Public Policy: The Essential Readings (Theodoulou & Cahn)

Public Policy: The Essential Readings (Theodoulou & Cahn)

Part I: The Nature of Public Policy

(Summarized by: Kuheli Dutt)

Chapter 1: The Contemporary language of Public Policy

(Stella Theodoulou)

1. We need to be able to distinguish between what governments intend to do and what they actually do

2. PP involves all levels of govt. and is not restricted to formal actors

3. PP is an intentional course of action with an accomplished end goal as its objective

4. PP is both long term and short term

Policy is an ongoing process; it involves not only the decision to enact a law but also the subsequent actions of implementation, enforcement and evaluation. PP does at least one or more of the following: it reconciles conflicting claims on scarce resources; it establishes incentives for cooperation and collective action that would be irrational without govt. influence; it prohibits morally unacceptable behavior and provides direct benefits to citizens.

Approaches to Studying Public Policy

1. Cycle-process approaches: The basic assumption in these approaches is that policy makers respond to the demands placed on them. The focus is on the process of policy making.

a. Systems Theory: PP is a political systems response to demands arising from the environment. The political system is thus a mechanism by which popular demands and popular support for the state are combined to produce those policy outputs that best endure the long term stability of the political system. The basic idea is that political systems should be seen as analogues to operating mechanical systems with feedback loops and clear goals. Weakness of this approach: it says little about how decisions are determined or how they arrive into the decision-making structures. Also, it stresses the importance of stability rather than change.

b. Structural Functionalism: Looks at the necessary functions that must be carried out in any political system if it to cope with its environment and achieve its goals. Also looks at the location of structures political parties and socializing agencies that facilitate that functioning. This approach acknowledges that the structures, arrangements, and procedures of political institutions have important consequences for the adoption and content of public policy. Institutions provide part of the context for policy making and need to be considered along with more dynamic aspects like political parties, groups, and opinions. Weakness of this approach: it tends to fragment the study of policy making by focusing on the various structures, thus making it difficult to concisely draw all of the different elements involved in the policy process together.

c. Policy Cycle: This approach views the policy process as a cycle that is deliberative, staged, recursive, and administrative. Policy making is thus seen as a dynamic ongoing process. Policies are described in two different senses: how they are made, and how they can be made better.

2. Models of who makes Public Policy: These models look at how the policy process operates and, most importantly, who controls or dominates the process and who benefits from it. a. Group Theory/Pluralism: PP is a product of group struggle. The central argument is that societies consist of a number of social, ethnic, or economic groups, who are more or less well organized. The public interest tends to emerge out of the struggle of competing individual and group claims. PP is the result of a unique process of interaction. The basic elements of this approach are multiple centers of powers and optimum policy developments through competing interests.

b. Elite Theory: Policies are made by a relatively small group of influential leaders who share common goals and outlooks. PP is not a product of group conflict and demands but rather as determined by the preferences of the minority ruling class who have political and economic power.

c. Corporatism: Interest groups do not merely attempt to influence PP but themselves become a part of the decision making and implementation system, thereby making society more manageable for the state or govt.

d. Subgovernments: The govt. alone does not make policy choices but endorses decisions made by groups like members of Congress, the bureaucracy, and interest groups. These structures develop around particular policy areas and involve the relevant legislators, bureaucrats, and interest groups. Therefore policy outcomes are determined by the relationship of these groups with the govt. and not just the govt. alone. This perspective has been outmoded in recent years among political scientists since there are a much larger number of interested actors in the policy making process, not just the three posited by this model.

Types of Public Policy

1. Classic typology: attributed to Theodore Lowi. PP is classified according to whether it is regulatory, distributive, or redistributive in nature.

2. Material/ Symbolic: Attributed to Murray Edelman. PP is either material or symbolic. Material policies provide tangible resources or substantive power to their beneficiaries and may impose costs on those who are adversely affected. Symbolic policies appeal to the values held in common by individuals in society. They can be used to divert public attention or satisfy public demand when no substantive benefits are being produced.

3. Substantive/Procedural: Attributed to James Anderson. Substantive policies are what the govt. intends to do and they provide advantages/disadvantages and costs/benefits of any given policy. Procedural policies look at how something will be done or who will do it.

