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1. Results of early parliamentaryelection – After Vučić, Vučić

Serbia has, after early parliamentary electionsin the spring of 2014, received a new-oldgovernment, headed by prime ministeraleksandar vučić of the Serbian progressiveparty (SnS). the entry of the Socialist party ofSerbia (SpS), headed by ivica dačić into the newgovernment is considered as a directconsequence of russian influence. namely, inthis way, russia does not have to investadditional effort and time to change the playersthrough which it articulates its significantpolitical and financial interests in Serbia.however, SpS has lost a lot with the loss of theministry of internal affairs, which is now led bythe SnS. this is not only related to the ability toinfluence the political-judicial-commercialdevelopments through the uncontrolled partsof the ministry of interior and other parts of thesecurity system which are now under theauthority of the SnS, but also about the factthat the Serbian public has an uncriticalaffection for the armed forces and the police,which brings a lot of votes to those who are attheir forefront. for the first time in Serbia, the

ruling coalition includes a political party, thealliance of vojvodina hungarians (Svm), whichat least formally advocates for Serbia’s entryinto nato.

based on this, one could hope that at least theprocess of criminalization of the rare individualswho also publicly advocate this policy will beslowed down, which was, until recently, thetrend. unfortunately, the way in which theheads of state, followed by the pro-governmentmedia, which is the majority, marked the 15thanniversary of the start of nato bombing ofyugoslavia, paints a completely different picture– that the policy of strengthening cooperationwith nato and the actual policy of euintegration will be jeopardized due to thepressure from russia.

for the time being, aleksandar vučićdemonstrates a lack of will or power to confrontthis. both options are contrary to speculationthat he is secretly sending signals that, in thelong term, he is in favor of Serbia’s natomembership. there are growing indications thathe also has an ambivalent relationship towardsSerbia’s european integrations, primarilybecause of his lack of a visible response, in any

Jelena Milić

„Today Serbia realized… that it was stunned by the liberalpromises and competition in tears for Zoran Đinđić, a puppet of

the West, a man who ruined the legendary Serbian Army andspecial services, who sold out the Serbian resistance and sent

Serbian heroes to the Hague Tribunal for abstract economic aid,and who, in the end, deservedly got himself shot for it.”

Konstantin Syomin, journalist of the Russian state television, theday after Kosovo declared independence, when fire was set to

Western embassies in Belgrade in February 2008

Jelena Milić, CEAS Director

PUTIN’S ORChESTRA

way, to the growing russian pressure directedagainst them.

both the previous and future prime minister ofSerbia have, in the period following electionsbut before formation of a new government,travelled to moscow, which pro-governmentmedia reported on quite inarticulately.

based on the above, based on vučić’s style ofgovernment while he was deputy primeminister and his first days as prime minister, butalso based on the general state of mind inSerbia, one can assume that the process of putinization of Serbia will continue rapidly, nowwith the growing pressure and barren effect ofpro-putin factors in the state and society –putin’s orchestra1. the nearly completeelectoral and organizational collapse of politicalparties, former bearers of any democratizationand europeanization of Serbia, thetechnocratization and confusion of theprogressive part of the civil society, as well asthe still ambivalent relationship of the politicalWest, and primarily the eu, towards the actualsituation in Serbia.

given everything that was mentioned above, itis not surprising that in Serbia, although a stateformally preparing for the start of accessionnegotiation with the eu, the maincharacteristics of putinization have a growing

foothold. their main implementer is aleksandarvučić himself – the lead violin of putin’sorchestra in Serbia, whether the eu, the uSaand primarily germany wanted to hear this ornot. under the term putinization we considerthe following: party instead of democraticcontrol of the security system: a clientelistic andunreformed judiciary, controlled media, anarbitrary relationship towards tycoons,tolerance and encouragement of endangeringsecular principles of the state system by one,pro-government religious organization that isalso the main arbiter of social dynamics: a poorhuman rights record and creation of a cult ofpersonality; the rendering of separation ofpowers as senseless: the weakening ofinstitutions; the criminalization of political andeconomic competitors; the re-writing of history;populism and fatalism.

2. The state of the security system wasonce again neglected in the election

campaign and in the Prime Minister’skeynote address

in the period between the formation of theprevious government and the earlyparliamentary elections, Serbia was shook byseveral serious scandals caused by the poorstate of the security system due to: leaks ofinformation, lack of norms, party abuse and adisturbed balance of blackmail that is a result ofa dependent judiciary. the recent floods inSerbia have laid bare the very bad state in thefield of civil protection as well, an importantpart of the security system. even the heads ofstate themselves recognized. previously that thesituation in the sector is poor. one is struck,above all, by: the poorly defined responsibilitiesof relevant stakeholders and commandhierarchy; unclear procedures ofcommunication of local authorities with therelevant agencies and the state level; lack of asystemic approach to protection of criticalinfrastructure and tolerance of widespreadillegal construction.

