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IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE COMPUTER SCIENCES CORPORATION, a Nevada corporation, and SERVICEMESH INC., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiffs, ) ) ) ) ) ) C.A. No. ________ ) v. ) ) ERIC PULIER, Defendant. ) ) ) VERIFIED COMPLAINT Plaintiffs Computer Sciences Corporation (“CSC”) and ServiceMesh Inc. (“ServiceMesh,” and collectively with CSC, “Plaintiffs”) file their Complaint against Defendant Eric Pulier (“Pulier”). NATURE OF THE ACTION 1. In 2013, CSC acquired ServiceMesh, a company founded by Pulier, for over $260 million. Under the Equity Purchase Agreement, CSC paid ServiceMesh equityholders an initial cash payment of $93 million and an earnout payment of $98 million. Pulier—the founder, Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, and one of the largest equityholders of ServiceMesh—received more than $9 million of the initial cash payment and more than $25 million of the earnout EFiled: May 12 2015 10:32AM EDT Transaction ID 57224092 Case No. 11011-

Pulier Complaint

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  • IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

    COMPUTER SCIENCESCORPORATION, a Nevada corporation,and SERVICEMESH INC., a Delawarecorporation,

    Plaintiffs,

    )))))) C.A. No. ________)

    v. ))

    ERIC PULIER,

    Defendant.

    )))

    VERIFIED COMPLAINT

    Plaintiffs Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) and ServiceMesh Inc.

    (ServiceMesh, and collectively with CSC, Plaintiffs) file their Complaint

    against Defendant Eric Pulier (Pulier).

    NATURE OF THE ACTION

    1. In 2013, CSC acquired ServiceMesh, a company founded by Pulier,

    for over $260 million. Under the Equity Purchase Agreement, CSC paid

    ServiceMesh equityholders an initial cash payment of $93 million and an earnout

    payment of $98 million. Pulierthe founder, Chairman, Chief Executive Officer,

    and one of the largest equityholders of ServiceMeshreceived more than $9

    million of the initial cash payment and more than $25 million of the earnout

    EFiled: May 12 2015 10:32AM EDT Transaction ID 57224092

    Case No. 11011-

  • 2payment. He also received a transaction bonus of over $13 million, restricted stock

    units of CSC with a fair market value of almost $26 million, and other incentives.

    2. The earnout payment was based on certain revenue generated by

    ServiceMesh from January 1, 2013 through January 31, 2014. A significant

    amount of that revenue came from contracts between ServiceMesh and

    Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd. (CBA). In fact, but for that revenue,

    ServiceMesh equityholdersincluding Pulierwould have received no earnout

    payment at all.

    3. In 2014after receiving his $9 million initial cash payment, $13

    million employee bonus, $25 million earnout payment, and $26 million worth of

    restricted stock units, and while employed by CSCPulier transferred more than

    $2 million to the personal bank accounts of two senior information technology

    executives at CBA, both of whom have since been arrested in Australia on charges

    of commercial bribery. Pulier made the transfers principally through an

    intermediary company he had recently formed called Ace, Inc. (Ace). These

    large payments breached the Equity Purchase Agreement and violated numerous

    CSC rules and policies that Pulier agreed to when he signed a Retention

    Agreement with CSC. Pulier did not advise or seek approval from CSC before the

    payments, and CSC did not learn about the payments until long after Pulier made

    them.

  • 34. Puliers wrongful conduct caused CSC to pay over $98 million in

    earnout payments that it otherwise would not have paid and resulted in a

    significant criminal law enforcement investigation in Australia that has caused

    CSC to incur significant legal and investigative costs. By this action, CSC and

    ServiceMesh seek to recover from Pulier the substantial damages caused by his

    intentional misconduct, fraud, fraud by omission, breach of the Equity Purchase

    Agreement and Retention Agreement, breach of the implied covenant of good faith

    and fair dealing, and breach of the fiduciary duties, including the duty of loyalty,

    he owed to CSC and ServiceMesh.

    PARTIES AND JURISDICTION

    5. CSC is a publicly held Nevada corporation that provides information

    technology and professional services. Its principal place of business is in Falls

    Church, Virginia.

    6. ServiceMesh is a Delaware corporation and a wholly owned

    subsidiary of CSC. Its principal place of business is in Santa Monica, California.

    7. Pulier is a resident and citizen of California. He resides at 12366

    Ridge Circle, Los Angeles, California, 90049, and may be served at that address.

