Rain on a parched land: reconstructing a post-conflict Sri Lanka

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Rain on a parched land:reconstructing a post-conflictSri LankaAmalendu Misra lecturera School of Politics and International Studies ,Queen's University , BelfastPublished online: 11 Aug 2006.

To cite this article: Amalendu Misra lecturer (2004) Rain on a parched land:reconstructing a post-conflict Sri Lanka, International Peacekeeping, 11:2, 271-288,DOI: 10.1080/1353331042000237274

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Rain on a Parched Land: Reconstructinga Post-conflict Sri Lanka

AMALENDU MISRA

The Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka is one of the longest running ethnic conflicts inrecent years. The ethnic war involving the government forces and rebels, whichlasted from 1983 to 2002, claimed some 64,000 lives – most of them civilians.With peace talks held in earnest between the disputants it appears the two-decade long conflict may finally be over. Cessation of hostility, of course, poseseven greater challenges – notably in post-conflict reconstruction. What shouldbe the preferred mode of interaction between the Tamil rebels and the SriLankan state in the new changed environment? Do international actors have arole to play in post-conflict reconstruction? How do we address the deep-seatedanimosities existing between Tamils and Sinhalese? This article contends thatpost-conflict reconstruction is society and context specific. By using several inter-linked variables, the article suggests that the best chance of putting the war-ravaged society on the road to recovery depends on addressing the recommen-dations contained within these variables.

A discussion about post-conflict reconstruction in Sri Lanka requires ananalysis of its inherent conflict dynamics. The Tamil nationalist strugglewas primarily an ethnic uprising, waged against the background of along-running discriminatory policy that favoured the country’s ethnicSinhalese majority over the minority Tamils. Between 1983 and 2002the civil war, characterized by strong ethno-nationalism on bothsides, went through various phases and the situation was madecomplex due to Colombo’s dependence on India to resolve the conflictmilitarily.

The secessionist conflict and the civil war entered a critical phase in2001. In the aftermath of the airliner attacks in the United States onSeptember 11th, a global consensus emerged against all forms of terroristcampaigns. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which untilthen had largely enjoyed the status of a ‘freedom movement’ wasequated with a terrorist organization and summarily outlawed not only

Amalendu Misra, Queen’s University, Belfast

International Peacekeeping, Vol.11, No.2, Summer 2004, pp.271–288ISSN 1353-3312/1743-906X online

DOI:10.1080/1353331042000237274 # 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd.

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in the United States but also in many other Western countries. This unex-pected change made the LTTE rethink its strategies. Suddenly withoutfriends and lacking any form of international support, it had to choosereconciliation as an alternative to violence. Following this development,it entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Sri Lankan government inFebruary 2002. Six months into the ceasefire, both parties to the conflictbegan to explore the possibilities of retreating from the two-decade-longcivil war. Yet the peace process has remained extremely fragile.

Autonomy and Democracy

During the initial peace talks LTTE’s chief negotiator Anton Balasinghampushed overboard their ‘original agenda’.1 He declared, ‘the Tigers’concept of a homeland and of self-determination demands needs to bedefined within the constructs of a united Sri Lanka’. In other words,the separatists appeared to abandon their claim for an independentTamil state. Retreat from this ‘original agenda’, however, does notamount to the Tamils’ complete commitment to a unitary Sri Lankanstate. For, ‘The LTTE’s vision and strategy for regional autonomy pre-supposes linking their quasi-state to the Sri Lankan state. In that sense,disarming of the LTTE, or de-commissioning of its weapons or dissolvingits fighting units might not be negotiable issues’.2

This is precisely what incensed hardline Sinhalese. While the centralgovernment appeared to be committed to the peace process, it found ithard to sell the idea to the country’s ethnic majority. The oppositionPeople’s Liberation Front or Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and theBuddhist Bhikkhu Front (BKF) appear to have gained significantground and popular support while accusing the ruling United NationalFront (UNF) of ‘selling out’ to insurgents, which amounts to treason.The President of the Republic, Chandrika Kumaratunga expressedanxiety about the LTTE’s demands to set up separate Tamil rebel lawcourts and police stations in the country’s north and northeast. Accordingto him a separate, independent legal system amounted to the division ofstate sovereignty, and this could not be permitted.

Although the LTTE was committed to the Norwegian-sponsoredpeace process and expressed its willingness to work jointly with thecentral government in the post-conflict undertakings, it also indicatedthat it reserved the right to withdraw from any arrangement that deniesor tampers with Tamil autonomy. According to Vellupillai Prabhakaran,the Tamil Tiger supremo: ‘[Tamils] are prepared to consider favourably apolitical framework that offers substantial regional autonomy and self-government in their homeland on the basis of their right to internal

272 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

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self-determination. But if their right to self-determination is denied andLTTE’s demand for regional self-rule is rejected it would have no alterna-tive other than to secede and form an independent state’.3 Hence, definingthe autonomy requested by the LTTE poses potential hazards to the peaceprocess, and lack of clarity about it will mar any long-term prospect inthat direction.

