QUINE'S THEORY OF ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT

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QunrE1S THEORY 01!' ON!OICGICA.L

COMMI!MEI!r

A. !beais sulmd. tted in partial :tul.i'ill•ent of the requirelllents f.or the degree of Jlaster of .Arta in the l'acul ty of Gre.duate Studies and Research of JlcGill trni.versit7.

April 1966 Montreal, P. Q.

TABLE 01!' CONTENTS

page

Abstract.

Foreword ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Introduction ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Chapter I. The Origin of the Method ••••••••••••••••••••••••• Chapter II. The Extension of the Method •••••••••••••••••••••

I 1 :; 10

Chapter III. Chapter IV. Chapter v.

Some Objections •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 20 The Conceptual Priori ty of Na tura1 Language • • • • • 30

The 11E-problem" ••••••• • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 40 Conclusion ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 46 Bibliography ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 47

FOREWOBD

The :f'ollowing rW.es of' ref'erence have been observed in this the.sis:

1. .All quotations :t'rom, and ref'erences to, worlœ by' Quine, and worlœ whiCh mention Quine, ref'er to the bibliograpJv' :f'ound at the end of' this thesis. Th:u.s, tor instance, "Strawson (2~ p. 196', means: "Strawsoa., Individu.als, p. 196."

2. Journal articles wbich have been reprinted in anthologies are not present in the bibliograpby. !he-,·titles of' 'BUCh arti:eles occur on1y in the te:x::t anà/or f'oot-notes. !J!huai· tor instance,

"Warnockt "Metapbysics in Logic" in Flew {lo) p;:re,'!lneans, "l!'lew CLdJ P• 78." · ·· · "

I.

INTRODUCTION

The invention of !'u.:nctional calculua, and more generally the rigoroua

development of s,ymbolie lo~c in the second half of the nineteenth centur,r

and in the beg1nnjng of the twentieth century have haaa great impact on

philosopb\Y. However, nowa.d.qs there ia a controvers;y concern:l.ng the

relevance of techniques of symbolie logic for solving philosophie problems.

:Both aides fi8ree that as a resul t of these techniques, philosophera have

ga.ined a better insight into their problems, thus oJJ.ly the rat~ge of appli­

cation of these techniques is at issue.

The problem of ontolog;y is probably the most appropriate testing

ground for this contronrs;y, not oJJ.ly because this philosophie problem

has recei ved great attention in twentieth ce:ntu.ry logical theory, but

also because it is thought to have been most affected b;y the earlier

mentioned developments in logic.

In 1113' thesis I examine Quine' s the ory of ontological commi tment in

the light of the controvers;y which it haa generated. I first give one

of the earliest attempts at applJing the techniques of s;ymbolic logic

to the problem of existence (Ch. I). Then I outline Qu,ine1s treatment

of the problem (Ch. II Sect. I) which is generally thought to be the

most ~orous contemporary attempt to bring s,ymbolic logic to bear on

problems of ontology.

2.

I argue against Quine 1s position, the position that the o:nly philo-1

sophical problem o~ existence is t~t which is coJmeeted wi th the exis-1

tential qua:ntifier. After having argued that Quine i:nte:nds to solve

the general philosophical problem of existence by bis criterion o~

ontological eommitment (Ch. II, Seet. II) I argue, ~ollowing Strawson,

that Quine's thesis concer.ning the elimdnation o~ siDgular terms involves

a misconception. (Ob. III, Sect. I).

Next I outline the objections o~ Carnap and Warnoek to Qaine 1s

notion o~ ontological commitment. (Ob. III, Sect. II).

In J'If3" ~ourth chapt er, I diseuse how Quille does reply to Carnap 1 s

objection and could reply to Warnock1s, and I argue that Quine 1s views

on reco:nstructiDg our natural language rely on untenable assumptions.

I conclude J'If3" thesis by arguing (Ch. IV) that Quine' s theory' o~

ontological commitment, involving a reconstruction o~ our natural

language does not deal adequately wi th the philosophical problem of

existence.

I

THE ORIGIN Ol!' THE METHOD

I

As a preliminary to my main topic, Quine 1 a theory of ontological

commi tment, I shall diseuse Russell' s the ory of descriptions; al though

I shall introduce Strawson1a opposition to Russell 1s programme, I will

not offer any definitive conclusions about the controvers.y.

Rasaell's chapter in Introduction to Mathematical PbilosopbY en-

1 2 ti tled "Descriptions" and Strawson 1 a article "On Referring" will

receive most of my attention. Nevertheleas, in my exposition I shall

also make use of Rusaell 1s "On Denoting"3and Strawson1s Introduction to

Logical Theo;r4•

Russell 1 a theor.r of descriptions is intended to solve the problem of

nunreality". He saya: "It ia argued, e.g. by Meinong, that we can apeak

about "the golden mountain" ,, "the round square" and so on; we can asaert

two propositions of which these are grammatical subjecta; bence they must

have some kind of logical being, since otherwiae the propositions in which

they occur would be meaningless"5• For Russell Meinong's argument shows

1. Russell (20) p. 167-180. 2. Caton (6) P• 162-195. :;~ Peigl (9) p. l03-ll8. 4. Strawson (25) 5. Russell (20 p. 169.

4.

a lack of "tbat feeling for reality wbich ~t to be preserved even in 1 1

the most abstract etudies" • He be~ieves that logicians like Meinong

were led to such conclusions by their und.ue emphasis on the grammatical

forme of propositions as guides for analysia; they lacked the apparatus

of propositional tunctions~. But, ":in deal.i.ng with propositions, we are

dealing in the first instance wi th sy.mbols, and if we attribute signifi-

canee to groups of symbole which have no significance we,shall fall into

the error of admi tting unreali ti es. n3 "Logic must no more admit a uni-

corn than zoolog;y can; for 1ogic is concerned wi th the real world just

as truly as zoo1og;y, thougb. with its more abstract and general features". 4

The Russellian posi tlhon is that i t is significant but false to say

"I met a unicorn", since the proper 8Il8.lysis reveals that "a unicorn" is

not a constituent of the proposition, though the concept "unicorn" is5•

To illustrate this point with another examp1e; we might ask for the

meaning of: ( 1) "A student knows his algebra"

(2) "student"

but not of: (3) "a student"

The 1ogical for.m. of (1) isz "x knows his algebra" where x can be-,planted

by a name or a description.

Now, a word is appropriate about namee and descriptions. It is

Busse11' s v:Lew that in the world there are things which we sometim.es nam.e

and sometimes de scribe. The question whether a name names a:n;ything is

senseless because to be a name.!!. to name something. That which it names

is i ts meaning. Consequently, "% is real• or "x is unreal" mak:e no sense

1. ibid. P• 169. 2. ibid. P• 168. 3· ibid. p. 170. 4. ibid. p. 169. 5. ibid. p. 168.

5.

when the values of x are names; on the other band when values are descrip-

ti ons the propositions make sense, they can be true or false.

The distinction between names and descriptions is seen from an exami-

nation of identity contexte. 1\'or example, the :f'unction: "x = x" will

become a true proposition whenever the x is replaced by a description.

Wha.t does this .mean?

Russell divides descriptions into

A. Defini te descriptions

B. Indefinite descriptions

Roughly, the difference between A and B is that in À there is an impli-

cation of uniqueness whereas in B there is not.

Thus:

Members of À bave the form "the so and so".

Members. of B have the form "a so and so".

Russell wants to say that this difference is intuitively clear so that

when I say "The man next door is noisy" I am taken to mean:

(a) "There is a man next door."

( b) "There is only one man next door."

( c) "There is nothing which is a man next door and is not noisy."

and when I say "A man next door :ls noisy." I am taken to mean:

( d) "The re is a man next do or."

(e) It is not the case that all men next door are not noisy."

1 One chooses between A and B mainly on epistemological grounds. But,

definite or indefinite description may or may not describe. A does not

describe if one of (a), or (b) is false. B does not describe if (d) is

1. In this example, one would choose between A and B according to one's information about the source of the noise.

6.

false. Bence, if in the identi ty context we replace x by a defini te

description which does not describe definite~ the resulting statement

of identity will be false. "The round square is round" will be false.

From this, it follows that substituting a name for the x in a tunction

will result in a proposition different from the one which resulte from

substitttting a description for the same x. For example, consider "K

wanted to know Whether x was Scott".

"K wanted to know whether Scott was Scott" is different from ffK

wanted to know Whether the author of Waverl;y was Scott", Where "Scott"

is a name and "the author of Waver~" a description.

