Rambouillet Peace Conference; Road to Conference and Results

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Rambouillet Peace Conference; Road to the Conference and Results

Ivan Boshkovich

HIST 7602Pierre Asselin, Ph.D.

Captain Carl O. SchusterFall 2009





Boshkovich 3

Part I

Introduction

Map of Former Yugoslavia1

The main goal of this professional paper is to explain what happened during

Rambouillet‘s Peace Conference in 1999 which was in actuality ultimatum to Serbian and

Yugoslav authorities. At the same time, on the opposite side this conference, Albanians

from Kosovo, were in much better situation because, and it will be well supported

throughout this paper, they could sit peacefully and relax knowing that the Serbs would

have to choose between two evils; acceptance of independence of Kosovo, or NATO

1Online, ―Kosovarian Independence: Viennese Celebration/Demonstration‖,http://anaj.wordpress.com/category/politics/



Boshkovich 4

intervention. Maybe even more interestingly, this research will explain what the most

important points that led to this conference were. Also, the outcome of these talks will be

explained and how that affects the region and the rest of the world. To make sure that the

audience has a clear picture about the entire conflict between Serbs and ethnic Albanians

(for sake of simplicity, in continuation of this paper the author will use term ―Albanians‖

even if it will describe Albanians from Kosovo), the author will present historical events

that led to the conflict between these two groups. Contrary to what some experts claim,

the beginning of this problem was not in the 1980‘s and the rise of Serbian leader

Milosevic, but six centuries earlier when the Ottoman Empire spread on Balkan

Peninsula. However, this paper will be more concentrated on the recent history of this

conflict, which is period after WWII, especially from the late 1980‘s until 2008 (when

Albanians declared independence which is recognized so far by 63 countries; the most

recent was New Zealand-November 2009). When elaborating about this period on the

Balkan Peninsula, in addition to the peace conference, the author will offer valuable

information regarding the incident in Racak, which was a trigger for the NATO bombing;

bombing itself; Kumanovo agreement; UN Resolution 1244; and unilateral declaration of

independence of Kosovo in 2008.

In addition, the readers of this research will have an opportunity to find out more

about the role of the Serbian Armed Forces in this conflict (mainly in the late 1990‘s),

and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). One will find this interesting because some of

the Serbian generals and politicians (based on command responsibilities), as well as the

KLA leaders were accused for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal of the



Boshkovich 5

former Yugoslavia or ICTY. Nevertheless, before they had to face this tribunal, some of

those individuals had a chance to participate in the 1999 Rambouillet peace talks.

Another aspect of this paper will be the involvement of the international

community. This is going to be discussed in chapters that are describing the conference,

also in these chapters the audience will discover more about media war and the influence

of some western politicians to the situation on Balkan.

At the end of this paper the audience will have a chance to read author‘s analysis

about the future of the Balkan Peninsula as well as the future of the world based on

events that took place in this region.

It is important to mention that the writer of this paper was born in Serbia (at that

time one of Yugoslav republics) and lived there until 2005, which gave him an

opportunity to see what happened in the war in Kosovo from a different perspective than

an average person in the rest of the world. However, thanks to his emigration to the USA

four years ago, the author completed his viewpoint of this conflict. Nevertheless, it is

possible that this paper will offer some views that differ from what people could hear on

CNN or BBC. The reason for this is that western media is very often willing to take sides

in wars, and in this case it was mostly Albanian side. Yet, if the author put some effort to

write something that is not favorable for Albanians in Kosovo, it would not be because of

some kind of bias, but rather due to facts that are supporting different viewpoints, which

will be documented adequately. Despite the fact that war in Kosovo happened just 10-11

years ago there is a huge number of sources that are helpful for anyone interested in this

topic. Some of those sources are bias, but some are quite objective and valuable.



Boshkovich 6

Chapter I

Section A; History of Violence

Serbs arrived on the Balkan Peninsula in the 7th century C.E. as pagan‘s tribe

from central Asia. The reason for this long voyage was probably protection from

barbarian tribes in Asia and also the warmer Mediterranean climate. Serbs settled this

area from Dalmatia, in today‘s Croatia, to a region that is known today as Former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In the middle of this area is today‘s Kosovo (full name

would be Kosovo and Metohija), also known as ‗Old Serbia‘. This entire territory was

under control of Byzantine Empire, and that is the reason why Serbs during the time

became Christians, and later, after the schism between Christians in 1054, Orthodox

Christians.

Albanians were the Serbs‘ southern neighbors, and until the Ottomans conquest

they were allies. Albanians were part of the Serbian army during the King Dushan‘s

leadership. In the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, Albanians stood along with Serbs against

Turks.2 Unfortunately, Serbian King Lazar lost this battle, and Turks occupied this part of

Europe for the next 500 years.3 The majority of Albanians saw this as an opportunity to

become Turks‘ ally and finally grows to be stronger than the Serbs. Most of Albanians

accepted Islam4 in an effort to be closer to their new rulers. This tactic began to have

results very fast and Turks started to settle Albanians in territories that were 100%

populated by Serbs. The excuse for this process Albanians, even today, tried to find in a

2 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje:Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 13.3 Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia’s bloody collapse (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 18.4 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 14.



Boshkovich 7

fact that Illyrians lived before Serbs on the entire Balkan Peninsula, and that they were

their ancestors. It is true that Illyrians lived on the Balkan, but there is no evidence that

Albanians are connected with them.

Since the Turks invasion of the Balkan in 14th century, Albanians and Serbs

became more hostile to each other. However, Turks were the main reason for the Serbs

migrations to the north, such as that from second half of the 15th century. But the largest

exodus of Serbs occurred during the World Wars, when Albanians started to realize their

nationalist ideas that were first introduced in 1878, when Albanians formed so-called

―League for protection of Albanian nation‖ or ―The First Prizren League‖.5

The reason

for this meeting was Berlin Congress, in which great powers decided to return to Serbia

some counties that were taken by Ottomans, in which during the occupation Albanians

settled. The main goal of this league was creation of Albanians‘ nation state that would

consist of four regions (vilayets) inhabited by Albanians6: a) South Albania and Epir with

capitol in Janina (Greece-I.B.); b) North and Central Albania (Skadar, Tirana, and

Elbasan); c) Macedonia (Skopje, Debar, Gostivar, Prilep, Veles, Bitola, Ohrid); d)

Kosovo with parts of southern central Serbia (Pec, Djakovica, Prizren, Novi Pazar,

Mitrovica, Sjenica, Pristina, Gnjilane, Presevo, and Kumanovo). Between 1878 and the

first Balkan war (1912), 400,000 people escaped from Kosovo to central Serbia.7

5 Jean-Arnault Dérens, ―Threat of Enduring Nationalism: Kosovo‘s Rival Histories‖, Le Monde

Diplomatique, July 12, 2005, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/62/446.html6 Bernard J. Fisher, ―A Brief Historical Overview of the Development of Albanian Nationalism,‖ Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 23, 2005,http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/MR313%20Fischer.doc7 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 15-16.



Boshkovich 8

Map of ―Great Albania‖8

During WWI, the Serbian army along with thousands of civilians had to retreat

through Albania to Greece. That was the only way since Austrians attacked from the

north and west, while Bulgarians struck from the east in an effort to concur Macedonia

which was southern Serbia at that time. During that retreat through Albania, Albanians

were very aggressive toward Serbs.9

Under the protection of the fascist Italian government in WWII, Albanian

collaborators killed thousands of Serbs and other non-Albanians.10 Before WWII, Serbs

8 Zvonimir Trajkovic, ―Srbi Iznad Sarajeva Postavljaju Divovski Kriz,‖ Srpska Politika,

http://www.srpskapolitika.com/intervjui/2008/latinica/042.html9 The New York Times, ―Serbian Retreat a Heroic Tragedy,‖ January 8, 1916, pg 2,http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9404E7DD103FE233A2575BC0A9679C946796D6CF;another good source for Serbian retreat through Albania is Olive M. Aldridge, Retreat from Serbia through

Montenegro and Albania (London: The Minerva Publishing Company, 1916)http://www.archive.org/texts/flipbook/flippy.php?id=retreatfromserbi00aldriala

10Carl Kosta Savich, ― Albanian Nazi Troops in WW2 Launched a Wide Spread Terror Against KosovoSerbs,‖ Vatopaidi Online, October 27, 2009, http://vatopaidi.wordpress.com/2009/10/27/albanian-nazi-troops-in-ww2-launched-a-wide-spread-terror-against-kosovo-serbs/



Boshkovich 9

were the majority in Kosovo and Metohija, making up 61% of population. However, after

WWII on 1961 census, Albanians were majority with 67, 1%, this number rose in 1971 to

73, 7% of population in what was called after WWII ―Serbian Autonomous Province

Kosovo and Metohija‖. According to Mr. Simic, in 1981 ethnic Albanians made 77.4%

of population of Kosovo, while Serbs fell from 23.6% in 1961 to 7.3% in 1981. Other

than that, half of Albanian population is younger than 20 years, which means that their

population will most likely double in the next 20 years. Additional data is available in

Tim Judah‘s book , The Serbs, where one can see that 441,740 of Albanians lived in

Yugoslavia in 1918, while that number rises to 1,730,000 in 1981.11

Besides Albanian ethnic cleansing of Serbs during WWII (in just one year of war,

until April 1942, 60,000 Serbs were forced to escape from Kosovo12), there are other

reasons why the demographic structure changed so rapidly. The first reason is that

Communist‘s regime in Yugoslavia did not allow Serbs to return to Kosovo and Metohija

after the war (the decision maker of that time was Josip Broz Tito, and many Albanians

were known as ‗Titoists‘ because he gave them autonomy). ―The ‗Titoist‘ phenomenon

among Albanians was not simply, as it is often described, an expression of nostalgia for

Tito‘s ‗gift‘ to Kosova of its position as a Yugoslav autonomous province…‖ 13 At the

same time, Tito allowed Albanians from Albania to move to this part of Serbia with

excuse that they are trying to escape from dictatorship of Enver Hodza. ―…in the creation

of a Communist Yugoslavia under Tito, the Croat-Slovene. He concluded before World

11 Tim Judah, The Serbs: history, myth & the destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1997), 311-13.12 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 19.13 Stephen Schwartz, ―'Enverists' and 'Titoists' - Communism and Islam in Albania and Kosova, 1941-99:From the Partisan Movement of the Second World War to the Kosova Liberation War,‖ Journal of

Communist Studies and Politics 25, no. 1 (2009): 65.



Boshkovich 10

War II that Yugoslavia could only be re-created on the basis of a weakened and

constricted Serbia‖.14

The second reason is the Albanians birth rate, which at the end of 20th century

was 6.8 children per family while Serbs had 1.5 per family. In addition to this, it is

interesting that even in a relatively peaceful period, from mid 1960‘s till mid 1980‘s,

approximately 200,000 people left Kosovo, creating 700 settlements ethnically

completely free of Serbs.15

Albanian pronazi demonstration during WWII16

Someone may ask why Serbs had tolerated this behavior of Yugoslav

communist‘s regime. The answer is that this regime was ruled by Dictator Josip Broz

14 David Binder, ―Thoughts about Serbs,‖ Journal of the North American Society for Serbian Studies 14,no. 2 (2000): 167-71, http://www.serbianstudies.org/publications/pdf/Vol14_2_Binder.pdf15 Dobrica Cosic, Kosovo (Beograd: Novosti, 2004), 44.16 Coordinamento Nazionale per la Yugoslavia, http://www.cnj.it/documentazione/KOSMET/foto.htm



Boshkovich 11

Tito who was Croat.17 Though it is still unclear why, Croats and Serbs could never live in

a harmony. It is not easy to find evidences of Serbian hostility toward Croats, but the

newest example of animosity between these two ethnic groups was in civil war of 1990‘s,

which ended in 1995 when Croats launched ―O peration Storm‖ in which 200,000

refugees escaped to Serbia and Bosnia, while ―In the days that followed Operation Storm,

property was destroyed and atrocities committed against those Serbs who remained.‖18

But much worst example for this hatred occurred in 1940‘s. Only in WWII,

Croats, which were Nazi allies, killed 700,000 Serbs (most of them in extermination

camp Jasenovac were Croats killed about 600,000 people19

).

Tito‘s regime changed the constitution in 1974, giving to this province all

attributes of republic except the name. Albanians took advantage of this by creating

ethnically clear of Serbs police, making them less important citizens without any possible

protection from Federal or Republic government. On the other side, Albanians took all

important positions in the Province government and courts. They developed a parallel

education system based on the Albanian language which was against the law. All these

things were unthinkable for Serbs in Albania, where they were forced during the time to

change their names so that they won‘t sound as Slovenes in addition to being forbidden to

be educated in their language.20 Besides that, Albanian government took all their houses

17 Rit Nosotro, ―Josip Broz Tito: 1892-1980, Yugoslavian Dictator Who Succeeded with Communism,‖ HyperHistory Online, 2003, http://www.hyperhistory.net/apwh/bios/b2tito-josip-marshall.htm18 Matt Prodger, ―Evicted Serbs Remember Storm,‖ BBC News, August 5, 2005,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4747379.stm19 Yad Vashem Museum Online, http://www1.yadvashem.org/education/entries/English/29.asp20 David J. Kostelancik, ―Minorities and Minority Language Education in Inter -war…‖ East European

Quarterly 30, no. 1 (1996): 81.



Boshkovich 12

and other belongings.21 However; discussion on this topic would require another research

paper.

Except for 1968, when Albanian separatists organized huge protests in all the

major cities in Kosovo, using an opportunity to cheer to ―Kosovo Republic‖, ―Long live

Albania‖ and Enver Hodza 22(which was minimized very effectively by Tito‘s communist

propaganda, explaining that it was just a group of youths that broke in a couple of stores,

which is common even in the western countries23) until 1980, when Tito died, Albanians

held their activities bellow the radar, knowing that time was working for them. After that

event everything changed. Albanian separatists begin massive demonstrations against

Serbian government with demands to be recognized as a Republic, which was

unacceptable for Serbian authorities because that would lead to separation from Serbia

and Yugoslavia. This period of violence in Kosovo lasts until 1989, when extremely

popular Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic changed the constitution, and brought

Serbian jurisdiction back to Kosovo, that would last until 1999.

21 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 10. 22 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: a short history (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 325.23 Dobrica Cosic, Kosovo (Beograd: Novosti, 2004), 24-25.



Boshkovich 13

Section B; The End of the Cold War

After Tito‘s death in 1980, Albanian separatists in Kosovo started massive

protests with parole ―Kosovo Republic‖. They believed that Tito‘s death meant death of

Yugoslavia. This was very dangerous for the security of the country, especially because

of the willingness of a huge number of Albanians in Macedonia (they already had

protests back in 1968 when they insisted on unification with Kosovo24) and Montenegro

to join those demonstrations. The state government decided to send army and police to

suppress protestors. This situation ended with declaring martial law25 and the

imprisonment of hundreds of Albanians. Unfortunately, these prisoners did not change in

the prison; oppositely, prison became an ideal place for recruiting new fighters for

Kosovo independence: ―Most [future] Albanian political prisoners were former students

arrested in the 1980s for their participation in the movement demanding a Republic of

Kosovo within Federal Yugoslavia‖.26 It should be mentioned that arrests in communist

Yugoslavia were very common thing for more trivial things, such as a joke about the

president or a communist party. So these arrests would happen to any other group,

regardless of ethnicity.

Albanian separatists concluded that it was still too early for open confrontation

with the government, and they decided to continue with a less transparent war against

Serbs and other non-Albanians. There was a great number of Serbs killed during the

1980‘s, usurpation of their land and live stock, rapes, refusing to help Serbs in hospitals,

24Ibid, 25.25 Stephen Schwartz, ―'Enverists' and 'Titoists' - Communism and Islam in Albania and Kosova, 1941-99:from the Partisan Movement of the Second World War to the Kosova Liberation War,‖ Journal of

Communist Studies and Politics 25, no. 1 (2009): 67.26 Zoran Kusovac, ―The KLA: Braced to Defend and Control,‖ Jane’s Online http://www.janes.com/defence/news/kosovo/jir990401_01_n.shtml





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Serbian police in action in Belgrade, Serbian capital30,31

The only institutions that gave some confidence to Serbs were the Church and the

Army. The largest number of Serbian churches and monasteries are on Kosovo. Some of

these sanctuaries are from the 12th and 13th centuries.32 Albanian separatists did not have

to make special effort to suppress Church because the communist party was more than

sufficient at doing that job. After WWII communists usurped thousands of hectares of

churches land and gave it to Albanians. Different than in other post-communist regimes,

Church never received this land back. However, Serbs priests are still in Kosovo as the

last representatives of Serbian continuity in this province/independent country (depends

from which perspective).

30 B92 Online, http://vukajlija.com/attached_images/0003/6960/policija.jpg31 Politika Online, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Hronika/Policija-na-nishanu-gnevnih.lt.html32 UNESCO Online, ―Medieval Monuments in Kosovo,‖ http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/724/



Boshkovich 16

One of Serbian Monasteries (Saint Archangels) that was destroyed while under KFOR protection (March2004)33

When speaking of the Army, Albanian separatists used different approach to

diminish that organization. The JNA (Yugoslav National Army) consisted of youths from

all six republics and two autonomous provinces. These recruits were not professional

soldiers, and they had to serve in the Army for 18 months, and from the middle 1980‘s 12

months. This was a multiethnic institution and Albanian terrorists (a growing group of

people that started to use violence to gain independence, later organized in the Kosovo

Liberation Army) attacked soldiers less than the police because they were sure that if they

attacked police in Kosovo they could kill only Serbs or loyal Albanians, which are seen

as traitors and collaborators. Albanian terrorists decided to change the structure of the

Army. In 1987, Albanian recruit Kelmendi joined the Army, and when he finally got the

rifle he killed 4 soldiers, wounded 6, and simply escaped from the base. The terrorists

33 Info-sluzba Kosova I Metohije Online, http://www.kosovo.net/news/archive/2004/April_14/8.html



Boshkovich 17

accomplished their goal, and the JNA did not insist anymore on mandatory serving for

Albanians. The JNA soldiers also became legitimate targets for terrorists, while recruits

from all other republics tried everything to avoid serving in Kosovo. Even the writer of

this research remembers how the parents of Yugoslav teenagers were doing everything to

find someone who could help their kids to avoid serving in Kosovo.

The situation for Serbs in Kosovo from 1988 was desperate. Now Serbs started

demonstrations in effort to show how worried they were. This was the perfect opportunity

for a new energetic politician to make a career. His name was Slobodan Milosevic. He

put himself as a leader of all Serbs who would protect them from Albanian terrorists. The

most important moment in his political career happened on 28 th June 1989 (600th

anniversary of Kosovo Battle) when he gave the famous speech in Kosovo, telling the

one million Serbs present, all the things that they wanted to hear

Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles and are facing

battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet.

However, regardless of what kind of battles they are, they cannot be won without

resolve, bravery, and sacrifice, without the noble qualities that were present here

in the field of Kosovo in the days past. Our chief battle now concerns

implementing the economic, political, cultural, and general social prosperity,

finding a quicker and more successful approach to a civilization in which people

will live in the 21st century. For this battle, we certainly need heroism, of course



Boshkovich 18

of a somewhat different kind, but that courage without which nothing serious and

great can be achieved remains unchanged and remains urgently necessary.34

Serbs from Kosovo felt saved, and they followed Milosevic everywhere. One

million people came to Belgrade‘s protest which was organized by Serbs from Kosovo.

The main speaker was Milosevic. He took the Communist Party of Serbia in his hands,

which was followed by the introduction of democracy, and his SPS (Socialistic Party of

Serbia) won first elections in Serbia. Milosevic changed the constitution, and Kosovo was

again under direct control of Serbia. Serbian refuges from Kosovo ceased to escape in to

the central Serbia, and citizens thought that problem of Albanian separatism and

terrorism in Kosovo is solved.

Milosevic with his supporters35

Unfortunately, in the mid 1990‘s, after the civil war in former Yugoslavia (which

seemed to be expected due to the end of the Cold War), Albanian separatists decided to

try again, this time more violently. Separatists started attacks on Serbs, other non-

Albanians, Police, Army, and institutions, including Albanians that were loyal to Serbia.

34 Slobodan Milosevic Online, ―Political Speeches: Slobodan Milosevic‘s 1989 St. Vitus Day Speech,‖June 28, 1989, http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/spch-kosovo1989.htm35 Ibid, ―Bibliography,‖http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/biography.htm



Boshkovich 19

Interestingly, Pandora‘s Box in Kosovo was not open during civil war in other parts of

Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina). Mr. Simic said that reasons

for that, one can find in these three theories: 1) Separatists in Kosovo were not satisfied

with the balance of power in Kosovo, and they wanted to wait until Serbia became

exhausted from civil wars; 2) Neighboring Albania was going through post-communist

transition and turmoil; 3) Until the Dayton peace conference in 1995 regard ending of

civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albanians in Kosovo hoped that international

community would put Kosovo‘s question in Dayton‘s negotiations. Since this never

happened, separatists ceased to support peaceful Mr. Rugova, and started to support so-

called KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), which was established at the end of 1993.36

The conflict culminated in 1998, when the USA threatened Serbia for the first

time with intervention due to ―ethnic cleansing of Albanians‖ and police brutality. To

make clear, Serbian security forces would overreact here and there. Those cases were

usually among police members, not in the army, because the police were local and

sometimes its members had relatives who were killed by KLA.37 Besides that, bad people

exist everywhere. Even US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan had an incident in which

soldiers raped a 14-year-old girl and killed her family. Another example are pictures from

Abu Graib prison where US soldiers sexually assaulted Iraq prisoners, somehow they

even used dogs. Fortunately, no one bombed the USA because of these couple lunatics.

Different than what an international audience could read in newspaper, Serbian

36 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 23-25.37 YouTube Online, Aidan Laverty and Tom Giles, ―Moral Combat - NATO at War - Part 3,‖ BBC

Production , 2000, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X7J2Uqxh194&feature=related



Boshkovich 20

authorities punished individuals involved in criminal activities.38 Many of them are still

in prison. The truth is that Serbs (civilians) suffered much more, and there was a new

wave of Serbian refuges, so the Albanian population on Kosovo rose to more than 95%.

However, the International Community led by Clinton‘s administration assumed that

Serbs are guilty for everything since they were already labeled as ‗bad boys‘ in wars in

former Yugoslavia.

Speaking of Serbian police, once again it should be mentioned that they could be

very violent toward any kind of protestors, regardless of their ethnicity or ideology.39

There was not any difference in police approach to Albanian protestors from that to

supporters of opposition in central Serbia. In both cases protests would end with dozens

of injured protestors and police officers, which always had negative effect to Milosevic‘s

dictatorship. Brutality always led to increasing of number of Milosevic‘s opponents.

However, in the case of Kosovo, once the KLA started to kill police officers on a daily

basis40, Serbian police traded batons for rifles and the conflict escalated to a degree of

which no one could stop that spiral of violence.

Albanian terrorists were shocked, and they decided to become more radical. They

started to attack Police, Army, Serbs, and especially loyal Albanians anytime and

everywhere (more about this in the section about the KLA). This was followed by a large

number of performances for an international audience, from hunger strike of miners,

38 Four former police officers were convicted and sent to prison for total of 68 years for war crime against50 Albanian civilians from Suva Reka. B92 Online, ―Presuda za Zlocin u Suvoj Reci,‖ April 23, 2009, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2009&mm=04&dd=23&nav_id=356909 39 Glas Javnosti Online, ― Ninth March Without Meeting,‖ March 8, 2000, http://arhiva.glas- javnosti.rs/arhiva/2000/03/09/srpski/p00030810.shtm; On March 9th, 1991 in Belgrade, 114 people werehurt and 2 people died in the demonstrations against Slobodan Milosevic‘s regime. 40 Global Security Online, ―Kosovo Li beration Army [KLA].‖ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/kla.htm



Boshkovich 21

through students declining to attend Serbian Universities, to food poisoning of school

children, but only Albanian children, even if the School was multiethnic. It should be

mentioned that during that time (September 1990) Albanians in Kosovo declared

independence by ―Kacanik Constitution‖; of course they did not have support from the

USA and other powers, so no one cared about it. 41 Nevertheless, during this turmoil

Albanians got a new leader, Ibrahim Rugova. On first elections for so-called ―Republic of

Kosovo‖ in 1992, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) led by Mr. Rugova won by

far, and he became the first President of Albanian parallel state in Kosovo, while Bujar

Bukosi was elected as a first Prime Minister.42

Rugova become very popular as a fighter for Albanian rights. The most important

thing that he has done for Albanians was abandoning of the blood feud. He gained

forgiveness among 150 families.43 This custom, which divided Albanians for centuries,

was the main reason why they were not as dangerous. Rugova was for Albanians what

Arafat was for Palestinians. His objectives developed from real autonomy, through the

Republic of Kosovo, to full independence.44 At the time Rugova and his followers

insisted that they should have the same rights as Serbs in Croatia, but they had to change

that once Croatian army conducted operation ―Oluja‖ (Storm) in August 199545, in which

they completed ethnic cleansing of Serbs that started in WWII.

Milosevic, on the other side, tried to imitate Israelis, but he did not understand

that for that kind of approach he needed the support of the USA. On the contrary, Rugova

41 UNESCO Online, ―Parallel worlds rebuilding the education system in Kosovo ,‖ 43,http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001361/136152e.pdf42 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 30.43 Milan Komnenic, Klopka u Rambujeu (Beograd: Prosveta, 2006), 124.44 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 31.45 Ibid, 36.



Boshkovich 22

had more support from the USA and other western countries, not to mention the support

from Muslim countries. It was quite normal when some politician visited Serbia, such as

Senator Bob Dole, to talk only with Albanians, avoiding even a courtesy talk with

government representatives. Encouraged by this amount of support, Albanian terrorists

decided to establish the KLA to intensify attacks on Serbs, especially after the collapse of

the Albanian government (in Albania) and stealing of countless number of weapons from

army bases around Albania (according to Mr. Simic it was more than 700,000 of

weapons).46 Albanian separatists were very surprised when the State Department put the

KLA on the list of terrorist organizations, which lasted until 1998, when the KLA ceased

to be considered as a terrorist group47, and, as some politicians in Serbia claim, actually

become NATO infantry in 1999 bombing of Serbia.

Mr. Holbrook (high ranking diplomat of Department of State who even took off his shoes to show respectto his host- I.B.) with KLA leadership48

46 Ibid, 49.47 Scott Park, ―State Department Once Called New Allies ‗Terrorists‘: Cohen: For KLA victory, but not forKLA,‖ Human Events, April 30, 1999,http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_199904/ai_n8836923/48 Forumi Shqiptar Online, http://www.forumishqiptar.com/showthread.php?t=44488



Boshkovich 23

Left to Right: Hashim Thachi (KLA Leader), Bernard Kouchner (UNMIK Chief), Sir Michael Jackson(NATO Command), Gen. Agim Ceku (Commanding KLA General), Gen. Wesley Clark (Commanding NATO General)49

According to Mr. Mitic, British journalist Tim Marshall in his book stated that

Americans did not came to Kosovo just to observe, but also to instruct the KLA and

provide them with equipment, satellite phones, etc.50

By 1997, the KLA controlled significant parts of Kosovo‘s territory. This was

unacceptable for Serbian authorities, and Milosevic decided to send more troops to this

region. Quite easily the army and police defeated KLA, but international community did

not like this usage of armed forces so they insisted that Serbia accept UN mission which

would control movements of Serbian security forces. The head of this Mission was

William Walker. The problem with this mission was that they did not do what they were

49 Emperors Online, http://emperors-clothes.com/serbo-croatian/articles/s-sinko.htm50 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 62.



Boshkovich 24

supposed to; instead, according to some military commentators at that time in

Yugoslavia, they were marking targets for the NATO.51

This Mission was supposed to have 2,000 members, but at the end there were

1,600 people. They did not have any weapons, but a large number of them were military

intelligence personnel from western countries. British journalist Tim Marshall said that

British sent members of SAS as well as members of other elite units. In addition to that,

according to this journalist, the CIA was also present and very active in this mission.52

Besides regular Serbian forces, there were some groups of so-called ―volunteers‖.

The most known leader of them was Arkan with his ―tigers‖. Some westerners said that

the number of these ―soldiers‖ was remarkable, but in actuality there were a couple of

dozens of them. While there were a remarkable percentage of volunteers that came to

Kosovo due to patriotic feelings and ideology (Arkan for example was very interested in

politics, he was once even a member of the Parliament), a significant number of them

came with the main goal to steal cars, TVs, money, jewelry, etc. General Lazarevic

mentioned some cases in which regular armed forces discovered misconduct of

volunteers: ―…25 volunteers were returned from the corps and seven were detained

because of renegade behavior, killings, robbery, rapes, et cetera‖.53

Of course, these volunteers created an extremely negative picture of Serbia in the

world, creating more damage then favor for their country. Unfortunately, they liked to

pose for pictures in uniform and journalists from around the globe saw a great

51 Vlada Republike Srbije Online, ―General lazarevic: Neizostavno se vracamo na Kosmet ,‖http://www.arhiva.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/1999-12/26/17141.html52 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 61.53 UN ICTY Online, Transcripts from General Lazarevic Testimony, 17981,http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/trans/en/071109IT.htm



Boshkovich 25

opportunity to make some story and earn their paycheck. On the other side the KLA

represented themselves as rebels fighting for freedom and democracy.

Arkan and his volunteers54

Interestingly, some politicians in Serbia were ahead of time. Mr. Cosic for

example, who was the first president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (established

in 1992 after the collapse of Socialistic Yugoslavia), wanted to determine a new border in

Kosovo which would give one third of Kosovo to Serbia and the rest to Albanians. He

even discussed about this with an USA ambassador in Yugoslavia Mr. Zimmermann, but

Milosevic refused that idea.55 The reason for that was Milosevic‘s stubbornness. He

insisted that Kosovo is part of Serbia and Yugoslavia and that no one could change that.

Legally he was right, but in reality he could not understand that almost two million of

Albanians in Kosovo do not want to live in Serbia, while Serbia is not as powerful as for

54 Zona Libre Online, http://www.zonalibre.org/blog/lobo/archives/077635.html55 Dobrica Cosic, Kosovo (Beograd: Novosti, 2004), 72.



Boshkovich 26

example Spain or China to suppress their separatisms in Basque, Catalonia and Tibet,

respectively. On the other side no one knows how Albanians led by Rugova would react

on this proposal, but most likely they would accept this idea because that would give

them independence without war (Mr. Cosic talked about this in 1992), which would be

recognized by Serbia.



Boshkovich 27

Part II

Chapter II

Section A; About the KLA

The KLA's guerrilla campaign was a deliberate attempt to provoke Belgrade intoreprisals that would attract the West's attention. Knowing it could not defeat Yugoslaviawithout NATO's military support, the KLA waged a nasty insurgency that includedassassinations of Serbian political and military officials.56

Answering the question ―What is actually the KLA?‖ back on 25th

February 1998,

the US special envoy for Kosovo, Ambassador Robert Gelbard said: ―I know how to

recognize terrorist when I see him. Trust me, these people are terrorists‖.57Even if it is not

easy to find these attributes about the KLA in western sources, a persistent researcher

will find one on BBC‘s website from June 28th 1998 where Gelbard was quoted saying:

―I know a terrorist when I see one and these men are terrorists,".58 However, according to

Mr. Simic a couple of months later the KLA was no longer considered a terrorist

organization, but fighters for freedom. Not just that, in the same year on April 21st,

Senators Mitch McConnell and Joseph Lieberman requested that the US administration

finance with 25 million dollars weapons for 10,000 members of the KLA. Journalist Tim

Judah noticed that comparing to organizations such as IRA, ETA, Hezbollah or Corsican

56 Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwartz, ―Was It a Mistake?; We Were Suckers for the KLA,‖ The

Washington Post , March 26, 2000,http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/51850611.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Mar+26%2C+2000&author=Christopher+Layne%3BBenjamin+Schwarz&pub=The+Washington+Post&edition=&startpage=B.01&desc=WAS+IT+A+MISTAKE%3F%3B+We+Were+Suckers+For+the+KLA 57 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 53.58 BBC Online, ―The KLA – Terrorists or Freedom Fighters?‖, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/121818.stm



Boshkovich 28

National Front, the KLA is most successful terrorist organization in modern history

because in just 18 months since they introduced themselves in public, they acquired main

political goals and succeed in gaining of support of the most powerful military

organization in the world to do for them majority of military goals.59

One of the KLA leaders, Jakup Krasnici openly stated that the KLA objective is

unification of all Albanians on Balkan.60 The other KLA leader, Bardil Mahmuti said that

they calculated that ethnic Albanians could lose approximately 300,000 people to gain

independence which is acceptable.61

According to the DEA (Drugs Enforcement Administration) Albanian mafia is the

most important link in monthly shipments of 4-6 tons of Turkish heroin to Western

Europe.62 The Times commented that the KLA "is a terrorist organization that has

financed much of its war effort with profits from the sale of heroin." Additional

documents from intelligence agencies of five different countries obtained by the news

agencies disclosed that "the KLA has aligned itself with an extensive organized crime

network centered in Albania that smuggles heroin and some cocaine tobuyers throughout

Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States." Members of the KLA are

among the individuals that are part of the Albanian drug cartel. Most of the profits from

this drug operation are then channeled into the KLA for arms purchases. 63

59 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 54.60 ICG Europe, Report No 153, ―Pan Albanianism: how big a threat to Balkan stability?‖, February 25,2004, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan014972.pdf61 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 62-63.62 Heather Cottin, ―The Balkan Route and the Contras of Kosovo,‖ CovertAction Online,

http://www.covertaction.org/content/view/77/75/63 UN Wire, ―Newspaper Explores KLA Drug, Terrorism Ties ,‖ May 6, 1999,http://www.unwire.org/unwire/19990506/2453_story.asp



Boshkovich 29

Besides the KLA activities that are connected to distribution of illegal drugs, their

connection with Al-Qaeda was also topic of some investigations. ―…some members of

the KLA received training in terrorist camps run by international fugitive Osama bin

Laden…64 And this is what Mr. Kirov, acting head of Bulgarian intelligence said about

Al-Qaeda aspirations on Balkan:‖ Ever since the Yugoslav wars began, Al-Qaeda and

other radical organizations have worked to gain and develop footholds in the Balkans and

among the expatriate populations. He war ned that Kosovo would become a ‗direct source

of regional instability and a hub for international terrorism‘ if concerted action was not

taken to address the issue.‖65

According to data from the Yugoslav police, among

members of the KLA it was not unusual to find Mujahedins from Afghanistan, Chechnya,

Egypt, Sudan, and other Islamic countries.66 According to the same sources, the KLA

was financed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the Humanitarian Organization

―Third World Relief Agency (TWRA)‖ led by sheik Omar Rahman and Osama bin

Laden.67 ―… the Bosnian pattern was replicated in Kosovo: Mujahadeen mercenaries

from various Islamic countries are reported to be fighting alongside the KLA in Kosovo.