However, minority protection and/or increased autonomy arrange-ments for minority groups have to be constructed in such a way thatnone of the communities feels aggrieved. In other words, if one commu-nity holds that it shares the majority of the burden and peace is installedat its own expense that community would have little incentive to continuewith the whole process. Inadequate space given to one or several groupsin a conflict, or rewarding one group over another, is often a cause ofrecurrence of civil war in conflict zones. Successful post-conflict recon-struction is very much a balancing act. In this particular context, notonly the Sri Lankan government but also the external third partiesinvolved in the peace process are required to clearly define the ways inwhich they intend to settle different autonomy demands and make theirdecision transparent to the affected communities.

Although it militates against the spirit of communal solidarity and is amajor obstacle in rebuilding inter-ethnic cooperation, it may be necessaryto opt for ‘temporary if not permanent territorial partition along ethniclines to avoid the recurrence of inter-group violence and conflict’.4 Thestate now has ‘an opportunity to come up with a political model thatincorporates principles of regional autonomy with self-governance’.5

Nevertheless, this should be drafted in such a way as to providemaximum protection to all communities.

While it is clear that the elites and leaders in a deeply divided societyuse violent conflict as a means of ‘transforming politics from an issue onwhich they are likely to lose power into one on which they can retainpower’, the rationale behind mass support to this personal and self-satisfying vision of leaders is often perplexing, especially when they areaware that they are being manipulated. The Tamils, in this context,had very little choice but to follow the dictates of LTTE. The LTTE, onits part, staved off all democratic opposition to its authority simply bykilling every other leader. One of the key objectives of post-conflictreconstruction is to promote greater political transparency in the affectedzone. Therefore, a vision of democratic pluralism on the part of leader-ship is critical to guarantee perpetuation of peace in deeply dividedsocieties.

The shortest route to popular participation in the democratic processcan be built through constitutional means, of course. But such guarantees

RECONSTRUCTING A POST-CONFLICT SRI LANKA 273

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will remain hollow unless provision exists for sustaining this process. Therole of international agencies involved in post-conflict reconstructionassumes immense importance here. They need to tie in aid provisionsto democracy. In short, it requires a form of engagement based oncarrot-and-stick policy. The optimists of the peace process recognizethis need and argue that ‘it will take time to turn the rebel Tigers froma ruthless terrorist army into a credible civilian administration’.6

Spoiler Problem

Post-conflict reconstruction is invariably laced with serious ‘spoiler’ pro-blems. External powers nursing old grievances or feeling left out from thelarger decision-making process could undermine the fledgling peaceprocess. A cursory glance at various post-conflict reconstruction casessuggests external actors with ‘limited’, ‘greedy’ or ‘absolute’ objectiveshave marred many of these undertakings.7 Angola, Cambodia andRwanda were constrained in their effort to emerge as peaceful societiesbecause of the continuing intervention by external actors, even whenan internationally sponsored peace process was well underway.

Turning to the Sri Lankan case it is imperative to ask if it faces anysuch challenges. Sri Lanka’s northern neighbour and the regionalpower, India, features prominently in this equation. Owing to complexethnic ties, geographical proximity and great power ambition, India hasremained intrinsically linked to the conflict on the island.8 The promi-nence of one or all of these issues at one point or another has forcedIndia to intervene in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka. New Delhi’sresponse or involvement, however, has been very ambivalent indeed.When the ethnic war began in the early 1980s it supported and armedthe rebel Tigers. In the second phase of the civil war, it tried to suppressthe Tigers when its military was stationed in the island as part of thepeacekeeping force.9

Given India’s strategic and cultural proximity to Sri Lanka, its invol-vement is crucial in determining the future of the peace process. However,policy makers in New Delhi suffer from two sets of grievances. First, theyhold grudges against the Sri Lankan authorities for the forced and uncer-emonious withdrawal of Indian ‘peacekeepers’ from the island in 1989.Second, they blame the LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran for the assassinationof former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

Since these two issues have primacy in India’s foreign policy projec-tion, it is unlikely that India would unreservedly commit to the peaceprocess or post-conflict reconstruction. Unless this is resolved a ‘spoilerproblem’ arises, whereby the peace process will remain hostage to the


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will of a regional power. Furthermore, India and Sri Lanka are deeplyuneasy about each other. Each considers the other as a threat, ‘not inthe sense of territorial ambitions, but in the influences that could affectthe capacity of each country to cope with its internal challenges’.10

Courting Combatants

During its two-decade-old campaign against the government, the LTTErecruited most able-bodied Tamils in the country’s north and northeastas soldiers. Put simply, a generation of Tamils lost its capacity to domuch beyond participating in a bloody war. The next generation, tooyoung to participate in direct action, grew up in the shadow of war. Athriving subculture of everyday violence and perpetual preparedness tocourt war severely affected the society’s ability to face issues on anormal day-to-day basis.

Although Tamil civilians regarded LTTE combatants as savioursduring the conflict, in the new situation they are extremely anxiousabout their future role. Reports of rebel hostilities against the civilianpopulation, including acts of torture, intimidation, harassment, abduc-tion, extortion and murder, are a matter of general public knowledge.That the combatants are a nuisance in the post-conflict phase is recog-nized by a significant number of Tamils, some of whom are ‘now predict-ing that once the ethnic conflict is resolved there will be another strugglefor Tamil rights – this time against the Tigers’.11 If anything, it suggeststhat ex-combatants are unable or unwilling to step into the civiliandomain. Reconstruction of civil society is dependent on disarming, demo-bilizing and reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian life.12 In theabsence of their successful reintegration, they would be in a position tospoil the peace process by taking up arms and withdrawing from anytreaty obligation. As a priority, the post-conflict reconstruction pro-gramme should ‘aim to provide sufficient economic and political incen-tives to encourage the former combatants to look for alternative meansof employment’.

