Ramelli the Divine as Inaccessible Object of Knowledge in Ancient Platonism

The Divine as Inaccessible Object of Knowledge inAncient Platonism: A Common Philosophical

Pattern across Religious Traditions

Ilaria Ramelli

I. INTRODUCTION

The notion of the divine as an inaccessible object of human knowledgeand reasoning is prominent in philosopherstheologians of the first fourcenturies ce who display a refined cognitive approach to religion and asophisticated treatment of the problem of theo-logy. Greek means reasoning and speaking () about the divine (), but if thedivine is unknowable, how can theology work? Notably, these thinkers allbelong to the same philosophical tradition, that of Platonism (so-calledMiddle Platonism and Neoplatonism), but they come from three differentreligious traditions. Philo of Alexandria (first century bce to first centuryce) comes from Judaism, in particular Hellenistic Judaism. Plotinus (thirdcentury ce) comes from so-called paganism, a general term for ancientcultic traditions other than Judaism and Christianity that is more usefulthan correct from the point of view of historians of religions.1 Finally, Ori-gen of Alexandria (second to third centuries ce) and Gregory of Nyssa

1 For a discussion of paganism/Hellenism as religion or culture in late antiquity seee.g. Aaron P. Johnson, Religion and Identity in Porphyry of Tyre. The Limits of Hellen-ism in Late Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); also Johnson,Ethnicity and Argument in Eusebius Praeparatio Evangelica (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2006); Johnson, Porphyrys Hellenism, in Le traite de Porphyre contre les chret-iens, ed. Sebastien Morlet (Paris: Institut dEtudes Augustiniennes, 2011), 16581.

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(fourth century ce) come from Christianity. Philo was a Jewish Platonist,Plotinus a pagan Platonist, and Origen and Gregory of Nyssa wereChristian Platonists.

Notwithstanding their affiliations to different religious traditions, thesethinkers reflections on the divine as an impossible cognitive object forhumans are remarkably homogeneous. It will be argued that this homoge-neity is mainly due to their common philosophical tradition, which pro-vides them with a shared epistemological and ontological pattern. All ofthese philosopher-theologians share a dialectic and a tension between adeclared apophaticismthe awareness that the divine is indeed an inacces-sible object of knowledge and expression for humansand a discourseabout the divine in which they nevertheless engage. It will therefore be nec-essary to clarify this dialectic. This will not have to be sought on the reli-gious plane, since the dialectic at stake is trans-religious and common to allof these imperial and late antique Platonists.

II. PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

All of these thinkers were both philosophers and theologians. From ourpost-Kantian perspective, philosophy and theology are two independentdisciplines, with different methodologies and objects, but this was not thecase in late antiquity. From the viewpoint of Patristic philosophers, andespecially Origen and Gregory of Nyssa, the study of God, i.e. theology,was the culmination of philosophy. This is why Origen did not teach theol-ogy without having taught the rest of philosophy first, and why he bannedatheistic philosophical schools from his teaching, as his disciple GregoryThaumaturgus attests in his panegyrical oration for Origen. In his Com-mentary on the Song of Songs prol. 3.24 Origen, after dividing philosophyinto ethics (ethica), physics (physica), epoptics (epoptica), and logic (log-ica), posited epoptics as the crowning glory of philosophy.2 Epoptics is thebranch of philosophy that investigates the divine and heavenly things(epoptica de divinis et caelestibus), that is, theology. Thus Origen regarded

Michael York, Paganism as Root-Religion, The Pomegranate 6 (2004): 1118 classifiesreligions as gnostic, dharmic, Abrahamic, and pagan; cf. York, Pagan Theology: Pagan-ism as a World Religion (New York: New York University Press, 2003).2 Origen, Commentary on the Song of Songs prol. 3.24. I will cite all sources in classicalstyle, whenever book, chapter, and/or paragraph numbers are available. I will make anexception only when page and/or column or line numbers are the sole citation formavailable.

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Ramelli The Divine in Ancient Platonism

theology as part and parcel of philosophy, its highest part in fact, on theone hand; and on the other hand made it clear that theology could not bestudied alone, without philosophical bases. In his Homilies on Genesis14.3, too, he admitted that the learned of this world thanks to the studyof philosophy [per eruditionem philosophiae] were able to grasp manytruths.3 Among these truths he included theological tenets. For instance,many philosophers write that God is one [unum esse Deum] and createdeverything [cuncta creaverit]. In this respect they agree with Gods Law.Some also add that God both made and governs all by means of his Logos[per Verbum suum], and it is Gods Logos that regulates all.4 Origen inthis passage cited the traditional (Stoic) division of philosophy into logic,physics, and ethics, but interestingly ascribed to logic the realm of meta-physics and theology as well: Logic is that part of philosophy which con-fesses God the father of all.5 The incongruence results from the fact thatthe tripartite division of philosophy was Stoic, and in Stoic immanentismboth metaphysics and theology were reduced to physics. But Origen, whowas no immanentist, could by no means accept such a reduction.

For Philo, theology was essentially exegesis of Scripture, which is allabout God, and this interpretation was to be performed through the lensesof philosophy, especially Platonism. His attention focused primarily onthe Bible, as Valentin Nikiprowetzky, David Runia, Peder Borgen, andDavid Winston have rightly emphasized.6 Philos approach was thereforeexegetico-theological, but philosophy offered him an indispensable frame-work for his exegesis. In Plotinuss view, too, philosophy included the inves-tigation of the divine realm, which was metaphysics at its highest level.Indeed, Aristotle himself treated theology as a synonym of metaphysics asopposed to physics: Three are the theoretical branches of philosophy: math-ematics, physics, and theology [, , ].7 Thus,Plotinuss discourse on the Oneattempted, suggestive, and limited at thesame time, as will be pointed out shortlyis both protological and theolog-ical.

3 Origen, Homilies on Genesis 14.3.4 Origen, Homilies on Genesis 14.3.5 Origen, Homilies on Genesis 14.3.6 Peder Borgen, Philo of Alexandria (Leiden: Brill, 1997); Valentin Nikiprowetzky, Lex-ege`se de Philon dAlexandrie, Revue dHistoire et de Philosophie Religieuses 53 (1973):30929; Nikiprowetzky, Le commentaire de lecriture chez Philon dAlexandrie (Leiden:Brill, 1977); David T. Runia, review of La philosophie de Mose, by Richard Goulet,Journal of Theological Studies 40 (1989): 588602; Runia, Philo of Alexandria. On theCreation of the Cosmos According to Moses (Leiden: Brill, 2001); David Winston, Philoand the Wisdom of Solomon on Creation, Revelation, and Providence, in Shem in theTents of Japhet, ed. James Kugel (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 10930.7 Aristotle, Metaph. 1026a18.