German, Turkish and Afghan instructors were reported to be training the KLA in guerilla

and diversion tactics‖68 Even according to the London Times, American intelligence

agencies pointed out that there is a possible connection between the KLA and Osama bin

Laden, a Saudi emigrant accused for bombing of USA embassies in Nairobi and Kenya in

64 Ibid.65 The New York Times, ―Carry on Blair,‖ May 10, 2007,http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/carry-on- blair/?scp=15&sq=Kosovo%20Liberation%20Army,%20Al-Qaeda&st=cse66 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 70.67 Ibid, 70.68 Michael Chossudovsky, ―Kosovo ‗Freedom Fighters‘ Financed by Organized Crime,‖http://www.eroj.org/urbiorbi/Yugoslavia/kosovo.htm



Boshkovich 30

August 1998.69 This statement was obviously released before 9/11. Some experts said

that they are concerned that Albanian organized crime groups from Kosovo, Albania and

Macedonia could make an alliance with other terrorist groups. However, according to US

officials, those links have not been detected.70

Unfortunately, it seems that all these information are not enough for the US and

other western countries to see the KLA as just another terrorist organization, which might

become a threat to American soldiers as well. It will probably happen once NATO came

on the way to the KLA‘s ambitions in Kosovo.

Between January 1st 1998, and June 10th 1999, members of the KLA carried out

2,896 terrorist attacks, to include 1,071 attacks on citizens, 1,642 on members of police,

and 573 on members of Yugoslav Army.71

69 The Times, ―U.S. Alarmed as Mujahidin Join Kosovo Rebels,‖ November 26, 1998.70 US Embassy Online, ―Islamic Terrorism and the Balkan,‖ July 26, 2005,www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL33012.pdf71 Youtube Online, ―Kosovo War – Political Aspects (Part I)‖, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fv-3z_cvJOk&feature=related



Boshkovich 31

KLA terrorists with beheaded Serbian 72

―Today these same men wear the uniforms of the [Kosovo] Protection Corps (approximately 5,000members of the former KLA are in the Corps).‖73

Is it possible to reconstruct this crime?

The KLA terrorist in the middle is Sadik Cuflaj from the area of Decani. On his

left is Valon Cuflaj, his son who is currently employed by UNMIK in Kosovo Protection

Corps (rank of Lieutenant). He is taking the position in inspector‘s office in Pec, and in

the meantime UNMIK took disciplinary measures against him and his father. The

assumption is that these crimes are committed by units led by Ramush and Daut

Haradinaj (Ramush‘s case will be more elaborated in following part of this section). The

human head that is visible on the right most likely is the head of Bojan Cvetkovic from

72 Dejan Lucic Online, http://www.dejanlucic.net/73 Vecernje Novosti, KLA Cut Off People’s Head http://www.ex-yupress.com/evnovosti/evnovosti13.html



Boshkovich 32

Nis (central Serbia), while it was not possible to find out whose head was the one on the

right side.74

Even the ICTY‘s (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia)

main prosecutor Carla Del Ponte could not ignore war crimes committed by members of

the KLA. Simply, there were so many evidences of their brutality that some KLA leaders

had to be accused and sent to Hague. Many people have disappeared during the bombing

and after arrival of the KFOR troops. That number includes over 1,500 Albanians that

disappeared after being captured by the KLA during the bombing, while 300 Albanians

were missed in second half of 1999 and 2000.75

Unfortunately, this number is growing

every day, especially in the Serbian community. Besides that, Del Ponte said that a

significant number of those that were captured (Serbian media covered that story before

Del Ponte) ended in Albania where Albanian doctors participated in surgeries in which

they were taking out internal organs of kidnapped people and smuggled them through an

airport in Rinas to wealthy patients in other countries.76 Naturally, since these crimes

were committed by the KLA which should represent ‗good boys‘, Del Ponte always

highlighted that these stories are based on statements of witnesses. At the same time

Serbs that were accused for war crimes were usually pronounced guilty even before the

trial would begin. Nevertheless, Del Ponte said that Thaci did admit during one

conversation that the KLA committed crimes in Kosovo. She replied that she commenced

investigation in regard to that on which he reacted by huge surprise and fear.77

Thaci did not have to defend himself in ICTY, but Ramush Haradinaj had to. This

74 Ibid75 Carla del Ponte and Cak Sudetic, Gospodja Tuziteljka: Suocavanje s Najtezim Ratnim Zlocinima i

Kulturom Nekaznjivosti (Beograd: Profil Knjiga, 2008), 268.76 Ibid, 268-69.77 Ibid, 271.



Boshkovich 33

well known KLA leader was elected by the Kosovo Assembly as a Prime Minister of

Kosovo in 2004. Based on Del Ponte‘s investigation, Haradinaj was accused for crimes

against humanity and violations of laws of war.78 Once again, Del Ponte made sure that

all accusations against Haradinaj were still to be proved (just on one page (281) of her

book she used word supposed 5 times before particular accusation made by witnesses).

Haradinaj found out about an indictment in March 2005, which was followed by his

patriotic speech. According to Del Ponte, it seemed that Søren Jessen-Petersen who was

chief of the UNMIK mission in Kosovo at that time was even sadder about this

accusation than Haradinaj himself. Jessen-Petersen said in his statement that it is very

painful that Mr. Haradinaj has to go to Hague, but he called all citizens of Kosovo to stay

calm and show same dignity that was showed by Haradinaj.79

Fortunately for Haradinaj, the entire process against him in ICTY was poorly

prepared and followed by the disappearance of all crucial witnesses. Del Ponte tried to

find some excuse for that, such as the fact that those few Albanians from Kosovo who

wished to give testimony would have to be protected along with their families and moved

to third countries which were not ready to accept them.80 Another explanation for a lack

of witnesses is evident in Nazim Bllaca‘s decision to talk. This man was member of

Kosovo‘s Intelligence Agency, for which he committed homicides, attempts of

homicides, and threats. Bllaca said that at that time he thought he was helping Kosovo,

but later on he found out that it was not the case.81

His activities include the bribery

(150,000 Euros) of Riza Rehaj who was supposed to be a witness in Hague in trial

78 Ibid, 281.79 Ibid, 283-84.80 Ibid, 270.81 Blic Online, ―Blaca: Tacijevi Saradnici su mi Naredjivali da Ubijam Ljude,‖ November 29, 2009,http://www.blic.rs/politika.php?id=123057



Boshkovich 34

against Fatmir Limaj, one of the KLA commanders.82 Because of that, at the court Rehaj

changed his original testimony. Besides that, Bllaca admitted that he also killed one

witness in Limaj‘s case.83 Anyway, Haradinaj was just another KLA leader that was

proclaimed innocent in front of ICTY because their prosecutors did not have enough

evidence to put him in jail. Also, this KLA leader had very expensive lawyers from the

law firm where one of employees is Cherie Blair (wife of British Prime Minister, at that

time, Tony Blair who was a strong advocate of bombing as well as independence of

Kosovo) for which he paid millions of Euros.84 Once again, different than for many

Serbian generals, money was not the problem. However, at present signals from Hague

are giving some hope that Haradinaj might have a renewed trial, but it is yet to be

confirmed.

Serbian Intelligence Agency (BIA) in her ‗White Book‘ also presented some

valuable information regarding the KLA. According to BIA, between 1996 and 1999 the

KLA have received 900 million of German Marks, and half of that was made by drug

trafficking. Besides that, Albanians from Europe that were in charge of the financing of

the KLA where involved in trafficking persons, and the smuggling of weapons. A

sizeable amount of money was collected through imposed tax to Albanians that work

abroad (3% of their income) which they were forced to pay. The KLA had a special

department in charge of Serbians enclaves. Their task was to make the remaining Serbs to

leave Kosovo and at the same time make sure that Serbs that are IDPs (Internal

82 Limaj was accused along with three other KLA members of torturing and killing civilians, BBC Online,―Prominent Kosovo Suspect Held,‖ February 19, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2778079.stm83 Vuk Z. Cvijic and Nedjeljko Zeljak. ―Zastrasivali Svedoke da ne Optuze Tacija i Limaja,‖ Blic Online, December 12, 2009, http://www.blic.rs/hronika.php?id=12339484 The Centre for Peace in the Balkans Online, ―U.S. Praises Incident Former Kosovo P.M,‖ May 1, 2007,http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article&articleid=14323



Boshkovich 35

Dislocated Persons) won‘t come back.85 Even today the KLA is still active in Europe.

This time they are better known as ‗Albanian Mafia‘ which is growing stronger every

day. Just recently some of their members were caught in London in attempt to sell a girl

to another group of Albanians. Albanians already control most of the prostitution in

Greece, Germany, and Italy, where they are preparing to take the jobs of the Italian

mafia, especially in Milan. According to data from Belgian police department specialized

for Albanian organized crime, Albanian mafia is dominant in illegal activities. Experts

think that war in Kosovo played a crucial role in spreading of Albanian mafia in

Europe.86

Even the famous Russian mafia is avoiding confrontations with Albanians due

to their brutality.

85 Vuk Z. Cvijic. ―Taci Bio Sef Obavestajne Sluzbe na Kosovu,‖ Blic Online, December 9, 2009,http://www.blic.rs/hronika.php?id=12455486 Blic Online, ―Prodavali Devojku za Tri Hiljade Funti,‖ December 8, 2009,http://www.blic.rs/svet.php?id=124352



Boshkovich 36

Section B; Road to Rambouillet

The beginning of the end started in the spring of 1998. That year separatists in

Kosovo initiated a real guerilla war. Almost every day the KLA would kill couple of

members of the Serbian armed forces from the ambush, in addition to attacks on

‖Albanian traitors‖ and non-Albanians.87 On the other side, Milosevic organized

referendum regarding the involvement of the international community in this conflict in

Kosovo. As expected, a vast majority of the Serbian population voted against

internationalization of the internal issues of Serbia. Arrogant Milosevic was very satisfied

with the result of referendum, which he saw as approval to handle this conflict in the

same manner. He sent more troops to Kosovo to protect the borders and to deal with the

KLA.

Due to an enormous use of armed forces, Clinton‘s administration treated

Yugoslavia with bombing. Even Mr. Cosic found this ironic because USA bombed

countries that just might be connected to attacks on USA embassies in Africa while

Yugoslavia was not allowed to fight against terrorists on her own territory. However, to

make sure that any future intervention has some legitimacy, the UN Security Council

voted for resolution that will allowed NATO to intervene against ―country that

threatening international peace‖, regardless of the fact that NATO was established to

protect only those countries that are members of that organization. In the meantime,

Adem Demaci, ― political leader of the KLA‖ appealed to his ―army‖ to ―fight against

Serbian occupation until entire liberation of Kosovo‖.88

87 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ―Indictment against RamushHaradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj Released to the Public,‖ March 10, 2005,http://www.icty.org/sid/863188 Dobrica Cosic, Kosovo (Beograd: Novosti, 2004), 89.



Boshkovich 37

The international community ordered Milosevic to sign the agreement with

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) regarding the engagement

of this organization‘s mission in Kosovo. This ―agreement‖ had 37 entries mainly made

to control Serbian armed forces without having to fight with them. This includes: turning

of all radars upon request of NATO headquarter in Vicenza, control of movements of all

Serbian border patrols (it was practically impossible to set an ambush for Albanian

terrorists that were smuggling weapons from Albania with all those OSCE employees

next to Serbian soldiers, especially because the OSCE had orange SUVs to make

themselves distinguishable), permission for NATO unmanned aircrafts to control the

entire region of Kosovo, etc. However, there was not any part of the agreement that

obligated Albanians to do anything.89 Nevertheless, only ten days later, on 27th October

1998, NATO commandant General Wesley Clark ordered Milosevic to pull his entire

army back to barracks, in addition to a request that Serbian police abandon her positions

on main roads in Kosovo (today‘s situation in Iraq proves how difficult is to pull troops

from the battlefield in short period of time). Once again, Milosevic accepted to do

everything under the threat of usage of NATO aviation. Serbs were shocked seeing all

those military convoys in retreat from Kosovo. Of course, this created vacuum on the

battlefield which made a great opportunity for the KLA to continue with their activities.

In the absence of enough support of the Serbian army, special police were forced

to fight with the KLA mainly on her own. The turning point was an incident in the village

of Racak, which happened on 17th January 1999. The KLA killed a couple of members of

the Serbian armed forces in an ambush, which was followed by police intervention and

89 Ibid, 94.



Boshkovich 38

the killing of some KLA terrorists.90 According to Serbian authorities, during the night

the KLA brought more bodies on this location, and also changed uniforms from fallen

terrorists so they would look like civilians, and according to a German documentary

movie this is something that also occurred in the village of Rugovo (Serbs were accused

for the massacres of civilians in Rugovo, but in reality there was a combat in which 24

KLA members and one police officer died, and according to OSCE there were not any

massacres but western media was never willing to say that).91 Nevertheless, in the

morning Albanians called Mr. William Walker (head of OSCE mission in Kosovo who

was delegated to this position by Secretary Albright92

which just proves how even this

European organization was just a toy of Clinton‘s administration) who came in company

with the KLA to see what happened in Racak (later on, during the trial against Milosevic,

Walker could not remember that he was there with the KLA, but, pictures from

newspapers reminded him). This was not the first time that Mr. Walker had a problem

with his memory. A great example is his testimony in BBC‘s documentary movie ―Moral

Combat-NATO at War ‖, where he said that he did not call his superiors from Racak

while Mr. Holbrook and General Clark claim that he called them immediately from the

scene.93 Nevertheless, Mr. Walker did obviously inform his mentors as soon as possible

about the killing of 46‘innocent civilians‘, even if some of them did not have holes from

bullets on their clothes due to a changing of uniforms. Finnish forensic experts in a final

90 Ibid, 101.91 YouTube Online, Bettina Kapune, ―It started with a Lie - NATO Aggression against Serbia 1999 Part 3,‖Westdeutschen Rundfunks (WDR), 2001, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kuhfyd6bJs&NR=192 YouTube Online, Aidan Laverty and Tom Giles, ―Moral Combat - NATO at War - Part 3,‖ BBC

Production , 2000, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X7J2Uqxh194&feature=related93 YouTube Online, Aidan Laverty and Tom Giles ―Moral Combat - NATO at War - Part 4,‖ BBC

Production , 2000, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S2G-FHu4P_8&feature=related



Boshkovich 39

report on the circumstances of the deaths two years ago of some 40 people in the village

of Racak in Kosovo found no evidence of a massacre by Serb security forces.94

Some experts in Serbia claim that this was well prepared performance with

purpose to invite NATO bombs, just like in case of Bosnia 1994, when, according to

some sources95, Muslims in Sarajevo conducted attack on ―Markale‖ market place in

downtown of Sarajevo just to blame the Serbs. That time dozens of people were killed

and injured which was a justification for NATO bombing of Serbian positions in Bosnia

and Herzegovina. Even British General Michael Rose who was commander of UN troops

in Bosnia at that time argues about this tragedy in his book as something that happened

under suspicious circumstances. Because of that, his book was used by Milosevic in the

trial in ICTY, but also became an interesting topic for Rose‘s critics such as Noel

Malcolm. Malcolm did not like Rose‘s observation that "French military engineers"

suggested that, because the market was almost surrounded by high buildings, "the bomb

might not have been fired from a mortar at all, but detonated in situ". But the French

military engineers were not the only team that investigated this massacre. There were two

more teams, and in final statement it was said that ―The final verdict of this team was that

the mortar had been fired from the north-north-east, from a distance of between 300 and

5,551 metres. This meant that it could have come from either Bosnian Army or Serb

positions: the scientific evidence was simply inconclusive.‖96 Yet, regardless of the fact

that it was possible that Serbs were not responsible for this massacre, NATO commenced

94 Bassuener Kurt, ―Week in Review-January 20-26, 1999,‖ Balkans Watch 2, no. 4 (1999),―http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/balkans/Balkan%20Action%20Council%20Archives/BW%202.4.do

c95 Jim Fish, ―Sarajevo Massacre Remembered,‖ BBC Online,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3459965.stm96 General Sir Michael Rose, ―Fighting for peace: Bosnia 1994 ,‖ Bosnian Institute Online,http://www.bosnia.org.uk/about/bi_books/long_reviews.cfm?book=148



Boshkovich 40

bombing of Serbs in Bosnia. This is an excerpt from UN‘s report that supports the theory

that this event led to intervention: ―On 5 February 1994, a mortar round exploded in the

Markale marketplace in downtown Sarajevo killing 68 people, mostly Bosniac civilians,

and injuring over 200. Images of the carnage, which were captured by television crews,

were then transmitted around the world, provoking outrage‖.97

Hopefully the history will show what really happened in Sarajevo, but for this

paper it is more important to find out if Racak was just a performance for the western

audience. According to Helena Ranta, forensic dentist from Finland, William Walker

threw the pencil at her in the winter of 1999 because she did not want to use stronger

language about the Serbs. She also said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to

manipulate the content of her reports while she was appointed by EU to investigate the

incident in Racak. She added that pressure regarding incident of Racak was very high,

including the one that came from media. ―In her investigations, Ranta focussed on

forensic medicine; she did not want to take a stand, at that stage, on politically and legally

loaded terminology‖.98

Finish forensics were not the only one that were involved in the investigation of

Racak. Belarus and Serbian forensics revealed that on the hands of 37 killed Albanians

(from examined 40) they found tracks (using the method of paraffin glove) of

gunpowder, which is the evidence that they used weapons before they died, but no one

cared about that.99

97 United Nations, ―Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: thefall of Srebrenica,‖ November 15, 1999, http://www.un.org/news/ossg/srebrenica.pdf98 Helsingin Sanomat. ―Helena Ranta: Foreign Ministry Tried to Influence Kosovo Reports.‖ Kosovo

Compromise. http://www.emperors-clothes.com/analysis/meetmr.htm99 Vecernje Novosti Online, ―U R eziji Vokera,‖ January 15, 2010,http://www.novosti.rs/code/navigate.php?Id=4&status=jedna&vest=168147&title_add=U%20re%C5%BEi



Boshkovich 41

Some politicians were reserved from the very beginning in regard to Mr. Walker

due to rumors that he covered up the massacres of El Salvador‘s government back in

1989. In the investigation of this rumor, the author of this research found out that when

President Clinton wanted to make William Walker the Ambassador to Panama, back in

1993, the Church in Panama and local politicians reacted very fast accusing him for

involvement of the assassination of five priests in El Salvador in November 1989. "'The

Jesuit order at the time denounced the complicity of the U.S. Embassy (headed by

Walker) in the case, for concealing evidence, obstructing the investigation, pressuring

judges to impede the trial process, and terrorizing witnesses,' Valdes said."100

On top of that, Fernando Garcia, Jesuit priest, said that ―Walker was 'a symbol of

the destruction of life' while he was ambassador in El Salvador."101

Even Mr. Petritsch, one of the three co-presides of the Rambouillet Conference,

said that Mr. Walker was always taking terrorists under protection and that way proved

his anti-Serbian position.102

Nevertheless, Racak incident was initial capsule for NATO intervention which

was actually already prepared.103 However, as Serbian politicians claim, to gain

international support for this intervention, ―International Community‖, popularly called

―the Contact Group‖ (consisted of ministries of foreign affairs from USA, UK, France,

Germany, Italy, and Russia) organized peace conference in Rambouillet (just out of

ji%20Vokera&kword_add=bombardovanje%2C%20racak; This is a story from Serbian newspaperVecernje Novosti, which is a very credible agency.100 Inter Press Service, ―Panama: Jesuits Oppose U.S. Ambassador Designate,‖ July 22, 1993,http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg00529.html101 Ibid.102 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 64.103 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 383; SecretaryAlbright talked about gaining support for bombing almost a year before the bombing. She said: ―To makethat [threat of force] credible, it was vital for NATO to begin laying plans for a bombing campaign‖.



Boshkovich 42

Paris) as a last attempt to avoid war against Yugoslavia.

The most important points from the statement of the Contact Group that was

issued on 29th January are that regardless of efforts that were made by international

community violence was still part of daily life in Kosovo. At the same time ‗the massacre

of Kosovo Albanians in Racak ‘ resulted in several thousands of people that had to escape

from their homes. Surprisingly, in second article of this statement one can found that the

Contact Group (CG) blamed both, Yugoslav armed forces and the KLA for escalation of

violence. Therefore, Ministers of the Contact Group urged both sides to accept

negotiations that would lead to political settlement. For that purpose the CG insisted that

all sides accept ‗the basis for a fair settlement must include the principles set out by the

Contact Group‘. Also, it was asked that negotiators include the elements of ‗substantial

autonomy for Kosovo‘ as a framework for the agr eement. (Appendix, page 121)

The CG also demanded that both sides send their delegations to Rambouillet by

the sixth of February, where they would participate in the negotiation process led by co-

chairmen Hubert Vedrine and Robin Cook (French and British Ministers of Foreign

Affairs). This process was originally meant to last seven days, but as it will be explained

in the following chapters of this paper, it lasted longer. Additionally, the CG required that

both sides restrain from military actions, and said that ‗The Contact Group will hold both

sides accountable if they fail to take the opportunity now offered to them‘.104

104 United Nations, Security Council, January 29, 1999, http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/s9996.pdf thisstatement will be also available in the appendix I of this research.



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Chapter III

The Rambouillet text, which called on Serbia to admit NATO troops throughoutYugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing.105 Rambouillet is not adocument that any Serb could have accepted. It was a terrible diplomatic document thatshould never have been presented in that form. — Henry Kissinger, Daily Telegraph, June 28 1999 106

Section A; Actors

The brief version of the proposed document (available in appendix II) explains

that Rambouillet accords are agreement made for a period of three years. That agreement

would cover the most important aspects of life for citizens of Kosovo: self-government,

peace, and security. Regarding democratic self-government it was said that it was meant

to cover education, health care, and financial development. In addition to that, both sides

were to agree that Kosovo will have a President, an Assembly, independent courts, local

government, and ―national community institutions with the authority needed to protect

each community's identity‖. On the subject of security it was explained that international

troops will take care of that. At the same time local police would provide law

enforcement while Serbian and Yugoslav security forces were supposed to leave Kosovo

(the exception was small number of border patrols). In section that covers ‗mechanism

for final settlement‘ it was said that after three years the international community would

hold the meeting in which they would find the final solution for Kosovo. On that meeting

they would take very seriously in to consideration ‗the will of the people, opinions of

relevant authorities, each party's efforts regarding the implementation of the Accords, and

105 Ian Bancroft, ―Serbia‘s Anniversary Is a Timely Reminder,‖ Guardian Online, March 24, 2009,http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/mar/24/serbia-kosovo106 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 189.



Boshkovich 44

the Helsinki Final Act‘.107

The entire agreement (Appendix III) which was signed only by Albanians was

eighty two pages long (―…they [Albanians] officially signed the eighty-two-page

agreement in a five-minute ceremony boycotted both the Yugoslav delegation and the

Russian negotiator.‖)108, and the Serbs had a huge number of complaints which most of

the time were not accepted. However, the agreement discussion will follow after

description of the delegations, which had actually never met in Rambouillet, except when

they would see each other by accident in the hallways. The reason for this was host‘s

decision to implement shuttle diplomacy rather than direct negotiations which Yugoslav

delegation favored.109

The negotiators

Serbian delegation

The Serbian delegation in Rambouillet was represented by five high-ranking allies

of Milosevic in addition to representatives of other ethnic groups from Kosovo. The

107 The State Department Online, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_990301_rambouillet.html108 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 405.109 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 203.



Boshkovich 45

reason for this is Serbia‘s desire to highlight that Albanians are not the only minority in

Serbian southern province. Therefore this is how the Yugoslav/Serbian delegation was

represented:

- Ratko Markovic; professor of law, constitutional expert, Serbian Deputy

Minister, and delegate of Socialist Party.

Ratko Markovic

- Nikola Sainovic; point of contact of Serbian Government on all matters regarding

Kosovo, in charge for negotiations including ceasefires and exchanges of

prisoners, former Minister of Economy, Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister, and

also delegate of Socialist Party.

- Vladan Kutlesic; Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister.

- Vladimir Stambuk; Serbian Deputy Speaker.

- Vojislav Zivkovic; Chairman of the Socialist Party's branch in Kosovo.

- Guljbehar Sabovic; Member of the Kosmet (Kosovo and Metohija) Provisional

Executive Council.

- Refik Senadovic; Representative of the Muslim national Community.

- Zejnelabidin Kurejs; Representative of the Turkish Democratic Party and the Turk

national community.



Boshkovich 46

- Ibro Vait; Representative of Goranies national Community.

- Faik Jasari; President of the Kosovo Democratic Initiative (ethnic Albanian

political party).

- Sokolj Cuse; President of Democratic Reform Party of Albanians.

- Ljuan Koka; President of Co-ordinating Council of the Yugoslav Association of

Romanies and representative of the Romanian national community.

- Cerim Abazi; Representative of the Egyptian national community.

Of course, it is noticeable that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, as well as

Serbian President Milan Milutinovic were not members of the Yugoslav/Serbian

delegation (for simplicity it will be called the Serbian delegation).

Ethnic Albanian delegation

Albanian delegation had 16 delegates, and the most important of those were:

- Ibrahim Rugova; President of so-called Republic of Kosovo since 1992 and

leader of ethnic Albanian community in Kosovo.

Ibrahim Rugova

- Fehmi Agani; Rugova‘s ally, one of the leaders of Democratic League of Kosovo

(LDK), professor of philosophy.



Boshkovich 47

- Veton Surroi; journalist with many important contacts in the West.

- Rexhep Qosja; an academic that was advocate of a greater Albania that would

bring together in one country (Albania) Albanians from Kosovo and other

neighboring countries.

- Jakup Krasniqi; former teacher from Drenica (KLA stronghold), KLA‘s

spokesman.

- Ram Buja; former member of leadership of Rugova‘s Party (LDK), senior KLA

official ―for civilian affairs‖.

The only surprise regarding this delegation was that Adem Demaci was not part of it.

He was opponent of Serbian rule in Kosovo for almost 30 years. But in the late 90‘s he

became critic of Rugova because of his non-violent approach. Besides that, he was the

KLA‘s political representative, but the KLA did not take in account his advice to ignore

Rambouillet Peace Conference.110

All these names of the members of the delegations are easy to find in numerous

sources that covered this conference. However, the most known media that covered the

Conference, such as BBC, did not know all names that will appear in Rambouillet,

including some KLA members.

Mr. Mitic (career diplomat of Yugoslavia) who was also one of the members of

delegations that was not mentioned offers more information regarding this matter.

According to Mr. Mitic, he and Professor Etinski were added to the Serbian delegation as

experts, beside two officials from SMIP (Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and other

personnel from the same Ministry. Additionally, Mitic discussed what the role of

110 BBC Online, ―Europe Kosovo Talks: The Negotiators,‖ February 6, 1999,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/273830.stm



Boshkovich 48

individuals in respective delegations was, particularly in Serbian delegation.

Professor Markovic was just officially a head of the delegation. In reality, Mr.

Sainovic was the chief because Milosevic had full confidence in him. As Markovic said

to other members of Serbian delegation: ―In the way that this duck on the lake is the

owner of this castle, I am the head of the delegation! Besides, that is something that I do

not have to explain to you, you saw that yourself!‖111 (Mitic‘s book is in Serbian and this

is one of translations made by the author of this paper, just like in cases of Simic,

Komnenic, Cosic, and some texts from Serbian newspapers). Additionally, Serbian

President Milutinovic joined the Conference to prove that Yugoslavia did take the

Conference seriously. He ignored Markovic‘s suggestions even if he was usually right.

Occasionally, Milutinovic would use attributes such as a traitor to critique Markovic.

Other than Markovic and Sainovic, Kutlesic and Stambuk were also important

members of the delegation, while other members would be informed occasionally about

the talks. Those others were mainly representatives of minorities from Kosovo who were

seeing by westerners just as an ornament to Serbian delegation.112 According to Austrian

Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch (one of three co-presides of the Conference), Kutlesic,

Markovic, and Sainovic were competent and willing to find the solution that was

acceptable for both sides, while other members of Serbian delegation did not have

anything to say.113

111 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 81.112 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 221.113 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 83.



Boshkovich 49

Speaking of Albanian delegation, it is very important to mention that the head was

not Rugova but Hasim Thaci, the top leader of the KLA (present Prime Minister 114). Most

likely that Albanians would not accept Thaci as the chief of their delegation without an

influence from someone from the side, which was probably Madeleine Albright. Between

the other two KLA fighters, Thaci succeeded to come to Rambouillet with the help of

OSCE mission in Kosovo, regardless of the fact that he did not have a passport or other

legal documents. However, French issued them travel documents.115 Besides Thaci, there

are other important members of the delegation that were not mentioned in media before

the conference. Those are experts in Albanian delegation that were mostly Americans

with their chief, Morton Abramowitz.116

Secretary Albright and Hasim Thaci – nick

name ―Snake‖ (as stated in Latin say; nomen atque omen-name fits the object-I.B.) in Rambouillet117

114 Central Intelligence Agency, ―Kosovo: Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments,‖May 12, 2009, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/world-leaders-k/kosovo.html115 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 200.116 Diana Johnstone, ―Nato‘s Mixed Motives,‖ http://www.spokesmanbooks.com/Spokesman/PDF/Johnstone69.pdf; Abramowitz may be considered theéminence grise behind the US policy of support to the Albanian secessionists in Kosovo117 Srpska Politika Online, http://www.srpskapolitika.com/Tekstovi/Komentari/2009/latinica/033.html.



Boshkovich 50

According to David Livingstone, Abramowitz was often associated to CIA‘s

activities abroad.118 Other than that, Abramowitz was the leader of the group of 32

American intellectuals who wrote a letter to President Clinton titled ―Milosevic is the

Problem‖ (22nd September 1998), in which they stated that the Balkan won‘t be peaceful

and stable until Milosevic is in power. And one of the crucial things in regard to

Abramowitz is that he is a close friend of Madeleine Albright, for which Tim Judah said

that is not insignificant.119 Of course that this is very significant because Abramowitz

represented the Albanian delegation, while his close friend represented the international

community to include both, the stick and the carrot. What then Serbian delegation had to

expect? The only chance was to put someone more important in to Serbian delegation,

but Serbs never understood that part of the game. It is not important who is right, it is

about good advocates.

Since the Albanians acted like rich clients that could afford all the best lawyers,

they engaged many other western experts to fight for them: Paul Williams, an expert for

international law from Washington D.C.; Marc Weller, Professor of International Law

from Cambridge; Shinasi Rama from Columbia University who was in charge for the

KLA public affairs in New York.120

When speaking of three co-presides of the Conference, except for the already

mentioned Petritsch, the other two were American Ambassador Christopher Hill, and

Russian Ambassador Boris Majorski. Officially these three individuals were supposed to

be equal, but it was obvious that Mr. Hill was ‗playing the first violin‘, while Petritsch

118 Word Press Online, ―Uighur Nationalism, Turkey and the CIA ,‖

http://eldib.wordpress.com/2009/08/03/uighur-nationalism-turkey-and-the-cia/; Morton Abramowitz wasalso deeply involved with Afghan Mujahedeen and Kosovo rebels.119 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 205.120 Ibid.



Boshkovich 51

and Majorski were just assistants. While Hill was most sympathetic to the KLA, Majorski

was making sure that he was not in opposition to Americans, but at the same time he was

doing his best not to confront with Yugoslav delegation, even if he (along with his

assistant Bazdnikin) acted sometimes as a ‘bigger Catholic than the Pope‘, criticizing

Serbs for refusing to accept the paper proposed by the Contact Group.121 Regardless of

the fact that Mr. Hill was the most influential co-preside of the Conference, it is

noticeable that Europeans were trying to show that they also had an important role in

these talks. As published in The New York Times:‖…the French Government controlled

the ground rules. The Americans, for example, wanted NATO military officials in

uniform at the conference as a confidence-building measure for the Albanians. The

French Government blocked their presence.‖122

Among other individuals that are important to mention in regard to this

conference are official hosts (co-chairmen) Hubert Vedrine (French Foreign Minister),

and Robert Cook (British Foreign Minister). Of course it would be unacceptable not to

mention the most important figure of the entire conference, Secretary of State Madeleine

Albright.

Despite being a very high ranking diplomat, who should refrain from announcing

publicly negative opinions about her counterparts, Albright never tried to hide her

extremely negative opinion about Milosevic. Regardless of the fact that Slovenia declared

independence, violating the constitution of the SFRY (Socialistic Federative Republic of

Yugoslavia), which was followed by an attempt of JNA to secure the borders, as well as

121 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 98.122 Jane Perlez, ―Diplomat vs. Rebels,‖ New York Times, February 25, 1999,http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/25/world/diplomat-vs-rebels.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/People/C/Clinton,%20Bill&scp=9&sq=Rambouillet%20peace%20conference%201999&st=cse



Boshkovich 52

Croatian ethnic cleansing of Serbs in 1995123, and civil war in Bosnia for which all three

sides were responsible (this time Serbs were military superior, but confrontation started

by killing of one Serbian in downtown of Sarajevo during his son‘s wedding), Albright

stated in her memoirs that ―Milosevic already started three wars in the Balkans (against

Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia). He seemed ready to begin a fourth‖.124 She insisted that

Milosevic has to be threatened by NATO if negotiations were meant to be possible.

Therefore, she started to gain support for NATO intervention almost a year before the

bombing. Albright was very satisfied when Robert Gelbard, Clinton‘s envoy for the

Balkan agreed that ―…it was vital for NATO to begin laying plans for a bombing

campaign‖125 back in April 1998.

On the other hand, Albright was very empathetic with the Albanians. During one

of her meetings with Rugova she said that ―[Rugova] said the goal of Albanians was

independence, but they might accept an interim status as an international protectorate or

even, he joked, as the fifty-first American state‖.126 On the same page of her book in a

footnote Albright said something that is common knowledge on the Balkan, but not for

the rest of the world: ―Macedonia and Greece strongly opposed independence for Kosovo

because they feared it might inflame separatist ambitions within their own ethnic

Albanian populations….More generally, some Europeans feared that an independent

Kosovo would become a hotbed of Islamic extremism and organized crime‖.127

123 Rebecca Sumner, ―A New World Order,‖ London Daily Online, http://www.london-daily.com/art/ld-rebec.htm124 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 380.125 Ibid, 383.126 Ibid, 385.127 Ibid, 385.



Boshkovich 53

Most of the thoughts that Albright put in her memoirs regarding the Balkan

described Albanians as innocent victims; while she forgot to talk about crimes committed

against Serbs. To make her stories more emotional and impressive she would talk about

Serbian crimes in detail, using an opportunity to blame Milosevic for everything, even if

he was not even close to the place where a particular incident had occurred. Here is one

of those examples; ―Three men, including a ninety-five-year-old paralytic, were burned

to death in their homes. Another sixteen civilians were found shot or hacked to death in

nearby villages. This was Milosevic‘s answer to the United Nations and NATO‖.128 Not

to mention how all these reports were questionable, just like the one from the Racak.