in spite of all of this, the election campaign, asin all previous election campaigns in Serbiasince the beginning of democratic

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1 a great contribution to victory over nazism in theSecond World War came from the many intelligenceofficers of the red army who operated in germany, italy,Switzerlans, Japan, hungary, and the rest of occupiedeurope and asia. a group of anti-nazis in germany andSwitzerland, organized in rings of the “red orchestra(rote kapelle) is considered to be the carrier of the ideaof creating a unique, anti-nazi national front in theheart of the third reich. unfortunately, the group wasdiscovered and executed by the german authorities inthe first 14 months of the war. otherwise, among theabwehr officers it was customary to call the refer to theillegal radio operator as the “pianist” or the “musician”.Whenever the military intelligence service wouldconclude that several such radio receivers belongs to thesame secret organization, the extensive network wouldbe referred to as an “orchestra” or “capella”, while theadjective “red” highlighted that it is a political, anti-fascist, or more precisely, a Communist organization –hence the title “red orchestra”. there is a school ofthought that considers members of the red orchestrawere merely brutal operatives of the technical apparaturof the Comitern, which had its own branch in Serbia aswell, formed by mustafa golubović.

consolidation, failed to mention the poor stateof the security system, despite having certaincrisis situation as an opportunity for givingpromises that were later forgotten. there wereno election promises of improving the state inthe areas in which it is needed: democraticoversight and normative framework ofhorizontal communication and a vertical chainof subordination of certain parts of the system.the issue of the material-technical equipmentof the system was also not considered in moredepth. it all comes down to confusing thesociety with announcement and cancellation ofprocurement of equipment that is inconsistentwith the actual security risks of Serbia. the lackof strategic planning in this field is also causedby the rash manner in which the policy ofmilitary neutrality was adopted, primarilybecause of kosovo. it dominates the entiresecurity sector and significantly affects theimpossibility of its reform, which the Center foreuro-atlantic Studies already wrote about indetail in its report for a more dynamic reformof the Security Sector in Serbia. this policy isnow strengthened by the bare pressure ofputin’s orchestra in light of the increasinglyintensive activities of moscow in the region andin Serbia. emphasis on the policy of militaryneutrality was obvious already in the firststatements of the prime minister, minister offoreign affairs and minister of defense. thehierarchy of security challenges and risks inSerbia is political rather than pragmatic –kosovo is still the greatest security risk. thisweakens the possibility of adequate response,as well as the possibility for a strategicpartnership with nato, the only geographically-close system of collective defense, which wouldalso help in streamlining costs in the securitysystem.

the Commissioner for information of publicimportance and personal data protectionrodoljub šabić and ombudsman Saša Jankovićpointed out to the many normativeshortcomings, primarily those regardingconstitutional freedoms in the field ofprotection of privacy of citizens and the practicewhich violates these, as early as in 2012. one ofthe recommended fourteen measures forovercoming this situation was adoption of a

new law on the Security intelligence agency(bia). the Center for euro-atlantic Studies haselaborated these recommendations andpublished an action plan for their adoption inits report extreme makeover. . alongside thementioned fourteen measures, it was pointedout that it is necessary to adopt a law onsecurity vetting, which is a constitutionalobligation of the state which has not yet beenfulfilled. it is also necessary to review the resultsof implementation of the law on data Secrecy(including adoption of the necessary bylaws,declassification of old documents, conductionof investigations, issuance of securitycertificates…) and adopt serious amendmentsof this law or adopt a new one, as the existinglaw does not deal with declassification of olddocuments of conduction of investigations.there also exist problems with other specificregulation dealing with archives or judicialproceedings, as indicated by representatives ofthe office of the Council on national Securityand Classified information protection (nationalSecurity authority – nSa).

the state in the security system did not earn aplace even in the several hours-long keynoteaddress of the new prime minister. the Serbianprogressive party, as an absolute electionwinner, simply continued with party overtakingof control over the security system. even theWestern international community failed tomention this issue as important, focusing solelyon continuation of implementation of the firstagreement on the principles governing thenormalization of relations between Serbia andkosovo (brussels agreement) and consolidationof the extremely difficult economic situation.

