RAJEEV SARIN V. STATE OF UTTRAKHAND

NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, JODHPUR

RAJIV SAREEN V. STATE OF UTTRAKHAND

(AIR 2011 SC 3081)

RAJIV SAREEN V. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

Table of Contents

Rajiv Sarin and Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand and Ors…………………………………………….3

INTRODUCTION-......................................................................................................................3

Forum & Corum of Judges:.............................................................................................................5

Articles Involved:............................................................................................................................5

Subject MATTER:-.........................................................................................................................5

Facts of the Case:.............................................................................................................................6

Issues for Consideration-................................................................................................................7

Arguments by the Appellant:-.........................................................................................................7

Arguments by the Respondent:-......................................................................................................8

Judgment And Reasoning:...............................................................................................................9

Criqtiue:-…………………………………………………………………………………………10

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………..11

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Ranjit Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors, (1965) 1 SCR 82…………………………..…7

Naveenchandra Mafatlal v. CIT, AIR 1955 SC 58……………………………………………..…7

Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569……………………………………………....8

State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal (2008) 13 SCC 5…………………………………….8

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RAJIV SAREEN V. STATE OF UTTRAKHAND

AND ORS.

AIR 2011 SC 3087

INTRODUCTION

Law making is the most important task of the Parliament and the state Legislature. The

Constitution has well defined boundary for the legislative competence of both the Parliament and

the State legislature through the three lists in the 7 th Schedule. But there arises some conflict

between the Parliament and the state legislature when law is made with respect to the List III of

the Seventh Schedule. This is known as repugnancy.

The Constitution, however, itself provides in Article 254 that a law relating to a subject-matter

prescribed in List III enacted by the State Legislature would be valid only in the absence of any

contravention to a law made by the Parliament on the same subject-matter. Article 254 of the

Indian Constitution contains the mechanism for resolution of conflict between the Central and

the State legislations enacted with respect to any matter enumerated in the List III of the Seventh

Schedule. Thus a doctrine namely the Doctrine of Repugnancy which is employed to test as to

when and where a State made law turns repugnant to Parliamentary legislation.

Supreme Court in the present judgment has reiterated and further explained the doctrine of

Repugnancy with respect to the Land Acquisition laws and has clarified that the pith and

substance of an act has to be seen before making it void because of the legislative incompetence

or repugnancy. The court in the same judgment has clarified that though the compensation given

under an acquisition may not be equal to the market rate but it has to be justified and not illusory.

No compensation would make the Act amenable to judicial review.

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FORUM & CORUM OF JUDGES:

The case was adjudged and decided by: S.H. Kapadia, C.J.I., Mukundakam Sharma, K.S.

Panicker Radhakrishnan, Swatanter Kumar and Anil R. Dave, JJ.

ARTICLES INVOLVED:

Article 14, 19, 21, 31A, 254.

SUBJECT MATTER:-

Land Acquisition.

FACTS OF THE CASE

This case is an appeal to judgement and order as passed by the High Court of Judicature at

Allahabad dismissing the writ petition filed by the Appellants.

1) The present case deals with the proprietary right of the Appellant’s father in an estate

known as Beni Tal Fee Simple Estate situated in Pargana Chandpur, Tehsil Karan

Prayag, District Chamoli, Uttarakhand.

2) After the death of his father the Appellant inherited the proprietary rights of that estate.

3) By a Gazette Notification dated 21st December, 1977 under Section 4-A of the

KUMAUN and Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960

(hereinafter referred to as "KUZALR Act") as amended by the U.P. Act No. 15 of 1978,

the rights, title and interest of every ‘hissedar’ in respect of forest land situated in the

specified areas ceased with effect from 01st January, 1978 and the same were vested in

the State Government.

4) A notice thereby was served to the Appellant directing the same under the KUZALR Act,

and the Appellant’s demand for compensation was also not entertained.

5) Aggrieved, the Appellant filed a writ petition in High Court of Allahabad challenging the

constitutional validity of Sections 4A, 18(1)(cc) and 19(1)(b) of the KUZALR Act.

6) The High Court of Allahabad dismissed the writ petition.

Hence the present appeal.