Nevertheless, careful readers of Albright‘s memoirs will find from time to time

sentences that are not in favor of Albanians. Here is an example; ―Often indiscriminate in

their [KLA] attacks, they seemed intent on provoking a massive Serb response so that

international intervention would be unavoidable‖.129 These kinds of tactics were

something that the writer of this paper would have used back in childhood to gain father‘s

support in fights with his older brother, but no one would imagine that the same

technique can be used on such a high level.

In her description of the Albanian delegation, one could see that Albright found

Rugova enigmatic, Surroi pragmatic, and Thaci problematic. Nevertheless, she found

Thaci very important and talked to him often trying to convince him to accept agreement

which he wanted to refuse because Albanians were supposed to wait three years before

the referendum in which they could vote for independence. Albright said: ―…we were

disappointed in him [Thaci], that if he thought we would bomb the Serbs even if the

128 Ibid, 388.129 Ibid, 386.



Boshkovich 54

Albanians rejected the agreement, he was wrong. We could never get NATO support for

that. ‗On the other hand,‘ I said, ‗if you say yes and the Serbs say no, NATO will strike

and go on striking until the Serb forces are out and NATO can go in. You will have

security. And you will be able to govern yourselves‖.130 Or as better explained in The

New York Times; ―…after intense arm-twisting by the U.S., the Albanian Kosovars said

yes. This was a dishonest yes -- it was a yes that was given not because the Kosovars

truly embraced Rambouillet, but because it was whispered in their ears that if they just

said yes and the Serbs said no, NATO would bomb the Serbs…‖131 Are these two

explanations strong enough pieces of evidences to see how the entire process in

Rambouillet was just a performance for the international community that was used to

make an excuse for bombing? Why? That is something that is not easy to find out. One

might assume that the USA wanted to show to the world that they are not always against

Muslims (both, in Bosnia and Kosovo Muslims were supported by the USA). Also, it is

possible that the West wanted to weaken Serbia because of its strong relationship with

Russia. In addition to that, it seemed that the USA was hardly waiting to bomb Serbia as

a punishment for the war in Bosnia. However, most likely the main reason was a strong

Albanian lobby in the USA which will be discussed later in this research.

Obviously Secretary Albright knew what she was talking about because she was

aware that Yugoslav delegation would never accept the agreement so she had to make

sure that Albanians would put their signature on the document. Unfortunately, Secretary

Albright missed an opportunity to explain why Yugoslav authorities could not accept

130 Ibid, 403.131 Thomas L. Friedman , ―Foreign Affairs; Kosovo‘s Three Wars,‖ New York Times, August 6, 1999,http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/06/opinion/foreign-affairs-kosovo-s-three-wars.html?sec=&spon=&&scp=1&sq=Rambouillet%20peace%20conference%201999&st=cse



Boshkovich 55

proposed document. Luckily, Mitic, Judah, Weller and other scholars talked about those

reasons and the audience will have a chance to find out more about that in the following

section.132

132 Stingray Online, http://www.mcculloughsite.net/stingray/2006/04/20/madeline-albright-can-legpress-400-pounds.php.



Boshkovich 56

Section B; Negotiations

Enter into negotiations with the intention of creating an agreement that will allow both parties to achieve their essential goals.

- Tom Hopkins133

The Conference started on February 6th 1999, and lasted until 23rd of February

instead of the originally planned 13th of February. ―Rambouillet, meanwhile, was under

siege from within. Thousands of security police were deployed, while road blocks were

operating throughout the town to prevent any mass demonstration of Albanians or

Serbs‖.134

Talks in Rambouillet (30 miles south of Paris) started and finished without any

procedure that was planned in advance even if these talks were extremely important, as

Tim Judah said, ―…the alternatives were so awful that it just seemed inconceivable that

either side would scupper the talks‖.135 The first draft of the agreement that was presented

to both sides by Contact Group had only three chapters; 1, 3, and 6. According to Mr.

Mitic this was not an accident. This is because chapters 2, 5, and 7 were so unacceptable

for the Yugoslav delegation that hosts did not want to present them until a couple of

hours before the end of the Conference.136 Still, even chapters 1, 3, and 6 were extremely

difficult for the Serbs to accept them. The first chapter cover ed ―The Constitution of

Kosovo‖; the third was dedicated to elections; while the sixth chapter elaborated the

institution of the ombudsman.

133 Bob Phillips, Phillips’ Book of Great Thoughts and Funny Sayings (Carol Stream: Tyndale HousePublishers, Inc., 1993), 226.134 Rupert Cornwell, ―The Peace Talks: Solution – or Simply a Sideshow?‖ The Independent, February 21,1999, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/the-peace-talks-solution--or-simply-a-sideshow-1072343.html135 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 197.136 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 231.



Boshkovich 57

Serbs insisted that the agreement included principles of the statement of the

Contact Group from London (chapter II section B of this paper) because they thought that

it would be a good way to highlight Yugoslav integrity and sovereignty.137 Unfortunately,

approximately 10 days of negotiations were lost because of this issue which was solved

against the will of Serbs and they were actually accused for the first time of obstruction.

Conversely, Albanians explained their three main goals at the beginning of the

Conference very clearly. These objectives included: the precise definition of the status of

Kosovo, organizing of referendum after three years of transitional period, and the

involvement of NATO in acceptance of the Agreement (as a one side that would sign the

Agreement). The Albanian side also had issues with acceptance of their request, but at the

end they even got something better; the NATO was not involved in signing of the

Agreement, but became warrantor of the Agreement with 10,000 troops in Kosovo.

The Serbian delegation had several complaints in regard to the Preamble of the

Agreement that were articulated in the form of the text that included all issues that the

Serbian delegation had found. Most of them the Contact Group did not accept, but at the

end of the Conference, on the paper that was signed by Albanians it became clear that

they did not change even those parts that were accepted.138 The reason why these and

later Serbian complaints were not accepted in the final version of the Rambouillet

Accords one can find in Marc Weller‘s explanation. He said that the only way for the

paper to be modified was that both sides agreed upon that. If not, the draft would not be

137 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 110.138 Ibid, 114.



Boshkovich 58

changed unless the negotiators thought that modification would be better for the

agreement.139

A similar situation was with Article I in which the Serbian delegation had again

couple of objections. For example, in the sentence where it was stated that both sides

would implement all necessary measures to help refugees in their return to Kosovo, the

Serbs requested ―if they are citizens of Yugoslavia‖ to be added. Of course Serbs

requested this in an effort to prevent Albanians from Albania to settle in Kosovo, but

once again in final text Serbs saw that none of their requests was accepted.140

On the other hand, the Albanians submitted comments on the draft on February

9th in which they stated that each annex was acceptable.141 That way it seemed that the

Albanians were more willing to cooperate while the Serbs had complaints regarding each

annex of the agreement (which will be presented in continuation of this chapter). Of

course, it is because of the fact that entire agreement was in favor of the Albanians.

In Annex I, named ―The Constitution of Kosovo‖, the title itself was irritating for

Serbs because the constitution is the highest law of independent countries, not of the

provinces. Instead, the Serbian side proposed the word ―Statute‖ so that the title of Annex

I would be ―The Statute of Kosovo‖. Nevertheless, the Contact Group did not accept this

request as well. Besides that, the Serbs had many other complaints such as in regard to

foreign missions in Kosovo, or Kosovo‘s offices in foreign countries, which Serbia was

not willing to accept except in cases of education, science, culture, or information. In

addition to this Serbs requested for some sentences to be completely deleted, such as:

Consent for state of emergency, or Consent of the President of Kosovo to Federal

139 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 228.140 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 116.141 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 228.



Boshkovich 59

decisions. Of course the reason for this is that the president of Kosovo (which would be

obviously always Albanian) would never support decisions of the Federal Government

that would blockade the implementation of Federal laws. Once again, the final paper

which was signed by Albanians was not different at all from the original.142

Yet, the Serbian delegation was constructive as much as possible. For example,

the Serbs first said that they won‘t participate in the talks if the KLA members were part

of the Albanian delegation143, but later on they did not insist on that even if the Serbs

consider the KLA as a terrorist organization. After all, even the US never negotiates with

terrorists.

In Article I of The Constitution, which elaborated the characteristics of the

Kosovo Assembly, Serbs had a few ideas. For example they urged that the Assembly

should be bi-cameral with 120 members instead of uni-cameral with 100 members.

Besides that, the Serbs had some objections in regard to the jurisdictions of the Assembly

because it assumed canceling of jurisdictions of the Federal authorities. Nevertheless, the

final paper did not see any changes with exception to the number of delegates in the

Assembly which would be 120 (80 directly elected and 40 from national communities),

but still in uni-cameral assembly.144

Another issue was ―The President of Kosovo‖. For the Serbs this meant that

Kosovo would have one more attribute of sovereign country, which was unacceptable.

Instead, Serbs suggested that the official title of that person should be ―President of the

Presides of Assembly‖. However, the Contact Group denied this suggestion as well.145

142 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 120.143 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 228-29.144 Ibid, 240.145 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 128.



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A very similar problem was with the ―Government of Kosovo‖. According to the

Contact Group‘s draft, this body would implement laws made by the Kosovo‘s

Assembly. Serbs found this problematic because they thought that the Assembly of

Kosovo should not be authorized to make laws. In addition, the Serbs proposed that

instead of the Government, Kosovo should have an ―executive council‖, for which Weller

said that would be ―…a weakened Council of Ministers‖.146 And again none of the Serbs

objections were accepted,147 even if it was obvious that these proposals (The President,

The Government, and The Assembly) were something that represents a sovereign

country, not an autonomous province. These articles gave to Kosovo authorities to

conduct foreign relations, elect Prime Minister, implementing laws, etc.148

The same situation was with the justice system in Kosovo. The Contact Group

had an idea that the justice system in Kosovo should be completely independent and

separated from that of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. Of course, the Serbian

delegation thought that this entire Article (V) was unacceptable. However, the Contact

Group did not change anything in their final version of the agreement149, just like in the

case of Article VI which covers human rights and rights of national groups (Serbs

requested adding of new statements such as ―the preventing of national groups to

jeopardize the rights of other citizens of Serbia and Yugoslavia‖).

Article VII covered the role of the municipals in Kosovo. Serbian delegation did

not have any objections to the proposed paper, but had a couple of suggestions; they

thought that it should be added that municipals‘ assemblies would be constitute in the

146 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 235.147 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 129.148 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 242.149 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 131.



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same manner as the Kosovo‘s Assembly, and that in the case of the reestablishment of

municipals‘ borders besides the consensus of the Assembly of Kosovo and authorities of

municipals involved in particular case add ―with acceptance of the people assembly of

Republic of Serbia‖. As usually, none of these suggestions were accepted.150

Article IX, which discussed the representation of Kosovo in Federal and Republic

institutions was also problematic for the Serbian delegation. The reason for this was that

this article stated that this representation was the possibility but not the obligation. Serbs

pushed for changing of this to an obligation, but the Contact Group did not accept this

idea as well.

As mentioned, Chapter 2 (regarding security) was not presented until 18/19

February (even if the Conference commenced on February 6th), so actors moved to the

Chapter 3 titled ―The Conducting and Supervising of Elections‖. Serbs found most of the

decrees acceptable from the Paragraph I with the exception for the role of the OSCE. The

Serbian delegation thought that it was acceptable that the OSCE assists with conducting

of census of citizens of Kosovo (actually that would be the only way since Albanians

refused for many years to participate in census), as well as to assist in creation of a free

and fair atmosphere for carrying out of the elections, but they found the idea that OSCE

should carry out the elections itself unacceptable. Nevertheless, in the final text of the

Agreement Serbian objections were not implemented. That was probably not a wise

decision by the negotiators. Of course all the countries of the world would find it

inappropriate that someone else conduct elections for them. Negotiators could instead

insist on supervision of the elections by the OSCE just to make sure that there is not any

150 Ibid, 134.



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kind of abuses. After all, Serbia has a tradition of presence of international supervisors on

all modern elections and no one has a problem with that because everybody wants to

make sure that their votes won‘t be stolen.

As mentioned earlier in this section, the sixth Chapter was dedicated to the role of

the ombudsman. The ombudsman‘s responsibility would be to supervise the realization of

the practice of rights of members of national groups, as well as human rights and basic

freedoms in Kosovo. The Serbian delegation did not have any major objections regarding

this chapter. However, they suggested additional sentence which would clarify that

ombudsman should be parliamentary envoy who should be Yugoslav citizen, chosen

without intervention of international community. This suggestion was not accepted by the

Contact Group.151

Chapter 4 and 4A were in connection to matters of economy, humanitarian relief,

reconstruction and economical development. The Albanian delegation ―commented upon

in writing very expeditiously‖.152 The Serbs had serious objections regarding the idea that

all property of Federal and Republic Governments would be transferred to institutions of

Kosovo. However, the Contact Group did not accept these objections, and the final

document was same as the initial one.153 Speaking of the international help, with

exception for humanitarian assistance, it should be mentioned that according to the

proposed agreement it would be dependable on full implementation of the Agreement, as

well as other conditions that would be established by potential donators. The Serbian

delegation found this Chapter offensive because it sounded like blackmail. They

suggested cancellation of the entire Chapter, but the Contact Group refused this proposal

151 Ibid, 140.152 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 229.153 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 142.



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and entire text ended as a part of the final document.154 In an effort to get positive

response from the Serbian delegation, Ambassador Hill traveled to Serbia to talk to

Milosevic. The Albanian delegation protested because of that since they thought it was

the violation of isolation that was imposed upon the delegations. Therefore Hasim Tachi

was allowed to leave the conference and see his mentors at home.155 However, the

Serbian delegation responded with the document that was ―incompatible with the non-

negotiable principles‖.156 Weller missed an opportunity to explain the reason why the

Serbs refused this Chapter, but he rather said that the Serbs did not even accept the

Chapter that covers international assistance, and that way have foreclosed effective

negotiations.157 By doing so he probably misled the part of the audience that did not have

a chance to see that Chapter which is available in the appendix of this research. After

reading that Chapter it becomes clear that Mitic did not lie when he said that it was a kind

of blackmail since it was said: ―International assistance, with the exception of

humanitarian aid, will be subject to full compliance with this Agreement as well as other

conditionalities defined in advance by the donors... ―(Appendix, page 155)

As explained, Chapter 2 (security) was finally presented on 18th February along

with Chapters 5 (implementation) and 7 (military presence). When the Serbian delegation

found out what was proposed by these three chapters it became clear why they were not

presented earlier.

Chapter 2 was explained that verification mission of OSCE (later named

Implementation Mission) would assume all responsibilities regarding the supervision of

154 Ibid, 144.155 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 229.156 Ibid.157 Ibid, 235.



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implementation of the entire agreement. As part of that, this mission would be in charge

of the creation of ―community police‖ to include the decision on the number of police

officers. Other than that, it was requested that all federal and republic police institutions

for training in Kosovo ceased to exist. Serbian Police would retreat from Kosovo in few

phases, and while doing that it would be supervised by the Implementation Mission.

These and some other acts from this Chapter were of course unacceptable for the Serbs

because they meant almost total cancelation of sovereignty of Yugoslavia and Serbia on

the territory of Kosovo. The only representatives of the Serbian Government would be on

border crossings with Albania and Macedonia, but there would not be more than 50 of

them. It is important to mention that there is not such autonomy anywhere else, not even

close.

Another last minute surprise was Chapter 5 titled ―Implementation I‖. It was

nothing less unacceptable than Chapter 4. The purpose of this Chapter was to transform

the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) mission to the real

civilian authority in Kosovo, which would be led by the chief of the Implementation

Mission (officially he would be the chief of the mutual commission, but his decisions

would be final). Based on this Chapter, this chief (protected by Vienna Convection as any

other member of diplomatic missions) would be the supreme law in Kosovo. It is

probably unnecessary to mention that the Serbian delegation could not accept this

Chapter as well. If anything, negotiators should request that this mission works on those

parts of Kosovo where the Serbian Government did not have authority (areas where

ethnic Albanians are in majority), or something similar to that. It is impossible that the

world finest diplomats could not come to a better solution than that in several weeks, of



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course if they were honest about finding the political solution. As some people would

say: ‗If you want, you‘ll find the way; if you don‘t want, you‘ll find the excuse‘.

Last, but not least is Chapter 7 named ―Implementation II‖, but it was actually

written in regard to international military presence. This Chapter included some parts that

are so contradictory that they would be comical if they were not so tragic for the Serbs.

For example it is stated that ―Sides invite NATO to establish and command by mi litary

forces in attempt to help securing and implementation of decrees from this Chapter. They

[NATO troops] also promote sovereignty and integrity of FR Yugoslavia‖158 (it was

unclear how would foreign troops promote sovereignty of an independent country, but it

became clear once they came to Kosovo after the bombing which will be discussed in the

part III of this paper). According to this Chapter the Yugoslav Army would have to

retreat from Kosovo in no more than 80 days, with the exception of border patrols which

could have up to 1,500 members. In addition to that, those soldiers would not be allowed

to have armored vehicles, while weapons on remaining vehicles could not be larger than

12, 7 mm caliber (it seems that they would be a perfect moving targets for the KLA

which by this Chapter was supposed to hand over weapons in the future). Marc Weller

also admits that Chapters 2 and 7 would ―…establish very strict limitations for the

operation of FRY/Serb law enforcement, border police, customs and military personnel,

both in terms of numbers and in terms of competence‖.159 It seems that the international

community just wanted to make sure that Serbia wouldn‘t sign the agreement for sure

because they knew that no one could accept this part of the ultimatum as well. Which

leader of the country would agree to withdraw all troops (with exception of small number

158 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 155.159 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 240.



Boshkovich 66

of border patrols) from the area in which terrorists/rebellions are targeting members of

other ethnic groups? Is it possible that negotiators did not want to offer to the Serbs some

kind of deal that would say for example that Serbian armed forces could stay in all those

areas where Serbs are the majority (northern Kosovo and few enclaves in the south,

including several monasteries)? Obviously there was no true desire to find a political

solution and avoid war.

Nevertheless, the most unacceptable parts of this Chapter and Agreement overall

was the section in which was stated that NATO troops would be allowed to use the entire

territory of FR (Federal Republic) Yugoslavia, to include air space and territorial waters,

without any restrictions.160 Besides that, those NATO troops would be immune from any

laws of Yugoslavia, and they would be protected from any kind of investigations or

arrests. This meant that Yugoslavia would not loose sovereignty just in Kosovo but on

the entire territory. Why did not negotiators offer something more acceptable to the

Serbs? It is not a rocket science to understand that the Serbs would be more willing to

sign the treaty if it said that UN troops will be deployed instead of NATO, and not in the

entire territory of Yugoslavia, but just in the parts of Kosovo where the Albanians are

majority, to make sure that two sides are divided by a buffer zone, just like the case of

Cyprus where UN troops are doing a good job since 1974.

In addition to this, at the end of this Chapter was stated that three years after the

implementation of this agreement the people of Kosovo would have a chance to reach a

final solution for Kosovo based on their will. This was the first time that the Albanian

160 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 210.



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side had some major complaints.161 They requested that ―will of people‖ was changed to

―referendum‖. That is the moment when Madeleine Albright jumped in to make sure that

the Albanians would accept the Agreement. She added her interpretation (on 22nd

February) to this chapter summarizing that this meant that people of Kosovo would be

able to hold referendum regarding the future of Kosovo in three years.162 Marc Weller

talked about this as well. He said that the Albanian delegation confirmed that after three

years of the interim period ―…the people of Kosovo will exercise their will through a

referendum, conducted freely and fairly‖.163 How could anyone expect that the Serbs

would accept this document? That way Serbia would agree to the secession of Kosovo in

2002, which is still worse than a unilateral declaration of independence. Interestingly,

even if the US said that this proposal would be available only if the Albanians sign by the

deadline it did not happen.164 However, this did not have any negative effects on the

Albanian position, and they did finally agree to sign this after Jim O‘Brien (the State

Department lawyer) told Jamie Rubin to distract Thaci (the strongest opponent of

acceptance of the proposal) while the Albanian delegation is accepting the proposal.165

Of course, this was just another aspect of the Agreement that was obviously

unacceptable for Serbs (since everybody knows what would be the outcome of that

referendum). Ministries of the Contact Group added that the entire conference (which

was prolonged for a week) should be finished by 1500 on February 23rd of 1999. The

Serbian delegation sent a couple of letters that day to all three co-presides of the

Conference where they urged for a continuation of negotiations, but it was ineffective and

161 Ibid, 211.162 Ibid, 215.163 Marc Weller , ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 235.164 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 215.165 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 404.



Boshkovich 68

the road to the bombing of Yugoslavia was open, with a small chance of a miracle in

additional talks scheduled for March 15th in Paris, where nothing new happened except

that Albanians officially signed the Agreement (March 18th), while Serbs signed their

own paper regarding autonomy of Kosovo.166 Most likely this meeting in March was

actually set only because the Albanians wanted an additional two weeks to make sure that

the KLA leaders would accept the agreement. Thaci had to travel through all areas that

were held by the KLA, while Albright sent Bob Dole to influence the Albanians toward

acceptance of the agreement. He said: ―We‘ll abandon you if you don‘t sign‖.167 Of

course, in today‘s world it would be very rare that someone allows to be abandoned by

the strongest possible ally in the history. Naturally, it is easy to imagine how Serbs felt

seeing the US officials transparently take sides.

The document that was signed by the Serbs was mainly the text that the Serbian

delegation proposed to become a part of the political aspect of the agreement that was the

topic of the negotiation process.

Chomsky reminds us that, in terms of diplomatic options, "before the bombing

(Yugoslavia) on the table were two proposals: the so-called Rambouillet

Agreement, which was presented as an ultimatum to Serbia, and Serbia's

proposal" formulated in its draft political agreement on substantial autonomy ( for

Kosovo), which would guarantee the equality of all citizens and all ethnic

communities, while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Republic

166 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 223.167 Ibid, 220.



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of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ". And the other proposal is also

hidden from the public, notes Chomsky. 168

Additionally, the authors of this Serbian document added many ideas from the

Contact Group‘s proposal avoiding those elements that would lead to the cancelation of

Serbian sovereignty.169 Of course, this was useless, and the sides could start to count

down the time to the NATO bombing of FR Yugoslavia.

168 Vlada Republike Srbije Online, ―Čomski: Postojalo je Drugačije Rešenje za Kosmet,‖http://www.arhiva.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/2000-03/06/18364.html 169 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 245.



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Section C; Reactions to the Conference

The Conference which lasted 17 days was unsuccessful (in a formal ceremony

only the Albanian delegation signed the agreement, witnessed by two negotiators since

Russian Ambassador Mayorski refused to participate)170 and each side started to prepare

for the next steps. NATO started to warm up their aircrafts, the KLA continued guerrilla

warfare while the Serbs declared a state of emergency.

Many people in Yugoslavia at that time were convinced that NATO would not

bomb the Serbs because it would not make any sense considering that Serbia was a US

ally in both World Wars in addition to being one of the sides that signed the Dayton

agreement regarding the ending of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mr. Cosic (Serbian

writer previously mentioned in this paper) said: ―What a paradox of the history! NATO

was created to fight with the Soviet Union, Russia and communism, but they will fight

for Albanian separatism, terrorism and secession of Kosovo‖.171 He also added that it was

the fourth time in the 20th century that Serbia was threatened to accept an ultimatum by

great powers (Austro-Hungary in 1914, Hitler in 1941, and Stalin in 1948).

Unfortunately, once again Serbia got an ultimatum that was impossible to accept because

that would mean the independence of Kosovo, while NATO troops would be allowed to

use the entire territory of Yugoslavia. However, Serbs were hoping that NATO would

restrain from bombing due to a Russia‘s position which was at that time that bombing is

unacceptable. Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov said that ―Russia cannot sit around and

watch NATO destroy a sovereign nation‖.172 Nevertheless, as Secretary Albright

explained ―Their [Russia‘s] military options were few, their dependence on the West was

170 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 235.171 Dobrica Cosic, Kosovo (Beograd: Novosti, 2004), 111.172 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 413.



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growing, their domestic politics were toxic, and their putative client in Belgrade was a

ruthless dictator‖.173 And she was right (mostly); all Russia could do was to complain, but

in reality NATO knew that this would not be a battle that Russia would fight, after all

NATO gave Russia the perfect excuse to intervene in Georgia in 2008. It was the same

scenario; great power came to help ―suppressed minority‖ that seeks independence

(Abkhazia and South Ossetia). This time NATO was the side that could just complain,

very well aware that it was not going to be their battle. One might assume that NATO and

Russia have made a deal regarding their interests in which small countries such as Serbia

and Georgia will pay the price, but of course, this theory would be impossible to prove.

Still, this topic is not unfamiliar to journalists such as Tim Marshall who compared

Kosovo and Georgia and said: ―This is not to defend Russia's actions in Georgia but it

does show how the Americans, British and others want things both ways - and it also

shows how the recognition of Kosovo has destroyed the hallowed concept that you don't

change borders through force‖. He also asked himself what would be the reason to have

different standards for Kosovo and South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The answer is usually,

'because of the behaviour of the Serb forces'. ―Put that forward in international law as a

justification for changing borders and you would be laughed out of court‖.174

Another interesting story is the reactions of some politicians and scholars in the

world regarding the Rambouillet Conference. Some of those reactions could be found in

Mr. Komnenic‘s book. He traveled to Paris during the Conference to show to the West

that Serbian opposition, which was the strongest enemy of Milosevic, was also aware that

173 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 414.174 Sky News Online, ―Russia Eats the Kosovo Cake,‖ http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World- News/Tim-Marshall-Russia-Eats-The-Kosovo-Cake/Article/200808215076194?lpos=World_News_Article_Related_Content_Region_8&lid=ARTICLE_ 15076194_Tim_Marshall%3A_Russia_Eats_The_Kosovo_Cake



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it was impossible to accept the proposed agreement. He stated that Mrs. Angelica Ber,

who was a member of the Bundestag from the Green Party of the FR Germany, said ―If

we read the agreement we would never allow NATO bombing‖.175

Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) complained to the Senate (22 March 1999) that

President Clinton promised something (NATO intervention) without consulting

Congress. Therefore, the USA will declare a war to the country that can not be an enemy

of the USA, and is actually a partner from the Peace Conference in Dayton regarding the

peace in Bosnia.176

Another member of the Congress that had a problem with this intervention was

Cunningham (R-CA). He said in the middle of the bombing (session of May 5, 1999)

Mr. Speaker, do you know the total number of people killed in Kosovo prior to

our bombing? It is amazing. People will say 10,000, 20,000. It is 2,012. Prior to

us bombing, this great massive killing, 2,012. Tudjman, the head of the Croatians,

slaughtered 10,000 Serbs in 1995 and ethnically cleansed out of Croatia 750,000

Yugoslavians. Where were we then? And on a scale 2,012, and one-third of those

were Serbs killed by the KLA. 177

He added that the USA was guilty for one million of refuges in neighboring countries.

This statement actually goes along with many similar statements that were made at that

time by politicians in Serbia who claimed that there was not a problem with refugees

before the bombing, and yet Serbia was bombed with the excuse (among other excuses)

that the international community has to help refugees.

175 Komnenic, Milan, Kloka u Rambujeu (Beograd: Prosveta, 2006), 134.176 Congressional Record Online, Congressional Record, March 22, 1999 (Senate), S3039-3050,DOCID:cr22mr99-39, wais.access.gpo.gov177 Ibid, May 5, 1999 (House), H2785.



Boshkovich 73

Another Congressman that opposed this intervention is John Richard Kasich from

Ohio. He said that civil war in Kosovo started in 1389, and there is a small possibility

that stepping in that kind of conflict will be successful.178

However, supporters of the intervention (and they might be led by desire to

punish the Serbs for civil war in Bosnia where the Serbs had an advantage in military

power 179) were doing what they were supposed to do to justify the bombing. Therefore

Mrs. Louise Arbour, which was at that time the main prosecutor for ICTY, had a meeting

with Secretary Albright (April 30th) after which (next month) Mrs. Arbour announced

that President Milosevic and his four most important assistants are accused of war crimes.

In reaction to this Albright said that this indictment is a proof that NATO intervention is

valid.180 One journalist asked if that meant that there was not war crimes before the

bombing, but Albright responded that she thinks that many things happened before the

bombing. Same day, Russian Foreign Ministry critiqued Mrs. Arbour‘s decision,

claiming that it had political motivation.181

Other reasons why the Serbs could not accept the Agreement one can find in the

fact that negotiators pressured Serbia to accept conditions regarding autonomy on part of

her territory that does not exist anywhere in the world. As Lord Gilbert, who was a

178 Congressional Record Online, Congressional Record , http://frwebgate6.access.gpo.gov/cgi-

bin/PDFgate.cgi?WAISdocID=933744387454+4+2+0&WAISaction=retrieve; we found this out when weintervened in Somalia. We furthermore found this out when we intervened in Lebanon, even under RonaldReagan. Being in the middle of civil wars that are not resolvable is a mistake for a major power. The

question is when, then, should we intervene militarily? Well, on three grounds. One, when it is in the directnational interests of the United States. Number two, when there is an absolute achievable goal. And numberthree, when there is a credible exit strategy. None of these criteria can be met in terms of Kosovo. There isno direct national interest, there is not an achievable goal, and finally, there is no credible exit strategy. 179 President Clinton said: ―this is not the first time we‘ve faced this kind of choice [over whether to takemilitary action]. When President Milosevic started the war in Bosnia seven years ago, the world did not actquickly enough to stop him….We learned some of the same lessons in Bosnia just few years ago.‖ RolandParis, ―Kosovo & the metaphor war,‖ Political Science Quarterly 117, no.3 (2002): 436.180 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 225.181 Ibid, 225.



Boshkovich 74

Minister of State in the MoD from 1997-1999 under George Robertson and spoke for the

Government in the House of Lords on defence said

I think the terms put to Milosevic at Rambouillet were absolutely

intolerable; how could he possibly accept them; it was quite deliberate…. It had

been decided in advance that Milosevic had to be taught a military lesson and the

only purpose of the Rambouillet process was to provide an excuse for doing so.

Milosevic was to be made an offer he couldn't accept…. it gave NATO

unrestricted access, not just to Kosovo, but to the whole of Yugoslavia (including

Montenegro). Unless defeated in a war no state with the pretence of independence

could accept those terms (and these terms were in fact omitted from the post-war

settlement in June 1999).182

The Following paragraphs will offer a few examples on how real autonomy

should look like. In case of South Tyrol, Italy and Austria made bilateral international

agreement, and this region gained wide autonomy without any international presence. At

the same time, the Italian Government secured sovereignty and integrity from any kind of

abuses.183Why something similar to this was not possible in case of Kosovo? It would be

better if the international community encouraged two sides to make an agreement, which

will guarantee wide autonomy for Albanians, and at the same time sovereignty and

integrity of Serbia.

In Spain, the Article II of the Constitution says that ―The Constitution is based on

the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all

182 David Morrison, ―Rambouillet Terms ‗Absolutely Intolerable‘, Says ex-Minister,‖ Labour & Trade

Union Review (2001), http://web.ukonline.co.uk/pbrooke/p&t/Balkans/dmonkosovo/200102183 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 179-80.



Boshkovich 75

Spaniards, and recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and

regions which make it up and the solidarity among all of them.‖184 Obviously there is a

right to autonomy, but also an explanation that the country cannot be divisible.

Ironically, both Italy and Spain were part of NATO forces that bombed FR

Yugoslavia.

Finland is another case that is interesting to mention in regard to successful

autonomies. This country has a remarkable Swedish minority (approximately 300,000)

who live compactly on territory of Finland, especially on Oland islands where they are

the majority. Still, as a minority they don‘t have any special rights, and the Government

sees them as citizens of Finland which mother tongue is Swedish.185 Nevertheless, Mr.

Marty Ahtisari (special envoy involved in ending of bombing and 2007 negotiations

process, which will be discussed later in this research) who comes from Finland never

thought that Albanians in Serbia should be treated in the same manner, as Serbs who

speak Albanian. Actually, he was one of the strongest allies of the Albanians in their

campaign for independence.

Another example of successful autonomy that is not comparable to that proposed

in Rambouillet is the case of Russian republic of Tatarstan. This region has autonomy

regarding culture, economy and technical cooperation with other countries, but Russia

kept positions in defense, security and international relations.186

Obviously, these examples from other democracies are not even close to the paper

that was discussed in Rambouillet.

Even Henry Kissinger said in Newsweek International (New World Disorder,

184 Spain Constitution Online, August 27, 1992, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/sp00000_.html185 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 184-85.186 Respublika Tatarstan Online, http://www.tatar.ru/?DNSID=830f4d0a9e1ddd7c1d6ac98b5eecc70b



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May 31st, 1999), ‖The air war in Kosovo is justified as establishing the principle that the

international community--or at least NATO--will henceforth punish the transgressions of

governments against their own people. But we did not do so in Algeria, Sudan, Sierra

Leone, Croatia, Rwanda, the Caucasus, the Kurdish areas and many other regions‖.187

Why is that so? What was the justification for bombing of Yugoslavia? The next

statement is one of the explanations how the international community justified the

bombing: George Kenny from Department of State said that they intentionally raised the

bar too high to make sure that Serbs would not be able to jump over.188 Eric Suy, former

chief advisor for the law in UN and professor of international law at Catholic University

in Brussels went so far that he compared the Agreement from Rambouillet with Hitler‘s

ultimatum to Czechoslovakia. In both cases he said that excuse was found in protection

of national minority.189

One more reaction came from British journalist Tim Marshall. He quoted Mr.

Robert Hayden from Pittsburgh University who claims that the only purpose of the

Agreement from Rambouillet was to justify military intervention against FR Yugoslavia.

He also said that members of western delegation had sketched the map of possible

division of Kosovo, but Albright prevented them to show that to the Serbian delegation, it

was feared that they might accept that.190

Serbian President Mr. Milutinovic gave an official statement on 23rd February, at

the end of negotiations. For this occasion it will be present most interesting parts from his

reaction.

187 Newsweek Online, ― New World Disorder ,‖ May 31, 1999, http://www.newsweek.com/id/88424/page/5188 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 189.189 International Court of Justice, May 10, 1999, 38-39, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/114/4491.pdf190 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 204.



Boshkovich 77

Participating in Rambouillet Peace Conference, Serbia and her citizens hadshowed that they had sincere intention to negotiate on ten principles that wasmade by the Contact Group. Unfortunately, today‘s decision to end ‗talks‘without a positive result is a normal consequence of what we used to talk about on previous press conferences (12th, 15th, and 20th February). Serbia especially

insisted on 10 principles of the Contact Group, that there is not going to beindependence of Kosovo and Metohija, that there is not a third republic [besidesSerbia and Montenegro], neither the referendum, while sovereignty and integrityof Serbia and FR Yugoslavia would not be challenged. However, those whoinitiated this meeting did not accept same approach. They offered documents thatwere in favor of the creation of a third republic and destroying Serbia. By doingthat, the international community worked absolutely in favor of the separatistmovement in Kosovo and Metohija. More than that, only 18 hours before the projected end of the conference, delegation got a new document (56 pages long)that was not discussed at all in first 18 days of the conference. Direct talks wererefused during the entire talks. It is a lie that negotiations could be successfully

conducted without negotiations. The conference was extended for three days because there was a significant improvement, which was made by acceptance ofseven crucial questions in regard to real autonomy, which was proposed by theSerbian delegation. Even the Contact Group admitted that. What then happened inthose three additional days of the conference?This was fraud without precedent and open aggression. Serbian delegation wasvery constructive in spite of the facts that: the entire conference was very poorlyorganized; Albanian delegation was always negative toward the idea of face-to-face meetings, even on the level of experts; Albanian delegation refused to putsignature on 10 principles of the Contact Group; the Albanian delegation,supported by sponsors and guardians, insisted on maximalist requests that

included international protectorate and referendum for independence.