3. Brief reminder why the issue of security system reform in Serbia

must be a perennial priority but is not

let us recall the main circumstances from recentSerbian history due to which reform of thesecurity system must be a permanent priority,but is not. in Serbia, as well as in theinternational community, it seems that thebeginning of dismantling of the murderousmilošević regime implemented through non-

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violent methods of struggle has been forgotten.this strategy implies very challengingcompromises with representatives of theprevious regime, not only those who violatedtheir citizens’ human rights by operating in thesystem, but also the creators and implementersof war crimes in the region and in kosovo,followed by political assassinations, primarilyfrom the security system. additionally, non-violent methods of dismantling non-democraticregimes also involve legal continuity whichprevents radical personnel changes of thecompromised staff, which was also the case inSerbia.

the process of genuine democratization ofSerbia was from the very beginning delayed bythe fact that the new regime of prime ministerĐinđić had authority only at the national level,while at the federal level, due to thecircumstances around montenegro’sparticipation in elections and nature of thepolicy of vojsilav koštunica. this led to theformation of a nucleus headed by general acatomić, which could not be described as everbeing committed to genuine democratization ofSerbia. the same has already then, intenselymaintained special relations with russia,despite the alleged support for europeanintegrations. Such a constellation of factorsrequired years of focusing on continuation ofdismantling the milošević regime in the securitysystem which Serbia, due to a number ofobjective and subjective reasons, never had.Sall of this has distracted political attention andresources for security system reform.

4. Review of the new-old appointment inthe security systemi

Judging by the profile of people who came tohead important parts of the security system andforeign affairs following early parliamentaryelections in 2014, substantial reforms in thisfield, on which the potential of our deviationfrom the ever growing pressure of putin to stopnot only cooperation with nato, but Serbia’s euintegrations as well depends on, will still not berealized.

4.1. Ministry of Defense

instead of nebojša rodić, considered to havebeen fond of more intensive cooperation withrussia and who replaced aleksandar vučić atthis position, the new minister of defense, whoalso comes from the SnS ranks, is bratislavgašić. Serbia has therefore changed threeministers in the period of less than two years.gašić is considered as a man who will, in theministry, without much question, implementthe plans of the new prime minister. gašić is,among other, known in the Serbian public as theperson who publicly called upon the formerminister of foreign affairs, the controversial vukJeremić, also encouraged by putin’s orchestra,to join the SnS team.

gašić’s first statement were discouraging,especially those related to the fact that kosovois still considered at the greatest security risk,as well as those about the possibility of re-introduction of regular military service. let usremind that in the midst of the electioncampaign, the Chief of Staff of the Serbianarmed forces ljubiša diković, seriouslycompromised by the role of his units in theconflicts in kosovo, disturbed the public with hisstatement that he is receiving increasingrequests for the re-introduction of regularmilitary service. the ministry of defense wasforced to react with an official denial.

gašić has, in his first addresses, assessed thatnot much has been done in the Serbian armedforces in the period between 2000 and 2012(when aleksandar vučić comes to head themod), and that is seems that the ministers ofdefense were „more concerned with self-promotion than the job that they weresupposed to do",despite the undoubted reformsteps that were taken in the mod during thisperiod, from standardization to raising the levelof operability with nato, professionalization ofthe armed forces and creation of conditions forparticipation of our armed forces in un and eupeacekeeping and peace building missions.

the expert public assumes that the trend ofallegedly successful political cooperation of theministry of defense with the ministry of

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defense of russia, with which it has almost notechnical cooperation on one hand, andsuccessful technical cooperation with nato,with which it has no political cooperation on theother, will continue. yet another change of theminister of defense is likely to affect the paceof harmonization of the individual partnershipaction plan (ipap) with nato that Serbia hasbeen working on over the past two year already,as it is assumed that the new minister may wantto first go through the extensive document ofapproximately sixty pages. the trend of slowingdown the pace of Serbia’s cooperation withnato can also be expected due to the natofocus shifting towards ukraine, preparations forthe summit in Wales, as well as increasedactivities in montenegro, which is trying tosecure an invitation for membership. this toocan have implications for the pace ofharmonizing the ipap in nato itself. having inmind the unusually harsh rhetoric andinaccuracies intentionally promoted in thepublic, even by the president and primeminister of Serbia, as well as the russianambassador to Serbia, which accompanied themarking of the 15th anniversary of natobombing of yugoslavia and the crisis in ukraine,one can assume that, under growing russianpressure, cooperation will be slowed down evenfurther.

it is also worrying that no one from the expertand wider public reacted to the mentionedinaccuracies. the atlantic Council of Serbiafailed to react on any occasion. among the fewprominent public advocates of Serbia’smembership in nato, the majority has anambivalent position on the nato bombing ofyugoslavia. putin’s orchestra has carried out anew wave of criminalization rof the few inSerbia who consider that there were legitimategeopolitical and regional circumstances that ledto the bombing, which was not condemned bythe Serbian public.

the Western international communitycontinues with the trend of having the level ofcooperation with nato in Serbia reliant uponthe preparedness of members of the Serbianarmed forces to train and cooperate, instead ofhaving this dependent on a political decision of

the state leadership brought on the basis of arational evaluation of security and defense risks,needs and abilities of Serbia. alliance andmember State officials too, if possible in anyway, avoid the topic of the bombing, in the bestcase mentioning the “set of circumstances” thatled to it. the statement of nato Secretary-general fogh rasmussen, that it (the bombing)prevented genocide in kosovo, was met withcynicism and ridicule by the majority in Serbia.

the new directors of the military intelligence(voa) and military Security (vba) agencies havenot been appointed yet. the former vbadirector, Svetko kovač, was dismissed withoutexplanation back in January 2014. the newSecretary of State at the mod is zoran Đorđević,and the new assistant ministers are: miroslavJovanović, miloš Janković, Jasminka todorovand Srbislav Cvejić.