Throughout the two-decade-long conflict, the LTTE actively recruitedchildren into its rebel army. The process continues even after the ceasefiredeclaration between the government and the rebels in February 2002. It isargued that if the LTTE leadership commits itself fully to the peaceprocess the rank and file including the child soldiers will follow suit.Demobilization and reintegration of these child soldiers, however, isfraught with difficulties. Resettlement of child-soldiers indoctrinatedinto violence and who suffer from deep psychological disorder wouldbe toughest challenge of all when it comes to social reconstruction.


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And, as is evident from many other civil war affected societies, it is thechild soldiers who are the first to go back to war in the event of a crisisin the peace process.13 Also, evidence from Angola, Sierra Leone,Burma and Colombia suggest that even when the rebel leadership wascommitted to a ceasefire and to a generally agreed peace process thechild soldiers continued about their business of looting, rampage, indis-criminate killing and other gory adventures for years. How can ex-child soldiers be enticed to become productive members of their commu-nity? ‘Child soldiers generally want to be recognized and included informal demobilization programmes. When they are excluded, resentmentand a sense of abandonment lead some to return to violence as a way ofimproving their lives’.14 Fortunately, Tamils have a strong family struc-ture often reinforced by deep emotional bonds. Replanting this ‘lost gen-eration’ into their families, or in the larger society for those unfortunateenough to have lost both parents, holds the key to their demobilizationand eventual reintegration into normal life. Donors and aid agencieshave a special duty in this regard.

Similarly, the government soldiers too need to adapt to a peacebuild-ing context. The internecine civil war created enormous space for SriLanka’s armed forces to expand at a staggering rate. Most governmentsoldiers in the civil war were Sinhalese and easily indoctrinated to theethnic dimensions of the conflict. Put bluntly they saw all forms ofTamil resistance as a threat to their very survival and developed a deep-seated antipathy toward the Tamil community as a whole. Post-conflictreconstruction requires that these soldiers go through a ‘sanitizationprocess’ to ensure that Tamils are treated as equals rather thanenemies. A significant portion of the military personnel would be super-fluous if peace holds. In this context, the soldiers could be used to workin developmental projects in the north and the northeast. This wouldserve two purposes. First, it would keep the military occupied in civi-lian/humanitarian tasks. Second, and most importantly, both the soldiersand the Tamils would interact in a changed environment – a key requisitein all post-conflict reconstruction undertaking.

Dealing with combatants is one of the most pressing and recurringchallenges of any post-conflict situation.15 Yet, ‘considerations of theefficacy of short-term targeting which privileges ex-combatants [overother civilian categories] must be balanced with long-term imperativesthat break down the combatant identity of the former soldier into onethat is “civlilianised”’.16 Similarly, a lasting ceasefire can hold only ifthe combatants are disarmed and demobilized. Decommissioning,collecting and destroying the weapons of ex-rebels is therefore criticallyimportant.


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The Role of Diaspora

Diaspora remittance is a vital aspect of many civil war economies.17 Thenature and characteristic of contemporary insurgency movements isoften determined by the economic contribution made by the diaspora.Sikh separatism in India in the 1980s, the Kurdish war of independence,Eritrean self-determination struggle, sectarian struggle in NorthernIreland and the Tamil liberation movement have benefited from thevital financial support of overseas communities. A growing body ofscholarship overwhelmingly suggests that rebel leaders build an organiz-ation by using economic and/or social endowments to recruit the labournecessary for war. They also build watertight ethnic identities to signalsupport for a cause, make promises of future benefits for that commu-nity, and use this critical avenue to recruit members and generatesupplies necessary for war.18 In sum, ‘foreign remittances have notonly supported families in need of assistance, but also providedmoney to purchase weapons and salaries to sustain fighters in conflictzones’.19

The civil war in Sri Lanka displaced some one million Tamils, half ofwhom remained in the country and half going abroad as refugees.20

Tamils displaced by the ethnic war can now be found on every continent.21

This diaspora has been the main financier of the liberation struggle.Thanks to their ‘economic muscle and international influence, theyhave been successful in waging an ideological battle for LTTE over-seas’,22 and through their financial contributions have aided the insur-gency within Sri Lanka. The LTTE in the past was instrumental insending a part of its sympathizers overseas to eke out a living and simul-taneously generate income for the ‘liberation struggle’. Those refugeeswho did not come to the West through this channel and were thus freefrom such obligation, often found the LTTE already present in theirfavoured destination.23 In sum, through a complex network, and attimes by using pressure tactics, the LTTE extracted a firm commitmentfrom refugees and migrants to remain politically, emotionally and finan-cially committed to the cause.

The diaspora community can continue contributing, but to a differentend. In the post-conflict context, the diaspora has a moral responsibilityto invest remittances in nurturing peace and post-conflict reconstructionefforts. Rebel leaders who find themselves without financing are unlikelyto grow large enough to engage in civil war or puncture the fragile peaceprocess.24 Simultaneously this form of economic clampdown can deterand discourage any LTTE splinter group from launching an offensive ifit feels that the peace process has not much to offer.


