PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN EDUCATION: A PROMISING MODEL FROM BRAZIL

PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP INEDUCATION: A PROMISING MODEL FROM

BRAZIL

TAMO CHATTOPADHAY1* and OLAVO NOGUEIRA2

1University of Notre Dame, South Bend, IN, USA2Associação Parceiros da Educação, Sao Paulo, Brazil

Abstract: Public–private partnership in education is increasingly viewed as an effective strategy forimproving basic education in developing countries. The current paper presents a case study from Brazilabout an emerging public–private partnership in secondary education between the State of Rio deJaneiro and two leading Brazilian private corporations. By employing a ‘co-management’ governancestrategy, the partnership leverages resources and technical knowledge of the private sector and offersa qualitatively different mix of academic-focused and technology-focused education for Brazil’s publicschool students. The paper argues that the partnership represents a promising model for addressing thechallenges of secondary education in Brazil. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Keywords: public–private partnership; secondary education; Brazil

1 INTRODUCTION

Public–private partnership (PPP) in education can be broadly defined as a contractualarrangement between the state and a private entity in any aspect of education provisionand management (Patrinos et al., 2009). Part of the reason PPP has entered the policydiscourse in international educational development is the rising demand for education thatstates are unable to meet without collaborating with private providers of schooling(Patrinos and Sosale, 2007).Certain PPP mechanisms, such as publicly financed and privately managed schools,

have shown great potential to be tailored to the education of low-income and marginalisedchildren—in terms of both access to schooling and quality of learning (LaRocque, 2008).However, the complexities of social, cultural, political and economic forces at play in eachcountry’s educational system make PPP a highly context-dependant phenomenon.

*Correspondence to: Tamo Chattopadhay, University of Notre Dame, South Bend, IN, USA.E-mail: [email protected]

Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Journal of International DevelopmentJ. Int. Dev. 26, 875–886 (2014)Published online 13 June 2013 in Wiley Online Library(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/jid.2930

In this paper, we present a PPP case study from the Brazilian education context. Weexplore an emerging partnership model between two leading private sector companiesand the Secretariat of Education of the State of Rio de Janeiro. We highlight thepedagogical and governance innovations of the model and discuss its potential foraddressing the challenges of secondary education in Brazil.Although innovative PPP examples can be found in diverse educational contexts, we

posit that Brazil represents an important case given its prominent role among developingcountries in implementing progressive social policies and achieving significant reductionsof poverty (Fishlow, 2011). Brazil’s economic ascent has been marked by a dynamicprivate sector that has also created national champions of corporate social responsibilityinitiatives (The Economist, 2009). We submit that this confluence of progressive socialpolicies and a socially engaged private sector makes Brazil a particularly illustrativecontext for the study of PPP in education.

2 THE CRISIS IN BRAZIL’S SECONDARY EDUCATION AND THE SCOPEOF PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP

Public and private schools represent two different educational realities in Brazil, as inmuch of Latin America:

‘In much of Latin America and the Caribbean, the rich and the middle class sendtheir students to private schools’ and lack interest in and commitment to providingresources and support for schools that ‘other people’s’ children attend. (Levin,2001: 539).

Perhaps the most significant difference between the public and private schools in Brazil,in addition to student socio-economic background (cited by numerous studies as the mostsignificant factor in explaining achievement levels), is the actual learning time in school.School day in Brazil is typically 4.5 h long—an already very low number when comparedwith other countries. However, within the public school system, little of that time is spentas ‘time on task’. A recent study in 36 public schools at the secondary level of educationacross Brazil found that, on average, only 44 per cent of the class time in the schoolsconstitutes in opportunities for actual learning (Gastaldi and Lima, 2011). Understandably,these structural constraints manifest in stark achievement gaps between students of publicand private schools in Brazil. Although approximately 85 per cent of students are enrolledin the public system, a student completing 11 years in a public school ‘knows’, on average,less than an eighth grader in a private school (Gois, 2010).Recent quality assessments employing a new national metric IDEB1 illustrate that on a

scale of 0–10, there has been only 2 per cent improvement at the secondary level in aperiod of 4 years, from 3.5 in 2007 to 3.7 in 2009, and only 10 per cent of high schoolgraduates demonstrate adequate proficiency levels (PNAD, 2009). Today, more than everbefore, quality secondary education acts as the ‘bridge’ that enables countries to movefrom lower to higher levels of economic development in a global knowledge economy