At the end of his letter, Mr. Milutinovic added that FR Yugoslavia and Serbia are

willing to continue talks in Belgrade, Pristina or any other place regarding Kosovo‘s

autonomy, but never about the independence of Kosovo or third republic. He even said

that FR Yugoslavia is willing to consider the size and character of international presence

in Kosovo and Metohija in an effort to implement the agreement that would be accepted

in Rambouillet.191 Even Albanian advisor Marc Weller talked about some of things that

were mentioned by President Milutinovic. He admits that the Serbian delegation in final

declaration emphasized the most important developments toward achieving a political

191 Ibid, 167-70.



Boshkovich 78

solution, as well as Serbian willingness to discuss about the character of international

presence in Kosovo.192 But, it seems that the international community was not willing to

give peace a chance because they made deadline for acceptance of the agreement, even if

―…a significant number of substantive issues had not been negotiated‖.193 Not to mention

that the most important annexes of the agreement were presented day before the deadline.

Yet there was some chance for avoidance of the war because both sides agreed to attend

new conference in Paris on 15th March, but it ended just with Albanian acceptance to sign

the document and Serbian decision to present their version of the Agreement.194 The

author of this paper thinks that there was a hidden agenda by the international community

not to achieve a peace solution because it does not make sense that negotiators did not

want to give more time to the time.

Besides Mr. Milutinovic, exactly one month later (23rd March 1999) the President

of Yugoslavia Mr. Milosevic also made an official statement regarding the conference,

which was written just one day after Mr. Holbrooke‘s last trip to Belgrade where he said

that the bombing is imminent if Yugoslavia does not accept the Rambouillet accords.195

Milosevic‘s statement was sent in form of the letter to Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Hubert Vedrine (France) and Robin Cook (UK), the official co-chairmen of the

conference. Unfortunately, this letter was not published, but is a part of the most knowing

collection of documents regarding Kosovo and Metohija published in Cambridge. These

are some of the most significant points of that letter.

192 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 233.193 Ibid, 231.194 Ibid, 234.195 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 227.



Boshkovich 79

…text that you named ―the Agreement from Rambouillet‖ was published inKosovo‘s newspapers even before the conference (Albanian newspaper KohaDitore). Belgrade is tolerant, but not stupid. Thanks to some one else‘s stupidity,the document that was supposed to be a result of negotiations was published even before those negotiations have begun. Therefore, my answer to your sentence ‗the

Agreement is on the table‘ is: just a proposal of the Agreement can be on thetable. But, an empty table can‘t lead to the agreement. Those that are interested into agreement have to seat around that table.Considering your threat with NATO bombing, your nations will be ashamed because of that, since you are preparing to use force against one small Europeannation just because of her willingness to protect its territory from separatism. Yougentlemen, as Ministers of Foreign Affairs of two European countries have theright to negotiate, mediate, etc, but you don‘t have the right to threaten othercountries and other citizens, nor you can arrange lives in other countries.196

The next day, 24th March 1999, NATO commenced the bombing of FR

Yugoslavia.

196 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 154-76.



Boshkovich 80

Part III

Chapter IV

Section A; “Merciful Angel”

Serbian capital Belgrade197

The Serbs would not accept a Nato force; Nato on its 50th anniversary wanted to

show it mattered - and only one outcome was possible

198

It was 24th March 1999 when the first ―smart bombs‖, as some ―experts‖ like to

call them, were felt in the Federal Republic Yugoslavia. These bombs are considered

smart due to their precision, which is unquestionable, but nobody cared about the size of

the blasts that were produced from explosions. NATO would, for example, hit the Army

Headquarters in the Serbian capital Belgrade, which is in downtown, even if that building

was empty days before bombing. However, civilians on the streets were killed even if

197 Info-sluzba Kosova I Metohije Online, http://www.kosovo.net/news/archive/2007/March_25/2.html198 BBC Online, ―Rambouillet Talks ‗Designed to Fail‘,‖ March 19, 2000,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/682877.stm



Boshkovich 81

they were mile away. Actually, more people died from the second ‗tomahawk‘, which

was launched a half hour later, because they came to help the injured. Civilians died also

in Radio Television of Serbia, in sanitarium in Surdulica199 , on dozens of bridges200

including the train bridge when the train passing through201, in factories (some of them

created small ecological catastrophes), in schools, etc. NATO bombers also attacked

refugees‘ convoy on Kosovo because they thought that it was a military convoy.202

Unfortunately, so-called journalists from western countries did not have an interest in the

coverage of this side of the story. NATO officials, such as General Wesley Clark, also

did not show concerns for this issue, and they viewed civilian victims as ―collateral

damage‖. Actually, as Rebecca Sumner noticed: ―three to four times more civilians than

soldiers were killed‖. Besides that, based to international law and NATO's documents,

NATO must be subordinate to the UN and meet the terms of the international law. But in

the case of Kosovo, NATO waged war without declaration of war which is illegal, used

cluster bombs (forbidden for exceptional inhumanity), ―and repeatedly refused to

subordinate their actions to the UN‖.203 One of the reasons for NATO’s arrogance can be

found in President Clinton‘s statement from 1993, where he said in regard to NATO

interventions: ―With the United Nations if possible, without it if necessary‖. He also

added: ―NATO is the decision-making criterion for the UN and not the other way

around‖.204

199 General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New York:Public Affairs, 2001), 334.200 Ibid, 334.201 Ibid, 254.202 Ibid, 254-55.203 Rebecca Sumner, ―A New World Order,‖ London Daily Online, http://www.london-daily.com/art/ld-rebec.htm204 Youtube Online, Bettina Kapune, ―It started with a Lie - NATO Aggression against Serbia 1999 Part 3,‖Westdeutschen Rundfunks (WDR), 2001, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kuhfyd6bJs&NR=1



Boshkovich 82

Nevertheless, the rest of the world did not show huge concern about life of

ordinary people in Yugoslavia until NATO bombed the Chinese embassy on the 45th day

of bombing. On that day three Chinese journalists died which raised questions in the

world about the way that NATO chooses targets, especially when considering that it had

very negative effect on relationship with two important powers, Russia and China.205

At the same time in Kosovo, Serbian Security forces saw an opportunity to

destroy the KLA, which was no longer on the State Department list of terrorist‘s

organization, regardless of their connections with Al-Qaeda. It should be mentioned that

some of the members of the KLA were involved in an unsuccessful attack on Fort Dix,

NJ in 2007.206 As usual, the worst situation was for the civilians. Approximately 800,000

Albanians escaped from Kosovo. Some of them were victims of ―friendly fire‖, some

victims of Serbian ―volunteers‖, but some were killed by the KLA because they did not

want to fight against the Serbs. Of course people could read only about bad Serbs and

Albanian refuges. Very often politicians from ―civilized countries‖ would make numbers

bigger. The newest example is the interview in which Italian Foreign Minister Massimo

D‘Alema gave to Indian newspaper. He said, ―When NATO attacked, Kosovo was under

the Serb occupation and three million refugees crossed over to Albania‖.207 What‘s

wrong with this statement? Well, first of all, Serbia could not occupy Kosovo because

that is/was (again depends from point of view) part of Serbia. Secondly, it is quite

205 Michael Mandelbaum, ―A Perfect Failure: NATO‘s War against Yugoslavia‖, Foreign Affairs (1999),http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/55396/michael-mandelbaum/a-perfect-failure-natos-war-against-yugoslavia206 Chris Suellentrop, ―Carry on, Blair,‖ The New York Times Online, January 28, 2010,http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/carry-on- blair/?scp=15&sq=Kosovo%20Liberation%20Army,%20Al-Qaeda&st=cse; four of the alleged plotters of aterrorist attack on Fort Dix, N.J., were ―ethnic Albanians from the former Yugoslavia, three from a town onthe Macedonia-Kosovo border and one who had served as a sharpshooter in the Kosovo Liberation Army(K.L.A.) in its clashes with Serbian security forces during the 1990s‖207 B92 Online, archive October 17, 2007, http://www.b92.net/



Boshkovich 83

impossible to have three million refuges from province that has less than two million

people (it is impossible to know exact number because Albanians refused to participate

on official census since 1981). Unfortunately, nobody cares about these comments

because the Serbs are considered guilty for everything bad that happened in former

Yugoslavia including Kosovo.

Nevertheless, Serbia had to fight against the KLA and the NATO. This NATO

intervention was called ―Merciful Angel‖. During this intervention, the KLA was very

active. According to Serbian General Lazarevic‘s testimony in international court for war

crimes, the KLA had between 20,000 and 25,000 members.208

The KLA had a tactic

called ―two villages‖. This meant that one village would be reserved only for the KLA,

while the next one was home of the civilians/refugee camp. After defeating of the KLA

positions, terrorists would escape to that second village and use civilians as shield. The

other tactic that was used by the KLA since 1998 was ―thousand fires‖.209 In other words,

the KLA would have cells in every village, and their mission was to attack Serbian forces

so often that they would not be able to control the situation. Lazarevic said that by 1998

the KLA controlled between 400 and 600 villages on Kosovo.210 At the same time, there

were more than 500 breakings of the Serbian border from Albania that were made by

Albanian groups seized from 10-800 members. Of course, Serbian forces could not stop

that because they were obligated by the UN to retreat from the border with Albania.

Speaking of battle with NATO aircrafts, Yugoslav army was in huge disadvantage

due to NATO‘s technical, quantitative, and logistical advantages. NATO used hundreds

208 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, p 17729,http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/trans/en/071106IT.htm209 Ibid, p 17754, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/trans/en/071106IT.htm210 Ibid, p 18372-73, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/trans/en/071115IT.htm



Boshkovich 84

of all kinds of aircrafts and bases in many countries. Those countries were not just

members of NATO, but all other interested in military defeat of Yugoslavia. This is what

General Clark said regarding Albania:

In Albania, the reception was overwhelmingly positive. The young prime

minister, Pandeli Majko, fluent in English, approved every request. May we use

an additional airfield? Of course, use all airfields. May we repair the highway to

Kukes? Please do so. And the road to Skopje? You may have all roads and all

government facilities – take anything you need.211

It was the same situation in FYRM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia),

and obviously in Croatia since General Clark said that NATO officials were in doubt if

they should launch a ground troop invasion (which actually never happened) from

Croatia and Hungary, or from Albania and FYRM.

Of course, NATO and the KLA coordinated their actions in Kosovo as real allies.

One of the KLA leaders, Agim Ceku, said more about that in Tim Judah‘s book, where

he explained how the KLA helped NATO to easier identify Yugoslav soldiers. He said:

One of the reasons Milosevic had to end the war was because we were attacking

from the border and he was obliged to bring in many units who made good

targets. Before, they had been dug in, but our attack made them come out. NATO

enjoyed that bombing! The Serbs were faced with low morale and no one wanted

to go to Pastrik or Kosare. Milosevic was in danger of losing his army. One B-52

killed 224 soldiers.212

211 General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New York:Public Affairs, 2001), 257.212 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 284.



Boshkovich 85

Finally after 78 days of NATO bombing, in which the usage of ammunition

enriched with depleted uranium and cluster bombs (violation of a couple of UN

agreements regarding conducting the wars) was a common thing (even Gen. Clark

mentioned usage of cluster bombs in his book 213), Milosevic understood that a fight with

19 countries could not last forever, regardless of the fact that Yugoslav Anti Air Defense

was much more successful then one would expect, even Gen. Clark admitted a couple of

destroyed aircrafts including Stealth fighter bomber F-117.214 Milosevic decided to sign

the Kumanovo (city in Macedonia) treaty, which was actually a capitulation (of course

Milosevic used his powerful propaganda to convince citizens that it was a victory).

Serbian forces had to retreat from Kosovo, while the KFOR came in to protect non-

Albanians. During this ―protection‖ more than 250,000 Serbs escaped to central Serbia,

while approximately 100,000 left in Kosovo, either on the north of the province or in

enclaves on the south. Unfortunately, the international community did not show an

interest to bring these refugees home. It is not very often that people are refugees in their

own country (precise name is actually Internal Dislocated Persons-IDP), but as head of

the European parliament for Southeast Europe Doris Pack said, Kosovo is the right

punishment for Serbian behavior.215 Interestingly Doris Pack is German politician and it

is questionable if she has the moral right to talk about punishing an entire nation because

of one leader. If she is right, Germany should not exist today.

Noam Chomsky discussed about legitimacy of NATO bombing. He said:

213 Ibid, 296.214 Ibid, 215.215 Glas Javnosti Online, ― Nezavisnost Kosmeta, Zatim Potpis Srbiji ,‖ December 14, 2007,http://www.glas-javnosti.rs/clanak/glas-javnosti-14-12-2007/nezavisnost-kosmeta-zatim-potpis-srbiji



Boshkovich 86

One of the most important is the study by the International Independent

Commission of Inquiry on the Kosovo war, headed by the distinguished South

African jurist Richard Goldstone. The commission rendered the harshest criticism

anywhere near the mainstream of the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999,

concluding that the bombing was ―illegal but legitimate‖: ―It was illegal because

it did not receive approval from the UN Security Council, but it was legitimate

because all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and there was no other way to

stop killings and atrocities in Kosovo‖.216

However, Chomsky argued about the statement that all diplomatic options were

exhausted. The reason for this he found in the fact that after 78 days of bombing two

sides did actually reach compromise, ―…so it appears that diplomatic options were

available, after all‖.217 Indeed, how was it possible to make some deal after the bombing

but not before? The international community led by NATO accepted to be present just in

Kosovo, Albanians did not insist anymore on referendum, while Serbs allowed the

foreign military presence. Is it possible that war was imminent just because some

influential people wanted that to happen, not to mention the real reasons for war because,

as Chomsky said: ―There is a vast documentary record available from impeccable

Western sources, including several compilations by the State Department released in

justification of war….They all reach the same conclusion: the killings and atrocities did

not precede but followed the bombing, as the indictment of Milosevic has also

revealed‖.218 He added: ―It is perhaps worth mentioning an astonishing justification for

216 Noam Chomsky, Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy (New York: HoltPaperbacks, 2006), 95.217 Ibid, 96.218 Ibid, 96.



Boshkovich 87

the bombing contrived by some of its supporters…that the NATO attack was justified by

the crimes at Srebrenica, or Bosnia generally‖.219

A very important part of any war is a media war. This is the war that Serbia lost

even before the real war started. World media pictured Serbs as the worst enemies of

democracy in the world. It was a pretty common thing to see how President Milosevic

was compared with Hitler, Serbian Armed Forces with Nazi troops, while the KLA was

portrayed as freedom fighters. All this was the same scenario that was used in Croatia and

Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even the writer of this paper experienced comic situation while

traveling to Athens in 1995 (Greece was one of rare countries that allowed Serbs to travel

regardless of UN sanctions). On that trip he met two girls from New York which were in

their mid twenties. Two of them showed interest to talk to the author of this paper and his

colleague from the band. However, once it was time for this author to say where he is

from, and he said Serbia, those two girls screamed ―Oh my God‖, and ran away. At that

time it seemed very funny, but from later perspective it became obvious that the situation

is very serious because people in the world thought that Serbs were monsters that are

killing babies and raping women (at that time media launched a story about collective

rapes of Muslim women in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

The same media did their job in preparing the world audience to new bombing of

Serbs. The Serbs were accused for millions of refuges from Kosovo and hundreds of

thousands of deaths. It was very common to hear comments such as: "we've now seen

about 100,000 military-aged [Albanian] men missing... they may have been murdered."-

US Defence Secretary William Cohen, or "225,000 ethnic Albanian men aged between

219 Ibid, 99.



Boshkovich 88

14 and 59 may have been killed‖- David Scheffer, the US ambassador at large for war

crimes. British PM Blair called upon the Holocaust and "the spirit of the Second World

War".220

Nevertheless, ten years after the war relevant institution came with real numbers

of people killed in the conflict in Kosovo from 1998 until 2000. According to FHP

(Found for Humanitarian Right), 13,421 people were killed in Kosovo or had been

reported as a missing person. 10,533 of those are Albanians; 2,238 are Serbs; 126

Gypsies; 100 Bosniaks; 40 Montenegrins; 25 Ashkalis; 18 Egyptians; 13 Turks; 10

Hungarians; and over 300 of members of other ethnic groups221

(unfortunately, number

of killed Serbs is not final because they are still targets of Albanian terrorists, including

the attack in March of 2004, the largest one since KFOR came to Kosovo).222 Evidently,

Albanians had almost five times more victims than Serbs, but in percentages Serbs

suffered more since there were 6-7 times more Albanians than Serbs in Kosovo (now that

ratio is 1 to 10). It is interesting that among killed Serbs are 577 soldiers and 354 police

officers (13 of those police officers were actually Albanians that were loyal to Serbia).

Unfortunately, it is still unknown what happened to 1,886 people that are missing (over

500 of them are Serbs, Gypsies and other non-Albanians).

Since one picture is worth a 1,000 words here are a couple of pictures that were

used to blame the Serbs and portray the Albanians as innocent victims that seek

democracy and freedom.

220 John Pilger, ―How Silent Are the Humanitarian Invaders of Kosovo?‖ Global Policy Forum Online,December 8, 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/36491.html 221 Blic Online, ―FHP: 13,421 Zrtva Sukoba na Kosovu,‖ October 6, 2009,http://www.blic.rs/hronika.php?id=114227222 Human Rights Watch, ―Kosovo: Failure of NATO, U.N. to Protect Minorities,‖ July 26, 2004,http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/07/26/kosovo-failure-nato-un-protect-minorities



Boshkovich 89

223 224

225 It is always good to show innocent unprotected

babies at the cover page and ask tendentiousquestions (I.B.)

226

223 Ovsiste Online, http://www.freewebs.com/ovsiste/#+224 BBC Online, September 27, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_pictures/7016174.stm225 Time Online, archive April 5, 1999,http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://img.timeinc.net/time/magazine/archive/covers/1999/11019

90412_400.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19990412,00.html&usg=__kTkiJdHBxskKu3OzUj4njz4Si2s=&h=527&w=400&sz=46&hl=en&start=3&um=1&itbs=1&tbnid=qcjmC1IbvlOiiM:&tbnh=132&tbnw=100&prev=/images%3Fq%3DTime%2BCover,%2BKosovo%26hl%3Den%26rlz%3D1T4GGIH_enUS310US310%26sa%3DN%26um%3D1226

Time Online, archive April 12, 1999,http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://img.timeinc.net/time/magazine/archive/covers/1999/1101990412_400.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19990412,00.html&usg=__kTkiJdHBxskKu3OzUj4njz4Si2s=&h=527&w=400&sz=46&hl=en&start=3&um=1&itbs=1&tbnid=qcjmC1IbvlOiiM:&tbnh=132&tbnw=100&prev=/images%3Fq%3DTime%2BCover,%2BKosovo%26hl%3Den%26rlz%3D1T4GGIH_enUS310US310%26sa%3DN%26um%3D1



Boshkovich 90

Section B; From UN Resolution 1244 to Declaration of Independence

In this section the most interesting points from UN‘s resolution 1244 (adopted

immediately after the bombing, on June 10 th 1999, available in Appendix (IV) of this

research) will be presented; it is also available on UN‘s website.227 This is one of those

statements that clearly say that Yugoslav sovereignty should be secure;

―Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and

territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the

region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2.‖228

Obviously, member states did not protect sovereignty and integrity of the FR

Yugoslavia and Serbia since on their watch the Albanians declared independence.

Another interesting point is in regard to presence of Yugoslav‘s armed forces in

Kosovo. It is written:

3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an

immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and

complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and

paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of

the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;

4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and

Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to

perform the functions in accordance with annex 2.229

227 United Nations, Resolution 1244, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement228 Ibid, 2.229 Ibid, 2.



Boshkovich 91

Yugoslavia completed her part of this demand; all men under arms were pulled

back from Kosovo, but the other side that had particular obligations by this demand did

not fulfill her tasks. Their troops (KFOR) did not fill the vacuum made by withdrawal of

Yugoslav forces, which created perfect conditions for the KLA to continue with their

activities. More importantly, the UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in

Kosovo) never wanted to even discuss the fulfillment of the demand where it is stated

that the Yugoslav police and military should be permitted to return to Kosovo and

perform some functions in accordance to annex 2 where is stated:

6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel

will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:

- Liaison with the international civil mission and the international

security presence;

- Marking/clearing minefields;

- Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;

- Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.230

As already mentioned in this paper, the KLA was supposed to be demilitarized

(―Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo

Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below‖)231, but instead of that, a huge

number of KLA fighters just changed uniforms and became part of Kosovo Protection

Corpus (KPC).

―…Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced

230 Ibid, 6.231 Ibid, 3.



Boshkovich 92

persons can return home in safety…‖232 is also something that was conduct only in the

manner to satisfy Albanian refugees. While they returned home immediately after the end

of the bombing, Serbs that were internally displaced persons (IDP) are still IDP and the

number of them is growing every day.

The following statement is one of those that are in favor of the Albanians because

it has ties with Rambouillet peace accords: ―Facilitating a political process designed to

determine Kosovo‘s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords

(S/1999/648)‖.233 What is noticeable for anyone that knows something about the

negotiation process over Kosovo is that it is very strange that this sentence which

supports Rambouillet accords is written in the same document where member states are

called to protect Yugoslav‘s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, Yugoslav

authorities led by President Milosevic had to accept this resolution to stop the bombing.

Another thing that was stated in resolution 1244 is ―Protecting and promoting

human rights”. Unfortunately, this was never implemented toward the Serbs who are

still targets of Albanian terrorists, especially in enclaves located in southern Kosovo.234

The truth is that the Resolution 1244 ―created an international protectorate‖235,

regardless of Milosevic‘s attempt to fool his citizens that he made a fair agreement.

232 Ibid, 3.233 Ibid, 4.234 Zejak N, ―Mortar Attack on Gorazdevac,‖ Blic Online, March 11, 2000, http://www.ex-yupress.com/blic/blic17.html235 Ray Murphy, UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia, and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues in

Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 157.



Boshkovich 93

Sectors in Kosovo236

KFOR divided Kosovo into five zones of responsibilities. The French contingent

is in the northern part of Kosovo, in an area where the Serbs are the majority. The British

are in the central region, including the capital of Pristina, probably because the UK is one

of the strongest supporters of Kosovo independence. The US troops are on the border

with FYR Macedonia because they do not want to be involved too much in possible

conflicts. Germans are on the south where Albanians represent vast majority, which is

good because Serbs still have bad memories from WWII regarding German soldiers. In

the west zone are Italian soldiers. This is a very dangerous zone because of the great

number of locations that are contaminated by depleted uranium that was used by NATO

bombers. One study shows that several Italian soldiers died because of that, while dozens

of them suffer from different types of cancer.

237

How poorly KFOR protects citizens of Kosovo, especially the Serbs is noticeable

through the number of damaged and destroyed churches and other evidences that Serbs

236 Planken Online, http://planken.org/images/balkans/map_kfor_sect.gif237 Blic Online, ―Uranijumski Danak na Jugu Srbije,‖ November 4, 2007,http://www.blic.rs/drustvo.php?id=18489



Boshkovich 94

were in Kosovo for centuries. According to British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since

1999 in Kosovo was damaged or destroyed total of 155 Serbian churches and

monasteries, 250 cemeteries, and approximately 6,750 of graves.238

There are soldiers from other countries inside these five zones, but their number is

not significant, and their purpose is to make picture of international presence in Kosovo,

not only NATO. KFOR came as a result of the UN resolution 1244. This resolution

should guarantee Serbia sovereignty and protection for all people, but the reality is

different. Peacekeepers are more concerned about their own safety, and there are not

enough of them.239

That is the reason why they created the KPC (Kosovo Protection

Corpus), with a mission to protect people. As already mentioned, the problem is that the

majority of the KPC are former KLA members, just this time on the UNMIK paycheck.

So it is not very difficult to imagine how concerned they are about the rights of Serbs.

The other part of the Resolution 1244 that no one cares about is allowing the Serbian

Police and Army to return in areas with Serbs majority. On the contrary, the UNMIK said

that any attempt in this direction from the Serbian government would be considered as an

attack on Kosovo and the UN.

238 Tereza Bojkovic, ―Britanci Prebrojali Unisteno Srpsko Nasledje na Kosmetu,‖ Politika Online, November 16, 2009, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Britanci-prebrojali-unishteno-srpsko-nasledje-na-Kosmetu.sr.html239 Melanie McDonagh, ―Now the Serbs Need Our Help,‖ New Statesman 128, no. 4442, 12,http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.hpu.edu:5000/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=104&sid=9dbdebf0-0704-4835-9a72-420fbf2333f2%40sessionmgr112&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=hlh&AN=2025037



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Serbian population in Kosovo 1999 (since KFOR‘s watch) and 2005240

In the meantime, Kosovo became a paradise for drug dealers and sex

trafficking.241, 242 The KLA is in charge of the majority of heroin supplies that comes

from Afghanistan through the Balkan to the EU. Even during the strongest presence of

Serbian Armed Forces in Kosovo it was impossible to stop these activities. Today the

situation is even worse, but the UNMIK did not show an interest to end these criminal

activities; probably even if they wanted it would not be doable. Prostitution is probably

the second biggest source of income for citizens of Kosovo.243 Unfortunately, even some

KFOR soldiers, with their high incomes and huge distance from loved ones are

occasionally clients. Other than this, Kosovo‘s economy almost does not exist, and

besides illegal privatization of some Serbian companies, there is no other way for citizens

to make money. According to the UNDP, 14 % of Kosovo citizens live with less than 70

eurocents per day.244

240 Novosti Online, February 21, 2008,http://www.novosti.rs/code/navigate.php?Id=4&status=jedna&vest=116577&datum=2008-02-22241 Imer Mushkolaj, ―Drug Dealers Flourish in Post-War Kosovo,‖ New York University, June 22, 2000,http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate/Imer062200.html242 BBC Online, ―Kosovo UN Troops ‗Fuel Sex Trade‘ ,‖ May 6, 2004,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3686173.stm243 Ronald G McNeil Jr., ―U.N. and NATO Move to Curb Kosovo Crime,‖ The New York Times,http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/15/world/un-and-nato-move-to-curb-kosovo-crime.html?pagewanted=1244 B92 Online, archive October 17, 2007, http://www.b92.net/



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The political situation in Kosovo is even worse than the economical. The first

Kosovo Prime Minister was Ramus Haradinaj, but, as explained in section about the

KLA, he had to go to Hague‘s war crimes court. He is now free in Kosovo due to the

disappearance of some crucial witnesses. 245, 246 The next Prime Minister was Agim

Ceku, another KLA suspect terrorist, but without enough evidences for Carla Del Ponte

(main prosecutor of ICTY in Hague) to press charges. The present Prime Minister is

Hasim Thaci, terrorist/rebellion earlier mentioned in this research. It is not difficult to

imagine how the Serbs feel with all these KLA leaders as Prime Ministers, but the writer

of this paper is very thankful to his grandparents because they decided a long time ago to

move from Kosovo. The only thing that the Serbs could do is avoiding participation in

this ―political life‖. Obeying official Belgrade, Serbs decide not to participate in elections

(except for a small number of those that are used by ethnic Albanians as an ornament).

The international community was ―very disappointed‖ with this decision. That is another

example of a double standard because Albanians from Kosovo have never (since 1990

first democratic elections) participated in elections, but that same international

community said that it was their democratic right not to vote, even if they could take

around 35 seats out of 250 in Serbian parliament, which would give them an opportunity

to, along with the Serbian opposition overthrow Milosevic‘s regime much earlier and

possibly avoid the war. More than that, when invited to participate in elections for

245 Simon Jennings, ―Hague Prosecutors Appeal Haradinaj Judgment,‖ Institute for War & Peace

Reporting, July 18, 2008, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=tri&s=f&o=345814&apc_state=henptri246 B92 Online, ―Hague Tribunal Sets Haradinaj, Balaj Free ,‖ April 3, 2008,http://www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes-article.php?mm=4&dd=3&yyyy=2008



Boshkovich 97

Serbian parliament, ethnic Albanians would cynically respond that they do not want to

interfere in domestic affairs of neighboring country.247

248 Republican presidential candidate Sen. John

McCain, R-Ariz., speaks to a pro Kosovo, proMcCain, rally across the street from his New York City hotel Friday morning,Feb. 11, 2000. McCain is in New York for the dayto attend fundraisers and to talk to the press before returning to South Carolina Friday night.(AP Photo/Stephan Savoia). 249

Money that the KLA made from dealing drugs, as well as from tax collection

abroad250, is no longer used for buying the weapons. Now that‘s the most important way

for buying the support for independence around the world. That is the reason why the

247 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 35.248 ―John McCain aimed Kosovo Islamic terrorists.‖ Svet , February 13, 2008,

http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_PsML9GxjaK0/R7dtJ7LSzJI/AAAAAAAAAXg/PChvWGtk-2k/s320/McCainKLA.JPG249 Justin Raimondo, ―McCain and the KLA connection,‖ Antiwar Online, February 25, 2000,www.antiwar.com/justin/j022500.html250 Zoran Kusovac, ―The KLA: Braced to Defend and Control,‖ Jane’s Online http://www.janes.com/defence/news/kosovo/jir990401_01_n.shtml; ―The self-proclaimed government ofthe 'Republic of Kosovo' collected a 3 per cent income tax on all exiles working in Germany, Switzerlandand Austria, but much more important for the financing of the KLA were the funds sent by family memberswho worked abroad‖.



Boshkovich 98

Albanians have such a strong caucus in the USA Senate and in EU parliament. One of the

main supporters of Albanian interests in USA is Congressman Joseph DioGuardi. He

founded the Albanian caucus (back in 1990‘s) in the Congress in which he brought

Senators Robert Dole, Alfonse D‘Amato, Dennis DeConcini, and Congressmen Tom

Lantos.251, 252 Besides that, it is very important to have private journalists in influential

magazines and newspaper. Due to a huge pressure from these Albanian‘s allies, the UN

decided to end this status quo. The UN sent Marti Ahtisary to solve this problem. Very

soon he came to the conclusion that Kosovo should be independent. There were some

rumors in Serbia that he received 40 million euros for this decision and that this

information came from the BND (German Intelligence Service)253, but this story never

reached cover pages. Naturally Serbian government strongly opposed this idea and the

UN decided to send ―Troika‖ (from number three, representing negotiators from USA,

EU, and Russia) to start new negotiations. Albanians never took these negotiations

seriously because the international community said that if ‗Troika‘ does not manage a

better solution in 120 days than Ahtisary‘s proposal will be implemented254 So Albanians

had a simple task, just to travel around the world with ‗Troika‘ and pretend that they care

about these talks.

Serbs, Albanians, and ‗Troika‖ had a due date of December 10th 2007. Even

before this date their negotiations were finished because a compromise was impossible.

Albanians wanted only independence while the Serbs could offer anything but the

251 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 22.252 Joseph J DioGuardi and Shirley Cloyes, ―The Albanian American Civic League: On a Collision Coursewith Slobodan Milosevic ,‖ http://blog.aacl.com/the-aacl-on-a-collision-course-with-slobodon-milsovic/253 Axis Information and Analysis Online, ―Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review ,‖ June 25, 2007,http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=1334254 Ahtisary received Nobel Peace Prize in 2008 for efforts to resolve international conflicts including thatone in Kosovo. Obviously it was less important how successful he was.



Boshkovich 99

independence. It is understandable that Serbia strongly disagreed with dismemberment of

15% of its territory. It would be interesting to see how people in UK for example would

feel if the international community insisted on the independence of Wales.

Potential Independent States in Europe255

However, the reality is that 1.8 million Albanians in Kosovo do not want to live

under Serbian authority. For this reason Serbs suggested a couple of solutions during

talks with ‗Troika‘. The Serbs offered a system that exists in China regarding Hong

Kong, which is the part of China but still parallel system. Albanians rejected this because

―Hong Kong and Kosovo have completely different positions‖.256 After this idea, Serbia

came up with another solution; Oland‘s islands in Finland with Swedish majority.257

Again, the Albanians said no. All that the Albanians wanted to talk about was the future

relations between Serbia and Kosovo as two neighboring countries.

255 Caenada Blogspot Online, http://caenada.blogspot.com/2008/02/potential-independent-states-in-europe.html256 B92 Online, ―Beograd: Kosovo kao Hong Kong ,‖ November 5, 2007,http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2007&mm=11&dd=05&nav_id=270794.257 United Nations, ―Serbia‘s President Calls on Secur ity Council to Prevent Encouragement, Adoption ofAny Unilateral Act on Independence of Kosovo ,‖ January 16, 2008,http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9227.doc.htm



Boshkovich 100

Section C; Declaration of Independence

Just a couple of months after the end of talks regarding the final solution for

Kosovo, on February 17th 2008, the Albanians unilaterally declared independence.

Interestingly, to avoid Russian intervention in the UN, separatists have chosen Sunday to

declare independence. This declaration was immediately recognized by the USA,

Germany, UK, France, Italy, and other countries that bombed Serbia 9 years before.

Additionally, countries that are probably not sure where Kosovo is recognized this

independence most likely due to a foreign pressure; examples are Costa Rica,

Afghanistan, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Belize, Samoa,

Comoros, Montenegro, FYR Macedonia, etc. Besides those countries, as expected, many

countries with Muslim majority have also recognized Kosovo as an independent country.

On the other side, Serbia decided to protect her territory and citizens not with the

weapons but by usage of diplomacy (for the first time since 1990‘s). The author of this

paper thinks that it was a very wise decision, regardless of the fact that some people in

Serbia thought that the invasion of Kosovo was a better alternative due to NATO‘s

commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. The most important allies for the Serbs regarding

this matter are Russia and China. Besides them, there are some other countries that are

also in favor of Serbia mainly because of their own issues with separatism, or just

because of their strong belief that independence of Kosovo is violation of international

law. Examples are: Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Greece, Cyprus, Brazil, India, Argentina,

South Africa, Venezuela, Bosnia and Herzegovina (because of Serbs in that country who

have some kind of veto in federal institutions), etc.