    8. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 8 Del. C.

    111(a)(2) as this matter involves the interpretation of the Equity Purchase

    Agreement, which is an instrument by which CSC purchased all of the equity

  • 4securities of ServiceMesh, a Delaware corporation. This Court also has subject-

    matter jurisdiction pursuant to 10Del. C. 341.

    9. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Pulier pursuant to Section

    11.18 of the Equity Purchase Agreement wherein he agreed to submit to the

    jurisdiction of a state court located in the State of Delaware for any action

    relating to or arising under that agreement. All claims asserted by Plaintiffs

    relate to or arise under the Equity Purchase Agreement and/or the Related

    Agreements as that term is defined in the Equity Purchase Agreement.

    FACTUAL BACKGROUND

    A. CSCs Acquisition of ServiceMesh

    10. In 2008, Pulier founded ServiceMesh as a privately held business.

    ServiceMesh provides an enterprise cloud management platform to automate the

    deployment and management of enterprise applications and platforms across

    private, public, and hybrid cloud environments. ServiceMesh counts among its

    customers some of the worlds largest enterprises in financial services, including

    CBA.

    11. In late 2013, CSC, ServiceMesh, the equityholders of ServiceMesh,

    and the equityholders representative entered into an Equity Purchase Agreement.

    Pursuant to that agreement, CSC purchased all of ServiceMeshs equity securities.

  • 5Following the transaction, ServiceMesh became a wholly owned subsidiary of

    CSC.

    12. To acquire ServiceMesh, CSC paid over $260 million. CSC paid

    $93,105,171 to ServiceMesh equityholders at the closing on November 15, 2013.

    It later paid $98,034,058 to ServiceMesh equityholders as an earnout on March 14,

    2014. The remainder of the purchase price was used to repay ServiceMesh debt,

    fund an indemnification escrow, pay the fee of the equityholders representative,

    pay for a post-closing working capital adjustment, and pay transaction expenses,

    including transaction bonus payments made by ServiceMesh to certain

    ServiceMesh employees, including Pulier.

    13. Pulier received over $9 million of the initial cash payment, over $25

    million of the earnout payment, a transaction bonus of over $13 million, and other

    consideration.

    14. ServiceMeshs already existing relationship with CBA was one of the

    reasons CSC acquired ServiceMesh, and that relationship formed part of the basis

    for the agreed acquisition price.

    B. Puliers and ServiceMeshs Representations and Warranties in theEquity Purchase Agreement

    15. As an equityholder of ServiceMesh and a party to the Equity Purchase

    Agreement, Pulier made various representations and warranties to CSC. He agreed

    that the agreement constituted a valid and binding obligation that was enforceable

  • 6against him, and that his obligations under the agreement would continue beyond

    the closing of the acquisition and until those obligations were fully performed. He

    represented that his execution of the agreement, his performance of his obligations

    thereunder, and the consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby would

    not violate any law applicable to him or violate, conflict with, result in a breach of,

    or constitute a default under any provision of any other contract to which he was a

    party. He further represented that he would not take any action to cause the

    representations and warranties made in the agreement to be untrue in any material

    respect.

    16. Attached as Exhibit B to the Equity Purchase Agreement was a Form

    of Letter of Transmittal to be executed by ServiceMeshs equityholders. In the

    Letter of Transmittal executed by Pulier, Pulier acknowledged that he had

    reviewed the terms of the Equity Purchase Agreement, and that he approved and

    agreed to be bound by those terms. In his capacity as the Chief Executive Officer

    and a significant shareholder of ServiceMesh, Pulier was heavily involved in the

    negotiation of the terms of the transaction, including the detailed terms included in

    the Equity Purchase Agreement and the related agreements contemplated by that

    agreement.

    17. ServiceMeshled by Pulieralso made various representations and

    warranties to CSC in the Equity Purchase Agreement. It represented that, except

  • 7as otherwise noted, its financial statements had been prepared in accordance with

    generally accepted accounting principles and accurately and fairly presented, in all

    material respects, its financial position and assets and liabilities. It represented that

    it had not incurred any liabilities or obligations that would be required in

    accordance with generally accepted accounting principles to be disclosed on its

    balance sheet that were not otherwise disclosed to CSC. It represented that a

    schedule attached to the agreement contained a true, correct, and complete list of

    each contract between it and its top customers, including CBA, and that true,

    correct, and complete copies of each material contract, including all amendments,

    waivers, and modifications thereto, had been made available to CSC. It

    represented that it was operating its business in compliance in all material respects

    with all applicable laws. It further agreed that its obligations under the agreement

    would continue beyond the closing of the acquisition and until those obligations

    were fully performed.