4. Liberal/Conservative: Liberal polices seek govt. intervention to bring about social change while conservative policies oppose such intervention. However this distinction has been blurred in recent years, with the emphasis being not on whether the govt. should intervene or not, but in what areas, in what form, and on whose behalf.

Chapter 2: Political Science and Public Policy

(Paul Sabatier)

Public policy did not appear as a significant subfield of political science until the 1960s and 1970s. Policy research by political scientists can be divided into 4 types:

1. Substantive area research: This looks at the politics of a specific policy, such as health, education, transportation, or foreign policy. This work has consisted mainly of detailed, largely atheoretical, case studies. While being informative, they are probably less useful than theoretical case studies on implementation or agenda setting.

2. Evaluation and Impact Studies: Mostly based on contributions from other disciplines, these studies have broadened the criteria of evaluation from traditional social welfare functions to include process criteria such as opportunities for effective citizen participation.

3. Policy process: This looks at the factors affecting policy formulation and implementation, as well as the subsequent effects of policy. The focus on the policy process provides opportunities for applying and integrating accumulated knowledge concerning political behavior in various institutional settings.

4. Policy design: This approach focuses on such topics as the efficacy of different types of policy instruments.

Sources of strain between political scientists and the subfield of policy scholars:

1. Difference in the fundamental conception of the purpose of govt. and political life. Policy scholars tend to view govt. in instrumental terms: govts are there to improve the welfare of members of society to provide public health, provide for common defense, correct externalities, improve public safety, etc. Political scientists view citizenship and political participation as ends in themselves rather than as a means of influencing policy decisions.

2. Difference in the normative assumptions. Policy scholars try to influence policy in areas in which they are specialists. Conversely, political scientists try to understand the way the world operates within their areas of specialization with lesser emphasis on trying to influence political behavior in the system.

3. Contributions to the field: In the eyes of political scientists, policy scholars have made only modest contributions to developing generalizable and empirically verified theories of the policy process.

In addition, the dominant paradigm of the policy process the stages heuristic is not really a causal theory. Instead, it divides the policy process into several stages (agenda setting, formulation and adoption, implementation, and evaluation), but contains no coherent assumptions about what forces are driving the process from stage to stage and very few falsifiable hypotheses. While the stages heuristic has helped to divide the policy process into manageable units of analysis, researchers have tended to focus exclusively on a single stage with little recognition of work in other stages. Also, the real world process often does not fit the sequence of stages envisaged.

On the other hand, a great deal of policy research has been methodologically sophisticated and guided by explicit theory. Examples include studies on agenda setting; implementation; long term policy change; and institutional arrangements for managing common property resources.

However, none of these sources of strain should pose serious obstacles to close collaborations between political scientists and the subfield of policy scholars both groups share a common interest in developing a better understanding of the policy process, i.e. the range of factors that affect governmental policy decisions and the impacts of those decisions on society.

Chapter 3: Distribution, Regulation, Redistribution: The Functions of Govt.

(Theodore Lowi)

Distributive Policies: characterized by the ease with which they can be disaggregated and dispensed unit by unit, with each unit more or less in isolation from other units and from any general rule. These policies can also be called Patronage policies, in that they are highly individualized decisions that can be called policy only by accumulation. In these policies the recipient and the deprived need never come in direct confrontation.

Regulatory Policies: like distributive policies, these are also specific and individual in their impact, but they are not capable of the level of disaggregation typical of distributive policies. Regulatory policies involve direct choices about who will be indulged and who deprived. Policies cannot be disaggregated to the level of the individual firm (as in the case of distributive policies), since decisions are made by the application of a general rule. Regulatory decisions are cumulative largely along sectoral lines, and are disaggregable only down to the sector level.

Redistributive policies are similar to regulatory policies in that relations among broad categories of private individuals are involved. However, on all other counts there are great differences in the nature of impact. The categories of impact are much broader, approaching social classes. Roughly speaking, they are haves and have-nots; bigness and smallness; and bourgeoisie and proletariat. The aim involved is not the use of property but property itself; not equal treatment but equal possession; not behavior, but being. The nature of a redistributive issue is not determined by the outcome of a battle over how redistributive a policy is going to be.

