Rahman Momin (1972) - The Facade of Objectivity

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The Facade of Objectivity: An Inquiry into the Epistemology of Value-Free Sociology Author(s): Abdur Rahman Momin Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 7, No. 44 (Oct. 28, 1972), pp. 2195-2202Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4361983Accessed: 07-05-2015 14:49 UTC

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SPECIAL ARTICLES

The Facade of Objectivity An Inquiry into the Epistemology of Value-Free Sociology

Abdur Rahman Momin

With its overwhelming emphasis on objective and value-free social research, academic sociology has in recent years come under heavy attack not -only from administrators but also from socially committed intellectuals and students.

In particular, the value-free stance of sociology and its paradoxical espousal of 'policy-relevant' social research has engendered deep resentment and anguish. Its critics strongly feel that sociology, in its obsession with scientism, has become an ally of the repressive regime of technocracy.

Scientific sociology is not onily'becoming inimical to radiCal social change but wittingly or unwittingly also lends support to the forces of injustice.

[Grateful acknowledgement is made to the following for their constructive suggestions and comments: A R Desai, J V Ferreira, B Narain and Manorama Savur, all of the Department of Sociology, University of Bombay; S N Valanjoo of Sophia College; and Jyoti Kulkarni of St Xavier's College, Bombay.] True observation must necessarily be extemal to the observer; the famous internal observation is no more than a. vain parody of it, which presents the ridiculously contradictory situation of our intelligence contemplating itself during the habitual performance of its own activity.

-AUCGUSTE COMTE

"NO science", wrote Max Weber in Iiis characteristic style, "is absolutely free from presuppositions anrd no science can prove its fundamental value to the man who rejects these presuppositions." (Gerth and Mills, 1946: 153) And what is more important, these presuppositions which are essentially of a philosophical nature, permeate every phase of the scientific enterprise. Not only theoretical formulations and empirical gene- ralisations but also methodological procedures and research designs bear the impress of such philosophic assumptions. In the social sciences this fact is all the more conspicuous because the subject matter of the socio-cultural disciplines is not inaniimate physical entities but valuing and meaning-seeking human beings. Since the social sciences deal with man as a social animal it is only natural that they make certain presuppositions about human nature and the reality of culture and society. These presuppositions underlie the various research procedures and techniques designed to obtain, classify and interpret empirical data. As Alvini Gouldner has put it, "every research method makes some assumptions about how information may be secured from people and what may be done with people, or to them, in order to secure it; this, in turn, rests on certain domain assumptions concerning who and what people are." (Gouldner, 1971;

50) Sociology is generally defined as the

scientific study of human behaviour in its social context. In the past five decades sociology as a scientific enterprise has made rapid strides and is now in a position to claim a place in the galaxy of sciences. This was made possible by an unprecedented proliferation of research designs and methodological paraphernalia. One of the dominant themes of modern, sociological researclh and theory is the canon of scientific objectivity or value-neutral scholarship. In essence it means that the aim of sociology as a scientific discipline is to undertake a purely detached and disinterested investigation of social pheno- mnena and the description of empirical regularities obtained therefore in value- free terms. All reference to value-judgments concerning any aspect of research findings is supposed to be beyond the pale of professional and scientific integrity. In the history of sociological thought it was Max Weber who made objectivity and value-neutral scholarship an article of professional faith. Since then it has become an integral part of the sociological tradition and it is only recently that it has come under concerted attack from younger sociologists who insist on a radical and committed perspective on the part of sociologists.

This is not to say that all sociologists have accepted the canon of value-free scholarship with an easy con-science; time and again daring intellects have raised their voice of protest against the value-free doctrine. The ideals of empathic identification and personal coi-i- Tnitment have stirred the imaginations of

a number of thinkers and the sociological tradition has a rich legacy of the existential-phenomenological perspective. (Tiryakian, 1965) The burden of my argument here is that the norm of scieI- tific objectivity and value-free scholarship has been a dominant motif of empirical social research arid that it has a definite set of epistemological implications about the nature of man and society.

SOCIOLOGY AS HER TO POSITIVE EPISTEMOLOGY

The central thesis developed in this paper is that the doctrine of scientific objectivity and value-neutrality as followed in present-day empirical social research is, in large measure, an off- shoot of positivists epistemology which has a set of presuppositions concerning the nature of man and the socio-cultural reality. What follows is in the main an exposition and elaboration of the same.

The positivist thesis maintains in principle that all phenomena are subject to universal laws. Like natural phenomena, social and cultural phenomena are also permeated with invariant patterns or laws which can be discover- ed and explained by the methods of the natural sciences. The positivists maintain that there is no funidamental cleav- age between the natural and the social sciences. Physicalism is the unifying principle in positivist epistemology which holds that every thing in principle can be explained in the language of physics. The aim of the socio-cultural disciplines is to discover universal laws of social phenomena by objective or 'external' investigation.

The positive viewpoint was set

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forth in a systematic manner by the French social philosopher Henri de Saint-Simon who was aliso the first to propose a science of society. At the outset of the century Saint-Simon pro- claimed the founding of the Religion of Newton. "...Universal gravity", Saint- Simon asserted, "is the sole cause of all physical and moral phenomena." All of human life and activity, of society and politics, were reducible to the ultimate source of cosmic gravitation. Saint- Simon's vision of society was founded enJ the image of the new mechanics-tech- nically rationalised in every cletail, pre- dictable in every activity, and hence brought under total scientific manage- ment. The religion of science was a faith in the existence of an objective Reason, impersonal and mechanical, harmonious and determinate, existing entirely apart from individual men and indifferent to their purposes (Matson, 1964: 31-33).