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III. PHILO

Philo of Alexandria interpreted the Hebrew Bible (in its Greek translation,the Septuagint or LXX) in the light of Platonic philosophy, and indeed hehas many themes in common with so-called Middle Platonism.8 He couldread Scripture with Platonic lenses thanks to an allegorical interpretation.This is what Christian interpreters of the Bible such as Origen and Gregoryof Nyssa would do as well. However, unlike some extreme Jewish Hellenis-tic allegorists against whom he seems to have reacted, Philo did not rejectthe historical aspect of Scripture. He kept both the historical and the alle-gorical planes at the same time.9

Likewise, the roots of Philos apophaticism and mysticism, too, arefound in his biblical exegesis.10 Philo interpreted some biblical episodes asthe allegorical expression of the necessity of apophaticism: this meant theawareness of the limit of human cognitive and discursive-expressive powerwhen it came to the divinity in itself, that is, its nature or essence as distinctfrom its activities and their products. This clearly presupposed a transcen-dent notion of the divinity, which squares with Platonism but not with animmanentistic system such as Stoicism (the latter influenced Philo as well,but more on the ethical than the ontological plane). These allegoricalexpressions appeared precisely in passages which have been fruitfully com-pared11 with the parallel interpretations of Origen and Gregory of Nyssa.This meant that there was a strong continuity in this respect between Philo,Origen, and Gregory of Nyssa.

Indeed, Philo inspired Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Gregory ofNyssa with the principle that the divinity is unknowable in its essence(upsilonlenis), and therefore also ineffable, but knowable through its activity.Indeed, What Is cannot be grasped from itself alone, without anythingelse, but only through its works, either qua creator or qua ruler.12 The

8 I limit myself to referring to the synthesis offered by David T. Runia, Philon dAlexan-drie, in Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, ed. Richard Goulet, vol. 5/a (Paris:CNRS, 2011), 36390.9 See Ilaria L.E. Ramelli, The Philosophical Stance of Allegory in Stoicism and its Recep-tion in Platonism, Pagan and Christian: Origen in Dialogue with the Stoics and Plato,International Journal of the Classical Tradition 18 (2011): 33571.10 On the relation between biblical exegesis and mysticism see Steven Katz,Mysticism andSacred Scripture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).11 See Ilaria Ramelli, Philosophical Allegoresis of Scripture in Philo and Its Legacy inGregory of Nyssa, Studia Philonica Annual 20 (2008): 5599.12 upsilonacute upsilonlenis !, "# # % & % , Philo, Abraham 122

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Godhead in itself is ineffable, unintelligible, impossible to grasp 13; inThe Special Laws 1.32 Philo gives up determining what is Gods essenceor upsilonlenis.14 Even the epithets that are ascribed to God in the Bible do notdescribe Gods very essence (upsilonlenis), that is, Gods true nature or upsilonacute,but rather Gods relationship to the creation. These two aspects are keptdistinct from one another.

What humans can know about God is that God is, 15 but notwhat Godis. Because of Gods transcendence, human intellects cannot grasp thedivine essence, but some help to this end can come from the revelation ofGod in Scripture.16 For Philo, just as for Clement, Origen, and Gregory,divine revelation in Scripture represents an important factor that moderatesnegative theology. It is a gnoseological factor in that it allows human beingsto know something of the divinity, which would otherwise be precluded.This cognitive factor, however, is subject to strict rules of interpretation.Allegoresis, in the sense of the allegorical exegesis of the sacred textinthis case, that of Scripture, but in the case of pagan Neoplatonists, forinstance, poetry and various forms of traditional myths and ritualsis thekey to grasping the true meaning of the Bible, but it is also a key availableto few, those who master this hermeneutical tool. This tendency to exclusiv-ity in relation to allegoresis is particularly evident in Clement and, to adegree, in Origen, but also in pagan Middle Platonists and Neoplato-nists, from Plutarch to Porphyry to Sallustius, who cherished allegoresis.

Just as Clement, Origen, and Gregory of Nyssa after him, Philo baseshis apophatic theology on Exod. 20:21, the passage in which Moses entersthe darkness where God is: Now the people were standing at a distance,but Moyses went into the darkness where God was. Philo and his follow-ers interpret this darkness () as a reference to Gods unknowability.17

Non-seeing is a metaphor of human cognitive impairment before the divine.

13 Philo, The Changing of Names 10; 15. On Gods ineffability in Philo see Sean Mc-Donough, YHWH at Patmos: Rev. 1:4 in its Hellenistic and Early Jewish Setting (Tubingen:Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 7984. For the Middle-Platonic background of the idea of Godsineffability in Philo: R. M. Garca, La concepcion de Albino y Apuleio de los atributosdel Dios transcendente, con especial referencia al termino arrhetos, in Arrhetos Theos:Lineffabilita` del primo principio nel medio platonismo, ed. Francesca Calabi (Pisa: ETS,2002), with review in Stylos 14 (2005): 17782; also Anna Passoni DellAcqua, Inno-vazioni lessicali e attributi divini: una caratteristica del Giudaismo alessandrino?, in LaParola di Dio cresceva, ed. Rinaldo Fabris (Bologna: Dehoniane, 1998), 87108.14 Cf. Philo The Special Laws 1.43; God Is Immutable 62; The Posterity of Cain 15.15 Exod. 3:14: I am The One Who Is. See Philo The Life of Moses 1.75. Translationfrom NETS (New English Translation of the Septuagint), throughout.16 Philo The Allegories of the Laws 3.100.17 Philo The Posterity of Cain 14; The Changing of Names 7.

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It is a metaphor of apophaticism, that is to say, the awareness that thehuman logos (word and thought) cannot grasp and express the divinity.This is a remarkable limitation to theo-logy (-), reasoning anddiscourse on the divine. The divinity in its own nature is an inaccessibleobject of human intellectual sight, that is, of human epistemic equipment.