4.2. Security Intelligence Agency (BIA)

aleksandar Đorđević, who replaced theprevious minister of defense in this position,remained to head bia. from 1998 until 2001Đorđević worked at a law firm of veljkoguberina, one of the main actors in the returnof radical nationalism at the scene in Serbia inthe nineties. in 1990 with the introduction of amulti-party system in Serbia, guberina came tothe forefront of the people’s radical party (nrS),which restored its work in the country at thetime. tomislav nikolić, now officially the leadviolin of putin’s orchestra in Serbia was also amember of the nrS, later joining vojislavšešelj’s radicals.

it should not be forgotten that the dailynewspapers danas and the internet portalpeščanik have, already in 2011, tried to open,unfortunately unsuccessfully, the, topic of therole of russian personnel - the so-called redorchestra – in the security system of Serbia,primarily the Serbian armed forces.

4.3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

the new minister of foreign affairs is the formerprime minister ivica dačić. dačić has,

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unfortunately, in the first days of the newfunction, compared kosovo and Crimea,pointing out to the “double standards of theWest”, completely overlooking a series of un SCresolutions pointing out to the crimes in kosovo,negotiations at rambouillet, opinion of thepermanent Court of Justice, negotiations on thenew status of kosovo, and a series of otherevents that make it impossible, although putinand his orchestra in Serbia do, to compareCrimea and kosovo.

4.3.1. The Brussels Agreement

formation of the new government coincidedwith the first anniversary of the signing of thebrussels agreement and the escalation of thecrisis in ukraine.

implementation of the agreement wassomehow objectively delayed by elections inSerbia and the announced forthcomingelections in kosovo. however, the ConstitutionalCourt in Serbia assessed as unconstitutionalpreviously agreed provisions related torecognition of diplomas, cadastres and registrybooks over the past couple of months, whichwill undoubtedly have long-term implicationsfor the possibility of normalization of relation.the Constitutional Court of Serbia will alsoreview the issue related to integrated bordermanagement.. furthermore, the issue offreedom of movement is still unresolved. theSerbian public reacted predominantlynegatively to the possibility of transforming thekosovo security forces into armed forces.Serbian leaders in kosovo, who were givenlegitimacy through obtaining support in recentelections, even announced the formation ofalternative forces. one gets the impression that,if substantial normalization of relationsbetween belgrade and prishtina is sought, theapproach to negotiations must change, bystarting with from topics and challenges. thecurrent approach, in which the prime ministersand eu representatives, with the support of theuSa, decide on the details, is evidently limitedin scope.

4.3.2. Serbia and the crisis in Ukraine

Serbia demonstrated its political indecisivenessaround ukraine, conditioned by economic andpolitical dependency on russia and the issue ofkosovo, already during the mandate of the so-called technical government, by linking theimpossible – giving support to territorialintegrity of ukraine and simultaneouslyhighlighting eternal friendship towards russia,without reference to what russia is currentlydoing in ukraine. the eu itself contributed tothe wrong perception of Serbian politicians nowestablished in the wider society as well, thatSerbia can remain non-aligned on this matteruntil its eventual, formal membership in the eu.it is not good if the current political elites do notunderstand the challenges and dilemmas thatthe eu and its member States are faced withregarding ukraine, and how deep the crisis inrelations with russia is. it is even worse if theydo understand, but still refuse to at least have aclearer political position on developments inukraine. it is not only about the Copenhagencriteria and their interpretation, or parts ofChapter 31 – Common foreign, Security anddeference policy, which Serbia is yet tonegotiate on with the eu, or the agreement onStabilization and association, that also mentionsobligations of both parties on harmonizingforeign policy. public opinion in member States,without whose support any further expansionof the eu will be more difficult, could questionwhether Serbia would was a sympatheticpartner in difficult times, and thus seriouslyaffect a final decision on membership.

it is interesting, but also dangerous, that themajority of political analysts in the country,those supporting Serbia’s europeanintegrations, play to the beat of putin’sorchestra, making parallels between Crimeaand kosovo.

the grotesque analogy kosovo-Crimea, firstused and presented by putin himself, isespecially dangerous for the Western balkansbecause the logic, methodology and argumentsused in defense of the russian annexation ofCrimea can arguably be used to “justify”

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requests for referendums and possiblesecession of northern kosovo, Sandžak,republic of Srpska, western macedonia…