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One of the key features of the war in Sri Lanka was that it createdwaves of ‘brain drain’ among the Tamil community. As is the case withseveral other conflict zones, most educated and capable individualswere forced to flee the conflict. This out-migration in effect deprivedthe community of important human capital. A return of talent is essentialfor the war-ravaged society and the country as a whole to recover itssocial capital and its economic growth.25 Although several of the first-generation refugees who fled to theWest now hold citizenship and perma-nent resident rights in these countries, many of the expatriates this authorinterviewed would like to return to ‘make a difference’. Nevertheless,they need a three-pronged assurance from the Sri Lankan government,the LTTE and international agencies engaged in post-conflict reconstruc-tion to provide hard guarantees as to their safety, freedom of movementand gainful employment in their areas of their expertise. To jump-start aneffective recovery programme the above demands need to be takenseriously and implemented in earnest.

Refugee and IDP Resettlement

Post-conflict reconstruction refers to overcoming legacies of conflict. As astrategy it can be implemented whenever there is a let-up in the fightingbetween groups, reconstruction tasks taking place in areas where conflicthas subsided. On that premise, it further assumes that from small oppor-tunities to redress grievances reconstruction can be gradually introducedto a larger audience and the entire affected area. Proponents of a partialand graduated approach contend that ‘many of the rebuilding activitiescan, and in fact usually do, occur while conflict is still taking place inother parts of the nation’.26

Indeed two of the main institutional forces behind contemporarypost-war/post-conflict reconstruction projects, the World Bank27 and theUNHCR,28 hold that it is impossible to situate a point of departure betweenconflict and post-conflict situations. Therefore, post- reconstruction workshould be undertaken even under conditions of general conflict. As a firststep both institutions target refugee resettlement as a priority and considerit crucial to furthering peace. Voluntary refugee repatriation is often con-sidered the most accurate of devices to gauge the success or failure ofpost-conflict reconstruction.

According to the UNHCR some 500,000 Tamils fled Sri Lankabetween 1983 and 2000. Although the ceasefire of 2001 has generallyheld and the disputants were involved in peace talks in earnest during2003, neither development has made any impact on the refugees. The100,000 Tamil refugees living in India are most sceptical of the peace


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process, though they clearly wish to return, if mainly ‘to escape policeharassment, round-ups, restriction on their movements, arbitrary deten-tion, a life based on handouts and discriminatory wages’.29 But there isvery little willingness among them to make a hasty return and overlookthe above conditionalities. Their adherence to the status quo is basednot only on their doubts about the peace process but on their life experi-ences. In 1993 several thousand refugees freely left the southern Indianstate of Tamilnadu for Sri Lanka, but were back in India withinmonths as peace prospects were shattered and some were caught in thecrossfire.

In addition to a vast refugee population, Sri Lanka also has a signifi-cant number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). They number over amillion and many have been displaced five or six times by the fighting.Unfortunately, IDPs have not featured in the peace talks between the gov-ernment and the rebels. Their plight obviously cannot be ignored.

Reconstruction is a long-term strategy which takes place even underconditions of conflict with the hope that initiatives will facilitategeneral peace in the future. Simultaneously, a key aim of reconstructionis to create a sense of ‘certainty and calm’ among the refugees and intern-ally displaced persons, to make them feel ‘needed’ in the land from whichthey fled. Clearly neither of the affected groups in the Sri Lankan situationfeels that conditions are ripe for return. How can theWorld Bank and UNHigh Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) achieve the objectives ofreconstruction in the absence of a sure and complete peace and rehabili-tation without making the two groups captives in an experiment?

Returning refugee populations and IDPs are not merely passive bene-ficiaries of humanitarian aid. Depending on how their cases are handled,they can contribute to either instability or reconstruction.30 According toa World Bank characterization, ‘a key component of achieving post-conflict reconstruction relates to the successful social and economicreintegration of war-affected populations’.31 Thus it is imperative that‘sustainable return’ is given the highest priority in any Sri Lankan initiat-ive for refugee and IDP resettlement.

According to a seminal study by UNHCR, in order for a society toemerge from the shadows of conflict it needs to address five key securitydilemmas affecting the refugees and IDPs to avoid a return to re-conflictdynamics. These are (a) physical, (b) material, (c) legal, and (d) social andpsychological insecurities.32 It is commonly agreed that the displaced inSri Lanka’s 20-year-old civil war face all or most of these insecurities.Should the government and rebels reach a nationally accepted consensuson an autonomous self-governing space for the Tamils within a united SriLanka, some of these dilemmas can be resolved. As examples from other


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war-torn societies suggest, ‘it is often difficult to redress the returnees’social and psychological insecurities damaged by violence and brutality,but part could be addressed if the returnees’ physical and material secur-ity is assured, and when a constructive relationship between returnees,civil society and the state is consolidated’.33

The ‘Muslim Question’