As far as existence is concerned the thesis is as followsz

I. "x exista" is senseless When the value of x :ia a name.

II. "x èxists11 or "x is so and so" is a sig:Difican.t proposition if

the value of :x: is a description and i ts truth, or talai ty depends on the

truth or falsity of the a's, b1s and c 1s corresponding to the description.

Àceordingl;y, "the present KiDg of ]'rance is wise•• will be a signifi-

cant but false proposition beeause in

a0 = "There is a King of France at present"

bo = "There is at most one XiDg of France at present"

co = "There is nothing wbich is a KiDg of France and is not wise"

ao is clear~ false, therefore the eonjunet ao and b0 and c0 is false.

Thus, we have a decision procedure for determôning the truth or falsity

of existential propositions where a description is a eomponent; we re­

phrase it as a eonjunct of the a•s, b1s and c 1s, and determine the truth

values of the conjunets by empirical means. If they all turn out to be

true, the erlstential proposition is true; if one or more of them turne

out to be false, the proposition is false. A corollary to Bussell's

solution of the problem of ttunreali"t;;r" is that whenever there ie a genuine

problem as to whether an e:x:istenti4 proposition ie tru.e or false, its

subject term is treated as a deeeri~tion. For e:z:am.ple, einee there ie 1

a genuine problem whether "Homer exista" is tru.e or false, we treat

"Homer" not as a name but as a shortha:nd for some description or other.

The following is a statement of Strawson's opposition to Russell:

"I think i t is tru.e to say that Russell 1 a theory of Descriptions •••

is still widel;y aeeepted among logicians as giviDg a correct aeeount of

the use of auch expressions" (as 1 the so and so 1 ) "in ordin.a.r.Y language.

I want to show in the tiret place that this theory, eo regarded, embodies

some fundamental mistakes".1 It has been seen that Russell anal;yeed

"The present King of :France is wiselt'~ .. sa:sr s,as ao and b0 and e0 • He

arrived ·, says Strawson, ·at this anal;ysis b;r asld.ng himself what would

be the eircumstanees in which we would sa:y that anyone who uttered the

2 sentence S had made a tru.e assertion.,, &o, b0 . and e0 are onl;y the nec es ..

sary conditions of making a true assertion b;y uttering the sentence B,

but they do not constitute a correct analysis of sentence s.

At the basie of this opposition lie the following statements:

a. "We cannot talk of the sentence being true or false, but onl;y

of its beillg used to make a true or false assertion."3

b. "':Mentioning' or 1referring1 ie not sometbing an expression does:

i t is something that someone ean use an expression to do. n4

Bussell'e confusion about a and b gave rise to th1nk1ng that "referrillg

or mentioning, if it oceurred at a11, mu.st be meaning". Strawson1s con-

Caton (6) p. 16;. ibid. p. 169. ibid. p. 169. ibid. p. 170.

Phrase in parentheses is 1l13' own. 1'

a.

clusion about l.!!he XiDg of li'rance is wise" is that the question of 1 ts

being true or false does not arise. The speaker of the sentence does not

mention a.nytb.irlg or ~body. Thus, he is spuriously using a significant

sentence rather than, as Russell would say, gem.d.nely utteril::tg a false

one. The "!he" of "The auch and such" shows, but does not state, that

we are, or intend to be, referrillg to one particular indi vidual of the

species "Such and such". "The'' used in such a way implies that the

existential conditions described by Hussell are fulfilled. That there

is a King of France is presupposed1 by The King of l'rance is wise· but

does not entail i t becauee the assertion of one and the denial of the

other does not lead to a contradiction. 2

!hus, while Strawson agrees that the position Russell seeks to

reject, i.e. that "round square","the golden mountain" have some kind

of logical being, should be rejected, he maintains that it could be

done more satisfactorily by avoiding the confusion Bussell and his

earlier opponents (e.g. Meinong) share:.3 It I!Dlst be noted that Straw­

son's position is not without its critics. 4 levertheless, a few points

remain unassailed:

1. Using an expression to refer to sometb.irlg is not in and of

itself to make any assertions about that thing but to lay dow.n the

grounds for assertions.

and more importantly:

2. :&nphasis should be placed on the different r&les expressions

1. Strawson gives the following def~tion of "presupposition": K is presupposed by L, if and only if , the truth of K is a necessary con­dition for the truth or falsity of L. Strawson (25) p. 175.

2. Caton (6) P• 185. 3'· ibid. P• 165. 4. Ayer (1), Russell (21), Black (4).

9.

play in a language and not on an analysis of expression as suoh wi thout

respect to their varied uses in a ~ety of contexte. '

!his latter point is a crucial one f ft is in fact discredi ting the

Russellian claim about the importanc' of the apparatus of propositional

:f'unctions, for by suoh an apparatus we can e:mmine only the conte:x:t-in-1

variant :teatures of statements leavüg an examination of their contert-

variant use aside.

Tbns this chapter has served a double r&lea

a) It bas introduced the historical roots from which will spri.ng

Quine's attempt to apply :tormal logical considerations to the

problem o:t existence, and at the same time

b) it has show.n a germ o:t the opposition to such programme.

II

THE EXTENSION Ol!' THE METHOD

10.

I

Gi ving a full amount of Quine' s theory of ontological commi tment

ia a rather complicated taak. The reaaon for this is twofold:

a) It is di:t'f'icult to malte out the extent of Quine' a claims.

b) Quine discusaes many important issues which the reader feels

are somehow related, yet the connections are seldom made explicit.

For Quine the ontological problam can be put simp~ - What is there?

He begins his treatment of the problem by an inves-tigation into the

nature of ontological disputes. He suggests that at some point in a

philosophie discussion one of the participants may assert that there

are certain thil:Jgs which the other llll!q, wi th equal vehemence, de~.

Quine further notes tbat the proponent of the negative side in the onto­

logical dispute seems to be at a disadvantage since he cannat admit that

his opponent disagrees with him. The situation is this. A asserts

"Unicorne exist" and if B wants to deey this he ia in the stra:nge posi­

tion of naming some things (unicorne) and saying that they do not exist.

Thus, as soon as B tries to express his disagreement with A he seems to

be contradicting himself. Quine calle this the "Pla tonie riddle of

nonbeing". He finds "traditional" attempts to solve the riddle inadequate.

11.

SayiDg ei ther that unicorne erlst in Olle sense and tables erlst in a

different sense; or distinguishiDg ~etween "subsiét~and "existing"

lead to unnecessary theoretical complications.1 In~ case, these

tradi tional answers have "united in ru1 ni ng the good old word • axiat'"

because" we have all been prone to sa;y, in our common-sense usage of

1exist 1 , that Pegasus does not exist, mean.i.Dg simp]J' that there is no 2 auch entity at all". !o dissolve the riddle Quine otfers a solution

in the spirit of Russell' s theo:r:y of descriptions. He wants to have a

. managea ble way of handling ontological disputes, but more importantly

he wants to refute, or at least to discredit Platonism, in the sense

in which Platonism is associated with the alreaqy mentioned problem of

nonbeing and the tradi tional answers to i t. In Quine' s attack on Pla-

tonism, however, the spirit of nominalism is more prominent thau in

Russell's attack on its Meinongian version. It will be remembered that

Russell' a main concern was to maintain a "sense of reali ty", whereas

Quine is also concerned with m1n1m1sing the number of entities presup-

posed b.1 our discoures. This feature of Quine 1s attack is illustrated

by his argument; against talk1ng of "unactualized" and "actualized"

possibles. ~ positing there two additional rea1ms of entities we open

ours el ves to a who le arra.y of add1 tional problems which were not there

in the first place.4 In his view a bloated ontology besides generating

unnecessary problems is, for aesthetic reasons, un.des1rable. Quine' s

programme is as follows:

He takes from Russell the notion that apparent D&Dles, complex

1. Quine (16) p. 4. 2. ibid. p. ;. ;. ibid. P• 4. 4. ibid. P• 4.

12.

descriptive phrases like "the author of Waverly" or "the present

King of France" can be ~zed as tragments of the wbole sentences 1n

which they occur. He goes further: 1

"The virtue of this analysis,"

he says "is tha.t the seemi:Dg name, a descriptive phrase,_i~ paraphraaed

1n context as a so-called 1ncomplete symbol. No unified expression is

offered as an ~sis of the descriptive phrase, but the statement as

a whole Which was the context of that phrase still gets its fUll quota

1 of meaning--whether t:rue or false". Thu.s, to apply Hussell 1 a theory to

"The round square cupola on Berkeley Collage is pink", we get "Something

is round and square and is a cupola on Berkeley College and is pink".

The second statement, says Quin~ceases to contain any component whiâh

even purports to name the alleged entity "round square cupola". The

burd en of the claim is placed on the pronoun "something".