In Exod. 33:2023, God says to Moses that he will be unable to see hisface, but he will only see his back: You shall not be able to see my face.For a person shall never see my face and live. . . . You shall stand on therock. Now, whenever my glory passes by, then I will put you in a hole ofthe rock, and I will cover you with my hand until I pass by. And I will takemy hand away, and then you shall see my hind parts, but my face will notappear to you. By means of his allegorical exegesis, Philo refers this pas-sage, as well, to Gods unknowability.18 Philos interpretationwhich, aswill be pointed out, was followed by Origen and Gregory of Nyssais thatGods existence is easy to grasp, whereas Gods essence is unknowable.However, the search for God is the noblest among human activities. Thus,the cognitive impairment of human beings before the divine should not stoptheir theo-logical investigation. In On Flight 165, too, Philo interpretsExod. 33:23 (you shall see my hind parts, but my face will not appear toyou) in the sense that only what is behind God, at his back, is know-able to human beings:

God says: You will see my back parts [# (], but my face[ ] you will not behold. For it is sufficient for thewise man to know what comes after and follows [# "* ], and the things which are after God [+ # ]; but he who wishes to see the principal Essence [ '/ upsilonlenis] will be blinded by the exceeding brilliancy ofits rays before he can see it.19

The visual metaphor of blindness due to the excessive brightness of thedivine essence is typical of Philo.20 As will be demonstrated below, Gregoryof Nyssa followed Philo in his exegesis of precisely this biblical passage in

18 Philo The Special Laws 1.32.50.19 Philo On Flight 165.20 Francesca Calabi, La luce che abbaglia: una metafora della inconoscibilita` di Dio inFilone, in Origeniana, vol. 8, Origene e la tradizione alessandrina, ed. Lorenzo Perrone(Leuven: Peeters, 2003), 22332.

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reference to apophaticism; more specifically, Gregory read Philos wordsthrough the filter of Origen.21

IV. PLOTINUS

Like the Jewish exegete Philo, the pagan Neoplatonist Plotinus was alsoconvinced that it was impossible for human beings to comprehend anddescribe the essence of God. This is the supreme principle, what Plotinuscalls the One or 0E. For him, humans can only cognitively grasp, under-stand and express what is around the divinity and what concerns it or# * upsilonlenis (exactly this notion will appear again in the writings ofGregory of Nyssa, who was very well acquainted with Plotinuss thought).Already Numenius, a Neopythagorean and Middle Platonist well known toPlotinus as well as to Origen, maintained that the first Intellect [],which is called absolute Being, is entirely unknown to humans. 22 TheOne, however, for Plotinus is even beyond Being, just as it is beyond theIntellect (N). The latter proceeds from the One as a second hypostasisor principle, but the One is above it.

According to Plotinus, human cognitive sight and language imply aseparation between the subject who sees and speaks, and the object of thissight and speaking. As a result, human intellection and language pertainnot to the One, but to duality; as such, they begin only at the level of theIntellect, one step after the One.23 Therefore, the One, the supreme principle

21 David Bradshaw, The Vision of God in Philo of Alexandria, American Catholic Phil-osophical Quarterly 72 (1998): 483500. Philo was received in Patristic mysticism morethan in ancient Jewish mysticism; on the latter see e.g. Peter Schaefer, The Hidden andManifest God: Some Major Themes in Early Jewish Mysticism (Albany: SUNY Press,1992); Daniel Matt, Varieties of Mystical Nothingness: Jewish, Christian, and BuddhistPerspectives, Studia Philonica Annual 9 (1997): 31631; Joseph Dan, Ancient JewishMysticism (New York: Mod Books, 1990); Ori Soltes,Mysticism in Judaism, Christianity,and Islam: Searching for Oneness (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).22 fr. 17 Des Places. Numenius, Fragments, ed. Edouard Des Places (Paris: Les Belles Let-tres, 1973). On the use of negative theology in Neopythagoreanism: John Whittaker,Neupythagoreismus und negative Theologie, in Der Mittelplatonismus, ed. ClemensZintzen (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1981), 16986 SymbolaeOsloenses 44 (1969): 10925. On negative theology in Platonism, see Deirdre Carabine,The Unknown God: Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition. Plato to Eriugena(Louvain: Peeters, 1995).23 These are protological principles, ". For the relationship between protology andmathematics in Plotinus see Svetla Slaveva Griffin, Plotinus on Number (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2009). On Plotinuss use of language in relation to the One see FredericM. Schroeder, Plotinus and Language, in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, ed.Lloyd P. Gerson (Cambridge: University Press, 1996), 33655; and Sara Rappe, Reading

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of Plotinuss metaphysics, is unspeakable and intellectually invisible,that is, incomprehensible; it is an impossible object of the human cognitivefaculty. This is because the One, as already mentioned, is anterior and supe-rior to the Intellect, which is the second principle in Plotinuss metaphysicalscheme, and qua talis is inferior to the One. Plotinuss triad of first princi-plesthe three "* upsilonasper2: the One, the Intellect, and the Soulisindeed strictly hierarchical. The second principle derives from, and is subor-dinated to, the first; in turn the third principle derives from, and is subordi-nated to, the second.24 Thus, the One comes before, and is beyond, anyhuman act of intellection and any cognitive grasp. This is why we humanscan only limit ourselves to say something that concerns it or that isabout/around it.25

Plotinus explains the main reason why it is impossible to touch andgrasp the One: because the One, which is beyond Being (), is infinite (), and it is ridiculous to try to grasp and circum-scribe what is infinite by nature.26 Plotinus also uses the reverse argument:not only can the One not be grasped intellectually because it is infinite, butmoreover it is infinite because its power cannot be grasped or encompassed:It is necessary to conceive the One as infinite . . . because its power isimpossible to comprehend.27 As will be demonstrated, this argument isalso paramount for Gregory of Nyssas negative theology, which owesmuch to that of Plotinus. Plotinus insists that the One, which is infinite, canbe contemplated only on the basis of finite realities, because humans cannotgrasp the infinite and indefinite (, "): If your mind cannotfind anything definite because the One is none of these things, you just stickto these, and contemplate on their basis.28

In Plotinuss view, the One can be known and expressed only in thenegative: We say what is not, but what is, we cannot say.29 This is the

Neoplatonism: Non-Discursive Thinking in the Texts of Plotinus, Proclus, and Damas-cius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).24 On the possible influence of Origen on Porphyrys characterization of Plotinuss threeprinciples see Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, Origen, Greek Philosophy, and the Birth of the Trini-tarian Meaning of Hypostasis, Harvard Theological Review 105 (2012): 30250. Asystematic comparison between Origen and Plotinuss thought is badly needed. The onlywork available so far is Henri Crouzel,Orige`ne et Plotin. Comparaison doctrinale (Paris:Tequi, 1991).25 * upsilonlenis: Enneads 5.3.1314.26 # & upsilonacute !2: Enneads 5.5.6.15.27 3 * upsilonlenis 45 "4 2: Enneads 6.9.6.1011.28 6 ' + 3 upsilonacute , " 4 74, 6 , * "upsilonacute 5: Enneads 6.9.7.29 8 9: 8 , upsilonlenis : Enneads 5.3.14.5. Raoul Mortley,