One of the least-known aspects of the internecine conflict in Sri Lanka is theabuse of the Muslim minority. Although they share linguistic features withTamils, Muslims have nonetheless refused to be identified as such. Thisyearning to be treated as a separate community on religious grounds hasproduced attendant problems. First, the self-definition of Muslims, asdifferent from Sinhalese and Tamils, has produced an element of solidaritybetween the latter two groups. Second, time and again they have beencaught up in the crossfire between the two main contestants. Third, theirallegiance to the unity of Sri Lanka has been suspect. Throughout the con-flict, theMuslim community oftenmaintained an ‘accommodationist strat-egy’ to avoid any direct confrontation with either the Tamils or Sinhalese.34

However, in a bilateral conflict that involved competing attempts to conso-lidate authority, theMuslims were pulled in both directions and were oftencaught up in the crossfire. A dispersed community living on both sides ofTamil-Sinhalese geographical divide, they were often branded as collabor-ators by both sides. In addition, ‘the Muslims’ growing self-perception as adistinct ethnic groupwith legitimate claims for influence in the Tamil home-lands was perceived by the LTTE as a threat to Tamil Eelam and to theirown claim of being the sole and rightful representatives of the Tamil popu-lation in these areas’.35 Following an LTTE-sponsored massacre ofMuslims in 1990, over 16,000 Muslim families were evicted from thenorth by the Tamil Tigers. Some 100,000 Muslims became IDPs owingto this low level of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and were forced to live in camps inthe south.36

Comprising about 7 per cent of the country’s population, theMuslimsare a relatively prosperous community, their prosperity based on strongbusiness acumen and money sent by Muslim guest workers in thePersian Gulf. Politically, too, they have a visible presence in the country’spolitical processes. In an otherwise fractious political system Muslimshave stayed united, forming a successful voting bloc with power tochange the nature of central government. This bargaining power,however, has led a section of the Sinhalese majority to view them as apotentially divisive force, in the context of continued Sinhalese hege-mony. On another plane, although both are minorities and have faced


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persecution by the Sri Lankan state, the Tamils have rarely been sympath-etic to the plight of Muslims. A shared history of religious hatred and reli-gious segregation has been manifested in rioting between them. TheMuslims, being numerically less powerful and located in Tamil-dominated areas, have experienced considerable damage to their lifeand property in these encounters.37

In the clamour surrounding the peace process between the governmentand the LTTE it is easy to ignore the needs and expectations of other min-orities, notably the Muslims. As Rothchild and Hartzel argue, ‘the exclu-sion of a minority group from critical decision-making processes at thepolitical centre can gravely heighten that community’s sense of exposureand vulnerability to their powerful elements in the society’.38 In the pastMuslims were mistreated by both the government and the rebels. The com-munity is justifiably afraid of both Sinhalese and Tamils and wants theirown, separate administrative entity. Although a difficult demand to enter-tain at this stage, one needs to be mindful of the fact that without someform of constitutional guarantee or safe havens they might achievecontrol of a large section of the country, as the Bosnian Muslims largelycontrol the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Reviving Ethnic Harmony

One of the fundamental reasons behind ethno-political rebellion or insur-gency in a multi-ethnic state is the central government’s policies of ethnicdiscrimination.39 It is widely established that in the past the Sri Lankanstate engaged in low levels of ethnic cleansing. It demonized the Tamilcommunity and treated every Tamil in the northeast as an insurgent.Those who attempted to escape this form of identification were castigatedas ‘terrorists’ and killed in ritualized ways, showing that such responseswere intended ‘as punishment for the collective errors of the Tamilpeople’.40 The Tamils on their part equated Sinhalese persecutors as‘potential threats’ to their independence aspirations and therefore legiti-mate targets.

This construct on both sides has done considerable damage to ethnicharmony. Therefore, it is pertinent to ask how to redress that mutual hos-tility. Many difficulties are associated with restoring trust and social cohe-sion after violent conflict.41 Once violence ceases, it becomes extremelydifficult to re-create a sense of identity and belonging among commu-nities that have experienced political, economic and socio-culturalbreakdown.42 Societies who have experienced internal conflict, buthave not resolved the root causes of their disputes, are prone to eruptinto more armed violence.43 Resolving intractable issues between


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former enemies at the political level does not always facilitate peace. Ashas been suggested by many analysts, ‘one clear lesson of civil war isthat social reintegration and reconciliation cannot be bought or legislatedin the short run’.44 The need for communities to resolve their past differ-ences and treat their erstwhile adversaries as equals is paramount in anypost-conflict reconstruction process.

The breakdown in ‘trust’ during prolonged civil conflict can be amajor obstacle to successful reintegration of war-affected populations.45

The task before the country as a whole involves the construction of socialand cultural bridges that brings divergent ethno-nationalist constituenciescloser together. Most conflict-ridden societies are governed by ‘a legacy ofvengeance-seeking group grievance’. Both sides of the war in Sri Lankaharbour unmitigated grudges; those affected by the conflict suffer fromdeep-seated anguish; and an overpowering climate of distrust stillhangs over the entire nation. For a majority of Tamils it is not easy togloss over past injustices, and the Sinhalese would find it hard to acceptTamils as a peace-loving community overnight.