1Índice de Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica (IDEB)—‘Rate of Development of Basic Education’—is usedby the Brazilian Ministry of Education (Federal) to assess the quality of Brazilian education. The IDEB computesa score for each school that takes into account students’ repetition rates and grades in standardised national exams,such as Prova Brasil and SAEB www.educarparacrescer.abril.com.br

876 T. Chattopadhay and O. Nogueira

Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Int. Dev. 26, 875–886 (2014)DOI: 10.1002/jid

http://www.educarparacrescer.abril.com.br

(Cuadra et al., 2005; di Gropello, 2006). Consequently, there is a growing concern that theeducation gap is ‘holding Brazil back’ from achieving its full potential as an economicpower in global markets (Barrionuevo, 2010).

3 THE NAVE/NATA MODEL OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP INBRAZILIAN SECONDARY EDUCATION

‘NAVE’ and ‘NATA’ are two recently inaugurated public high schools in Rio de Janeirothat resulted from partnerships between the State Secretariat of Education of Rio de Janeiro(SEEDUC) and Brazilian private companies, telecommunications giant Oi Telecom in thecase of NAVE and Grupo Pão de Açúcar, a prominent Brazilian supermarket chain, in thecase of NATA. Although designated as public schools, there are a number of characteristicsthat distinguish the NAVE/NATA schools from traditional public schools of Brazil. Thesedistinctive aspects are discussed as follows.

3.1 Curricular Delivery Innovations

Since 1998, Brazil’s secondary education system has de facto operated a single-trackacademic curriculum of formal basic education, without any calibration of technicalorientation and/or curriculum diversification. NAVE and NATA schools—which adoptedthe denomination of Núcleo Avançado (‘Advanced Nucleus’)—represent an innovativecurricular delivery model that integrates the traditional high school curriculum with atechnical education, supported by cutting-edge infrastructure and technology resources.The technical teaching at NAVE is focused on communication, programming and

information technology. Three different courses are offered: multimedia creation, gamingand digital media score production. As for NATA, the focus is on food technology andfood engineering, with three course offerings: dairy production, milk production and breadmaking. In each school, these ‘technical tracks’ comprise students’ second and third yearsof high school. Students express their preferences (such as dairy production vs breadmaking in NATA) at the end of their first years, and track assignment is based on students’performances.The pedagogical innovation of NAVE and NATA lies in the delivery aspect of the

process, i.e. how subjects are taught. The traditional high school curriculum is preservedin both schools; however, it is now infused with assignments and learning activities relatedto the domains of skills and knowledge of the respective industry sectors of the privatepartners. For example, contents from regular math classes (from the traditional curriculum)are often related to activities of developing digital games (in the case of NAVE) or to thebread-making measurements and procedures (in the case of NATA). Interestingly, theNATA site is adjacent to a dairy factory that was reactivated by Pão de Açúcar. The factoryspace was optimised, and 20 classrooms have been set up in the redesigned factory floor.The factory continues milk and dairy production under its brand. At the same time, itfunctions as a study lab for the school’s students.In short, through their innovative delivery of high school curriculum, both schools now

offer a rigorous foundational education combined with significant exposure totechnological learning. Such a formation provides a valuable opportunity for the NAVE

Brazil Public–Private Partnership Model 877


and NATA students—coming from public schools—to compete at par with the studentsfrom the best private schools, both for the job market and in the university entrance exams.

3.2 Time on Task

Both NAVE and NATA offer a full 8-h school day, thereby addressing one of the coreissues in the high school reform agenda of Brazil: learning time in school. The extendedtime on task at NAVE and NATA schools makes their enriched delivery mechanismsfeasible.