Arenas of Power

Once one posits the general tendency of these areas of policy or governmental activity to develop characteristic political structures, a number of hypotheses become compelling. These hypotheses begin to resemble the three general theories of political process.

1. The distributive arena: Distributive issues individualize conflict and provide the basis for highly stable coalitions that are virtually irrelevant to the larger policy outcomes; thousands of obscure decisions are merely accumulated into a policy of protection or of natural-resources development or of defense subcontracting. The structure of the relationships usually lead to the Congress and this structure is relatively stable because all who have access of any sort usually support whoever are leaders. And there tend to be elites of a particular sort in the Congressional committees whose jurisdictions include the subject matter in question. For example, the Public Works Committee is virtually the govt. on rivers and harbors. Similarly, until recently, for tariff matters the House Ways and Means Committee was the governing authority. It is a broker leadership but policy is best understood as cooptation rather than conflict and compromise.

2. Regulatory arena: Composed of a multiplicity of groups organized around tangential relations or shared attitudes. Owing to the relatedness of regulatory issues (as opposed to the unrelatedness of distributive issues where the activities of single participants need not be related) these decisions involve direct confrontations of indulged and deprived, and the typical political coalition is born of conflict and compromise among tangential interests that usually involve a total sector of the economy. Therefore the power structure in regulatory politics is far less stable than that in the distributive arena. Since coalitions form around shared interests, the coalitions will shift as the interests change or as conflicts of interest emerge. With such group-based and shifting patterns of conflict built into every regulatory issue, it is in most cases impossible for a Congressional committee, an administrative agency, a peak association governing board, or a social elite to contain all the participants long enough to establish a stable power elite. Policy outcomes seem inevitably to be the residue remaining after all the reductions of demands by all participants have been made in order to extend support to majority size. However, in regulatory decision-making, relationships among group leadership elements and between them on any one or more points of governmental access are far too unstable to form a single policy-making elite. As a consequence, decision-making tends to pass from administrative agencies and Congressional committees to Congress, the place where uncertainties in the policy process have always been settled. Congress as an institution is the last resort for breakdowns in bargaining over policy. Beginning with reciprocity in the 1930s, the tariff began to lose its capacity for infinite disaggregation because it slowly underwent redefinition, moving away from its purely domestic significance towards that of an instrument of international politics. It became a means of regulating the domestic economy for international purposes. The significant feature here is not the international but the regulatory part of the redefinition. As the process of redefinition took place, a number of significant shifts in power relations took place as well, since it was no longer possible to deal with each dutiable item in isolation. By the 1960s the tariff had emerged as a regulatory policy with a developing regulatory arena.

3. Redistributive Arena: Issues that involve redistribution cut closer than any others along class lines and activate interests in what are roughly class terms. If there is ever any cohesion within peak associations, it usually occurs on redistributive issues. There is also a structure of communications favoring generalized and ideological demands; this structure consists of the peak associations, and it is highly effective when the issues are generalizable. This is the case consistently for redistributive issues, almost never for distributive issues, and only seldom for regulatory issues. Where the peak associations have reality, their resources and access are bound to affect power relations. Owing to their stability and the impasse (or equilibrium) in relations among broad classes of the entire society, the political structure of the redistributive arena seems to be highly stabilized. Its stability, unlike that of the distributive arena, derives from shared interests. But in contrast to the regulatory arenas, these shared interests are sufficiently stable and clear and consistent to provide the foundation for ideologies.

The following table summarizes the hypothesized differences in the political relationships described above:

Arenas and Political Relationships: A Diagrammatic Survey

ArenaPrimary Political UnitRelation Among UnitsPower StructureStability of StructurePrimary Decisional LocusImplementation

DistributionIndividual, Firm, CorporationLog-rolling, mutual non-interference, uncommon interestsNon-conflictual elite with support groupsStableCongressional committee and/or agencyAgency centralized to primary functional unit (bureau)

RegulationGroupThe Coalition, shared subject-matter interest, bargainingPluralistic, multi-centered theory of balanceUnstableCongress, in classic roleAgency decentralized from center by delegation; mixed control