According to a great many observers ‘justice and reconciliation, intandem, must be seen as central pillar of any assistance for post-conflictreconstruction and should receive priority attention early and throughoutthe life of an operation’.46 In Sri Lanka, however,with atrocities committedby both Tamils and Sinhalese, it is hard to uphold the prescription forjustice effectively. Besides, seeking justice and holding on to the prescriptionof legal persecution ‘when the wounds of the conflict are still raw and thepeace so fragile’ would constitute a grave error.47 Therefore, there shouldbe added emphasis on reconciliation. A successful post-conflict reconstruc-tion, in this context, is dependent on introducing a healing process thatseeks compromise over conflict, friendliness over distrust and forgivenessover vengeance. Elimination of social exclusion and increased social cohe-sion certainly hold the key to improved inter-ethnic relations. The role andcapacity of the newly reformed state is clearly a critical element in the stra-tegic interactions between collectivities.48 In the absence of the state provid-ing scaffolding for such cross-ethnic/communal interaction, the persistenceof pre-conflict prejudice would be very high indeed.

State Failure and State Rebuilding

Civil wars are usually about failures of legitimate state authority.49 As a rule,most contemporary civil war affected societies face serious institutionalbreakdown, suffer from weak or non-existent political institutions, enjoyonly limited or partial legitimacy and authority and are characterizedby the absence of a civil society.50 A society or state that experiences all


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these manifestations is often described as a ‘failed state’. Post-conflictreconstruction efforts are a challenge in this framework. Given this level ofinstitutional breakdown, when introduced to this terrain, many well-intentioned peace processes flounder and ultimately collapse.

Although Sri Lanka did exhibit several of the defining characteristicsof ‘failed states’, it did not fail. True, it lost partial control of the country’snorth and northeast, and encountered numerous insurgencies and ‘terror-ist’ attacks in Colombo and elsewhere, but this did not undermine thelarger democratic process or the system of governance and did not meta-morphose into utter lawlessness and chaos. In the midst of two decades ofenduring civil war it was reduced to a weak state and remained suscep-tible to failure but never actually failed.51 In spite of the challenges tothe very fabric of the state there was no effort to tamper with democracy,and the military did not intervene in the civilian decision-making process.

Therefore, the chances of Sri Lanka emerging from its violent past andreaping long-term peace dividends are far higher compared to some otherwar-torn states such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone or Somalia. However,this outcome is contingent upon the Sri Lankan state reorienting itself to anewmethod of thinking and operation. Consolidation of peace is likely tocome under strain if:

. there is no transparent power sharing;

. the state fails to recognizeminority rights within amulticultural set up;

. former combatants are not provided general amnesty;

. there are no safe havens for minorities;

. the state fails to provide adequate employment facilities;

. political elites ignore the recommendations of the internationalcommunity.

As the neo-liberal argument goes: to nurture diverse ethnic identitieswithin a given cultural and political system, the state must promote mech-anisms that preserve regional autonomy, linguistic education rights,ethnic representation and/or religious freedom. Lack of these provisionsin this direction could severely endanger post-conflict reconstructionefforts and substantially raise the probability of recurrence of ethniccivil war.52 Sadly, these admirable sentiments are often ignored insocieties emerging from years of conflict.

Political Economy of Post-conflict Reconstruction

Following their first round of peace talks in Sattahip naval base, Thai-land, in September 2002, both the Sri Lankan government and the


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LTTE made a joint appeal to the international community to providereconstruction aid for the country’s war-ravaged north and northeasternregion. Their initial expression on the appointment of a Joint Task Forcefor Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activities (JTF) suggested thatboth had thought through the process of creating a post-conflict future.The international community and donors received this joint declarationwith much enthusiasm. Since such open reconciliatory approachesbetween former enemies stand a better chance of producing a viableoutcome in terms of the adversaries’ dedication to conflict resolution,one could argue in this particular case the commitment of the donorsand the international financial bodies was likely to be more serious com-pared to other instances where such goodwill between parties to the con-flict was absent.

In approaching post-conflict reconstruction from a donor’s perspec-tive, however, we realize that ‘building peace is seldom the sole interestof an external third party’.53 An analysis of some major post-conflictreconstruction projects in recent years reveals that external institutionaland donor governments’ overt commitment to reconstruction of a war-torn state is linked to their long-term economic and geopoliticaldesigns, commercial interests and refugee repatriation. Given this modeof thinking and objective planning, many post-conflict reconstructionprojects in the developing world are abortive. Cambodia, Mozambique,Bosnia and Afghanistan exemplify this.

Where does Sri Lanka stand in this equation? Unfortunately, given thecountry’s relatively unimportant strategic location and its inability tocontribute to satisfying the world hunger for mineral, oil or gas require-ments, the chances of its receiving significant aid packages to rebuild thecountry are minimal. Some countries such as Japan (which happened tobe the largest provider of foreign aid during the war years) have promisedto supplement a part of the post-conflict reconstruction budget. But thereis bound to be a dearth of other good Samaritans. An early display ofdonor interest in post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan, Angola,Bosnia, Cambodia, East Timor and Mozambique, to name a few, hasbeen depressingly limited in their subsequent commitment.