Saint-Simon's one-tinme disciple Au- guste Comte who later quarrelled with him and became his opponent, invented the name sociology for the emerging science of society. In his book Coturs de philosophie positive he spoke of ri- gid, inexorable laws of social life which determine the necessary conditions of society in every epoch. He also described the evolution of every society from the theological, to the nmetaphysi- cal, and finally, the positivist or scientific stage. For the discovery of universal laws which were believed to govern the socio-cultural realm, Comte proposed a social physics modelled after the physical science. Thus he wrote: "We possess now a celestial physics, a ter- restrial physics, either mechanical or chemical, a vegetable physics and an animal physics; we still want one more and last one, social physics, to complete the system of our knowledge of nature. I understand by social physics the science which has for its object the study, of social phenomena considered in the same spirit as astionomical, physical, chemical or physiological phenomena, that is, subject to natural invariable laws, the discovery of which is the sp- cial object of investigation." (Timasheff, 1967:21)

The scientific method characteristic of physical and biological sciences aims at discovering universal laws underlying recurrent uniformities in physical or biological phenomena. Abstraction and generalisation and therefrom, prediction and control are the basic elements of the scientific method by which the exact sciences attempt to explain natural phenomena.

The framework of positivist epistemology in its essential points was borrow- ed from the natural sciences. The philo-

sophy of the natural science is founded on an epistemological dichotomisation between the subject and the object. This dichotomisation - the Cartesian split between the knower and the known - is facilitated by the fact that the observation and analysis of natural phenomena is in large measure objective, in that the phenomena under study re'main unaffected by the cognitive contaminations of the observer.' It is therefore possible, in the study of natural phenomena, to ascertain the exact relationships between the variables which lead to the next stage of prediction and finally control. It goes without saying that the natural and exact sciences are founded on the assumption that natural phenomena are governed by necessary laws and that it is possible to ascertain, predict and control the mode of empirical regularities with a view to formulating general laws and propositions.

OBJEcTIvE AS A METHODOLOGICAL PoSTULATE

The methodology of the natural sciences with all its underlying philosophical assumptions was introduced into the social and behavioural sciences by the positivistically-oriented social scientists. The Cartesian dualism of subject and object being separated for detached scientific analysis was applied to the study of socio-cultural phenomena. Out of this epistemological dichotomisation emerged the methodological postulate of scientific objectivity and disinterested inquiry. Behind the acceptance of the value-free doctrine was the implicit belief that objectivity finds its fullest expression in the exact sciences which the social sciences would do well to approximate.

The idea of objectivity and value- neutrality as an article of professional belief has been advocated right from the father figures of sociology such as Durkheim and Weber to the rank and file of their contemporary followers. Emile Durkheim was one of the first major theorists in sociology to stress ani objective and dispassionate study of what he called 'social facts'. We can clearly trace a continuity with the positivist tradition in his writings, particularly in his "Rules of the Sociological Method" wherein he envisions a natural science of society modelled after the exact sciences like physics and biology. Durkheim regarded society not only logi- cally prior to the individual but ascribed to it a reality of its own. Social facts which are the stuff of sociefi, are entities which can be known only through external observation and not by inltrospection or empathy.

Max Weber was another social

theorist of major importance who worked out a methodological distinction between problems of scientific investigation and those of evaluation. He forcefully demanded for sociology a value-free perspective. In his essay entitled 'Science as a Vocation' he forcefully argued for renouncing personal value-judgments in social scientific investigations. "The researcher and teacher", Weber argued, "must keep apart the ascertainment of empirical facts and his practical evaluation in terms of likes and dislikes, because fact- finding and evaluation happen to be two different things." (Bendix and Roth, 1971: 49).2

The dominant figure in contemporary American sociology is undoubtedly Talcott Parsons. Parson's system theory inherited a good deal from positivist epistemology and is clearly an attempt to follow upon the heels of the natural sciences. It is interesting to reflect that George Lundberg, who was himself e staunch positivist, once described Par- sons as a neo-positivist 'who proposed to force sociology into thle framework of physics.' The high priest of positivism had asserted that Newton's three law, of motion could be applied to social phenomena. In Parsons' system theory we find a practical and consistent ap- plication of these laws to social life. The generalised conditions of equilibium or laws offered by Parsons and Bales, in their "Working Papers in the Theory of Action", are: (1) The Principle of Inertia; (2) The Principle of Action and Reaction; (3) The Principle of Effort; and (4) The Pri4'iple of System Integra- tion. In Parsons' conception of society as a boundary maintaining system, the model of classical mechanics is basic to the argument, as Don Martindale points out (Martindale, 1961: 498-99). The above conditions, offered as laws of 'homeostatic equilibrium' were acknowledged by Parsons himself to be analog- ous to the Newtonian laws of mechanics.

Objectivity and value-neutrality is an integral part of Parsons' structural- functionalism. An objective and disinterested investigation of social phenomena is a prerequisite for uncovering empirical regularities underlying social processes which are, in tum, reduced to invariable laws of social life. Thus it will be clear that behind the facade of objectivity lies essentially the same positivist epistemology propounded by Comte. In fact the entire corpus of the empiricist tradition in American sociology, represented in the main by structural-functionalism, has clear posi- tivistic colourings. Even the vocabulary and methodological procedures bear the halo of the Comtean vision (Horton, 1968: 434-51).

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OBJECTIVE SOcAL RESEARCH AND TH ImAGE OF MAN

As has been noted in the beginning, every science has a set of philosophic presuppositions concerning the nature and reality of the phenomena under investigation which structures and 'conditions the fabric of its theory and method. Scientific-empiricist sociology which has positivist epistemology as its donmain assumption, functions under a definite set of presuppositions concerning the socio-cultural reality and the nature of man. These presuppositions hardly find explicit and consistent expression in the professional writings of modem sociologists; nevertheless, they undergird all empirical research and theory-building. Gouldner succinctly describes this set of assumptions

To the degree that social sciences are modelled on the physical sciences, they entail the domain assumption that people are "things" which may be treated and controlled in much the same mnanner that other sciences conitrol their non- human materials; people are "sub- jects" who may be subjected to the control of the experimenter for purposes they need not understand or even consent to (Gouldner, 1971: 50).