He now extends Russell's analysis to all singular terme, terme

which purport to refer uniquely to enti ti es. lll singular terme can 1n

principle be elim1nated.2 ~ singular term K is equivalent to a des­

cription auch as "the x tha.t K1s 11 and can be analysed away "!....!! Russell". The extension of Bussell's analysis consista in saying that

all singular terme can be const:rued as descriptions; for Russell, the

class of s1ngula.r terme was greater than that of descriptions. Quine<1s

thesis in contrast presupposes that 1n principle there is no difference

between nam1ng somethi.ng and listing all the predicates and only those

predicates which apply to that thing; that we can secure uniqueness of

reference to, for example, Socra.tes by listing all the predicates whiâh

apply to Socrates and to h1m only. Nevertheless, Quine's conclusion

l. ibid. p. 6. Note that by"context"he means wha.t Russell meant by "context of the proposition" and not what Strawson did by "context of the assertion".

2. ibid. P• 146.

from the possibility of eJ1m1nsting 'ingular terms is that we can

use singular terms significantly in Jentences w1 thout presupposing that i . 1

there are the entities wbich those t~rms purport to name • Thus, "the

only way we can involve ourselves in ontological commitment (is) by our

use of bound variables"2

• This then is Quine 1 s cri teri on of ontological

commi tment. For an example of how i t might work, take "There are grey

elephants". In first order .tunctional calculus, the above statement

would be symbolised as"3 x (E xct-G x)'; the x is bO\md by the existential

quantifier "3 x". Th.us, one would be commi tted to ail and only those

things which x takes on as values auch as to make the sentence true.

The importance of this cri teri on for Quine is illustrated by the

following quotation. 11We now have a more explicit standard whereby to

decide what a given theor,y or form of discourse is committed to: a

theor,y is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound

variables of the theor,y met be capable of referring in order that the

affirmation made in the theor,y be true 11 •3

Before going on to tu.rther elaborate the criterion, I shall add

a few more words about the elimination of singular terms. Quine says:

"Wbatever we say w1 th the help of names can be said in a language that

shuns names altogether. To be assumed as an entity is,purely and simp1y,

to be reckoned as the value of a variable. In terme of the categories

of traditional grammar, this amounts roughly to saying that to be is

to be in the range of reference of a pronOlm.. "4 That we be able, in

principle,to eliminate singular terme is crucial to his general programme,

for if it were true that singular terme are theoretical1y superfluous,

1. ibid. p. 12. 2. ibid. p. 12. 3• ibid. P• 13. F. 4. ibid. p. 13.

it would follow that we could have a language consisting of quantified

statements alone. Renee, the Quiniap ontological criterion would be

sufficient for all cases.

Also the problem of univeraals cauld be solved by Quinian methode;

we would bec-.nitted ouly to classes because:

(a) All names could be construed as predicates (or as clusters of

predicates);

(b) All predicates ~be construed as relations;

(c) All relations can be construed as classes of classes.

As I have said, the thesis about singular terms is crucial to Quine's

contentions concerniDg ontology. A more detailed exandnation of it

will be offered in the next chapter.

However, for a fuller understanding of Quine's criterion of

ontological commitment two qualifications of it must be taken into

account. The two qualifications Quine off ers are the following:

(a) "What there is does not in general depend on one's use of

language, but what one says there is does111 • This tells us what Quine

means by "ontological commi tment of our dis course": we are not commi t;jed

to entities--what exista, but only to saying that there are auch and auch

entities--saying what there is. This leads to the point that, primarily,

ontological commitment applies not to man but to discourse. The way I

talk may commit me to saying what there is but I ~ disregard ~ commit­

ment. I maJ take the attitude of frivolit,y.

Another important qualification connected w1 th (a) is

( b) One can free one self from ontological commi tment by al tering

1. ibid. P• 103.

15.

1 one's discourse • It may be that I can rephrase what I want to ~

into an idiom avoidillg quantification, avoidiDg the use of "fhere is."

!his point is important for Quine because whenever I use "!here is" I

automatical.l7 i.D.vo1 Te JÇ'Self in an onto1ogical commi tm.ent but w1 th

this qua.li.fication more flexibility is allowed.

Quine also says that: "Relative to a reall.1' alien language it 'II1Jq

happen despite the most sympathetic effort, that we cannot make even the

2 roughest and remotest sense of ontological commitmsnt" • lfow, this sug-

gests that there may be cases where we cannot decide in an ontological

dispute alODg Quinian methode, but the question is: What would count

as auch an alien language for Quine? J.Prom the context it appears that

he has amo:ag others, the natural language in mind.

".... the idiomatic use of "there is" in ordinary" language knows

no bounds comparable to those that might be reasonably adhered to in

scientific discourse painstakingly for.mulated in quantificational terms•3•

But, would he accept auch an alienation between a quantified language4

and the œtural language?5

In sum, we see two things happeni:Dg: an attempt at a more or lesa

decisive ~ of bandling ontological disputes, and second, an attempt

at reducing the num.ber of entities which we can, or must sa:r there are.

It has already' been pointed out that Quine is attack:l.ng Platonism, and

that his attack is in the spirit of nomina.Jism.

1. ibid. P• 103. 2. ibid. P• 107. 3. ibid. P• 106. 4. A language expressible in quantiticational form. {Quine otten usee

"echematieed language" to mean '!quantified language".) 5. A more detaUed discussion of this question is g1 Ten in JIJ1' Obapter IV.

16.

II

At this point the difficul ty concer.ning the extent of Quine • s

philosophical claims has to be settled. It might be argued that Quine

1s not concerned with metaphysics, but is merelJ attempting to deal

with some philosophical problems of the exact sciences. Therefore, to

say that he fails to solve the general philosophical prob1em of existence

1s beside the point. This argument 1s supported by the fact that Quine

repeatedlJ points out that he is not worried about what there is, bu.t

what one 1s committed to saying there is. But, this distinction 1tse1f

needs to be clarified.

What Quine says 1n the fol1owing passages seems yet stronger support

for this argument. Quantificational form is a good standard for apprais-

ing onto1og1cal cammitment of one or other of our theories because~he

quantificational form is a convenient standard form in which to couch a

1 theor,y." or again:

" •••• i t is only in this spirit, in reference to one or another real

or imagined 1ogica1 schematisation of one or another part of or all of

1. ibid. P• 105.

17.

science, that we can with fUll propriety inquire into ontological pre­

suppositions".1

In these passages he seems to suggest tbat he ie not concerned w1 th

the general problem. However, I shall now show that this is by no means

the whole story.

1) Even in the pages where the two previous quotations appear he sqs

more. He is e:r:plicitly arguing against the "champions of ordinar,y l&DgUage"

who say that "there is" certainly belcmgs to ordinar,y la:r:tguage but "look

aekance at a cri teri on of ontological cODDi tment which turne on a real

or imagined translation of statements into quantiticatioD&l for.m". 2

2) In \ford and Object3 Quine argues against saying that there can

be different senses of "there are".

The giet of both 1) and 2) is that Quine 1s not satisfied with eaying

that there is the problem of "there is" in ordinary language for which

there cannot be a forma! solution, and that there is the problem of "there

is" of sche-.tised language which .!!. for.mally soluble. He is sq1ng rather

that we could and should have a general (formal) solution for both.

3) In llethods of Logic Quine sqs: "There are no ultimate philo-

sophical probleu concerning ter.ms and their references, but on1y con-

cerniDg var.iab~es and their T&J.ues; and there are no ultimate pbilosoph:tcal

problams concerning existence except insofar as existence is expressed

b7 the qU&lltitier (3x). n4

4) Hie discussions and examples range over a wide section of ordi­

nary la:Dguage. 5

These four points are convincing enough bat there are other grounds

1. ibid. p. 106. 2. ibid. p. 106. 3. Quine (19) P• 241. P. 4. Quine (17) P• 224. 5. ct. Quine (16), p. 2-12., and Quine (18).

on which one might assert that Quine is maldDg a fairly wide philoso­

phical clailll. He also says: "Ontologioal questions •••• are on a par

18.

with questions of natural. science.•1 "Aa an em.piricist I contimle to

think of the conceptuel schem.e of scieBCe as a tool, ultilllately, for

predict1Dg future experience in the light of past experience. :P.tv'sioal

objecta are conceptuall;y im.ported into the situation as convenient inter­

mediaries •••• comparable, epistemologically, to the goda of Homer.•2

"Posit1Dg does not stop with macroscopic ~sical objecta. Objecta

at the atomic level are posited to make the laws of macroscopic objecta,

and ultimately the lan of experience, simpler and more DIBnageable."'