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ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT-

The main issue of consideration in the present case was:

I. Whether the KUZALR Act as passed by the State of Kumaun and Uttarakhand is

repugnant to Section 37 and 84 of the Indian Forests Act, 1927?

ARGUMENTS BY THE APPELLANT: -

1. The main aim of KUZALR Act was to provide for the acquisition of the rights, title and

interests of the hissedars by the State which was done in furtherance of abolition of the

Zamindari system and introduction of the land reforms. As KUZALR Act, 1960 in its

original form was made only for agrarian reforms, the private forest land was not included

in its ambit thus vesting of private forests in the State would not be by way of agrarian

reform. And thereby, the private forests so acquired under Section 4A of the challenged

Act would become property of the State which is objectionable and is not a part of

agrarian reform under Entry 18 List II and Entry 42 List III.

2. Rule 41 which talks of management of forest land by Gaon Sabha or any other local

authority established does not apply to the forest land as it is a provision mentioned under

Chapter IV which is not covered under Section 4A of the impugned Act.

ARGUMENTS BY THE RESPONDENT: -

1. The first argument by the respondents was that the acquiring of private forest land forms

a part of agrarian reform, it was submitted by the Counsel for the Respondent that the

vesting of forest land under the KUZALR Act are directly linked with the agrarian

reforms, as the land as the forest land so acquired is managed by the Goan Sabha or any

local authority for its proper use leading to the betterment of village economy and hence,

the legislation is in the nature of agrarian reforms.

2. Regarding the second contention of the Appellant the Counsel for the Respondent states

that Rule 41 of Chapter IV only lays down how the lands vested in the State including

forest and non-forest land is to be dealt with. The said rule definitely applies to the forest

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lands as it has been specifically so mentioned in the said Rules as well which are vested

in the State under Section 4A of the KUZALR Act.

JUDGMENT AND REASONING:

The following observations were made by the apex court to reach the final judgement of the case-

The Supreme Court observed that as under the act both the Land and forests are managed

by the Gaon Sabha, a local authority for the betterment of the village, the provision of

acquisition of Forest Land under the KUZLAR Act is directly linked with the agrarian

reforms. Supreme Court in Ranjit Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors.1 said that for

agrarian reformsThere must be a proper planning of rural economy and conditions and a

body like the village Panchayat is best designed to promote rural welfare than individual

owners of small portions of lands.2 So, where the land acquired by the State is to be

transferred to a Goan Sabha or Village Panchayat for its management and use of land

leads to betterment of village economy, so the legislation is in nature of agrarian reforms.

Court further held that the test of repugnancy is to be applied only if both legislations fall

under the Concurrent List of 7th of the Constitution. For the repugnancy to be present

under 254 there are 2 requirements,

a. There has to be a confrontation between a central law and state law, and

b. The presidential assessment has to be held as non-existent.

In order to find out the subject matter of an enactment, even in the context of enactments

relatable to List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, passed by different legislatures,

the doctrine of pith and substance can be relied upon and would apply. The court mentioned that

there shall always be a presumption of constitutionality in favor of statute and while construing

such statute every legal permissible effort should be done keep the stature within the competence

of state legislature3. And when there is a challenge to legislative competence, the courts will try

to ascertain the pith and substance of such enactment on the scrutiny of such Act in question.

1 (1965) 1 SCR 822 Supra13 Naveenchandra Mafatlal v. CIT, AIR 1955 SC 58

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Applying the requirements of repugnancy as mentioned above, in the present the Supreme Court

observe that as both the Indian Forest Act, 1927 and the KUZALR Act operate in two different

and distinct fields as the KUZALR Act relates to agrarian reforms and therefore it deals with

the "land" ,however, the Central Act i.e. the Indian Forests Act 1927 deal with "forests" and its

management, preservation and levy of royalty/fees on forest produce. Therefore no repugnancy

exists between the two and both these act are legally valid and constitutional. It was also held by

the Supreme Court that as no such repugnancy exists between the Central and State Law there

was no such requirement of Presidential assent and Article 254(2) has no application in the

instant case.

The test for determining such repugnancy is indeed to find out the dominant intention of the both

legislations and whether such dominant intentions of both the legislations are alike or different.