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essence of what is called negative theology or apophaticism. The useof many negative adjectives in reference to the supreme principle or firstdivinity was already deployed in Middle Platonism: for instance, ,ineffable, , unspeakable, ", impossible to cir-cumscribe, 9 , unlimited, etc.30 This trend will continue inpagan and Christian Platonism as well, as will soon be clear. Accordingto Plotinus, due to the very superiority of the One to the Intellect, to Being,and to finitude, humans can have no knowledge of the One on the cogni-tive-epistemological plane: neither knowledge nor intellective intuition ofit.31 This would later be emphasized by Proclus.32 For this reason it isnecessary for the soul to go far from science and all of its objects, becauseevery knowledge and every science implies a multiplicity and thereforedetaches the soul from unity and the One itself. In fact, whenever the intel-lect knows, this immediately produces a duality of knower and known:

For science is reasoning, and reasoning entails multiplicity [# / # 3 ; ]. In this way the soul fails toattain the One, because it falls into number and multiplicity [6" * ]. . . . The intellect that knows [] cannot even remain simple itself [3 upsilonlenis


Union with the One must therefore escape the duality of knowledgeand expression.34 It is especially noteworthy that Plotinus in this connectionshows the awareness of the following tension on the cognitive and commu-nicative plane. The One cannot be expressed or even thought, since thisimmediately implies a duality and multiplicity, but the philosopher, never-theless, does speak of it. He or she does so not in a positive or assertive way,but by way of indication, to give hints to those who want to contemplate:

The One cannot be said or writtenand nevertheless we speakand write, to lead people toward it [ 6 upsilonlenis] and toawaken them from the slumber of words / reasonings to the wakeof contemplation [" * ], asthough we indicated the way [= ; upsilonacute] to thosewho want to contemplate.35

This methodological statement by Plotinus is also fundamental to keep themystical union with the One (which he is going to describe) within therealm and scope of philosophy. Union with the One thus becomes a kind ofapophatic culmination of the theological branch of philosophy. At the sametime, Plotinus likely wanted to mark the distinction between this union atthe limit of philosophy and any such experience promoted by mystery reli-gions. Plotinuss philosophical theology is notoriously different from laterNeoplatonists religious-theurgical drift. Olympiodorus classified Proclus,together with his inspirers Iamblichus and Syrianus, among the religiousexponents of Neoplatonism, as opposed to the philosophical exponentssuch as Plotinus and Porphyry: Some, such as Plotinus, Porphyry, etc.,give priority to philosophy; others, such as Iamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus,and the whole priestly school, give priority to the priestly art, >.36

For Plotinus the One cannot be known intellectually (by the intuitiveintellect, ), let alone reached by means of a discursive approach(through 2 or discursive reason), but can be contemplated in ecstasy.At the epistemological level, this difference is decisive. Philosophical dis-course on God, on the supreme Principle (the One), is a hint to mysticalunion with God. Humans cannot gaze at God, neither with their physicalnor with their intellectual sight, but they can experience God in anotherway: in a mystical experience. This is an ecstasy, a mystical union:

34 Nelson Pike, Mystic Union: An Essay in the Phenomenology of Mysticism (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1992).35 Plotinus Enneads 6.9.4.36 Damascius, Commentary on Platos Phaedo 1.172.

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The comprehension [upsilonacute] of the One can be attained neitherthrough science [' ] nor through intellection [#], as in the case of the other intelligible beings, but thanksto a presence [# ] that means more than science[ ]. . . . The One is present [7].37

This reception, which is meta-cognitive proper, is called by Plotinus, trust/faith, a term which in Plotinus receives a much more positiveconnotation than in Plato. Indeed, Plato ranked with 6 (rep-resentation, apprehension through shadows, conjecture) at the lower tiersof knowledge, far inferior to discursive reason (2) and intuitive in-tellect (). However, Plotinuss bears a different sense thanChristian , faith.38 This act of meta-cognitive comprehension forPlotinus is not an epistemic possession, which, as has been pointed out,would immediately imply dualism and separation. Rather, it is the actionof receiving the One as present, in an authentic union:

It will be sufficient to be able to touch it in an intelligible way[ 2] [. . .] Only later will it be possible to reflect[&] on it. But in that instant it is necessary to believe[upsilonacute] that one has seen it [. . .] it is necessary to think that itis present [& @]39

This presence of the One in trust/faith allows the human subject totouch it (2). This touching is something better and greaterthan knowing it or 6, the verb that expresses the cognitive graspingof objects.40 This experience can be done only by means of abstraction fromeverything else. Indeed, 2, remove everything, is Plotinuss

37 Plotinus Enneads 6.9.4. Kevin Corrigan, Solitary Mysticism in Plotinus, Proclus,Gregory of Nyssa, and the Pseudo-Dionysius, Journal of Religion 76 (1996): 2842; cf.Curtis L. Hancock, Negative Theology in Gnosticism and Neoplatonism, in Neopla-tonism and Gnosticism, ed. R.T. WallisJ. Bregman (Albany: State University of NewYork Press, 1992), 16786. Also Raoul Mortley, From Word to Silence, I, The Rise andFall of Logos; II, The Way of Negation, Christian and Greek (Bonn: Hanstein, 1986);John Peter Kenney, Ancient Apophatic Theology, in Gnosticism and Later Platonism:Themes, Figures, and Texts, eds. John Turner and Ruth Majercik (Atlanta: SBL, 2000),25975.38 On classical and Christian notions and terminology of faith see Ilaria Ramelli,Alcune osservazioni su credere, Maia 51 (2000): 6783; and Ramelli, Studi su Fides(Madrid: Signifer, 2002).39 Plotinus Enneads 5.3.17.40 Ibid. 6.6.