RedistributionAssociationThe peak association, class, ideologyConflictual elite, i.e. elite and counterelite StableExecutive and peak associationsAgency centralized toward top (above bureau), elaborate standards

Chapter 4: Symbols and Political Quiescence

(Murray Edelman)

If the regulatory process is examined in terms of a divergence between political and legal promises on the one hand and resource allocations and group reactions on the other hand, the largely symbolic character of the entire process becomes apparent. Some generalizations are commonly made:

1. Tangible resources and benefits are frequently not distributed to unorganized political group interests as promised in regulatory statutes and the propaganda attending their enactment. This is true of the values held out to (or demanded by) groups which regard themselves as disadvantaged and which presumably anticipate benefits from a regulatory policy.

2. When it does happen, the deprived groups often display little tendency to protest or to assert their awareness of the deprivation. Although the presumed beneficiaries of regulatory legislation often show little or no concern with its failure to protect them, they are nevertheless assumed to constitute a potential base of political support for the retention of these statutes in the law books.

3. The most intensive dissemination of symbols commonly attends the enactment of legislation which is most meaningless in its effects upon resource allocation. In the legislative history of particular regulatory statutes the provisions least significant for resource allocation are most widely publicized and the most significant provisions are least widely publicized.

4. Policies severely denying resources to large numbers of people can be pursued indefinitely without any serious controversy.

Two broad patterns of group interest activity vis--vis public regulatory policy are evidently identifiable on the basis of these various modes of observing the social scene. These can be summarized as:

1) Pattern A: A relatively high degree of organization rational, cognitive procedures precise information an effective interest in specifically identified, tangible resources a favorably perceived strategic position with respect to reference groups relatively small numbers

2) Pattern B: shared interest in improvement of status through protest activity an unfavorably perceived strategic position with respect to reference groups distorted, stereotyped, inexact information and perception response to symbols connoting suppression of threats relative ineffectiveness in securing tangible resources through political activity little organization for purposeful action quiescence relatively large numbers.

Signs and symbols in themselves do not have any magical forces as narcotics. They are, rather, the only means by which groups not in a position to analyze a complex situation rationally may adjust themselves to it, through stereotypization, oversimplification, and reassurance. There have been many instances of effective administration and enforcement of regulatory statutes. In each such instance it will be found that organized groups have had an informed interest in effective administration. Sometimes the existence of these groups is explicable as a holdover from the campaign for legislative enactment of the basic statute; and often the initial administrative appointees are informed, dedicated adherents of these interests. They are thus in a position to secure pertinent data and to act strategically, helping furnish organization to the groups they represent. Sometimes the resources involved are such that there is organization on both sides; or the more effective organization may be on the reform side. The securities exchange legislation is an illuminating example, for after Richard Whitneys conviction for embezzlement, key officials of the New York Stock Exchange recognized their own interest in supporting controls over less scrupulous elements. This interest configuration helps to explain the relative popularity of the SEC in the thirties both with regulated groups as well as organized liberal groups.

Chapter 5: The Analysis of Public Policy: A Search for Theories and Roles

(Robert Salisbury)

One may distinguish three major positions on what we mean by policy.

1. Public policy consists in authoritative or sanctioned decisions by governmental actors. It refers to the substance of what govt. does and is to be distinguished from the processes by which decisions are made. Policy here means the outcomes or outputs of governmental processes.

2. Policy consists of a general framework of authoritative rules, and, while the precise boundary between policy and non-policy is nearly always debatable in the particular situation, the distinction crops up very often, with terms like discretionary versus ministerial acts, controversy versus routine, and policy versus administration suggesting the manifold permutations on the theme of policy.

3. Policy refers to those actions calculated to achieve goal or purpose, and all political activity should be viewed as policy oriented. This conception is summed up in Friedrichs definition of policy: a proposed course of action of a person, group or govt. within a given environment providing obstacles and opportunities which the policy was proposed to utilize and overcome in an effort to reach a goal or realize an objective or purpose. It is essential for the policy concept that there be a goal, objective, or purpose. According to Friedrich, there is a difference between specific decisions and actions, and a program or course of action, and that it is the latter to which the term policy refers. It is patterns of behavior, rather than separate, discrete acts which constitute policy.