To put it simply, a provision in one legislation in order to give effect to its dominant purpose

may incidentally be on the same subject as covered by the provision of the other legislation, but

such partial or incidental coverage of the same area in a different context and to achieve a

different purpose does not attract the doctrine of repugnancy.

Supreme Court in a 5 judges bench decision4 observed that ‘on a scrutiny of the Act in

question, if found, that the legislation is in substance one on a matter assigned to the

legislature enacting that statute, then that Act as a whole must be held to be valid

notwithstanding any incidental trenching upon matters beyond its competence i.e. on a

matter included in the list belonging to the other legislature’, therefore the court in the

present matter observed that the KUZALR Act is a law principally related to Entry 18

(land) of List II read with Entry 42 in List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution

and only incidentally entrenches upon “forest” i.e. Entry 17A of List III. This is so

because it is an enactment for agrarian reforms and so the basic matter is “land”. Since

the land happens to be forest land, it spills over and incidentally encroaches on Entry

17A. Moreover the mere possibility of repugnancy will not make a State law invalid, for

repugnancy has to exist in fact and it must be shown clearly and sufficiently that the State

law is repugnant to the Union law5.

The pith and substance of the two laws does not operate and relate to the similar matter as

the KUZALR Act relating to agrarian reforms deals with the subject i.e. “land”; however, 4 Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 5695 State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal (2008) 13 SCC 5

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the Central Act i.e. the Indian Forests Act 1927 deal with “forests” and its management,

preservation and levy of royalty/fee on forest produce so both are the two different entries

in the seventh schedule. KUZALR Act further provides for statutory vesting, i.e. statutory

taking over of property of hissedar, which happened to be 1st January of 1978, i.e. the

statutorily fixed date. Therefore, the forest land become the property of the State

Government and is dealt with like land, which is acquired under Section 4A of KUZALR

Act. This emerges from a reading of Rule 41 of the KUZALR Rules itself. Moreover as

the Parliament does not intend to make a complete code for the acquisition and

management of the land, even if there exists some clashing both the laws can stand

together.

Further, the acquisition under the KUZALR Act is a case of "taking" upon payment of an

amount, which is not intended to be the market price of the rights acquired. On the other

hand, the power of acquisition under Section 37 of the Indian Forests Act 1927 i.e. the

Central Act is an acquisition based on the principles of public purpose and compensation.

Thus, the aforesaid Acts relate to different subject matters, and the acquisitions

mentioned therein are conceptually different.

The appeal in the present case was partly allowed and the Court said that in any case compensation cannot be denied as the KUZALR Act itself provides for compensation and any attempt to do away with the compensation would make such order amenable to judicial review.

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CRITIQUE: -

The framers of our Constitution made the Constitution with biase towards the Center . But our framers were fully sympathetic towards the provincial aspirations and autonomy. That is why they established Supreme Court with the hope that the future evolution of the Indian Constitution would be done in such a manner that justice is done to both the center and state legislature. The court in the process of interpretation of the Constitution may sometimes feel it necessary to strengthen the center while at other times may uphold the provincial cause.

The present case is an example of such a scenario that merely because the State made legislation incidentally entrenches upon a part covered under the Central made law it cannot be held repugnant and ultra vires to the powers granted to the State by the Constitution. The main object of the impugned legislation has to be looked at and taken into account which was done so the instant case and the State Law was held not to be repugnant to the Central Law.

Thus the present judgment is of utmost importance as it has made the jurisprudence regarding the

doctrine of Repugnancy more clear than before and thus helps us to understand that mere

legislative incompetence or infringement does not make an Act void, but the intention and the

real subject matter has to be taken into account.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Books: V.N. Shukla’s Constitution of India- Mahendra P. Singh

M.P. Jain- Indian Constitution Law

Constitution of India- PM Bakshi

D.D. Basu Introduction to the Constitution of India.

Websites:

http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1214980/?type=print

http://www.lawker.in/2014/11/kerala-high-court-upholds.html

http://www.manupatrafast.in/

http://www.rajdeepandjoyeeta.com/recent-constitution-bench-cases/172-rajiv-sarin-a-anr-

vs-state-of-uttarakhand-a-ors.html

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RAJEEV SARIN V. STATE OF UTTRAKHAND