    18. Pulier signed the Equity Purchase Agreement on ServiceMeshs

    behalf and agreed personally, as an equityholder of ServiceMesh, to indemnify and

    hold CSC harmless from and against any and all losses arising out of or resulting

    from any breach of or inaccuracy in any representation or warranty of ServiceMesh

    contained in the agreement.

  • 8C. CSCs Employment of Pulier and Grant of Restricted Stock Units toHim

    19. Under the terms of the Equity Purchase Agreement, Pulier agreed to

    remain employed by ServiceMesh after the transaction closed on November 15,

    2013. Following the transaction, Pulier became Vice President and General

    Manager of CSCs cloud business unit, which was being operated through CSC as

    well as through ServiceMesh, a new wholly owned subsidiary of CSC. Sometime

    later, Pulier was named Head of Strategy for CSCs emerging business group.

    Pulier was Vice President of CSC during the entire period of his employment.

    20. To provide incentives for Pulier to remain employed by ServiceMesh

    following the transaction, CSC granted him restricted stock units of CSC with a

    fair market value of $25,945,738 pursuant to the Retention Agreement signed by

    Pulier and CSC. These restricted stock units were governed by CSCs 2011

    Omnibus Incentive Plan Service Based Restricted Stock Unit Award Agreement

    (the RSU Agreement).

    21. As an employee of CSCand as a condition to his grant of restricted

    stock unitsPulier agreed to abide by CSCs rules and policies, including its Code

    of Business Conduct. He agreed that these rules and policies include provisions to

    protect the business and goodwill of CSC; confirmed that he had read them; and

    agreed to be bound by them as if they were specifically incorporated into his

    Retention Agreement.

  • 9D. CSCs Earnout Payment to Pulier

    22. On March 14, 2014approximately four months after CSCs

    acquisition of ServiceMesh closedCSC paid $98,034,058 to ServiceMesh

    equityholders as an earnout under the Equity Purchase Agreement. Pulier received

    $25,309,113 of this earnout payment.

    23. The earnout payment was based on revenue from stand-alone

    ServiceMesh operations recognized from January 1, 2013 through January 31,

    2014 (the Measurement Period) and derived from a specified business pipeline

    (the Measurement Revenue). Under the earnout terms, CSC agreed to pay

    approximately $10.15 for every dollar of Measurement Revenue recognized in

    excess of $20 million during the Measurement Period, up to $33.5 million.

    24. The final Measurement Revenue included almost $12 million of

    revenue from contracts between ServiceMesh and CBA. More than $10 million of

    that revenue came from ten contracts that ServiceMesh and CBA entered into

    during the Measurement Period. One of those contracts resulted in $5,022,542 of

    Measurement Revenue, and the others resulted in $5,404,084 of Measurement

    Revenue. Without this revenue from CBA, the $20 million floor for the earnout

    would not have been met, and ServiceMesh equityholdersincluding Pulier

    would have received no earnout payment at all. With the CBA revenue, however,

    the $20 million floor was exceeded by $9,659,265, resulting in an earnout payment

  • 10

    of $98,034,058 to ServiceMesh equityholders as a whole, and $25,309,113 to

    Pulier individually.

    25. The Measurement Period for the earnout ended on January 31, 2014.

    Between that date and March 14, 2014, CSC engaged in an earnout verification

    process. As part of that process, Pulier and a CBA executivewho would later

    receive some of the payments from Pulierexecuted an audit confirmation letter.

    In that letter, Pulier and the CBA executive confirmed that the written agreements

    between ServiceMesh and CBA represented the entire agreement between the

    companies. Pulier and the CBA executive were provided space to describe any

    discrepancies, additional contract terms, side-letter arrangements, or oral

    agreements outside the contracts that might alter the written contract provisions.

    They listed nothing. As part of the earnout verification process, Pulier made

    misrepresentations to CSC and its internal and external accountants concerning the

    existence and terms of ServiceMeshs contracts with CBA, including new contracts

    allegedly entered into during the waning days of the Measurement Period.