4.3.4. Serbia and NATO aspirations ofMontenegro

Since aleksandar vučić’s coming into power inSerbia in 2012, Serbia and montenegroimproved their relations, previouslyjeopardized, among other, by actions of tadić’semissary mlađan Đorđević. unlike Serbia,montenegro acted strategically since thebeginning of the crisis in ukraine, harmonizingits policies with the policies of the Westerninternational community, increasing in this wayits admission to nato this year. in this way,montenegro has also shown the voters in theeu that it is becoming a partner in solidarity andthat it is harmonizing its policies with thepolicies of the eu prior to concludingnegotiation on Chapter 31 – Common foreign,Security and defense policy. the increasedpressure of moscow on montenegro, atmoments not only inappropriate, but totallybizarre, was, because of this decision, evidenteven before the escalation of the conflict inukraine, reaching a level of open threats. it issupported by putin’s orchestra withinmontenegro as well, which was, during theprevious year, getting louder, as in Serbia,primarily through the money streamlined tocertain media and organizations. those familiarwith the situation in montenegro claim thatchanges in editorial policies of the daily vijestiand weekly monitor, coincided with thebeginning of the influx of russian assets.therefore, just like in Serbia, the actions ofopenly pro-putin organizations arestrengthened through the editorial policy of themainstream media. official belgrade was, as inmany other situations, publicly silent regardingthis trend, which in Serbia culminated in thedemonization of a legitimate decision ofmontenegro and its democratically electedleadership, by officials of the Serbian orthodoxChurch.

the reasons for such behavior should be soughtin the fact that montenegro’s nato

membership would put an end to the obviouslystill existent hopes in some circles in Serbia,montenegro and russia, that its independenceis of temporary nature. it would also contributeto regional stability, which is obviously not inrussia’s interest. however, above all, althoughnot a necessary precondition for eumembership, montenegro’s nato membershipwould, having in mind the strengthened russiananti-european action in the region, probablyreduce the mentioned pressure and thus createconditions for a smooth continuation of thealready challenging european integrations ofmontenegro. this should be given seriousthought by the pro-eu option in montenegroitself, if it has not yet formed its position ofmontenegro’s nato membership.

4.3.5. Serbia and NATO aspirations of Bh

resolving the issue of immovable defenseproperty at the national level is a requirementfor bosnia and herzegovina to commence usingits nato membership action plan (mep) in fullcapacity. however, leaders from the republic ofSrpska (rS) refused all solutions offered so farby conditioning the registration of immovabledefense property with resolving the issue of allstate property. in short, the republic of Srpskais suggesting to have the state property ofbosnia and herzegovina divided on entity orlocal levels of government, which would leavethe country virtually asset less. in this way, thekey policy objective of the leaders from therepublic of Srpska is tacitly achieved: to preventcontinuation of the process of integration ofbosnia and herzegovina into nato.

informally, they explain this with theirreluctance to support membership of bosniaand herzegovina in nato as long as Serbia doesnot change its attitude towards possiblemembership. it is indicative that this is contraryto their position of support of bh’s natomembership over the previous years. this shiftis considered as a direct consequence ofoutstanding efforts of the president of therepublic of Srpska, milorad dodik, whoadvocates secession. on the occasion of therussian annexation of Crimea, dodik recently

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stated: „russia’s actions are solely directedtowards creating a neutral environment forpolitical decisions and dialogue within ukraine.this has my support", becoming thus the leadviolin of putin’s orchestra in bh. absurdly,instead of the impression of aleksandar vučićdistancing himself from dodik due to theradicalization of his views becoming clearernow, exactly the opposite is happening – a newdegree of convergence. this is best seen in theway in which vučić related to the floods in bh.

as in the case of montenegro, natomembership of bh would likely frustrate thoseworking on the disintegration of bh. aside frombh, they are obviously also present both inSerbia and in russia. nato membership of bhwould contribute to long-term stabilization inthe region as well, which is again not in theinterest of moscow and putin’s orchestra.

4.4. Ministry of Interior (MUP)

for the six years which he spent at the forefrontof the ministry of interior, ivica dačić did notimplement a single reform, personnel-wise ororganizational, primarily due to the very stablebalance of blackmail with which compromisedactors sustain each other in public life, oftenalso in freedom from criminal liability. the bestexample of the existence of a balance ofblackmail is the subsistence of the policedirector milorad veljović at this function. it isestimated that during his six-year tenure inmup, dačić employed around 4,000 partyactivists, even though oSCe assessments showSerbia does not need more than 30,000 to35,000 members in the ministry of interior.

the new minister of interior is nebojšaStefanović, of the SnS, who previously servedas the president of the national assembly.Stefanović is also seen as an unquestionableimplementer of vučić’s wishes and policies,both in the party as well as in the ministry ofwhich he is now formally in charge. theselection of State Secretaries is still underway.assistants to the minister are: predrag marić,Željko kojić and Slobodan nedeljković.