"!rotal science, mathematical and naturel. and human, is similarly lJut

aore extremel;y underdetermined by experience. !he edge of the system

mu.st be ltept squared with experience; the rest, w:i.th all its elaborate

11\Yths or fictions, has as its objective the sim.plicity of laws.•4

Oonsequently, when Quine sqs: "!he important thing is to muler-

stand our instruments; to keep tab on the diverse presuppositions of

di verse pollrtions of ·our theor:r, and reduce them where we can", 5 he

is to be taken as maldDg a general claim. about ontolog;y, one that bas

and ehould bave importauce over and above mathematics and logic.

!rhis section was not m.eant to turther elabora te Quine' s cri terion

of ontologioal commitm&Dt but rather to decide its seope. It has been

deeided that Quine intends to solve the general philosophical problem

of existence. !lms, in the remaining cbapters I shall treat his claim.

concerning ontology as a general philosophical clâta.

1. QQine (16) P• 45. 2. ibid. P• 44. 3. ibid. P• 44. 4. ibid. P• 45. 5. ibid. P• 117.

19.

ln the immediately following chapter I shall examine two types of

objection to Quine's theory of ontological commitment, objections to

his thesis about the elimination of singular terme, and objections to

his very notion of ontological commitment.

III

SOME OBJOOTIONS

20.

I

In the previous Chapter I bave suggested that the thesis about the

elimination of singular tems is crucial to Quine' s general programme

and have given reasons why it is so. One f'inds a fuller discussion of this

issue in Strawson' s Indi viduals1 and "Singular Tems, Onto1ogy and Iden­

tity"2. Existentia1 quantification has "•••• a role, in language which

is to be brought out or elucidated in contrast with the place, or ro1e,

in language which linguistic singular terms have. No sense can be

attached to the idea that they can have the place they have even if there

is no such place", S81S Strawson.3 This statement is a succinct summar,y

of the elaborate po1emic directed against Quine in "Singular Tems of

Ontology and Identity". The outline of Strawson1a argument there is as

follows:

He begins w1 th three quotations from Quine:

1) "The who1e categor.y of singular tems is theoretically supe~

f'luous ••• there are logica1 advantages in thi nkj ng of i t as theoretically

cleared awa:y."4

1. Strawson (24) p. 195. J.F. 2. Strawson ( 26) 7. In Strawson (24) p. 196. 4. Quine (17) P• 211.

21.

2) "Wbatever we say with the help of names ean be said in a laÙguage

which ehuns names altogether."1

;) ".All sillgul.ar terme aside from the variables that serve as

pronolmS in connection wi. th quantifiera, are dispensable and elimina ble

by paraphrase.n2

Then he points out that while these three statements aeem to s~ the

same thing, yet there is a difference. 1) and 2) state the theoretical

possibility of a situation where we use no siDgular ter.ms at all. ;)

states the possibility of using siDgular terms, but also paraphrasing

them into different for.ms where they are not used.

Thus, there are two the ses, one strcmger and one weaker. The weaker

(W) being 'that we can eJim1nate singular ter.ms by paraphrase language',

and the stronger (s) being 'that we can e]1m1nate singular terme by a

language which could stand b.f itself~ W is weaker because to understand

the paraphrase would involve understanding it "as forma of words from

which singular terme have been eliminated by paraphrase."; S on the

other band will not do because there is no guarantee that the description

of the logical character of the "new language" will remain as it was

within the "old la:cguage" witbout the contert of the "old language".

Strawson's strategy is to show that:

a) Quine produces evidence to support W only.

b) ~e advantages Quine claims follow from S only.

Since W follows from S but S does not follow from W the truth of a)

and b) will seriously damage Quine' s position. Renee, what Strawson

seeks to establish is "that it is impossible in principle tbat the

language of the paraphrase (my 1 new language' ) sbould be interpreted

1. Quine (16) p. 1;. 2. ibid. P• 146 ;. Strawson (26) p. 434.

22.

as Quine and the rest of us interpret i t, unl.ess i t is se en as a para­

phrase lallgUàge,i.;.e. unless language also contains singular terms."

Strawson is correct in maintaining that Quine needs S because Quine

wants to say more than just that nin the langu,aae of the paraphrase

all reference to objecta is so narrowed down".

Briefly, the argument is as follows:

Quine's predicates or what Strawson calls universal terms "must

be connected with our experience if any are to be understooa.rr1 Further-

more, these universal terms must be connected with particular bits or

slices of our experience. Renee, if they are to be learnt as predicates

of particulars, they must be learnt as predicates of demonstratively

identified particulars. But, no meaning can be attached to the idea of

their being learnt as predieates of demonstratively identified particu-

lars unless the language cont$8 expressions used for maki ng demonstra-

ti vely identitying references to particulars, i.e. unless i t contains

singular terms for particulars. To put this more generally: It is

maintained that a schema could not have the sense it has for us, the

gra.mme.r it has for us, except in the context of that simpler gra.mme.r

2 against the background of which we can learn it.

Strawson considera the possible objection that •no ways of reading

or interpreting the schema are mandatory, that these are the na.tural

ways only for those whose ordinary language does in fact contain singu­

lar terms. 13 A similar objection is envisaged in Individuals: "ÂllS.lysis

must !ether be seen as an attempt, hampered b7 the difficulty of getting

away from the forma of ordina.ry speech, ••• We mnst be liberal and ima­

gina.tive 1n our interpretation of it."4 However, his answer is that

1. ibid. P• 446. 2. Against the background of natural language contajning singular terms. 3. ibid. p. 448. 4. Strawson (24) P• 19~.

23.

in such a case we Dll18t fortei t our cla.im to re:ter to particulars at

all; we are then not enti tled to sq, because it does not· malœ sense,

that all reference is narrowed dow.n to the values of our bound variables.

T.hat Strawson has given an adequate representation of Quine's point

can be seen from the :to11owing two quotations from Quine: "!be creative

aspect is involved in the progressive re:tinement of scientific language."1

"!be philosopher' s task was wel1 compared by B'eurath· to that of a

mariner who :mu.st rebui1d his ship on the open sea. n2

I could find nothillg beyond these and other similar}J" vague commente

of Quine which could be tak:en as counter-objections to Stn.wson's·.thesis

concerning singular terme.

Thus, i t JliEJ:Y be conc1uded that Quine cazmot ( 1ogical}J") invi;te us

to consider the possibUity of el1m1netiDg singular terme, for our Ullder-

standing of existentiallJ" quantified statements depends on our ability

to refer identif;ying}J" with singular terme. In rq fourth· chapter I

shall :turther rein'! oree Strawson' s cri ticism of Quine on this point,

by pointing out inadequacies in Quine's views on reconstructing

(regenerating) our :natural {ordiœry) language.

1. Quine (16) P• 106. 2. ibid. P• 79.

24.

II

In this section, I am going to consider two objections to Quine's

propoeal of a criterion of ontological oommitment; namely those of

Carnap and Warnock. Although these objecti.one originate from two

widely different philosophical backgrounds, logical posi ti Tism, and

ordinary laJJgU.age analysis, they are s1m1lar in that both question the

very notion of an ontological commi tment.

For Carnap the problem of ontological commi tment is not a theoreti-

cal, but merely a practieal one. His argu.m.ent is as follows:

!here are two types of existenti.al statements:

a) internal existential statements

b) external existential statements

Statements of type a) are formulated within a given la:nguage. i'hey

assert "that there are entities of a specified kind, (and) can be formu-

lated as simple existential state.ments in a language oonta1ning variables

1 for these entities." Examples of these are "there are tables", "there

are numbers greater than 10". Given the langu.age, these are "usual.ly

1. Schilpp (22) p. 871.

25.

analytic aDd tri vial. n1

Statements of type b}: , on the other haDd "... purport to assert

the existence of entities of the kind 1n question not merely within a

given language, but, so to speak before a language bas been constructed"~

These Carnap would cali pseudo-theoretical statements, they should pro­

perly be thought of as proposals for the acceptance of language forms.

Examples of these are: "There are objecta", "There are uumbers". How,

for Carnap, since he does not think a)-type atatements are problematic,

the purported problem of ontological commitment ia no more than a dispute

about the acceptance of language forms. He suggeats an example to illus-

trate the point.

1 Sappose1,he says, 1there are two philosophera Xl and x2 discusaing

in the na.tural la:nguage about two construc-.ed object languages LJ. aDd

L2! These two languages are the eame except the univerae of discourae

D:L of L1 (the range of values of the variables) ia more comprehensive

than D2 of ~· Sappose aleo that Dl containe indiv:f.duals, classee of

indi viduals and classes of classes of indi viduala, but D2 does not con­

tain classes of classes of indi viduals. Consequently, the 81Dtactical

rules'of transformation and the semantical rules for L- concepts are

auch that:

1) 11li'or some :x and so:rne y, x is an element of y" is provable L-

tru.e 1n Ll•

2) "li'or enry :x and every y, x is not an element of y" is provable

L-true in L2·

How, both Xl aDd X2 agree that L2 ia simpler than LJ., they both under­

stand the ayntactical rules for L1 and ~ only x2 does not understand

1. ibid. P• 871. 2~ ibid. p. 871.