Boshkovich 101

In reaction to declaration of independence many Serbs spontaneously started

demonstrations in major cities in Serbia and rest of the world. Unfortunately, some of

those protestors missed an opportunity to peacefully show their concern and

disagreement with this decision (there is an old saying in Serbia that Serbs never miss an

opportunity to miss the opportunity). Instead, they broke in to the US embassy and set

fire in which one protestor (internally displaced person from Kosovo) has died. Sadly,

because of a couple dozen of violent protestors that attacked the US and Croatian

embassy the rest of the world (thanks to the CNN and other news agencies) did not see

almost a million of worried protestors but footage from the US embassy in fire instead.258

Even the writer of this paper had friends at work that asked him what‘s wrong with the

Serbs again.

Nevertheless, Serbian authorities commenced a huge diplomatic offensive to

make sure that number of countries that are recognizing Kosovo is not growing, lobbying

at the same time in the UN to open discussion in front of the International Court of

Justice (ICJ) in Hague which would have to hear pros and cons about declaration of

independence and announce the official opinion.259

This trial started on December 1st 2009, and the Serbs are hoping that this

decision will be in their favor, but some people are very concerned, especially after

Hisashi Owada‘s (Japanese Judge who is the President of ICJ)260 announcement that most

258 CNN Online, ―U.S. Warns Serbia It‘s Responsible for Safety of Embassy ,‖ February 22, 2008,http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/02/22/us.serbia/index.html?iref=storysearch; yet, some Westernsources were lees bias, such as Times, http://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1715332,00.html259 BBC Online, ―UN Seeks World Court Kosovo View ,‖ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7658103.stm;74 countries in the UN voted in favor of asking ICJ for advice, 6 were against, while 74 abstained fromvoting.260 Miroslav Lazanski, ―Od Japanca, Iskreno,‖ Politika Online, November 22, 2009,http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Svet/Od-Japanca-iskreno.sr.html



Boshkovich 102

likely the ICJ statement won‘t be right or wrong, but rather several pages of interpretation

which will make room for both sides to interpret it in the way they like.

So far several countries have had a chance to speak in front of the ICJ regarding

Kosovo independence. Approximately 15 countries will support the Serbs, while the

same number of countries will support the Albanians. Here are a couple of statements

from the ICJ sessions so far, starting with those that support Serbian positions:

The ambassador of Bolivia said that Serbia could not unilaterally forbid the

staying of international organization in Kosovo, and in the same manner authorities in

Pristina cannot unilaterally cancel the sovereignty of Serbia over Kosovo. He said that the

right for independence is guaranteed to nations that are under colonial rule or occupation.

Since Kosovo have never been a colony nor under the occupation of foreign country it

can not have right for independence.261

China said that there is not question that Kosovo was part of FR Yugoslavia and

Serbia after the collapse of SFRY. The integral parts of sovereign countries, based on

international law, do not have the right to unilaterally declare independence, while

protection of territorial integrity is a blueprint for international order of law.262

Cyprus called the ICJ to implement international law, and stated that Kosovo‘s

declaration of independence is illegal. Cyprus‘ Ambassador denied accepting Kosovo as

a ‘unique case‘, warning that if the ICJ found Kosovo‘s independence legal it would be

very difficult to limit that statement just to Kosovo.263

261 Blic Online, ―Brazil i Bolivija Protiv, Bugarska za Nezavisnost Kosova,‖ April 12, 2009,http://www.blic.rs/politika.php?id=123905262 B92 Online, ―Nastavak Rasprave o Kosovu u Hagu,‖ December 7, 2009,http://www.blic.rs/politika.php?id=123905263 Ibid



Boshkovich 103

Russia said (Tuesday, December 8th 2009) that unilateral declaration of

independence is illegal, underlining that the Resolution 1244, which confirms the Serbian

territorial integrity is still active. The Russian delegation said that it is very often heard

that the international law is not the real law, but that the real law is that one of the

stronger. They added that this is time to show that international law is the real one.264

Spain also said that Kosovo violated international law. Spain envoy stated that

unilateral declaration of independence can not be in line with international law because it

violates principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia, which are protected by

the Resolution 1244 of Security Council of UN.265

On the other side, countries that are traditionally opposed to Serbia gave their

views:

The Bulgarian envoy said that Kosovo did not violate international law or the

Resolution 1244. He said that declaration of independence is not covered by international

law, but under domestic constitutional law. According to him, the Resolution 1244 did

not require agreement regarding the status of Kosovo.266

Croatian envoy, Andreja Metelko Zgombic said that Kosovo was part of the

SFRY, and that because of that it had right to declare independence. She added that

Albanians in Kosovo were victims of repression of Serbian authorities, and that will of

the people of Kosovo should be the bottom line in making the final decision regarding

264 Novosti Online, ―Pravo je Iznad Moci,‖ December 8, 2009,http://www.novosti.rs/code/navigate.php?Id=1&status=jedna&vest=164837&title_add=Pravo%20je%20iznad%20mo%C4%87i&kword_add=nezavisnost%20kosova%2C%20medjunarodni%20sud%20pravde265 Ibid266 Blic Online, ―Brazil i Bolivija Protiv, Bugarska za Nezavisnost Kosova,‖ April 12, 2009,http://www.blic.rs/politika.php?id=123905



Boshkovich 104

Kosovo.267 Unfortunately, she missed an opportunity to explain why Serbs in Krajina

(part of Croatia where Serbs were in majority until ethnic cleansing of 1995) did not have

the same right as the one that she is giving to Albanians. However, this is something that

was expected from Croatia, especially when one knows that by giving right to southern

Serbian province to separate they are giving the same right to Serbian northern province

(Vojvodina), which was already occupied by Croatia (WWII when Vojvodina along with

Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of German made independent Croatia).

The USA asked ICJ to leave Kosovo‘s declaration of independence intact either

by refusal to make a statement about that, or by finding that the international law does not

forbid declaration of independence. The USA envoy also asked the ICJ not to look at

Kosovo‘s case as a part of bigger story, but rather as a unique case. He added that there is

not any kind of contradiction between peacefully declared independence and international

law, including the Resolution 1244. Envoy also explained that by doing this Kosovo did

not break principle of territorial integrity because that is obligatory only for states, but not

for inner entities. He also said that declaration of independence of Kosovo is final stage

of death of the SFRY, with note that initially Serbia did not recognize Slovenia and

Croatia, but later on that happened.268 Again, it is not hard to find biases in the statement

of country that supports independence of Kosovo. First, who is going to explain to other

regions in the world that seeks independence why they can not be a ‗unique case‘ as

well? Also, the US envoy compared Slovenia and Croatia, which were republics that

267 B92 Online, ―Nastavak Rasprave o Kosovu u Hagu,‖ December 7, 2009,http://www.blic.rs/politika.php?id=123905

268 Novosti Online, ―Pravo je Iznad Moci,‖ December 8, 2009,http://www.novosti.rs/code/navigate.php?Id=1&status=jedna&vest=164837&title_add=Pravo%20je%20iznad%20mo%C4%87i&kword_add=nezavisnost%20kosova%2C%20medjunarodni%20sud%20pravde



Boshkovich 105

were part of the SFRY with Kosovo which is/was a Province of Serbia (as people would

say apples and oranges). Lastly, is not this a great excuse for the Serbs in Bosnia

(Republic of Srpska covers 49% of Bosnia) to request independence as the last stage of

collapse of the SFRY?

Still, there are some important individuals in the US who also think that

independence of Kosovo is not good idea. One of them is James Lyons (U.S. Navy

retired Admiral) who use to serve as commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, senior

U.S. military representative to the United Nations, and deputy chief of naval operations,

where he was principal adviser on all Joint Chiefs of Staff matters. He said that ―…more

than 300 mosques have been built in Kosovo, funded mainly by Saudi Arabia where the

radical teachings of the Wahhabi sect are promoted‖. Admiral Lyons also explained that

leaders of the KLA have connections with the global jihad movement, as well as with

organized crimes, and still they represent ―…the dominant element in the local Albanian

administration…”. More importantly he noticed that the US is endorsing formation of

‗Taliban-like‘ state in the heart of Europe. That is something that will be dangerous for

stability of the region. At the same time it will complicate US relations with Russia and

China which are already bad due to issues over Iran, Taiwan, North Korea and Middle

East.269

If the writer of this paper could give some advice to the Serbian and Albanian

authorities it would be to come back to the table and find the solution that would satisfy

both sides. Of course, that would mean that neither side would get 100%, but more

importantly neither side would lose 100%, which is the case at this moment. Actually, the

269 The Washington Times, ―Kosovo Train Wreck-Warnings,‖ January 2, 2008,http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jan/02/kosovo-32train-wreck-warnings/



Boshkovich 106

year 2010 might be a good year for negotiations since the ICJ should finish a process

regarding the legitimacy of declaration of independence.



Boshkovich 107

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is important to mention that the author of this paper wanted to

make sure that people who are not very familiar with the situation on Balkan Peninsula

had a chance to find out more about events that took place and are taking place in this

part of Europe. Hopefully, the audience saw that the Rambouillet Peace Conference was

actually an ultimatum which Serbs could never accept. At the same time, the readers of

this research had a chance to see that there is always the other side of the story. Nothing

is black and white, there is also a huge gray area. Just like in the case of Israelis and

Palestinians, or Kurds and Turks, Serbs and Albanians also have their sides of the same

story. Unfortunately, many major news agencies saw situation on the Balkan through

lenses of subjectivity, which is completely wrong and unacceptable. This is bad not just

because of generalization about the entire nation, but because of the credibility of news

provided by those stations. One of the lessons learned for the author of this project is to

always accept information heard from TV with lot of skepticisms. Of course, one would

not go so far to believe in all theories of conspiracy such as the one that 9/11 was an

‗inside job‘, but in cases such as the last year‘s victory of Sri Lanka‘s government against

Tamil Tigers in which Sri Lanka‘s government was supported by all means, one would

assume that the western audience did not hear the other side of the story.

Nevertheless, Serbs and Albanians should admit their mistakes and try to look

forward to future coexistence in the EU; after all state borders practically do not exist in

EU. Serbia should understand that even if Kosovo does not win full independence,

Albanians, due to a very high birth rate will be the majority in Serbia roughly 50 years

from now. Besides that, for future reference, Serbs needs to realize that it is impossible to



Boshkovich 108

suppress terrorists/rebellions without approval of the USA, EU, and NATO. The best

examples are Turkey270 which has to fight against Kurds, and Israel fighting against

sever al terrorist‘s groups. Thanks to the support of the western world they can fight

against terrorists even in neighboring countries such as Iraq and Lebanon, respectively.

One can‘t imagine what would have happened if Serbia tried to fight against the KLA in

Albania.

In the future on the Balkan Peninsula, the world can expect more turmoil in FYR

Macedonia, the southern part of central Serbia, Montenegro, and perhaps Greece (some

of incidents in these areas were already mentioned in news and articles such as Pan-

Albanianism: How big a threat to Balkan stability?).271

The reason for this is the Albanian aspiration to create ―Great Albania‖ as

mentioned earlier in this research. For this purpose terrorists established ANA (Albanian

National Army) which already had conflicts with security forces in FYR Macedonia and

central Serbia. Just a couple years ago Macedonian police conducted action on Sar

Mountain in which they killed several terrorists and recovered weapons for 650 men.272

Many questions rose during this research; why does it seem that the international

community uses double standards in solving the problems around the world? Is it

possible that Croatia has right to separate from Yugoslavia while Serbs can not separate

from Croatia (or just stay in Yugoslavia)? Why was Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH)

270 Peter Brooke, ―Kosovo: What We Weren‘t Told ,‖

http://web.ukonline.co.uk/pbrooke/p&t/Balkans/dmonkosovo/Kosovo; ―The Yugoslav response was notgentle but it was certainly no more heavy-handed than Turkey's response to the Kurdish PKK guerrillas, ina war which 30,000 lives were lost, 4,000 villages were razed to the ground and 3 million Kurds weredriven from their homes. And Turkey is a member of NATO, which participated enthusiastically in

NATO's "humanitarian war" on Yugoslavia.” 271 ICG Europe. Report No 153, ―Pan Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkan Stability?‖ February 25,2004, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan014972.pdf.272 B92 Online, archive November 9, 2007, http://www.b92.net/



Boshkovich 109

allowed to separate from Yugoslavia but Serbs were not allowed to separate from BH?

How are Albanians entitled to declare independence of Kosovo but Serbs from northern

Kosovo cannot stay in Serbia? Why did not the Albanians in Kosovo do almost anything

to encourage the Serbs to come back (According to the UNHCR, only just over 6,000

Serbs have returned home since the end of the war 273), which is sad when the world

knows that there is over 238,000 of IDP‘s.274 Why is Serbia‘s future in the EU

conditioned with arrest of General Mladic (Serb from Bosnia accused for war crimes),

which Serbian authorities can not find (just like the US can not find Osama Bin Laden),

while at the same time no one blackmails Croatia due to a unsolved problem with the

refuges that never returned from Serbia (just like the case when no one pressured Austria

due to WWII Nazis that are still free citizens of this country).275

The answer to all these questions might be that all this is a part of much bigger

picture. That is getting closer to Russia by destruction of their ally on Balkan. The

importance of this strategy was obvious immediately after NATO bombing when Russian

troops came first to Kosovo (contingent from Bosnia) and captured Pristina airport

Slatina. They did so to ensure that their reinforcement will have a place to land (Serbs

were amazed when they saw Russians in Kosovo before NATO). But, as the Secretary

Albright summarized; ―The Russian military had prepared six transport aircraft to f erry

273 ―Waiting Game,‖ Economist 376, no. 8434 (2005): 43,

http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.hpu.edu:5000/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=104&sid=a4ecd0df-105c-4b4d- b4fb-7239e7c36e7d%40sessionmgr110&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=17580396274 UNMIK Online, ―Division of Public Monitoring ,‖ April 8, 2004, 2,http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2004/mon/apr/lmm080404.pdf 275 Efraim Zuroff the director of the Simon Wiesenthal Center office in Jerusalem talked about Austria as asafe heaven for Nazis in his interview with Politika. Zorana Suvakovic, ―Nacisti jos Setaju Balkanom,‖ Politika Online, December 4, 2009, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Nacisti-josh-shetaju-Balkanom.sr.html



Boshkovich 110

thousands of troops to reinforce the small contingent at the Pristina airport. The flights

never took off because the Russians were denied to cross the airspace of Hungary,

Romania, and Bulgaria….the NATO-led force deployed and ended up feeding the lightly

supplied Russians at the airport…‖.276 Naturally, a couple of years later Romania and

Bulgaria were invited to become members of NATO (Hungary accede to NATO in April

1999, during the bombing). Nevertheless, it might be wise to determine where the limit of

NATO‘s increase is. Is it realistic to expect that France, for example, will fight with

Russians over Estonia? Besides that it seems better to build partnership with Russia than

to provoke them by putting under NATO‘s umbrella countries that are in their backyard.

After all, Russians proved in the 2008 war with Georgia that they still do not need

approval to invade another sovereign country.

Another explanation is that the west did not want a strong Yugoslavia but rather

several weak states under protectorate of EU, IMF, and NATO. "In post-cold war Europe

no place remained for a large, independent-minded socialist state that resisted

globalisation," said George Kenney, former Yugoslavia desk officer of the US state

department. ―The Serbs' great ‗crime‘ was not reading the script‖.277

Additionally, it is just important to think far and wide because by allowing the

independence of Kosovo western world made a precedent that could be crucial in future

geopolitical games with some major powers. Examples are China with several regions

that seek independence or India which has many states that would like to be independent.

Even Russia showed that it is not immune to terrorism and separatism. Nevertheless,

western powers should be extremely careful when they make those moves because it

276 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 423-24.277 Neil Clark, ―It‘s Time to End Serb-Bashing,‖ Guardian Online, January 14, 2008,http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jan/14/itstimetoendserbbashing



Boshkovich 111

could make wrong effect such as in the case of Russia and Mr. Putin. One of the reasons

why this ex KGB officer got such a huge support from his people is the bombing of

Yugoslavia which he used to highlight the importance of powerful Russia. Maybe, if

NATO did not bomb Yugoslavia and teased this big country, Russia would be still in

political coma with some weak leader such as Mr. Yeltsin (well known for many scandals

connected to alcohol and violation of law278) who would never seriously opposed

demands from the west.

Another significant issue is NATO credibility. This organization needs to be

extremely cautious when making important decisions. First NATO military actions were

in 1990‘s against Serbs in Bosnia and Serbia (Yugoslavia). Many countries saw that as a

violation of international laws which damaged NATO credibility. More importantly,

during the bombing of Serbia in 1999, NATO bombed China‘s embassy in Belgrade279

which created a major diplomatic incident. Without mistakes such as that one or as

explained with Russia, NATO led by USA might be in better position today regarding

much more serious issues (Iran, Iraq, Al-Qaeda, North Korea, etc). All this issues would

be much easier to solve with the help of Russia and China. Unfortunately, these two

countries are not truly concerned about rogue regimes, but actually have pretty successful

cooperation in various fields (economy, weapons). However, President Obama

demonstrated, by abandoning the idea of the missile shield in Europe, that he is willing to

change western approach to other world powers which might be crucial for the future of

the world and avoidance of unnecessary wars (and interventions) such as that in

278 ―Swiss investigators say that up to $15m worth of bribes were made available to the Russian leader[Yeltsin], his family and senior Kremlin officials by a construction company competing for Kremlincontracts. ―, BBC Online, ―Business: The Economy Yeltsin Linked to Bribe Scandal,‖ September 8, 1999,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/441916.stm279 Madeleine Albright. Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 417-18.



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Yugoslavia.

The UN is another organization that also lost credibility (which was always

questionable) over Yugoslavia and later on in Serbia because it did not do anything to

prevent Albanians from declaring their independence. Actually, many countries in this

organization were very supportive to independence of Kosovo, and the only reason that

Kosovo is not member of UN is Russia. Nevertheless, it would not be a surprise if some

future president of Russia allows membership of Kosovo in UN in return for some

benefits from the west. Especially when one has in mind that the only super-power is

pressuring countries around the world to recognize independence of Kosovo. The most

recent knowing case is Bangladesh. According to the RTS (Radio Television of Serbia),

the USA demanded for the fifth time this year (2009) from Bangladesh to recognize

independence of Kosovo. Even US Ambassador to Bangladesh, James Moriarty, admitted

that he talked about that with secretary and ministry of foreign affairs of Bangladesh.280

However, this poor country still refuses to obey requests of the USA. A journalist of RTS

indicates that the main reason for this refusal is Bangladesh‘s close relations with Russia.

Besides that, it would not be surprise if the reason were fear from separatist movements

in Bangladesh who would see this as their chance to gain independence.

Another problem with the loss of credibility of UN and other international

organizations is the fact that worlds ‗rogue regimes‘ will also learn a lesson and become

more reluctant to peace talks and acceptance of UN resolutions, especially when they see

280 RTS Online, ―Pritisak na Banglades da Prizna Kosovo,‖ November 16, 2009,http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/ci/story/1/%D0%A1%D1%80%D0%B1%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0/302081/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%BA+%D0%BD%D0%B0+%D0%91%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%88+%D0%B4%D0%B0+%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BD%D0%B0+%D0%9A%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE.html



Boshkovich 113

that main advocates of those resolutions from the west are not fulfilling their part of the

deal (in case of Resolution 1244 it was the protection of Serbian integrity). Maybe that is

the reason why Iran does not want to participate in talks regarding WMD (Weapons of

Mass Destruction). Besides that, how can western democracies can expect that double

magnet diplomacy (Secretary Albright talked about that in her book explaining how US

used Russia to influence Serbia) to work in the future if one country, in this case Russia,

was treated like a used diaper once they completed their task.

In the end, it is important to explain that the major powers in the world led by the

US should understand that it is a must to support the obedience of the international law.

There is no such a thing as a ―one time precedent‖ as President Obama explained

recognition of Kosovo (which was actually something that happened during Mr. Bush‘s

administration; someone could say just another mistake of Bush‘s administration). Once

established the precedent based on military power it is opening of Pandora‘s Box for

which no one knows how it will work in the future. What if USA goes through major

economic crises which will make China (for example) stronger power? And if, again just

a theoretical example, Mexicans from California decide to declare independence of

southern California. Who will protect the US sovereignty and integrity from separatists

backed by stronger military power? That is why the world needs laws that will be obeyed

always, not only when one side needs them. And that is the reason why no country in the

world should be faced with ultimatum such as that one from Rambouillet.

There cannot be good and bad terrorism. All terrorists are bad regardless of

possibility that their goals might at some point align with goals of some world power, not

to mention that some of those ‗freedom fighters‘ might become some they a threat to the



Boshkovich 114

country that was supplying them with weapons, just like in case of Iraq (while at war

with Iran) and Afghanistan (while at war with Soviets) which were supplied with

weapons by US, and today they use some of those weapons to attack US troops;

obviously someone did not think far and wide.

Clinton in Pristina (Kosovo capital) next to his 11 foot tall statue in 2009 for purpose of ceremonymade in his honor 281

281 Telegraph Online, ―Bill Clinton unveils statue of himself in Kosovo‖, November 1, 2009,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/kosovo/6481057/Bill-Clinton-unveils-statue-of-himself-in-Kosovo.html



Boshkovich 115

Historiography

The first source that will be discussed in this part is BBC‘s documentary movie

Moral Combat; NATO at War (accessible at YouTube) . Producers of this movie were

favorable to Albanians (at the beginning of the movie they showed picture of Serbian

soldier with the mask who looked really scary, while the KLA fighters where showed as

they sang military cadences using the same melody as the US armed forces), but still they

provided a lot of useful information. Those information are mostly usable as primary

sources (testimonies of those that were involved in this story-Walker, Gen. Clark,

Albright, Serbian leaders, Holbrook, the KLA leaders, etc).

Another good source is Albright‘s book Madam Secretary: A Memoir, in which

she described many situations closely related to the topic of this paper. Even if she has a

very negative opinion about Serbs and their leadership it is possible to find some useful

information in her memoires.

Carla Del Ponte‘s book is another primary source that one will find interesting,

especially the part that covers KLA‘s crimes because it is not very often that someone

covers those war crimes, usually audience has much easier access to those crimes that

were committed by Serbs.

General Wesley K. Clark who was supreme allied commander in Europe offered a

significant number of information that were helpful in finding out more about NATO

bombing. Besides that, he went deeper and elaborated on some diplomatic issues in

which he was one of the main actors.

Journalist Tim Judah who wrote for the New York Review of Books, the London

Observer, the Sunday Telegraph, and the Guardian Weekend magazine wrote a book



Boshkovich 116

named Kosovo; War and Revenge. In this book readers can find many stories that explain

situation in Kosovo, but just like in case of Secretary Albright most of them are bias and

well chosen to support a stereotype abut Serbian guiltiness. Another book written by Tim

Judah is The Serbs; History, Myth & Destruction of Yugoslavia. This book offers very

detailed story of history of the Balkan with a vast amount of valuable information.

The Fall of Yugoslavia; the Third Balkan War by Misha Glenny is another book

that gives perspective in to western point of view. The writer of this book covers the

period from 1990 and situation in Croatia until 1996. This is interesting book about

situation on the Balkan, but the last edition is from 1996 and because of that it is not

essential for the research about the war in Kosovo. Yet it is valuable for any one

interested in other events that have occurred in the 1990‘s.

A very interesting book is Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse; Causes, Course and

Consequences by Christopher Bennet. This book just like many others talks about recent

wars, but more importantly it covers the early history of Balkan Peninsula, which is

important if one wants to understand the roots of the problem.

UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo; Operational and Legal

Issues in Practice by Ray Murphy provides valuable information about the UN‘s

peacekeeping mission around the world, including KFOR in Kosovo.

A several pages of Noam Chomsky‘s book Failed States; The Abuse of Power

and the Assault on Democracy are dedicated to case of Kosovo and Yugoslavia overall,

but mostly in the manner to support his accusations regarding US foreign policy.

Speaking of Serbian primary sources it is important to mention four books:



Boshkovich 117

1. Put u Rambuje (a trip to Rambouillet) by Predrag Simic which was very useful for this

research because he covered most of the stories regarding the Conference. At the same

time he did not allowed to himself to be bias just because he is Serbian, rather he

supported all statements with valid documentation.

2. Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (how Rambouillet happened to us) by Miodrag Mitic.

As already mentioned in this research , probably the most valuable book about this topic.

This is mainly because Mr. Mitic was a member of Yugoslav delegation in Rambouillet,

which gave him an opportunity to participate in all important occasions that occurred

during the Conference. He can not be blamed for being bias, but it is obvious that he had

a very hard time to digest all injustices that happened to Serbs.

3. Kosovo by Dobrica Cosic, which was prepared mainly by his daughter Ana Cosic-

Vukic. She actually made a selection of Mr. Cosic‘s entries from his diary, as well as

letters that he exchanged with relevant leaders in Yugoslavia and the rest of the world.

This is a very interesting book because Mr. Cosic was the president of FR Yugoslavia

and had a chance to participate in many important meetings, including those where was

discussed about solutions for Kosovo.

4. Klopka u Rambujeu (a trap in Rambouillet) by Milan Komnenic. Mr. Komnenic was

for many years one of those that fought against Milosevic in the Parliament and on the

streets of Belgrade. He was not included in Serbian delegation, but he traveled to Paris to

support Serbian cause. At that time he met with many influential politicians in Europe,

working on improvement of Serbian image abroad. However, his book did not offer

much data that could be used in this research. The main reason for that is the way that

Mr. Komnenic writes. It is too poetic for paper related to diplomacy and military studies.



Boshkovich 118

A huge number of newspapers, magazines, and other sources available online

were also used in this research. Some of them offered stories from primary sources, such

as interviews with main actors of the Conference and the bombing that followed, but

some were very well written secondary sources that covered many interesting statistics.

Most used news agency from Serbia is probably B92, which is traditionally opposed to

Milosevic and his followers. At the same time, this news agency was always close to

European values, and very supportive to democratization of Serbia. Speaking of foreign

news agencies, in this research most used was BBC, which covered many important

moments in recent history of Kosovo; from 1990‘s till today‘s process in Hague in front

of ICJ and ICTY.

Other books that are valuable for this topic are: Kosovo; a Short History, written

by Noel Malcolm, Making War, Thinking History; Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential

Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo by Jeffrey Record, Albania and Kosovo-Blue

Guide, The Road to Kosovo; a Balkan Diary written by Greg Campbell, Kosovo;

Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions, edited by William Joseph Buckley, and

Yugoslavia; a Country Study.

Additional sources used for this research include: The Rambouillet Conference on

Kosovo by Marc Weller, articles from journals such as the Foreign Policy as well as

commentaries from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Besides that, very

valuable information can be found in researches such as Depleted Uranium

Environmental and Medical Surveillance in the Balkans, which is actually written in a

form of the information paper (report). Also worth to mention is records from the US



Boshkovich 119

Congress, as well as transcripts from the ICTY. Unfortunately, the Serbian Parliament is

not so easy accessible records wise, at least on line.

At the end it is important to mention that the writer of this research is also a good

source regarding this topic. The reason for that is that he lived in Serbia until 2005, which

gave him an opportunity to see NATO bombing live (actually during one night at the

beginning of the bombing he got almost killed by one ‗Tomahawk‘, along with his future

wife and couple of friends), and talk to IDPs from Kosovo, as well as with refugees from

Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (many of them are still in refugee‘s camps, even if

they were forced to leave their homes in 1995). Also, the writer of this research is very

well informed about the negotiation process about future of Kosovo because he followed

all of the news and press releases at that time since he was aware that all those events

were very important for the future of the country where he lived.

After all, people in Serbia did not have a choice but to follow politics at that time

because it was present everywhere. Either through the pressure from EU regarding

cooperation with ICTY, permanent threat of bombing, fears of terrorism, or simply desire

to know if Serbia will become member of EU which would close the curtain on bloody

period in Balkans. Unfortunately, that still did not happen, even though the last civil war

in that region ended in 1999.



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Appendix

I Statement by the Contact Group

UNITED NATIONS SSecurity CouncilDistr.

GENERAL

S/1999/96

29 January 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 29 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE

SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to enclose the statement of the Foreign Ministers of

France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of

Great

Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America (the

Contact

Group) following their meeting in London on 29 January 1999.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be

circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jeremy GREENSTOCK

99-02329 (E) 290199 /...

S/1999/96

EnglishPage 2

Annex

Statement by the Contact Group issued in London on

29 January 1999

1. Contact Group Ministers met in London on 29 January to consider the

critical situation in Kosovo, which remains a threat to peace and

security in the region, raising the prospect of a humanitarian

catastrophe.

2. Despite the intensive efforts of the international community,

violence remains a daily occurrence in Kosovo. Ministers unreservedly

condemned the massacre of Kosovo Albanians at Racak, which resulted in

several thousand people fleeing their homes. The escalation in violence

- for which both Belgrade’s security forces and the Kosovo Liberation

Army (KLA) are responsible - must be stopped. Repression of civilians

by the security forces must end and those forces must be withdrawn.

Ministers of the Contact Group deplore the failure of the parties to

make progress towards a political settlement, and cannot accept that

this should permit the crisis to continue. Time is of the essence in

reaching a solution, and the Contact Group is therefore assuming its



Boshkovich 121

responsibility.

3. Ministers called on both sides to end the cycle of violence and to

commit themselves to a process of negotiation leading to a political

settlement. To that end, the Contact Group:

(a) Insisted that the parties accept that the basis for a fair

settlement must include the principles set out by the Contact Group;(b) Considered that the proposals drafted by the negotiators contained

the elements for substantial autonomy for Kosovo and asked the

negotiators to refine them further to serve as the framework for

agreement between the parties;

(c) Recognized that the work done by the negotiators had identified the

limited number of points that required final negotiation between the

parties;

(d) Agreed to summon representatives from the Federal Yugoslav and

Serbian Governments and representatives of the Kosovo Albanians to

Rambouillet by 6 February, under the co-chairmanship of Hubert Vedrine

and Robin Cook, to begin negotiations with the direct involvement of

the Contact Group. The Contact Group recognized the legitimate rights

of other communities within Kosovo. In the context of these

negotiations, it will work to ensure that their interests are fully

reflected in a settlement;

(e) Agreed that the participants should work to conclude negotiations

within seven days. The negotiators should then report to Contact Group

Ministers, who will assess whether the progress made justifies a

further period of less than one week to bring the negotiations to a

successful conclusion.

4. The Contact Group demanded that the parties seize this opportunity

to reach a settlement offering peace to the people of Kosovo. The

Contact Group praised the present role of the Organization for Security

and Cooperation in

/...S/1999/96

English

Page 3

Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission in working to reduce tensions

in Kosovo and create the conditions for political dialogue, and

recognized the continuing role of the Mission. The Contact Group

recognized that continuing international engagement would be necessary

to help the parties implement a settlement and rebuild the shattered

province. It required that the parties accept the level and nature of

international presence deemed appropriate by the international

community.

5. In the meantime, the Contact Group demands that the Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia:

(a) Stop all offensive actions/repression in Kosovo;

(b) Comply fully with the OSCE/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia agreements and relevant Security Council resolutions;

(c) Promote the safe return of all those who have been forced to flee

their homes as a result of the conflict. This includes bringing much-

needed relief to Kosovo;



Boshkovich 122

(d) Cooperate fully with OSCE and permit the Kosovo Verification

Mission and its Chief of Mission to continue to carry out their

responsibilities unhindered;

(e) Cooperate fully with the International Tribunal for the Former

Yugoslavia as required by relevant Security Council resolutions;

(f) Conduct a full investigation of Racak with the participation of the

International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, allowing the ChiefProsecutor and Tribunal investigators to enter and work in Kosovo to

participate in the investigation of the massacre;

(g) Identify and suspend the Yugoslav Army/Serbian Special Police

officers operating in Racak at the time of the massacre until the

results of the investigation become available;

(h) Mitigate the sentences of those imprisoned in connection with the

conflict and provide due process to all detainees.

6. The Contact Group emphasized that compliance with Security Council

resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) applied equally to

the Kosovo Albanians. It condemned all provocations by the KLA, which

could only fuel the cycle of violence, and insisted that all hostages

should be released. The Contact Group believes that the framework it

has set out meets the legitimate aspirations of the Kosovo Albanians

and demands that their leaders rally behind negotiations to reach a

settlement and end provocative actions which would impede the political

process.

7. The Contact Group asked Robin Cook to travel to Belgrade and

Pristina to transmit these messages to the parties.

S/1999/96

English

Page 4

8. The future of the people of Kosovo is in the hands of leaders in

Belgrade and Kosovo. They must commit themselves now to complete thenegotiations on a political settlement within 21 days to bring peace to

Kosovo. The Contact Group will hold both sides accountable if they fail

to take the opportunity now offered to them, just as the Group stands

ready to work with both sides to realize the benefits for them of a

peaceful solution.282

-----

282 United Nations, Security Council, January 29, 1999, http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/s9996.pdf thisstatement will be also available in the appendix I of this research



Boshkovich 123

II Fundamentals of the Agreement

This is a document that could be found on the Department of State Website regarding an

agreement that was proposed to sides in Rambouillet;

The Rambouillet Accords are a 3-year interim agreement that will provide democraticself-government, peace, and security for everyone living in Kosovo.

Democratic self-government will include all matters of daily importance to people inKosovo, including education, health care, and economic development. Kosovo will havea President, an Assembly, its own courts, strong local government, and nationalcommunity institutions with the authority needed to protect each community's identity.

Security will be guaranteed by international troops deployed on the ground throughoutKosovo. Local police, representative of all national communities in Kosovo, will provide

routine law enforcement. Federal and Republic security forces will leave Kosovo, exceptfor a limited border protection presence.

Mechanism for final settlement. An international meeting will be convened after 3years to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo. The will of the peoplewill be an important factor at the international meeting.

DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNMENT

During the interim period, citizens in Kosovo will govern themselves democraticallythrough Kosovo institutions.

Kosovo will have a Constitution. The Constitution calls for the democraticselection of a President, a Prime Minister and Government, an Assembly, andstrong communal authorities. Kosovo will have its own Supreme Court,Constitutional Court, other courts, and prosecutors.Free and fair elections will be held within 9 months of entry into force, under thesupervision of the OSCE.Kosovo will have the authority to make laws not subject to revision by Serbia orthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including levying taxes, instituting programsof economic, scientific, technological, regional, and social development,conducting foreign relations within its areas of responsibility in the same manner

as a Republic, and all matters of local government.Kosovo and its national communities will perform most functions presentlyhandled by the Republic of Serbia. However, citizens in Kosovo will be able tocall upon Republic institutions for assistance, if they wish. The Federal Republicwill not be permitted to act in ways injurious to Kosovo. National communities in Kosovo will be able to control their own identities,including preserving their languages and operating schools and hospitals. Allother authorities are forbidden from interfering.



Boshkovich 124

Human rights and the rights of the members of all national communities will beguaranteed.The international community will play a role in ensuring that these provisions arecarried out, through a civilian Implementation Mission, an ombudsman andconstitutional court judges selected under international auspices, OSCE

supervision of elections, and an international military presence.

SECURITY

The Parties invite NATO to deploy a military force (KFOR), which will be authorized touse necessary force to ensure compliance with the Accords, protect international agenciesinvolved with implementation, and provide a secure environment for everyone inKosovo.