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most famous injunction.41 A less pithy and more thoroughly motivatedexpression of this principle is found in Enneads 6.9.7.921. Here Plotinuswarns that it is impossible to grasp [] the One until in the soulthere is the impression [upsilonacute] of something else. Therefore, in order tocontemplate the One, the soul must leave all external realities [2 9 "] and turn entirely toward its interiority [ A 2] . . . after giving up knowing everything ["# 2], first sense-perceptible objects and then the intelligible formsthemselves, one should forget even the knowledge of oneself ["3 * upsilonasper]. The negation of all knowledge and the abstraction from allobjects of knowledge bring the soul toward the One in a theology that isnegative in that it draws on such a negation and abstraction. Forgettingeven the knowledge of oneself is the peak of this abstractive process; Chris-tian mystics will build on this and conceive mysticism as a self-offering.42

Abstraction was indicated already in Middle Platonism, by Alcinous,as a way that leads to some knowledge of God on a par with the analogicalway.43 These would later be labeled via negationis and via analogiae respec-tively. Likewise Plutarch and Clement of Alexandria presented abstractionas a way to contemplationClement in particular as a means to ascend tothe first Intellect, N.44 Porphyry would follow his teacher Plotinus withregard to abstraction.45

Indeed, for Plotinus the One is present in silence. Since the One has noexistence ( upsilonasper2), one must stop any rational investigation into itand be silent.46 The One is the silence that remains after the removal ofthe Difference that necessarily exists between the subject and the object of

41 Ibid. 3.17; cf. 6.7.36; 6.8.21.42 James Wetzel, What the Saints Know: Quasi-Epistemological Reflections, in TheWiley-Blackwell Companion to Christian Mysticism, ed. Julia Lamm (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 55061: There is no conceivable knowledge of God that is not a self-offering. The inconceivable part is what we receive in return (560). On epistemologicalapproaches to mysticism: Steven Katz, Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism, inMysticism and Philosophical Analysis, ed. Steven Katz (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1978), 2274; William Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of ReligiousExperience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Michael Stoeber, ConstructivistEpistemologies of Mysticism: A Critique and a Revision, Religious Studies 28 (1992):10716; Keith Yandell, The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 1993); Evan Fales,Divine Intervention: Metaphysical and Episte-mological Puzzles (New York: Routledge, 2010).43 Alcinous Teaching 165.1718 H.44 Plutarch Platonic Questions 3.10011002B; Clement of Alexandria Strom. 5.71.2.45 Porphyry Sentences Leading to Intelligible Realities 40.46 ", * "4 4 74 3 9 &:Plotinus Enneads 6.8.11.1.

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thinking.47 Silence, like darkness, is the metaphor for the meta-cognitiveexperience of the divine that Plotinus postulates. For both imply the nega-tion of any epistemic experience and expressionnot, however, to precludeany experience of the divine at all, but rather to open the door to a meta-epistemic experience, to point to it, as Plotinus himself says.

V. ORIGEN OF ALEXANDRIA

Origen was a fellow-student of Plotinus at Ammonius Saccass school inAlexandria, and he can probably be identified with the homonymous Neo-platonist mentioned by Porphyry in the Life of Plotinus, by Proclus, and byother Neoplatonists.48 Like Philo the Jew, Origen the Christian supportedthe thesis of the incomprehensibility of Gods nature or essence on the epi-stemic plane, and the possibility for humans to know only Gods works andactivities (9 and ):

In the limits of our scarce forces, we have known the divine nature[divina natura] by considering it more from its works [ex operumsuorum contemplatione] than through our cognitive capacity [exnostri sensu contemplatione]. We have observed its visible crea-tures and have known by faith those invisible, because humanfrailty [humana fragilitas] cannot see everything with its eyes andknow everything with its reason [ratione complecti]. For thehuman being is the weakest and most imperfect among all rationalbeings.49

47 T 3 , B' 4C * upsilonacute. FH # "4 , G : Enneads 5.1.4.39.48 Strong arguments for this identification in Pier Franco Beatrice, Porphyrys Judgmenton Origen, in Origeniana, vol. 5, Historica, Text and Method, Biblica, Philosophica,Theologica, Origenism and Later Developments, ed. Robert J. Daly (Leuven: Peeters,1992), 35167; Beatrice, Origen in Nemesius Treatise On the Nature of Man, in Ori-geniana, vol. 9, Origen and the Religious Practice of His Time, ed. Gyorgy Heidl andRobert Somos (Leuven: Peeters, 2009), 531; Thomas Bohm, OrigenesTheologe und(Neu-) Platoniker? Oder: Wem soll man misstrauen: Eusebius oder Porphyrius? Ada-mantius 8 (2002): 723; Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, Origen, Patristic Philosophy, and ChristianPlatonism: Re-Thinking the Christianisation of Hellenism, Vigiliae Christianae 63(2009): 21763; Ramelli, Origen the Christian Middle/Neoplatonist, Journal of EarlyChristian History 1 (2011): 98130. On the same line most recently, see ElizabethDePalma Digeser, A Threat to Public Piety: Christians, Platonists, and the Great Persecu-tion (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2012), 4971.49 OrigenOn First Principles 2.6.1. Regrettably, very little is devoted to Origen in BogdanBucur, Mysticism in the Pre-Nicene Era? in The Wiley-Blackwell Companion toChristian Mysticism, ed. Julia Lamm (Malden-Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 13346.Morealbeit with a different perspective than in the present essayin John Dillon, The

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There is something that is precluded to human sight: Gods nature. Inhis Commentary on the Gospel of John 19.6.3538, in a passage that willexert a strong influence on Gregory of Nyssa, Origen claims that Godsnature and power (upsilonacute and upsilonacute)50 are even beyond being (upsilonlenis).Thus, humans cannot reach them: they cannot see and observe (;)or contemplate () or perceive () them, but barely peerat () them. This is precisely a verb for a difficult object of observa-tion, be it physical or intellectual sight (i.e. cognitive faculty).

According to Origen, the Godhead cannot be known by human rea-son,51 and yet it is mysteriously intelligible, intelligible thanks to an in-effable power or faculty ("4 2 ), even though ittranscends everything.52 In particular, God transcends being or upsilonlenis andintellect or ,53 but at the same time is also the supreme Being.54 Indeed,only the invisible and incorporeal nature (upsilonacute " * "7)of God is Being in the fullest and most proper sense.55 Every other being isa being, an upsilonlenis, exclusively by virtue of participation in the Being that isGod.56

Origen felt the need to maintain the identity between God and theabsolute Being because of Exod. 3:14, which in the Septuagint reads: 76 ; I, I am the One who Is. This, from the biblical side; but he alsowanted to stick to Platos identification of the Being and the Good. Thedivinity is the Good and the Being, while evil, its opposite, is non-being.This idea will return in Gregory of Nyssa and other Christian Platonistssuch as Evagrius, Ps. Dionysius, and Maximus the Confessor. Origen, forinstance, declares that evils are not substances / beings.57 Unlike crea-tures, which are good insofar as they participate in the Good, the divinityis the Good. It is the Good itself, upsilonlenisa Numenian termbyessence.58 God is the absolute Good, the Good per se.