3.3 Teacher Collaboration

At NAVE and NATA, teachers from both the traditional and technical subjects join effortsand teach classes together, thereby driving the seamless integration between the academicand professional orientations. This robust teacher collaboration is sustained by the fact thatteachers are exclusive to the schools and do not need to shuttle between multiple schools(as is typically the case for public school teachers in Brazil). This allows enough time forteachers to discuss and prepare classes together. In fact, besides quality of schoolleadership, ‘teacher collaboration’ is pointed out by the teachers themselves at both NAVEand NATA as the decisive factor that makes the model successful in innovative deliveryand teaching methods.The collaboration of teachers also underpins the nature of teacher–student interactions in

both schools, translating into pedagogical models that enable students to work in teamprojects and support each other’s learning. For instance, in NAVE, each teacher is assignedto a small group of students for whom she or he acts as the advisor, in consultation with heror his other colleagues, through the 3 years of high school. Besides strengthening theschool-wide culture of collaboration and mutual support, these processes are designed toensure that no student in the school is left behind under the pressures of a demanding,non-traditional pedagogical model.

3.4 Selection of Students

Whereas entrance to traditional public schools in Brazil does not involve a selectionprocess, both NAVE and NATA schools select their students through an extremelycompetitive admissions process resulting in an acceptance ratio of 10:1 or higher.2 Indeedsome might consider the NAVE/NATA model as promoting elitism. However, suchcritical observations would validate the fact that the existing public system provides fewacademically enriching alternatives for motivated yet poor students. Results from the11th-grade (graduating) students who participated in the mandatory exams of Rio deJaneiro State Education Assessment System demonstrate that both NAVE and NATAstudents significantly outperform their counterparts in public schools [http://www.saerj.caedufjf.net/saerj (accessed on 07 Nov. 2011)].

2Correspondence with principals in both schools, between June 2010 and October 2011



http://www.saerj.caedufjf.net/saerj

http://www.saerj.caedufjf.net/saerj

The status of NAVE and NATA as exemplary public education institutions is probablybest demonstrated by the fact that middle-class parents who typically shun public schoolsand send their children to private ones have become vocal constituents for securingadmission rights of their children to NAVE and NATA! Starting in 2011, after lawsuitsfrom private school parents, the NAVE and NATA now hold 5 per cent of the spots forstudents coming from private schools and another 5 per cent for students with disabilities,with the remaining 90 per cent for eighth graders from public schools

3.5 Governance Innovation

In our opinion, the emerging governance model of NAVE and NATA schools offers someof the most important lessons for potential PPP design and operation in the educationsector. According to Samara Werner, Director of the Oi Futuro Institute (at the time ofNAVE’s conception), the foundation arm of the Oi Telecom parent company, theinspiration for NAVE came from a public–private model in the health sector—the INCORinitiative. INCOR is a university-linked public hospital recognised as a centre ofexcellence in the clinical and research areas of cardiology, cardiovascular medicine andcardiovascular surgery. It is the result of a partnership between a public hospital and aprivate company. In addition to the hospital, the INCOR is composed of a Research andDissemination Centre.Interestingly, when NAVE was launched in 2008, replication of the model (‘more

NAVEs’) was not placed at the core of the private partner’s goals. Instead, the priorityfor Oi Futuro was to create a school that would be able to test, systematise and disseminatespecific aspects of innovative curricula, pedagogy and school management protocols. At thesame time, the Oi Futuro leadership understood very clearly that, for NAVE’s innovationsto be eventually absorbed at a system-wide level, it was imperative that NAVE would be aschool within the public system (as opposed to a stand-alone private school) with teachersand school administrators drawn from the existing public system’s pool of resources:

‘We wanted to start a new model, and we quickly understood that it had to be part ofthe network of schools we were trying to generate solutions for. We would havenever been able to directly alter system results, but as private social investmentproject, we saw this as our way to maximize our resources.’ (Samara Werner,Director, Oi Futuro Institute)

Such programme logic meant for the private entity to partner with the SEEDUC andoperate the school under what would eventually be called a ‘co-management model’.Under the leadership of the State Secretary of Education at that time, Tereza Porto, themodel quickly gained momentum. One year after the launch of NAVE, Grupo Pão deAçúcar, one of Brazil’s major supermarket chains, was engaged by Mrs Porto to enter intoa similar partnership with SEEDUC and launch its own brand of co-managed schools.NATA was born in 2009.