4.5. Parliamentary Committees for thecontrol of security services, defense and

internal affairs

the Security Services Control Committee, intowhich new members are already elected, hasnot yet elected its president. in the previousterm, this function was performed by JadrankaJoksimović (SnS), and the Committee mainlydealt with defining detailed procedures for itsown functioning. it remains to be seen whethergood democratic practice of having one of thetwo Committees controlling the security systemled by a representative of the opposition will berespected.

the publicly unfamiliar marija obradović fromSnS has been appointed to the forefront of thedefense and internal affairs Committee. Shereplaced dušan bajatović from SpS. theCommittee did not meet regarding the recentcatastrophic floods in Serbia.

4.6. Energy, infrastructure and miningMinistries

aleksandar antić from SpS was appointed tohead the ministry of energy and mining, havingno experience in this field. in the previous termthis ministry was led by SnS cadre, energy byzorana mihajlović, often targeted by russiandiplomats and the gazprom leadership, andmining by milan bačević, close to the presidentof Serbia tomislav nikolić. bačević was alsoconsidered as the first man of SnS for liaisonwith the united russia party. mihajlovićis thenew minister of the new ministry ofConstruction, transport and infrastructure,while bačević, who failed to save his ministerialposition, will probably get a comforting place indiplomacy. dušan bajatović, SpS, remains at theforefront of Srbijagas for now. the removal ofmihajlović from the ministry of energy and thesubsistence of bajatović are considered a directconsequence of demands from moscow. in thisway, another, perhaps crucial, ministry in Serbiais given to the party already known to play inputin’s orchestra – SpS.

here, the continuity of action of putin’sorchestra in certain state bodies in Serbia

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should also be noted, primarily in the sectors ofsecurity and energy. Sources of the danas dailyin the security circles during the government ofzoran Đinđić and the mission “Sablja” claimedalready in 2012, that appointing the democraticparty of Serbia (dSS) party official radomirnaumov as president of the board of theelectric power industry of Serbia, and then, in2004, as the minister of energy, was “inspired”by interest relations with russia. in this capacity,he signed dozens of contracts with russianfirms. dSS-cadre continued to lead energypolicies during the governments of vojislavkoštunica: after naumov it was aleksandarpopović, at the time when the greatestprivatization in democratic Serbia began – niS.naumov, however, continued to be activeinstitutionally, but as a minister of religion. hewill later be present in various privatizationcommittees.

despite the fact that many consider russia asSerbia’s best friend, dSS, who openlycampaigned to stop eu integration andstrengthen institutional relations with russia,failed to exceed the threshold. experts believethat the reason for this is that the Serbianpublic, despite the rhetoric on the importanceof eu integrations, recognized vučić’s SnS as themain stronghold of unbreakable cooperationwith russia, even at the cost of eu integrations.SnS essentially did nothing to dissuade them ofthat. in the city government, SnS introduceddSS, and Siniša mali was appointed as themayor of belgrade. mali is also considered as anunquestionable implementer of vučić’s plans. inhis resume there are spots indicating a goodunderstanding of russian companies in theregion.

4.7. European integrations

Jadranka Joksimović, president of the SecurityServices Control Committee in the previousterm was appointed as the minister withoutportfolio in charge of eu integrations. expertcircles consider that this architecture of statebodies: minister without portfolio, Serbianeuropean integration office and the Chiefnegotiator, will be quite complicated for

functional coordination of all stakeholders.

5. The dynamic of internal relations in SNS

Within SnS itself, there was obviously a lot oftension over vučić’s decision to bring non-partyfigures into the government, who were notactively involved in the election campaign.before the new cabinet was announced, therewere many speculations whether the SnSpresident of the board, radomir nikolić,tomislav nikolić’s son, will take on one of theleading positions in the government. radomirwas, by the way, employed for a time in abranch office of Srbijagas.

the complex inner dynamic in SnS will be oneof the main parameters, alongside putin’sorchestra on one hand, and the will and powerof the eu to keep Serbia on its current course ofslow convergence on the other, that will affectwhether Serbia will move towards the politicalWest or the political east in due course.aleksandar vućić, who is increasingly showinghis true political face of an idea-less autocratprone to micromanagement, inflates his ratingin the wider public primarily throughmainstream media. despite his passive-aggressive manner of addressing journalistsfrom almost all media, based on the number ofpositive articles and frequency of appearance inthese, only putin can pose as competition. theombudsman Saša Janković excellently speaksabout self-censorship and the general state ofthe Serbian media in his annual report. onegets the impression that both the new and theold members of the government are willing toendure vučić’s humiliating manner of speakingand acting.

6. Putin’s Orchestra and the Westerninternational community

let us also have a look at the maincharacteristics of the other two parameters thatwill decide on the fate of the value-politicalcourse of Serbia - the strengths of putin’sorchestra and the policies of the Westerninternational community.