It seems pertinent at this juncture to pinpoint the fact that the general culture in which the various sciences flourish acts as a potent source of the assumptions on which the sciences build the structure of theory and research. If the presuppositions of a science happen to be in accord with the cultural ethos of a society at a giveni point of time, that science has favourable chances for flourishing and consolidating itself. My contention in this connection is that the image of man and society wvhich is projected in present-day social science research is but a reflection of the Zeitgeist. The spirit of the times in modern society, particularly in the technologically advanced countries of the WVest, is permeated with the values of science and technology. The pervasive penetration of the values of science in all spheres of life has intoxicated our consciousness with the hubris of science. The cultural ethos of modem Western society is clearly immersed in scientism, in an addition to the values of science andl technology. And what kind of an image of man does the scientific world- view offer? It treats man as "an accident of evolution, a complex of reflexes, a puppet twitched into love or war by the showman who pulls the strings, or ... a by-product of chemical andi physiological processes pursuing his

course across a fundamentally alien and brutal environment and doomed ultimately to finish his pointless journey with as little significance as in the person of the amoeba his ancestors once began it." (Klapp, 1969 : 60)3 Probably the philosophical sensitivities of C E M Joad led him to paint an overdrawn picture of the scientific world-view; nevertheless, it is a realistic portrayal of its essential features. The scientific world-view turns a valuing and meaning-seeking human organism into a thing, an object, and thus deprives him of his Existenz, the free, personal, and subjective essence of his personality.

Needless to say, the social and behavioural sciences which are a product of the Zeitgeist cannot but drink from its cup. The image of man that science portrays and finds support and approval in the spirit of the times finds repeated expression in social scientific research. Behind the facade of ongoing objective social research there stands the basic assumption, which is a hang- over of the old positivist vision, that it is possible to discover universal laws of socio-cultural phenomena which condition and determine human behaviour in all its variety and diversity. The nomothetic ambition does not rest here: it proceeds to effect prediction and control of human beings on the basis of such laws. Elbridge Sibley, in a recent accessment of the aims and claims of scientific sociology has observed that:

Throughout the history of American sociology.., it is possible to discern a basic faith in the possibility of discovering universal patterns of social structure and function and hence a basic faith in the ultimnate possibility of achieving scientific prediction, with the corollary, but even more remotely, possibility of exercising control (Sibley, 1971).4

And the image of man standing, as it were, behind the bars of inexorable social laws, is essentially that of a help- less, determined creature, a prisoner of a social world which is of his own maldng but over which, paradoxically, he has no control. The conception of a man who makes himself and excer- cises rational control over his destiny as a free agent is something alien to present-day social research and theory. The indictment might sound harsh; but so is the situation. Surveying the progress of a decade of sociological research in 1961, Reinhard Bendix made the following remark which is all the more valid today after a decade : "Modern social science teaches us to regard man as a creature of his drives, habits, and social roles in whose behaviour reason

and choice play no decisive part." (Bendix, 1961: 34)

THE DIExMMA OF A VALUE-FREE SOCIOLOGY

"Today", writes Alvin Gouldner with his characteristic candour, "all the powers of sociology, from Parsons to Lundberg, have entered into a tacit alliance toa' bind us to the dogma that 'Thou shalt not commit a value-judgment !"' (Gouldner, 1963: 35) Objecti- vity and disinterested scientific inquiry is the avowed aim of scientific sociology. The sociologist is supposed to set aside his value preferences and ethical judgments while carrying out sociological investigation in order that the scientific validity of his analyses and conclusions may not suffer from his personal whims and biases. Unfortunately, however, the sociologist is caught in a paradoxical trap the monment he sets to work. The question of selecting his problem makes him confront a dilemma: the tragedy of the value-free sociologist is that while selecting his area of research he has to make a value-judgment, either consciously or uniconsciously.

The professionalisation of sociology as a scientific discipline has widened the network of social research to an enormous extent. This phenomenon is more conspicuous in the United States where big research projects are largely sponsored and funded by the federal government or corporate agencies. The value-free sociologist might comfort himself by believing that the much dreaded task of mnaking value-judgments is finally left to the sponsoring and financing agency and that he has only to provide expertise. Here again the dilemma creeps in: in-leaving the task of making value-judgments to the agency, he secretly acquiesces in what C Wright Mills termed the 'bureaucratic ethos', since he provides his expertise with the full knowledge that his findings would be utilised by the financing agency for some purpose or the other. In fact what he does, as Robert Friedrichs puts it, is to trade one value for another - the personal that he assigns to the solution of certain problems for the delightfully impersonal value of financial support. (Friedrichs, 1970: 85).

Although most of the findings of social science research are utilised in serving communications and advertising agencies, sometimes, wittingly or unwittingly, they lend support to the furtherance of utterly inhuman and exploitative ends of official bureaucracy. Robert Lynd's characteristic indictment

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of 'policy relevant' social research ex- poses the scandal of objective and value-free scholarship.

These volumes (on the American .soldier) depict science being used with great skill to sort out and to control men for purposes not ot their own willing. It is a signi- ficant measure of the impotenoe of liberal democracy that it must increasingly use its social science not directly on democracy's own problems, but tangentially and indirectly; it must pick up the crumbs from private business research ... from Army research- on how to tum frightened -draftees into tough soldiers who will fight a war whose purposes they do not understand. With socially extrane- ous purposes controlling the use of social science each advance in its use tends to make it an instrument of mass control, and thereby a threat to democracy. (Mills, 1959: 115)5 A

It becomes clear that such profes- sedly objective, value-free social research provides a convenient and quasi- natural pretext for defending and justifying the status quo, however inhuman and degenerated it may happen to be. Or may be, as Couldner argues, that sociological objectivity and value- neutrality' is the product of a cynical, alienated man and society. Sociology emerged in a period which witnessed the disintegration of a traditional belief system. It took shape in a social structure which was in the throes of a pervasive anomie. The rise of sociological objectivity was an adaptive res- ponse to this goalless, cynical social situation. The strains of alienation echo in the cotemporary scene. "... theii (sociologists') conception of themselves as 'value-free' scientists, while not accurate, does reflect an underlying structure of sentiment that entails a certain remoteness from the rhythm of contemporary society, a feeling that they are marching to a somewhat different music. To some degree, it expresses a remoteness common to all withdrawn soldiers." (Gouldner, 1971 336) The "objectivity of the social Sciences is not the expression of a dispassionate and detached view of the social world; it is rather, an ambivalent effort to accommodate to alienation and to express a muted resentment of it." (Gonddner, 1971 : 53).