Security in Kosovo will be handled by KFOR. All other security forces will withdraw or be phased out under the supervision of KFOR, according to a balanced schedule of

reciprocal steps by all sides specified in the Accords.

Yugoslav army forces will withdraw completely from Kosovo, except for alimited border guard force (active only within 5 km. border zone) and associated personnel.Serb security forces will withdraw completely except for limited number of border police and, for a transitional period, a limited number of civil policeofficers who will serve at the direction of the international ImplementationMission until local police are trained to replace them.The Kosovo Liberation Army will hand over security in Kosovo to NATO troopsand will be demilitarized.

Local police will take over all policing duties in Kosovo within 1 year, extendablefor a limited period only by the Chief of the Implementation Mission.

A MECHANISM FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT

Three years after entry into force of the Accords, an international meeting will beconvened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of thewill of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each party's efforts regarding theimplementation of the Accords, and the Helsinki Final Act.283

283 The State Department Online, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_990301_rambouillet.html.



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III Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo

The Parties to the present Agreement,

Convinced of the need for a peaceful and political solution in Kosovo as a prerequisite

for stability and democracy,

Determined to establish a peaceful environment in Kosovo,

Reaffirming their commitment to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, aswell as to OSCE principles, including the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris fora new Europe,

Recalling the commitment of the international community to the sovereignty andterritorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

Recalling the basic elements/principles adopted by the Contact Group at its ministerialmeeting in London on January 29, 1999,

Recognizing the need for democratic self-government in Kosovo, including full participation of the members of all national communities in political decision-making,

Desiring to ensure the protection of the human rights of all persons in Kosovo, as well asthe rights of the members of all national communities, Recognizing the ongoingcontribution of the OSCE to peace and stability in Kosovo,

Noting that the present Agreement has been concluded under the auspices of the

members of the Contact Group and the European Union and undertaking with respect tothese members and the European Union to abide by this Agreement,

Aware that full respect for the present Agreement will be central for the development ofrelations with European institutions,

Have agreed as follows:

Framework

Article I: Principles

1. All citizens in Kosovo shall enjoy, without discrimination, the equal rights andfreedoms set forth in this Agreement.

2. National communities and their members shall have additional rights specified inChapter 1. Kosovo, Federal, and Republic authorities shall not interfere with the exerciseof these additional rights. The national communities shall be legally equal as specifiedherein, and shall not use their additional rights to endanger the rights of other national



Boshkovich 126

communities or the rights of citizens, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia, or the functioning of representative democraticgovernment in Kosovo.

3. All authorities in Kosovo shall fully respect human rights, democracy, and the equality

of citizens and national communities.

4. Citizens in Kosovo shall have the right to democratic self-government throughlegislative, executive, judicial, and other institutions established in accordance with thisAgreement. They shall have the opportunity to be represented in all institutions inKosovo. The right to democratic self-government shall include the right to participate infree and fair elections.

5. Every person in Kosovo may have access to international institutions for the protectionof their rights in accordance with the procedures of such institutions.

6. The Parties accept that they will act only within their powers and responsibilities inKosovo as specified by this Agreement. Acts outside those powers and responsibilitiesshall be null and void. Kosovo shall have all rights and powers set forth herein, includingin particular as specified in the Constitution at Chapter 1. This Agreement shall prevailover any other legal provisions of the Parties and shall be directly applicable. The Partiesshall harmonize their governing practices and documents with this Agreement.

7. The Parties agree to cooperate fully with all international organizations working inKosovo on the implementation of this Agreement.

Article II: Confidence-Building Measures

End of Use of Force

1. Use of force in Kosovo shall cease immediately. In accordance with this Agreement,alleged violations of the cease-fire shall be reported to international observers and shallnot be used to justify use of force in response.

2. The status of police and security forces in Kosovo, including withdrawal of forces,shall be governed by the terms of this Agreement. Paramilitary and irregular forces inKosovo are incompatible with the terms of this Agreement.

Return

3. The Parties recognize that all persons have the right to return to their homes.Appropriate authorities shall take all measures necessary to facilitate the safe return of persons, including issuing necessary documents. All persons shall have the right toreoccupy their real property, assert their occupancy rights in state-owned property, andrecover their other property and personal possessions. The Parties shall take all measuresnecessary to readmit returning persons to Kosovo.



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4. The Parties shall cooperate fully with all efforts by the United Nations HighCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international and non-governmentalorganizations concerning the repatriation and return of persons, including thoseorganizations monitoring of the treatment of persons following their return.

Access for International Assistance

5. There shall be no impediments to the normal flow of goods into Kosovo, includingmaterials for the reconstruction of homes and structures. The Federal Republic ofYugoslavia shall not require visas, customs, or licensing for persons or things for theImplementation Mission (IM), the UNHCR, and other international organizations, as wellas for non- governmental organizations working in Kosovo as determined by the Chief ofthe Implementation Mission (CIM).

6. All staff, whether national or international, working with international or non-governmental organizations including with the Yugoslav Red Cross, shall be allowed

unrestricted access to the Kosovo population for purposes of international assistance. All persons in Kosovo shall similarly have safe, unhindered, and direct access to the staff ofsuch organizations.

Other Issues

7. Federal organs shall not take any decisions that have a differential, disproportionate,injurious, or discriminatory effect on Kosovo. Such decisions, if any, shall be void withregard to Kosovo.

8. Martial law shall not be declared in Kosovo.

9. The Parties shall immediately comply with all requests for support from theImplementation Mission (IM). The IM shall have its own broadcast frequencies for radioand television programming in Kosovo. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall provide all necessary facilities, including frequencies for radio communications, to allhumanitarian organizations responsible for delivering aid in Kosovo.

Detention of Combatants and Justice Issues

10. All abducted persons or other persons held without charge shall be released. TheParties shall also release and transfer in accordance with this Agreement all persons held

in connection with the conflict. The Parties shall cooperate fully with the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to facilitate its work in accordance with its mandate,including ensuring full access to all such persons, irrespective of their status, whereverthey might be held, for visits in accordance with the ICRC's standard operating procedures.

11. The Parties shall provide information, through tracing mechanisms of the ICRC, tofamilies of all persons who are unaccounted for. The Parties shall cooperate fully with the



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ICRC and the International Commission on Missing Persons in their efforts to determinethe identity, whereabouts, and fate of those unaccounted for.

12. Each Party:

(a) shall not prosecute anyone for crimes related to the conflict in Kosovo, except for persons accused of having committed serious violations of international humanitarianlaw. In order to facilitate transparency, the Parties shall grant access to foreign experts(including forensics experts) along with state investigators;

(b) shall grant a general amnesty for all persons already convicted of committing politically motivated crimes related to the conflict in Kosovo. This amnesty shall notapply to those properly convicted of committing serious violations of internationalhumanitarian law at a fair and open trial conducted pursuant to international standards.

13. All Parties shall comply with their obligation to cooperate in the investigation and

prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law.

(a) As required by United Nations Security Council resolution 827 (1993) and subsequentresolutions, the Parties shall fully cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal forthe Former Yugoslavia in its investigations and prosecutions, including complying withits requests for assistance and its orders.

(b) The Parties shall also allow complete, unimpeded, and unfettered access tointernational experts- including forensics experts and investigators to investigateallegations of serious violations of international humanitarian law.

Independent Media

14. Recognizing the importance of free and independent media for the development of ademocratic political climate necessary for the reconstruction and development of Kosovo,the Parties shall ensure the widest possible press freedoms in Kosovo in all media, publicand private, including print, television, radio, and Internet.

Chapter 1

Constitution

Affirming their belief in a peaceful society, justice, tolerance, and reconciliation,

Resolved to ensure respect for human rights and the equality of all citizens and nationalcommunities,

Recognizing that the preservation and promotion of the national, cultural, and linguisticidentity of each national community in Kosovo are necessary for the harmoniousdevelopment of a peaceful society,



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Desiring through this interim Constitution to establish institutions of democratic self-government in Kosovo grounded in respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty ofthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and from this Agreement, from which the authoritiesof governance set forth herein originate,

Recognizing that the institutions of Kosovo should fairly represent the nationalcommunities in Kosovo and foster the exercise of their rights and those of their members,

Recalling and endorsing the principles/basic elements adopted by the Contact Group at itsministerial meeting in London on January 29, 1999,

Article I: Principles of Democratic Self-Government in Kosovo

1. Kosovo shall govern itself democratically through the legislative, executive, judicial,and other organs and institutions specified herein. Organs and institutions of Kosovoshall exercise their authorities consistent with the terms of this Agreement.

2. All authorities in Kosovo shall fully respect human rights, democracy, and the equalityof citizens and national communities.

3. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has competence in Kosovo over the followingareas, except as specified elsewhere in this Agreement: (a) territorial integrity, (b)maintaining a common market within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which powershall be exercised in a manner that does not discriminate against Kosovo, (c) monetary policy, (d) defense, (e) foreign policy, (f) customs services, (g) federal taxation, (h)federal elections, and (i) other areas specified in this Agreement.

4. The Republic of Serbia shall have competence in Kosovo as specified in thisAgreement, including in relation to Republic elections.

5. Citizens in Kosovo may continue to participate in areas in which the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia have competence through their representationin relevant institutions, without prejudice to the exercise of competence by Kosovoauthorities set forth in this Agreement.

6. With respect to Kosovo:

(a) There shall be no changes to the borders of Kosovo;

(b) Deployment and use of police and security forces shall be governed by Chapters 2and 7 of this Agreement; and

(c) Kosovo shall have authority to conduct foreign relations within its areas ofresponsibility equivalent to the power provided to Republics under Article 7 of theConstitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.



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7. There shall be no interference with the right of citizens and national communities inKosovo to call upon appropriate institutions of the Republic of Serbia for the following purposes:

(a) assistance in designing school curricula and standards;

(b) participation in social benefits programs, such as care for war veterans, pensioners,and disabled persons; and

(c) other voluntarily received services, provided that these services are not related to police and security matters governed by Chapters 2 and 7 of this Agreement, and that anyRepublic personnel serving in Kosovo pursuant to this paragraph shall be unarmedservice providers acting at the invitation of a national community in Kosovo.

The Republic shall have the authority to levy taxes or charges on those citizensrequesting services pursuant to this paragraph, as necessary to support the provision of

such services.

8. The basic territorial unit of local self-government in Kosovo shall be the commune. Allresponsibilities in Kosovo not expressly assigned elsewhere shall be the responsibility ofthe communes.

9. To preserve and promote democratic self-government in Kosovo, all candidates forappointed, elective, or other public office, and all office holders, shall meet the followingcriteria:

(a) No person who is serving a sentence imposed by the International Criminal Tribunal

for the Former Yugoslavia, and no person who is under indictment by the Tribunal andwho has failed to comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal, may stand as acandidate or hold any office; and

(b) All candidates and office holders shall renounce violence as a mechanism forachieving political goals; past political or resistance activities shall not be a bar to holdingoffice in Kosovo.

Article II: The Assembly

General

1. Kosovo shall have an Assembly, which shall be comprised of 120 Members.

(a) Eighty Members shall be directly elected.

(b) A further 40 Members shall be elected by the members of qualifying nationalcommunities.



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(i) Communities whose members constitute more than 0.5 per cent of the Kosovo population but less than 5 per cent shall have ten of these seats, to be divided among themin accordance with their proportion of the overall population.

(ii) Communities whose members constitute more than 5 per cent of the Kosovo

population shall divide the remaining thirty seats equally. The Serb and Albanian nationalcommunities shall be presumed to meet the 5 per cent population threshold.

Other Provisions

2. Elections for all Members shall be conducted democratically, consistent with the provisions of Chapter 3 of this Agreement. Members shall be elected for a term of threeyears.

3. Allocation of seats in the Assembly shall be based on data gathered in the censusreferred to in Chapter 5 of this Agreement. Prior to the completion of the census, for

purposes of this Article declarations of national community membership made duringvoter registration shall be used to determine the percentage of the Kosovo population thateach national community represents.

4. Members of the Assembly shall be immune from all civil or criminal proceedings onthe basis of words expressed or other acts performed in their capacity as Members of theAssembly.

Powers of the Assembly

5. The Assembly shall be responsible for enacting laws of Kosovo, including in political,

security, economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural areas as set out below andelsewhere in this Agreement. This Constitution and the laws of the Kosovo Assemblyshall not be subject to change or modification by authorities of the Republics or theFederation.

(a) The Assembly shall be responsible for:

(i) Financing activities of Kosovo institutions, including by levying taxes and duties onsources within Kosovo;

(ii) Adopting budgets of the Administrative organs and other institutions of Kosovo, with

the exception of communal and national community institutions unless otherwisespecified herein;

(iii) Adopting regulations concerning the organization and procedures of theAdministrative Organs of Kosovo;

(iv) Approving the list of Ministers of the Government, including the Prime Minister;



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(v) Coordinating educational arrangements in Kosovo, with respect for the authorities ofnational communities and Communes;

(vi) Electing candidates for judicial office put forward by the President of Kosovo;

(vii) Enacting laws ensuring free movement of goods, services, and persons in Kosovoconsistent with this Agreement;

(viii) Approving agreements concluded by the President within the areas of responsibilityof Kosovo;

(ix) Cooperating with the Federal Assembly, and with the Assemblies of the Republics,and conducting relations with foreign legislative bodies;

(x) Establishing a framework for local self- government;

(xi) Enacting laws concerning inter-communal issues and relations between nationalcommunities, when necessary;

(xii) Enacting laws regulating the work of medical institutions and hospitals;

(xiii) Protecting the environment, where inter- communal issues are involved;

(xiv) Adopting programs of economic, scientific, technological, demographic, regional,and social development, as well as urban planning;

(xv) Adopting programs for the development of agriculture and of rural areas;

(xvi) Regulating elections consistent with Chapters 3 and 5;

(xvii) Regulating Kosovo-owned property; and

(xviii) Regulating land registries.

(b) The Assembly shall also have authority to enact laws in areas within the responsibilityof the Communes if the matter cannot be effectively regulated by the Communes or ifregulation by individual Communes might prejudice the rights of other Communes. In theabsence of a law enacted by the Assembly under this subparagraph that preempts

communal action, the Communes shall retain their authority.

Procedure

6. Laws and other decisions of the Assembly shall be adopted by majority of Members present and voting.



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7. A majority of the Members of a single national community elected to the Assembly pursuant to paragraph 1(b) may adopt a motion that a law or other decision adverselyaffects the vital interests of their national community. The challenged law or decisionshall be suspended with regard to that national community until the dispute settlement procedure in paragraph 8 is completed.

8. The following procedure shall be used in the event of a motion under paragraph 7:

(a) The Members making the vital interest motion shall give reasons for their motion. The proposers of the legislation shall be given an opportunity to respond.

(b) The Members making the motion shall appoint within one day a mediator of theirchoice to assist in reaching an agreement with those proposing the legislation.

(c) If mediation does not produce an agreement within seven days, the matter may besubmitted for a binding ruling. The decision shall be rendered by a panel comprising

three Members of the Assembly: one Albanian and one Serb, each appointed by his or hernational community delegation; and a third Member, who will be of a third nationalityand will be selected within two days by consensus of the Presidency of the Assembly.

(i) A vital interest motion shall be upheld if the legislation challenged adversely affectsthe community's fundamental constitutional rights, additional rights as set forth in ArticleVII, or the principle of fair treatment.

(ii) If the motion is not upheld, the challenged legislation shall enter into force for thatcommunity.

(d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply to the selection of Assembly officials.

(e) The Assembly may exclude other decisions from this procedure by means of a lawenacted by a majority that includes a majority of each national community elected pursuant to paragraph 1(b).

9. A majority of the Members shall constitute a quorum. The Assembly shall otherwisedecide its own rules of procedure.

Leadership

10. The Assembly shall elect from among its Members a Presidency, which shall consistof a President, two Vice-Presidents, and other leaders in accordance with the Assembly'srules of procedure. Each national community meeting the threshold specified in paragraph 1(b)(ii) shall be represented in the leadership. The President of the Assemblyshall not be from the same national community as the President of Kosovo.



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11. The President of the Assembly shall represent it, call its sessions to order, chair itsmeetings, coordinate the work of any committees it may establish, and perform othertasks prescribed by the rules of procedure of the Assembly.

Article III: President of Kosovo

1. There shall be a President of Kosovo, who shall be elected by the Assembly by vote ofa majority of its Members. The President of Kosovo shall serve for a three-year term. No person may serve more than two terms as President of Kosovo.

2. The President of Kosovo shall be responsible for:

(i) Representing Kosovo, including before any international or Federal body or any bodyof the Republics;

(ii) Proposing to the Assembly candidates for Prime Minister, the Constitutional Court,

the Supreme Court, and other Kosovo judicial offices;

(iii) Meeting regularly with the democratically elected representatives of the nationalcommunities;

(iv) Conducting foreign relations and concluding agreements within this power consistentwith the authorities of Kosovo institutions under this Agreement. Such agreements shallonly enter into force upon approval by the Assembly;

(v) Designating a representative to serve on the Joint Commission established by ArticleI.2 of Chapter 5 of this Agreement;

(vi) Meeting regularly with the Federal and Republic Presidents; and

(vii) Other functions specified herein or by law.

Article IV: Government and Administrative Organs

1. Executive power shall be exercised by the Government. The Government shall beresponsible for implementing the laws of Kosovo, and of other government authoritieswhen such responsibilities are devolved by those authorities. The Government shall alsohave competence to propose laws to the Assembly.

(a) The Government shall consist of a Prime Minister and Ministers, including at leastone person from each national community meeting the threshold specified in paragraph1(b)(ii) of Article II. Ministers shall head the Administrative Organs of Kosovo.

(b) The candidate for Prime Minister proposed by the President shall put forward a list ofMinisters to the Assembly. The Prime Minister, together with the list of Ministers, shall be approved by a majority of those present and voting in the Assembly. In the event that



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the Prime Minister is not able to obtain a majority for the Government, the President shall propose a new candidate for Prime Minister within ten days.

(c) The Government shall resign if a no confidence motion is adopted by a vote of amajority of the members of the Assembly. If the Prime Minister or the Government

resigns, the President shall select a new candidate for Prime Minister who shall seek toform a Government.

(d) The Prime Minister shall call meetings of the Government, represent it as appropriate,and coordinate its work. Decisions of the Government shall require a majority ofMinisters present and voting. The Prime Minister shall cast the deciding vote in the eventMinisters are equally divided. The Government shall otherwise decide its own rules of procedure.

2. Administrative Organs shall be responsible for assisting the Government in carryingout its duties.

(a) National communities shall be fairly represented at all levels in the AdministrativeOrgans.

(b) Any citizen in Kosovo claiming to have been directly and adversely affected by thedecision of an executive or administrative body shall have the right to judicial review ofthe legality of that decision after exhausting all avenues for administrative review. TheAssembly shall enact a law to regulate this review.

3. There shall be a Chief Prosecutor who shall be responsible for prosecuting individualswho violate the criminal laws of Kosovo. He shall head an Office of the Prosecutor,

which shall at all levels have staff representative of the population of Kosovo.

Article V: Judiciary

General

1. Kosovo shall have a Constitutional Court, a Supreme Court, District Courts, andCommunal Courts.

2. The Kosovo courts shall have jurisdiction over all matters arising under thisConstitution or the laws of Kosovo except as specified in paragraph 3. The Kosovo courts

shall also have jurisdiction over questions of federal law, subject to appeal to the Federalcourts on these questions after all appeals available under the Kosovo system have beenexhausted.

3. Citizens in Kosovo may opt to have civil disputes to which they are party adjudicated by other courts in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which shall apply the lawapplicable in Kosovo.



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4. The following rules will apply to criminal cases:

(a) At the start of criminal proceedings, the defendant is entitled to have his or her trialtransferred to another Kosovo court that he or she designates.

(b) In criminal cases in which all defendants and victims are members of the samenational community, all members of the judicial council will be from a nationalcommunity of their choice if any party so requests.

(c) A defendant in a criminal case tried in Kosovo courts is entitled to have at least onemember of the judicial council hearing the case to be from his or her national community.Kosovo authorities will consider and allow judges of other courts in the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia to serve as Kosovo judges for these purposes.

Constitutional Court

5. The Constitutional Court shall consist of nine judges. There shall be at least oneConstitutional Court judge from each national community meeting the threshold specifiedin paragraph 1(b)(ii) of Article II. Until such time as the Parties agree to discontinue thisarrangement, 5 judges of the Constitutional Court shall be selected from a list drawn up by the President of the European Court of Human Rights.

6. The Constitutional Court shall have authority to resolve disputes relating to themeaning of this Constitution. That authority shall include, but is not limited to,determining whether laws applicable in Kosovo, decisions or acts of the President, theAssembly, the Government, the Communes, and the national communities are compatiblewith this Constitution.

(a) Matters may be referred to the Constitutional Court by the President of Kosovo, thePresident or Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, the Ombudsman, the communalassemblies and councils, and any national community acting according to its democratic procedures.

(b) Any court which finds in the course of adjudicating a matter that the dispute dependson the answer to a question within the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction shall refer theissue to the Constitutional Court for a preliminary decision.

7. Following the exhaustion of other legal remedies, the Constitutional Court shall at the

request of any person claiming to be a victim have jurisdiction over complaints thathuman rights and fundamental freedoms and the rights of members of nationalcommunities set forth in this Constitution have been violated by a public authority.

8. The Constitutional Court shall have such other jurisdiction as may be specifiedelsewhere in this Agreement or by law.



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Supreme Court

9. The Supreme Court shall consist of nine judges. There shall be at least one SupremeCourt judge from each national community meeting the threshold specified in paragraph1(b)(ii) of Article II.

10. The Supreme Court shall hear appeals from the District Courts and the CommunalCourts. Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the Supreme Court shall be thecourt of final appeal for all cases arising under law applicable in Kosovo. Its decisionsshall be recognized and executed by all authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Functioning of the Courts

11. The Assembly shall determine the number of District and Communal Court judgesnecessary to meet current needs.

12. Judges of all courts in Kosovo shall be distinguished jurists of the highest moralcharacter. They shall be broadly representative of the national communities of Kosovo.

13. Removal of a Kosovo judge shall require the consensus of the judges of theConstitutional Court. A Constitutional Court judge whose removal is in question shall not participate in the decision on his case.

14. The Constitutional Court shall adopt rules for itself and for other courts in Kosovo.The Constitutional and Supreme Courts shall each adopt decisions by majority vote oftheir members.

15. Except as otherwise specified in their rules, all Kosovo courts shall hold public proceedings. They shall issue published opinions setting forth the reasons for theirdecisions.

Article VI: Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

1. All authorities in Kosovo shall ensure internationally recognized human rights andfundamental freedoms.

2. The rights and freedoms set forth in the European Convention for the Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly in

Kosovo. Other internationally recognized human rights instruments enacted into law bythe Kosovo Assembly shall also apply. These rights and freedoms shall have priority overall other law.

3. All courts, agencies, governmental institutions, and other public institutions of Kosovoor operating in relation to Kosovo shall conform to these human rights and fundamentalfreedoms.



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Article VII: National Communities

1. National communities and their members shall have additional rights as set forth belowin order to preserve and express their national, cultural, religious, and linguistic identitiesin accordance with international standards and the Helsinki Final Act. Such rights shall

be exercised in conformity with human rights and fundamental freedoms.

2. Each national community may elect, through democratic means and in a mannerconsistent with the principles of Chapter 3 of this Agreement, institutions to administerits affairs in Kosovo.

3. The national communities shall be subject to the laws applicable in Kosovo, providedthat any act or decision concerning national communities must be non- discriminatory.The Assembly shall decide upon a procedure for resolving disputes between nationalcommunities.

4. The additional rights of the national communities, acting through their democraticallyelected institutions, are to:

(a) preserve and protect their national, cultural, religious, and linguistic identities,including by:

(i) inscribing local names of towns and villages, of squares and streets, and of othertopographic names in the language and alphabet of the national community in addition tosigns in Albanian and Serbian, consistent with decisions about style made by thecommunal institutions;

(ii) providing information in the language and alphabet of the national community;

(iii) providing for education and establishing educational institutions, in particular forschooling in their own language and alphabet and in national culture and history, forwhich relevant authorities will provide financial assistance; curricula shall reflect a spiritof tolerance between national communities and respect for the rights of members of allnational communities in accordance with international standards;

(iv) enjoying unhindered contacts with representatives of their respective nationalcommunities, within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and abroad;

(v) using and displaying national symbols, including symbols of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia;

(vi) protecting national traditions on family law by, if the community decides, arrangingrules in the field of inheritance; family and matrimonial relations; tutorship; andadoption;



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(vii) the preservation of sites of religious, historical, or cultural importance to the nationalcommunity in cooperation with other authorities;

(viii) implementing public health and social services on a non-discriminatory basis as tocitizens and national communities;

(ix) operating religious institutions in cooperation with religious authorities; and

(x) participating in regional and international non-governmental organizations inaccordance with procedures of these organizations;

(b) be guaranteed access to, and representation in, public broadcast media, including provisions for separate programming in relevant languages under the direction of thosenominated by the respective national community on a fair and equitable basis; and

(c) finance their activities by collecting contributions the national communities may

decide to levy on members of their own communities.

5. Members of national communities shall also be individually guaranteed:

(a) the right to enjoy unhindered contacts with members of their respective nationalcommunities elsewhere in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and abroad;

(b) equal access to employment in public services at all levels;

(c) the right to use their languages and alphabets;

(d) the right to use and display national community symbols;

(e) the right to participate in democratic institutions that will determine the nationalcommunity's exercise of the collective rights set forth in this Article; and

(f) the right to establish cultural and religious associations, for which relevant authoritieswill provide financial assistance.

6. Each national community and, where appropriate, their members acting individuallymay exercise these additional rights through Federal institutions and institutions of theRepublics, in accordance with the procedures of those institutions and without prejudice

to the ability of Kosovo institutions to carry out their responsibilities.

7. Every person shall have the right freely to choose to be treated or not to be treated as belonging to a national community, and no disadvantage shall result from that choice orfrom the exercise of the rights connected to that choice.



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Article VIII: Communes

1. Kosovo shall have the existing communes. Changes may be made to communal boundaries by act of the Kosovo Assembly after consultation with the authorities of thecommunes concerned.

2. Communes may develop relationships among themselves for their mutual benefit.

3. Each commune shall have an Assembly, an Executive Council, and suchadministrative bodies as the commune may establish.

(a) Each national community whose membership constitutes at least three percent of the population of the commune shall be represented on the Council in proportion to its shareof the communal population or by one member, whichever is greater.

(b) Prior to the completion of a census, disputes over communal population percentages

for purposes of this paragraph shall be resolved by reference to declarations of nationalcommunity membership in the voter registry.

4. The communes shall have responsibility for:

(a) law enforcement, as specified in Chapter 2 of this Agreement;

(b) regulating and, when appropriate, providing child care;

(c) providing education, consistent with the rights and duties of national communities,and in a spirit of tolerance between national communities and respect for the rights of the

members of all national communities in accordance with international standards;

(d) protecting the communal environment;

(e) regulating commerce and privately-owned stores;

(f) regulating hunting and fishing;

(g) planning and carrying out public works of communal importance, including roads andwater supplies, and participating in the planning and carrying out of Kosovo-wide publicworks projects in coordination with other communes and Kosovo authorities;

(h) regulating land use, town planning, building regulations, and housing construction;

(i) developing programs for tourism, the hotel industry, catering, and sport;

(j) organizing fairs and local markets;



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(k) organizing public services of communal importance, including fire, emergencyresponse, and police consistent with Chapter 2 of this Agreement; and

(l) financing the work of communal institutions, including raising revenues, taxes, and preparing budgets.

5. The communes shall also have responsibility for all other areas within Kosovo'sauthority not expressly assigned elsewhere herein, subject to the provisions of ArticleII.5(b) of this Constitution.

6. Each commune shall conduct its business in public and shall maintain publiclyavailable records of its deliberations and decisions.

Article IX: Representation

1. Citizens in Kosovo shall have the right to participate in the election of:

(a) At least 10 deputies in the House of Citizens of the Federal Assembly; and

(b) At least 20 deputies in the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.

2. The modalities of elections for the deputies specified in paragraph 1 shall bedetermined by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbiarespectively, under procedures to be agreed with the Chief of the ImplementationMission.

3. The Assembly shall have the opportunity to present to the appropriate authorities a list

of candidates from which shall be drawn:

(a) At least one citizen in Kosovo to serve in the Federal Government, and at least onecitizen in Kosovo to serve in the Government of the Republic of Serbia; and

(b) At least one judge on the Federal Constitutional Court, one judge on the FederalCourt, and three judges on the Supreme Court of Serbia.

Article X: Amendment

1. The Assembly may by a majority of two-thirds of its Members, which majority must

include a majority of the Members elected from each national community pursuant toArticle II.1(b)(ii), adopt amendments to this Constitution.

2. There shall, however, be no amendments to Article I.3-8 or to this Article, nor shallany amendment diminish the rights granted by Articles VI and VII.



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Article XI: Entry into Force

This Constitution shall enter into force upon signature of this Agreement.

Chapter 2

Police and Civil Public Security Article I: General Principles

1. All law enforcement agencies, organizations and personnel of the Parties, which for purposes of this Chapter will include customs and border police operating in Kosovo,shall act in compliance with this Agreement and shall observe internationally recognizedstandards of human rights and due process. In exercising their functions, law enforcement personnel shall not discriminate on any ground, such as sex, race, color, language,religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a nationalcommunity, property, birth or other status.

2. The Parties invite the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)through its Implementation Mission (IM) to monitor and supervise implementation of thisChapter and related provisions of this Agreement. The Chief of the ImplementationMission (CIM) or his designee shall have the authority to issue binding directives to theParties and subsidiary bodies on police and civil public security matters to obtaincompliance by the Parties with the terms of this Chapter. The Parties agree to cooperatefully with the IM and to comply with its directives. Personnel assigned to police-relatedduties within the IM shall be permitted to wear a uniform while serving in this part of themission.

3. In carrying out his responsibilities, the CIM will inform and consult KFOR asappropriate.

4. The IM shall have the authority to:

(a) Monitor, observe, and inspect law enforcement activities, personnel, and facilities,including border police and customs units, as well as associated judicial organizations,structures, and proceedings;

(b) Advise law enforcement personnel and forces, including border police and customsunits, and, when necessary to bring them into compliance with this Agreement, including

this Chapter, issue appropriate binding directions in coordination with KFOR;

(c) Participate in and guide the training of law enforcement personnel;

(d) In coordination with KFOR, assess threats to public order;

(e) Advise and provide guidance to governmental authorities on how to deal with threatsto public order and on the organization of effective civilian law enforcement agencies;



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(f) Accompany the Parties' law enforcement personnel as they carry out theirresponsibilities, as the IM deems appropriate;

(g) Dismiss or discipline public security personnel of the Parties for cause; and

(h) Request appropriate law enforcement support from the international community toenable IM to carry out the duties assigned in this Chapter.

5. All Kosovo, Republic and Federal law enforcement and Federal military authoritiesshall be obligated, in their respective areas of authority, to ensure freedom of movementand safe passage for all persons, vehicles and goods. This obligation includes a duty to permit the unobstructed passage into Kosovo of police equipment which has beenapproved by the CIM and COMKFOR for use by Kosovo police, and of any othersupport provided under subparagraph 4(h) above.

6. The Parties undertake to provide one another mutual assistance, when requested, in the

surrender of those accused of committing criminal acts within a Party's jurisdiction, andin the investigation and prosecution of offenses across the boundary of Kosovo with other parts of the FRY. The Parties shall develop agreed procedures and mechanisms forresponding to these requests. The CIM or his designee shall resolve disputes on thesematters.

7. The IM shall aim to transfer law enforcement responsibilities described in Article II below to the law enforcement officials and organizations described in Article II at theearliest practical time consistent with civil public security.

Article II: Communal Police

1. As they build up, communal police units, organized and stationed at the communal andmunicipal levels, shall assume primary responsibility for law enforcement in Kosovo.The specific responsibilities of the communal police will include police patrols and crime prevention, criminal investigations, arrest and detention of criminal suspects, crowdcontrol, and traffic control.

2. Number and Composition. The total number of communal police established by thisAgreement operating within Kosovo shall not exceed 3,000 active duty law enforcementofficers. However, the CIM shall have the authority to increase or decrease this personnelceiling if he determines such action is necessary to meet operational needs. Prior to

taking any such action, the CIM shall consult with the Criminal Justice Administrationand other officials as appropriate. The national communities in each commune shall befairly represented in the communal police unit.

3. Criminal Justice Administration.

a. A Criminal Justice Administration (CJA) shall be established. It shall be anAdministrative Organ of Kosovo, reporting to an appropriate member of the Government



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of Kosovo as determined by the Government. The CJA shall provide generalcoordination of law enforcement operations in Kosovo. Specific functions of the CJAshall include general supervision over, and providing guidance to, communal policeforces through their commanders, assisting in the coordination between separatecommunal police forces, and oversight of the operations of the police academy. In

carrying out these responsibilities, the CJA may issue directives, which shall be bindingon communal police commanders and personnel. In the exercise of its functions, the CJAshall be subject to any directions given by CIM.

b. Within twelve months of the establishment of the CJA, the CJA shall submit forreview by the CIM a plan for the coordination and development of law enforcement bodies and personnel in Kosovo within its jurisdiction. This plan shall serve as theframework for law enforcement coordination and development in Kosovo and be subjectto modification by the CIM.

c. The IM will endeavor to develop the capacities of the CJA as quickly as possible. Prior

to the point when the CJA is able to properly carry out the functions described in the preceding paragraph, as determined by the CIM, the IM shall carry out these functions.

4. Communal Commanders. Subject to review by the CIM, each commune will appoint,and may remove for cause, by majority vote of the communal council, a communal policecommander with responsibility for police operations within the commune.

5. Service in Police.

(a) Recruitment for public security personnel will be conducted primarily at the locallevel. Local and communal governments, upon consultation with communal Criminal

Justice Commissions, will nominate officer candidates to attend the Kosovo PoliceAcademy. Offers of employment will be made by communal police commanders, withthe concurrence of the academy director, only after the candidate has successfullycompleted the academy basic recruit course.

(b) Recruitment, selection and training of communal police officers shall be conductedunder the direction of the IM during the period of its operation.

(c) There shall be no bar to service in the communal police based on prior politicalactivities. Members of the police shall not, however, be permitted while they hold this public office to participate in party political activities other than membership in such a

party.

(d) Continued service in the police is dependent upon behavior consistent with the termsof this Agreement, including this Chapter. The IM shall supervise regular reviews ofofficer performance, which shall be conducted in accordance with international due process norms.



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6. Uniforms and Equipment.

(a) All communal police officers, with the exception of officers participating in crowdcontrol functions, shall wear a standard uniform. Uniforms shall include a badge, pictureidentification, and name tag.

(b) Communal police officers may be equipped with a sidearm, handcuffs, a baton, and aradio.