‘Tereza presented us with the opportunity. There was the interest to re-activate amilk and dairy factory where the school is today, and we were very enthusiasticabout the possibility of a secondary-level of education project sustained on aninnovative pedagogical model. And right after we visited NAVE, everything quicklymade sense to us and we decided to make it happen.’ (Ana Maria Diniz, Grupo Pãode Açúcar Administrative and Advisory Board Member)



Under the concept of the co-management model, the public partner (State Secretariatof Education) oversees the provision of the traditional curriculum at the schools,whereas the private partner oversees the delivery of the technical education. Bothpartners are in constant communication, and they participate in the decision-makingprocess of both ends of the delivery system. Decisions on how regular curricularactivities can be integrated to the technical curriculum (and vice versa) are successfullyachieved because of this extensive teacher-to-teacher interaction that is at the core ofthe co-management model deployed at NATA and NAVE. Whereas the leadership fromboth ends of the partnership appears as a key determinant in the set-up of thegovernance model, the long-term success of the PPP in this model heavily relies onthe partnership developed by the teachers themselves who teach traditional andtechnical subjects.Further, the co-management model entails that in addition to the school principal, who is

a state employee, a liaison officer from the private partner is physically based within aschool. Although the liaison official does not have authority over the day-to-day runningof the school, he or she is responsible for supporting the school principal on thedeployment of an integrated PPP model, mediating the public–private relationship,overlooking the private investments and reporting to the private partner. Figure 1schematically represents the co-management model.Interestingly enough, for NATA, the co-management model was not part of the initial

strategy. Daryalva Bacellar, director of Pão de Açúcar Institute (the foundation arm ofthe parent company) and the person responsible for the project, revealed in interviews withthe researchers that Pão de Açúcar saw its role in setting up the initial infrastructure,reviving the milk and dairy factory on site, developing the technical curriculum and then

Figure 1. Schematic representation of the co-management model



handing over the operation of the school to a government entity such as SEEDUC or StateSecretariat of Agriculture, Fishing and Supply.

‘It was not in the plan for us to become co-managers (as NAVE)—but it was thechosen path after a while and it was great because we were then able to acquire theknow-how of the process. Today we have a much better ability to replicate the modeland build more NATA-s.’ (Daryalva Bacellar, Director of Pão de Açúcar Institute)

Although the same partnership model as NAVE’s was followed, NATA went furtherand established as a top priority the preparation of workforce in strategic areas for thecompany and industry:

‘We feel a great sense of responsibility in making sure that they (students) areabsorbed in the market if they choose to bypass university upon graduation. We feelour responsibility doesn’t end after they graduate, therefore we must be very awareof the technical careers we include in the curriculum. If not with us, we want them tobe inserted in the market at a place they will be able to move forward and make greatuse of the education NATA has provided them.’ (Daryalva Bacellar)

Clearly, the private organisation is aware of the fact that for many talented yet poorstudents in their school, forsaking the pursuit of higher education and joining the jobmarket right after high school graduation could be a pressing reality. Such organisationalgoal settings are a testimony to the fact that the NAVE/NATA model was intended notonly to deliver quality education to lower-income students but also to create a newinstitutional approach for private sector involvement in public education. Figure 2 depicts

Figure 2. Shared objectives and outcomes in NAVE and NATA schools



how the shared objectives of public and private stakeholders in the NAVE/NATA modelare achieved.Granted, the co-management model is not without its inherent challenges. For example,

because of current job market characteristics in Rio de Janeiro (and much of Brazil), salaryscale and career path for the public school and technical teachers are differentiated.Although so far, this scenario has not raised problems in the day-to-day activities andteacher-to-teacher relationships (according to both ends of the partnership), such intricacyshould be closely followed as the model matures.Furthermore, the public and private partners have consultatively set up stringent criteria

for selection of principals, administrative staff and regular curriculum teachers. Technicalteachers are selected by the private partner. Although this has ensured an extremelycompetitive recruitment process (acceptance ratio of more than 30:13), the ultimate hiringdecision lies with the state authority SEEDUC and presents an area of potential contention:

‘We don’t take part in the principal and teacher selection process, neither can weevaluate them. This is a challenge and we are thinking of ways of addressing this,in attempt to make school improvement a constant hallmark of our work.’(Daryalva Bacellar)