It is not that the value-free sociologist does not have his personal opinion about the social and human implications of his work. As George Lundberg once admitted, social scientists, like other people, often have strong feelings about religion, art, politics, and econo- mics. Thrt is, they have likes in these

matters as they have in wine, women, and song. Then why on earth this talk of objectivity, one might ask. To mne it seems that behind the facade of objectivity and value-neutrality lurks the same nomothetic pretension: the desire to compare biceps -- with their bigger brothers or natural scientists, to borrow Robert Merton's picturesque phrase. Since long the positivist vision of a natural science of society has haunted the imaginative minds of sociologists and most of the theoretical and methodological sophistication of their discipline is an expression of this lingering hope. It is interesting, however, to note that there are Signs of awakening from this idealistic slumber among a number of modem sociologists; they have begun to take stock of the aims and claims of their discipline in tenns of performance and achievement. Consequently, there has been a decline in the obsession with a purely natural scienre of society. A large number of sociologists feel no hesitation in confess- ing that the ideal of value-neutrality literally remains an ideal, an altar, so to speak, kept on a high pedestal and worshipped ritually from a distance, with hardly any pragmatic considera- tions on the part of the worshippers. In this connection, the survey of sociological opinion undertaken by' Gouldner in 1964 is quite revealing. It indicates that altogether 45 per cent of the approxi- matelj 3,500 who replied felt that the discipline's value-free ideal "helps sociology to remain independent of outside pressures and influences," nearly three-quarters acknowledged that "most sociologists merely pay lip service to the ideal." (Friedrichs, 1970: 124)

SCnrvrrC SOCIOLOGY CONFRONTS TiE COTNTmR CULTUnE

The sixties in America witnessed a widespread upsurge directed against the -American social system. This upsurge, initiated and guided by the dissenting youth, took varied forns of expression, ranging all the way from violent student rebellions at Harvard, Berkelev, and Columbia universities and the political activism of the New Left to beat- hippie bohemianism. What is most characteristic about this dissenting wave is its disenchantment with the Zeitgetst. Behind the manifestations of generation- al conflict, student demonstrations, pas- sive withdrawal of hippies and yippies, and the generally non-conformist and defiant mood of the young, is a deep- seated malaise which is endemic in the structure of the technocratic society of America. Science and technology which

are largely responsible for shaping the present social structure are the special targets of youth resentment and attack. The diffusion of this disaffiliation has assumed such large proportions that it clearly heralds the emergence of a counter culture. In fact as Theodore Roszak points out, this counter culture is so radically disaffiliated from the main- stream assumptions of American society that it scarcely looks to many as a culture at all, but -takes on the alarming appearance of a barbaric intrusion (Ros. zak, 1968: 42).6 But the fact is that, in spite of its characteristic disregard of conventional norms of behaviour, the value-orientation of this counter culture is imbued with a deep sense of huma- nism. The following declaration of the New Left is perhaps the best exposition of their viewpoint:

We regard men as infinitely preci- ous and possessed of unfulfilled capacities for reason, freedom and love.... We- oppose the deperso- nalisation that reduces human beings to the status of things.

Loneliness, estrangement, isola- tion describe the vast distance between man and man today. These dominant tendencies cannot be overcome by better personnel ma- nagement, nor by improved gad- gets, but only when a love of man overcomes the idolatrous worship of things by man. (Roszak, 1968: 58- 59)

Anti-technologism and anti-academicism,- according to Kenneth Kenis- ton, are among the dominant themes of youth dissent in contemporary America. Anti-technologism is directed against the impersonality stratification and hierarchy of modem institutions. Anti- academicism, in essence, lays stress on the relevance, applicability, and personal meaningfulness of knowledge. What is demanded is that intelligence be engaged with the world just as action should be informed by knowledge. (Keniston, 1970: 21-49) This trend is clearly against the professional canons of objectivity and value-neutrality in the academic disciplines. Social scien. ces, and sociology in particular, to the degree to which they have come to rely exclusively on scientific techniques and procedures, have engendered resentment and antagonism among the humanistically inclined intellectuals and students. The stress in academic sociology on quantification, large-scale social research, and especially on objective, value-free scholarship has resulted in a backlash opposition from students and younger sociologists. The young radicals mince no words in regarding academic sociology and social theory as "an undifferentiated obfuscation of life, an

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ideology discoloured by a pervasive bias in the service of the status quQ." (Gouldner, 1971:9) It is not merely a coincidence that quite a niunber of re- bellious students have been students of sociology who have turned down conventional academic sociology as an ally of the Establishment.

VALUE-NEu-TALiTy: MYTH OR REALITY?

The contention of value-free sociologists that it is possible to purge our perception of all cognitive contaminations, which forms the basis of their value-neutral stance, does not stand closer scrutiny. The fact of the matter is that, as existential-phenomenologists have held since long, the perception of reality is an evaluation of reality; and the stuff of evaluation is provided by previous cognitive experience. Evalua- tion being essentially subjective, this means that all knowledge has an inera- dicable component of the personal. The obvious corollary of this is that the ideal of objective knowledge remains at best an ideal and not a proven fact of experience. Recently, Michael Polanyi, the British scientist-philosopher-sociologist, has offered a thorough and extensive documentation in this behalf in his monumental "Personal Knowledge". The burden of Polanyi's contention is that "into every act of knowing there enters a passionate contribution of the person knowing what is being knowvn, and this co-efficient is not mere imperfection but a vital component of knowledge." (Polanyi, 1958: 1) Polanyi convincingly demonstrates that even in the realm of the exact and natural sciences this personal element of knowledge makes its way; that the so-called subjective values of personal commitment and passionate participation are as integral to science as rigorous analysis and mathematical abstraction.

This perspective finds support from the recent developments in the newly- emerging field of metalinguistics. Re- searches in this field have brought to light the fact that the very linguistic tools and grammatical systems selected predispose us to observe and analyse selected areas of experience, that the very symbols and models that structure our systemnatic thinking will necessarily bias that which we perceive (Friedrichs, 1970: 143).