Knowledge of God in Origen, in Knowledge of God in the Graeco-Roman World, ed.John Dillon and Jaap Mansfeld (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 21928.50 Gods essence/nature and power also appear coupled in Origens Commentary on theGospel of John 20.24.207.51 Origen Against Celsus 6.65.52 2 : ibid., 7.45.53 Ibid., 6.64; 7.38.54 upsilonlenis: ibid., 6.64 and On First Principles 1.3.5.55 upsilonlenis: Origen, Commentary on the Gospel of John 20.18.159; cf. invisibleand incorporeal essence, upsilonlenis " * "7 said of God in Origen AgainstCelsus 6.71.56 Origen, Against Celsus 6.64.57 upsilonlenis 9 upsilonlenis # 2: Origen, Philoc. 24.4.58 ' upsilonlenis: Origen Selected Passages from the Exegesis of the Book of Numbers,Patrologia Graeca 12.577D.

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If God is the absolute Good, Origen deduces that Gods power(upsilonacute) must also be good and Gods operation or activity ()manifests itself in the goodness of the divine creation and divine Provi-dence.59 That essence, power, and activity in God must be considered in aunitary way was also Iamblichuss view,60 on the pagan side of Neopla-tonism. Iamblichus knew Origens thought and seems to have been influ-enced by it in various respects, as is emerging from ongoing research.

After speaking of the epistemic process of deducing Gods essence onthe basis of Gods activity and works in creation, Origen describes God asa Monad and Henad (a unity) in On First Principles 1.1.6. Since God isan intelligible nature and not material or corporeal, Origen argues, theGodhead is simple [intellectualis natura simplex]; absolutely nothing canbe added to it . . . but it is a Monad [2] in an absolute sense, and, soto say, a Henad [2]: intelligence and spring from which every intelligencegushes out. This passage is extant in Rufinus of Aquileias Latin trans-lation, but it is noteworthy that Rufinus chose to leave Origens originalGreek terms for monad and henad, without translating them. This isprobably because he considered them to be technical terms. Thus, in Ori-gens view, the Godhead is the principle of everything, and therefore wemust not deem it composite. This absolute simplicity takes God away fromthe grasp of human knowledge, just as it does the One according to Ploti-nus, as has been pointed out above.

Consistent with this, in On First Principles 1.1.5 Origen illustrates theexcellence and cognitive incomprehensibility of the Godhead, who isincomprehensible and impenetrable in its reality. Every human thought isinevitably inferior to, and cannot grasp, the Godhead itself, just as a sparkis infinitely inferior to the splendor of the sun. So is human intelligenceinferior to the intellectual and spiritual realities, and these in turn areinferior to God. God is superior to all of these, ineffably and inestimablyexcellent. This is a development of the Platonic metaphysical model of tran-scendence.

VI. GREGORY OF NYSSA

Gregory of Nyssa, the youngest and most philosophically minded of theCappadocian Fathers, is the most insightful follower of Origen and the

59 Origen On First Principles 2.9.1; 3.5.2; 4.4.8.60 Iamblichus On Mysteries 1.5.18.

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greatest Patristic Platonist along with Origen himself and Augustine ofHippo. His reflections on apophaticism are marked by a profound influenceof Philo and, above all, of Origen and Plotinus. Indeed, he was very wellacquainted with the works and thought of all of these Platonists.

In his Homilies on Ecclesiastes Gregory interprets Ecclesiastes 3:7 (averse concerning a time to speak and a time to be silent) as follows: Thetime to be silent is when one wants to investigate the nature of God,whereas the time to speak is when one wants to announce the wonders ofhis works.61 Like Plotinus, Gregory thinks that the very essence or natureof God is impossible to express and must lie in silence. In Against Eunomius2.1.105, Gregory declares that divine realities, which exceed both wordand discursive thought [# upsilonasper3 * 2], must be hon-ored with silence (4 ). What can be grasped cognitively andcan therefore be expressed is Gods activity in the world, first of all theCreation.62 Like Plotinus, Philo, and Origen, indeed, Gregory maintainsthat Gods nature or essence (upsilonlenis) is known only in the impossibility ofbeing understood []. 63 This is why Gregory, for instance,in his dialogue On the Soul and the Resurrectionan intentional Christianremake of Platos Phaedo64uses a great many negative adjectives in refer-ence to God. For example, God is invisible, unspeakable, impossible todefine, incorporeal, immaterial, impalpable, unlimited, non-dimensional,and Gods essence is inaccessible. Gods essence is a precluded cognitiveobject, and its characteristics must be inferred by analogy; its existence isrevealed by the contemplation of the world (Psalm 18:2: The heavens aretelling of divine glory, and the firmament proclaims his handiwork).

Like Plotinus, in fact, Gregory maintains that only by analogy can Godbe known, and this to a very limited extent. In his Homilies on the Song ofSongs Gregory remarks that, since Gods infinite nature is inaccessible tohuman minds, we must proceed by conjecture. We must start from ourknowledge of the world, and try to represent to ourselves the incompre-hensible by means of what we can comprehend, on the basis of a certainanalogy.65

61 Gregorii Nysseni Opera 5 p. 414.62 Especially on Gregory of Nyssa see also Philipp Renczes, The Patristic Notion ofDivine Grace on the Horizon of Apophatic Theology, in Silenzio e parola nella patris-tica (Rome: Augustinianum, 2012), 3953.63 Gregory of Nyssa Against Eunomius 1.373.64 On this dialogue, with commentary, see Ilaria Ramelli, Gregorio di Nissa Sullanimae la resurrezione (Milan: BompianiCatholic University, 2007); reviews by PanayiotisTzamalikos, Vigiliae Christianae 62 (2008): 51523; and Mark Edwards, Journal ofEcclesiastical History 60 (2009): 76465.65 9 ": Gregorii Nysseni Opera 6.3638.

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The infinity of God is a crucial point in Gregory of Nyssas negativetheology, and this point partially depends on Plotinus.66 The latter, as dem-onstrated earlier, used the following double argument: not only that theOne cannot be grasped intellectually because it is infinite, but also that it isinfinite because its power cannot be grasped or encompassed. The sameargument is repeated by Gregory of Nyssa, who draws on both Plotinusand Origen on this score: the divinity is impossible to grasp preciselybecause it is infinite.67 Gods nature is consequently impossible to touchand conceive (", "), and it is superior to any grasp["] provided by reasoning.68

Gregory, like Plotinus (and Philo), ascribed infinity to Godbut not toevil. Only what is contrary to Beauty and the Good is limited, whereasthe Good, whose nature is not susceptible of evil, will progress toward theunlimited and infinite.69 Gregory thus posited God as , and evil aslimited, in that it is the opposite of God. It is not to be ruled out thatGregory was consciously correcting Plotinus, who, in turn followingPlato, described as both absolute evil and the One.70 Gregoryprobably realized that, if evil is and the One / Good / Godhead toois , there is not enough opposition between the two, which there-fore risk telescoping into one another.