Along the same lines, a further challenge lies in the role and reaction of local teacherunions. In much of Brazil, recent efforts by public education agencies to deploy teacherselection processes and teacher evaluation systems based on performance criteria haveoften been met with heavy resistance from teacher unions. In this sense, the SEEDUCmodel seems to have courageously staked its position. While teacher union support isindeed an area of concern for the longevity and growth of the model, union protestsspecifically aimed at NAVE and NATA schools have not been orchestrated to date.Although the absence of union resistance so far might indicate successful manoeuvringby the SEEDUC leadership, it is yet to be seen whether the small number of‘alternatives’ (two for the moment) has anything to do with it. The intent of theSEEDUC leadership to increase the number of NATAs and NAVEs in the near future(as depicted in their conversations with the authors) will truly put to test the viability ofthe model.For its part, the SEEDUC (2011) considers its mission to ‘secure an education that

guarantees access, permanence and success of students in the classroom. . . (with) theobjective to promote a quality public education’. Consequently, the power of the co-management model lies in a design that allows the state to secure its institutional objectivesof benefitting all students while simultaneously enabling the private sector to leverage offits strengths:

‘Each school follows the same model, but their strategic objectives are slightlydifferent. Even though the ultimate goal—delivering quality academic and technicaleducation—comes first, each school has their specific characteristics, and that has alot to do with the private partners’. (Professor Penha, State Secretariat of Education,Rio de Janeiro)

Currently, the NAVE and NATA schools receive the same maintenance budget thatother state schools receive in addition to the funding for technical equipment, materials

3Correspondence with the State Secretariat of Education of Rio de Janeiro on October 2011.



and instructors from the private sector. Unofficial records estimate the initial set-up cost ofNATA at R$6.8m [approximately $3.7m (using a 1.8 conversion rate)] and an annualoperating budget of R$2m ($1.1m). The unusually high start-up cost reflects the fundingthat went into reactivating the dairy factory as part of the school’s physical infrastructure.Undoubtedly, without the investment from the private partners (in infrastructure, technicaland management support and supply of teachers for the technical education), the schoolswould not have the ability to deliver the current level of excellence. All this imposesfurther pressure on the private entities in their goals of sustaining the model.Encouragingly, the tangible and intangible benefits of affecting systemic change are

seen by the corporate entities as compelling reasons to continue investments and toreplicate the schools in a sustained co-management model with education agencies in otherstates of the Brazilian republic:

‘We are thinking of building more NATA-s, perhaps in Sao Paulo. But we are alsothinking now of disseminating our know-how. We have been approached byUniversities, interested in our course-design, the material we created. This mightbe a way to guarantee sustainability and grow our number of NATA-s.’ (DaryalvaBacellar, Director of Pão de Açúcar Institute)

Perhaps the most promising impetus for the sustainability of NAVE and NATA schoolslies in the very design of the co-management model, where the private partners are notmerely providing technological resources as an ‘add-on’ to the existing school structurebut are accountable and time-bound stakeholders for the success of the whole school:

‘You have to think of the school as a whole, and it can’t be ONE more project in theschool, it has to be THE project of the school. We had seen what the oppositeformula was doing elsewhere in Brazil, and it was a top priority not to do that. That’swhat we aimed for with NAVE and this model’ (Samara Werner, Oi Futuro Institutedirector at the time of NAVE’s conception).

Indeed, the ‘add-on’ approach is a commonly occurring phenomenon in the privatesocial investment field in Brazil, where well-intended ideas inserted into traditional schoolstructure result in a myriad of unsynchronized projects that impede more than enablesustainable educational attainment. In contrast, the embedded design of NAVE’s andNATA-s technology-infused whole-school transformation model is more realisticallypoised for replication and mainstreaming into the public education arena in Brazil.