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6.1. Putin’s Orchestra

putin’s orchestra in Serbia has grown andbecame more tuned already in mid-last year,following a visit of nikolai patrushev, Secretaryof the Security Council of the russianfederation. Since that period, a large number ofnewly-formed organizations that almost entirelydeal only with activities promoting putin’spropaganda in Serbia appeared. Somepreviously established media portals with aclear putin propaganda strengthened theirpresence in the public sphere as well,intensively reporting on the activities of thementioned organizations. they form the core ofputin’s orchestra outside of state institutions.for their views and attitudes they usually do nothave formal public support of the nationalleadership, but without the invisible hand of thegovernment their increasing media and publicpresence would be impossible. the main stateamplifier of this part of putin’s orchestra is theuniversity of belgrade, which is of particularconcern. in the media sphere, these are thedailies: večernje novosti, kurir, politika,informer, as well as the majority of political tvtalkshows.

the unacceptable activities of the mentionedorganizations, such as the making of lists of„Serb-haters” face an ambivalent reaction ofthe authorities. they (the authorities) neverexplicitly condemn such actions, and in the bestcase scenario give statements such as “wecondemn any kind of violence”, which actually equates the actions of human rights activistswith abusers from right-wing organizations.

one of the most recognizable modus operandiof the mentioned organizations, besidesarbitrary criminalization of the pro-Westernoption in Serbia, is the non-hesitation tocontaminate the public with inaccuracies orassessments completely taken out of context.unfortunately, the openly pro-Western optiontoo is small, quiet and inert to react to all theinaccuracies. it is also questionable whetherthere is any media space for it. the mentionedfifteenth anniversary of the nato bombing is,alongside the already mass occurrence of over-dimensioning the extent of economic

cooperation and potential for it with russia, agood example. during those days, manyscientific papers were published, mostlyfinanced by russian assets, analyzing the effectsof depleted uranium, but not a single oneconsiders the possibility that the accident atChernobyl could have also affected some of thementioned findings.

part of the public that was loudly against thewars in the former yugoslavia, for example, anti-nationalist and pro-human rights oriented, hasnow become anti-globalist, often with confusingviews on putin and ukraine. translations ofpapers on ukraine of the great timothy Snyderon the peščanik portal are praiseworthy.unfortunately, mainstream media in Serbia,unquestionably under the control of thegovernment, do not provide space for such anargumented analysis of developments inukraine. and because of this, as well as becauseof the complete disintegration of theopposition, the rhetoric of the putin’s orchestrafalls onto very fertile ground. in the majority ofSerbian media, putin is an absolute hero ofunquestionable action.

the field for the erosion of public support foreuropean integrations, a primary objective ofputin’s orchestra in Serbia, is very successfullyprepared by the Serbian orthodox Church (SpC)as well. With the acceptance of the brusselsagreement it has gained a large space in thecreation of daily politics. it increasingly reliesand calls for cooperation with the russianorthodox Church, from which it has up to nowsignificantly differed in its position on socialfreedoms. the SpC honored leonid reshetnikov,director of the increasingly influential russianinstitute for Strategic research in Serbia (riSi)reshetnikov is a promoter of organic unity ofthe state and religion and is an advocate of thehuntington rhetoric of a creation of a specialrussian civilization as a counter-balance to theWest. he is one of the main conductors ofputin’s orchestra who does not hesitate to evenbrutally attack the legitimate leadership ofmontenegro when it does something that is notaccording to moscow’s will. and the SpC gaveits support to its priest afmilohije radović, whoplaced an actual orthodox curse against the

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montenegrin leadership for their decision tojoin the economic sanctions against russia.

resistance of the state to such russian creatingof a new situation in the field, with the supportof putin’s orchestra within Serbia itself, is tooweak. it leaves space for doubt whether thealleged commitment to european integrations,primarily of SnS, was simply an excuse forcoming into power, which will disappear at thesame time when public support to euintegrations does, as it did not at all stand upagainst its organized erosion. this was best seenduring the parallel visit of the eu enlargementCommissioner Stefan füle and highrepresentative for the Common foreign andSecurity policy, Catherine ashton, on the onehand, and the russian duma Speaker Sergeinaryshkin, on the other. naryshkin, who self-invited himself to Serbia, probably at thesuggestion of putin himself in order to testSerbia’s loyalty, is on the list of russian officialstargeted by eu and uSa sanctions because ofthe annexation of Crimea and russianoperations in eastern ukraine. despite of this,he was received by the president of Serbiatomislav nikolić, the Serbian parliament and theuniversity of belgrade. almost none of themedia, nor any official in Serbia, announced tothe public the fact that naryshkin is undersanctions. at the same time, his bulgariancolleague wisely came up with anotherobligation and denied naryshkin hospitality,despite the fact that bulgaria is no lessdependent on the import of russian energyresources than Serbia.