(c) Subject to authorization or modification by the CIM, each commune may maintain,either at the communal headquarters or at municipal stations, no more than one long- barreled weapon not to exceed 7.62 mm for every fifteen police officers assigned to thecommune. Each such weapon must be approved by and registered with the IM and KFOR pursuant to procedures established by the CIM and COMKFOR. When not in use, allsuch weapons will be securely stored and each commune will keep a registry of theseweapons.

(i) In the event of a serious law enforcement threat that would justify the use of theseweapons, the communal police commander shall obtain IM approval before employingthese weapons.

(ii) The communal police commander may authorize the use of these weapons without prior approval of the IM for the sole purpose of self-defense. In such cases, he mustreport the incident no later than one hour after it occurs to the IM and KFOR.

(iii) If the CIM determines that a weapon has been used by a member of a communal police force in a manner contrary to this Chapter, he may take appropriate corrective

measures; such measures may include reducing the number of such weapons that thecommunal police force is allowed to possess or dismissing or disciplining the lawenforcement personnel involved.

(d) Communal police officers engaged in crowd control functions will receive equipmentappropriate to their task, including batons, helmets and shields, subject to IM approval.

Article III: Interim Police Academy

1. Under the supervision of the IM, the CJA shall establish an interim Police Academythat will offer mandatory and professional development training for all public security

personnel, including border police. Until the interim police academy is established, IMwill oversee a temporary training program for public security personnel including border police.

2. All public security personnel shall be required to complete a course of police studiessuccessfully before serving as communal police officers.



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3. The Academy shall be headed by a Director appointed and removed by the CJA inconsultation with the Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission and the IM. The Directorshall consult closely with the IM and comply fully with its recommendations andguidance.

4. All Republic and Federal police training facilities in Kosovo, including the academy atVucitrn, will cease operations within 6 months of the entry into force of this Agreement.

Article IV: Criminal Justice Commissions

1. The parties shall establish a Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission and CommunalCriminal Justice Commissions. The CIM or his designee shall chair meetings of theseCommissions. They shall be forums for cooperation, coordination and the resolution ofdisputes concerning law enforcement and civil public security in Kosovo.

2. The functions of the Commissions shall include the following:

(a) Monitor, review, and make recommendations regarding the operation of lawenforcement personnel and policies in Kosovo, including communal police units;

(b) Review, and make recommendations regarding the recruitment, selection and trainingof communal police officers and commanders;

(c) Consider complaints regarding police practices filed by individuals or nationalcommunities, and provide information and recommendations to communal policecommanders and the CIM for consideration in their reviews of officer performance; and

(d) In the Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission only: In consultation with designatedlocal, Republic and Federal police liaisons, monitor jurisdiction sharing in cases ofoverlapping criminal jurisdiction between Kosovo, Republic and Federal authorities.

3. The membership of the Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission and each CommunalCriminal Justice Commission shall be representative of the population and shall include:

(a) In the Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission:

(i) a representative of each commune;

(ii) the head of the Kosovo CJA;

(iii) a representative of each Republic and Federal law enforcement component operatingin Kosovo (for example, Customs police and Border police);

(iv) a representative of each national community;

(v) a representative of the IM, during its period of operation in Kosovo;



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(vi) a representative of the VJ border guard, as appropriate;

(vii) a representative of the MUP, as appropriate, while present in Kosovo; and

(viii) A representative of KFOR, as appropriate. (b) In the Communal Criminal Justice

Commissions:

(i) the communal police commander;

(ii) a representative of any Republic and Federal law enforcement component operatingin the commune;

(iii) a representative of each national community;

(iv) a civilian representative of the communal government;

(v) a representative of the IM, during its period of operation in Kosovo;

(vi) a representative of the VJ border guard, who shall have observer status, asappropriate; and

(vii) A representative of KFOR, as appropriate.

4. Each Criminal Justice Commission shall meet at least monthly, or at the request of anyCommission member.

Article V: Police Operations in Kosovo

1. The communal police established by this Agreement shall have exclusive lawenforcement authority and jurisdiction and shall be the only police presence in Kosovofollowing the reduction and eventual withdrawal from Kosovo by the MUP, with theexception of border police as specified in Article VI and any support provided pursuant toArticle I(3)(h).

(a) During the transition to communal police, the remaining MUP shall carry out onlynormal policing duties, and shall draw down, pursuant to the schedule described inChapter 7.

(b) During the period of the phased drawdown of the MUP, the MUP in Kosovo shallhave authority to conduct only civil police functions and shall be under the supervisionand control of the CIM. The IM may dismiss from service, or take other appropriatedisciplinary action against, MUP personnel who obstruct implementation of thisAgreement.



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2. Concurrent Law Enforcement in Kosovo.

(a) Except as provided in Article V.1 and Article VI, Federal and Republic lawenforcement officials may only act within Kosovo in cases of hot pursuit of a personsuspected of committing a serious criminal offense.

(i) Federal and Republic authorities shall as soon as practicable, but in no event later thanone hour after their entry into Kosovo while engaged in a hot pursuit, notify the nearestKosovo law enforcement officials that the pursuit has crossed into Kosovo. Oncenotification has been made, further pursuit and apprehension shall be coordinated withKosovo law enforcement. Following apprehension, suspects shall be placed into thecustody of the authorities originating the pursuit. If the suspect has not been apprehendedwithin four hours, the original pursuing authorities shall cease their pursuit andimmediately depart Kosovo unless invited to continue their pursuit by the CJA or theCIM.

(ii) In the event the pursuit is of such short duration as to preclude notification, Kosovolaw enforcement officials shall be notified that an apprehension has been made and shall be given access to the detainee prior to his removal from Kosovo.

(iii) Personnel engaged in hot pursuit under the provisions of this Article may only becivilian police, may only carry weapons appropriate for normal civilian police duties(sidearms, and long-barreled weapons not to exceed 7.62mm), may only travel inofficially marked police vehicles, and may not exceed a total of eight personnel at anyone time. Travel in armored personnel carriers by police engaged in hot pursuit is strictly prohibited.

(iv) The same rules shall apply to hot pursuit of suspects by Kosovo law enforcementauthorities to Federal territory outside of Kosovo.

(b) All Parties shall provide the highest degree of mutual assistance in law enforcementmatters in response to reasonable requests.

Article VI: Security on International Borders

1. The Government of the FRY will maintain official border crossings on its international borders (Albania and FYROM).

2. Personnel from the organizations listed below may be present along Kosovo'sinternational borders and at international border crossings, and may not act outside thescope of the authorities specified in this Chapter.

(a) Republic of Serbia Border Police

(i) The Border Police shall continue to exercise authority at Kosovo's international bordercrossings and in connection with the enforcement of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia



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immigration laws. The total number of border police shall be drawn down to 75 within 14days of entry into force of this Agreement.

(ii) While maintaining the personnel threshold specified in subparagraph (i), the ranks ofthe existing Border Police units operating in Kosovo shall be supplemented by new

recruits so that they are representative of the Kosovo population.

(iii) All Border Police stationed in Kosovo must attend police training at the Kosovo police academy within 18 months of the entry into force of this Agreement.

(b) Customs Officers

(i) The FRY Customs Service will continue to exercise customs jurisdiction at Kosovo'sofficial international border crossings and in such customs warehouses as may benecessary within Kosovo. The total number of customs personnel shall be drawn down to50 within 14 days of the entry into force of this Agreement.

(ii) Kosovar Albanian officers of the Customs Service shall be trained and compensated by the FRY.

(c) The CIM shall conduct a periodic review of customs and border police requirementsand shall have the authority to increase or decrease the personnel ceilings described in paragraphs (a)(i) and (b)(i) above to reflect operational needs and to adjust thecomposition of individual customs units.

Article VII: Arrest and Detention

1. Except pursuant to Article V, Article I(3)(h), and sections (a)-(b) of this paragraph,only officers of the communal police shall have authority to arrest and detain individualsin Kosovo. (a) Border Police officers shall have authority within Kosovo to arrest anddetain individuals who have violated criminal provisions of the immigration laws.

(b) Officers of the Customs Service shall have authority within Kosovo to arrest anddetain individuals for criminal violations of the customs laws.

2. Immediately upon making an arrest, the arresting officer shall notify the nearestCommunal Criminal Justice Commission of the detention and the location of thedetainee. He subsequently shall transfer the detainee to the nearest appropriate jail in

Kosovo at the earliest opportunity.

3. Officers may use reasonable and necessary force proportionate to the circumstances toeffect arrests and keep suspects in custody.

4. Kosovo and its constituent communes shall establish jails and prisons to accommodatethe detention of criminal suspects and the imprisonment of individuals convicted ofviolating the laws applicable in Kosovo. Prisons shall be operated consistent with



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international standards. Access shall be provided to international personnel, includingrepresentatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Article VIII: Administration of Justice

1. Criminal Jurisdiction over Persons Arrested within Kosovo.

(a) Except in accordance with Article V and subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, any person arrested within Kosovo shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Kosovo courts.

(b) Any person arrested within Kosovo, in accordance with the law and with thisAgreement, by the Border Police or Customs Police shall be subject to the jurisdiction ofthe FRY courts. If there is no applicable court of the FRY to hear the case, the Kosovocourts shall have jurisdiction.

2. Prosecution of Crimes.

(a) The CJA shall, in consultation with the CIM, appoint and have the authority toremove the Chief Prosecutor.

(b) The IM shall have the authority to monitor, observe, inspect, and when necessary,direct the operations of the Office of the Prosecutor and any and all related staff.

Article IX: Final Authority to Interpret

The CIM is the final authority regarding interpretation of this Chapter and hisdeterminations are binding on all Parties and persons.

Chapter 3

Conduct and Supervision of Elections Article I: Conditions for Elections

1. The Parties shall ensure that conditions exist for the organization of free and fairelections, which include but are not limited to:

a) freedom of movement for all citizens;

b) an open and free political environment;

c) an environment conducive to the return of displaced persons;

d) a safe and secure environment that ensures freedom of assembly, association, andexpression;



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e) an electoral legal framework of rules and regulations complying with OSCEcommitments, which will be implemented by a Central Election Commission, as set forthin Article III, which is representative of the population of Kosovo in terms of nationalcommunities and political parties; and

f) free media, effectively accessible to registered political parties and candidates, andavailable to voters throughout Kosovo.

2. The Parties request the OSCE to certify when elections will be effective under currentconditions in Kosovo, and to provide assistance to the Parties to create conditions for freeand fair elections.

3. The Parties shall comply fully with Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the OSCE CopenhagenDocument, which are attached to this Chapter.

Article II: Role of the OSCE

1. The Parties request the OSCE to adopt and put in place an elections program forKosovo and supervise elections as set forth in this Agreement.

2. The Parties request the OSCE to supervise, in a manner to be determined by the OSCEand in cooperation with other international organizations the OSCE deems necessary, the preparation and conduct of elections for:

a) Members of the Kosovo Assembly;

b) Members of Communal Assemblies;

c) other officials popularly elected in Kosovo under this Agreement and the laws andConstitution of Kosovo at the discretion of the OSCE.

3. The Parties request the OSCE to establish a Central Election Commission in Kosovo("the Commission").

4. Consistent with Article IV of Chapter 5, the first elections shall be held within ninemonths of the entry into force of this Agreement. The President of the Commission shalldecide, in consultation with the Parties, the exact timing and order of elections forKosovo political offices.

Article III: Central Election Commission

1. The Commission shall adopt electoral Rules and Regulations on all matters necessaryfor the conduct of free and fair elections in Kosovo, including rules relating to: theeligibility and registration of candidates, parties, and voters, including displaced personsand refugees; ensuring a free and fair elections campaign; administrative and technical



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preparation for elections including the establishment, publication, and certification ofelection results; and the role of international and domestic election observers.

2. The responsibilities of the Commission, as provided in the electoral Rules andRegulations, shall include:

a) the preparation, conduct, and supervision of all aspects of the electoral process,including development and supervision of political party and voter registration, andcreation of secure and transparent procedures for production and dissemination of ballotsand sensitive election materials, vote counts, tabulations, and publication of electionsresults;

b) ensuring compliance with the electoral Rules and Regulations established pursuant tothis Agreement, including establishing auxiliary bodies for this purpose as necessary;

c) ensuring that action is taken to remedy any violation of any provision of this

Agreement, including imposing penalties such as removal from candidate or party lists,against any person, candidate, political party, or body that violates such provisions; and

d) accrediting observers, including personnel from international organizations and foreignand domestic non-governmental organizations, and ensuring that the Parties grant theaccredited observers unimpeded access and movement.

3. The Commission shall consist of a person appointed by the Chairman-in-Office (CIO)of the OSCE, representatives of all national communities, and representatives of political parties in Kosovo selected by criteria to be determined by the Commission. The personappointed by the CIO shall act as the President of the Commission. The rules of

procedure of the Commission shall provide that in the exceptional circumstance of anunresolved dispute within the Commission, the decision of the President shall be finaland binding.

4. The Commission shall enjoy the right to establish communication facilities, and toengage local and administrative staff.

Chapter 4

Economic Issues Article I

1. The economy of Kosovo shall function in accordance with free market principles.

2. The authorities established to levy and collect taxes and other charges are set forth inthis Agreement. Except as otherwise expressly provided, all authorities have the right tokeep all revenues from their own taxes or other charges consistent with this Agreement.



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3. Certain revenue from Kosovo taxes and duties shall accrue to the Communes, takinginto account the need for an equalization of revenues between the Communes based onobjective criteria. The Assembly of Kosovo shall enact appropriate non-discriminatorylegislation for this purpose. The Communes may also levy local taxes in accordance withthis Agreement.

4. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be responsible for the collection of allcustoms duties at international borders in Kosovo. There shall be no impediments to thefree movement of persons, goods, services, and capital to and from Kosovo.

5. Federal authorities shall ensure that Kosovo receives a proportionate and equitableshare of benefits that may be derived from international agreements concluded by theFederal Republic and of Federal resources.

6. Federal and other authorities shall within their respective powers and responsibilitiesensure the free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital to Kosovo, including

from international sources. They shall in particular allow access to Kosovo withoutdiscrimination for persons delivering such goods and services.

7. If expressly required by an international donor or lender, international contracts forreconstruction projects shall be concluded by the authorities of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia, which shall establish appropriate mechanisms to make such funds availableto Kosovo authorities. Unless precluded by the terms of contracts, all reconstruction projects that exclusively concern Kosovo shall be managed and implemented by theappropriate Kosovo authority.

Article II

1. The Parties agree to reallocate ownership and resources in accordance insofar as possible with the distribution of powers and responsibilities set forth in this Agreement,in the following areas:

(a) government-owned assets (including educational institutions, hospitals, naturalresources, and production facilities);

(b) pension and social insurance contributions;

(c) revenues to be distributed under Article I.5; and

(d) any other matters relating to economic relations between the Parties not covered bythis Agreement.

2. The Parties agree to the creation of a Claim Settlement Commission (CSC) to resolveall disputes between them on matters referred to in paragraph 1.



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(a) The CSC shall consist of three experts designated by Kosovo, three experts designated jointly by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, and threeindependent experts designated by the CIM.

(b) The decisions of the CSC, which shall be taken by majority vote, shall be final and

binding. The Parties shall implement them without delay.

3. Authorities receiving ownership of public facilities shall have the power to operatesuch facilities.

Chapter 4 A

Humanitarian Assistance, Reconstruction and Economic Development

1. In parallel with the continuing full implementation of this Agreement, urgent attentionmust be focused on meeting the real humanitarian and economic needs of Kosovo in

order to help create the conditions for reconstruction and lasting economic recovery.International assistance will be provided without discrimination between nationalcommunities.

2. The Parties welcome the willingness of the European Commission working with theinternational community to co-ordinate international support for the parties' efforts.Specifically, the European Commission will organize an international donors' conferencewithin one month of entry into force of this Agreement.

3. The international community will provide immediate and unconditional humanitarianassistance, focusing primarily on refugees and internally displaced persons returning to

their former homes. The Parties welcome and endorse the UNHCR's lead role in co-ordination of this effort, and endorse its intention, in close co-operation with theImplementation Mission, to plan an early, peaceful, orderly and phased return of refugeesand displaced persons in conditions of safety and dignity.

4. The international community will provide the means for the rapid improvement ofliving conditions for the population of Kosovo through the reconstruction andrehabilitation of housing and local infrastructure (including water, energy, health andlocal education infrastructure) based on damage assessment surveys.

5. Assistance will also be provided to support the establishment and development of the

institutional and legislative framework laid down in this Agreement, including localgovernance and tax settlement, and to reinforce civil society, culture and education.Social welfare will also be addressed, with priority given to the protection of vulnerablesocial groups.

6. It will also be vital to lay the foundations for sustained development, based on a revivalof the local economy. This must take account of the need to address unemployment, and



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to stimulate the economy by a range of mechanisms. The European Commission will begiving urgent attention to this.

7. International assistance, with the exception of humanitarian aid, will be subject to fullcompliance with this Agreement as well as other conditionalities defined in advance by

the donors and the absorptive capacity of Kosovo.

Chapter 5

Implementation I Article I: Institutions

Implementation Mission

1. The Parties invite the OSCE, in cooperation with the European Union, to constitute anImplementation Mission in Kosovo. All responsibilities and powers previously vested in

the Kosovo Verification Mission and its Head by prior agreements shall be continued inthe Implementation Mission and its Chief.

Joint Commission

2. A Joint Commission shall serve as the central mechanism for monitoring andcoordinating the civilian implementation of this Agreement. It shall consist of the Chiefof the Implementation Mission (CIM), one Federal and one Republic representative, onerepresentative of each national community in Kosovo, the President of the Assembly, anda representative of the President of Kosovo. Meetings of the Joint Commission may beattended by other representatives of organizations specified in this Agreement or needed

for its implementation.

3. The CIM shall serve as the Chair of the Joint Commission. The Chair shall coordinateand organize the work of the Joint Commission and decide the time and place of itsmeetings. The Parties shall abide by and fully implement the decisions of the JointCommission. The Joint Commission shall operate on the basis of consensus, but in theevent consensus cannot be reached, the Chair's decision shall be final.

4. The Chair shall have full and unimpeded access to all places, persons, and information(including documents and other records) within Kosovo that in his judgment arenecessary to his responsibilities with regard to the civilian aspects of this Agreement.

Joint Council and Local Councils

5. The CIM may, as necessary, establish a Kosovo Joint Council and Local Councils, forinformal dispute resolution and cooperation. The Kosovo Joint Council would consist ofone member from each of the national communities in Kosovo. Local Councils wouldconsist of representatives of each national community living in the locality where theLocal Council is established.



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Article II: Responsibilities and Powers

1. The CIM shall:

(a) supervise and direct the implementation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement

pursuant to a schedule that he shall specify;

(b) maintain close contact with the Parties to promote full compliance with those aspectsof this Agreement;

(c) facilitate, as he deems necessary, the resolution of difficulties arising in connectionwith such implementation;

(d) participate in meetings of donor organizations, including on issues of rehabilitationand reconstruction, in particular by putting forward proposals and identifying prioritiesfor their consideration as appropriate;

(e) coordinate the activities of civilian organizations and agencies in Kosovo assisting inthe implementation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement, respecting fully theirspecific organizational procedures;

(f) report periodically to the bodies responsible for constituting the Mission on progressin the implementation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement; and

(g) carry out the functions specified in this Agreement pertaining to police and securityforces.

2. The CIM shall also carry out other responsibilities set forth in this Agreement or asmay be later agreed.

Article III: Status of Implementation Mission

1. Implementation Mission personnel shall be allowed unrestricted movement and accessinto and throughout Kosovo at any time.

2. The Parties shall facilitate the operations of the Implementation Mission, including bythe provision of assistance as requested with regard to transportation, subsistence,accommodation, communication, and other facilities.

3. The Implementation Mission shall enjoy such legal capacity as may be necessary forthe exercise of its functions under the laws and regulations of Kosovo, the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, and the Republic of Serbia. Such legal capacity shall include thecapacity to contract, and to acquire and dispose of real and personal property.

4. Privileges and immunities are hereby accorded as follows to the ImplementationMission and associated personnel:



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(a) the Implementation Mission and its premises, archives, and other property shall enjoythe same privileges and immunities as a diplomatic mission under the Vienna Conventionon Diplomatic Relations;

(b) the CIM and professional members of his staff and their families shall enjoy the same

privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by diplomatic agents and their families underthe Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and

(c) other members of the Implementation Mission staff and their families shall enjoy thesame privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by members of the administrative andtechnical staff and their families under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Article IV: Process of Implementation

General

1. The Parties acknowledge that complete implementation will require political acts andmeasures, and the election and establishment of institutions and bodies set forth in thisAgreement. The Parties agree to proceed expeditiously with these tasks on a schedule set by the Joint Commission. The Parties shall provide active support, cooperation, and participation for the successful implementation of this Agreement.

Elections and Census

2. Within nine months of the entry into force of this Agreement, there shall be electionsin accordance with and pursuant to procedures specified in Chapter 3 of this Agreementfor authorities established herein, according to a voter list prepared to international

standards by the Central Election Commission. The Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE) shall supervise those elections to ensure that they are freeand fair.

3. Under the supervision of the OSCE and with the participation of Kosovo authoritiesand experts nominated by and belonging to the national communities of Kosovo, Federalauthorities shall conduct an objective and free census of the population in Kosovo underrules and regulations agreed with the OSCE in accordance with international standards.The census shall be carried out when the OSCE determines that conditions allow anobjective and accurate enumeration.

(a) The first census shall be limited to name, place of birth, place of usual residence andaddress, gender, age, citizenship, national community, and religion.

(b) The authorities of the Parties shall provide each other and the OSCE with all recordsnecessary to conduct the census, including data about places of residence, citizenship,voters' lists, and other information.



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Transitional Provisions

4. All laws and regulations in effect in Kosovo when this Agreement enters into forceshall remain in effect unless and until replaced by laws or regulations adopted by acompetent body. All laws and regulations applicable in Kosovo that are incompatible

with this Agreement shall be presumed to have been harmonized with this Agreement. In particular, martial law in Kosovo is hereby revoked.

5. Institutions currently in place in Kosovo shall remain until superseded by bodiescreated by or in accordance with this Agreement. The CIM may recommend to theappropriate authorities the removal and appointment of officials and the curtailment ofoperations of existing institutions in Kosovo if he deems it necessary for the effectiveimplementation of this Agreement. If the action recommended is not taken in the timerequested, the Joint Commission may decide to take the recommended action.

6. Prior to the election of Kosovo officials pursuant to this Agreement, the CIM shall take

the measures necessary to ensure the development and functioning of independent mediain keeping with international standards, including allocation of radio and televisionfrequencies.

Article V: Authority to Interpret

The CIM shall be the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of the civilianaspects of this Agreement, and the Parties agree to abide by his determinations as bindingon all Parties and persons.

Chapter 6

The Ombudsman Article I: General

1. There shall be an Ombudsman, who shall monitor the realization of the rights ofmembers of national communities and the protection of human rights and fundamentalfreedoms in Kosovo. The Ombudsman shall have unimpeded access to any person or place and shall have the right to appear and intervene before any domestic, Federal, or(consistent with the rules of such bodies) international authority upon his or her request. No person, institution, or entity of the Parties may interfere with the functions of theOmbudsman.

2. The Ombudsman shall be an eminent person of high moral standing who possesses ademonstrated commitment to human rights and the rights of members of nationalcommunities. He or she shall be nominated by the President of Kosovo and shall beelected by the Assembly from a list of candidates prepared by the President of theEuropean Court of Human Rights for a non-renewable three-year term. The Ombudsmanshall not be a citizen of any State or entity that was a part of the former Yugoslavia, or ofany neighboring State. Pending the election of the President and the Assembly, the CIM



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shall designate a person to serve as Ombudsman on an interim basis who shall besucceeded by a person selected pursuant to the procedure set forth in this paragraph.

3. The Ombudsman shall be independently responsible for choosing his or her own staff.He or she shall have two Deputies. The Deputies shall each be drawn from different

national communities.

(a) The salaries and expenses of the Ombudsman and his or her staff shall be determinedand paid by the Kosovo Assembly. The salaries and expenses shall be fully adequate toimplement the Ombudsman's mandate.

(b) The Ombudsman and members of his or her staff shall not be held criminally orcivilly liable for any acts carried out within the scope of their duties.

Article II: Jurisdiction

1. The Ombudsman shall consider:

(a) alleged or apparent violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo,as provided in the Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republicof Serbia, and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights andFundamental Freedoms and the Protocols thereto; and

(b) alleged or apparent violations of the rights of members of national communitiesspecified in this Agreement.

2. All persons in Kosovo shall have the right to submit complaints to the Ombudsman.

The Parties agree not to take any measures to punish persons who intend to submit orwho have submitted such allegations, or in any other way to deter the exercise of thisright.

Article III: Powers and Duties

1. The Ombudsman shall investigate alleged violations falling within the jurisdiction setforth in Article II.1. He or she may act either on his or her own initiative or in response toan allegation presented by any Party or person, non-governmental organization, or groupof individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation or acting on behalf of allegedvictims who are deceased or missing. The work of the Ombudsman shall be free of

charge to the person concerned.

2. The Ombudsman shall have complete, unimpeded, and immediate access to any person, place, or information upon his or her request.

(a) The Ombudsman shall have access to and may examine all official documents, and heor she can require any person, including officials of Kosovo, to cooperate by providingrelevant information, documents, and files.



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(b) The Ombudsman may attend administrative hearings and meetings of other Kosovoinstitutions in order to gather information.

(c) The Ombudsman may examine facilities and places where persons deprived of theirliberty are detained, work, or are otherwise located.

(d) The Ombudsman and staff shall maintain the confidentiality of all confidentialinformation obtained by them, unless the Ombudsman determines that such informationis evidence of a violation of rights falling within his or her jurisdiction, in which case thatinformation may be revealed in public reports or appropriate legal proceedings.

(e) The Parties undertake to ensure cooperation with the Ombudsman's investigations.Willful and knowing failure to comply shall be a criminal offense prosecutable in any jurisdiction of the Parties. Where an official impedes an investigation by refusing to provide necessary information, the Ombudsman shall contact that official's superior orthe public prosecutor for appropriate penal action to be taken in accordance with the law.

3. The Ombudsman shall issue findings and conclusions in the form of a published report promptly after concluding an investigation.

(a) A Party, institution, or official identified by the Ombudsman as a violator shall, withina period specified by the Ombudsman, explain in writing how it will comply with any prescriptions the Ombudsman may put forth for remedial measures.

(b) In the event that a person or entity does not comply with the conclusions andrecommendations of the Ombudsman, the report shall be forwarded for further action tothe Joint Commission established by Chapter 5 of this Agreement, to the President of the

appropriate Party, and to any other officials or institutions that the Ombudsman deems proper.

Chapter 7

Implementation II Article I: General Obligations

1. The Parties undertake to recreate, as quickly as possible, normal conditions of life inKosovo and to cooperate fully with each other and with all international organizations,agencies, and non-governmental organizations involved in the implementation of this

Agreement. They welcome the willingness of the international community to send to theregion a force to assist in the implementation of this Agreement.

a. The United Nations Security Council is invited to pass a resolution under Chapter VIIof the Charter endorsing and adopting the arrangements set forth in this Chapter,including the establishment of a multinational military implementation force in Kosovo.The Parties invite NATO to constitute and lead a military force to help ensure compliance



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with the provisions of this Chapter. They also reaffirm the sovereignty and territorialintegrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

b. The Parties agree that NATO will establish and deploy a force (hereinafter "KFOR")which may be composed of ground, air, and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO

nations, operating under the authority and subject to the direction and the political controlof the North Atlantic Council (NAC) through the NATO chain of command. The Partiesagree to facilitate the deployment and operations of this force and agree also to complyfully with all the obligations of this Chapter.

c. It is agreed that other States may assist in implementing this Chapter. The Parties agreethat the modalities of those States' participation will be the subject of agreement betweensuch participating States and NATO.

2. The purposes of these obligations are as follows:

a. to establish a durable cessation of hostilities. Other than those Forces provided for inthis Chapter, under no circumstances shall any armed Forces enter, reenter, or remainwithin Kosovo without the prior express consent of the KFOR Commander(COMKFOR). For the purposes of this Chapter, the term "Forces" includes all personneland organizations with military capability, including regular army, armed civilian groups, paramilitary groups, air forces, national guards, border police, army reserves, military police, intelligence services, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Local, Special, Riot and Anti-Terrorist Police, and any other groups or individuals so designated by COMKFOR. Theonly exception to the provisions of this paragraph is for civilian police engaged in hot pursuit of a person suspected of committing a serious criminal offense, as provided for inChapter 2;

b. to provide for the support and authorization of the KFOR and in particular to authorizethe KFOR to take such actions as are required, including the use of necessary force, toensure compliance with this Chapter and the protection of the KFOR, ImplementationMission (IM), and other international organizations, agencies, and non- governmentalorganizations involved in the implementation of this Agreement, and to contribute to asecure environment;

c. to provide, at no cost, the use of all facilities and services required for the deployment,operations and support of the KFOR.

3. The Parties understand and agree that the obligations undertaken in this Chapter shallapply equally to each Party. Each Party shall be held individually responsible forcompliance with its obligations, and each agrees that delay or failure to comply by oneParty shall not constitute cause for any other Party to fail to carry out its own obligations.All Parties shall be equally subject to such enforcement action by the KFOR as may benecessary to ensure implementation of this Chapter in Kosovo and the protection of theKFOR, IM, and other international organizations, agencies, and non- governmentalorganizations involved in the implementation of this Agreement.



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Article II: Cessation of Hostilities

1. The Parties shall, immediately upon entry into force of this Agreement (EIF), refrainfrom committing any hostile or provocative acts of any type against each other or againstany person in Kosovo. They shall not encourage or organize hostile or provocative

demonstrations.

2. In carrying out the obligations set forth in paragraph 1, the Parties undertake in particular to cease the firing of all weapons and explosive devices except as authorized byCOMKFOR. They shall not place any mines, barriers, unauthorized checkpoints,observation posts (with the exception of COMKFOR-approved border observation postsand crossing points), or protective obstacles. Except as provided in Chapter 2, the Partiesshall not engage in any military, security, or training-related activities, including ground,air, or air defense operations, in or over Kosovo, without the prior express approval ofCOMKFOR.

3. Except for Border Guard forces (as provided for in Article IV), no Party shall haveForces present within a 5 kilometer zone inward from the international border of the FRYthat is also the border of Kosovo (hereinafter "the Border Zone"). The Border Zone will be marked on the ground by EIF + 14 days by VJ Border Guard personnel in accordancewith direction from IM. COMKFOR may determine small scale reconfigurations foroperational reasons.

4. a. With the exception of civilian police performing normal police duties as determined by the CIM, no Party shall have Forces present within 5 kilometers of the Kosovo side ofthe boundary of Kosovo with other parts of the FRY.

b. The presence of any Forces within 5 kilometers of the other side of that boundary shall be notified to COMKFOR; if, in the judgment of COMKFOR, such presence threatens orwould threaten implementation of this Chapter in Kosovo, he shall contact the authoritiesresponsible for the Forces in question and may require those Forces to withdraw from orremain outside that area.

5. No Party shall conduct any reprisals, counter-attacks, or any unilateral actions inresponse to violations of this Chapter by another Party. The Parties shall respond toalleged violations of this Chapter through the procedures provided in Article XI.

Article III: Redeployment, Withdrawal, and Demilitarization of Forces

In order to disengage their Forces and to avoid any further conflict, the Parties shallimmediately upon EIF begin to re-deploy, withdraw, or demilitarize their Forces inaccordance with Articles IV, V, and VI.



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Article IV: VJ Forces

1. VJ Army Units

a. By K-Day + 5 days, all VJ Army units in Kosovo (with the exception of those Forces

specified in paragraph 2 of this Article) shall have completed redeployment to theapproved cantonment sites listed at Appendix A to this Chapter. The senior VJcommander in Kosovo shall confirm in writing to COMKFOR by K-Day + 5 days thatthe VJ is in compliance and provide the information required in Article VII below to takeaccount of withdrawals or other changes made during the redeployment. This informationshall be updated weekly.

b. By K-Day + 30 days, the Chief of the VJ General Staff, through the senior VJcommander in Kosovo, shall provide for approval by COMKFOR a detailed plan for the phased withdrawal of VJ Forces from Kosovo to other locations in Serbia to ensure thefollowing timelines are met:

1) By K-Day + 90 days, VJ authorities must, to the satisfaction of COMKFOR, withdrawfrom Kosovo to other locations in Serbia 50% of men and materiel and all designatedoffensive assets. Such assets are taken to be: main battle tanks; all other armored vehiclesmounting weapons greater than 12.7mm; and, all heavy weapons (vehicle mounted ornot) of over 82mm.

2) By K-Day + 180 days, all VJ Army personnel and equipment (with the exception ofthose Forces specified in paragraph 2 of this Article) shall be withdrawn from Kosovo toother locations in Serbia.

2. VJ Border Guard Forces

a. VJ Border Guard forces shall be permitted but limited to a structure of 1500 membersat pre- February 1998 Border Guard Battalion facilities located in Djakovica, Prizren, andUrosevac and subordinate facilities within the 5 kilometer Border Zone, or at a limitednumber of existing facilities in the immediate proximity of the Border Zone subject to the prior approval of COMKFOR, with that number to be reached by K-Day + 14 days. Anadditional number of VJ personnel -- totaling no more than 1000 C2 and logistics forces -- will be permitted to remain in the approved cantonment sites listed at Appendix A tofulfill brigade-level functions related only to border security. After an initial 90 day period from K- Day, COMKFOR may at any time review the deployments of VJ

personnel and may require further adjustments to force levels, with the objective ofreaching the minimum force structure required for legitimate border security, as thesecurity situation and the conduct of the Parties warrant.

b. VJ elements in Kosovo shall be limited to weapons of 82mm and below. They shall possess neither armored vehicles (other than wheeled vehicles mounting weapons of12.7mm or less) nor air defense weapons.



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c. VJ Border Guard units shall be permitted to patrol in Kosovo only within the BorderZone and solely for the purpose of defending the border against external attack andmaintaining its integrity by preventing illicit border crossings. Geographic terrainconsiderations may require Border Guard maneuver inward of the Border Zone; any suchmaneuver shall be coordinated with and approved by COMKFOR.

d. With the exception of the Border Zone, VJ units may travel through Kosovo only toreach duty stations and garrisons in the Border Zone or approved cantonment sites. Suchtravel may only be along routes and in accordance with procedures that have beendetermined by COMKFOR after consultation with the CIM, VJ unit commanders,communal government authorities, and police commanders. These routes and procedureswill be determined by K-Day + 14 days, subject to re- determination by COMKFOR atany time. VJ forces in Kosovo but outside the Border Zone shall be permitted to act onlyin self-defense in response to a hostile act pursuant to Rules of Engagement (ROE) whichwill be approved by COMKFOR in consultation with the CIM. When deployed in theBorder Zone, they will act in accordance with ROE established under control of

COMKFOR.

e. VJ Border Guard forces may conduct training activities only within the 5 kilometerBorder Zone, and only with the prior express approval of COMKFOR.