26.

the semantical rules of LJ., but this is not crucial. So far there is no

problem. The problem arises when x2 objecta to L1 on the grounds that

he bas arrived at the following two ontological resulta:

3) There are classes of objecta.

4) There are no classes of classes of objecta, and he says that

he arrived at this result because the semantical rules of ~ allow the

phrase "classes of classes", which ha,s no reference.

For Carnap 3) and 4) would be pseudo-statements because they are

misconstrued by x2 as existential statements of the natural language

"absolutely and objective1y"1 rather than (correetly) as statements

2 "relative to this or that la.ngua&e".

Therefore, when Quine says that your language Lx commi ta you to

§ and ~ beeause your semantieal rules allow ~ and SJ , aceording to

Carnap, he is uttering a pseudo-statement. Thus, Car.nap's point is

that ontologieal disputes as Quine conceives them are spurious. They

are idle disputes. Once we get clear on the semantical and syntactical

rules of the language, such disputes need not arise.

Wa.mock1 s treatment of the problem is different. He takes Quine' s

assumption to be that "if an expression has a designa. ti ve use, there is

something which in that use it designates113 and aslœ for the test whereby

one could decide Wbat expressions are to be taken to have designative

uses. 4

One of these tests is existential generalization. From:

1) "Leeds is a City" one can generalize to

la) "Something is a city" or

1. ibid. o. 873. 2. ibid. p. 873. 3. Warnock, "Metapbysics in Logic", in Flew (10) p. 78. 4. ibid. p. 78.

lb) "There is something which is a city" or

le) "There ia an x auch that x is a city"

But, from:

2) "Valhalla is Il\)'"thological11 one cannot generalize to

2a) "There is an x auch that x is !1\)'"thological"

Thus it is argued that the above shows that "Leeds" does, and "Valhalla"

does not have designative use.

'But, this test', says War.nock, 'breaks down in cases of;

3) "Appendicitis is painful"

4) "17 is a prime number", because it ia not clear whether one

would rule out statements of the form:

;a) "There is something which is painful"

;b) "Something ia a prime number" t

Even if we are liberal and say that clearly we can a.dmi t ;a and ;b does

it follow (as it would for Quine) that we are committed to Platonic

entities? In both statementa (;a and 3b) "somethiDg" is a component,

and treating it as logicians do both statements are of the form:

"3 x( •• x ••• )tt fhe point, however, ia that "something" -does not fonction

in ordinary language in the aame way as i t does in logic. Thus, at least

in the case of ordinary language the first test fails to tell whether an

expression is uaed designatively or not. Consequently, as far as ord.i.nar;r

language is concerned, we can say with Warn.ock that the question of onto­

logical commitment is not yet answered.

1 The second test Warnock examines is that of ~1inian "application".

(Quine "Notes on Existence and Necessity" Journal of P.bilosop~ 40, 1943)

This is the converse of existential generalization in that here one is to

1. ct. Quine (18), and Quine (17)

• 28.

find a formula wbich is true for all x' s and see whether i t "applies"

to the term in question. If it does, the term is said to have designated

use. For example, if there is a formula, s~ ( ••• x ••• ) which is true of

all x and applies to a term 'a' then 1a 1 bas a designative use. Let the

formula be (3 y) (x)y). If it is true that (x) (;ry) (x;>y), and that

3 7 (x) 7) is "applicable" to the term 1 a 1 ; i.e. if substi tu ting 1 a' for

'x' in)y (x>:r) )"ields a true statement; then 'a' is said to have a

designative use.

The wealmess of this latter test aceording to Warnock, is that we

could find certain formulas wbieh are both true of all x' s and "appl)""

to every possible term,e.g. •(x = x)•.

To sum up Warnock's position so far: Quine is interested in the

ontological commitment of languages. His procedure for deciding about

commitment is to find wbich terme aan be instances of the bound variables

of quantification. (Those which are, are said to have designative use).

But existential quantification is but a deviee of quan~ificational logic

which as auch bas "little or no clear application to the ordinary words

and idiome in which the problems are initiall)" expressed".1

Jinally, Warnock considera the possible eounter-objection tbat his

own objection might after all be ir:relevant. Could Quine agree wi th all

that Warnock bas said, and reply that the question of ontological commit-

ment is concerned not wi th ordinar.r language but wi th "one or another real

or i:magined logieal schematisation of one or another part or all of science 11?2

If what I stq in the previous cbapter is right, such a charge of ir-

relevance bas already been answered. Bevertheless, the fact remains tbat

Quine's criterion of ontological commitment bas no prima facie application

to ordinary language.

1. Flew (10) p. 90. z. Quine (16) p. 106.

29.

~e purpose of this chapter bas been to outline the objections of

Carnap, and the objections of two ordinary language philosophera: Strawson

and Warnock. In the next chapt er I shall reexamine, briefly, Carnp.p 1 s

objections, and, in detail, the ordinar,y language philosophera' objections.

IV

THE COBCEPTU!L PRIORITY OF BJ.TURAL LANGUAGE

30.

The aim of this ehapter is to elueidate :f'urther some of the difti­

cul ties one encounters in attempting to relate the '11U'ious aspects of

Quine's philosophy. Thus, I propose to consider how he does or could

reply to Oar.Dap's ani Warnoek's objections.

Very brietly, the ob3ections are as follows:

(1) Oar.Dap:

Ontological questions arise in certain traaeworks;

answers to them mq be found by log.l.cal methode or by empirical

investigations. However, questions about the erlstence of the :tramework

(uumbers, large size objecta) are at beat questions eoncerniDg convenience

of linguis'tic expression. !hus, Quine'e problem about ontology is a

pseudo-theoretical one.

( 2) Yar.nock:

The efforts of symbolic logicians to clarif'y probl8DIS of

ontology :tail. If, however, Quine agreee that S)'Dlbolic logic can make

no important contribution to philosophie problems of ontology, only to

"one or another real or i:magined schematisation of one or another ~

or all of science", the issue cames to an uncontroversial end.

Quine's general defense against (1) is that Oarœp's distinction

between exte:mal and internal enstential statements is a :misconception. It

1

relies on the "analy'tic-syntheti;c" distinction, a distinction which is

unacceptable. 1

1 What needs to be done now i~ to examine Qttine's reasons for the

1

rejection of the "analJtic-synt~tic" distinction, and Carnap's justi­

fication of the "inter.nal~exte~" distinction.

The "analy'tic-synthetic" di~tinction is usual.lJ' stated in the

following way: There are two types of statements, thoae which are true

by virtu.e of certain facts about' the world, and those which are tru.e i

by v:l.rtue of their meaning. Thefie two types of atatements are said

to be "synthetic" and "ana:cytic" respective:cy. Quine rejects the

"analytic-synthetic" distinction because, in his opinion, there are

no adequate criteria for analyticity. He considera the following

attempts at giving a criterion:

A) The e:xplanation of analJ'ticity in terme of syno'1J'3"1117. When

I srq 1 "all bachelors are UXIJDal'l"ied men" is analJ'tic' , I mean that

"bachelors" and "unmarried men" are synoil1m.OUS. More generallJ', a

statement is called analy'tic if i t ean be transformed into a truth of

logic by substi tuting synonyme for synonyme. In our example, this

substitution would result in the logical truth "ali bachelors are 1

bachelors" (x) (Bx = Bx). But, Quine's objection is tbat this will

not do because our notion of synOJJ'3flJY is in as much need of clarifi-

cation as that of analytici ty. In fact, most attempts at definillg

syno~ rely on the notion of ~icity.

B) Expl.anation of analyticity in terme of artificial languages.

Bere i t is held that since ord~ lar:lgWlge is vague we must look

at artificial l.anguages1 which ~ve explicit nsemantical rules",

l. Quine would distiilguish between artificial languages and a reconstru.cted language. CF. in my next chapter: Quine • s use of "ordinar;y language".

32.

in order to lllake the distinction olear. Camap (also) holds this new.

l'or him, a atatemtnt S is said to be ~o tor a laDguage L it it is

true aecordillg to the semantical mlea ot L. Bat what, asks Quine, are

"semantical IUles"? Bow are we to explain .!!!!g? Quine in the end say'S,

"Semantioal IUles determining the anal.J'tio atatements ot an art1tic1al

language are ot interest onl.7in so far as we alreaq understand the

notion of analy'tioity; the7 are of no help in gainiDg this UD.derstand:tng."1

lfow it :f'ollows from B that Oamap's distinction between erlernal. and

internal existential statement relies on the "analytic-s,ynthetic"

distinction because the var.y notion of semantical rule relies on that

distinction.