When the natural and exact sciences are not supposed to be immune from this linguistic preconditioning, how can the sciences of man be an exception, especially in view of the fact that in the latter the observer and the observed are

subject to the same cultural condition- ing? In point of fact, this selective perception and value preference finds expression in three distinct phases of social research: in the selection of problems; in the preference for certain hypotheses and not others; and in the choice of 'certain conceptual schemes for the itnterpretation of data. Whatever claims of objectivity and value-neutrality the disinterested researcher might make in these phases of his work he does exer- cise his valuing faculties either at a conscious or unconscious level. The professional demands of objectivity may compel him to shun all subjective de- lusions, but the paradox of the situation is that, as Morris Cohen once described it, those who banish questions of value at the front door admit them unavowed- ly and therefore uncritically at the back door.

At this point a crucial question arises: when detached and disinterested observation is merely a delusion and value- fudgments are unavoidable, how can we guarantee the scientific worth of our findings? The best way to solve this puzzle, in my opinion, is to make an explicit acknowledgment of our presuppositions and value preferences underlying our research designs. This will not only facilitate consistency between the objective of the research work and the actual empirical findings but will also help in the detection of possible flaws in the handling of factual data. In the normal course of sociological investigation, the researcher selects his specific area of research and proceeds with the formulation of hypotheses and the construction of a conceptual framework in keeping with certain assumptions which he sets himself to prove before he goes about the busf- ness of actual empirical investigation. Sometimes it so happens that his handling of empirical data, on the basis of w7hich he formulates his hypotheses and theoretical framework, suffers from a conscious or unconscious manoeuvr- ing; this happens as a result of his eagerness to confirm his preconceived conceptual framework. Now when the error is detected and is attributed to the conceptual bias of the investigator, once again he harps on the professional canon of objectivity, giving a step-by-step description of his research design. How- ever, the heart of the problem escapes his attention: the deliberate or otherwise mishandling of factual data is not accepted as a possible reason of the flaw in the outcome of research. Con- trary to popular misconception, facts hardly speak for themselves: they arc made to speak in a certain fashion ac-

cording to one's convenienoe, or as Gunnar Mydral has put it, "Facts do not organise themselves into concepts and theories just by being looked at; indeed, except within the framework of concepts and theories, there are no scientific facts but only chaos." (Myrdal, 1970:9)

On the other hand, if he explicitly sets forth the underlying set of assumptions and then proceeds with his work, it is always possible to point out such flaws and convince the researcher himself of such a possibility. Otherwise there is always the danger of mixing up empirical data with value-judgments based on them. The best way, therefore, is to draw a sharp line of demarcation between value-judgments and actual empirical data; and this is possible only when we make an explicit and clear-cut acknowledgment of the former. Anthropologist Kathleen Gough considers this the safest way of safeguarding the professional integrity of the social sciences: "I suggest that an anthropologist (or for that matter any social scientist) who is explicit about his own values is likely to frame his problems more sharply and to see more clearly the line between values and data than one who has not examined his values." (Gough, 1968: 149) Irving Horowitz makes the matter more explicit: "the history of social science is internally and organically bound at its upper and lower levels by ethical perspectives ... It is my further contention that the suppression of this commitment of social science to ethical perspectives leads not to better scientific work, but on the contrary, to a series of disastrous consequences: (a) indifference to problem solving; (b) unconscious ideological distortion in t:heory construction; (c) a neglect of the scientific evaluation of value theory; (d) an identification of objectivity in social research with indifference to ethical judgments." (Horowitz, 1967-31) Karl Mannhein suggested essentially the same thing almost three decades ago: "A clear and explicit avowal of the implicit metaphysical presuppositions which underlie and make possible empirical knowledge will do more for the clarification and advancement of research than a verbal denial of the existence of these presuppositions accompanied by their surreptitious admission through the back door." (Mannheim, 1936:80)

SOCIOLOGY FOR WHAT?

A few years, ago the New York Times ran an editorial under the above caption, chiding the sociologists for

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offering so little that had any relevance to the problems of our times. Does one pursue sociology, the Times asked, "to get particular individuals academic positions, profitable grants of doubtful use, or is it to make pioneering contri- butions to the understanding of the nature and operation of a complex society undergoing rapid change?" And here is an even more impassioned out- burst of a sociologist himself:

Time is short; we cannot wait years for research to give us impregnable theses. America's academia fiddles while the fires are burning. Where are the studies of the new corporate power, of the Defenoe Department, of the military-industrial complex, of the new bureaucracies, of Vietnam? Ameri- can academics are prisoners of liberal democratic ideology. Even as the chains rust, they do not move. A new current of reason and passion is arising in America - outside of its conventional institutions. The current of reason must flow faster to create an image of reality and hope for the future.... (quoted in Bendix, 1970)

The young radicals who are the champions of the culture denounce all of academic sociology and social theory as "an undifferentiated obfuscation of life, an ideology discoloured by a pervasive bias in the service of the status quo." And what is more agonising for the sociologist is that even the uphol- ders of the status quo look at his contri- butions with suspicious eyes. Once a Congressman put a very baffling question to one of America's -most distinguished sociologists, Robert Merton: "Why don't you sociologists get to work and contribute something useful?" to which Merton could only mumble, "That damned popular image again!"