Policy typologies may be based on data that are composed of perceptions of the actors. Thus whether a particular policy is classified as zero sum or non-zero sum may depend on how the relevant actors perceive it, and similarly, with the distinction between symbolic and material policies. Lowi, on the other hand, attempts to classify policies as distributive, redistributive, or regulatory in part, according to their impact on society. However, impact on society appears to be beyond our present capacity to measure in any way that goes beyond the plausible hunch. This criterion then becomes a special case of the criterion of actors perceptions, with observers replacing decision-makers as the active party.

From the array of extant possibilities, we employ a typology that is adapted from Lowis formulation and uses data derived from actor perceptions. Policies are classified as distributive, redistributive, regulatory, and self-regulatory. A question that immediately arises is how this formulation fits the distinction between zero-sum and non-zero sum policies. One may argue that none of the four types necessarily implies zero-sum conditions. Distributive and self-regulatory policies can be definitely considered non zero-sum, while redistributive and regulatory policies may approach zero-sum conditions. However, in general, American politics are mostly decided in distinctly positive sum games.

Chapter 6: With the Consent of All

(Robert Dahl)

There are at least four reasons for insisting that governments ought, ideally, to derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. First, govt. without consent is inconsistent with personal freedom. Second, govt. without consent can be an affront to human dignity and respect (aka concentration camps). Third, one may demand solely out of self-interest that a govt. rest on consent (no dictatorships, etc). Finally, consent is necessary because govts that derive their power from the consent of the governed are more likely to be durable and stable.

While it is relatively easy to state why govts should derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, it is difficult to state how this should be accomplished. The difficulty stems from the inevitable element of conflict in the human condition: people living together simply will not always agree. When people disagree, how can a decision be based on the consent of all?

Even if people cannot always agree specific policies, a solution may be to gain their consent for a process. Thus the consent of the governed may be interpreted to mean their approval of the processes by which decisions are arrived at and their willingness to abide by these decisions, even if these seem wrong. This solution is what links consent with democracy. In the real world, democracies dont always satisfy all the conditions implied by this solution; but it serves as one standard against which to measure their success and failure.

But how is this solution to be applied? What sort of democracy are we talking about: decision making by a sovereign majority, or pluralistic democracy?

Decision making by a sovereign majority:

In this vision of democracy, the citizens of a given country all approve of the principle of majority rule, according to which all conflicts over the policies of govt. are settled by a majority of citizens or voters, either directly in a referendum or public assembly, or indirectly through elected representatives. To approve of a system that applies the principle of majority rule, one needs to believe that during this historical period and in this particular society the principle represents the fullest attainable achievement of ones values. It is reasonable to conjecture that the more diverse the beliefs held among a body of people, the less likely it is that they will approve of the idea of making decisions by majority rule.

Possible ways to maintain homogeneity among the population, such as ostracism and secession, are painful and present serious moral and practical difficulties. Also, there is one further difficulty in trying to apply the majority rule which has special significance for Americans. That some people may have voted in the distant past to accept the Constitution of the United States is surely no reason to feel bound to accept their verdict even today. Ideally then, every new generation must be free to make their own constitution and throw out the old rules. The Declaration of Independence contains these ringing phrases:

That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends (Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness) it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness

Seventy years later, confronted by secession, and on the eve of war, Lincoln reaffirmed:

This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing Government, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it

But the phrase the People is ambiguous. Does it mean that any majority is free to change the Govt.? If so, then what is the significance of the Constitution? Is there no legitimate way in which minority groups can receive guarantees that the rules they agree to abide by will not change at the whim of the next legislature? These are difficult questions to answer and no answers seem to command universal agreement. To gain consent of all applying the majority principle gives rise to serious problems, both practical and logical. In practice, popular govts have moved towards a rather different solution, that of a pluralistic democracy.