6.2 The current policy of the Westerninternational community in Serbia and

the region

the question of how seriously the Westerninternational community considers the alreadyvisible results of activities of putin’s orchestrain Serbia, as well as what measures can be takento silence it, remains open. this also, withoutdoubt, depends on the will of Serbian officialsto be helped in this, primarily through supportin eu integrations. if they care about the idea ofmodernizing Serbia and its membership in theeu, they would have to demonstrate this more

clearly already, even at the cost of antagonizingthe kremlin. the previous silence and confusingmessages of eu and member State officialsshould not be, as they are now, understood aslong-term support and understanding for theSerbian policy of sitting on two chairs.

following the elections in 2012, when thereformed representatives of the miloševićregime came into power led by own interestsand priorities, and a part of them even formallysupported the normalization of relationsbetween Serbia and kosovo, the Westerninternational community decided to once againstrip down the criteria that a Candidate Stateneeds to fulfill in order to start negotiationswith the eu. this decision itself was not withoutmerit, but is seems that the methodology of itsimplementation was flawed. the newgovernment, led by the trio vučić, nikolić,dačić, was declared as reformist and pro-european, before they made any specificactions. this demoralized the previous actors ofany such democratization of Serbia and gave thenew government a green light to overpay theprocess of normalization of relations withkosovo both at the internal and foreign policyplan, increasingly showing its true authoritarianface.

one gets the impression that the Westerninternational community has finally returned toa somewhat more realistic course of publicdisclosure of their assessments of events inSerbia. over the past year, since the signing ofthe brussels agreement, and even before it,while it was preparing the field, it was evidentlyready to value the positive trends in this fieldmuch more than the negative in others. thereturn of the eu to public disclosure of positionsis good for Serbia, especially given the fact thatafter the elections it became clear that the innercritical voice on the actions of the currentgovernment, except for economic measures,almost disappeared.

Sonja biserko, president of the helsinkiCommittee for human rights in Serbia, recentlystated a series of strong arguments on why theeu should, despite the negative trends in Serbia,speed up and simplify the process of accession.however, Serbia and others need to do much

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more in order to coax the eu, taught by the badexperience of such an approach in the case ofbulgaria and romania, to take such a decision.it seems that the public in Serbia does notunderstand the severity of challenges that theeu and its member States are faced with, fromarticulating common measures towards thekremlin, the situation in ukraine, redefining oftheir security and defense policies, tonegotiation on the trade and investmentpartnership with the uSa (ttip). this is alsofollowed by the very uncertain europeanparliament elections and elections for newleaders of the european Commission. there is achance that, due to the lack of interest of largepolitical parties, anti-eu powers of the extremeright and left come out as victorious, also givinglegitimacy to putin, which will bring newchallenges for the eu and potentially discourageit from enlargement towards the balkans.

7. Where now?

in such circumstances, Serbian officials need todo everything they can in order to help the euhelp Serbia. it is not only the matter of significant systemic financial support and helpfor rehabilitation of recent flood damage, butalso the help from social floods that threatensus. there is great danger that, under thepressure of putin’s orchestra, its own dilemmas,challenges and misconceptions, Serbia gives upon democracy. it is, by the way, not only aboutmerely counting votes or anarchy in whicheveryone can say what they want, as it is oftenvulgarized in Serbia.

recently, the american non-governmentalorganization national institute for democracy(ndi) and the belgrade Center for free electionsand democracy highlighted this danger. themain findings of their latest research show thatthe attitude of Serbian citizens towardsdemocracy as a political system is increasinglydependent on their socio-economic status andthat today, there is only 30 percent of thosewho consider democracy as better than anyother form of government. it seems thatputinization, as a model of governance, also hassignificant support in Serbia, which is even more

dangerous than the support that aleksandarvučić, the lead violin of putin’s orchestra inSerbia has.

if this trend continues, in parallel with the loudtrumpeting of putin’s orchestra on theeconomic-political-social domination of russiagrowing by the day – despite facts showing thatthe economic situation is worsening, andsupport for the annexation of Crimea given onlyby few rogue and failing states, or intimidatedsatellites – it will be increasingly difficult toargument in Serbia, why are rich countriesdemocratic, as the harvard professor ricardohausmann does. once the trend of illusionsovercomes the trend of factual decision-making,and one of them is that all countries that haveundergone the process of eu integration are,despite the economic crisis, still among therichest countries in the world even if they donot have natural resources – as excellentlynoted by gerald knaus of the european Stabilityinitiative in his paper Why they look West -ukraine, poverty and the eu – society usuallyfalls into a prolonged decline, which Serbiashould certainly remember.

14 The New Century No 07 -May 2014Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies – CEASDr. Dragoslava Popovića 15, 11000 Belgrade, SerbiaTel/fax: +381 11 323 9579; office@ceas-serbia.org, www.ceas-serbia.org