In sum, the force o:f' Quine's counter-objection is that i:f' Carnap

makes the "internal.-erternal" distinction, the onua is upon h1m to

explain what an artiticial laDguage is, wbat a aemautical rule ia.

Since auch an explanation would have to req on the "anal.y1iic-synthetic"

distinction, and since this distinction is untenable, Oamap1s objection

is without weight.

It must be noted bere that the issue about ane.J.ytic and syntbetic

statements ia b7 no meana a cloaed one. Xevertheless, Quine is justi­

:f'ied in his counter-objection. C&rnap does have a rather strict re-

quirement :tor what he considera a l.aDgu.age and,!!!. does not meet e.r:fT

ot Quine'a objections to the "ana:cy-tio-aynthetio" distinction, i.e.,

in the W8J' he lllakes the distinction i t is vu.J.nerable to Quine' s attf4ck. -In spi te o:f' al1 this, the di:f':f'erence between Carœ.p 1 s and Quine' s

position is not as great as one might think. !bis is what Quine 88.18

about their di:f':f'erence concer.ning ontology: "llow Carœ.p bas mai:ntained

tbat this is a question not o:f' matters of fact but of cboosing a

1. Quine (16) P• 36.

conTenient language torm, a cOimmient conceptual acb.eme or tramework:

tor science. ti th this I agree, but oJll1' on the pro'Yi.ao that the same be

conceded regarding scientitic b1Potheses generalq. Carnap bas recognized

that he is able to preserve a double standard tor ontologioal questions

and scientitio Jvpotheaes ODly' by assum.ing an absolute distinction between

the analytio and the s;ynthetio; and I need not sa:r aga1n tbat this ia

a distinction which I reject. •1 Or again: "Carnap, lewis, and othera

take a pragœatic stand on the question of chooaiDg between l.a:Dguage

toma, scientitio framework:a; but thair pragmatism leaves ott at the

iJDagined botmdar,y between the a.Da.l.Ttic and the s;rnthetic. I:n repudiatiDg

auch a botœ.da.J:1 I espouse a more thorougbgo:L:ag pragmatism. tt2 !hus, the

main difference betwêen them is that Quine is more sens:! tin to the

subtle difficulties conneoted with the "analytic-s;ynthetic" distinction,

and as he sqa he is a more "thoroughgoiDg pragmatist" • 'lb.ether auch a

"thorough go:L:ag pragma.tiD" is oalled for, whether it is needed, has

still to be decided •

.As far as Wamock:'s objection ia concerned, I have already dismi.ased

the counter-charge of irrelevance as havillg no adequate basie. !hus, I

propose to re-e::œmine the controversy ~ light of what Quine sqs in his

ohapter "Logic and the Reification of Universals": "Ordinary la:Dguage

rema::ins indeed ftmdamental, not only' genetically, but also as a medium for

the ultilllate claritication, by' however elaborate paraphrase, of auch more

artiticial usages." But, preoccupation with ordirlar,y language passes

over the creative aspect of philosopq,.3

While Warnook: would readily agree w1 th the tirst statement he

would have suspicions about the creative aspect ot philosopD1'• J'or,

1. ibid. P• 46. 2. ibid. P• 46. 3. ibid. P• 105.

be could argue, if it is tru.e tbat ordi:nar,y language is :f'nndamental,

then &rJ'3' irlhovations introduced in a. regenerate language have to be

clarified in ol'diDar;y la:nguage. But aillee the problem of ontology, he

could say, arose from ordi.:Da:r7 la:Dguage, and paradoxes seem to arise in

it, the problem should be solved there. .A regenerate, schematiaed,

la:Dguage which ex hvpothesi does J'lOt bave those problems can at best

be a sketcey summa:cy of what bas been achieved in the natural la:Dguage.

But, 1lOW what is this creative aspect of philosoplv'? In "A.1ms

and Claims of Regimentation1", Quine speaks at departures tram ordiDar;,y'

la:nguage. 2 Som.e departures, he says, might later become ol'diDar;y la:nguage,

because the language which is psychologicallJ' JIIOst fundamental is ordi­

Dar.Y J.a:nguage; consequent]Jt, azq departure could la ter become a part of

ordinary language.

Herein lies the basie di vergence between Quine and ord.inary laDgUage

philosophera lilœ Strawson or Warnock. Ord.1.na.r.r language philosophera

would insist tbat tbere is no precise definition (no necessary and

sufticient conditions) for what constitutes an ordinary language, but

the7 would maintain that there are certain conceptual criteria enablir.lg

us to decide which language is ordirJar.r and which is regenerate. Quine

on the ether band tak:i.Dg advantage:.'of this vaguenese fills the gap:

the language wbich is most fundamental peyehologically ~ ordinary

language. OrdiDar,r language philosoplllers, in contradistinotion, maintain

that ordina:ry language is conoeptu.al.ly, not just psycholoôcal]Jt, prior.

Qu,ine's thesia about translation 1:las to do with the issue here.

He denies empbatical]Jt that radical translation is possible, tba.t it

is possible ever to give an emet translation of som.ethiilg in a different

1. "Begimentation" means reconstruction in quantificational form. 2. Quine (19) Section 33.

language. !his he calle a "lexicogm:phers1 JQ"th,. !1!be reason he otters

~or rejecti.Dg the possibil1't7 o~ radical translation is that it presup­

poses an inadequate theoey of meanil:lg; that it presupposes the Tiew of

mea:nings as som.e ld.nd of ideal enti ties. On that Tiew sentences eould

be radical translations of one another because they would "sba.re" the

same meanillg.

lfithout going into aJl:1 great detail, we cou.ld grant Quine the

impossibility of radical translations WhiCh.follow from the inadequacy

of~ (Platonist) theor.r of meani.Dg. However, we need not agree with

his conclusions. P1rst, we need not agree that none but the ps,rcholo­

gical account of meanil'lg is possible. Second, we need not agree that

because under certain theories radical translation is misconceived, we

must, and need rest content with a loose contact with our natural

la:nguage when we depart from i t. lhen we are faced wi th a departure

from ordina.r,y usage, the questions we, must ask are:

Is the departure called for?

What are the "conceptual wheels" turnèd by the departure?

Oould we turn theae same "wheels" in the old, non-regenerate

language?

Blat, most importantly:

Will this departure be consistent w.1. th other things we want to

sq, and can perhaps say onJ.y in the natural language?

!rhese questions are important, and though they seem too vague in the

abstract, in particular contexte a:nswers to them are not cm.:Q' pessible

but are easential. !rheae questions and answers to them. will, in par­

ticular contexte, constitute an analy'sis of the meani.Dg of the d.epartures

in question. Quine off ers two just~ications for his departures fJ:o m

ordiJlarT l.a:Dguage in his theo17 of ontological commi tm.entl t

l. ibid.. P• 158.

1) they aJ:e• aida to clarification

2) they simpli:t,y theory

I shall etart with a discussion of 2).

i'he notion of simplicity is probably one of the most problematic.

So ~ different senses of it are invoked by different people in

various contexte tbat a:ay reference to i t must be treated w1 th great

caution. That there is uneasiness about "simplicity" can be seen

from what :Bu.nge says: "The unqualified demand for econollij" in every

respect, or even in some one respect, is definitely incompatible with

a number of important desiderata of theory constru.ctions-such as, e;;g., accuracy, depth, and external consistency-whence simplici ty tout court

should nei ther be regarded as mandatory nor be coun.ted as an inde pendent

cri terion on a par w::L th othe re-let alone above others. The rules of

simplicity fall under the general norm 'Do not hold arbitrar:y (un­

grounded)beliefs'"l~.

That there is further uneasiness about Quine's use of "simplioity"

is evident from what Katz says. Katz argues tbat Qu.ine 1s discussion,

2 in Word and Object , of simplioity does not "offer an independent

methodological justification for preferring the simplest b1Potheses",3

or rather the purported justifications he does offer are wrong. Quine' s

passage in question is to Jlij" knowledge his most detailed and serious

account of simplici ty.