A Pluralistic Solution:

The practical solutions that democratic countries have evolved are a lot less clear than the straightforward application of the principle of majority rule. These solutions seem less logical, less coherent, more untidy, and more unattainable. Patterns of democratic govt. do not reflect a logically conceived philosophical plan so much as a series of responses to problems of diversity and conflict, by leaders who have sought to build and maintain a nation, to gain the loyalty and obedience of its citizens, and at the same time to conform to aspirations for democracy. However, some common elements can be discovered. For one thing, in practice, countries with democratic regimes use force, as other regimes do, to repel threats to the integrity of the national territory. Consequently, secession is usually either impossible, or extremely costly. Second, many matters of policy (e.g. religious beliefs) are beyond the legal authority of any govt. Third, many questions of policy are placed in the hands of private, semi-public, and local governmental organizations such as churches, families, business firms, trade unions, towns, cities, etc. These questions of policy are also outside of the reach of any national policy. Fourth, whenever a group of people believe that they are adversely affected by national policies or are about to be, they generally have extensive opportunities for presenting their case for negotiations that may produce a more acceptable alternative.

In addition to all these, the United States has limited the sovereignty of the majority in still other ways. In fact, it is sometimes called a pluralistic system, the fundamental axiom in theory and practice of which is: Instead of a single center of sovereign power there must be multiple centers of power, none of which is or can be wholly sovereign. Although the only legitimate sovereign is the people, in the perspective of American pluralism even the people ought never be an absolute sovereign; consequently no part of the people, such as a majority, ought to be absolutely sovereign.

Chapter 8: Imperfect Competition

(Ralph Miliband)

What is wrong with the pluralist-democratic society is its implicit assumption that the major organized interests in these societies, and notably capital and labor, compete on more or less equal terms, and that none of them therefore is able to achieve a decisive and permanent advantage in the process of competition. In reality, business enjoys a massive superiority both inside and outside the state system, in terms of immensely stronger pressures which, as compared with labor and any other interest, it is able to exercise in the pursuit of its purposes.

One such form of pressure is the pervasive and permanent pressure upon govts. and the state generated by the private control of concentrated industrial, commercial and financial resources. Of course, govts. do have the formal power to impose their will upon business by the exercise of legitimate authority. However, the control of large businesses, especially those in crucially important areas of economic life makes it extremely difficult for govts to impose upon them policies to which they are firmly opposed. What is involved here is not active resistance but the inert power of business: the failure to do things that are not positively commanded by the state but merely asked for, and the doing of other things, which are not strictly illegal but are not recommended by the state either.

In the abstract, govts. do indeed have the power to wield the big stick against business, but in practice find it politically and economically difficult to do so. These difficulties are best epitomized in the phrase loss of confidence. It is an implicit testimony to the power of business that all govts. have been profoundly concerned to gain and retain the confidence of business more than they have for any other organized interest group. The presidency of John F Kennedy provides some illuminating instances of this. Soon after he came to office, he found himself engaged in a power struggles with the Business Advisory Council (BAC), a group of top corporate executives that had enjoyed a special relationship with the govt. since 1933. After a series of difficulties, (which included the insistence of the Secretary of Commerce to modify the manner of appointment of the BAC, the subsequent severing of official connections by the BAC and its renaming as the Business Council, the govts plans to create a new BAC a plan which never quite materialized) the president was faced with the insistence that he was anti-business and he turned full circle from his earlier, firm, bold posture towards the BAC. In spite of the labor leaders complaint against inflationary wage increases, the president placed emphasis on restoring a good working relationship with the Business Council.

Nowadays, it is not only with the power of their own business class that govts. have to reckon: they also have to reckon with the power and pressure of outside capitalist interests and forces, such as large foreign firms, powerful and conservative foreign govts., central banks, private international finance, and organizations like the IMF and World Bank. Given that capitalism is now a major international system whose constituent economies are closely related and interlinked, most govts depend on the goodwill and cooperation of the international capitalist community.

In the light of the strategic position that capitalist enterprise enjoys in its dealings with govt., simply by virtue of its control over economic resources, the basic notion of the pluralist theory that there are several veto groups in society is questionable. Of these other groups, the power of labor as an interest group in society is often assumed to equal the power of capital. In reality, however, labor has nothing of the power of capital in the day-to-day decision making process of the capitalist enterprise. What a firm produces; whether it exports or not; whether it invests and in what; whether it absorbs or gets absorbed by other firms these are decisions over which labor has minimal influence. In this sense, labor lacks a firm basis of economic power, and consequently much less pressure potential vis--vis the state and therefore govts. are not as concerned about obtaining the confidence of labor as they are about business.