    E. Puliers Transfer of Money to Certain CBA Executives

    26. After Pulier received the $25 million earnout payment from CSC, he

    founded Ace, which in turn transferred more than $2 million to two senior

    information technology executives at CBA, both of whom had extensive

    involvement in ServiceMesh projects and contracts. These individuals had

  • 11

    authority to execute, and did execute, significant contracts and related documents

    with ServiceMesh and CSC on behalf of CBA, including during the Measurement

    Period. Indeed, one of these individuals was the same CBA executive who had

    executed the audit confirmation letter regarding the ServiceMesh-CBA contracts

    that CSC required as part of its earnout verification process.

    27. Pulier funded these payments and directed that they be made through

    Ace to the two CBA executives. There was no written agreement between Ace and

    the CBA executives as to the purpose or terms of these payments. Upon

    information and belief, one of the CBA executives created and provided to CBA

    false documents regarding the payments.

    28. Pulier did not advise or seek approval from CSC before making the

    payments. Because Pulier withheld information about the payments, CSC was

    unaware of them until long after Pulier made them.

    29. In March 2015, Australian authorities arrested the CBA employees on

    charges of commercial bribery.

    30. These payments to executives of a CSC customer violated CSCs

    rules and policies, which were expressly incorporated into Puliers Retention

    Agreement. CSCs Code of Business Conduct provides that CSC employees must

    act with integrity and transparency in all personal dealings that would or could

    appear to conflict with the business interests of CSC. CSCs Personal Conflict of

  • 12

    Interest Policy specifically requires CSC employees to avoid actual or potential

    conflicts between the interests of CSC and the interests of the employee or a third

    party. CSC employees are required to investigate their own affairs, be open about

    conflicts as soon as they arise, and report any actual or potential conflicts to their

    manager or Human Resources immediately.

    F. Puliers Failure to Cooperate with CSCs Investigation

    31. After learning of the arrest of the first CBA executive, CSC began its

    own internal investigation into the allegations made by Australian authorities.

    CSC representatives repeatedly directed Pulier to submit to a full interview

    concerning the payments and asked him to produce all emails and other

    information from his personal email accounts and personal devices that were sent

    or received for work purposes. Pulier did not provide timely or complete

    responses to these requests. In addition, he refused to submit to a full interview by

    CSC counsel unless CSC agreed that it would never divulge what he said to the

    very authorities in Australia who were investigating his payments and who had

    brought charges against the CBA executivesa condition to which CSC would not

    agree. Pulier never provided to CSC all communications and documents

    concerning the payments in question.

    32. Puliers refusal to provide requested information and submit to a full

    and unconditional interview violated CSCs rules and policies. CSCs Policy on

  • 13

    Contacts and Interaction with Law Enforcement Agencies and Counsel for Others

    and CSC Investigators requires each CSC employee to cooperate fully in company

    investigations relating to the employees work in order to facilitate investigations

    into potential irregularities and enable any corrective actions, as needed. When

    CSC investigators contacted Pulier concerning the payments, Pulier was obligated

    to cooperate by responding to all questions and requests for documents fully and

    accurately.

    G. Puliers Threats Against CBA

    33. Pulier accused CBA of making false statements about him that caused

    him substantial damages. In letters to CBAs outside counsel, Puliers counsel

    raised the threat of legal action, stating that he wished to avoid litigation with

    CBA, warning that CBA had exposed itself to significant liability under California

    law, citing cases and discussing damages in defamation actions, and demanding

    that CBA act immediately to correct the situation.

    34. Pulier did not advise or seek approval from CSC before threatening

    CBA, which became a valued client of CSC as a result of the ServiceMesh

    acquisition. Puliers threats against a CSC customer violated CSCs Code of

    Business Conduct and Personal Conflict of Interest Policy.

  • 14

    H. CSCs Suspension of Pulier and Puliers Resignation From CSC

    35. On March 26, 2015, CSC notified Pulier of his termination for

    cause, as that term is defined in the RSU Agreement. CSC also notified Pulier

    that, for a 30-day period commencing on March 26, he was suspended, with full

    pay and benefits, from all of his roles and responsibilities at CSC. To the extent

    the RSU Agreements cure provision was applicable to Puliers conduct, CSC

    afforded Pulier the opportunity to cure within 30 days of the notice.

    36. On April 22, Pulier resigned from CSC effective immediately. He

    resigned without good reason, as that term is defined in the RSU Agreement.

    COUNT I(Breach Of The Equity Purchase Agreement)

    37. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt by reference each and every

    allegation in the preceding paragraphs.