To deal adequately w::Lth the problem of simplicity in science is

beyond the ecope of this thesis. !levertheless, we cau say tbat in some

1. Bange, "The Weight of Simplicity in the Construction and Assayin of Scientific Theories", in lester (12) p. 309.

2i. Quine (19) p. 20. 3. Katz (14) p.lll.

sense of 11 simplicity'" a requeat to aim.plif'.y specifie theories TJ_, T2 •••

ete. is legitimate, beeause usually' we ean get clear on what is asked

for in the specifie cases. But, talk of simplicity of our conceptual

scheme as if i t were some kind of a theory, like the one a we are

familiar w.:l.th in science, is surely' not to be taken at face value.

!hus, Quine's offering simplification of theor.y as a justification for

departures from. ordinar.y language as such is highl;r questionable. He

should not invite us to accept that even .2!!!, of . the aim8 of philosoph;y

is simplification of theor.y unless he ean show us:

(1) How it is legitimate to speak of our eoneeptual seheme as

some sort of a theory.

(2) How the notion of simplicity is operative in this purported

theory.

In as mnch as Quine does not deal adequatel;r with these two points,

his u:rmecessary extension of the notion a theory and his reliance on

the notion of simplicity is not justified.

Let me now turn to Quine' s claim that his programme of ontological

commi tment can aid us 11to understandj :ag the referential work of l.a:n8uage" •1

He remarks that in ordinary language we paraphrase certain expressiou

to reaeh the assent of our interlocutor, i.e. my interlocutor ms;r not

assent to, or understand something I sa:y, but if I paraphrase my state­

ment he may assent to an~or understand the paraphrase.--This is true.--

He then goes œ: to say that paraphrasing a certain e:xistential statement

into logical symbole can also have the same resulta .-!his is also

true.--However, this does not mean that all paraphrasing into quantifi­

cational form w.:l.ll have that result. That sometimes we can aehieve

1. Quine (19) p. 158.

clarity' 'by our use of e:rlstentiall.y quantitied statements in no W8:3'

justifies sa.yiDg that allf8:3'a, and ollly through existential quantiti-

cation cau we clarif",y the notion of e:rlstence, cl.a.ri.f,y the re:terential

work of our language. It is u:a.sound to make a clear-cut distinction

between how we cOJIDIDlllicate, and what the re:terential work of la:nguage

1 is1 as Quine bas done. For how are we to tmderstand the referential

work of language unless we know how to commun:t ca te wi th referring e::z::-

pressions? In the first chapter i t bas been. seen how illportant i t is

not to be "taken in" by plausible so1màing paraphrases, and how impor­

tant i t is to keep the conterts of assertions in mind.

Another claim Quine m.akes, which is meant to lend further support

to the theory of ontological comm.itment, is that • •••• To paraphrase a sentence

o:t ordiDar;y language into lO&ical symbols is '9'irtually to paraphrase i t

into a special part, still o:t ordinar,r or semi-ordi.Dary language; tor

the shapes of the indi vidual characters are UDim.portant. So we see that

paraphrasing into logical symbole is a:tter, lllJ. not unl1lœ what we all do

every- dtq in parapbrasiDg sentences to avoid ambigui ty. • 2 :rirst, "semi­

ordinary' l.aiiguage" is nothing but a "long-hanà:" for S)'Jllbolic notation,

as for eza:mple: "There is an ::z:: euch that it X's" (semi-ordinary-) is by

defini ti on &PlOJ31DIOUS wi th 9 ::z::( IX)" ( aym.bolic) • The pro blem for us is not

to get :trom sèmi-ord.inary la:Dguage to symbolic expression, but to get to

semi-ord.inary l.aiiguage i tselt. About this Quine sqs:

"But in the pattest o:t pa#aphrasing one courts contusion and

obscurity' imag1n1ng som.e absolute By'D07J.Y'IIII' as goa1.•3

1. ibid. P• 158. 2. ibid. P• 159. 3• ibid. P• 161.

This counter-objection bas already been dealt with. L&ck of

absolute syno~ does not justif,y Quine 1s refusal to accept &QYthing

short of a psychological cr1ter1on for syno~ for meaning.

A corollary to Quine 1s.thesis on syno~ is that the only notion

of conuni tment whi.ch makes · a:ny sense is to be found in elementary logic, in

first order 1'tmctional calculus. This explains his insistence on Ê!!

cr1ter1on of ontological commitment. Since he found a need to solve

ontological disputes and would not reconcile himself to a method lese

rigorous and precise than quantificational logic, his offer for a solu­

tion was to be in tems of quantificational logic. In this respect,

Quine was "ru.thlessly" consistent. However, whi.le one could agree that

quantificational schemata, serving as limited modela for some types of

discourse are useful provided the possible or actual uses of that model

are know.1;1, one would maintain that the task of expla:in:lng, and/or under­

standing is not through paraphrase into quantification, but rather it

is through descriptions, redescriptions, examinations of various uses,

and contexte, and other similar methode.

Quine 1s worries over ambiguity are, in a:rrt case, needless. There

1s nothing wrong w1 th ambigui ty and impreciseness as auch. Most of our

concepts are and some need to be ambiguous and imprecise. But, then

what is ambiguous outside a specifie context of discourse need not be

so within it. 'That a term is ambigtlous 1 , means that there are several

wa1s one ean understand it, therefore, one need only ask which way it

was meant to be understood. The problem of ambiguity arises when one

looks at terms or statements as eontext invariant "entities", things which

must do the same job in all contexte. Thus in rq next chapter I shall

investigate, in the spirit of the previous paragra.ph, what regimentation

contributes to our understanding of the problems of ontology.

v

THE "E-PROBLEM"

40.

U'p to œw, I have deal t wi th the presuppositions underlyiDg Quine 1 s

thesis about ontologioal. commi tment. In the follo'Wing chapter I ahall

address m;,ysel:r to the specifie problem of what Quinian regi:mentation ca:n

contribute to our u:nderstandi:Dg of E-problems. I use "E-problems" to avoid

biasing the issue wJ. th a loaded expression. It refere to the oluater

of problems falH:ag under these difi'erent heaà1ngs:

a) !he various uses of 11there is", "exista".

b) !he refer:r.lmg work of l.arlguage.

c) Decià.iDg about ontologieal disputes.

d) Genui:D.e or pseudo-ontologioal disputes.

e) The statua of uni versals.

The temptation is tc aq, as Quine does, that ordina:ry use of 11there

is", "erlsts" lmows no bounds, thus we have to restrict it, to make

it more 118ll8.ge&ble. But, we must go eautious~ here. 1fe must first

distiDguish between sqiDg that we do not UDdersta:nd what is meant b7

the expressions "thare is", "exista", and SEqiDg that their use soma­

times generates parado::œs. Quine would sq that disagreementa and

paradoxes are generated 'because we have a vague and imprecise notion

ot ex::Lstence. Renee, tor hia the solution of E-problems cannot be

piecem.eal, va.ry1Dg :trom. contexte to contexte; he requires a general

decision-procedure.

"•••·" now have a more ex.plicit standard whereby" to decide what

ontology a given theor,r or for.m of discoures is committed to."1

41.

But, as I han indicated in..,- preTious chapter, treedoa from

'9118Ueness, and treedom from paradoxes are nei thar sufficient nor neces­

eary conditions for freedom from contusion.

!hat Quine ahould come to auch a strict requirement for sol"fi.Dg

E-problems can also be seen from the first question he aslœ about the

problem.: "What is there?" !his is indeed a simple sounding question,

but one which upon scro.till1' becomes incree.si»gly abstruse. It sounds

lik:e "What is on tables?" "What is on one's mind?" ''lhat is the sum

ot 2 and 2?". Y et i t demanda an answer that could satisf7 81l'3' one of

these. !his wtq. of approa.ching the E-problem. prejudices the case from

the outset. It presupposes that there is a general, tormal problem

which needs solving.

Quine's anti-Platonism., in the end, comes to this: Plato has

asked "What is real?" or "What really ex::Lsts?", and his answer •s

that it is the one in the man11 he was led to this conclusion b;r con­

centrating on the indiTidual terme of discourse, not realizing that

whatever we sq fapes the tribunal of experience together wi th our

whole conceptua.l schem.e. But depending on our conceptual scheme what

is real may vary.

Quine might be right in his diagn.osis that the source of Pl.ato' s

fallac;r was over-emphasis ot the sim:Uari ti es in grammatical fôr.m.

1. Quine (16) p. 13.

42 ••

Bowever, he does not, in that case, go far enough. He is atill

lookiDg for a general solution to !BE problem of existence. Renee, the

question: "What is there?" Now, &l'JI. auswer to any of the three earlier

question is s, P or R whateTer s, P. or R might be. Yet the auswer to

"lhat ia there?" is drastically d.ifterent. It can haTe only, one possible

answer.