Gregory of Nyssas apophatic theologythe awareness that the di-vinity in itself can be known and spoken of only in negative termsrefersto the specific area of Gods transcendence. Gods nature or essence(upsilonacute or upsilonlenis), infinite as it is, cannot be known, whereas Gods activi-ties or operations () can be known and spoken of. This is thesame line as Philos and Origens. In his treatise To Ablabius: There AreNot Three Gods, Gregory states that names do not reveal Gods nature,what the Godhead is in its essence, since this is unnamable and ineffa-ble (" * ). Rather, names describe some-thing of what pertains to it (literally: what is about/around it [*

66 Although the connection with Plotinus is not investigated, the centrality of Gods infin-ity to Gregorys apophaticism is caught by Ari Ojell, The Constitutive Elements of theApophatic System of Gregory of Nyssa, in Studia Patristica, vol. 41, eds. Frances Young,Mark Edwards, and Sarah Parvis (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 397402; and Robert Bright-man, Apophatic Theology and Divine Infinity in St. Gregory of Nyssa, Greek Ortho-dox Theological Review 18 (1973): 97114.67 Gregory of Nyssa Against Eunomius 1.6668.68 Ibid., 2.158, with the very same terminology as used by Plotinus.69 " * " " upsilonacute: Gregory of NyssaOn the Soul and the Resurrection 97AB.70 Plotinus Enneads 1.8.9.

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upsilonlenis]: an idea pointed out above in Plotinus and very well known toGregory). Now, this something does not at all indicate what divinenature is in its essence [' upsilonlenis].71

The divinity, invisible in its nature, becomes visible in its works, andcan thus be understood by human intellects in some respects concerning itsnature (literally, again: about/around it [* upsilonlenis]). Here, too, Greg-ory relies not only on Plotinus, but also on Origen, Against Celsus 6.65,who used in a similar sense the expression what is around/about, #. This phrase in turn was already employed by Clement of Alexandria,between the second and the third century ce, in a passage that deals pre-cisely with the abstractive process in the human cognitive grasp of God.72

Origen elaborated on the same concept and expression in Commentary onthe Gospel of John 13.21.124: it is possible to find in Scripture clues to saysomething () regarding Gods nature or essence, * upsilonlenis .The same concept and expression is also found in Plotinus, in Enneads5.3.14: the One is ineffable, , because to say something about itis, after all, to say something, , but the One is not merely some thing,that is, a thing among all others. The very same idea and expression will befound again in another Origenian, a milestone in Christian apophati-cism: the early sixth-century Neoplatonist called Ps. Dionysius the Areo-pagite, who was deeply influenced by Proclus.73

Gregory specifically follows Philo in his interpretation of Exod. 20:21,the passage in which Moses enters the darkness where God is.74 Like Philoand Origen after him, Gregory draws a distinction between Gods essenceor nature, unknowable, and Gods existence, knowable and actuallyknown. He draws the same connection as Philo did between Exod. 20:21(Moyses went into the darkness where God was) and Psalm 17:12 (Hemade darkness his hideaway; around him was his tent, dark water in cloudsof air) in reference to the very same allegorical interpretation of the cogni-tive inaccessibility of Gods nature. Now, this connection had already been

71 Gregorii Nysseni Opera 3/1.4243.72 Clement of Alexandria Miscellany 5.11.71.3.73 Ps. Dionysius the Areopagite Heavenly Hierarchy 2.3. On his negative theology I limitmyself to referring to the most recent work, Charles Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymityin Dionysius the Areopagite: No longer I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). OnPs. Dionysius in the tradition of Christian mysticism see Andrew Louth, The Originsof the Christian Mystical Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); cf. Louth,Mysticism: Name and Thing, Archaeus 9 (2005): 921; Bernard McGinn, The Pres-ence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism, vol. 1. The Foundations ofMysticism (New York: Crossroad, 1991); McGinn, ed., The Essential Writings of Chris-tian Mysticism (New York: Modern Library, 2006).74 Gregory of Nyssa The Life of Moses 1.47 and 2.110.

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established by Origen.75 Gregory very probably depends on Origen on thisscore; indeed he often reads Philo through Origen.76 Centuries later, thesame connection will appear again in a classical text of mystical traditionsuch as the Cloud of Unknowing.77

Gregory, in The Life of Moses 2.219255 draws on Philo once morein his allegorical exegesis of Exod. 33:2023, where God says to Mosesthat he will be unable to see his face, but he will only see his back. Philo, asalready indicated, referred this passage to Gods unknowability in The Spe-cial Laws 1.32.50, and so does Gregory. Gregory indeed follows Philo inhis exegesis of Exod. 33:23 in reference to apophaticism, and, in this casejust as in many others,78 he follows him through the lenses of Origen. Greg-ory observes that this episode must be interpreted allegorically, since it hasno literal meaning, because it speaks of the back of God. This entails anotion of corporeality, and therefore an anthropomorphism, which isabsurd in reference to God. God has no back, since God has no body what-soever. God is incorporeal: this is a tenet of Platonismagainst Stoicismand Epicureanism, for instance.

On the same grounds Philo also denied any anthropomorphic featurein God, but Gregorys argument and terminology evidently stick to Ori-gens theory of Scriptural allegoresis in On First Principles 4. Here theabsurdities at the literal level of Scripture ("upsilonacute and , thingsthat are impossible and illogical according to Aristotelian literary-criticterminology79) are said to reveal that the passages that include them cannotbe interpreted literally, but must be understood allegorically. Exactly divineanthropomorphismsthe attribution of human or material characteristicsto Godsuch as the notion of the back of God are a kind of absurditythat Origen adduced as a reason to reject the literal meaning of a biblicalpassage and interpret it allegorically. The notion of Gods face is of courseno less anthropomorphic than that of Gods back, but Philo, Origen, andGregory tend not to choose this as an example of blatant anthropomor-phism. All of them, however, do interpret both Gods face and Gods backallegorically.

75 Origen Against Celsus 6.17; Commentary on the Gospel of John 2.172; and Fragmentsfrom the Exegesis of the Gospel of Luke 162.76 This has been argued in Ramelli, Philosophical Allegoresis.77 On this tradition see e.g. Denys Turner, The Darkness of God: Negativity in ChristianMysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).78 As is demonstrated in Ramelli, Philosophical Allegoresis.79 Aristotle inquired into "upsilonacute in literature, especially myth, in Poetics 1460ab. SeeN. J. Richardson, Aristotles Reading of Homer, in Homers Ancient Readers, ed. Rob-ert Lamberton and John Keeney (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 3040.