    38. The Equity Purchase Agreement is a valid, legally enforceable

    contract.

    39. Pulier was a party to the Equity Purchase Agreement and agreed to be

    bound by its terms.

    40. Pulier materially breached the Equity Purchase Agreement by

    (1) making the payments to two CBA executives; (2) failing to disclose to CSC

    those payments and any agreements he or Ace had with those executives; and

    (3) causing ServiceMesh to enter into ten contracts during the Measurement Period

  • 15

    with CBA, the company that employed the two individuals to whom Pulier

    directed the payments. These actions and omissions breached Puliers

    representations and warranties in the Equity Purchase Agreement, as well as his

    obligation to continue performing under the agreement beyond the closing of the

    acquisition and until his obligations were fully performed.

    41. CSC has been damaged by Puliers material breaches of the Equity

    Purchase Agreement. ServiceMeshs relationship with CBA was one of the

    reasons CSC acquired ServiceMesh, and that relationship formed part of the basis

    for the agreed acquisition price. Had CSC known that Pulier would make the

    payments to two CBA executives, CSC would have paid less than $260 million to

    acquire ServiceMesh. In addition, it would not have paid Pulier a $9 million initial

    cash payment, a $13 million employee bonus, or a $25 million earnout payment, or

    granted him $26 million in restricted stock units.

    42. Additionally, as a result of Puliers material breaches of the Equity

    Purchase Agreement, Plaintiffs have incurred and will continue to incur significant

    legal and investigative costs. Plaintiffs have been required to retain legal counsel,

    investigate the large payments to CBA executives, and coordinate with Australian

    officials regarding the criminal investigation, among other things.

  • 16

    COUNT II(Breach Of The Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing Under

    The Equity Purchase Agreement)

    43. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt by reference each and every

    allegation in the preceding paragraphs.

    44. Under the Equity Purchase Agreement, Pulier had an implied

    contractual obligation to deal fairly with CSC and not to engage in conduct that

    would prevent CSC from receiving the benefits of the agreement. This obligation

    required Pulier to act in good faith and in a manner consistent with the purpose and

    spirit of the agreement.

    45. Pulier breached his implied covenant under the Equity Purchase

    Agreement by (1) making the payments to two CBA executives; (2) failing to

    disclose to CSC those payments and any agreements he or Ace had with those

    executives; (3) causing ServiceMesh to enter into ten contracts during the

    Measurement Period with CBA, the company that employed the two individuals to

    whom Pulier directed the payments; and (4) misrepresenting in the audit

    confirmation letter the full scope and nature of ServiceMeshs agreements with

    CBA. These actions and omissions were not taken in good faith and were

    inconsistent with the spirit and purpose of the Equity Purchase Agreement, which

    was to establish the terms for CSCs purchase of ServiceMeshs equity securities

  • 17

    based on the true value of ServiceMesh, including the true value of ServiceMeshs

    relationship with CBA.

    46. Puliers material breaches of the implied covenant of good faith and

    fair dealing deprived CSC of the benefits of the Equity Purchase Agreement and

    caused CSC to suffer damages. Had CSC known that Pulier would make payments

    to two CBA executives, CSC would have paid less than $260 million to acquire

    ServiceMesh. In addition, it would not have paid Pulier a $9 million initial cash

    payment, a $13 million employee bonus, or a $25 million earnout payment, or

    granted him $26 million in restricted stock units.

    47. Additionally, as a result of Puliers material breaches of the implied

    covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiffs have incurred and will continue

    to incur significant legal and investigative costs as described above.

    COUNT III(Fraud)

    48. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt by reference each and every

    allegation in the preceding paragraphs.

    49. On February 11, 2014, Pulier provided CBA with a list of the

    agreements CBA had entered into with ServiceMesh and asked CBA to confirm

    (1) that the list represent[ed] the entire agreement between ServiceMesh and

    CBA, and (2) that there were not any discrepancies, any additional contract terms,

    or side letter arrangements or oral or written agreements outside of the contract

  • 18

    which may alter the written contract provisions. Pulier also instructed CBA to

    reply directly to Tida Strey, a CSC employee, at 8484 Westpark Drive, McLean

    VA, 22102, in the enclosed return envelope and email to [email protected],

    or fax to Tida Strey at 1.866.678.6457.

    50. Pulier intentionally did not list, in the audit confirmation letter, the

    side agreement he had with the two CBA executives under which he paid them

    over $2 million shortly after the ServiceMesh acquisition closed and Pulier

    received his $25 million earnout payment.