One can uaderstand the question 11What is there, tor theor,r T?tt or

11\Vhat is the ontological comœitment of theor.r T?"• And, the auswer that

"theor,y T is committed to those and on1y those entities which are the

values of bound 'VIU'iables of theor,y T." makes sense. It JD&kes sense,

bu.."f; i t presupposes that theo17 T is expressible in qœntif'ioational

tom.. In reali v, there are Ter,y few, if aJV' auch theories. !J!hus

even the ontological problem of theories is mch more tho1'1'q' than

Quine seems to suggest. But, when we come to E-problems, tb.i..llgs be­

come m:u.ch more difticul t.

In the first place, i t is di::f'ficul t to see how Quine can apealt of

the ontoloQ of genèral discourse, how he can sq that when we come to

THE problem of existence we should look upon our conceptual scheme as

some sort of a theor.r, and on our l.anguage as some sort of unifiable, if

not unified, discourse. !he truth is that E-problems are not in all1'

important sense like the purported ontological problems of the sciences.

Our particular sctentitic theories have certain more or lesa specifie

jobs to do. The deployment of modela tor certain scientific theories,

which !! an essential scientitic-ontological task is gtlided by JDalJ1

specifie considerations, arisiDg in specifie conterts of inquir.y. These

tasks are not sbared with our discourse at large.

"!rhere is" &l'll.d "exista" give rise to disagreements and paradoxes

in ordinary di~ourse because the1 are put to l1l.l.lV' and varied uses.

Of course, schematisation will help in some cases, but 1 ~ is only one

(by no means the most important) of many considerations. It is not

t:rue that whenever E-problems arise they are resolvable by the Quinian

criterion; Warnock1s "Are there Appendicites?" and "Are there m;ythical

mountains?" are two e:x:a:mples of that. '

Thus Qu.ine 1s dictum that:

"To decline to explain oneselt in tems of quantification, or in

tems of those speèial idiome of ordinary language by which quantifica­

tion is directly explained, is simply to decline to disclose one's

referential intent"1is too strong. E-problems, I• w:lsh to maintain,

are generated by various contexte of inquiry', especially when two cate­

gories of dis course, auch as the DJTthical and factual, the formal and

material, are at play in those contexte. But, even then the E-problems

are only secondar;y. The prima:ry pro blems are adequate understanding

and adequacy of descriptions.

Suppose A describes a certain state of affaira and B finds the

description inadequate. Then B may invite A to take another look or

to tr;y to redescribe the given state of affaira. In the end, A and B

:may still come up w:l th two al tema te descriptions. Suppose also that

the two descriptions differ, as Quine would say, in their referential

intent. Bow could A and B understand and decide about this difference

in intent? They would not ask one another for schematisation but

rather ask what turther :moves they would be allowed to make, or pre-

vented from making with their respective descriptions. In other words,

they would have to explore in piecemeal fashion the consequences and

ramifications of the â.l tema te descriptions. Their exploration might

have one of two re sul ta:

1) the referential problem has been dissolved with the mutual

1. Quine (19) p. 243.

44.

acceptance of one description

2) the difference in referential intent hae been underetood and

nei ther of them would, for some understandable, particular reason change

his description.

The second alternative is a possibility, but even then schematisa-

tion would not help because the divergence would be due to their dif-

ferent treatment of the particular situation.

:N'ow, Quine would say that they could have gone on and on, until

eventually they would have agreed on a certain schematisation. But,

this is what I find unacceptable, for it

a) places too much emphasis on the referential problem

b) puts too much faith in schematisation.

But more seriously,

c) it assumes the possibility of tully resolving all ontological

(referential) disagreements.

We could say more or lesa clearly what outeide considerations are

relevant to our particular problem, in the particular univeree of die-

course. But, to suggest that there is ultimately only one univeree

of discourse, a quantifiable one, where ontological probleme can be

resolved, seems at beat gratuitous.

I have earlier suggested that Quine 1s treatment of the E-problem

ie motivated by his dissatisfaction with the Platonic view of universals;

in accordance w1. th the law of parsimoDY he attempts to reduce the number

of universals. In this sense, he is attacking the Platonic theory from.

1 wi thin. However, in recent philosoph;lcal discussions , the concern

over uni versals has diminished, not tJ:!,rough complacency, but be cause

1. Stra.wson, "On ReferriDg" in Caton (6); Scriven, "Definitions, Explanations, and Theories" in :Peigl (8); Wittgenstein (27)

the new ways of looking at our concepts, our language, is thought to

have undercat the Platonic view of universals. Quine, if m:r arguments

in these last two chapters are valid, failed to show us how what he

talees to be the ontological problem is a problem, and furthermore, if

he meant to contribute to the solution of E-pro blems how his theory

of ontologioal oommitment oontributes to such a solution.

CONCLUSION

!he conclusion reached in this s'tudy 1s that Quüae's attempt to

apply techniques of s.ymbolic logic bas~ at best, ~ a limited ap-

plication to the problems of existence. His criterion of ontologi­

cal commitaent, relyillg on the notion of the e:d.stential quantifier

of s.ymbolic logie, is mch too restricti n to be of use in sol Ting

the philosophie problem. J'urthem.ore, his reliance on syabolic

logic is misconceived, tor an adequate discussion of existence mat

include a cri tical e:œmtnation of the logicians' notion of ex:Lsten­

tial qualification. It ought not start wi th the assu.m.ption that

their notion is the correct one.

46.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

47.

BIBLIOORAPHY

Only those works which have been of use to me in the present thesis, are mentioned here.

{1) AYER, A. J.

(2) AYER, A. J. (ed.)

(3) BEN'ACER.U', P. and PUTNAM, H. ( eds.)

(4) BLACK, M.

(5) BUNGE, M.

{6) CATON, c. E.(ed.)

(7) CHURCH, A.

(8) PEŒGL, H. etc., (eds.)

(9) l!'EIGL, H. and SELLARS, w. (eds.)

(10) :FLEW, A. (ed.)

(11) :FLEW, A. (ed.)

(12) FOSTER, M. H. and MARTIN, M. L. (eds.)

: The Concept of a Person,_ London, MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1963.

: The Revolution in Philosophy, London, MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1963;.

: Philosopbx of Mathematics, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964.

: Problems of Anal;rsis, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954.

: The Mfth of Simplicity, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963.•

: Philosoph;y and Ordinary Language, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1963.

: 110ntological Commitment". Journal of PhilosopSr, Vol. 55, 1958.

: Minnesota Studies in the Philosopbl of Science, Vol. II, Minneapolis:, University of Minesota Press, 1958.

: Readi.:n.gs in P.bilosophical Anal.ysis, New York, Appleton-Centucy-Crofts, Inc., 1949.

: Essaye in Conceptual Apal.:rsis, London, JlacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1956.

: Logic and Language, Pirst Series, Oxford, Blackwell, 1960.

: Probabili ty, Confirmation and Simplici t:r, New York, The Odyssey Press, Inc., 1966.

48.

(13) HARRE, R. : Theories and !J!bings, London, Sheed and Ward, 1961.

(14) KATZ, J. J. • The Problem of Induction and its Solution, • Chicago, The l.TniTersity' of Chicago Press, 1962.

(15) LIISKY, L. (ed.) . Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, • Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1952.

(16) QUillE, w. v. • l'rom a Logical Point of Viewi New York, • Harper and Row, Inc., 196~.

(17) QUINE, W. V. . Methods of Logic, New York, Holt, Retnehart • and Winston, Inc., 1964.

(18) QUINE, W. V. "Notes on Existence and Necessity", Journal of Pbilosopgr, Vol. 40, 1943.

(19) QUINE, W. V. : Word pd Objec!, Cambridge, The M.I.T. Press, 1960.

(20) RUSSELL, B. • Intro!uction to Mathe:mat.i_ç,!Ü Philoeop,&, . IDndon, George Allen and Unwin Ltd .. , 1953.

(21) RUSSELL, B. • "Mr. Strawson On Referr.l.l:lg", :Mind, Vol. LXVI, • No. 263, 1957.

(22) SCIILPP, P. A. (ed.) . !he Pbilosoph,y of Rudolf Oama;2, La Salle, • Open Court, 1963 •.

(23) STRAWSON, P. J!l. • "A Logician's Landscape", Philoso'Dhv, • Vol. 30, 1955.

(24) STRA.WSON, P. J!l. . Indi'Vidue.ls, London, Methuen, 1964. •

(25) STRA.'ISON, P. J!l. . ~tro!!!ction to Losical Theo~, London, . Jlethuen, 1963.

(26) STR!WSOllt P. 1'. : "SiDgular Tems, Ontology and Identi ty", Bïnd, Vol. LXV, No. 260, 1956.

(27) WIT!GE!fSTEill, L. • P.bilospEhical Investii!tions, Oxford, • Blaeltwell, 1963.