All post-conflict societies suffer from diminished levels of capital –social, human and financial. ‘States emerging from conflict are not coin-cidentally also among the world’s poorest’.54 However, compared toother contemporary post-war reconstruction projects, the one for SriLanka would be considerably less taxing in economic terms. True,much of the country’s north and northeast is destroyed, the infrastruc-tural facilities in these parts barely exist and a considerable tract ofarable land has been laid waste. In other words, Sri Lanka has a level


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of devastation comparable to other war-torn societies. However, in termsof human capital it stands out from all other war-ravaged societies.Tamils happen to be one of the most industrious communities. Theireconomic success in the West (often in the face of extreme challenges)is a testimony to their steadfastness and tenacity.55 Thanks to this ‘dedi-cation to succeed’ they could recreate an able society through their workethic should peace return.

To launch that drive will require much-needed financial assistance.Initial estimates suggest that at least US$500m in terms of aid and invest-ment, job creation and de-mining projects will prepare the war-ravagedregions to make preliminary moves in that direction. Unfortunately, thebankrupt Sri Lankan government can hardly foot that bill. Hence, exter-nal economic commitment is paramount in the post-conflict reconstruc-tion work.

Conclusion

Post-conflict reconstruction is a long-term comprehensive project thatrequires unremitting effort by the governing regime, ex-rivals and theinternational community.56 A key feature of societies emerging fromyears of conflict is that ‘formal peace agreements are rarely fullyimplemented and the post-conflict period is beleaguered by small-scale,sustained violence, resulting in many of these being in a prolonged stateof half war and half peace’.57 However, one positive aspect in thewhole process is that the longer the ceasefire continues the more difficultit will be for either side to break it. In the Sri Lankan case, both partieshad reached their optimal level of conflict potential and were clearly suf-fering from war fatigue.58 Introducing former adversaries to peace divi-dends and receiving their full commitment to post-conflict initiative isrelatively easy in this scenario.

In conflict-ridden societies, one can talk about the future by talkingabout the past. Post-conflict reconstruction is an attempt to understandthe past and aims to avoid the pitfalls already encountered. As withmany war-torn societies, although it may be possible to impose an exter-nally mediated order in Sri Lanka’s two-decade long conflict, ‘the sense ofcommunity’ that was lost due to an internecine conflict has to grow fromwithin. Mutual trust and sincerity between the government and rebels arekeys to the success of a well-entrenched peace process.59 Therefore, thepost-war reconstruction project will not take off until complete trust isestablished between the parties to the conflict. Similarly, a successful con-flict resolution and external resolve to post-conflict reconstructiondepend to a large degree on the disputants’ or the conflicting parties’


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commitment to just peace and good governance. Absence of any of theabove conditionalities could severely undermine the entire process.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to thank the referees for their helpful suggestions.

NOTES

1. This refers to ‘Tamil demand for (a) a distinct nationality; (b) right to self-determination; (c) recognition of the north and northeast of the country as the tra-ditional Tamil homeland’. The Sri Lankan government has always rejected suchdemands as violating the country’s sovereignty.

2. Pravada (Colombo), 16 Sept. 2002.3. For a full text of Velupillai Prabhakaran’s statement, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/

world/south_asia/2526765.stm4. Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel, ‘Recovering from Civil Conflict’, Inter-

national Peacekeeping, Vol.9, No.2, pp.3–4.5. Alan Bullion. ‘Dreaming of a War-Free Future’, The World Today, Vol.58, No.12,

p.27.6. ‘Peace in Sri Lanka: Tottering on’, The Economist, 1 Feb. 2003, p.57.7. Stephen John Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, International Security,

Vol.22, No.2, pp.5–53.8. For an incisive discussion, see Alan Bullion, India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Crisis,

London: Continuum, 1995.9. The literature is too extensive to itemize, but for a brief overview, see Stanley

J. Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide & Dismantling of Democracy, Chicago: Uni-versity of Chicago Press, 1991.

10. Padmaja Murthy, ‘Indo-Sri Lankan Security Perceptions: Divergences and Conver-gences, Strategic Analysis, Vol.24, No.2, p.344.

11. Frances Harrison, ‘Sri Lanka’s tricky transition to peace’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2721945.stm

12. Nicole Ball, ‘Demobilising and Reintegrating Soldiers’, in K. Kumar (ed.), RebuildingSocieties after Civil War, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997; also see, Mats Berdal,Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the Termin-ation of Armed Conflicts, Adelphi Paper 303, Oxford: Oxford University Press forIISS, 1996.

13. For an early discussion, see ‘Kalashinikov Kids’, The Economist, 8 July 1999, p.72.14. Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, Child Soldiers: Prevention, Demobilisa-

tion and Reintegration, No.3, May 2002, p.2.15. Scot Feil, ‘Building Better Foundations: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction’,

Washington Quarterly, Vol.25, No.4, p.104.16. Chris Alden, ‘Making Old Soldiers Fade Away’, Security Dialogue, Vol.33, No.3, p.353.17. Mark Duffield, ‘Post-modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-adjustment States and Private

Protection’, Civil Wars, Vol.1, No.1, p.84.18. Jeremy Weinstein, ‘The Structure of Rebel Organisations: Implications for Post-

Conflict Reconstruction’, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Report, No.4,Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002, p.2.

19. JohannaMendelson Forman, ‘Achieving SocioeconomicWell-Being in Postconflict Set-tings’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.25, No.4, p.137.