In recent years academic sociology, with its overwhelming emphasis on objective and value-free social research, has come under heavy attack not only from administrators but also from socially committed intellectuals and students. In particular, the value-free stance of sociology and its paradoxical espousal of 'policy-relevant' social research has engendered deep resentment and anguish. Its critics strongly feel that sociology, in its obsession with scientism, has become an ally of the repressive regime of technocracy. Scientific sociology is not only becoming inimical to radical social change but wittingly or unwittingly also lends support to the forces of injustice. As Elbridge Sibley has described it, "sociologists are simul- taneously charged with irresponsibility in standing aloof from struggles for social justice and wvith serving assidu-

ously as handmaidens of the forces of social injustice. Indeed, the strictures of the vehement critics suggest a com- posite image of a sociologist as Pontius Pilate, Machiavelli, and a playboy." (Sibley, 1971)

In recent years sociology has grown in its outward stature to an enormous extent. There has been a tremendous proliferation of research techniques and methodologies to fathom and explore the immensities of the social world. Count- less monographs, books and research reports have been published, along with scores of professional journals to serve the communication needs of an ever- growing community of sociologists the world over. Looking from this vantage point, one might well ask a legitimate question: Has this remarkable growth in outward stature been accompanied by a proportionate growth in the inward stature of the discipline? How much has sociology, conceived as the science of man living in a norm-bound community of human beings, contributed to man's understanding of himself in rela- tion to his fellow human beings? How much has it contributed to bringing people nearer one another which fact is the moving spirit behind most social relationships? An honest and critical soul-searching on the part of sociologists would indicate that compared to the ad- vancements in methodological paraphernalia, sociology's contribution to human understanding in a cross-cultural and national context is quite disappoint- ing. Reinhard Bendix's indictiment is perhaps a little too harsh, but it is a plain truth: "social scientists are less concerned with improving the understanding of the mass of men, and they are more intent on insuring the objectivity of their own practices." (Bendix, 1961: 34)'

It is gratifying to note that there is emerging a breed of humanistically committed sociologists who repudiate the nomothetic pretensions of an objective, value-free sociology and who want their discipline to adopt a critical and committed stance towards social institutions and problems. Foremo.st among them are Alvin Gouldner, Peter Berger, Lewis Coser, Edward Tiryakian, Ernest Becker, Lewis Feuer, Dennis Wrong, Arthur Vidich and Maurice Stein. In a large majority of contemporary sociologists there is a growing realisation that sociology should adopt a posture of involvement and engagement. Thus, in Gouldner's survey, some 70 per cent of the respondents agreed that "one part of the sociologist's role is to be a critic of contemporary society". A majority went on to deny that sociolo-

gists "contribute to the welfare of society mainly by providing an understanding of social processes"; contribut- ing "ideas" for "changing society" was felt to be more important.

One of the distinguishing charac- teristics of homo sapiens, MIan the Wise, is that he utilises the fund of his knowledge and experience which he gradually accumulates over the years and generations, for his betterment and welfare. In the light of his experiences and accumulated wisdom he tries new forms and modes of living and being which would help him in the unfold- ment of his fathomless potentialities. Being a self-reflecting animal, he keeps on evaluating critically his own creations over time which, in turn, widens and deepens his cultural consciousness. Freedom and creativity which underlie the evaluative process, has always been a vital component of man's existence, leaving its indelible mark on the complex of human behaviour patterns we call culture. What is a science, if not a systematic body of knowledge and wisdom accumulated over a period of time and shared in common by a variety of cultures? The very fact of man being an ever-growing organism in his multi-dimensional personality demands that the ideal of a science of man, as of all knowledge, should be permeated with a critical, evaluative spirit. As Ernest Becker has beautifully put it, "The scienoe of man is an active, innovative, interventionist science. It is founded on the belief that men must continually modify cherished lifeways to accord with future goals and continuing historical changes." (Becker, 1969: 170)8 Needless to say, an objective, value-free science of man and society can never take such a critical posture simply because it does not believe in social criticism.

A critical, evaluating science of man and society, by implication, has to be a humanistic discipline, that is to say, it wvould be committed to a belief inl the wvorth and dignity of the hbumani person. It is curious to reflect that psychology which followed more closely Apon the heels of the natural sciences has been the first to come out of the nomothetic cocoon in wvhich it encapsulated itself in the beginning of its scientific career. The emergence of a new outlook, that of humanistic psychology which enlists the sympathy and active co-operation of such distinguished psychologists and psychotherapists as Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers and Rollo May, among others, is indicative of this new phase in its development.

What lesson can we in India draw from

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ECONOMIC AND POLMTICAL WEEKLY October 28, 1972

these shifts in values and perspectives in the social sciences of a technologically advanced country? For one it must be clear that the historical, socio- cultural and philosophical context of the development of the social sciences in India (however meagre it might seem from Western standards) is entirely ,different from that of advanced nations. The shallowness of the ideals of objec- tivitv and value-neutrality as exposed by the radical sociologists of the West should in the least sharpen our sensitivities and perceptions to the needs of our social situation. The ideals of involvement and participation should be all the more fruitful and rewarding, both theoretically and from a pragmatic standpoint, on the part of humanistically committed social scientists of an underdeveloped country like India. The gnawing poverty of the teeming millions, the awfully unhygienic conditions of sprawling slums, mass illiteracy and superstitions, and in short, all the dread- ful features of a tradition-oriented society undergoing rapid modemisa- tion, call for opening up of the libe- rating vistas of social science. Thus wNe can draw a clear-cut lesson from our survey of objectivity and value- neutrality in its epistemological and historical context: first, we need a social commitment in the htumanistic and phenomenological sense, an unwavering belief in the worth and dignity of individual human beings and their capability to develop their potentialities in a rational manner; we should utilise the fund of our experiences and in- sights into the dynamics of human behaviour in assisting the suffering humanity to rise to higher levels of existence. The only purpose of science, Galileo had said, is to ease the hard- ships of huiiman existence and I believe it is a noble and most sublime ideal for the science of man.

NoTEs 1 Even in the realm of the natural

sciences the situation is not as hope- ful as the positivists would have us believe. The competitive atmos- phere prevalent in the world of scientific inventions and discoveries highlights the personal factor involv- ed in scientific enterprise. This is enthusiastically described in Jim Watson's account of how Francis Crick, Maurice Wilkins and he solved the problem of the structure of the genetic material DNA. "Watson's account makes clear that he at least, worked in constant fear that the great chemist and Nobel prize-winner, Linus Pauling, who had already solved the problem of the structure of protein, would get there first ... No one after reading

Watson, whether his accounts of his colleagues are reasonably accurate or wildly biased, could believe that the genetic code was cracked by detached, unemotional men working solely for truth's sake and caring little for the world" (Rose and Rose, 1969: 242-43). Recent developments in quantum physics have opened up a broad vista of epistemological implications with regard to the nature of scientific observation. Werner Heisen- berg's principle of indeterminacy has a crucial significance in this connection. "The fact that we cannot observe the course of nature without disturbing it" in principle implies, as Matson puts it, that the act of observation is at the same time un- avoidablv an act of participation, that man is at once an actor and a spectator in the drama of existence. The post-modern image of the scientist stands *as that of an actor, as a "participant-observer" (Matson, 1964: 142-46). For an outstanding and masterly exposition of this view, see (Polanyi, 1958).