4 DISCUSSIONS

The NAVE/NATA model seems poised to effectively and innovatively address the twoconverging priorities of contemporary education reform in Brazil: high school curricularrelevance and prevention of student disengagement (Neri, 2009). The strategy of providinga technical education while teaching the regular high school curriculum effectively allowsstudents of different learning abilities and interests to pursue the ‘best-fit’ post-secondaryoption, thereby increasing their motivation for and engagement with high school studies(de Castro, 2011). Significantly, the vision of the NAVE/NATA model is echoed todayin a growing global discourse about a more diversified set of secondary educationpathways—ones that prepare students with an adequate blend of foundational and appliedtechnical skills so that they have more choices to pursue post-secondary education and



labour market choices (Symonds et al., 2011; UNESCO, 2012). A crucial distinctionbetween NAVE/NATA model and the many private schools set up by other Braziliancorporations such as Embraer (airplane manufacturer) or Bradesco (bank) is that theNAVE and NATA schools are public schools playing by the rules of public educationof the State of Rio de Janeiro.Certainly, examples of PPP that create institutions of excellence for poor students within

an otherwise mediocre public schooling universe exist in other parts of the world. Forexample, in the United States, ‘charter schools’ represent one such approach of publiclyfunded but privately operated schools, particularly catering to disadvantaged children.Some of the more successful charter schools—such as the Knowledge is PowerProgram—are also often part of a network or Charter Management Organisation thatshares best practices and organisational culture among its member schools. Certain charterschools may also be formed around a specific thematic focus—such as the DemocracyPrep Charter Schools in New York (focus on civic education) or the High Tech HighSchool in California that focuses on science and technology education. Yet other charterschools may employ a unique pedagogical model such as blended learning with significantonline education component (e.g. Rocketship Education Schools in California andnationwide). In other words, the charter school movement embodies organisational,curricular and pedagogical innovations brought into the public schooling space by theprivate providers. At the same time, there is an important distinction between charterschools and the NAVE/NATA approach. Whereas the private partners in the US charterschooling space are entities whose core competence is education, in the NAVE/NATAmodel of Brazil, one finds corporations from other industry sectors engaging with publiceducation. Indeed, the two Brazilian private partners—Oi Telecom (NAVE) and GrupoPão de Açúcar (NATA)—are leading business organisations of the country who are mosteffectively tuned to the skill needs and gaps of their respective industries and are sensitiveto their own brand equity. Notably, as this paper goes to press, the US Education mediareports the first significant collaboration resembling the NAVE/NATA model in thatcountry—the partnership between IBM Corporation and New York City Department ofPublic Education into the creation of Pathways to Technology Early College High Schoolor P-TECH (Cavanagh, 2013).Examples of private providers partnering with government can be found in India in the

widespread practice of ‘aided private schools’ where teacher salaries are covered bygovernment funds. More recently, corporate leaders through their respective charitablefoundations have taken up an active role in improving government schools. These effortsrange from supporting professional development of public school teachers (e.g. AjimPremji Foundation) to running an entire network of schools catering to poor children(e.g. Bharti Foundation). Although these efforts represent significant commitment of privateresources and management capacity to education of underprivileged children, they are notextensions of the industry sectoral expertise of the sponsoring corporations as in the caseof NAVE and NATA. However, this situation might change quickly as the Governmentof India is strongly advocating PPPs to meet its ambitious Right to Education mandate.Ultimately, poverty in Brazil (as elsewhere) is multidimensional, and school remains

an important yet not the only institution for social mobility. The extent to which theNAVE/NATA model of PPP in education can play a role in alleviating poverty inBrazil remains an open question. Indeed, the possible replication of the model in otherparts of Brazil and its relative impact on poor children’s education constitute importantresearch agendas for the future.



5 CONCLUSION

Today, whether viewed as a lever of national competitiveness in the knowledge economy,as a driver of individual mobility and social inclusion or as a factor for sustaining acohesive and secure society, secondary education has emerged as a domain of criticalsignificance in international development globally. The unfolding PPP model of NAVEand NATA schools holds great promise for a system-wide secondary education reformin Brazil. Unlike the cash-dominated corporate charities to education sector among USFortune 500 companies (Van Fleet, 2011), the NAVE/NATA model can be viewed as asustainable social innovation and ‘shared value’ creation (Porter and Kramer 2011) inthe education sector. The model also offers insights for other emerging economies wherethe education system is desperate for qualitative improvements to meet the skill demandsof the 21st century.

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PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN EDUCATION: A PROMISING MODEL FROM BRAZIL