    51. On February 21, 2014, a CBA executivewho was one of the two

    that received the large payments coordinated by Pulierstated in writing that the

    list of contracts Pulier provided agree[d] with [CBAs] records, and that there

    were no agreements other than those Pulier had identified. The same day, the CBA

    executive, acting in accordance with Puliers instructions, sent the letter to Tida

    Strey at CSC.

    52. Pulier intentionally represented that the audit confirmation letter listed

    all of the contracts CBA had with ServiceMesh even though he knew of his side

    agreement with the two CBA executives. By instructing a CBA executive to send

    the letter to CSC, Pulier intentionally communicated this false representation to

    CSC with the intent that CSC rely on his misrepresentation and with the intent to

    secure the earnout payment by exceeding the $20 million earnout floor.

  • 19

    53. CSC justifiably relied on Puliers misrepresentation in the audit

    confirmation letter and suffered damages as a result of Puliers fraud. Because of

    Puliers fraud, CSC made an earnout payment of approximately $98 million to

    ServiceMesh equityholders, including an earnout payment of approximately $25

    million to Pulier. CSC would not have made any earnout payment at all had it

    known of Puliers side agreement with the two CBA executives.

    54. Additionally, as a result of Puliers fraud, Plaintiffs have incurred and

    will continue to incur significant legal and investigative costs as described above.

    COUNT IV(Fraud By Omission)

    55. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt by reference each and every

    allegation in the preceding paragraphs.

    56. As a Vice President of CSC and as part of his obligations during the

    earnout verification process, Pulier had a duty to disclose all agreements he was

    aware of between or among ServiceMesh, CBA, and their respective employees,

    including his side agreement with the two CBA executives regarding the large

    payments. Pulier owed CSC a duty to disclose this agreement so that CSC was not

    misled regarding ServiceMeshs relationship with CBA.

    57. Pulier intentionally failed to disclose his side agreement with the two

    CBA executives regarding the large payments.

  • 20

    58. CSC justifiably relied on Puliers failure to disclose his side

    agreement with the two CBA executives in the audit confirmation letter or

    otherwise, and it suffered damages as a result. Had it known of Puliers fraud by

    omission, CSC would not have made an earnout payment of approximately $98

    million to ServiceMesh equityholders, including an earnout payment of

    approximately $25 million to Pulier.

    59. Additionally, as a result of Puliers fraud by omission, Plaintiffs have

    incurred and will continue to incur significant legal and investigative costs as

    described above.

    COUNT V(Breach Of The Retention Agreement)

    60. The Retention Agreement entered into between CSC and Pulier is a

    valid, legally enforceable contract.

    61. Pulier was a party to the Retention Agreement and agreed to be bound

    by its terms.

    62. In the Retention Agreement, Pulier agreed to abide by CSCs rules

    and policies, which were provided to him in connection with his execution of the

    Retention Agreement. Pulier also acknowledged that he read the rules and

    policies.

    63. Pulier materially breached the Retention Agreement by failing to

    comply with numerous CSC rules and policies.

  • 21

    64. First, Pulier materially breached the Retention Agreement by

    (1) making payments to two senior information technology executives at CBA;

    (2) failing to disclose to CSC those payments and any agreements he or Ace had

    with those executives; and (3) causing ServiceMesh to enter into ten contracts

    during the Measurement Period with CBA, the company that employed the two

    individuals to whom Pulier directed the payments. These actions and omissions

    violated CSCs Code of Business Conduct and Personal Conflict of Interest Policy,

    which together require each CSC employee to act with integrity and transparency

    in all personal dealings that would or could appear to conflict with the business

    interests of CSC; avoid actual or potential conflicts between the interests of CSC

    and the interests of the employee or a third party; investigate their own affairs; be

    open about conflicts as soon as they arise; and report actual or potential conflicts to

    their manager or Human Resources immediately. These actions and omissions

    also violated CSCs Ethical and Legal Business Conduct Policy, which requires

    CSC employees to observe and preserve CSCs core corporate values, make

    decisions and choices that are consistent with those values, and comply with

    applicable internal policies.

