientious . . . They will impose various public acts of penitence upon themselves with a

beautiful and edifying effect” (Dostoevsky, 266). However, even if the person is in the

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extraordinary class, Raskolnikov is confident about their suffering. He comments that, “pain and

suffering are always inevitable for a large intelligence and a deep heart. The really great men

must, I think, have great sadness on earth" (Dostoevsky, 268-269). Ultimately, regardless of

whether the act was just or not, committing a crime will result in suffering. This theory is very

telling about Raskolnikov's own state of mine during both the stages leading up to the murder

and his illness and rage following the act. But the idea of a criminal demanding his own

punishment is not a unique idea; Hegel made the same argument in Philosophy of Right.

Hegel wrote a very strong parallel argument to Raskolnikov's position in Crime and

Punishment. He argued that:

Beccarria's requirement that men should give their consent to being punished is right

enough, but the criminal gives his consent already by his very act. The nature of the

crime, no less than the private will of the criminal, requires that the injury initiated by the

criminal should be annulled. (Jones, 516)

According to Hegel, just as Raskolnikov, there exists an inherent quality in a criminal act

that inspires the perpetrator to seek punishment. This might be part of the reason why Hegel

argued that it is unnatural for Heroes to be happy. Hegel wrote that, “[Heroes] attained no calm

enjoyment; their whole life was labor and trouble; their whole nature was nought else but their

master-passion” (Hegel, 44). Guided by the invisible force of Spirit, individuals are moved to

obtain their passion, even when it leads them to act in monstrous ways. This anxiety leads to

another state Raskolnikov suffered in Crime and Punishment.

Raskolnikov feels unhappy and anxious as he is moved by what he perceives to be an

invisible power to kill the pawnbroker. Leading up to the murder, he feels that the desire was

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both stronger than him and somehow natural. But the state was simultaneously stressful and

filled Raskolnikov with despair, as if approaching his doom. During this time, Raskolnikov

perceives himself as going through the same trials and negative life experiences that Hegel

outlined for Heroes. Furthermore, the force that Raskolnikov believes guided him to commit the

crime is exactly that sense of Spirit that Hegel argued moved men to act, largely unknown to

them.

Lastly, Raskolnikov admits that the categories utilized to divide people into ordinary and

extraordinary are fairly arbitrary. He states that the important structure is that they are based on

“laws of nature,” which either imparts one with the “gift or talent to utter a new word” or does

not (Dostoevsky, 267). He finishes his description by mentioning that Heroes could find in their

consciences a sanction for “wading through blood,” if it meant fulfilling their missions.

Raskolnikov's essay is the clearest Hegelian argument from Crime and Punishment, but it is not

the only one in the text.

Toward the beginning of Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov overhears two gentlemen

discussing the moral properties of killing the pawnbroker who Raskolnikov later murders. A

student and an officer discuss several characteristics of the pawnbroker, especially her negative

qualities, including how coldly she treats late payments, the interest she charges, and the abuse of

her sister. Without provocation, the student mentions that he could kill the pawnbroker and make

off with her money “without the faintest conscience-prick” (Dostoevsky, 68). The officer laughs

but the student continues by describing the pawnbroker as an old, spiteful woman who basically

throws money away instead of helping the poor and sickly. As the student grows more heated,

the officer interrupts him by asking if the student could actually kill the pawnbroker. The student

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corrects himself by replying that he was arguing whether or not the act was just, but that he could

not kill her (Dostoevsky, 69). With this statement, he illuminates that facet from Hegelian

philosophy that examines the value of normally immoral acts, such as murder, for moral

intentions by utilizing the guidance of conscience. The student's conscience signals that it was

not a just act, so he answered that he would not commit murder. This conversation also alludes

to Raskolnikov's later ethical issues following the murder. From these examples, the parallels

between Hegel and Dostoevsky are outlined fairly clearly. But some scholars have argued that

one can make no distinctive connection between the two authors.

Malcolm Jones wrote in his article, “Some Echoes of Hegel in Dostoevsky,” that

Hegelian philosophy does not appear in Dostoevsky's writing, succinctly summarizing other

critics' objections. He held that many of Dostoevsky’s contemporaries prior to the incarceration

were fascinated by Hegelian ethics, but that there is no written record of Dostoevsky ever having

gotten a chance to read the texts (Jones, 504). Although Dostoevsky requested Hegel’s History

of Philosophy while he was in Siberia, Jones argued that there is no historical evidence of

Dostoevsky having read the book. Furthermore, Jones argued that many of those examples in

Crime and Punishment cited as Hegelian ideas were different enough that they fail to

substantiate the claim.

A more in-depth reading of both Hegel’s History of Philosophy and Dostoevsky's Crime

and Punishment reveals that not only do Jones's claims fail to refute the connection, but that they

actually aid his opponents' arguments. Jones cited three specific differences between the two

texts, including the role and ideas of Heroes. First, Jones argued that Hegel's World Historical

Figures achieve and collect the best deeds and words of their age, while implying that the ideas

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do not originate with the Hero. In contrast, Raskolnikov specifically argues that the

extraordinary man bears the new idea (Jones, 515). However, after his original introduction of

Heroes, Hegel continued the description, writing that “they draw the impulse of life from

themselves . . . [World Historical Figures] know this nascent principle” (Hegel, 43). Hegel

clearly stated that Heroes took the ideas from themselves. If it is a nascent principle, then it is a

principle having come into existence from the Hero, not simply the best collected views of the

Hero's time.