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There are further proofs of how Gregory did know Philos exegesis ofa biblical passage, but decided to keep closer to Origens exegesis of thatpassage. Gregory links Exod. 33:23 (interpreted as an exhortation to followGod) with Deut. 13:4, which speaks of walking after God, and withPsalm 62:9, about sticking to the back of God. The same connection hadbeen drawn by Origen.80 Gregory, on the other hand, chose not to interpretthe words my back, what is behind me in an eschatological sense.81 Inso doing he left aside the eschatological exegesis of those wordsperhapsto be traced back to Philo, On Flight 165: what comes after and fol-lowswhich Origen knew and developed.82

In the second of Gregory of Nyssas Homilies on the Song of Songs,the soul, personified as a character in a dialogue, addresses God as follows:Your Name is beyond any other name and is inexpressible and incompre-hensible to any rational being. Likewise in Homily 6: How is it possiblethat the One who is beyond every name be found by means of the pronun-ciation of a name? Indeed, the divine, from the point of view of itsnature, is ungraspable / untouchable ["] and incomprehensible["] . . . ineffable [] and inaccessible ["!] toreasoning.83 This is why we know only its existence, and not its essence.84

This is what Philo also maintained, as has been remarked above.In his sixth Homily on the Beatitudes, Gregory insists that the divine

nature, in what it is per se, is beyond any thought that can comprehend it,inaccessible and unapproachable to every conjectural intuition. Likewisein Against Eunomius 2.67ff. he illustrates the impossibility of graspingintellectually and expressing the divine substance. He does so by interpret-ing the migration of Abraham as an allegory of the souls ascent to the One,that is to say, the Plotinian One identified by Gregory with God the Trin-ity.85 Gregory explains that from knowledge based on sense-perception,symbolized by Chaldaean wisdom, one can pass on to the intelligiblerealm by analogy. Abrahams first acquisition is negative knowledge of Godand the awareness that Gods nature is unknowable:

80 Origen Fragments from the Exegesis of Psalms, Patrologia Graeca 12.1489B.81 # ( : Exod. 33:23.82 See Origen, Homily on Psalm 36.4: posteriora mea quae in novissimis temporibusimplebuntur, my back / what is behind me what will take place in the eschatologicaltimes, at the end of all; Commentary on the Song of Songs 3.4; Homilies on Jeremiah16.24; On First Principles 2.4.3.83 Gregory of Nyssa Against Eunomius 2, Gregorii Nysseni Opera 1.26566.84 Ibid., 24748.85 Ibid., 8496.

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In relation to the concepts [upsilonasper], he went through everyrepresentation [6] of its nature coming from names, purifiedhis own rational faculty from such suppositions [upsilonasper], andreceived a faith that is absolutely pure from every notion [9].Then he considered it a sure and clear clue of the knowledge ofGod to believe that the Godhead is beyond every sign that providesits knowledge.86

In Gregorys Homilies on the Song of Songs negative and positive the-ology intermingle,87 after the model of Origens commentary on the Songof Songs. In the twelfth homily Gregory hammers home and further devel-ops the same apophatic thesis:

As for what always turns out to be beyond any impression thatcan reveal it, how could it ever be understood by means of anindication included in this or that name? This is why the soulexcogitates every meaning of names, in order to indicate that inex-pressible Good, but every discursive capacity of reasoning isalways defeated and declared inferior to the object that it is look-ing for. This is why the soul says: I have called him as I could,excogitating words that indicate its inexpressible beatitude, but hewas always superior to the indication suggested by their mean-ings. The same experience often happens to the great David aswell, who invokes God with an infinity of names, and yet recog-nizes that he has remained inferior to the truth.

For Gregory, just as for Philo, by means of names we can only sayhow God is ( ), and not what God is [ ].88 Divine namesare established by humans on the basis of each of the divine activities[] that we know89; the divine is denominated with differentappellatives which refer to its manifold activities.90 Indeed, the divinity,

86 Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius 2.89.87 This is noted by Martin Laird, Apophasis and Logophasis in Gregory of Nyssas Com-mentarius in Canticum Canticorum, in Studia Patristica, vol. 37, ed. M. F. Wiles andE. J. Yarnold (Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 12632; more broadly Laird, Gregory of Nyssaand the Grasp of Faith. Union, Knowledge, and Divine Presence (Oxford: Oxford Uni-versity Press, 2004).88 : To Ablabius Gregorii Nysseni Opera 3/1.56.89 Ibid., 3/1.4490 Against Eunomius Gregorii Nysseni Opera 1.315.

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who is invisible in its nature, becomes visible in its activities.91 Per se,God transcends every movement of our mind or 2, the discursivemind.92 That is to say, the divinity is an inaccessible cognitive object.

VII. CONCLUSION

The notion of the divine as an inaccessible object of human thought andreasoning is very similar in these philosopher-theologiansPhilo, Plotinus,Origen, and Gregorywho belonged to the same Platonic philosophicaltradition, but to three different religious traditions. The similarity of theirreflections on the divine as an inaccessible epistemic object for humans,which can nevertheless be experienced in a meta-cognitive way, seems dueto their common philosophical tradition.

Most interestingly, all of these thinkers show a tension between theapophaticism they declarerepeatedly proclaiming that the divine is animpossible object of human thought and languageand the discourseabout the divine (-) that none of them gives up developing. Inorder to be able to say something of the divine, notwithstanding all, theypursue the strategy of differentiation. That is, they establish that thedivines intimate nature or essence is inaccessible, and indeed does not offeritself as a cognitive object, but that the divine manifests itself in its effects.

For Philo, Origen, and Gregory, moreover, the divine manifests itselfthrough Scripture. Unlike Plotinus, they considered the Bible to be the reve-lation of the divinity. However, Plotinus also postulated a direct access tothe divine, not through a cognitive, intellectual process, but through themystical experience, which allows one to touch what one cannot seewith the eyes of the body or of the soul. This possibility, too, was admittedboth by Philo and by Origen and Gregory of Nyssa. Philosophical discourseabout the divine, theo-logy, is thus described by Plotinus as an indica-tion, a hint, that points to the mystical, non-dualistic experience of anobject (God) that, qua object of knowledge and therefore qua epistemicobject, is inaccessible.

Catholic University of the Sacred Heart and Durham University.

91 On the Beatitudes Gregorii Nysseni Opera 7/2.141.92 Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius 2, Gregorii Nysseni Opera 1.397.

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Ramelli the Divine as Inaccessible Object of Knowledge in Ancient Platonism