    65. Second, Pulier materially breached the Retention Agreement by

    refusing, while a CSC employee, to cooperate fully with CSCs investigation

    regarding the large payments to CBA executives. CSCs Policy on Contacts and

  • 22

    Interaction with Law Enforcement Agencies and Counsel for Others and CSC

    Investigators required Pulier to cooperate fully in company investigations relating

    to his work in order to facilitate investigations into potential irregularities and

    enable any corrective actions, as needed. This required cooperation specifically

    included providing CSC investigators and any external parties acting under CSCs

    direction complete and truthful answers to all questions and volunteering any

    material information that may be pertinent to CSCs investigation of the large

    payments to CBA executives. Pulier violated this policy, and thereby breached the

    Retention Agreement, by refusing to timely and fully disclose requested documents

    and material information regarding the payments to CBA executives, and refusing

    to submit to a complete interview to discuss the payments.

    66. Third, Pulier materially breached the Retention Agreement by

    threatening CBA regarding comments CBA purportedly had made about Puliers

    payments to CBA executives. In February 2015, counsel for Pulier wrote to

    counsel for CBA, citing California defamation law and stating that CBA, by its

    actions, had exposed itself to significant liability under California law. By

    threatening CBA, a CSC client, Pulier violated various CSC policies and

    procedures, including its Code of Business Conduct and its Personal Conflict of

    Interest Policy.

  • 23

    67. Puliers material breaches of the Retention Agreement have damaged

    CSC. Had CSC known that Pulier would cause ServiceMesh to enter into ten

    contracts with CBA during the Measurement Period, make payments to two CBA

    executives, not disclose to CSC those payments and any agreements he or Ace had

    with those executives, not cooperate fully with CSCs investigation of those

    payments, and threaten CBA, CSC would not have granted Pulier $26 million

    worth of restricted stock units or allowed any of those units to vest, and would not

    have made any earnout payments to ServiceMesh equityholders.

    68. Additionally, as a result of Puliers breach of the Retention

    Agreement, Plaintiffs have incurred and will continue to incur significant legal and

    investigative costs as described above.

    COUNT VI(Breach Of The Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing Under

    The Retention Agreement)

    69. Under the Retention Agreement, Pulier had an implied contractual

    obligation to deal fairly with CSC and not to engage in conduct that would prevent

    CSC from receiving the benefits of the agreement. This obligation required Pulier

    to act in good faith and in a manner consistent with the purpose and spirit of the

    agreement.

    70. Pulier breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing

    under the Retention Agreement by (1) making payments to two CBA executives

  • 24

    that were not permitted under CSCs rules and policies; (2) failing to disclose to

    CSC those payments and any agreements he or his foundation had with those

    executives; (3) causing ServiceMesh to enter into ten contracts during the

    Measurement Period with CBA, the company that employed the two individuals to

    whom Pulier directed the payments; (4) misrepresenting in the audit confirmation

    letter the full scope and nature of ServiceMeshs relationship with CBA;

    (5) refusing to cooperate fully with CSC in its investigation of the payments to

    CBA executives; and (6) threatening CBA, an important CSC client. These actions

    and omissions were not taken in good faith and were inconsistent with the spirit

    and purpose of the Retention Agreement, which was, in large part, to memorialize

    the parties understanding with respect to the terms of Puliers new employment

    with CSC.

    71. CSC has been damaged by Puliers breach of the implied covenant of

    good faith and fair dealing. Had CSC known of Puliers actions and omissions, it

    would not have granted him $26 million worth of restricted stock units or allowed

    any of those units to vest, and would not have made any earnout payments to

    ServiceMesh equityholders.

    72. Additionally, as a result of Puliers breach of the implied covenant of

    good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiffs have incurred and will continue to incur

    significant legal and investigative costs as described above.

  • 25

    COUNT VII(Breach Of Fiduciary Duty On Behalf Of Plaintiff ServiceMesh)

    73. ServiceMesh incorporates and adopts by reference each and every

    allegation in the preceding paragraphs.

    74. Following CSCs acquisition of ServiceMesh and at least through the

    end of the earnout period, CSCs cloud business was pursued through both CSC

    and ServiceMesh, as a wholly owned subsidiary of CSC. As Chairman and CEO

    of ServiceMesh before the acquisition, and Vice President of CSC appointed by

    CSC to run the cloud business after the acquisition, Pulier owed fiduciary duties of

    care, loyalty, good faith, and candor to ServiceMesh. This required Pulier to,

    among other things, conduct the affairs of ServiceMesh with due care; not put self-

    interests or any personal considerations ahead of the interests of ServiceMesh; act

    in good faith (by, among other things, not violating any laws or consciously and

    intentionally disregarding fiduciary duties); and communicate with ServiceMesh

    with forthrightness and candor.