Jones's second criticism compared the perspective of Dostoevsky's Raskolnikov and the

Hegelian idea. Jones argued that, “Raskolnikov does not see himself . . . as participating in the

unfolding of the Idea” (Jones, 515). However, Jones’s position actually undermines his own

argument. According to Hegel, Heroes are unaware of their position. They act according to their

own impulses and the drive of Spirit, but without knowledge of their overall historical position

(Hegel, 43). Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment does not utilize Hegel's argument,

Dostoevsky does; Raskolnikov is the agent through which Dostoevsky portrays the Hegelian

idea. Therefore, if Raskolnikov does not view himself as a participant of the Idea, then he is

portrayed as an even stronger Hegelian figure, as constructed by Dostoevsky.

Lastly, Jones argued that Raskolnikov does not ultimately become a Hero, and that the

epilogue of Crime and Punishment does not portray Raskolnikov within the framework of

Hegelian philosophy. The first half of his claim is true, but that point is central to Dostoevsky's

entire argument. Jones wrote that, “Raskolnikov's story is not that of a superman, of a world-

historical individual” (Jones, 514). Raskolnikov was a man who tried to become a superman and

failed either to achieve or arguably even wholly define his goals. But Dostoevsky did not agree

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with Hegelian ethics; he designed Raskolnikov as a portrayal of the Hegelian idea that fails – and

quickly, considering that most of the novel takes place within a month. Although Raskolnikov

enacts his, and therefore Hegel's, portrayal of a Hero, the result is that ultimately the theory was

flawed, according to Dostoevsky, which is why Raskolnikov did not achieve the Hegelian ideal

of Hero following the conclusion of Crime and Punishment.

Malcolm Jones held that there is neither enough contextual evidence to suggest that

Crime and Punishment was influenced predominately by Hegel, opposed to the more general,

popular philosophy existent during that time, nor historical evidence that proves Dostoevsky

actually read the Hegelian texts. However, other experts have proven that Hegel's philosophy

was a unique vision. Raskolnikov was not an agent of general Idealism or Romanticism; he was

largely a unique Hegelian construction, and there are some notable ways in which Hegel

separated himself from contemporary thinkers. Chenxi Tang wrote that Hegel moved beyond,

“the Romantic Spinozism that explains nature and spirit in terms of monist metaphysics. It does

not provide a naturalistic account of spirit in the sense that spirit emerges from the development

of nature” (Tang, 238). Unlike other Romanticists, Hegel argued that Nature could not

communicate directly with the human sphere; social communication through the Spirit was the

only way Nature could connect with humans. Furthermore, Hegel argued that, “the geographic

conditions of a particular people's habitat help to define the role it plays in world history” (Tang,

238). During that time, popular Romanticism did not connect natural forces and particular ideas

in the same way as Hegel, especially not through his “World Historical Individuals” theory.

These very differences between Hegel and Romanticism help to define Raskolnikov's position

and philosophy from Crime and Punishment.

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Utilizing Crime and Punishment to illustrate the potentially harmful impact of Left

Hegelian ethics, Fyodor Dostoevsky sought to warn radicals against progressive ideas that could

end in calamity. Although Dostoevsky had personally experienced the negative effects of

revolutionary socialist thought, he did not endeavor to vilify the Left Hegelian persona in order

to realize some vendetta against Hegelian groups. Dostoevsky believed it was imperative that he

inform the curious public about the possible dangers of their inquiries in order to help them. In

The Miraculous Years, Joseph Frank effectively defined Dostoevsky's ambition:

In Crime and Punishment, [Dostoevsky] would take the sporadic questionings to such

impoverished representatives of the educated youth, struggling desperately to keep their

heads above water amid the imperial splendors of Petersburg, and raise them to the level

of a tragic confrontation between man's ambition to change the world for the better and

the age-old moral imperatives of the Christian faith. (Frank, 79, Miraculous)

Dostoevsky sensed a great need for Russian youth to critically analyze their liberal

actions and ideas and he wrote Crime and Punishment largely as a tool to further his

conservative campaign toward tempering their progressive views. In order to support his ideas,

Dostoevsky used Hegelian philosophy to create a character who fails in the ways that

Dostoevsky feared that the Russian radicals could fail. Dostoevsky constructed Raskolnikov

partly based upon his unique experiences with and understanding of Left Hegelianism.

Dostoevsky shared an acute intimacy with his character Raskolnikov, and that required an

intimate knowledge of Hegelian philosophy. Raskolnikov illustrates multiple facets of

Dostoevsky's life: his difficulties in St. Petersburg, his struggles in prison, and his eventual,

secure acceptance of Christian ethics. But Raskolnikov also illustrates Dostoevsky's fear of a

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people whose ambitions were not balanced by the moral foundation of Christianity. Raskolnikov

is Dostoevsky's agent of Left Hegelianism, created to intimate how an individual with a strong

moral purpose may make the wrong decisions without the right ethical structure. Dostoevsky

utilized the philosophy of Georg Hegel for historical and contextual reasons, which was a clear

decision due to Dostoevsky's history and clearly ascertained in the context of Crime and

Punishment.

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Works Cited

Dostoevsky, Fyodor. Crime and Punishment. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1951.

Frank, Joseph. Dostoevsky: The Miraculous Years. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

Frank, Joseph. Dostoevsky: The Seeds of Revolt. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Frank, Joseph. Dostoevsky: The Years of Ordeal. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.

Hegel, Georg. Introduction to the Philosophy of History. Scotts Valley: IAP, 2009.

Houlgate, Stephen. An Introduction to Hegel. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005.

Jones, Malcolm. (1971) “Some Echoes of Hegel in Dostoevsky.” The Slavonic and East

European Review. Dec 7 2010.

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Stillman, Peter G. Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit. Albany: State University of New York Press,

1987.

Tang, Chenxi. The Geographic Imagination of Modernity: Geography, Literature, and

Philosophy in German Romanticism. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.

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