The one important weapon that labor wields as an interest group is the strike; and where it has been used with real determination, its effectiveness as a means of pressure has been clearly demonstrated. However, determination is the problem because labor is extremely vulnerable to man internal and external influences calculated to erode its will and persistence. Among the weaknesses of labor as a group are: its inability to speak with the same sort of authority as business; and the extent of divisions within the labor group, both in sectoral and ideological terms. Because of the effectiveness of these influences, govts. have generally found it unnecessary to treat labor with the same sort of deference that they have accorded to business.

Chapter 9: Group Politics and Representative Democracy

(David Truman)

In recent decades, the vast multiplication of interests and organized groups in the political process is not a peculiarly American phenomenon. The causes of this growth lie in the increased complexity of techniques for dealing with the environment, in the specializations that these involve, and in associated disturbances of the manifold expectations that guide individual behaviour in a complex and interdependent society. In the United States, the multiplicity of interest groups not only has been fostered by the extent of technical specialization, but also has been stimulated by the diversity of the social patterns that these changes affect. Diversity of interests is a concomitant of specialized activity, and diversity of groups is a means of adjustment. The activities of political interest groups imply controversy and conflict, the essence of politics.

Interest Groups and the Nature of the State

Predictions concerning the consequences of given political activities are based upon conceptions of the governmental process. A major difficulty in political prediction is that, in part because the relevant processes are extremely complex, our understanding of them is often not adequate; that is, the conceptions do not always account for all the variables and specify their relative importance. Such conceptions being inadequate in these respects, predictions based upon them are not always reliable, with their accuracy often being a matter of chance. However, we cannot escape the necessity to predict. A second handicap in political prediction is that the underlying conceptions are often almost completely implicit. Many, if not most, predictions about the significance and implications of organized interest groups on the American scene rest on unreliable, implicit conceptions, often relying on inadequate and unacknowledged theory of the political process.

People participate in established patterns of continuing interactions (interest groups) with almost all such interactions involving power. An increasing proportion of interest groups in the United States are politicized, that is, they make claims through or upon the institutions of government. The institutions of govt. are centers of interest-based power. In order to make claims, political interest groups will seek access to the key points of decision within these institutions. The extent to which a group achieves effective access to the institutions of govt. is the resultant of a complex of interdependent factors. Broadly, these can be classified into three (somewhat overlapping) categories:

(1) Factors relating to the groups strategic position in society: This includes the groups status or prestige in society; the extent to which govt. officials are formally or informally members of the group; and the usefulness of the group as a source of political and technical knowledge.

(2) Factors relating to the internal characteristics of the group: This includes the degree and appropriateness of the groups organization; the degree of cohesion it can achieve in a given situation, especially in the light of competing group demands; the skills of the leadership; and the groups resources in numbers and money.

(3) Factors peculiar to the governmental institutions themselves: This includes the operating structure of govt. institutions since these affect the groups advantages and handicaps; and the effects of the group life of particular units or branches of govt.

A characteristic feature of the governmental system in the United States is that it contains a multiplicity of points of access. The federal system establishes decentralized and more or less independent centers of power, vantage points from which to secure privileged access to the national govt. The peculiar character of the American party system is both a sign and cause of the strength of the constituent units within the federal scheme. National parties tend to be poorly cohesive leagues of locally based organizations rather than unified and inclusive structures. Thus, especially at the national level, the party is an electing-device and only in limited measure an integrated means of policy determination. Within the Congress, furthermore, controls are diffused among committee chairmen and other leaders in both chambers. The variety of these points of access if further supported by relationships stemming from the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers, from related checks and balances, and at the State and local level from the common practice of choosing an array of executive officials by popular election. At the Federal level the formal simplicity of the executive branch has been complicated by a Supreme Court decision that has placed a number of administrative agencies beyond the removal of the powers of the President.

Depending on the whole political context in a given period, and on the relative strength of contending interests, one or another of the centers of power in the formal govt. or in the parties may become the apex of a hierarchy of controls. The total pattern of govt. over a period of time thus represents a protean complex of crisscrossing relationships that change in strength and direction with alterations in the power and standing of interests, organized and unorganized.