    75. Puliers decision to (1) make payments to two CBA executives;

    (2) fail to disclose to CSC those payments and any agreements he or Ace had with

    those executives; (3) cause ServiceMesh to enter into ten contracts during the

    Measurement Period with CBA; and (4) misrepresent in the audit confirmation

    letter the full scope and nature of ServiceMeshs relationship with CBA, violated

    his fiduciary duties.

  • 26

    76. Pulier had a duty to disclose all agreements he was aware of between

    or among ServiceMesh, CBA, and their respective employees, including his side

    agreement with the two CBA executives regarding the large payments.

    77. Pulier breached his duties to ServiceMesh by engaging in the

    fraudulent conduct described above, benefiting himself at ServiceMeshs expense,

    and subordinating ServiceMeshs interests to his own personal interests.

    78. Additionally, as a result of Puliers breaches of his fiduciary duties,

    Plaintiffs have incurred and will continue to incur significant legal and

    investigative costs as described above.

    COUNT VIII(Breach Of Fiduciary Duty On Behalf Of Plaintiff CSC)

    79. CSC incorporates and adopts by reference each and every allegation

    in the preceding paragraphs.

    80. Following CSCs acquisition of ServiceMesh, Pulier became Vice

    President and General Manager of CSCs cloud business unit, and later Head of

    Strategy for CSCs emerging business group. Pulier was a Vice President of CSC

    from the time of his employment until termination of that employment. Following

    CSCs acquisition of ServiceMesh and at least through the end of the earnout

    period, CSCs cloud business was pursued through both CSC and ServiceMesh, as

    a wholly owned subsidiary of CSC.

  • 27

    81. By virtue of his position as Vice President of CSC, Pulier owed CSC a

    fiduciary duty under Nevada law. He owed CSC, among other things, a duty of

    loyalty.

    82. Pulier breached his duty of loyalty to CSC by (1) making payments to

    two CBA executives that were not permitted under CSCs rules and policies;

    (2) failing to disclose to CSC those payments and any agreements he or Ace had

    with those executives; (3) causing ServiceMesh to enter into ten contracts during

    the Measurement Period with CBA, the company that employed the two

    individuals to whom Pulier directed the payments; (4) misrepresenting in the audit

    confirmation letter the full scope and nature of ServiceMeshs relationship with

    CBA; (5) refusing to fully cooperate with CSC in its investigation of the large

    payments to CBA executives; and (6) threatening CBA, an important CSC client.

    83. CSC has been damaged by Puliers breach of his duty of loyalty. Had

    CSC known of Puliers actions and omissions, it would not have granted him $26

    million worth of restricted stock units or allowed any of those units to vest, and

    would not have made any earnout payments to ServiceMesh equityholders.

    84. Additionally, as a result of Puliers breach of his duty of loyalty, CSC

    has incurred and will continue to incur significant legal and investigative costs as

    described above.

  • 28

    PRAYER FOR RELIEF

    Plaintiffs request the following relief:

    85. All damages recoverable at law or in equity. This includes, but is not

    limited to, payments made to Pulier under or in connection with the Equity

    Purchase Agreement, the value of vested restricted stock units granted to Pulier

    under his Retention Agreement, and the full amount of the earnout payment paid to

    ServiceMesh equityholders under the Equity Purchase Agreement.

    86. Pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law.

    87. Attorneys fees, interest, and costs as provided for in the Equity

    Purchase Agreement, the Retention Agreement, and as otherwise allowed by law.

    88. All other specific or general relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled

    which the Court shall deem to be just and equitable.

  • 29

    Respectfully submitted,

    OF COUNSEL:

    Bryant C. Boren Jr.BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.1001 Page Mill RoadBuilding One, Suite 200Palo Alto, California 94304T: 650-739-7500

    Thomas E. OBrienBAKER BOTTS L.L.P.2001 Ross AvenueDallas, Texas 75201T: 214-953-6934

    Dated: May 12, 2015

    POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP

    /s/ Peter J. Walsh, Jr.Peter J. Walsh, Jr. (#2437)Jacob R. Kirkham (#5768)1313 North Market StreetP.O. Box 951Wilmington, DE 19899(302) 984-6000

    Counsel for Plaintiffs Computer SciencesCorporation and ServiceMesh Inc.