2 Weber formulated an 'understanding' sociology with verstehen. or empathic communication or understanding as its method. He insisted on objectivity in order to draw a distinction between statements of facts and statements of value. With- in the bounds of this distinction he was not against the expression of value-judgments on the part of the sociologist. As Gouldner argues, "Weber also held that the sociologist's expression of value-judgments may be voiced if caution waas excercised to distinguish them from statements of facts. If Weber insisted on the need to maintain scientific objectivity he also warned that this was altogether different from moral indifference" (Gouldner 1963: 35-52). Weber's insistence on value-neutrality was motivated by his intense desire to preserve the integrity and autonomy of the social sciences. As Guenther Roth has observed, "Weber was a cham- pion of the liberal university which endeavours to be open to all political and philosophical orientations, with the proviso, of course, that professors he competent and pro- ductive scholars, not just pro- pagandists of their cause" (Roth, 1971: 34-54). Lewis Coser, in a recent history of sociological thought, has described the historical and intellectual context of Weber's position in an excellent way: "Weber was appalled by the- fact that the social sciences were dominated by men Who felt obliged, out of a sense of patriotism, to defend the cause of the Reich and the Kaiser in their teachings and writings. They oriented their research toward enhancing the greater glory of the Fatherland. It is against this prostitution of the scientific calling that Max Weber directed his main effort. I-Iis appeal for value-neutrality wIas intended as a thoroughly libJerating end-

eavour to free the social sciences from the stultifying embrace of the powers that be and to assert the right, indeed the duty, of the investigator to pursue the solution to his problem regardless of wvhether his results serve or hinder the affairs of the.national state. In Weber's view, value-neutrality is the pursuit of disciplined and methodical inquiry would emanci- pate the social sciences from the heavy hand of the political decision-makers. It would end the heteronomy of the social sciences and clear the way for their auto- nomous growth" (Coser, 1971: xix).

3 This world-view, mechanistic and and materialistic as it is, is not intrinsic to science per se, but is a product of historical and cultural forces operating in Western society. As Abraham Maslow has pointed out, "Our orthodox conception of science as mechanistic and ahuman seems to me one local part-mani- festation of expression of the larger, more inclusive world-view of mechanisation and dehumanisation" (Maslow, 1966: Ch 1). For an excellent exposition of the impact of this scientific wvorld-view of the social sciences, see Matson, 1964, Chs 1, 2, 3.

4 Functionalist social anthropology, like scientific sociologv, has had a good dose of the positivist elixir. As E E Evans-Pritchard has observed: "Social anthropologists, dominated consciously or unconsciously, from the beginnings of their subject, by positivist philosophy, have aimed, and for the most part still aim . . . at proving that man is an automaton, and' at describing the sociological laws in terms of whlich actions, ideas and beliefs can be explained and in the light of which they are controlled. The approach implies that human societies are natuiral svstems which can he reduced to variables" (Evans- Pritchard, 1962: 60).

5 "The short point is that the science of human r elations. constitutes an effectivc tool for the manipulation of men. A very large portion of scientific knowledge about human relations is the resnilt of research geared to manipulative puirposes. The Western Electric Company paid Mayo and his collaborators to increase the prodluctivitv of workers. Stouffer and his colleagues and Grinker anid Spiegel had direct responsibilities -for adlding to the fighting qualities of men in the armed services. Leighton's wvork was dcone as an a(ljunct for the wartime Japanese evacuation and the larger purpose Nvas to provide guidance to the. military for the administration of -onquered people" (Morton Grodzins quoted in Matson, 1964: 289).

6 It is interestiang to reflect that Pitirim Sorokin, in his famous Ideational-Sensate characterisation of socio-cu-ltural systems, predicted, as far hlack as the thirties, the rise of a counter culture within the

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sensate systen df Western . civlsa- tion. This counter culture, he held, would he launched bv a disenchant- ed fragment of the population who would turn indifferent and antagoni- stic to the dominant values of its sensate cutlture (see Mormin, 1971: 27-32).

7 "Modern social scientists ... no longer believe that men can r id their mincls of ... impedliments to lucid thbotiuht: only scienltist.s can Thev assert that there is onlv one e scapte frnom the consequences of irrationalitv: that is hs' the applica- tion of scientific method. And this method can INe used effectively only by the expert fev . . . Instead of attempting to makc people more rational, contemporary social scientists often content themselves with asking of them that they place their trust in social science and accept its fincdings" (Bendix, 1961: 34). The positivistically-inclined sociologist's fascination with the natur al scienitists has been well satirised by C WVright Mills: "[the abstracted empiricist's] most cherished professional self-imagc is that of the natuiral scientist. In their arguments about various philosophical issues of social science, one of their invariable points is that tbey- are 'natural scientists', or at least that they represent the viewI&int of natural science. In the discourse of the more sophisticated, or in the presence of some smiling and exalt- ed physicist, the self-image is more likely to be shortened by merely 'scientist' (Mills, 1959: 56).

8 Ernest Becker is among those few original \sirite(rs in the social sciences today \x ho have an acute r'ealisa- tion of the inadequacv of modern social theoi-ies in providing the ediifice of a uinified, huimanistic science, of man founded on a realistic theorv of human natuire. Currently he is engaged in such a challeanging endeavoulr and his lauid- able efforts holdl promise for the social sciences of a troubled xvorld that is ours. The present writer is working onl a critical evaluation of Becker's contribuitions for his Ph D.

REFERENCES

Becker, Ernest 1969: "Angel in Armouir: A Post-Freudian Perspective on the Nature of Man", Nexv York; George Braziller.