20. An estimated 250,000 Tamil expatriates live in Europe, 220,000 in North America,90,000 in India and 40,000 in Australia. United Nations High Commissioner for


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Refugees, Remembering the Displaced: Celebrating their Courage, Resilience andDetermination, Colombo: UNHCR, 2000.

21. Oivind Fuglerud, Life on the Outside: Tamil Diaspora and Long Distance National-ism, London: Pluto, 1999, p.2.

22. Jehan Perera, ‘Expatriate Power: To End War or Prolong it?’, accessed atwww.geocities.com/CapitolHill/4708/it/junart1.htm.

23. Fuglerud (n.21 above), p.154.24. Weinstein (n.18 above), p.2.25. Mendelson Forman (n.19 above), p.131.26. John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan ‘Toward Postconflict Reconstruction’,

Washington Quarterly, Vol.25, No.4, p.90.27. For a detailed discussion, see TheWorld Bank, Post-Conflict Fund: Guidelines and Pro-

cedure, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1999.28. UNHCR, UNHCR Operational Framework for Repatriation and Reintegration in

Post-Conflict Situations, Geneva: UNHCR, 1999.29. Several interrelated factors contribute to this treatment of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees

in India, perhaps the most important being the prejudice which surfaced follow-ing Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination by a Tamil suicide bomber in1991.

30. Arthur C. Helton, ‘Rescuing the Refugees’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.81, No.2, p.78.31. World Bank, The Transition from War to Peace: An Overview, Washington, DC:

World Bank, 1999, ch.7, p.2.32. The State of World’s Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1997, pp.153–60.33. B.S. Chimni, ‘Refugees and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Critical Perspective, Inter-

national Peacekeeping, Vol.9, No.2, pp.167–8.34. For a comprehensive discussion, see Meghan O’Sullivan, ‘Conflict as a Catalyst: The

Changing Politics of the Sri Lankan Muslims’, in S. Gamage and I.B. Watson (eds.),Conflict and Community in Contemporary Sri Lanka, New Delhi: Sage, 1999.

35. Brigitte Refslund Sorensen,Caught Between Borders: Response Strategies of the Intern-ally Displaced, London: Pluto Press, 2001, p.176.

36. UNHCR, Remembering the Displaced: Celebrating their Courage, Resilience andDetermination, Colombo: UNHCR, 2000.

37. For a detailed discussion see, Stanley J. Tambiah, Leveling Crowds: EthnonationalistConflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia, Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1997.

38. Donald Rothchild and Caroline A. Hartzell, ‘Security in Deeply Divided Societies: TheRole of Territorial Autonomy’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol.5, Nos.3/4,p.257.

39. For analysis on this aspect of conflict dynamics, see Ted Robert Gurr, People VersusStates, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000.

40. Pamela J. Stewart and Andrew Strathern, Violence: Theory and Ethnography, London:Continuum, 2002, p.166.

41. World Bank, Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Perspectives andProspects, Paris: World Bank Paris Office, 1998, p.8.

42. Newman and Schnabel (n.4 above), p.1.43. Albrecht Schnabel, ‘Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Second-Generation Preventive

Action, International Peacekeeping, Vol.9, No.2, p.19.44. Nat J. Colletta and Taies Nezam, ‘From Reconstruction to Reconciliation’, Develop-

ment Outreach, autumn 1999, p.6.45. World Bank, The Transition from War to Peace: An Overview, Washington, DC:

World Bank, 1999, ch.7, p.8.46. Michele Flournoy and Michael Pan, ‘Dealing with Demons: Justice and Reconcilia-

tion’, Washington Quarterly, Vol.25, No.4, p.111.


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47. According to debates in the Sierra Leonean peace process. See Peter Penfold, ‘WillJustice Help Peace’, The World Today, Vol.58, No.11, p.23.

48. Rothchild and Hartzell (n.38 above), p.256.49. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, ‘International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical

and Quantitative Analysis’, American Political Science Review, Vol.94, No.4, p.779.50. Newman and Schnabel (n.4 above), p.1.51. Robert I. Rotberg, ‘Failed States in a World of Terror’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.81, No.4,

p.131.52. Nicholas Samabanis, ‘Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?’,

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.45, No.3, p.267.53. James K. Boyce, ‘Aid Conditionality as a Tool for Peacebuilding: Opportunities and

Constraints’, Development and Change, Vol.33, No.5, p.1034.54. Mendelson Forman, (n.19 above), p.125.55. Peter Chalk, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s International Organisations and

Operations: A Preliminary Analysis, Commentary No.77, Toronto: Canadian SecurityIntelligence Service, 2000.

56. Amalendu Misra, ‘Afghanistan: The Politics of Post-war Reconstruction’, Conflict,Security and Development, Vol.2, No.3, p.14.

57. Nat J. Colletta and Taies Nezam (n. 44 above), p.6.58. As Mason and Fett suggest, ‘the longer a civil war lasts, the greater the likelihood par-

ticipants motivation to negotiate a solution rather than continue with the conflict’,T. David Mason and Pattrick J. Fett, ‘How Civil Wars End: A Rational ChoiceApproach’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.40, No.4, p.552. Also, see Fen OslerHampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail, Washington,DC: US Institute of Peace, 1996.

59. Mats Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper,No.303, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.129.


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Documents

Rain on a parched land: reconstructing a post-conflict Sri Lanka