Chapter 10: The Power Elite

(C. Wright Mills)

The power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary citizens, and to make decisions having major impacts on the lives of these citizens. They are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society. The power elite are not solitary rulers. Political advisors and spokesmen often influence their thoughts and decisions. Immediately below the elite are professional politicians (both in the Congress as well as in pressure groups), and below them are professional celebrities who, even if they are not the head of any dominating hierarchy themselves, often have the power to attract public attention.

The power of the American elite has been explained in two broad ways: through historical events that have led some people to influence and control others; and through the personal awareness of the actors involved and the perception of others about their assumed powers. However, while both these are relevant, in order to understand the power of the American elite, we have to look beyond these factors towards the major institutions of modern society. Within American society, major national power now resides in the economic, the political, and the military domains (referred to as the big three). Typically, the decisions made within the political domain determine economic activities and military programs. Other institutions such as religious, family, and educational institutions are considered subordinate to the big three and are shaped by them.

Within each of the big three, the typical institutional unit has become enlarged and administrative, and in the power of its decisions, has become centralized. The means of power at the disposal of the decision makers have increased enormously; their central executive powers have been enhanced, and within each of them modern administrative routines have been elaborated and tightened up. As each of these domains becomes enlarged and centralized, the consequences of its activities become greater, and its traffic with the others increases. The decisions of a handful of corporations bear upon the economic, political and military developments of the rest of the world. In a structural sense, the big three form a triangle of power, which is the source of the interlocking directorate that is most important for the historical structure of the present. This interlocking is clearly revealed at each of the points of crisis of modern capitalist society slump, war, and boom. In each, men of decision are led to an awareness of the interdependence of the major institutional orders. As each of these domains coincide with the others, and as decisions tend to become total in their consequence, the leading men in each of these three domains of power the warlords, the corporate chieftains, and the political directorate tend to come together, to form the power elite of America.

The power elite are considered people who have the most of whatever there is to have in society, which generally includes money, power, and prestige as well as the lifestyles that they wish to lead. But the elite themselves would not have these if it were not for their positions in great institutions, these institutions being the necessary bases of power, wealth and prestige, and at the same time the chief means of exercising power, of acquiring and retaining wealth, and of cashing in the higher claims for prestige. Accordingly, no one can be truly powerful or wealthy unless they have access to the command of major institutions, while great prestige increasingly follows the major institutional units of the social structure.

The people of the higher circles may also be conceived as members of a top social stratum, as a set of groups whose members know one another, see one another socially and at business, and so, in making decisions, take one another into account. According to this conception, the elite feel themselves to be the inner circle of the upper social classes. They form a more or less compact social and psychological entity and behave toward one another differently from the way they behave with members of the other (or lower) classes.

In eras of equalitarian rhetoric, the more intelligent or the more articulate among the lower and middle classes, as well as guilty members of the upper, may come to entertain ideas of a counter-elite. In western society, there is a long tradition of considering the poor, the exploited and the oppressed as the truly virtuous, the wise, and the blessed.

The conception of the power elite and of its unity rests upon the corresponding developments and the coincidence of interests among economic, political, and military organizations. It also rests upon the similarity of origin and outlook, and the social and personal intermingling of the top circles from each of these dominant hierarchies. This conjunction of institutional and psychological forces, in turn, is revealed by the heavy personnel traffic within and between the big three institutional orders, as well as by the rise of go-betweens in the high level lobbying. The American power elite has also planned and plotted once the conjunction of structural trend and of the personal will to utilize it gave rise to the ruling elite class. However, claims that the ruling elite was founded by plotting cannot be given any real weight. So far as explicit organization conspiratorial or not is concerned, the power elite, by its very nature, is more likely to use existing organizations, working within and between them, than to set up explicit organizations whose membership is strictly limited to its own members. With the wide secrecy that usually cover their operations and decisions, the power elite can mask their intentions, operations, and further consolidation. There is nothing hidden about the power elite, though its activities are not publicized; as an elite it is not organized, though its members know one another; and there is nothing conspiratorial about it, although its decisions are often publicly unknown and its mode of operation manipulative than explicit.