3. Yugoslav Air and Air Defense Forces (YAADF)

All aircraft, radars, surface-to-air missiles (including man-portable air defense systems{MANPADS}) and anti-aircraft artillery in Kosovo shall immediately upon EIF beginwithdrawing from Kosovo to other locations in Serbia outside the 25 kilometer MutualSafety Zone as defined in Article X. This withdrawal shall be completed and reported by

the senior VJ commander in Kosovo to the appropriate NATO commander not more than10 days after EIF. The appropriate NATO commander shall control and coordinate use ofairspace over Kosovo commencing at EIF as further specified in Article X. No airdefense systems, target tracking radars, or anti-aircraft artillery shall be positioned oroperated within Kosovo or the 25 kilometer Mutual Safety Zone without the prior expressapproval of the appropriate NATO commander.

Article V: Other Forces

1. The actions of Forces in Kosovo other than KFOR, VJ, MUP, or local police forces provided for in Chapter 2 (hereinafter referred to as "Other Forces") shall be in

accordance with this Article. Upon EIF, all Other Forces in Kosovo must immediatelyobserve the provisions of Article I, paragraph 2, Article II, paragraph 1, and Article IIIand in addition refrain from all hostile intent, military training and formations,organization of demonstrations, and any movement in either direction or smugglingacross international borders or the boundary between Kosovo and other parts of the FRY.Furthermore, upon EIF, all Other Forces in Kosovo must publicly commit themselves todemilitarize on terms to be determined by COMKFOR, renounce violence, guarantee



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security of international personnel, and respect the international borders of the FRY andall terms of this Chapter.

2. Except as approved by COMKFOR, from K-Day, all Other Forces in Kosovo must notcarry weapons:

a. within 1 kilometer of VJ and MUP cantonments listed at Appendix A;

b. within 1 kilometer of the main roads as follows:1) Pec - Lapusnik - Pristina2) border - Djakovica - Klina3) border - Prizren - Suva Rika - Pristina4) Djakovica - Orahovac - Lapusnik - Pristina5) Pec - Djakovica - Prizren - Urosevac - border6) border - Urosevac - Pristina - Podujevo - border7) Pristina - Kosovska Mitrovica - border

8) Kosovka Mitrovica - (Rakos) - Pec9) Pec - Border with Montenegro (through Pozaj)10) Pristina - Lisica - border with Serbia11) Pristina - Gnjilane - Urosevac12) Gnjilane - Veliki Trnovac - border with Serbia;13) Prizren - Doganovic

c. within 1 kilometer of the Border Zone;

d. in any other areas designated by COMKFOR.

3. By K-Day + 5 days, all Other Forces must abandon and close all fighting positions,entrenchments, and checkpoints.

4. By K-Day + 5 days, all Other Forces' commanders designated by COMKFOR shallreport completion of the above requirements in the format at Article VII to COMKFORand continue to provide weekly detailed status reports until demilitarization is complete.

5. COMKFOR will establish procedures for demilitarization and monitoring of OtherForces in Kosovo and for the further regulation of their activities. These procedures will be established to facilitate a phased demilitarization program as follows:

a. By K-Day + 5 days, all Other Forces shall establish secure weapons storage sites,which shall be registered with and verified by the KFOR;

b. By K-Day + 30 days, all Other Forces shall store all prohibited weapons (any weapon12.7mm or larger, any anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons, grenades, mines or explosives)and automatic weapons in the registered weapons storage sites. Other Forcescommanders shall confirm completion of weapons storage to COMKFOR no later thanK-Day + 30 days;



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c. By K-Day + 30 days, all Other Forces shall cease wearing military uniforms andinsignia, and cease carrying prohibited weapons and automatic weapons;

d. By K-Day + 90 days, authority for storage sites shall pass to the KFOR. After this date,it shall be illegal for Other Forces to possess prohibited weapons and automatic weapons,

and such weapons shall be subject to confiscation by the KFOR;

e. By K-Day + 120 days, demilitarization of all Other Forces shall be completed.

6. By EIF + 30 days, subject to arrangements by COMKFOR if necessary, all OtherForces personnel who are not of local origin, whether or not they are legally withinKosovo, including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from neighboring and other States, shall be withdrawn from Kosovo.

ARTICLE VI: MUP

1. Ministry of Interior Police (MUP) is defined as all police and public security units and personnel under the control of Federal or Republic authorities except for the border police referred to in Chapter 2 and police academy students and personnel at the trainingschool in Vucitrn referred to in Chapter 2. The CIM, in consultation with COMKFOR,shall have the discretion to exempt any public security units from this definition if hedetermines that it is in the public interest (e.g. firefighters).

a. By K-Day + 5 days, all MUP units in Kosovo (with the exception of the border policereferred to in Chapter 2) shall have completed redeployment to the approved cantonmentsites listed at Appendix A to this Chapter or to garrisons outside Kosovo. The seniorMUP commander in Kosovo or his representative shall confirm in writing by K-Day + 5

days to COMKFOR and the CIM that the MUP is in compliance and update theinformation required in Article VII to take account of withdrawals or other changes madeduring the redeployment. This information shall be updated weekly. Resumption ofnormal communal police patrolling will be permitted under the supervision and control ofthe IM and as specifically approved by the CIM in consultation with COMKFOR, andwill be contingent on compliance with the terms of this Agreement.

b. Immediately upon EIF, the following withdrawals shall begin:

1) By K-Day + 5 days, those MUP units not assigned to Kosovo prior to 1 February 1998shall withdraw all personnel and equipment from Kosovo to other locations in Serbia.

2) By K-Day + 20 days, all Special Police, including PJP, SAJ, and JSO forces, and theirequipment shall be withdrawn from their cantonment sites out of Kosovo to otherlocations in Serbia. Additionally, all MUP offensive assets (designated as armoredvehicles mounting weapons 12.7mm or larger, and all heavy weapons {vehicle mountedor not} of over 82mm) shall be withdrawn.



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c. By K-Day + 30 days, the senior MUP commander shall provide for approval byCOMKFOR, in consultation with the CIM, a detailed plan for the phased drawdown ofthe remainder of MUP forces. In the event that COMKFOR, in consultation with theCIM, does not approve the plan, he has the authority to issue his own binding plan forfurther MUP drawdowns. The CIM will decide at the same time when the remaining

MUP units will wear new insignia. In any case, the following time-table must be met:

1) by K-Day + 60 days, 50% drawdown of the remaining MUP units including reservists.The CIM after consultations with COMKFOR shall have the discretion to extend thisdeadline for up to K-Day + 90 days if he judges there to be a risk of a law enforcementvacuum;

2) by K-Day + 120 days, further drawdown to 2500 MUP. The CIM after consultationswith COMKFOR shall have the discretion to extend this deadline for up to K-Day + 180days to meet operational needs;

3) transition to communal police force shall begin as Kosovar police are trained and ableto assume their duties. The CIM shall organize this transition between MUP andcommunal police;

4) in any event, by EIF + one year, all Ministry of Interior Civil Police shall be drawndown to zero. The CIM shall have the discretion to extend this deadline for up to anadditional 12 months to meet operational needs.

d. The 2500 MUP allowed by this Chapter and referred to in Article V.1(a) of Chapter 2shall have authority only for civil police functions and be under the supervision andcontrol of the CIM.

Article VII: Notifications

1. By K-Day + 5 days, the Parties shall furnish the following specific informationregarding the status of all conventional military; all police, including military police,Department of Public Security Police, special police; paramilitary; and all Other Forcesin Kosovo, and shall update the COMKFOR weekly on changes in this information:

a. location, disposition, and strengths of all military and special police units referred toabove;

b. quantity and type of weaponry of 12.7 mm and above, and ammunition for suchweaponry, including location of cantonments and supply depots and storage sites;

c. positions and descriptions of any surface-to-air missiles/launchers, including mobilesystems, anti-aircraft artillery, supporting radars, and associated command and controlsystems;



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d. positions and descriptions of all mines, unexploded ordnance, explosive devices,demolitions, obstacles, booby traps, wire entanglements, physical or military hazards tothe safe movement of any personnel in Kosovo, weapons systems, vehicles, or any othermilitary equipment; and

e. any further information of a military or security nature requested by the COMKFOR.

Article VIII: Operations and Authority of the KFOR

1. Consistent with the general obligations of Article I, the Parties understand and agreethat the KFOR will deploy and operate without hindrance and with the authority to takeall necessary action to help ensure compliance with this Chapter.

2. The Parties understand and agree that the KFOR shall have the right:

a. to monitor and help ensure compliance by all Parties with this Chapter and to respond

promptly to any violations and restore compliance, using military force if required. Thisincludes necessary action to:

1) enforce VJ and MUP reductions; 2) enforce demilitarization of Other Forces; 3)enforce restrictions on all VJ, MUP and Other Forces' activities, movement and trainingin Kosovo;

b. to establish liaison arrangements with IM, and support IM as appropriate;

c. to establish liaison arrangements with local Kosovo authorities, with Other Forces, andwith FRY and Serbian civil and military authorities;

d. to observe, monitor, and inspect any and all facilities or activities in Kosovo, includingwithin the Border Zone, that the COMKFOR believes has or may have militarycapability, or are or may be associated with the employment of military or policecapabilities, or are otherwise relevant to compliance with this Chapter;

e. to require the Parties to mark and clear minefields and obstacles and to monitor their performance;

f. to require the Parties to participate in the Joint Military Commission and its subordinatemilitary commissions as described in Article XI.

3. The Parties understand and agree that the KFOR shall have the right to fulfill itssupporting tasks, within the limits of its assigned principal tasks, its capabilities, andavailable resources, and as directed by the NAC, which include the following:

a. to help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks associated withthis Agreement, including free and fair elections;



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b. to assist the movement of organizations in the accomplishment of humanitarianmissions;

c. to assist international agencies in fulfilling their responsibilities in Kosovo;

d. to observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations,refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate threat to lifeand person.

4. The Parties understand and agree that further directives from the NAC may establishadditional duties and responsibilities for the KFOR in implementing this Chapter.

5. KFOR operations shall be governed by the following provisions:

a. KFOR and its personnel shall have the legal status, rights, and obligations specified inAppendix B to this Chapter;

b. The KFOR shall have the right to use all necessary means to ensure its full ability tocommunicate and shall have the right to the unrestricted use of the entire electromagneticspectrum. In implementing this right, the KFOR shall make reasonable efforts tocoordinate with the appropriate authorities of the Parties;

c. The KFOR shall have the right to control and regulate surface traffic throughoutKosovo including the movement of the Forces of the Parties. All military trainingactivities and movements in Kosovo must be authorized in advance by COMKFOR;

d. The KFOR shall have complete and unimpeded freedom of movement by ground, air,

and water into and throughout Kosovo. It shall in Kosovo have the right to bivouac,maneuver, billet, and utilize any areas or facilities to carry out its responsibilities asrequired for its support, training, and operations, with such advance notice as may be practicable. Neither the KFOR nor any of its personnel shall be liable for any damages to public or private property that they may cause in the course of duties related to theimplementation of this Chapter. Roadblocks, checkpoints, or other impediments to KFORfreedom of movement shall constitute a breach of this Chapter and the violating Partyshall be subject to military action by the KFOR, including the use of necessary force toensure compliance with this Chapter.

6. The Parties understand and agree that COMKFOR shall have the authority, without

interference or permission of any Party, to do all that he judges necessary and proper,including the use of military force, to protect the KFOR and the IM, and to carry out theresponsibilities listed in this Chapter. The Parties shall comply in all respects with KFORinstructions and requirements.

7. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, the Parties understand and agreethat COMKFOR has the right and is authorized to compel the removal, withdrawal, orrelocation of specific Forces and weapons, and to order the cessation of any activities



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whenever the COMKFOR determines such Forces, weapons, or activities to constitute athreat or potential threat to either the KFOR or its mission, or to another Party. Forcesfailing to redeploy, withdraw, relocate, or to cease threatening or potentially threateningactivities following such a demand by the KFOR shall be subject to military action by theKFOR, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance, consistent with the

terms set forth in Article I, paragraph 3.

Article IX: Border Control

The Parties understand and agree that, until other arrangements are established, andsubject to provisions of this Chapter and Chapter 2, controls along the international border of the FRY that is also the border of Kosovo will be maintained by the existinginstitutions normally assigned to such tasks, subject to supervision by the KFOR and theIM, which shall have the right to review and approve all personnel and units, to monitortheir performance, and to remove and replace any personnel for behavior inconsistentwith this Chapter.

Article X: Control of Air Movements

The appropriate NATO commander shall have sole authority to establish rules and procedures governing command and control of the airspace over Kosovo as well aswithin a 25 kilometer Mutual Safety Zone (MSZ). This MSZ shall consist of FRYairspace within 25 kilometers outward from the boundary of Kosovo with other parts ofthe FRY. This Chapter supersedes the NATO Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement ofOctober 12, 1998 on any matter or area in which they may contradict each other. Nomilitary air traffic, fixed or rotary wing, of any Party shall be permitted to fly overKosovo or in the MSZ without the prior express approval of the appropriate NATO

commander. Violations of any of the provisions above, including the appropriate NATOcommander's rules and procedures governing the airspace over Kosovo, as well asunauthorized flight or activation of FRY Integrated Air Defense (IADS) within the MSZ,shall be subject to military action by the KFOR, including the use of necessary force. TheKFOR shall have a liaison team at the FRY Air Force HQ and a YAADF liaison shall beestablished with the KFOR. The Parties understand and agree that the appropriate NATOcommander may delegate control of normal civilian air activities to appropriate FRYinstitutions to monitor operations, deconflict KFOR air traffic movements, and ensuresmooth and safe operation of the air traffic system.

Article XI: Establishment of a Joint Military Commission

1. A Joint Military Commission (JMC) shall be established with the deployment of theKFOR to Kosovo.

2. The JMC shall be chaired by COMKFOR or his representative and consist of thefollowing members:



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a. the senior Yugoslav military commander of the Forces of the FRY or hisrepresentative;

b. the Ministers of Interior of the FRY and Republic of Serbia or their representatives;

c. a senior military representative of all Other Forces;

d. a representative of the IM;

e. other persons as COMKFOR shall determine, including one or more representatives ofthe Kosovo civilian leadership.

1. The JMC shall:

a. serve as the central body for all Parties to address any military complaints, questions,or problems that require resolution by the COMKFOR, such as allegations of cease-fire

violations or other allegations of non-compliance with this Chapter;

b. receive reports and make recommendations for specific actions to COMKFOR toensure compliance by the Parties with the provisions of this Chapter;

c. assist COMKFOR in determining and implementing local transparency measures between the Parties.

4. The JMC shall not include any persons publicly indicted by the International CriminalTribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

5. The JMC shall function as a consultative body to advise COMKFOR. However, allfinal decisions shall be made by COMKFOR and shall be binding on the Parties.

6. The JMC shall meet at the call of COMKFOR. Any Party may request COMKFOR toconvene a meeting.

7. The JMC shall establish subordinate military commissions for the purpose of providingassistance in carrying out the functions described above. Such commissions shall be at anappropriate level, as COMKFOR shall direct. Composition of such commissions shall bedetermined by COMKFOR.

Article XII: Prisoner Release

1. By EIF + 21 days, the Parties shall release and transfer, in accordance withinternational humanitarian standards, all persons held in connection with the conflict(hereinafter "prisoners"). In addition, the Parties shall cooperate fully with theInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to facilitate its work, in accordancewith its mandate, to implement and monitor a plan for the release and transfer of



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prisoners in accordance with the above deadline. In preparation for compliance with thisrequirement, the Parties shall:

a. grant the ICRC full access to all persons, irrespective of their status, who are beingheld by them in connection with the conflict, for visits in accordance with the ICRC's

standard operating procedures;

b. provide to the ICRC any and all information concerning prisoners, as requested by theICRC, by EIF + 14 days.

2. The Parties shall provide information, through the tracing mechanisms of the ICRC, tothe families of all persons who are unaccounted for. The Parties shall cooperate fully withthe ICRC in its efforts to determine the identity, whereabouts, and fate of thoseunaccounted for.

Article XIII: Cooperation

The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of thissettlement, as described in the Framework Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the United Nations Security Council, including the International Criminal Tribunal forthe former Yugoslavia.

Article XIV: Notification to Military Commands

Each Party shall ensure that the terms of this Chapter and written orders requiringcompliance are immediately communicated to all of its Forces.

Article XV: Final Authority to Interpret1. Subject to paragraph 2, the KFOR Commander is the final authority in theaterregarding interpretation of this Chapter and his determinations are binding on all Partiesand persons.

2. The CIM is the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of the references inthis Chapter to his functions (directing the VJ Border Guards under Article II, paragraph3; his functions concerning the MUP under Article VI) and his determinations are binding on all Parties and persons.

Article XVI: K-Day

The date of activation of KFOR -- to be known as K-Day -- shall be determined by NATO.

Appendices:A. Approved VJ/MUP Cantonment SitesB. Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force



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Appendix A: Approved VJ/MUP Cantonment Sites

1. There are 13 approved cantonment sites in Kosovo for all VJ units, weapons,equipment, and ammunition. Movement to cantonment sites, and subsequent withdrawal

from Kosovo, will occur in accordance with this Chapter. As the phased withdrawal ofVJ units progresses along the timeline as specified in this Chapter, COMKFOR will closeselected cantonment sites.

2. Initial approved VJ cantonment sites:

a) Pristina SW 423913N0210819E

b) Pristina Airfield 423412N0210040E

c) Vuctrin North 424936N0205755E

d) Kosovska Mitrovica 425315N0205227E

e) Gnjilane NE 422807N0212845E

f) Urosevac 422233N0210753E

g) Prizren 421315N0204504Eh) Djakovica SW 422212N0202530E

i) Pec 423910N0201728E

j) Pristina Explosive Storage Fac 423636N0211225E

k) Pristina Ammo Depot SW 423518N0205923E

l) Pristina Ammo Depot 510 424211N0211056E

m) Pristina Headquarters facility 423938N0210934E

3. Within each cantonment site, VJ units are required to canton all heavy weapons andvehicles outside of storage facilities.

4. After EIF + 180 days, the remaining 2500 VJ forces dedicated to border security

functions provided for in this Agreement will be garrisoned and cantoned at the followinglocations: Djakovica, Prizren, and Ursoevac; subordinate border posts within the BorderZone; a limited number of existing facilities in the immediate proximity of the BorderZone subject to the prior approval of COMKFOR; and headquarters/C2 and logisticsupport facilities in Pristina.

5. There are 37 approved cantonment sites for all MUP and Special Police force units inKosovo. There are seven (7) approved regional SUPs. Each of the 37 approvedcantonment sites will fall under the administrative control of one of the regional SUPs.Movement to cantonment sites, and subsequent withdrawal of MUP from Kosovo, willoccur in accordance with this Chapter.

6. Approved MUP regional SUPs and cantonment sites:

a) Kosovska Mitrovica SUP 425300N0205200E

1) Kosovska Mitrovica (2 locations)

2) Leposavic

3) Srbica

4) Vucitrn

5) Zubin Potok



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b) Pristina SUP 424000N0211000E

1) Pristina (6 locations)

2) Glogovac

3) Kosovo Polje

4) Lipjan

5) Obilic

6) Podujevo

c) Pec SUP 423900N0201800E

1) Pec (2 locations)

2) Klina

3) Istok

4) Malisevo

d) Djakovica SUP 422300N0202600E

1) Djakovica (2 locations)

2) Decani

e) Urosevac SUP 422200N0211000E

1) Urosevac (2 locations)

2) Stimlje

3) Strpce

4) Kacanik

f) Gnjilane SUP 422800N0212900E

1) Gnjilane (2 locations)

2) Kamenica

3) Vitina

4) Kosovska

5) Novo Brdo

g) Prizren SUP 421300N0204500E

1) Prizren (2 locations)

2) Orahovac3) Suva Reka

4) Gora

7. Within each cantonment site, MUP units are required to canton all vehicles above 6tons, including APCs and BOVs, and all heavy weapons outside of storage facilities.

8. KFOR will have the exclusive right to inspect any cantonment site or any otherlocation, at any time, without interference from any Party.

Appendix B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force

1. For the purposes of this Appendix, the following expressions shall have the meaningshereunder assigned to them:

a. "NATO" means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), its subsidiary bodies,its military Headquarters, the NATO-led KFOR, and any elements/units forming any partof KFOR or supporting KFOR, whether or not they are from a NATO member country



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and whether or not they are under NATO or national command and control, when actingin furtherance of this Agreement.

b. "Authorities in the FRY" means appropriate authorities, whether Federal, Republic,Kosovo or other.

c. "NATO personnel" means the military, civilian, and contractor personnel assigned orattached to or employed by NATO, including the military, civilian, and contractor personnel from non-NATO states participating in the Operation, with the exception of personnel locally hired.

d. "the Operation" means the support, implementation, preparation, and participation by NATO and NATO personnel in furtherance of this Chapter.

e. "Military Headquarters" means any entity, whatever its denomination, consisting of orconstituted in part by NATO military personnel established in order to fulfill the

Operation.

f. "Authorities" means the appropriate responsible individual, agency, or organization ofthe Parties.

g. "Contractor personnel" means the technical experts or functional specialists whoseservices are required by NATO and who are in the territory of the FRY exclusively toserve NATO either in an advisory capacity in technical matters, or for the setting up,operation, or maintenance of equipment, unless they are:

(1) nationals of the FRY; or

(2) persons ordinarily resident in the FRY.

h. "Official use" means any use of goods purchased, or of the services received andintended for the performance of any function as required by the operation of theHeadquarters.

i. "Facilities" means all buildings, structures, premises, and land required for conductingthe operational, training, and administrative activities by NATO for the Operation as wellas for accommodation of NATO personnel.

2. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities under this Appendix, all NATO personnel shall respect the laws applicable in the FRY, whether Federal, Republic,Kosovo, or other, insofar as compliance with those laws is compatible with the entrustedtasks/mandate and shall refrain from activities not compatible with the nature of theOperation.

3. The Parties recognize the need for expeditious departure and entry procedures for NATO personnel. Such personnel shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations and



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the registration requirements applicable to aliens. At all entry and exit points to/from theFRY, NATO personnel shall be permitted to enter/exit the FRY on production of anational identification (ID) card. NATO personnel shall carry identification which theymay be requested to produce for the authorities in the FRY, but operations, training, andmovement shall not be allowed to be impeded or delayed by such requests.

4. NATO military personnel shall normally wear uniforms, and NATO personnel may possess and carry arms if authorized to do so by their orders. The Parties shall accept asvalid, without tax or fee, drivers' licenses and permits issued to NATO personnel by theirrespective national authorities.

5. NATO shall be permitted to display the NATO flag and/or national flags of itsconstituent national elements/units on any NATO uniform, means of transport, or facility.

6. a. NATO shall be immune from all legal process, whether civil, administrative, orcriminal.

b. NATO personnel, under all circumstances and at all times, shall be immune from theParties' jurisdiction in respect of any civil, administrative, criminal, or disciplinaryoffenses which may be committed by them in the FRY. The Parties shall assist States participating in the Operation in the exercise of their jurisdiction over their own nationals.

c. Notwithstanding the above, and with the NATO Commander's express agreement ineach case, the authorities in the FRY may exceptionally exercise jurisdiction in suchmatters, but only in respect of Contractor personnel who are not subject to the jurisdictionof their nation of citizenship.

7. NATO personnel shall be immune from any form of arrest, investigation, or detention by the authorities in the FRY. NATO personnel erroneously arrested or detained shallimmediately be turned over to NATO authorities.

8. NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, andequipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRYincluding associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limitedto, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities asrequired for support, training, and operations.

9. NATO shall be exempt from duties, taxes, and other charges and inspections and

custom regulations including providing inventories or other routine customsdocumentation, for personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, supplies, and provisions entering, exiting, or transiting the territory of the FRY in support of theOperation.

10. The authorities in the FRY shall facilitate, on a priority basis and with all appropriatemeans, all movement of personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, or supplies,through or in the airspace, ports, airports, or roads used. No charges may be assessed



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against NATO for air navigation, landing, or takeoff of aircraft, whether government-owned or chartered. Similarly, no duties, dues, tolls or charges may be assessed against NATO ships, whether government-owned or chartered, for the mere entry and exit of ports. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft used in support of the Operation shall not be subjectto licensing or registration requirements, nor commercial insurance.

11. NATO is granted the use of airports, roads, rails, and ports without payment of fees,duties, dues, tolls, or charges occasioned by mere use. NATO shall not, however, claimexemption from reasonable charges for specific services requested and received, butoperations/movement and access shall not be allowed to be impeded pending payment forsuch services.

12. NATO personnel shall be exempt from taxation by the Parties on the salaries andemoluments received from NATO and on any income received from outside the FRY.

13. NATO personnel and their tangible moveable property imported into, acquired in, or

exported from the FRY shall be exempt from all duties, taxes, and other charges andinspections and custom regulations.

14. NATO shall be allowed to import and to export, free of duty, taxes and other charges,such equipment, provisions, and supplies as NATO shall require for the Operation, provided such goods are for the official use of NATO or for sale to NATO personnel.Goods sold shall be solely for the use of NATO personnel and not transferable tounauthorized persons.

15. The Parties recognize that the use of communications channels is necessary for theOperation. NATO shall be allowed to operate its own internal mail services. The Parties

shall, upon simple request, grant all telecommunications services, including broadcastservices, needed for the Operation, as determined by NATO. This shall include the rightto utilize such means and services as required to assure full ability to communicate, andthe right to use all of the electro-magnetic spectrum for this purpose, free of cost. Inimplementing this right, NATO shall make every reasonable effort to coordinate with andtake into account the needs and requirements of appropriate authorities in the FRY.

16. The Parties shall provide, free of cost, such public facilities as NATO shall require to prepare for and execute the Operation. The Parties shall assist NATO in obtaining, at thelowest rate, the necessary utilities, such as electricity, water, gas and other resources, as NATO shall require for the Operation.

17. NATO and NATO personnel shall be immune from claims of any sort which arise outof activities in pursuance of the Operation; however, NATO will entertain claims on anex gratia basis.

18. NATO shall be allowed to contract directly for the acquisition of goods, services, andconstruction from any source within and outside the FRY. Such contracts, goods,



Boshkovich 178

services, and construction shall not be subject to the payment of duties, taxes, or othercharges. NATO may also carry out construction works with their own personnel.

19. Commercial undertakings operating in the FRY only in the service of NATO shall beexempt from local laws and regulations with respect to the terms and conditions of their

employment and licensing and registration of employees, businesses, and corporations.

20. NATO may hire local personnel who on an individual basis shall remain subject tolocal laws and regulations with the exception of labor/employment laws. However, local personnel hired by NATO shall:

a. be immune from legal process in respect of words

spoken or written and all acts performed by them in

their official capacity;

b. be immune from national services and/or national

military service obligations;

c. be subject only to employment terms and

conditions established by NATO; andd. be exempt from taxation on the salaries and

emoluments paid to them by NATO.

21. In carrying out its authorities under this Chapter, NATO is authorized to detainindividuals and, as quickly as possible, turn them over to appropriate officials.

22. NATO may, in the conduct of the Operation, have need to make improvements ormodifications to certain infrastructure in the FRY, such as roads, bridges, tunnels, buildings, and utility systems. Any such improvements or modifications of a non-temporary nature shall become part of and in the same ownership as that infrastructure.Temporary improvements or modifications may be removed at the discretion of the NATO Commander, and the infrastructure returned to as near its original condition as possible, fair wear and tear excepted.

23. Failing any prior settlement, disputes with the regard to the interpretation orapplication of this Appendix shall be settled between NATO and the appropriateauthorities in the FRY.

24. Supplementary arrangements with any of the Parties may be concluded to facilitateany details connected with the Operation.

25. The provisions of this Appendix shall remain in force until completion of theOperation or as the Parties and NATO otherwise agree.



Boshkovich 179

Chapter 8

Amendment, Comprehensive Assessment, and Final Clauses Article I: Amendment and Comprehensive Assessment

1. Amendments to this Agreement shall be adopted by agreement of all the Parties,except as otherwise provided by Article X of Chapter 1.

2. Each Party may propose amendments at any time and will consider and consult withthe other Parties with regard to proposed amendments.

3. Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis ofthe will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts regarding theimplementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake acomprehensive assessment of the implementation of this Agreement and to consider

proposals by any Party for additional measures.

Article II: Final Clauses

1. This Agreement is signed in the English language. After signature of this Agreement,translations will be made into Serbian, Albanian, and other languages of the nationalcommunities of Kosovo, and attached to the English text.

2. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.284

284 http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html



Boshkovich 180

IV Resolution 1244

UNITED NATIONS SSecurity CouncilDistr.

GENERAL

S/RES/1244 (1999)

10 June 1999

RESOLUTION 1244 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting,

on 10 June 1999

The Security Council,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the

United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council

for the maintenance of international peace and security, Recalling itsresolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September

1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999,

Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the

requirements of these resolutions, Determined to resolve the grave

humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and

to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced

persons to their homes, Condemning all acts of violence against the

Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party,

Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999,

expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return

to their homes in safety, Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of

the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Welcoming thegeneral principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted

on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming

also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the

principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in

Belgrade on

99-17289 (E) /...

S/RES/1244 (1999)

Page 2

2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia’s agreement to that paper, Reaffirming the

commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorialintegrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States

of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2,

Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy

and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo, Determining that the

situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to

international peace and security, Determined to ensure the safety and

security of international personnel and the implementation by all

concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and



Boshkovich 181

acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the

United Nations,

1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be

based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in

the principles and other required elements in annex 2;

2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the

principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;

3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an

immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and

begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all

military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid

timetable, with which the deployment of

the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;

4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and

Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to

Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;

5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices,

of international civil and security presences, with appropriate

equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the

Security Council, a Special Representative to control the

implementation of the international civil presence, and further

requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative

to coordinate closely with the international security presence to

ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a

mutually supportive manner;

7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to

establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in

point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its

responsibilities under

paragraph 9 below;

/...

S/RES/1244 (1999)

Page 3

8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective

international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that

the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;

9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security

presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:

(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary

enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the

return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and

paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;

(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed

Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;

(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced

persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can

operate,

a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid

can be delivered;

(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil



Boshkovich 182

presence can take responsibility for this task;

(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as

appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;

(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work

of the international civil presence;

(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required;

(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, theinternational civil presence, and other international organizations;

10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant

international organizations, to establish an international civil

presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for

Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy

within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide

transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the

development of provisional democratic selfgoverning institutions to

ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of

Kosovo;

11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil

presence will include:

(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of

substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account

of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as

long as required;

/...

S/RES/1244 (1999)

Page 4

(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional

institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a

political settlement, including the holding of elections;

(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its

administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting theconsolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions and other

peacebuilding activities;

(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s

future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords

(S/1999/648);

(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from

Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established under a

political settlement;

(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other

economic reconstruction;

(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian

organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;

(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local

police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international

police personnel to serve in Kosovo;

(j) Protecting and promoting human rights;

(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and

displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;

12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations,

and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to

Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such



Boshkovich 183

organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of

international aid;

13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to

contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe

return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this

context the importance of convening an international donors’

conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g)above, at the earliest possible date;

14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the

international security presence, with the International Tribunal for

the Former Yugoslavia;

15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end

immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for

demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security

presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the

Secretary-General;

16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution

1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of

the international civil and security presences;

/...

S/RES/1244 (1999)

Page 5

17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other

international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the

economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the

Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for

South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to

further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and

regional cooperation;

18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the

implementation of all aspects of this resolution;

19. Decides that the international civil and security presences areestablished for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter

unless the Security Council decides otherwise;

20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular

intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports

from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences,

the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of

this resolution;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex 1

Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting

of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre

on 6 May 1999

The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on

the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;

- Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;

- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security

presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of

guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;

- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided

by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for

a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;



Boshkovich 184

- The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and

unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;

- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political

framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for

Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the

principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and thedemilitarization of the KLA;

/...

S/RES/1244 (1999)

Page 6

- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization

of the crisis region.

Annex 2

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards

a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in

Kosovo.

2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and

paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.

3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective

international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided

under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the

achievement of common objectives.

4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic

Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified

command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for

all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes

of all displaced persons and refugees.

5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of

the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can

enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The

interim administration to provide transitional administration while

establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic

self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and

normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.

6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel

will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:

- Liaison with the international civil mission and the international

security presence;

- Marking/clearing minefields;

- Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;

- Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.

7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the

supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid

organizations.

8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim

political

framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for

Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the

principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia and the other



Boshkovich 185

/...

S/RES/1244 (1999)

Page 7

countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations

between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt theestablishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and

stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the

implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad

international participation in order to further promotion of democracy,

economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.

10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the

principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other,

previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the

footnote below.1 A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly

concluded that would, among other things, specify additional

modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb

personnel in Kosovo:

Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule

and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be

withdrawn;

Returning personnel

- Equipment associated with returning personnel;

- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;

- Timetable for their return;

- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;

- Rules governing their relationship to the international security

presence and the international civil mission.

Notes

1 Other required elements:

- A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning,e.g., seven days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons

withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within

48 hours;

- Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will

be under the supervision of the international security presence

and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not

thousands);

/...

S/RES/1244 (1999)

Page 8

- Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of

verifiable withdrawals;

- The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement

shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of

withdrawals.285

285 United Nations, Security Council, June 10, 1999, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12533/



Boshkovich 186

List of Acronyms

ANA – Albanian National Army

BH – Bosnia and HerzegovinaBIA – Security Information Agency (Bezbednosno Informativna Agencija)BND – Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst)CIA – Central Intelligence AgencyCG – Contact GroupDEA – Drugs Enforcement AdministrationETA – Basque Homeland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna)EU – European UnionFHP – Found for Humanitarian RightFRY – Federative Republic of YugoslaviaFYRM – Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

ICJ – International Court of JusticeICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for the Former YugoslaviaIDP – Internal Dislocated PersonsIMF – International Monetary FundIRA – Irish Republican ArmyJNA – Yugoslav National Army ( Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija)KFOR – Kosovo ForceKGB – Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti) KLA – Kosovo Liberation ArmyKosmet – Kosovo and MetohijaKPC – Kosovo Protection Corpus

LDK – Democratic League of KosovoMoD – Ministry of Defence NATO – North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationOSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in EuropeRTS – Radio Television of SerbiaSAS – Special Air ServiceSFRY – Socialistic Federative Republic of YugoslaviaSMIP – Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Savezno Ministarstvo Inostranih Poslova)SPS – Socialistic Party of SerbiaTWRA – Third World Relief AgencyUN – United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development ProgrammeUNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for RefugeesUNMIK – United Nations Interim Administration MissionWMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction



Boshkovich 187

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Documents

Rambouillet Peace Conference; Road to Conference and Results