Bendix, R 1961: "The Image of Man: in the Social Sciences: The Basic As- sumptions of Present-Day Research" in Lipset and Smelser, 1961.

Bendix, R 1970: "Sociology and the Distrust of Reason" in American Sociological Rbview, Volu-me 85, Number 5.

Bendix, R and Roth, G 1971: "Scholar- ship and Partisanship: Essays on Max Weber", California: University of California Press.

Coser, Lewis A 1971: "Masters of Sociological Thought", New York, Harcourt BArace.

Evans-Pritchard, E E 1962: "Essays in Social Anthropology"F, London, Faber and Faber.

Friedrichs, Robert W 1970: "A Socio- logy of Sociology", N!ew York, The

Free Press. Gerth, H H and Mills, C W 1946:

"From Max Weber: Essays in Socio- logy". New York, Oxford University Press.

Colgh, Kathleen 1968: "World Revolu- tion and the Science of Man" in Rosrzak 1968a.

Couldner, A XV 1963: "'Anti-Miniotatir:I The Myth of a Value-Free Sociologv", in Stein and Vidich, 1963.

Couldner, A IV 1971: "The Coming v Crisis of Western Sociology", New Delhi, Ileinemann.

H-orow7itz, I L 1967: "Professing Socio- logy", Chicago, Aldine Ptublishing Company.

o-lorton, John 1968: "Order and Conflict Theories of Social Problems" in Lindenfeld, 1968.

Kaplan, A 1970: Individuality and the New Society, Seattle, University of Washington Press.

Keniston, K 1970: "Dissenting Youth and the New Society" in Kaplan, 1970.

Klapp, 0 E 1969: "Collective Search for Idenitity", Neew York, Holt, Rinehart.

Lindenfeld, F 1968: "Raclical Perspec- tives on Social Problems", New York, Macmillan.

Lipset, S M and Smelser, N J 1961: "Sociology: The Progress of a Decade", New jersev, Prentice-Hall.

Mannheim, Karl 1936: "Ideology and Utopia", New York, Harcourt, Brace. q

Martindale, i) 1961: "The Nature and I Types of Sociological Theoryv, p Londotn, Routledge and Kegani Paul.

Maslow, A 1966: "The Psychology of Science", New York, Hiarper and Row.

Matson, F W 1964: "The Broken Image", New York, George Braziller.

Mills, C W 1959: "The Sociological Imagination", New York, Oxford University Press.

Momin, A R 1971: "Man against Cul- ture: an Essay on Sorokin's 13th Pro- phecy" in Journal of the Bombay University Postgraduate Studetts Union.

Myrdal, Gunnar 1970: "Objectivity in' Social Research", London, Gerald 1 uckworth.

Plolanyi, M 1958: "Personial Knowledge", London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Rose, H and Rose, S 1969: "Science ancl Society", London, Penguin Press.

Roszak, Theodore 1968a: "The Dis- senting Academy", New York Random Hlouse.

Roszak, Theodore 1968b: "The Making of a Couinter Culture", London, Faber and Faber.

Roth, Guienther 1971: "Valiue-neuitrality' in Germany and the United States" in Bendix and Roth, 1971.

Sibley, Elbridge 1971: "Scientific' Sociology at Bay?" Americacn Socio- logist, Volume 6, Supplementary Issue.

Stein, M and Vidich, A 1963: "Socio- logy on Trial", New Jersey, Prentice- Hall.

Timasheff, N 5 1967: "Sociological Theory, Its Nature and Growth", New York, Random HIouse.

Tiryakian, E A 1965: "SExistential- Phenomenology and the Sociological Tradition" American Sociological Review, Volume 30, Niumber 5.

Ihternational Administration Its Evolution and Conzemporary Applications Editd by ROBERT S. JORDAN

Focuses on the origins of interriational administration and considers how technioues of internat ional administration are being adapted to serve the major needs of peace-keeping, politico- military reaionalism, aind economic regiona-;lism-. The ten essays include a prologue which is a look at the life of an international civil servant, essays on the evolution and applications of international administration, and a speech by Dag Hammarskjold. Paper ?1.80

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This first fu 1l analysis of Britain's experiercle as a nuclear power traces her nuclear history from 1939 to 1970, studying it in terms of its applicability to other possible nuclear powers. The political, economtc, scientific, military, and bureaucratic incentives that led Britain to develop nuclear weapons are analysed, the role of nuclear force in foreign policy is examined, and theorics of deterrence and pointers to the future are considered. Cloth boards ?5.50

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Bombay Delhi at calcutta Madras

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Article Contentsp. 2195p. 2196p. 2197p. 2198p. 2199p. 2200p. 2201p. 2202

Issue Table of ContentsEconomic and Political Weekly, Vol. 7, No. 44 (Oct. 28, 1972), pp. 2169-2208Front Matter [pp. 2169-2192]No Easy Escape [pp. 2169-2170]Factional Politics [p. 2170]No Time for Tinkering [pp. 2170-2171]Limits of Special Programmes [pp. 2171-2172]And the Enemy Within [p. 2172]More Confusion [pp. 2172-2173]Letter to EditorOn Differential Rates of Interest [p. 2173]

Calcutta Diary [pp. 2174-2175]Companies: Much out of Nothing [pp. 2175-2177]From Our CorrespondentsAnother 'Bechtel Deal'? [pp. 2177-2178]Dissecting the Joint Sector [pp. 2178-2180]A Splinter Does Not Make a Split [pp. 2180-2181]Aftermath of Fee Equalisation [pp. 2181+2183-2184]Conference Histrionics [pp. 2185+2187]Aiders and Abettors [pp. 2187-2188]Japanese Activity in East Asia [pp. 2189+2191+2193]

ReviewReview: Not Enough for a Book [pp. 2193-2194]

Special ArticlesThe Facade of Objectivity: An Inquiry into the Epistemology of Value-Free Sociology [pp. 2195-2202]African 'Fascism' in Perspective [pp. 2203-2206]'Socialism at the Grassroots': A Comment [pp. 2206-2208]

Documents

Rahman Momin (1972) - The Facade of Objectivity